Saturday, April 14, 2012

Why is so much money being pumped into airlines?

The region's aviation sector is booming as a result of the significant investment in the industry by many of the region's governments.

To date, the UAE has invested $136 billion in its aviation sector in the last two decades; the total investment alone between 2009 and 2014 is predicted to exceed $22.3bn. Qatar is investing $14bn (including the new Doha International Airport) and Bahrain's neighbor Saudi Arabia has invested $5.3bn in recent years.

The region has also seen significant investment by individual carriers. Etihad has received high levels of investment for nine years and it is now intensifying its strategy of growing passenger numbers via tie-ups with other carriers. This includes a recent investment of $400 million through stakes in Air Berlin and Air Seychelles, with further possible investments in Aer Lingus and other ventures.

But the question is why is so much money being pumped into the aviation sector, at what benefit to these countries? Does it make economic or commercial sense or is it simply just competition to outshine one's neighbors?

The GDN spoke to a top aviation expert who outlined the reasons. Airlines provide an infrastructure asset connecting a country's businesses to global markets and sources of inputs and ideas offering the potential for boosting national productivity, economic growth and living standards.

Academics have argued that a positive relationship exists between higher levels of connectivity and higher level of labour productivity. It has been demonstrated that a 10 per cent rise in connectivity, relative to a country's GDP, will boost long-term productivity.

Take Gulf Air for example, despite its losses studies conducted indicate the national carrier makes a substantial contribution to Bahrain; its GDP contribution is equivalent to 8pc of Bahrain's total GDP. The airline is directly responsible for a contribution of $246m to Bahrain's GDP while it indirectly supports a contribution of another $133m by its major business suppliers/partners, i.e., BAS, BAC, Bahrain Duty Free.

The airline is also indirectly responsible for a contribution of $155m through travel industry business it generates and $1,391m through the wider impact on its economy across several sectors in Bahrain such as hotels, transport, etc.

As one of the largest employers in the Kingdom providing direct and indirect employment to more than 21,000 people including 3,400 in Gulf Air alone; it is important to the economic growth of the country as it provides business links with key business and financial destinations in the world helping to attract investment.

Direct links to the financial centres such as London and Paris are essential given the importance of financial services to Bahrain. Private services businesses are highly mobile and are attracted by quality infrastructure, including air services. Losing the connectivity provided by Gulf Air would severely undermine Bahrain's competitiveness versus other neighbouring states (e.g. Dubai and Abu Dhabi), said sources.

Gulf Air acts as a national infrastructure asset and ambassador to the kingdom helping maintain independent destination status for Bahrain providing links to key regional and global markets.

There are also substantial 'multiplier' contributions to GDP as those working for Gulf Air and its suppliers spend their incomes within the country.

Other airlines in the region such as Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways offer similar but greater benefits to their respective countries; a factor of the high levels of government investment in the aviation and tourism industries.

To remain as a key regional aviation hub and establish a strong infrastructure asset for the kingdom, Bahrain needs to provide a similar level of support to the aviation sector.

In recent years neither Bahrain's aviation sector nor Gulf Air has received the same level of investment as their neighbors. These governments consider their national carriers as an integral part of the countries' long-term growth.

During the coming weeks as the government and country debate the long-term future of Bahrain's national carrier, let's hope they understand the importance a healthy aviation industry plays in the country's economic and commercial growth

http://www.gulf-daily-news.com

Estate Police Association concerned with deficiencies in audit... Airport downgrade looms ...Transport Minister claims political agenda

 Officials of the Estate Police Association (EPA) are concerned that deficiences highlighted in an interim security audit by the T&T Civil Aviation Authority (TTCAA) could result in the country’s two international airports being downgraded. They claim the Piarco International and ANR Robinson Airports could slide from Category 1 to 2, for failing to meet standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

EPA’s second vice-president Emmanuel Henry said the TTCAA has to ensure the standards of ICAO are carried out. ICAO has the power to downgrade the airports. Henry blamed a chronic shortage of security officers and a breakdown in wage negotiations for the problems.

Yesterday, in response to the EPA’s claims, the AATT announced that issues raised in the security audit will be dealt with in a comprehensive plan. “The details emanating from such reports seek to identify any gap that may exist and make recommendations to plug such gaps,” the AATT explained.


Hadeed—ignorance of the highest order
TTCAA director-general, Ramesh Lutchmedial, refused to comment on the issue, saying it was sensitive and a matter he “could not put out in the public domain”. However, AATT chairman, Gerald Hadeed, refuted the EPA’s allegations. He said the AATT and TTCAA have been complying with ICAO standards and he denounced the group’s claims as “ignorance of the highest order”.

Hadeed said the country’s airports will never be downgraded. He said since receiving the findings of the audit three weeks ago, the AATT has implemented a 29-page corrective-action plan. “Our board realises how important security is. From the corrective-action plan we have put in place, we do take this very seriously.”

Hadeed said the issues raised in the audit were minor and related to training and non-functional airport equipment.

Maharaj—EPA playing politics
Transport Minister Devant Maharaj accused the EPA of playing politics because of their current impasse with the AATT board. “It’s a raw, naked political agenda,” he declared. Maharaj said the AATT’s is working feverishly to ensure that the airports will never be downgraded. He added: “You don’t downgrade an airport just so. If that is the case, hundreds and millions of airports all over the world will shut down.”

Audit report shows:

The audit report, dated February 27, 2012, showed 13 areas, which need improvement:

• International passenger screening checkpoints not adequately staffed.
• Screening personnel appeared fatigued, having worked the night shift into the morning, resulting in incompetencies in the application of procedures and processes.
• AATT has not established policies and procedures for handling suspect or unattended baggage.
• No explosive-trace detection or other advanced screening technologies to support current conventional screening technologies used at passenger- and cabin-screening checkpoints, to enhance detection capabilities.
• No specialised equipment, such as an explosives-containment chamber, or disposal mechanisms, or portable explosive-trace detection capabilities for dealing with suspect improvised explosive device in baggage, cargo, mail or other unattended articles at the airport.
• No contingency plan to deal with acts of unlawful interference at the airport.
• Failure to conduct table-top, partial or full-scale exercises, relating to an act of unlawful interference.
• At the departure level, where access is controlled by keypads and magnetic access cards, lock and key system not properly functioning.
• Doors 13 and 14 at boarding gates were found opened and unattended while no aircraft operation was taking place.
• Auditors were able to gain entry into the sterile area from airside via doors on the jet-bridge, which were left unlocked and unattended after aircraft operations had ceased.
• One door, which secures the jet-bridge from unauthorised access from the airside, had a broken lock, while another was found unsecured and unattended.
• A vehicle and its occupants were allowed access to airside through main airside access control gate without being searched or screened.
• Lighting fixtures on the perimeter fencing located north-east of the North Terminal Building and east of the South Terminal not functioning.
• The AATT had not established and identified  a designated employee-screening checkpoint.
• No records to indicate increase in patrols during the night and no foot patrol of the airside was observed.
• No records to indicate foot patrols were carried out.
• Several cameras in the CCTV surveillance system were non-functional.
• Images in a number of cameras were hindered by the installation of articles in the atrium for Carnival.
• The AATT internal report showed no records of action being taken to address the deficiencies identified.

At ANR Robinson Airport:
• Several areas along the chain-link fence had deteriorated, which was not reflected in the patrol log.
• Holes were observed in the fence.
• Perimeter fence in the vicinity of Customs and Excise and the public food court showed evidence of climbing and that items may have been removed or introduced into the restricted area.
• Patrol reports not documented and recorded.
• The existing height of the fence needs to be increased or a secondary fence installed due to the close proximity of public facilities and activities.

 http://guardian.co.tt

Airport emergency drill exposes grave loopholes

KARACHI, April 14: A full-scale airport emergency exercise carried out at the Jinnah Terminal on Saturday suggested that a lot was needed to be done to bring the emergency response of the Civil Aviation Authority at par with international standards.

The exercise was delayed by over an hour as the PIA aircraft, a Boeing 747, to be used in the exercise, arrived late as it got delayed at Madina.

The evacuation exercise, involving over 104 passengers, took over 20 minutes, as against the standard requirement of 90 seconds for the full load of passengers — in case of Boeing 747 over 400 passengers. Only two doors were used. The emergency escape chute of one of the doors could not be opened so that door was closed.

The first door, near the nose, was then opened as it had the operational chute. The second door that was opened was the last door near the tail, but passengers were evacuated through stairs and not by a chute from that door. When asked, airport manager Nasir Sheikh insisted that the last door in the B-747 aircraft did not have a chute and therefore the stairs were used.

The exercise began with a fake fire after which an emergency was declared and firefighters, ambulances, etc rushed in. The fire was extinguished and then the crew opened one of the doors. However, after waiting for so many minutes and making many efforts, they could not open the escape chute.

After wasting so many minutes, the crew moved to another door having an operational chute and started to evacuate the passengers. First children were sent out followed by women.

The evacuated passengers stood near the aircraft and the crew announced that they got away from the aircraft. On the ground, paramedics quickly brought the injured to the ambulances and carried out dressing, while one of the injured passengers was shifted through a helicopter.

The B-747 aircraft have 10 doors on the lower deck and two on the upper deck, which are usually used in emergencies, and all should have been used in an emergency. Emergency escape chutes are fixed in all the doors and should be operational for safety reasons. If some doors were malfunctioning or chutes were non-operational and the aircraft had to be used, fewer passengers who could use that door in emergency are carried, according to sources.

The media was invited at the last moment and no briefing was held either before the start or after the conclusion of the exercise to give a correct picture.

The official time of the evacuation could be known through the report of umpires, but it certainly was way longer than the required 90 seconds, showing that a lot of improvement was needed.

Meanwhile, a statement issued by CAA spokesperson Pervez George said the exercise was conducted after every two years at all airports being a mandatory requirement of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

“Its purpose is primarily to practice standard operating procedure of all agencies deployed in and around the airport to depict as actual happening of an emergency at any airport in Pakistan,” he said, adding that this exercise went very well in which CAA firefighters, the Airport Security Force, the army, Pakistan International Airlines, private airlines, all ambulance services, including Edhi, Chhipa, St John, Civil Hospital, Jinnah Hospital, Aga Khan Hospital, city fire brigade, Pakistan Air Force, Princely Jet Helicopter, police, etc, took part.

Old inn coming down

 
What's going on here?

Coldwater, Mich. — Newcomers to Branch County may not connect, but with the facade down from the former restaurant by the Branch County Memorial Airport, “Airport Inn” is revealed, a hugely popular eatery in days gone by. The food was good, about as close to home cooking as one can get in a restaurant.

What’s going on?

The building has been through a number of incarnations in recent years, none of them successful, and Airport Manager Ron Dooley said due to the poor condition of the structure, the airport board is tearing it down. This is expected to take all summer, since despite the condition, there is material to be salvaged.

Scene of tragedy

Joanne Macklin, sister-in-law of Wesley Macklin, who established “Mack’s Airport Inn,” recalled Thursday the circumstances of his murder. Macklin also ran a catering business, and In 1976, he was there one night waiting for a truck to return when in an attempted robbery, he was shot and killed. Joanne said there were two or three involved in the crime, and they all got off “lightly.” She said services for Wesley brought people from all over.

Lesson to be learned
Steve Macklin said his uncle Wesley worked hard for his money, and the killer somehow knew he carried around a lot of cash in his wallet. When the perpetrator demanded his money, he refused. Said Macklin, when one’s life is in danger, give them whatever they want.

Leaving the diner
Steve recalled that as part of a divorce settlement in the early 60s, Wesley’s ex-wife had it as part of the decree that he could not operate a restaurant in the city of Coldwater. So, he left the diner, in what is now the Chicago Pike Florist, and established the Inn 500 feet west of the city limits. Steve said his “smorgasbord” buffet was a novel concept in the area.

Another place to eat
So what’s a hungry aviator to do? The new Prop Blast Cafe, with a menu full of fresh food, is open for those who fly or those who stay close to the ground. Prop Blast is at 302 Airport Drive, propblastcafe.com.

http://www.thedailyreporter.com

‘Nigeria not at war with British Airways over airfare’

 Written by Kolawole Daniel, Abuja

THERE are reports that many Nigerians are serving jail terms over drug related offenses in Brazil and some other countries, how does this affect the image of Nigeria abroad?

A country with about 150 million populations will have its own fair share of the good, the bad and  ugly. However, I believe that as long as the principles of fair hearing are adopted and the fundamental human rights are not infringed upon in the course of investigations, a person who has been found to have erred, should face the full wrath of the law. I believe that no country wants to hear that its citizen are in prisons in other countries because it doesn’t give it a good image, but I also believe that what must be emphasized is that our citizens, who are serving jail terms abroad, must be given fair hearing and full legal representation.

Since many of these people leave the shores of the country in search of pastures green due to the state  of unemployment in the country, what do you think government should do to alleviate the situation?

I believe that government is in the process of creating more employment, strengthening our educational system and migration laws, increase the capacities of Nigeria’s embassies and create  awareness for patriotism. So, I believe that if government is doing its bit, it also behoves on us as Nigerians to realise that we collectively and individually put our hands together to ensure that jobs are created, that there is better education and ensure that there is better value systems for our children. Above all, we should have the interest of the country at heart at all times.

How will you assess the foreign policy thrust of the present administration?

The foreign policy of this administration, I believe,  is on foreign direct investments and I must say that in the last couple of years, Nigeria has seen her export grow in leaps and bounds. We have signed trade treaties with a number of countries. We have signed trade treaty with Turkey and Serbia, energy pact with Germany and reviewed bi-lateral commission with United Kingdom.

So, as regards our foreign policy thrust which is on direct investment, I will say Nigeria has done remarkably well. When the new ambassadors were being posted out, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated to the ambassadors that their mission was to go into the countries where they have been posted and positively engage those countries  because it is by so doing that we can actually know what we can do with those countries as regards to their economy.

So, on that front, our economy will grow and I will say we are doing well. However, one area I think we should look at is our glorious foreign policy of the late 90s, those years when Joseph Garba was the  president of the United Nations General Assembly and Emeka Anyaokwu was at the Commonwealth. We had a lot of visibility in those years and I think we must return to the point  where we started to take the leadership of a lot of   international organizations. If we head these organizations that we are, it will definitely help our foreign policy and direct investments because a lot of these foreign organizations are economy driven as well. So, I will to a large extent  say that we have done very well and there is room for us to do more.

The Minister of Finance, Dr Mrs Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, is aspiring for the World Bank Presidency,  do you think the Federal Government is doing enough to ensure her emergence?

That is part of the reasons we have  embassies in these countries because we are supposed to engage these countries on a number of issues. What  we export outside of Nigeria is the true reflection of our aspirations and one of our aspirations is to see one of ours head the World Bank. I also believe that  making her the president of the World Bank goes with horse trading with a lot of countries. I know that Africa has already endorsed her but we (Africa) only have 19 votes. So, we will need to get across to other countries and rally support for her. I know that we have missions in all these countries  and Nigeria’s missions are doing their best in this regard.

If the British Aiways refuses to bring down its fares what do you think will happen?

I don’t think we have a face-off with the British Airways. They have been invited to the House of Representatives for a fact finding mission. The aviation sector has been deregulated and government has put in place regulatory body that oversees the price regime and ensure best practices. I think what the House committee on Aviation did was to call the British Airways to get facts so that we can actually call the regulatory agency that we have oversight function over and find out if there are lapses that led to the arbitrary price regime with the British Airways, vis-a-vis all the other airlines; and look at the enabling laws that set up the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) to see if there is anything we can do to help NCAA to live up to   expectations.

As to what would likely happen, if the British Airways don’t back down, I really don’t think we have got to that stage yet. I don’t think it is a political matter; it is a commercial matter; it’s about pricing. By the time we engage NCAA effectively and consider the market forces and the comparative price range within the same region, I am sure it will not get to that point.

So, you don’t think the British government could consider taking measures that will in turn affect Nigeria negatively as a result of this?

As I said, we are part of the solution, not the problem and Nigeria’s foreign policy is about resolution of issues through dialogue and effective engagement. I think we are going to parley, I believe that the issue will be resolved amicably.

You are one of the few women in the House of Representatives, how are the women in parliament fairing because you are just 24 out of 360?

Obviously the mathematics doesn’t add up and we are still clamoring for more female lawmakers  in the House of Representatives. However, I must say that as people, we are pulling our weights together and we are working hard to be heard and seen. From the impression we are creating on the Nigeria’s political landscape especially, the parliament, you will think we are more than we actually are. That goes to show that we are doing the best that we can.

Constitution review is around the corner, are there specific gender issues that women in parliament want to bring forward during the proposed amendment?

Yes, we are looking at the language of the constitution, we want to ensure that there is gender mainstreaming in the constitution amendment. We want to ensure that the 35 per cent affirmative action is included in the constitution; it must be part of our rights as women. There are also so many other issues that we are looking at with regards to children and their rights.

http://www.tribune.com.ng

New terminal of Devi Ahilya Bai airport inaugurated

Indore: To improve air connectivity across the state, all 50 districts will have airstrips in near future. This was announced by Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan while addressing an inaugural ceremony of the new terminal building of Devi Ahilya Bai airport on Saturday.

Promising speedy development of infrastructure, Chouhan said that at present only 22 districts in the state had airstrips and the same would be developed in remaining districts as well. The CM also urged the centre to accord international status to Indore airport and start a cargo facility at Indore, so that industries and farmers of the state could be benefited.

Civil Aviation minister Ajit Singh, who inaugurated the new terminal, said that the new integrated terminal building of Indore airport was equipped with all necessary amenities. International airport status would be granted to it shortly after completing some formalities, added Singh. The minister too favored the idea of converting old terminal into a cargo terminal saying that the state had vast potential in textile, information technology and tourism. Union minister of state for commerce and industry Jyotiraditya Scindia termed the commencement of new terminal building as a historic achievement.

The new terminal, built at a cost of Rs135 crore, has a capacity to handle 700 air travelers and 12 aircraft at a time. The terminal is equipped with a sewage treatment plant facility for minimizing consumption of water and state-of-the-art rain water harvesting facility. The terminal building has been built with loop glasses which help in utilizing natural light to maximum. The complex has received 9001:2008, ISO 14001:2004 and OHSAS 18001:2007 certifications.

Cocaine worth £500k seized at Gatwick Airport

A woman carrying 12 kilos of cocaine worth almost £500,000 has been arrested at Gatwick Airport.

UK Border Force officers stopped her when she arrived in the UK with her three children on a flight from Kingston, Jamaica on Friday morning.

A thorough search found she had hidden the Class A drug in a number of items in her luggage, including a cosmetic paste.

She was arrested, interviewed and subsequently charged with a drugs importation offence, a spokesman for the UK Border Agency said.

The woman, who has not been named, is now in custody as she awaits her first court appearance.

Ingrid Smith, assistant director of the UK Border Agency at Gatwick Airport, said: 'Our officers work 24/7 to keep drugs, smuggled goods and illegal immigrants out of the UK.'

She added that her staff were doing everything they could to disrupt the drugs trade as it can have 'a devastating impact on communities across the country'.

Robinson R22 Beta II, Helikat LLC, N1152W: Accident occurred April 14, 2012 in Farmington, Connecticut

NTSB Identification: ERA12LA282 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, April 14, 2012 in Farmington, CT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/23/2013
Aircraft: ROBINSON HELICOPTER R22 BETA, registration: N1152W
Injuries: 2 Serious.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The helicopter slowed as it approached the landing zone on a modified right-base turn to the north. Gusting wind from the south had prevailed for most of the day and was present at the time of the accident. As the pilot turned to "enter the landing area," he felt a “bump” in the tail rotor control pedals. The pilot added that he applied left pedal to compensate for a right yaw, and the helicopter immediately "started to rotate" at an increasing yaw rate with full left pedal applied. The pilot stated that the rotation stopped when he pushed the collective control "full down" and applied aft cyclic. The helicopter then descended through the trees and collided with terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of pre-impact mechanical anomaly.

U.S. Army guidance listed high gross weight, high-density altitude, low indicated airspeed, power droop, and right downwind turns as factors that may contribute to a loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) and described vortex ring state, or settling with power, as a condition in which the helicopter loses lift and settles in its own downwash. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance cautioned pilots to remain vigilant to power and wind conditions and stated that low airspeed, out-of-ground-effect (OGE), and high-power-demand flight conditions were conducive to LTE. Additionally, FAA guidance described unanticipated right yaw in helicopters, or LTE, as a critical, low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic, which could result in an uncommanded rapid yaw rate that does not subside of its own accord, and, if not corrected, could result in a loss of aircraft control. When operating at airspeeds below effective translational lift, pilots should avoid OGE hover and high-power demand situations, such as low-speed downwind turns. Contributing factors for LTE include high gross weight/high density altitude, low indicated airspeed, power droop, and right downwind turns. Therefore, the pilot’s performance of a high-power, low-speed downwind turn during gusting wind likely caused the LTE.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's inadequate compensation for wind during a high-power, low-speed downwind turn, which resulted in a loss of control due to loss of tail rotor effectiveness and settling with power. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to land downwind.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 14, 2012, about 1840 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R22 helicopter, N1152W, was substantially damaged following a loss of control and subsequent uncontrolled descent while approaching South Meadows Heliport (CT73), Farmington, Connecticut. The certificated private pilot and a passenger were seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated from Chester Airport (SNC), Chester, Connecticut, around 1740, with the intended destination of CT73. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the pilot, the helicopter departed SNC after it was serviced with 17 gallons of fuel. He completed a scenic flight lasting approximately one hour, before returning for landing at CT73. The heliport was a small paved pad on the east side of a large open field, surrounded by tall trees.

The approach was from the southeast on a northwesterly heading, and according to the pilot, the windsock "indicated a wind direction opposite" to the helicopter’s flight path. He then initiated a turn to "enter the landing area" when he felt a bump in the tail rotor control [pedals]. The pilot added that he applied left pedal to compensate for a right yaw, and the helicopter immediately "started to rotate" at an increasing yaw rate with full left pedal applied. The pilot stated that the rotation stopped when he pushed the collective control "full down" and applied aft cyclic. The helicopter then descended through the trees and collided with terrain.

A witness at the heliport heard the helicopter approach and described the sound as "all fine." She said the sound changed, and then she heard a loud bang.

In a written statement, the pilot stated that the initial approach to CT73 was from the east to the west along an east-west road that was south of the field. He then turned the helicopter to the northwest "into the wind." However, examination of radar data revealed that the helicopter approached from the southwest, orbited an airport 2 miles south of CT73, and approached the helipad from the south. The helicopter was in a shallow, descending left turn to the northwest at 90 knots groundspeed, about 1 mile south of CT73 when the radar track terminated. From the point where the radar track terminated, a right turn to the north was required to align with the landing zone. The helicopter descended vertically through trees to ground contact about one-half mile directly south of the helipad.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for lighter-than-air balloon, and a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third class medical certificate was issued March 30, 2011. The pilot reported 850 total hours of flight experience on that date. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed several incomplete entries, but suggested 798 total hours of rotorcraft experience.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA and maintenance records, the helicopter was manufactured in 2006 and had accrued 1,825 total aircraft hours. Its most recent annual inspection was completed August 24, 2011 at 1,801 total aircraft hours.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1853, the weather observation at Hartford-Brainard Airport (HFD), 9 miles east of the accident site included clear skies, temperature 19C, dewpoint -3 C, and winds from 190 at 8 knots. At 1753, the winds were from 190 at 7 knots, and at 1653, the winds were from 170 at 7 knots gusting to 15 knots.

At 1853, the weather observation at Meriden Markham Municipal airport, 13 miles south of the accident site included clear skies, temperature 18 C, dewpoint -2 C, and winds from 190 at 8 knots gusting to 16 knots. At 1753, the winds were from 180 at 10 knots gusting to 17 knots.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

FAA inspectors performed a preliminary examination of the helicopter at the accident site on the day of the accident. The examination revealed no pre-impact mechanical anomalies. The helicopter was removed from the site, and a detailed examination of the wreckage was scheduled.

On May 2, 2012, an NTSB investigator performed a detailed examination of the wreckage. The tail rotor output shaft was separated at the gear box, but remained attached by the control arm. The fracture surfaces at the gearbox separation were consistent with overload fracture. Control continuity was established from the cockpit to the main and tail rotors. One main rotor pitch-change link was fractured due to overload. The tail rotor push/pull tube was separated at the tailcone separation point.

The engine was rotated by hand at the cooling fan, and continuity was confirmed through the powertrain and valvetrain to the accessory section. Compression was confirmed using the thumb method.

The main fuel tank was compromised by impact, but continuity of the fuel system was confirmed throughout.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unanticipated Right Yaw (Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness)

The FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 90-95, Unanticipated Right Yaw in Helicopters, in February 1995. The AC stated that the loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) was a critical, low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic which could result in an uncommanded rapid yaw rate which does not subside of its own accord and, if not corrected, could result in the loss of aircraft control. It also stated, "LTE is not related to a maintenance malfunction and may occur in varying degrees in all single main rotor helicopters at airspeeds less than 30 knots."

Paragraph 6 of the AC covered conditions under which LTE may occur. It stated:

"Any maneuver which requires the pilot to operate in a high-power, low-airspeed environment with a left crosswind or tailwind creates an environment where unanticipated right yaw may occur."

Paragraph 8 of the AC stated:

"OTHER FACTORS...Low Indicated Airspeed. At airspeeds below translational lift, the tail rotor is required to produce nearly 100 percent of the directional control. If the required amount of tail rotor thrust is not available for any reason, the aircraft will yaw to the right."

Paragraph 9 of the AC stated:

"When maneuvering between hover and 30 knots: (1) Avoid tailwinds. If loss of translational lift occurs, it will result in an increased high power demand and an additional anti-torque requirement. (2) Avoid out of ground effect (OGE) hover and high power demand situations, such as low-speed downwind turns. (3) Be especially aware of wind direction and velocity when hovering in winds of about 8-12 knots (especially OGE). There are no strong indicators to the pilot of a reduction of translation lift... (6) Stay vigilant to power and wind conditions."

Vortex Ring State (Settling With Power)

According to the FAA Rotorcraft Flying Handbook, "Vortex ring state describes an aerodynamic condition where a helicopter may be in a vertical descent with up to maximum power applied, and little or no cyclic authority. The term 'settling with power' comes from the fact that the helicopter keeps settling even though full engine power is applied."

U.S Army Field Manual 1-203 defined Settling with Power as:

A condition in powered flight in which the [helicopter] settles in its own downwash.

Three things needed to get into settling with power:

1) Low airspeed
2) 20 to 100% of available engine power applied
3) A 300 foot per minute or greater rate of descent, with insufficient power remaining to retard the sink rate

Contributing factors for a loss of tail rotor effectiveness include:

1) High gross weight/[Density Altitude]
2) Low indicated airspeed
3) Power droop
4) Right downwind turns

Robinson Helicopter Safety Notice SN-34 AERIAL SURVEY AND PHOTO FLIGHTS -VERY HIGH RISK discussed the risks associated with low speed, out-of-ground-effect maneuvering in adverse wind conditions at less than 30 knots. An excerpt of the Safety Notice cited the following:

"While maneuvering, the pilot may lose track of airspeed and wind conditions. The helicopter can rapidly lose translational lift and begin to settle. An inexperienced pilot may raise the collective to stop the descent. This can reduce RPM thereby reducing power available and causing an even greater descent rate and further loss of RPM. Rolling on throttle will increase rotor torque but not power available due to the low RPM. Because tail rotor thrust is proportional to the square of RPM, if the RPM drops below 80% nearly one-half of the tail rotor thrust is lost and the helicopter will rotate nose right. Suddenly the decreasing RPM also causes the main rotor to stall and the helicopter falls rapidly while continuing to rotate. The resulting impact is usually fatal."


 (Brad Horrigan, Hartford Courant / April 14, 2012)

Two were injured in a helicopter crash in Farmington Saturday near the corner of Meadow Road and Meadow Lane.

 (Brad Horrigan, Hartford Courant / April 14, 2012) 


Update: Irene Van is listed as being in fair condition at 9:30 p.m., according to a Hartford Hospital representative. Fair condition is defined as: "Vital signs are stable and within normal limits. Patient is conscious but may be uncomfortable; indicators are favorable."

Original story: A small private helicopter crashed off Meadow Road around 6:30 p.m. Saturday, seriously injuring a female passenger, who officials said was initially trapped. LifeStar was called but was unable to respond and the passenger was transported to Hartford Hospital by ambulance.

The male pilot, who NBC is reporting is state Rep. Bill Wadsworth (R-21), was not seriously hurt, police said. According to officials who declined to be identified, the passenger was Irene Van, of Farmington.

The helicopter, a Robinson R22, crashed into the woods off Meadow Road, fractured and spilled some jet fuel at the scene. The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating the cause of the crash. Connecticut Department of Energy and Evironmental Protection officers responded to control the fuel spill.

Farmington Fire and Tunxis Hose responded, as well as UConn parademics.
Meadow Road is currently closed at Meadow Lane but police Sgt. Timothy McKenzie said the road will likely reopen soon, though an officer will be posted at the scene. FAA officials will return in the morning to continue the investigation, McKenzie said.

http://canton-ct.patch.com
Two people have been hospitalized after a small helicopter crashed in Farmington, according to police. 

One of the individuals is State Representative Bill Wadsworth, according to a source within the Republican party.

A spokesman for Hartford Hospital says William Wadsworth was listed in fair condition Saturday night.


Officers said the crash happened on Meadow Road at about 6:30 Saturday night. 
A spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration said two people were on board the Robinson R22 helicopter.

Both were taken to Hartford Hospital, according to police.

Neighbors told Eyewitness News the tail rotor failed, which caused the helicopter to spin out.

On his official state website, Wadsworth is listed as a "privately rated helicopter pilot" as well as a "commercial and instructor rated hot air balloon pilot."

He was a member of the Farmington council prior to being elected a state representative.

FAA investigators were on scene Saturday night, performing a preliminary investigation. A more thorough investigation is expected Sunday.

http://abclocal.go.com

FARMINGTON-  A small helicopter crash-landed off Meadow Lane shortly before 7 p.m. on Saturday, and one of the two passengers was taken to a hospital, police said.

A man and a woman were in the helicopter, which crashed in a lightly wooded area on the corner of Meadow Road and Meadow Lane, inches from thick power lines.

The woman was injured but was conscious and alert, according to Farmington Police Sgt. Tim McKenzie. The man, who was piloting the helicopter, was not injured.

Police officers and fire fighters were waiting for a Federal Aviation Administration investigator to arrive and would likely be on the scene through the night, McKenzie said.

Police said Meadow Road at Meadow Lane will be closed into Sunday.


Two people were injured in a helicopter crash on Meadow Road in Farmington, according to police.

Jim Peters, a spokesman for the Federation Aviation Administration, said the small Robinson helicopter crashed at 6:40 p.m. on Saturday.

The helicopter is registered to William Wadsworth of Farmington and it appears the pilot does not have serious injuries.

NBC Connecticut spoke to his daughter, who said Wadsworth was piloting the helicopter and a female passenger was inside. 

"He is hurt, but OK, " Wadsworth's daughter said.

Meadow Road will be closed at Meadow Lane while the FAA investigates the cause of the crash.

http://www.nbcconnecticut.com

St. Anthony officials seek county help for airport

St. Anthony Airport Runway
 Crack sealing of the runway is among St. Anthony officials’ plans for upgrading Stanford Field, the city’s airport. While grants, fees and property taxes will pay for some of the cost of a list of improvements, they won’t cover all of them. City officials met Monday with Fremont County officials to seek help. 


ST. ANTHONY — Airport upkeep is a prime focus of St. Anthony officials.

They shared that focus Monday with the Fremont County Commission, urging the county to help financially with a project that might help the facility grow.

“The city has put a lot of money into it,” Mayor Neils Thueson said, also acknowledging the support the airport has received in the past from the county.

“It’s been a real asset to the city and to the county,” the mayor told the commission. Of particular benefit to the county and its agricultural base are the two agricultural spray plane operations at the airport, he said.

In recent years, the county has contributed $3,000 annually for airport projects.

This year the city asked for more.

The commission discussed the issue and agreed to contribute more, but not the requested amount.

Councilman Rod Willmore, the council liaison with the City Airport Board, said the city has been negotiating with Rocky Mountain Power to install three transformers and a new power line to serve existing and future hangar owners at the airport.

The electrical upgrade is estimated to cost $27,350. The city plans to provide materials and labor totaling $2,500 to that project, as well as city funds totaling $16,150. That leaves $11,200 — the amount Thueson and Willmore requested from the county.

The commission voted later to allocate $6,000 toward the city’s request, an amount double what the annual contribution has been, but half of what the city requested.

Before the vote, county officials raised several questions, such as how many hangars would benefit from the new power lines and whether those hangar owners would pay hookup fees to help pay for the cost. They also wanted to know what fees the city charged to hangar owners.

The airport has 22 existing hangars. Except for those with long-term contracts, the city charges hangar owners an annual fee of 20 cents per square foot to lease the city land where the hangars are built. The fees were reviewed two years ago and were raised to be more comparable to area airports.

Willmore said the city has been approached about the construction of more hangars, but one of the needs of hangar owners is electrical power, and the available power at the airport is maxed out.

“We have extension cords running between buildings,” Willmore said.

He estimated about half of the hangars have power now, and many of those without power would be interested in the service, though he is uncertain about how many.

Hookup fees of about $500 for electrical service have been discussed, but he is unsure how many takers the city would get, especially since the airport recently added natural gas service, at the expense of the hangar owners.

If electricity were available at the airport, there is a strong possibility more pilots might choose to build hangars at the facility, since the Rexburg airport is out of hangar space and the Rigby airport is nearly filled to capacity, Willmore said.

More hangars would bring more property tax revenue and fees to help pay for the upgrades, the city officials said.

The city also is planning a $30,491 project this spring to crack seal, paint and seal the runway with the help of a $21,000 state grant.

Last year the city completed a fence project to enclose the airport to keep animals away from the runway.


Source: http://www.rexburgstandardjournal.com

St. Luke's Careflight Damaged In Hard Landing

ABERDEEN, SD -  An Avera St. Luke’s Careflight pilot has been treated and released from the hospital after a hard landing on a gravel road in Aberdeen early Saturday morning.

The pilot was the only person on board as the air ambulance was flying to Avera St. Luke’s Hospital after refueling at the airport. An unusual noise prompted the pilot to make a precautionary landing in the northeast part of town near the Sacred Heart Cemetery.

Officials are crediting the pilot for avoiding nearby power lines and homes. The helicopter sustained significant damage during the hard landing.

Avera St. Luke’s is suspending its air ambulance service for now. But it expects to resume in a matter of days.

The FAA is investigating the incident. Careflight is a contracted service through Med-Trans Corp of Dallas.

Rockwell Commander 690A, Ponderosa Aviation Inc., N690SM: Accident occurred November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, Arizona

http://registry.faa.gov/N690SM
 
NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/03/2013
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) purchased the airplane and relocated it from Indiana to PAI's base at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona, about 1 week before the accident. PAI's president conducted the relocation flight under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ferry permit due to an unaccomplished required 150-hour inspection on the airplane. The airplane's arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit, and no inspections were accomplished to render the airplane airworthy after its relocation. Although other airworthy airplanes were available, PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) (the accident pilot) and the director of operations (DO), who were co-owners of PAI along with the president, decided to use the nonairworthy airplane to conduct a personal flight from SAD to Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 110 miles away. All available evidence indicates that the DOM was aware of the airplane's airworthiness status and that this was the first time he flew in the accident airplane. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night visual meteorological conditions (VMC). After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying.

The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. The return flight was also conducted under VFR in night VMC. There was no moon, and the direction of flight was toward sparsely lit terrain. After takeoff, the air traffic control (ATC) tower controller instructed the pilot to maintain runway heading until advised due to an inbound aircraft. About 2 minutes later, the controller cleared the airplane for its requested right turn and then began a position relief briefing for the incoming controller. No subsequent communications to or from the airplane occurred, nor were any required. Radar data indicated that the airplane turned onto a course directly towards SAD and climbed to and leveled at an altitude of 4,500 feet. About 4 minutes after the right turn, while continuing on the same heading and ground track, the airplane impacted a mountain in a wings-level attitude at an elevation of about 4,500 feet.

Although the airplane was technically not airworthy due to the unaccomplished inspection, the investigation did not reveal any preimpact airframe, avionics, engine, or propeller discrepancies that would have precluded normal operation. Airplane performance derived from radar tracking data did not suggest any mechanical abnormalities or problems.

FFZ, which has an elevation of 1,394 feet mean sea level (msl), is situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain. The mountain is surrounded by sparsely lit terrain and rises to a maximum charted elevation of 5,057 feet msl. The investigation was unable to determine whether, or to what degree, the pilot conducted any preflight route and altitude planning. If such planning had been properly accomplished, it would have accounted for the mountain and provided for terrain clearance. The pilot had flown the round trip flight from SAD to FFZ several times and, most recently, had flown a trip from SAD to FFZ in night VMC 2 days before the accident. Thus, the pilot was familiar with the route and the surrounding terrain. According to the pilot's brother (PAI's president), the pilot typically used an iPad for navigation and flew using the ForeFlight software app with the "moving map" function. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depictions) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. Although iPad remnants were found in the wreckage, the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot adhered to his normal practice of using an iPad for the flight or, if so, what its relevant display settings (such as scale or terrain depiction) were. Had the pilot been using the ForeFlight app as he normally did, he could have been able to determine that the airplane would not clear the mountain on the given flight track.

According to the pilot's brother, the pilot typically departed an airport, identified the track needed to fly directly to his destination, and turned the airplane on that track. Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its turn on course to SAD about 2 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from FFZ to SAD with the track starting about 2 miles northeast of FFZ direct to SAD revealed that while the direct line track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from the point 2 miles northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. Thus, the pilot likely set on a direct course for SAD even though the delayed right turn from FFZ put the airplane on a track that intersected the mountain. The pilot did not adjust his flight track to compensate for the delayed right turn to ensure clearance from the mountain.

In addition, a sector of the Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B airspace with a 5,000-foot floor was adjacent to the mountain range, which reduced the vertical options available to the pilot if he elected to remain clear of that airspace. The pilot's decision to remain below the overlying Class B airspace placed the airplane at an altitude below the maximum elevation of the mountain. The pilot did not request VFR flight following or minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) services. Had he requested VFR flight following services, he likely would have received safety alerts from ATC as defined in FAA Order 7110.65. Had he requested the MSAW in particular, he likely would have received an advisory that his aircraft was in unsafe proximity to terrain. Further, the investigation was unable to determine why the pilot did not request clearance to climb into the Class B airspace or fly a more southerly route that would have provided adequate terrain clearance. On the previous night VMC flight from FFZ to SAD, the pilot stayed below the Class B airspace but turned toward SAD right after departure. In response to issues raised by this accident, the FAA conducted a Performance Data Analysis Report System (PDARS) study to determine the legitimacy of a claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to be granted clearance to enter Class B airspace. The PDARS study revealed that on the day of the accident, 341 VFR aircraft were provided services by Phoenix TRACON. The PDARS study, however, was unable to document how many aircraft were actually within the Class B airspace itself or how many had been refused services; the study only documented how many had been provided services. In response to a January 20, 2012, FAA internal memo formally restating the claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to obtain clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, the FAA conducted a comprehensive audit of the PHX Class B airspace that spanned four different time periods and was spread among several sectors during peak traffic periods to provide the most accurate picture. Of 619 requests for VFR aircraft to enter Class B airspace, 598 (96.61%) were granted. While data was not available to refute or substantiate any claims from previous years regarding difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, this data clearly indicated that difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace did not exist during the four time periods in which the audit took place in the months after the accident.

The moonless night decreased the already low visual conspicuity of the mountain. The airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange and GPS navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display. Had the pilot conducted the flight under instrument flight rules (IFR), the resultant handling by ATC would have helped ensure terrain clearance.

The airplane was not equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS). Six years earlier, the accident airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. This modification rendered the airplane exempt from the TAWS requirement; however, this modification was not approved by the FAA or documented via a supplemental type certificate or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Modification). Per the requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.223, TAWS is not required for airplanes with fewer than six passenger seats. In this accident, onboard TAWS equipment could have provided a timely alert to help the pilot avoid the mountain.

Based on the steady flight track; the dark night conditions; the minimal ground-based lighting; and the absence of preimpact airplane, engine, or propeller anomalies that would have affected the flight, the airplane was likely under the control of the pilot and was inadvertently flown into the mountain. This controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident was likely due to the pilot's complacency (because of his familiarity with the flight route and because he selected a direct route, as he had previously done, even though he turned toward the destination later than he normally did) and lack of situational awareness. In January 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under VFR at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents. The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by accomplishing several actions, including proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following IFR practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain a safe ground track and altitude combination for the moonless night visual flight rules flight, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's complacency and lack of situational awareness and his failure to use air traffic control visual flight rules flight following or minimum safe altitude warning services. Also contributing to the accident was the airplane's lack of onboard terrain awareness and warning system equipment.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI's DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot's 72-Hour History

According to the pilot's wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplemental type certificate and/or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration). Postaccident review of the documentation that was used to substantiate the seating configuration change revealed that the modified seating position plan was not one of the manufacturer's/type certificate holder's approved configurations. The document that was used to substantiate the change was determined to be an altered version of the manufacturer's original document, but it was incorrectly represented as a manufacturer's original document. Attempts to determine who made the improper and unauthorized changes to the seating configuration document, or when they were made, were unsuccessful.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included wind from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 40 miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point -1 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury. US Naval Observatory data for November 23, 2011, indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3%, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Neither FFZ nor SAD was equipped with a VOR ground navigation facility. Navigation between the two airports via available VOR stations would result in an indirect flight route.

The flight from SAD to FFZ and the accident flight were both conducted in VMC as VFR flights. No flight plan was filed for either flight, and neither pilot had requested air traffic control (ATC) flight following services. Available radar data and interviews with PAI personnel indicated that the pilot had flown between SAD and FFZ several times previously and that he tended to use his iPad, equipped with ForeFlight software and GPS, to fly directly between the two. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depiction) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot's habit pattern was to depart the airport, identify the track needed to fly directly to the destination, and turn the airplane onto that track. Remnants of an iPad were found in the wreckage. Damage precluded determination of its positive association with a particular owner, its functionality, or its operational status at the time of the accident.

Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its right turn on course to SAD about 1.5 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from two different initial locations (FFZ, and northeast of FFZ after completion of the turn) to SAD revealed that while the direct track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. That resulting ground track was also coincident with the accident flight radar data ground track.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sequence of Events

The pilot first contacted FFZ ground control at 1820:21. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway D, and he taxied as instructed without incident. At 1823:35, the pilot contacted FFZ local control and advised that he was holding short and was ready for departure. The pilot was advised to again hold short to wait for landing traffic. At 1825:00, the controller instructed the pilot to "fly straight out" until advised due to landing traffic and cleared him for takeoff from runway 4R. The airplane became airborne at 1826:14. At 1826:47, the controller issued the "right turn approved" advisory to the pilot. At that point, the airplane was still on the runway heading, about 1.45 nautical miles (nm) from FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,200 feet. The pilot responded to the transmission with "right turn approved." No further radio transmissions to or from the accident pilot were recorded.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

FFZ was equipped with two runways designated 4/22 L and R. The airplane's arrival and departure runway (4R) measured 5,101 feet by 100 feet. Airport elevation was 1,394 feet msl. The local topography consisted of a flat basin floor bounded by mountainous terrain, primarily to the north and east. FFZ was situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain, which rose very steeply to a charted maximum elevation of 5,057 feet msl, or about 3,700 feet above FFZ.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Accident Site

The accident site was on the northwest face near the top of the Flatiron region of Superstition Mountain. The accident site consisted of two basic terrain areas: a sloped area (about 45 degrees downhill to the northwest), abutted by a vertical rock formation on its southeast side.

The sloped area was primarily rock, interlaced with cracks, soil patches, boulders, and sparse vegetation. The rock formation rose about 100 feet above the southeastern edge of the sloped area. Airplane debris was scattered on the sloped area in a primary field that measured about 150 feet southeast-northwest by about 80 feet northeast-southwest. A significant amount of debris was clustered near the base of the vertical face, with some debris strewn or caught on the face. The southeast section of the sloped area and much of the vertical face were fire damaged, soot covered, or scorched. The northwest edge of the sloped debris field was about 150 feet southeast of the end of the sloped terrain, which then became very steep (sometimes near vertical) and fell irregularly away to the valley floor about 3,000 feet below.

On-Site Wreckage Observations

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain at an elevation of about 4,500 feet msl that was essentially only accessible by helicopter. The wreckage was recovered by helicopter and transported to a secure facility for subsequent detailed examination.

The airplane was highly fragmented. The debris pattern axis was oriented northwest to southeast, and the debris and fire damage were arrayed in a fan-like pattern consistent with the approximate flight direction. Most airplane components were severely impact and fire-damaged. Some debris (heavier/denser items, such as engine gearbox components and generators) was found northwest (downhill) of the main debris field, consistent with those components rolling downhill after impact. The largest wreckage section was a portion of an inboard wing box with one engine attached. Paint transfer marks on the rock face were consistent with a wings-level (roll axis) impact.

Both engines and portions of their propellers were identified in the wreckage. Propeller, engine, and gearbox damage was consistent with high power rotation at impact. All three landing gear were identified in the wreckage, and damage patterns were consistent with the landing gear being retracted at impact. Some airplane skin segments exhibited significant accordion-like crush damage. Many cockpit-related items, including instruments, instrument panel sections, and pilots' seat fragments, were found on the terrain beyond the vertical rock formation; some were several hundred feet beyond the vertical rock formation.

Damage patterns were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The majority of the first-stage compressor impeller blades were separated at the hubs. The second-stage compressor impeller blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation. There was rotational scoring on the aft side of the third-stage turbine blade platforms and metal spray deposits on the suction side of the third-stage turbine blades. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation were identified.

The blade damage to both propellers was severe, with leading-edge damage, multiple bends, twisting, concave bending of the blade chord at the tips, and tips that had fractured and separated. Two separate blade angle witness marks were each consistent with impact while at a normal (not in feather and not in reverse) operating position. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal propeller operation were identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc.

PAI was founded in 1975 by the pilot-rated passenger's father. Later, the pilot and his brother purchased the company, and, in January 2011, the pilot-rated passenger, who had worked there for many years, bought into a partnership with them.

At the time of the accident, PAI, which was based at SAD, employed 25 people, including 13 pilots (10 on a seasonal/part-time basis) and 9 maintenance personnel. PAI owned a total of 14 airplanes, including the accident airplane. The fleet included three Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690 models and nine 500 models.

PAI held a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand air carrier operations in the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. However, PAI rarely exercised the privileges of that certificate and averaged about two revenue passenger transport flights per year. PAI's primary purpose for obtaining and maintaining the certificate was to be qualified to contract with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management for air attack missions (the application of aerial resources, by both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, on a fire).

Eight of the PAI airplanes were on the 14 CFR Part 135 certificate; the accident airplane had not yet been added to the certificate.

FAA Oversight

The FAA FSDO in Scottsdale, Arizona, was the assigned certificate-holding district office for PAI and oversaw about 60 Part 135 certificated operators, no Part 121 certificated operators, and about 520 Part 91 operators.

The POI was assigned to PAI in 2007. Her duties included oversight of 12 designees and 30 check airmen and POI for 54 operators. PAI was one of 10 Part 135 operators assigned to the POI. She estimated that she had about 100 hours in Rockwell International/Aero Commander airplanes, 25 of which were in the 690 model. The POI considered PAI to be a "low-maintenance operator," meaning that PAI was compliant with FAA requirements and presented few issues of concern. She physically visited PAI about once per year. Due to the distance between the FSDO and SAD, she never made unannounced visits. Her visits would take about 2 days, during which she would oversee pilot training, examine records and recordkeeping, and conduct base inspections and ramp checks. She never gave checkrides to PAI pilots; those were conducted by another inspector. The POI qualified the pilot-rated passenger as a "good" chief pilot. He was the person at PAI with whom the POI had the most contact, and she would mainly communicate her concerns and questions to him. She did not have much familiarity with the pilot.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Homeowner's Surveillance Camera Imagery

The airplane's preimpact flightpath, impact explosion, postimpact fire, and initial arrival of search and rescue aircraft were captured on a private citizen's home surveillance camera. That camera was located about 6 miles south of and 3,700 feet lower than the impact site. A file that contained about 50 minutes of image data, during the period from about 1810 to 1900, was provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The time stamp data was provided by the camera owner and was not independently correlated or verified by the NTSB; therefore, all times are approximate.

The 1810 image depicted the mountain in silhouette form, but as night fell, the mountain disappeared from the image. No lights were visible on the mountain. Due to the night conditions, the optical resolution capability of the camera, and the distance of the airplane from the camera, the imagery provided only a macro view and associated timeline of the events. The airplane itself was not visible; its position was manifested by its blinking beacon or strobe lights only. The lights of the airplane first appeared in the field of view at 1830:00 and remained visible until 1830:48, when the lights disappeared behind the terrain. A large flash of light appeared at 1830:52, followed by a second, much larger and brighter flash about 3 seconds later. Lights indicative of a fire remained visible until about 1844, and the first responding aircraft (again only visible as lights) appeared about 1848.

Examination of the path of the airplane's lights on the image field of view did not reveal any erratic motions or changes of direction; the stability of the flightpath was similar to that depicted in the ground tracking radar data.

Weight and Balance Information

Maintenance records indicated that on at least 15 occasions, modifications that affected the airplane's weight and balance values were accomplished; however, no records of the actual revised weight and balance data were discovered during the investigation.

Calculations that used the original empty weight plus other known or presumed values resulted in an estimated accident flight weight of 8,953 pounds, which was below the maximum allowable weight, and a center of gravity within the allowable envelope.

Airplane Performance

The derived level-flight ground speed for the last 2 minutes of the flight was approximately 190 knots, which was slightly higher than the pilot's operating handbook maximum range speed for similar conditions. Surface wind data indicated that the airplane would have experienced a slight tailwind during the climbout and level-flight segments.

TAWS-Related Guidance for FAA Inspectors

Published FAA guidance for FAA inspectors to use to determine whether the airplane seating configuration changes (if properly accomplished) would have exempted the airplane from the TAWS requirement was examined in detail. The relevant FAA guidance included FAA Order 8900.1 and 14 CFR Part 1, Part 21, Part 43 (Appendix 1), Part 91, and Part 135.

Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B Airspace Information

The Phoenix metropolitan area was designated and charted as Class B airspace, centered on PHX and the PHX VOR (PXR). The airspace elevation boundaries were defined by floor and ceiling altitudes, with lateral boundaries defined by distance and bearing from defined locations. Class B airspace is typically described as having the shape of an "upside-down wedding cake," where the airspace floor altitudes increase as the distance from the center increases. Aircraft operating under VFR are prohibited from entering Class B airspace without explicit permission from the responsible ATC facility. Mountainous terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the 5-000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about 3 1/2 miles east.

The NTSB ATC group chairman's factual report provides detailed information regarding the Class B airspace around the Phoenix area. For more information, see the docket for this accident (NTSB case number WPR12MA046).

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents

The FAA defines a CFIT accident as a situation that occurs when a properly functioning aircraft "is flown under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision."

In 1998, the FAA formed the General Aviation (GA) CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) as part of the FAA "Safer Skies" program. The stated goal of the Safer Skies initiative was to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 10-year period via a comprehensive review of aviation accident causes and implementation of safety intervention strategies. In April 1999, the GA CFIT JSAT published its final report, which identified 55 interventions to address CFIT accident causes. The FAA CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) was formed to develop detailed CFIT accident reduction strategies based upon the top 10 JSAT interventions that were considered to be the most effective and feasible. The CFIT JSIT final report was published in 2000, and JSIT recommended interventions included the following:

- Improve safety culture within the aviation community,
- Promote development and use of low-cost terrain clearance and/or look-ahead device,
- Improve pilot training regarding decision-making and human factors,
- Enhance the biennial flight review and/or instrument competency check, and
- Develop and distribute mountain flying technique advisory material.

In March 2003, as part of its response to the CFIT JSIT, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC "highlights the inherent risk" that CFIT poses for GA pilots. According to the AC, one primary cause of CFIT accidents was loss of situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25) defined situational awareness as the "accurate perception of the operational and environmental factors that affect the airplane, pilot, and passengers during a specific period of time." The handbook stated that a situationally aware pilot "has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." The handbook stated that "some of the elements inside the airplane to be considered are the status of airplane systems, and also the pilot and passengers" and cautioned that "an awareness of the environmental conditions of the flight, such as spatial orientation of the airplane, and its relationship to terrain, traffic, weather, and airspace must be maintained."

The handbook stated that obstacles to maintaining situational awareness included fatigue, stress, and task overload and that a contributing factor in many accidents is a distraction that diverts the pilot's attention. Complacency was cited as another obstacle to maintaining situational awareness. When activities become routine, there is a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot's effectiveness in the cockpit. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.

NTSB Safety Alert

In January 2008, the NTSB issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under visual flight conditions at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents.

The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following instrument flight rules practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.


NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
 Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI’s director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI’s DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot’s 72-Hour History

According to the pilot’s wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplemental type certificate and/or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration). Postaccident review of the documentation that was used to substantiate the seating configuration change revealed that the modified seating position plan was not one of the manufacturer's/type certificate holder's approved configurations. The document that was used to substantiate the change was determined to be an altered version of the manufacturer's original document, but it was incorrectly represented as a manufacturer's original document. Attempts to determine who made the improper and unauthorized changes to the seating configuration document, or when they were made, were unsuccessful.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included wind from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 40 miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point -1 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury. US Naval Observatory data for November 23, 2011, indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3%, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Neither FFZ nor SAD was equipped with a VOR ground navigation facility. Navigation between the two airports via available VOR stations would result in an indirect flight route.

The flight from SAD to FFZ and the accident flight were both conducted in VMC as VFR flights. No flight plan was filed for either flight, and neither pilot had requested air traffic control (ATC) flight following services. Available radar data and interviews with PAI personnel indicated that the pilot had flown between SAD and FFZ several times previously and that he tended to use his iPad, equipped with ForeFlight software and GPS, to fly directly between the two. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depiction) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot's habit pattern was to depart the airport, identify the track needed to fly directly to the destination, and turn the airplane onto that track. Remnants of an iPad were found in the wreckage. Damage precluded determination of its positive association with a particular owner, its functionality, or its operational status at the time of the accident.

Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its right turn on course to SAD about 1.5 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from two different initial locations (FFZ, and northeast of FFZ after completion of the turn) to SAD revealed that while the direct track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. That resulting ground track was also coincident with the accident flight radar data ground track.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sequence of Events

The pilot first contacted FFZ ground control at 1820:21. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway D, and he taxied as instructed without incident. At 1823:35, the pilot contacted FFZ local control and advised that he was holding short and was ready for departure. The pilot was advised to again hold short to wait for landing traffic. At 1825:00, the controller instructed the pilot to "fly straight out" until advised due to landing traffic and cleared him for takeoff from runway 4R. The airplane became airborne at 1826:14. At 1826:47, the controller issued the "right turn approved" advisory to the pilot. At that point, the airplane was still on the runway heading, about 1.45 nautical miles (nm) from FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,200 feet. The pilot responded to the transmission with "right turn approved." No further radio transmissions to or from the accident pilot were recorded.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

FFZ was equipped with two runways designated 4/22 L and R. The airplane's arrival and departure runway (4R) measured 5,101 feet by 100 feet. Airport elevation was 1,394 feet msl. The local topography consisted of a flat basin floor bounded by mountainous terrain, primarily to the north and east. FFZ was situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain, which rose very steeply to a charted maximum elevation of 5,057 feet msl, or about 3,700 feet above FFZ.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Accident Site

The accident site was on the northwest face near the top of the Flatiron region of Superstition Mountain. The accident site consisted of two basic terrain areas: a sloped area (about 45 degrees downhill to the northwest), abutted by a vertical rock formation on its southeast side.

The sloped area was primarily rock, interlaced with cracks, soil patches, boulders, and sparse vegetation. The rock formation rose about 100 feet above the southeastern edge of the sloped area. Airplane debris was scattered on the sloped area in a primary field that measured about 150 feet southeast-northwest by about 80 feet northeast-southwest. A significant amount of debris was clustered near the base of the vertical face, with some debris strewn or caught on the face. The southeast section of the sloped area and much of the vertical face were fire damaged, soot covered, or scorched. The northwest edge of the sloped debris field was about 150 feet southeast of the end of the sloped terrain, which then became very steep (sometimes near vertical) and fell irregularly away to the valley floor about 3,000 feet below.

On-Site Wreckage Observations

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain at an elevation of about 4,500 feet msl that was essentially only accessible by helicopter. The wreckage was recovered by helicopter and transported to a secure facility for subsequent detailed examination.

The airplane was highly fragmented. The debris pattern axis was oriented northwest to southeast, and the debris and fire damage were arrayed in a fan-like pattern consistent with the approximate flight direction. Most airplane components were severely impact and fire-damaged. Some debris (heavier/denser items, such as engine gearbox components and generators) was found northwest (downhill) of the main debris field, consistent with those components rolling downhill after impact. The largest wreckage section was a portion of an inboard wing box with one engine attached. Paint transfer marks on the rock face were consistent with a wings-level (roll axis) impact.

Both engines and portions of their propellers were identified in the wreckage. Propeller, engine, and gearbox damage was consistent with high power rotation at impact. All three landing gear were identified in the wreckage, and damage patterns were consistent with the landing gear being retracted at impact. Some airplane skin segments exhibited significant accordion-like crush damage. Many cockpit-related items, including instruments, instrument panel sections, and pilots' seat fragments, were found on the terrain beyond the vertical rock formation; some were several hundred feet beyond the vertical rock formation.

Damage patterns were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The majority of the first-stage compressor impeller blades were separated at the hubs. The second-stage compressor impeller blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation. There was rotational scoring on the aft side of the third-stage turbine blade platforms and metal spray deposits on the suction side of the third-stage turbine blades. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation were identified.

The blade damage to both propellers was severe, with leading-edge damage, multiple bends, twisting, concave bending of the blade chord at the tips, and tips that had fractured and separated. Two separate blade angle witness marks were each consistent with impact while at a normal (not in feather and not in reverse) operating position. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal propeller operation were identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc.

PAI was founded in 1975 by the pilot-rated passenger’s father. Later, the pilot and his brother purchased the company, and, in January 2011, the pilot-rated passenger, who had worked there for many years, bought into a partnership with them.

At the time of the accident, PAI, which was based at SAD, employed 25 people, including 13 pilots (10 on a seasonal/part-time basis) and 9 maintenance personnel. PAI owned a total of 14 airplanes, including the accident airplane. The fleet included three Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690 models and nine 500 models.

PAI held a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand air carrier operations in the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. However, PAI rarely exercised the privileges of that certificate and averaged about two revenue passenger transport flights per year. PAI's primary purpose for obtaining and maintaining the certificate was to be qualified to contract with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management for air attack missions (the application of aerial resources, by both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, on a fire).

Eight of the PAI airplanes were on the 14 CFR Part 135 certificate; the accident airplane had not yet been added to the certificate.

FAA Oversight

The FAA FSDO in Scottsdale, Arizona, was the assigned certificate-holding district office for PAI and oversaw about 60 Part 135 certificated operators, no Part 121 certificated operators, and about 520 Part 91 operators.

The POI was assigned to PAI in 2007. Her duties included oversight of 12 designees and 30 check airmen and POI for 54 operators. PAI was one of 10 Part 135 operators assigned to the POI. She estimated that she had about 100 hours in Rockwell International/Aero Commander airplanes, 25 of which were in the 690 model. The POI considered PAI to be a "low-maintenance operator," meaning that PAI was compliant with FAA requirements and presented few issues of concern. She physically visited PAI about once per year. Due to the distance between the FSDO and SAD, she never made unannounced visits. Her visits would take about 2 days, during which she would oversee pilot training, examine records and recordkeeping, and conduct base inspections and ramp checks. She never gave checkrides to PAI pilots; those were conducted by another inspector. The POI qualified the pilot-rated passenger as a "good" chief pilot. He was the person at PAI with whom the POI had the most contact, and she would mainly communicate her concerns and questions to him. She did not have much familiarity with the pilot.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Homeowner's Surveillance Camera Imagery

The airplane’s preimpact flightpath, impact explosion, postimpact fire, and initial arrival of search and rescue aircraft were captured on a private citizen's home surveillance camera. That camera was located about 6 miles south of and 3,700 feet lower than the impact site. A file that contained about 50 minutes of image data, during the period from about 1810 to 1900, was provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The time stamp data was provided by the camera owner and was not independently correlated or verified by the NTSB; therefore, all times are approximate.

The 1810 image depicted the mountain in silhouette form, but as night fell, the mountain disappeared from the image. No lights were visible on the mountain. Due to the night conditions, the optical resolution capability of the camera, and the distance of the airplane from the camera, the imagery provided only a macro view and associated timeline of the events. The airplane itself was not visible; its position was manifested by its blinking beacon or strobe lights only. The lights of the airplane first appeared in the field of view at 1830:00 and remained visible until 1830:48, when the lights disappeared behind the terrain. A large flash of light appeared at 1830:52, followed by a second, much larger and brighter flash about 3 seconds later. Lights indicative of a fire remained visible until about 1844, and the first responding aircraft (again only visible as lights) appeared about 1848.

Examination of the path of the airplane's lights on the image field of view did not reveal any erratic motions or changes of direction; the stability of the flightpath was similar to that depicted in the ground tracking radar data.

Weight and Balance Information

Maintenance records indicated that on at least 15 occasions, modifications that affected the airplane's weight and balance values were accomplished; however, no records of the actual revised weight and balance data were discovered during the investigation.

Calculations that used the original empty weight plus other known or presumed values resulted in an estimated accident flight weight of 8,953 pounds, which was below the maximum allowable weight, and a center of gravity within the allowable envelope.

Airplane Performance

The derived level-flight ground speed for the last 2 minutes of the flight was approximately 190 knots, which was slightly higher than the pilot’s operating handbook maximum range speed for similar conditions. Surface wind data indicated that the airplane would have experienced a slight tailwind during the climbout and level-flight segments.

TAWS-Related Guidance for FAA Inspectors

Published FAA guidance for FAA inspectors to use to determine whether the airplane seating configuration changes (if properly accomplished) would have exempted the airplane from the TAWS requirement was examined in detail. The relevant FAA guidance included FAA Order 8900.1 and 14 CFR Part 1, Part 21, Part 43 (Appendix 1), Part 91, and Part 135.

Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B Airspace Information

The Phoenix metropolitan area was designated and charted as Class B airspace, centered on PHX and the PHX VOR (PXR). The airspace elevation boundaries were defined by floor and ceiling altitudes, with lateral boundaries defined by distance and bearing from defined locations. Class B airspace is typically described as having the shape of an "upside-down wedding cake," where the airspace floor altitudes increase as the distance from the center increases. Aircraft operating under VFR are prohibited from entering Class B airspace without explicit permission from the responsible ATC facility. Mountainous terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the 5-000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about 3 1/2 miles east.

The NTSB ATC group chairman's factual report provides detailed information regarding the Class B airspace around the Phoenix area. For more information, see the docket for this accident (NTSB case number WPR12MA046).

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents

The FAA defines a CFIT accident as a situation that occurs when a properly functioning aircraft "is flown under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision."

In 1998, the FAA formed the General Aviation (GA) CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) as part of the FAA "Safer Skies" program. The stated goal of the Safer Skies initiative was to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 10-year period via a comprehensive review of aviation accident causes and implementation of safety intervention strategies. In April 1999, the GA CFIT JSAT published its final report, which identified 55 interventions to address CFIT accident causes. The FAA CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) was formed to develop detailed CFIT accident reduction strategies based upon the top 10 JSAT interventions that were considered to be the most effective and feasible. The CFIT JSIT final report was published in 2000, and JSIT recommended interventions included the following:

- Improve safety culture within the aviation community,
- Promote development and use of low-cost terrain clearance and/or look-ahead device,
- Improve pilot training regarding decision-making and human factors,
- Enhance the biennial flight review and/or instrument competency check, and
- Develop and distribute mountain flying technique advisory material.

In March 2003, as part of its response to the CFIT JSIT, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC "highlights the inherent risk" that CFIT poses for GA pilots. According to the AC, one primary cause of CFIT accidents was loss of situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25) defined situational awareness as the "accurate perception of the operational and environmental factors that affect the airplane, pilot, and passengers during a specific period of time." The handbook stated that a situationally aware pilot "has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." The handbook stated that "some of the elements inside the airplane to be considered are the status of airplane systems, and also the pilot and passengers" and cautioned that "an awareness of the environmental conditions of the flight, such as spatial orientation of the airplane, and its relationship to terrain, traffic, weather, and airspace must be maintained."

The handbook stated that obstacles to maintaining situational awareness included fatigue, stress, and task overload and that a contributing factor in many accidents is a distraction that diverts the pilot’s attention. Complacency was cited as another obstacle to maintaining situational awareness. When activities become routine, there is a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot’s effectiveness in the cockpit. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.

NTSB Safety Alert

In January 2008, the NTSB issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under visual flight conditions at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents.

The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following instrument flight rules practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.

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NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
 Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.


This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time (MST), a Rockwell International 690A, N690SM, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona, about 5 minutes after takeoff from Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona. The certificated commercial pilot and the five passengers, who included two adults and three children, were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, which held a Part 135 operating certificate, and which was based at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.

According to several witnesses, the children's father, who was a co-owner of Ponderosa Aviation and who lived near SAD, regularly used the operator's airplanes to transport the children, who lived near FFZ, between FFZ and SAD or vice versa. According to a fixed base operation (FBO) line serviceman who was familiar with the children and their father, on the night of the accident, the children arrived at FFZ about 15 minutes before the airplane arrived. The airplane was marshaled into a parking spot adjacent to the FBO building; it was already dark. The father was seated in the front left seat and operating the airplane, and another individual was in the front right seat. After shutdown, the father and a third individual, whom the line serviceman had not seen before, exited the airplane. The individual in the front right seat did not exit the airplane; he remained in the cockpit with a flashlight, accomplishing unknown tasks, and subsequently repositioned himself to the front left seat.

The father went into the FBO to escort the children to the airplane. The father, three children and the third individual returned to the airplane. The individual in the front left seat remained in that seat, the third individual seated himself in the front right seat, and the father and three children situated themselves in the rear of the airplane. Engine start and taxi-out appeared normal to the line serviceman, who marshaled the airplane out of its parking spot.

Review of the recorded communications between the airplane and the FFZ air traffic control tower (ATCT) revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, the ATCT local controller issued a "right turn approved" clearance to the flight. Review of the preliminary ground-based radar tracking data revealed that the takeoff roll began about 1826 MST, and the airplane began its right turn towards SAD when it was about 2 miles east of FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,600 feet above mean sea level (msl). About 1828, the airplane reached an altitude of 4,500 feet msl, where it remained, and tracked in an essentially straight line, until it impacted the terrain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56, and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The airplane's transponder was transmitting on a code of 1200 for the entire flight.

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain, at an elevation of about 4,650 feet, approximately 150 feet below the top of the local peak. Ground scars were consistent with impact in a wings-level attitude. Terrain conditions, and impact- and fire-damage precluded a thorough on-site wreckage examination. All six propeller blades, both engines, and most major flight control surfaces were identified in the wreckage. Propeller and engine damage signatures were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility, where it will be examined in detail.

According to the operator's and FAA records, the pilot had approximately 2,500 total hours of flight experience. He held multiple certificates and ratings, including a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument-airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in July 2011, and his most recent flight review was completed in September 2011.

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1976, and was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331 series turboshaft engines. The airplane was recently purchased by the operator, and was flown from Indiana to the operator's base in Arizona about 1 week prior to the accident. The airframe had accumulated a total time in service (TT) of approximately 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a TT since major overhaul (SMOH) of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a TTSMOH of 1,482 hours.

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included winds from 350 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 40 miles; few clouds at 20,000 feet; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point -1 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. U.S. Naval Observatory data for November 23 indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3 percent, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.


PHOENIX - A Valley trampoline park is holding a benefit event for a woman who lost her three children in a plane crash last November .

Skypark Indoor Trampoline Park at 40th Street and Indian School Road is hosting the event today until 8 p.m.

Founders Richard Kohan and Mark Svejda are holding the event to help Karen Perry get back on her feet after the loss of her children and her home.

Perry's children Morgan, 9, Logan, 8, and Luke, 6, were killed Thanksgiving Eve when the small plane they were in crashed in the Superstition Mountains.

Perry then lost her Gold Canyon home to foreclosure.

She has kept busy donating her time, and gifts of food, clothes and food to families in need.

Perry was at Saturday's event and said she doesn't know how she's getting through the tragedy, but she somehow just does.

"I live right by that mountain, I drive past it every day, I see it every day, and there isn't a minute that I look up there that I don't think about it," Perry said.

If you'd like to help but can't attend today's event, you can make a donation online to the Perry Family Memorial .

Skypark Indoor Trampoline Park is donating 50 percent of today's proceeds to Karen and the Perry Family Memorial fund.

http://www.abc15.com

NTSB Identification: WPR12FA046
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.


On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time (MST), a Rockwell International 690A, N690SM, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona, about 5 minutes after takeoff from Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona. The certificated commercial pilot and the five passengers, who included two adults and three children, were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, which held a Part 135 operating certificate, and which was based at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.

According to several witnesses, the children's father, who was a co-owner of Ponderosa Aviation and who lived near SAD, regularly used the operator's airplanes to transport the children, who lived near FFZ, between FFZ and SAD or vice versa. According to a fixed base operation (FBO) line serviceman who was familiar with the children and their father, on the night of the accident, the children arrived at FFZ about 15 minutes before the airplane arrived. The airplane was marshaled into a parking spot adjacent to the FBO building; it was already dark. The father was seated in the front left seat and operating the airplane, and another individual was in the front right seat. After shutdown, the father and a third individual, whom the line serviceman had not seen before, exited the airplane. The individual in the front right seat did not exit the airplane; he remained in the cockpit with a flashlight, accomplishing unknown tasks, and subsequently repositioned himself to the front left seat.

The father went into the FBO to escort the children to the airplane. The father, three children and the third individual returned to the airplane. The individual in the front left seat remained in that seat, the third individual seated himself in the front right seat, and the father and three children situated themselves in the rear of the airplane. Engine start and taxi-out appeared normal to the line serviceman, who marshaled the airplane out of its parking spot.

Review of the recorded communications between the airplane and the FFZ air traffic control tower (ATCT) revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, the ATCT local controller issued a "right turn approved" clearance to the flight. Review of the preliminary ground-based radar tracking data revealed that the takeoff roll began about 1826 MST, and the airplane began its right turn towards SAD when it was about 2 miles east of FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,600 feet above mean sea level (msl). About 1828, the airplane reached an altitude of 4,500 feet msl, where it remained, and tracked in an essentially straight line, until it impacted the terrain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56, and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The airplane's transponder was transmitting on a code of 1200 for the entire flight.

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain, at an elevation of about 4,650 feet, approximately 150 feet below the top of the local peak. Ground scars were consistent with impact in a wings-level attitude. Terrain conditions, and impact- and fire-damage precluded a thorough on-site wreckage examination. All six propeller blades, both engines, and most major flight control surfaces were identified in the wreckage. Propeller and engine damage signatures were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility, where it will be examined in detail.

According to the operator's and FAA records, the pilot had approximately 2,500 total hours of flight experience. He held multiple certificates and ratings, including a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument-airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in July 2011, and his most recent flight review was completed in September 2011.

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1976, and was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331 series turboshaft engines. The airplane was recently purchased by the operator, and was flown from Indiana to the operator's base in Arizona about 1 week prior to the accident. The airframe had accumulated a total time in service (TT) of approximately 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a TT since major overhaul (SMOH) of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a TTSMOH of 1,482 hours.

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included winds from 350 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 40 miles; few clouds at 20,000 feet; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point -1 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. U.S. Naval Observatory data for November 23 indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3 percent, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.