Friday, April 27, 2012

TSA Seizes Record Number of Guns at Dallas Love Field


The Transportation Security Administration said the number of guns its agents have found on travelers at airports across Texas is up, with the biggest spike at Dallas Love Field.

This month alone, TSA agents seized six guns at Love Field -- 15 so far this year. Compare that to just 1 gun during the same time frame, last year.

Despite checking in more than three times the number of passengers, the agency seized 16 guns so far this year at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport -- just one more than at Love Field.

All of the travelers had concealed handgun licenses and simply forgot they were armed, the TSA said.

But whether it is an accident or not, all passengers caught with a weapon in their carry-on are arrested. The civil fines can reach up to $10,000.

“If you are planning on taking a quick weekend trip, that can turn into an expensive endeavor if you don't take that time upfront that you know everything in your bag,” said Amy Williams, TSA federal security director at Love Field.

Williams said travelers must transport guns in checked baggage. Each airline has its own individual policies.

Source:  http://www.nbcdfw.com

Cirrus SR22, Photopherisis Inc., N110EB: Accident occurred April 21, 2012 in Newcomerstown, Ohio

NTSB Identification: CEN12FA251 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, April 21, 2012 in Newcomerstown, OH
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2015
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N110EB
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

About 5 minutes before the accident, when the airplane was in cruise flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), at 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl), and at 156 knots ground speed, an air traffic controller updated the altimeter setting via the radio. The pilot acknowledged the call, and his voice sounded normal. No other radio transmissions were received from the pilot, and he made no distress calls. Radar data showed that the airplane then began a descending right turn, that the airspeed increased slightly through the turn, and that the airspeed then suddenly decreased to 61 knots as the turn radius decreased. The airplane had turned about 270 degrees and descended to an altitude of 4,900 ft msl before radar contact was lost. A witness reported seeing the airplane coming out of the low clouds (the cloud ceiling was about 700 to 800 ft above ground level) in a nose-down descent with the wings about level before it disappeared behind a tree line. Examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies.

Data from the on-board recoverable data module (RDM) showed an anomaly in the electrical bus voltages, autopilot mode changes, and a momentary dropout of the pilot transmission frequency. Specifically, the RDM data showed that the airplane was flying at 8,000 ft pressure altitude at an airspeed of 148 knots with the autopilot on when alternator 1 dropped offline followed by alternator 2 dropping offline; the airplane is equipped with a two-alternator, two-battery, 28-volt direct current electrical system. About 3 seconds later, the autopilot disengaged. The RDM data confirmed that the airplane then entered a descending right turn with the airspeed increasing slightly and then suddenly decreasing. The data further showed that the airplane then rolled right and that the pitch attitude sharply decreased. The airspeed then increased, and both the roll and pitch reversed back toward wings level before the data ended.

The bolster switches for alternator 1, alternator 2, battery 1, battery 2, and the avionics were cycled “on” and “off” on an exemplar airplane to determine what may occur in the cockpit when the bolster switches are manually moved. Seven sets of various electrical bolster switch activations and deactivations were documented. During the tests, bolster switch operation on the exemplar airplane yielded recorded data similar to the accident flight data; however, the reason for the recorded electrical anomalies could not be determined because the RDM does not record the physical position of either the bolster switches or circuit breakers. The data did reveal that the airplane began its deviation off course and its subsequent descending right turn in IMC conditions a few seconds after the alternators went offline and that the pilot was likely attempting to troubleshoot the electrical anomaly with bolster switch activations and deactivations as the airplane descended and turned through the clouds. The electrical anomalies likely distracted the pilot and led to his subsequent loss of airplane control. The witness’s statement that the airplane came out of the low clouds with the wings about level and the RDM data indicate that the pilot may have been able to recover from the turn and rapid descent to some degree but that there was insufficient altitude for a full recovery.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s loss of airplane control in instrument meteorological conditions due to his distraction by electrical system anomalies, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent. The reason for the electrical system anomalies could not be determined. 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 21, 2012, approximately 1220 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22, N110EB, registered to Photopheresis INC., of Morristown, New Jersey, was substantially damaged when it impacted heavily wooded terrain in the vicinity of Newcomerstown, Ohio. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal cross country flight. The flight originated at 1013 from the Somerset Airport (SMQ), and its intended destination was Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio.

According to radar data and recorded radio communications provided to the NTSB by the FAA, approximately 5 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was in cruise flight at 8,000 feet msl at 156 knots ground speed, when Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) updated the altimeter setting via radio. The pilot acknowledged the call and his voice sounded normal. No other radio transmissions or distress calls were from received from the pilot after the altimeter setting acknowledgment.

Radar data showed the airplane begin a descending right turn with airspeed increasing slightly through the turn and then suddenly decreasing to 61 knots as the radius of the turn decreased. The airplane had turned approximately 270 degrees of heading and descended to an altitude of 4,900 feet msl before radar contact was lost.

There were no eye-witnesses to the accident, however, a boy who was a passenger of a car reported that he thought that he saw the airplane coming out of the low clouds in a descent, about wings level before it disappeared out of sight behind a tree line. The boy stated that he then saw black smoke.

Recovered data from the on-board data module (RDM) showed an anomaly in the electrical bus voltages, autopilot mode changes, a momentary drop out of the pilot transmit frequency, and a descending right turn with a decreasing radius until impact. Detailed information is provided in the TESTS AND RESEARCH section of this report.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the pilot held a valid private pilot certificate with Airplane Single Engine Land (ASEL) and Instrument Airplane ratings. He held a valid third class medical certificate, issued April 28, 2010. At the time of his most recent medical exam, the pilot reported about 1,200 hours total flight time, of which 100 hours were within the preceding 6 months. The pilot attended and completed the Cirrus Standard Perspective Differences and Cirrus Turbo Differences Course on April 14, 2009. Additionally, he completed the Cirrus Icing Awareness Course on October 5, 2009.

According to information provided by a flight instructor who had flown about once a month with the pilot in recent years, the pilot completed a successful bi-annual flight review in the SR22 on February 17, 2012.

Remnants of the pilot's logbook were found at the accident site, but the contents were damaged from impact and could not be documented.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Cirrus SR22-3423, registration number, N110EB, received its standard airworthiness certificate on April 13, 2009. Cirrus records indicate that the pilot purchased the airplane new and took delivery on April 13, 2009. According to the records on file at Cirrus Aircraft, the airplane was equipped with: Garmin Perspective avionics with dual AHRRS and a single air data computer, Chartview, a GFC 700 autopilot with yaw dampener, Enhanced Vision System (EVS), Synthetic Vision, air conditioning, a Tornado Alley turbo-charging system, supplemental oxygen, engine monitoring, traffic alerting system, terrain awareness system (TAWS-B), XM weather/radio, FIKI, a Tanis heater, and a recoverable data module (RDM). 

The cover for the airframe, engine, and propeller logbooks were found at the accident site, but the pages were not located. 

The airplane was equipped with a two-alternator, two battery, 28-volt direct current (VDC) electrical system designed to reduce the risk of electrical system faults. The system provides uninterrupted power for avionics, flight instrumentation, lighting and other electrically operated and controlled systems during normal operation. The electrical system also provides automatic switching from either battery or alternator to the Essential Bus in the event of an electrical system failure by the opposing alternator or battery. 

The bolster panel contains the pilot switches for operating ALT 1, ALT 2, BAT 1, and BAT 2. The switches are mounted adjoining so that a pilot can control all four switches with a single hand. Power generated from the alternators is fed into the Master Control Unit (MCU). The MCU regulates and distributes the power to the batteries and the system loads. Each alternator provides constant charging current for the corresponding battery and primary power to the aircraft electrical system during normal system operation.

The flight instructor who had given the pilot his most recent bi-annual flight review reported that there had been one instance whereby the autopilot had disengaged during a flight sometime in the fall of 2011. He recalled that the problem may have been associated with a battery issue, but could not recall all of the details.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was from Zanesville Municipal Airport (ZZV), Zanesville, Ohio, located approximately 24 miles southwest of the accident site at an elevation of 900 feet. The airport had an un-augmented ASOS and reported the following conditions at the approximate time of the accident: Zanesville (ZZV) special weather observation at 1222 EDT, automated, wind from 340º at 5 knots, visibility 7 miles in light rain, ceiling broken at 800 feet agl, overcast at 1,200 feet, temperature 6º C, dew point 4º C, altimeter 29.89 inches of Hg. Remarks - automated observation system, ceiling 600 variable 1,000 feet, hourly precipitation 0.01 inch.

The pilot of N110EB contacted the Washington, DC, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contract Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) at 0745 EDT (1145Z) on April 21, 2012 and obtained a weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan. A copy of the event reconstruction for that briefing was obtained and is included as Attachment 1 in the NTSB Meteorology Group Chairman's Factual Report. An audio file was also reviewed and documented to evaluate the accuracy and content of that briefing, which follows: The pilot initially contacted the AFSS for an outlook briefing for the flight departing at 0800 EDT on April 22, 2012. 

A complete meteorological factual report prepared by a NTSB meteorology specialist is available in the supporting docket for this report.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The Recoverable Data Module (RDM) was located in the debris field and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington DC for evaluation and download. 

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

General

The airplane's main wreckage was located on a heavily wooded hillside at 40°14'58.32" North latitude, 81°32'44.95" West longitude at an approximate elevation of 1,060 feet msl. The direction of energy was about 093 degrees magnetic. The hillside had a 10-degree up slope. The initial point of impact consisted of two trees about 31 feet apart. One tree had missing bark and tree scars on one of its large branches approximately 44 feet above the ground. The second tree's trunk was broke off approximately 34 feet above the ground. Three more tree trunks in the direction of energy ranging in size from 4-8 inches were freshly broken off. 

About 80 feet from the initial point of impact there was a 3-4 foot deep crater that measured approximately 11 feet long. Within the crater, the propeller hub remained attached to a portion of the crankshaft, which still had the #6 cylinder attached to it by the piston and connecting rod. There were two trees at the far end of the crater. The main wreckage including the firewall, engine, instrument panel, and center console, was found leaning uphill against the trees. 

The remainder of the airplane was severely fragmented and dispersed over a debris field that measured roughly 370 feet long by about 250 feet wide at its widest point. Evidence of spot fires were present throughout the debris field. Brown wilted vegetation was present that was consistent with fuel damage. Evidence at the site was consistent with the airplane impacting the trees about 25-30 degrees nose down and level wings.

Engine

The main portion of the engine was located approximately four feet from the impact crater and exhibited impact damage. The forward portion of the crankshaft and propeller hub, and the number six cylinder were located in the impact crater and was embedded the ground. Fractured pieces of the engine crankcase and oil sump were located in the impact crater along with a turbocharger, forward section of the cam shaft, parts of the propeller governor,and magneto drive gears. The engine and all components and accessories exhibited impact damage. The right magneto was separated from the engine, exhibited impact damage and the housing was fractured. The magneto was disassembled with no pre-impact anomalies noted. The left magneto was separated from the engine, exhibited impact damage and the housing was fractured exposing the internal parts of the magneto. The magneto was disassembled with no pre-impact anomalies noted. The ignition harness exhibited impact damage. The spark plugs exhibited impact damage and had light colored combustion deposits. The electrodes were normal when compared to the Champion Check A Plug chart. The fuel pump was fractured free of the engine and located in the debris field. The fuel pump exhibited impact damage. The drive coupling was fractured and only half of it was located. The fuel pump turned freely by hand using a screw driver. The fuel pump was disassembled and exhibited normal operating signatures. The oil pump remained attached to the engine. The cover was not removed due to damage to the oil pump housing studs. The oil sump exhibited impact damage and was fractured into several small pieces in the impact crater.

Cylinder number six and a portion of the crankshaft were separated from the engine and located in the impact crater. Cylinder five was separated from the crankcase and remained attached to the crankshaft by the piston and connecting rod. All six cylinders exhibited impact damage. All cylinders were inspected using a lighted bore scope. The internal combustion chambers exhibited a material consistent with that of light combustion deposits. The cylinder bores were clear of scoring and no evidence of hard particle passage was observed in the cylinder bore ring travel area. Dirt was observed in the combustion chambers and all induction risers were fractured from the cylinders. Impact damage to the valve train, rocker arms and rocker arm covers was observed. The rocker arm covers were removed and those that were not breached contained a residue of oil. All damage noted was consistent with impact damage. The crankcase exhibited impact damage and the forward section was fragmented. The accessory portion of the crankcase was fractured. The crankshaft was fractured between the number 5 and number 6 rod journals. The forward portion of the crankshaft was separated from the crankcase and the propeller hub remained attached to the propeller flange. The camshaft gear and magneto drive gears were found in the wreckage and exhibited impact damage.The starter was fractured at its base and exhibited impact damage. The base remained attached to the starter adaptor and the other half of the starter remained attached to the firewall by a cable.

The propeller hub remained attached to the engine crankshaft propeller flange. All three of the composite propeller blades were fractured near the hub and located in the debris path. All three blades exhibited nicks, gouges, and portions of the blades were missing.

Fuselage and Cabin Section

The fuselage was severely fragmented along the debris path. Both crew doors were fragmented. Larger portions of the upper and lower sections of both doors were located within the debris field. The latching mechanisms for the upper and lower latches for both doors were located and exhibited impact damage. The baggage door was found separated from the fuselage and exhibited impact damage.

All the seats were fragmented. The left front crew seat airbag was deployed. A large portion of the right front crew seat was hanging in a tree and was not accessible for examination. The right front airbag could be seen and was deployed.

Cockpit

Switch positions and settings could not be documented due to severe impact damage. A flight bag, Jeppesen chart notebooks, airplane manuals, and miscellaneous items (baggage tie down straps, fuel sampler cup, etc.) were present in the debris field. A rolled up set of sun reflector mats were present in the debris field. The pilot's logbook was present in debris field. It had sustained fire damage and no usable information was obtained. A propeller logbook binder cover was present in the debris field. Pages from the propeller logbook were not recovered. The cover for the airframe logbook was located in the debris field. Pages from the logbook were not recovered.

Seats and Restraints

All the seats were fragmented. The left front crew seat airbag was deployed. A large portion of the right front crew seat was hanging in a tree and was not accessible for examination. The right front airbag could be seen and was deployed.

Wing Section and Control Surfaces 

The wing was found severely fragmented. Three main pieces of aileron were identified in the debris field that made up the majority of the left aileron. Two main pieces of the left flap were located in the debris field that made up the majority of the left flap. The right flap was found separated from the wing and exhibited fire and impact damage. Three pieces of aileron were identified in the debris field that made up the majority of the right aileron. About 4 feet of the center aileron control cable was found from the left hand turnbuckle to the console aileron actuation pulley. The cable was fractured at the console aileron actuation pulley. When visually examined, the fracture had a broom straw appearance consistent with tension overload. The other end of the cable was fractured at the turnbuckle. Two sections of aileron control cable were located in the debris field with the flap hinge assemblies present on the cable. When visually examined, both sections of control cable had fractures with a broom straw appearance consistent with tension overload. 

The roll trim motor position could not be determined due to impact damage. 

The flap actuator shaft was found separated from the flap motor. When the flap motor components were laid out together the shaft extension was approximately 4 inches which was consistent with the flaps being in and 'UP' position.

Empennage and Stabilizers

The empennage was mostly fragmented. The horizontal stabilizer was found separated from the empennage and exhibited impact damage, with both the upper and lower skins mostly intact. Both elevators were separated from the horizontal stabilizer and exhibited impact damage. The pitch trim motor was in a neutral position. Elevator control cable continuity was confirmed.

The vertical stabilizer was found fragmented. The rudder was separated from the vertical stabilizer and exhibited impact damage. Rudder control cable continuity was confirmed.

Landing Gear

The nose landing gear assembly separated from the airplane and exhibited impact damage. The left main landing gear and its surrounding mounting structure separated from the wing and exhibited impact damage. The right main landing gear was fragmented.

Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS)

The CAPS safety pin was located in the debris field and evidence at the site was consistent with the system not being deployed prior to impact. The activation handle was found separated from the activation cable and was located in the debris field. About 10.5 feet of the activation cable remained attached to the igniter assembly. Most of the activation cable housing was not present. When visually examined the fractured end of the cable had a broom straw appearance consistent with tension overload.

The FS222 bulkhead was fragmented. The rocket motor launch tube assembly was found attached to the FS222 bulkhead and exhibited impact damage. The igniter base, when viewed looking down the launch tube, had a brownish appearance consistent with residue from a rocket motor ignition. The parachute enclosure was found separated from the FS222 bulkhead. The CB7 access panel was found separated from the FS222 bulkhead. There was forward bowing of the lower portion of the panel. Four cuts were present in the bowed portion of the panel that were consistent in size and shape of the 3-point shackles. Vertical scratching was present on the aft side of the panel.

The CAPS harnesses, risers and a portion of the parachute suspension lines extended from the main wreckage on an 80 degree magnetic azimuth and were tangled through several trees. The incremental bridle and lanyards remained attached to the D-bag. The incremental bridle was partially unstitched. There were 75 bar tack stitches present. When measured, the stitched portion of the incremental bridle was 36 inches in length. The parachute was found in the D-bag. The suspension lines of the parachute were found partially extracted from the D-bag. Part of the nylon D-bag appeared melted. The rear harness was partially undone with 20 inches remaining stitched together. One reefing line cutter was attached to a Y-strap. The ignition loop was bent but present in the reefing line cutter. The other reefing line cutter was not observed. The white cord that secures the triple D-ring assembly had been cut. A small portion of the white cord remained tucked behind the Velcro enclosure for the reefing line cutters.

The CAPS enclosure cover was located about 75-100 feet uphill of the main wreckage and exhibited impact damage.

The rocket motor was located approximately 165 feet uphill from the main wreckage. The placard atop of the motor canister was scratched and torn. The pick-up collar and support were present on the rocket motor and exhibited impact damage. The rocket motor and pick-up collar assembly had separated from the incremental bridle lanyards.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot and no medical issues were discovered that could have contributed to the accident. Toxicology tests performed were negative.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

RDM Description

The Heads Up Technologies RDM is a crash hardened unit installed in the tail of the aircraft in order to record flight, engine, and autopilot parameters. Data is logged once per second and stored internally on 4 thin small outline package (TSOP) memory devices inside the crash hardened enclosure. When the storage limit is reached the oldest record is deleted.

Autopilot Description

The Garmin GFC 700 digital Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Autopilot system is a fully digital, dual channel, fail-passive digital flight control system composed of multiple Line-Replaceable Units (LRUs) and servos. The GFC 700 is fully integrated within the Cirrus Perspective Integrated Avionics System architecture and is used to stabilize the aircraft pitch, roll and yaw (optional) axes. Pitch auto trim provides trim commands to the pitch trim servo to relieve any long-term effort required by the pitch servo. 

Summary of RDM Data for the Accident Flight

The recorded data indicate that prior to the upset the airplane had been travelling at about 8000 feet pressure altitude, at an airspeed of 148 knots, heading 273 degrees magnetic while on autopilot (in the GPS lateral mode and ALT vertical mode) navigating to APE (the GPS way point for the Appleton, Ohio VOR antenna). 

About 16:18:30 UTC, the data for Alternator 2 became invalid after having been at a previous value of 25 Amps. At the same time, the data for Battery 1 also became invalid for one second, and then changed to -27 Amps. Subsequently, the voltages for the Main Bus 1 and 2, and the Essential Bus decreased from about 28-29 volts, to about 23-25 volts. 

About 3 seconds later at 16:18:33, the autopilot disengaged (the Autopilot/Flight Director parameter changed from AP/FD to FD only). About 2 seconds after that, the airplane began rolling to the right (right wing down) and the heading began to increase (right turn). About 10 sends later, the pitch attitude began to decrease (airplane nose down) and the altitude began to decrease. 

About 16:18:53, the autopilot was re-engaged, and the AP mode had changed from GPS and ALT to ROLL and PITCH. At this time, the roll attitude was about 32 degrees right wing down and the pitch attitude was about 5 degrees nose down. These values increased to a peak of about 63 degrees right wing down and 24 degrees nose down, before they began to reduce. When the values had reduced to 48 degrees of right roll and 16 degrees of nose down pitch and at an airspeed of 203 knots, the autopilot mode changed to LEVEL for both the lateral and vertical coupled modes at about 16:19:09. The engine power was reduced about 5 seconds later. 

The nose down pitch attitude then reduced gradually and continually was toward level and reached 0 at about 16:19:27. Over this time the roll attitude oscillated down (toward wings level) to about 30 degrees right wing down and then increased back to about 41 degrees right wing down at 16:19:27. 

The airplane then rolled sharply to the right, reaching 155 degrees of right roll, while the pitch attitude sharply decreased to about 71 degrees nose down. Shortly thereafter, the airspeed increased to about 277 knots. Both roll and pitch then reversed their trends back toward level, and had reached about 18 degrees right wing down and 46 degrees nose down, before the data ended at 16:19:47. During this trend reversal, the normal acceleration reached the recorded limit of 5 positive G's. 

Note: The entire Vehicle Recorder Laboratory Factual Report prepared by a NTSB vehicle recorder specialist is available in the supporting docket for this report.

Electrical System, Autopilot and RDM Data Observations in an Exemplar Airplane

During the week of September 29, 2014, under the oversight of the NTSB IIC, Cirrus SR22, serial number 3771, was ground run with the same Garmin Integrated Avionics (GIA) software version as the accident airplane (Version 6.07 also referred to as Phase C+). Bolster switches for ALT1, ALT2, BAT1, BAT2, and Avionics were cycled OFF then ON in various combinations to observe the cockpit displays and compare them with the RDM data recorded for the same time frame.

Seven sets of various bolster switch activations/deactivations were documented to demonstrate what occurs in the cockpit and what data the RDM records respective to manual movements of the switches (i.e., ON/OFF). The areas in the RDM data that were examined were: Essential Bus volts, Main Bus 1 volts, Main Bus 2 volts, Alternator 1 amps, Alternator 2 amps, Pilot Transmit Frequency, and Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Modes. 

#1 Avionics Switch OFF, Then Turned Back ON 

The Avionics Switch was turned OFF for approximately 10 seconds. In the RDM data, the Essential and Main Bus voltages remained the same; the ALT 1&2 and BAT1 amp readings remained the same. The pilot transmit frequency changed from the selected communications frequency to a null value represented by 5 dashes. No change in the AFCS Modes occurred. 

The PFD displayed an "Avionics OFF" crew alerting system (CAS) message. A Red X was displayed over the location of the transponder information. 

During the time the Avionics switch was turned off the COM1 frequency number displayed on the PFD turned white. According to the Garmin Pilot's Guide when both active COM frequencies appear white it is an indication that no COM radio is selected for transmitting (on the audio panel).

Once the Avionics Switch was turned back on, the audio panel lights all lit up momentarily consistent with the unit conducting a self-test during normal start-up. Immediately following this, the selections that had been on prior to the Avionics Switch being shut off were re-illuminated. At about this time the COM1 frequency turned green again on the PFD. Additionally, the Red X over the Transponder Status Box was replaced with the transponder information. 

#2 BAT1 Switch OFF

The BAT1 switch was turned off for approximately 12 seconds. In the RDM data, the Essential and Main Bus voltages remained the same; the ALT 1&2 and BAT1 amp readings remained the same. No change in the Pilot Transmit Frequency or AFCS Modes occurred. The PFD did not display any messages during the time the BAT1 switch was in the OFF position.

#3 ALT 1&2 OFF

The ALT 1&2 switches were turned off for approximately one minute. In the RDM data, the Essential and Main Bus voltages decreased. ALT 1&2 amps decreased to zero or dashes. BAT1 amps increased. No change in the Pilot Transmit Frequency or AFCS Modes occurred. The PFD displayed multiple CAS caution messages.

#4 ALT 1&2 and Avionics Switch OFF, Then Avionics Switch Turned Back ON

The ALT 1&2 and Avionics Switch were turned OFF. Then the Avionics Switch was immediately turned back ON. In the RDM data, the Essential and Main Bus voltages decreased. ALT 1&2 amps decreased to zero or dashes. BAT1 amps increased. The Pilot Transmit Frequency went from the selected communications frequency to dashes for two seconds. No change in AFCS modes occurred.

The PFD behavior was consistent with the behavior described in #1 above.

#5 ALT 1&2 and BAT1 Switches OFF, Then BAT1 Switch Turned Back ON

The ALT 1&2 and BAT1 switches were turned OFF. Then the BAT1 switch was immediately turned back ON. 

In the RDM data, the Essential Bus and Main Bus 1&2 volts decreased. ALT 1&2 amps decreased to zero or dashes. BAT1 amps increased. The Pilot Transmit Frequency went from the selected communications frequency to dashes for two seconds. The autopilot data changed from "AGA--Y----" to "FGA-------". 

"AGA--Y---"

"A" = Autopilot and Flight Director engaged

"G" = GPS coupled lateral mode 

"A" = Altitude coupled vertical mode

"Y" = Yaw dampener ON

"FGA"-------"

"F" = Flight Director engaged

"G" = GPS coupled lateral mode

"A" = Altitude coupled vertical mode

"-" = Yaw Dampener OFF

The PFD displayed the AFCS Status Annunciation Warning: "PITCH." 

The AFCS Status Box displayed an Automatic Autopilot Disengagement indicated by a flashing red and white "AP" annunciation and by the autopilot disconnect aural alert, which continued until the AP Key was depressed on the AFCS control panel. 

Additionally, the AFCS Status Box displayed an Automatic Yaw Dampener disengagement indicated by a five-second flashing yellow "YD" annunciation. After five seconds the "YD" extinguished (went blank).

The COM2 frequency momentarily was Red X'ed. Multiple messages were listed in the Comparator Window. CAS caution messages were displayed over time with regard to electrical busses and BAT1. 

Approximately 18 seconds after the BAT1 switch was turned back on, the AP Key on the AFCS control panel was depressed. The aural alert tone "warbled" and the flashing red & white "AP" extinguished. The AP Key was pushed a second time and the aural alert was silenced. Normal operation usually requires the AP Key be depressed one time to silence the aural alert. 

Following this, additional attempts to depress the AP Key did not result in the engagement of the autopilot until the AFCS Status Annunciation Warning: "PITCH" extinguished. Once the warning did extinguish, depressing the AP Key immediately engaged the autopilot.

#6 ALT1&2, BAT1, Avionics Switch OFF, Then BAT1 and Avionics Switches ON

The ALT 1&2 and BAT1 switches were turned OFF. Then the BAT1 and the Avionics switch were immediately turned back ON. 

In the RDM data, the Essential Bus and Main Bus 1&2 volts decreased. ALT 1&2 amps decreased to zero or dashes. BAT1 amps increased. The Pilot Transmit Frequency went from the selected communications frequency to dashes for three seconds. The autopilot data changed from "AGA--Y----" to "FGA-------".

Ten seconds later the autopilot data changed from "FGA-------" to "FRP-------".

"FGA-------" 

"F" = Flight Director engaged

"G" = GPS coupled lateral mode

"A" = Altitude coupled vertical mode

"FRP-------" 

"F" = Flight Director engaged

"R" = Roll coupled lateral mode

"P" = Pitch coupled vertical mode

The PFD displayed the AFCS Status Annunciation Warning: "PITCH." 

The AFCS Status Box displayed an Automatic Autopilot Disengagement indicated by a flashing red and white "AP" annunciation and by the autopilot disconnect aural alert, which continued until the Autopilot Disconnect Button was depressed on the pilot's yoke.

The AFCS Status Box also displayed an Automatic Yaw Dampener disengagement, indicated by a five-second flashing yellow "YD" annunciation. After five seconds the "YD" extinguished (went blank).

The AFCS Status Box also indicated that the flight director was reverting to the default mode in both the lateral and vertical axis. This was displayed as a flashing yellow mode annunciation for both GPS and ALT for 10 seconds. After 10 seconds the flashing yellow annunciation stopped and was replaced with a green Roll Hold Mode annunciation (ROL) and a green Pitch Hold Mode annunciation (PIT).

Following this, additional attempts to depress the AP Key did not result in the engagement of the autopilot until the AFCS Status Annunciation Warning: "PITCH" extinguished. Once the warning extinguished, depressing the AP Key immediately engaged the autopilot.

#7 ALT1&2, BAT1&2, Avionics Switch OFF, Then All Switches Immediately Back ON

The ALT 1&2, BAT 1&2, and Avionics Switch were all turned OFF. Then all the switches were immediately turned back ON. 

In the RDM data, the Essential Bus and Main Bus 1&2 voltages remained constant. ALT1&2 and BAT1 amps remained constant. The Pilot Transmit Frequency changed from the selected communications frequency to 121.500 for one second then returned to the previously selected communications frequency. The autopilot data changed from "AGA--Y----" to all dashes. Engine monitoring data parameters continued to record whereas multiple other parameters reverted to dashes. 

The PFD momentarily displayed all possible flags except for the comparator and CAS message boxes. Shortly after this the "AHRS ALIGN: Keep Wings Level" message appeared while the screen background was all black. The AFCS Control Unit lights all extinguished.

Summary of Bolster Switch Operations

Bolster switch operation on the exemplar airplane yielded recorded data similar to the accident flight data. It also provided insights regarding power interruptions to key components like the autopilot and audio panel and data recorded in association with their operation. However, the source of the power interruption during the accident flight could not be definitively reproduced or identified – i.e., electrical anomalies, bolster switch operation, or circuit breaker operation because the RDM does not record the physical position of either the bolster switches or circuit breakers.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

After the on-scene phase of the investigation, the airplane wreckage was recovered to Atlanta Air Salvage, Atlanta, Georgia, and later released to the owner's representative.


NTSB Identification: CEN12FA251
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, April 21, 2012 in Newcomerstown, OH
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N110EB
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 21, 2012, approximately 1220 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22, N110EB, registered to Photopheresis INC., of Morristown, New Jersey, was substantially damaged when it impacted heavily wooded terrain in the vicinity of Newcomerstown, Ohio. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal cross country flight. The flight originated at 1013 from the Somerset Airport (SMQ), and its intended destination was Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio.

According to preliminary radar data and recorded radio communications, approximately 5 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was in cruise flight at 8,000 feet msl at 156 knots ground speed, when Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) updated the altimeter setting via radio. The pilot acknowledged the call and sounded normal. No other transmissions were from received from the pilot.

Preliminary radar data showed the airplane begin a descending right turn with airspeed increasing slightly through the turn and then suddenly decreasing to 61 knots as the radius of the turn decreased. The airplane had turned approximately 270 degrees of heading and descended to an altitude of 4,900 feet msl before radar contact was lost.

The airplane's main wreckage (cabin and engine) was located on a heavily wooded hillside at 40°14'58.32" North latitude, 81°32'44.95" West longitude at an approximate elevation of 1,060 feet msl. The direction of energy was about 093 degrees magnetic. The hillside had a 10-degree upslope. The initial point of impact consisted of two trees 31 feet apart from one another. One tree had missing bark and tree scars on one of its large branches approximately 44 feet above the ground. The second tree’s trunk was broke off approximately 34 feet above the ground. Three more tree trunks in the direction of energy ranging in size from 4-8 inches were freshly broken off. The remainder of the airplane was severely fragmented and dispersed over a debris field that measured roughly 370 feet long by about 250 feet wide at its widest point. Evidence of spot fires were present throughout the debris field. Brown wilted vegetation was present that was consistent with fuel damage. Evidence at the site was consistent with the airplane impacting the trees approximately 25-30 degrees nose down and about level wings.

The airplane's Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) system was examined at the accident site and evidence showed that it had not deployed prior to impact.

The airplane's Remote Data Module (RDM) was located in the debris field and taken into custody by the NSTB IIC for examination at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory, Washington DC.

There were no eye-witnesses to the accident, however, a boy who was a passenger of a car reported that he thought that he saw the airplane coming out of the clouds in a descent before it disappeared out of sight behind a tree line. He stated that he then saw black smoke.

The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was from Zanesville Municipal Airport (KZZV), Zanesville, Ohio, located approximately 24 miles southwest of the accident site at an elevation of 900 feet. The airport had an un-augmented ASOS and reported the following conditions at the approximate time of the accident: Zanesville (KZZV) special weather observation at 1222 EDT (1622Z), automated, wind from 340º at 5 knots, visibility 7 miles in light rain, ceiling broken at 800 feet agl, overcast at 1,200 feet, temperature 6º C, dew point 4º C, altimeter 29.89 inches of Hg. Remarks - automated observation system, ceiling 600 variable 1,000 feet, hourly precipitation 0.01 inch.

After the on-scene phase of the investigation, the airplane wreckage was recovered to Atlanta Air Salvage, Atlanta, Georgia.


 
Emilio Bisaccia, MD 
 Resident of Basking Ridge, NJ. Emilio passed away unexpectedly on Saturday April 21st. Raised in Nutley, NJ he went on to attend The Ohio State University graduating with a BA cum laude in June 1974. Emilio received a medical degree from the Medical College of Ohio in June 1979, and held medical licenses in NJ, NY and OH.

A Mass service for Dr. Emilio P. Bisaccia, MD, who died last Saturday in a single-engine plane crash in Ohio, is scheduled for Monday at St. James R.C. Church in Basking Ridge at 11 a.m., according to an online obituary on the Gallaway & Crane Funeral Home website.

Visiting hours prior to the Funeral Mass are scheduled for noon to 2 p.m. and from 4 to 6 p.m. on Sunday, at Gallaway & Crane Funeral Home, 101 S. Finley Ave. in Basking Ridge.

Interment will be at Somerset Hills Memorial Park Mausoleum in Basking Ridge, according to the obituary information.

The website said Bisaccia was born on Nov. 10, 1952, in Newark. He was a resident of Basking Ridge.

According to a statement issued on Tuesday by the Affiliated Dermatology Cosmetic Surgery Center, which Dr. Bisaccia co-founded, he is survived by his wife, Teresa, and two sons, Adam and Devon.

Affiliated Dermatology has offices in Morristown, Liberty Corner and Ohio. 

His obituary said the family has asked memorial gifts be directed to the Columbia University Department of Dermatology, c/o Marilyn Mullins, 100 Haven Ave., Suite 29D, New York, N.Y. 10032, or to the Wounded Warrior Project P.O. Box 758517, Topeka, Kansas 66675. 

NTSB Identification: CEN12FA251 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, April 21, 2012 in Newcomerstown, OH
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N110EB
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On April 21, 2012, approximately 1220 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22, N110EB, registered to Photopheresis INC., of Morristown, New Jersey, was substantially damaged when it impacted heavily wooded terrain in the vicinity of Newcomerstown, Ohio. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the vicinity and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal cross country flight. The flight originated at 1013 from the Somerset Airport (SMQ), and its intended destination was Ohio State University Airport (OSU), Columbus, Ohio.

According to preliminary radar data and recorded radio communications, approximately 5 minutes prior to the accident, the airplane was in cruise flight at 8,000 feet msl at 156 knots ground speed, when Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) updated the altimeter setting via radio. The pilot acknowledged the call and sounded normal. No other transmissions were from received from the pilot.

Preliminary radar data showed the airplane begin a descending right turn with airspeed increasing slightly through the turn and then suddenly decreasing to 61 knots as the radius of the turn decreased. The airplane had turned approximately 270 degrees of heading and descended to an altitude of 4,900 feet msl before radar contact was lost.

The airplane's main wreckage (cabin and engine) was located on a heavily wooded hillside at 40°14'58.32" North latitude, 81°32'44.95" West longitude at an approximate elevation of 1,060 feet msl. The direction of energy was about 093 degrees magnetic. The hillside had a 10-degree upslope. The initial point of impact consisted of two trees 31 feet apart from one another. One tree had missing bark and tree scars on one of its large branches approximately 44 feet above the ground. The second tree’s trunk was broke off approximately 34 feet above the ground. Three more tree trunks in the direction of energy ranging in size from 4-8 inches were freshly broken off. The remainder of the airplane was severely fragmented and dispersed over a debris field that measured roughly 370 feet long by about 250 feet wide at its widest point. Evidence of spot fires were present throughout the debris field. Brown wilted vegetation was present that was consistent with fuel damage. Evidence at the site was consistent with the airplane impacting the trees approximately 25-30 degrees nose down and about level wings.

The airplane's Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) system was examined at the accident site and evidence showed that it had not deployed prior to impact.

The airplane's Remote Data Module (RDM) was located in the debris field and taken into custody by the NSTB IIC for examination at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory, Washington DC.

There were no eye-witnesses to the accident, however, a boy who was a passenger of a car reported that he thought that he saw the airplane coming out of the clouds in a descent before it disappeared out of sight behind a tree line. He stated that he then saw black smoke.

The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was from Zanesville Municipal Airport (KZZV), Zanesville, Ohio, located approximately 24 miles southwest of the accident site at an elevation of 900 feet. The airport had an un-augmented ASOS and reported the following conditions at the approximate time of the accident: Zanesville (KZZV) special weather observation at 1222 EDT (1622Z), automated, wind from 340º at 5 knots, visibility 7 miles in light rain, ceiling broken at 800 feet agl, overcast at 1,200 feet, temperature 6º C, dew point 4º C, altimeter 29.89 inches of Hg. Remarks - automated observation system, ceiling 600 variable 1,000 feet, hourly precipitation 0.01 inch.

After the on-scene phase of the investigation, the airplane wreckage was recovered to Atlanta Air Salvage, Atlanta, Georgia.


FAA IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 110EB        Make/Model: SR22      Description: SR-22
  Date: 04/21/2012     Time: 1622

  Event Type: Accident   Highest Injury: Fatal     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
  City: NEWCOMERSTOWN   State: OH   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES INTO A WOODED AREA, THE 1 
  PERSON ON BOARD WAS FATALLY INJURED, 8 MILES FROM NEWCOMERSTOWN, OH

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   1
                 # Crew:   1     Fat:   1     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Unknown      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: CLEVELAND, OH  (GL25)                 Entry date: 04/23/2012 

Belize: Mysterious plane crash landed on farm road in San Victor Village


In the rush of the organized media to stay abreast of all the ‘latest’ homicidal rampages, the latest in a string of mysterious ‘drug planes’ that have crash-landed hither-and-yon throughout the country occurred this past Friday, April 20th, and it occurred once more in northern Belize.

The plane is a converted Cessna® 210-N single-engine with only two seats (for a pilot and a passenger), and modified to carry at least 1,000 pounds of cargo (most likely illicit drugs bound for Mexico, and then the United States and Canada for sale). But by the time the Police arrived, neither cargo nor pilot was aboard. 

When they arrived to the field, the mangled and wrecked plane was there, barely a shadow of its glorious self.

Police believe that the field in San Victor Village was the place that the plane planned to refuel, but the pilot couldn’t avoid a huge pothole in the feeder road, which led to the crash. The plane, despite having bogus registration papers which pointed to Ecuador as a point of origin, is believed to have been brought in Mexico.

As for the likely cargo, that’s long gone, either in the sea or already over the Mexican border. Police investigations continue at this time.

Embraer 190 PP-PJM Decolagem em Fernando de Noronha 1080p - Decolagem da pista 12.Voo TIB5431 com destino à Recife

‘Bhool-ja’: Bhoja Air Boeing 737-200, AP-BKC, Flight B4-213, Islamabad, Pakistan

‘Bhool-ja’ is not the name of any airline. It means ‘forget it’. It represents a mindset, a mental inertia, of those who choose lip service over actions, cosmetics over contents, first aid over root causes and ‘buddyism’ over competence. When a state adopts this mindset as its official policy, a series of events begin to happen. Buddies become director generals and shakedown inspections replace stringent airworthiness requirements and procedures. Check out a Boeing 737-200 manual, and you will find daily checks, transit checks, B checks, C checks and D checks, but nowhere will you find ‘shakedown’ checks that have been recently ordered by the government to give out the impression that it is doing something important. ‘Bhool-ja’ is based on the belief that peoples’ memory, anger and emotions have a short shelf-life and can be easily pacified by lame statements such as “the PM and president have taken notice of the accident or they have ordered an enquiry”. That is where all matters come to an end.

For any accident to happen there ought to be immediate, contributory and root causes. The current buddy system has created leaders who are neither capable nor interested in determining the root causes. Although a system of permits, licenses, and approvals exists for most functions, they continue to remain poorly regulated. The aeroplane that crashed in Islamabad and killed 127 persons had all the licenses, approvals and airworthiness certificates. Only if these had been effective, there would have been no need to order the vague, superficial and frivolous ‘shakedown’ inspections.

We need to do away with the ‘bhool-ja’ approach, de-politicise our institutions and insist that they follow professional and ethical standards. Our Buddy Aviation Authority (BAA) is just not in the right business. It took it three years and two letters in the press to correct the spellings of what was written as ‘Perlimantrians’ at the Jinnah Airport’s check-in counter. An organization that cannot see dozens of people smoking in the lounges, and scores smoking on the concourse of the airport, can hardly be trusted to keep an eye on the engineering aspects of modern-day jet airliners.


Naeem Sadiq

Karachi


Source:  http://www.thenews.com.pk

Syphax Airlines is now officially launched! Syphax Airlines est maintenant officiellement lancée, bon vent à notre compagnie ! sur la façade de la municipalité de Sfax (vidéo HD)

 

Sfax a connu le soir du 14 avril 2012 un évènement sans précédent en Tunisie. Pour son lancement, la nouvelle compagnie aérienne tunisienne Syphax Airlines a organisé  un show sur la façade de la municipalité de Sfax baptisé #SyphaxShow.  Des milliers de personnes ont été présentes et ont pu jouir d'un spectacle jamais réalisé en Tunisie auparavant.  Syphax Airlines est maintenant officiellement lancée, bon vent à notre compagnie !

Translation:
Sfax evening of April 14, 2012 an unprecedented event in Tunisia. At the launch, the new airline Syphax Tunisian Airlines held a show on the front of the Municipality of Sfax # SyphaxShow baptized.  Thousands of people attended and were treated to a show ever made in Tunisia before.

"Syphax Airlines is now officially launched, good luck to us!"

Washington: Report says state’s regional airports produce 250,000 jobs

Washington’s 135 public airports are continuing to help local economies take flight, generating thousands of jobs and millions of dollars for cities and counties throughout the state.

The findings are just a few of the highlights from the recently-released 2012 Aviation Economic Impact Study, conducted by the Washington State Department of Transportation’s Aviation Division, which protects and preserves the state’s system of public use airports.

Data collected for the impact study provides a look at how Washington’s public-use airports contribute to the economy.

“The study helps us take a much closer, detailed look at our system in terms of its economic benefits and provides unique insight from the perspective of the airports, the industry and those who use our services,” said Tristan Atkins, WSDOT aviation director. “Ultimately, it’s a tool that helps us improve the way we do business.”

Highlights of the 2012 study include:
  • Statewide commercial and general aviation activity generate approximately 248,500 jobs, $15.3 billion in wages, and $50.9 billion in economic activity.
  • A significant share of aviation system contributions are from the mobility and connectivity of people, goods and services across all modes of transportation.
  • Smaller airport facilities are critical in providing access to life-saving medical air transport and other services such as disaster management and wildfire support.
  • Tax revenues generated from aviation activities provide the State of Washington General Fund more than $540 million annually. Cities, special purpose districts, and counties receive approximately $243 million in annual revenue.
“Our last study was completed in 2001, so this also helps us provide some much-needed updates to economic data such as the jobs, wages and types of businesses at each airport,” Atkins said. “The 2012 study results speak for themselves – and the message is overwhelmingly positive.”

In 2001, airports generated 171,300 jobs, more than $4 billion in wages and $18.5 billion in annual sales.

The 2012 study uses different methods to present a more complete picture of the aviation system’s economic impacts, resulting in increases of 77,200 jobs, $11.3 billion in wages, and $32.4 billion in sales compared to the 2001 study.

Working to brighten the airports’ financial picture even further, WSDOT Aviation is creating an online calculator that will allow users to explore economic development opportunities, attract businesses and weigh investment choices at individual airports.

The interactive economic calculator is scheduled to be completed this spring and will integrate with WSDOT’s  Airport Information System database, which provides an in-depth look at the state’s airports.

Monitoring public use airports’ impacts is just one of the roles of WSDOT’s Aviation Division. WSDOT Aviation is also responsible for integrating aviation with the state’s other transportation modes of highways, rail and ferries.

Source:  http://theolympiareport.com

Flat tire leaves Air India passengers stranded for five hours

INDORE: About 130 passengers on board the Air India IC 606 flight were stranded for five hours at the Devi Ahilyabai Airport here at on Friday morning when one of its tires deflated just before take off for Delhi at 7.50 am.

Air India's Mumbai-Indore-Bhopal-Delhi flight (IC 606) landed at Indore airport at 7.20 am from Mumbai and it was expected to take off for Bhopal at 7.50 am.

The flight had to be cancelled and the passengers were sent to Delhi via Bhopal in another flight at 12.45 pm. This was the second flight to have been grounded at the city airport here in the last four days, after a Raipur-bound Jet Lite flight suffered a bird-hit at the airport on April 24.

Airport director RN Shinde said, "All the passengers were de-boarded safely and sent to Delhi by another aircraft. Experts are inspecting the grounded aircraft to figure out the reason for deflation of the tire."

The flight landed safely from Mumbai and boarding announcement was made after a technical team inspected it. However the deflated tire was detected when a couple of passengers were left to board the flight. It was then that the flight was cancelled.

Shinde however said the tire was damaged before touching the runway.

"Flight would not have been announced, had the technical error been spotted during inspection. It occurred after inspection," said an Air India official pleading anonymity.

The passengers later left with the IC 506 flight at 12.45 pm for Delhi via Bhopal from Indore. A technical team has been called from Delhi to inspect the grounded aircraft.

Mount Royal Aviation Fleet Unveiling

Mount Royal's School of Aviation unveils a brand new fleet of aircraft on April 12, 2012. The new planes include four Cessna C-172 Skyhawks and three Tecnam P2006Ts, as well as a new flight simulator on Mount Royal's Lincoln Park Campus. 

UFO caused Bhoja Air Boeing 737-200 plane crash in Islamabad, Pakistan - report

The Bhoja Air Boeing 737 crash in Islamabad on April 20 could have been caused by Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) sighting by the pilot, unconfirmed reports say.

A Russian news report on the crash shows footage of three mysterious lights moving in formation, leading to speculation in the UFO community that blame for the tragic accident might lie with an extraterrestrial craft, reported the Daily Mail.

The news report suggests that the pilot might have been distracted by the object and complained to the control tower at Islamabad Airport as he made his approach. The official reason however is that the plane’s fuel tanks exploded midair during a heavy thunderstorm, killing all 127 people on board.

In a mayday call made moments before the disaster, the pilot reported that a fuel tank had caught fire and the plane was out of control. He asked controllers at Benazir Bhutto International Airport for help as he prepared for an emergency landing, saying he could see the roofs of houses but not the runway.

The Civil Aviation Authority said the aircraft had been properly positioned as it began its approach, but suddenly descended to 200 feet while still flying at 300 miles an hour. It then descended 50 feet more before its tanks exploded.

Given the violent storm lashing Islamabad during the accident, some experts have speculated that ‘wind shear, the sudden changes in wind that can lift or smash an aircraft into the ground during landing, might have been a factor.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has ordered a judicial investigation into the accident. Farooq Bhoja, head of Bhoja Air, has been put on the Exit Control List. Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, ‘’It is being said that the aircraft was quite old, so it has been ordered to investigate thoroughly the air worthiness of the Bhoja Air aircraft.’’ 

Source:  http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk

Cessna 560XL Citation XLS, Pape Group Inc., N101PG: Accident occurred April 27, 2012 in Eugene, Oregon

NTSB Identification: WPR12FA193
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 27, 2012 in Eugene, OR
Probable Cause Approval Date: 07/07/2015
Aircraft: CESSNA 560XL, registration: N101PG
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that, during the visual approach to the airport, he and the second-in-command (SIC) lowered the landing gear and verified that all cockpit indications showed that the landing gear were in the down-and-locked position. The airplane touched down smoothly on the main landing gear (MLG) and then touched down on the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC had his hand on the thrust reversers when he and the SIC heard the landing gear unsafe horn; the left MLG then collapsed followed immediately by the collapse of the right MLG and the NLG. The airplane slid on its belly for about 1,500 ft before it came to rest on the runway. Cockpit voice recorder data confirmed that the unsafe landing gear configuration warning did not occur before touchdown as reported by the PIC. 

Postaccident examination revealed that, although the landing gear handle was in the down-and-locked position, all of the landing gear were fully retracted and engaged in their respective uplocks. Extensive testing of the airplane's hydraulic and electrical systems did not reveal any malfunctions that would have resulted in an uncommanded gear retraction. Some small, fine particulate matter was observed within the hydraulic manifold assembly; however, testing was unable to determine if these particles contributed to the uncommanded landing gear retraction.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
An uncommanded landing gear retraction after touchdown for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT


On April 27, 2012, about 1430 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna Citation 560XL, N101PG, sustained substantial damage to the left wing and front pressure bulkhead following an uncommanded landing gear retraction while landing at Mahlon Sweet Field Airport (EUG), Eugene, Oregon. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and one passenger were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Pape Group Inc., as a cross country corporate transportation flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio, with an intermediate stop at Centennial Airport (APA) in Denver, Colorado. 

The pilot in command (PIC) reported that the flight from APA was uneventful. During the visual approach into EUG, the PIC called for full flaps and final landing configuration. The flight crew both verified that all cockpit indications showed the landing gear in the down and locked position. The airplane touched down smoothly on the main landing gear followed by the nose gear. The PIC had his hand on the thrust reversers (he was unsure if he started to deploy them or not) when the flight crew heard the landing gear unsafe horn; the left main landing gear collapsed followed immediately by the right and nose gears. The airplane slid on its belly for about 1,500 feet before it came to rest on the runway. 

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot in Command (PIC)

The PIC, age 44, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings that included airplane single- and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated about 5,600 hours of flight experience, about 250 of which were in the accident airplane. His most recent FAA second-class airman medical certificate was issued on April 14, 2012, with the restriction that he must wear corrective lenses. 

Second Pilot

The second pilot, age 45, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings that included airplane single- and multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. At the time of the accident, he had accumulated about 2,519 hours of flight experience, about 15 of which were in the accident airplane. He also held a FAA second-class medical with no limitations or waivers. 

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Cessna Citation 560XL, serial number 560-5590, and was manufactured in 2005. The airplane was maintained under a manufacturer's inspection program and its most recent maintenance occurred on December 21, 2011. At the time of the accident, the airplane had a total time of 1,937 hours.

The airplane has a tricycle landing gear system that is controlled electrically and actuated hydraulically. 

The landing gear control panel in the cockpit contains a landing gear handle, three gear indicator lights, a red gear unlocked indicator, and an audible warning system. The landing gear handle can be positioned either up or down, with the two positions separated by a detent. Therefore, if the handle is in the up position the pilot must pull the handle out to clear the detent before positioning it in the down position. There is also a locking solenoid within the gear handle that physically restricts the handle from being moved while the airplane is on the ground. This solenoid is activated by a squat switch on the left main landing gear, which indicates if there is 'weight on wheels' or 'no weight on wheels'. 

The hydraulic system contains a bypass valve, a manifold assembly that houses the control valves for all hydraulic components, and landing gear actuators. The bypass valve opens and closes on command to pressurize and depressurize the system. The landing gear control valve, which is secured to the manifold assembly, receives an electrical signal to either an extend or retract solenoid, which directs fluid through an internal spool to either the extend or retract side of the hydraulic system. When the control valve is not in use, it is spring loaded to a neutral position. Finally, the landing gear actuators, one at each gear, raise and lower the gears. When the gear is retracted, mechanical uplocks hold the gear in place; and when the gear is extended, an internal lock within the actuators hold the gear into the extended position.

In summary, if the pilot wants to retract the landing gear: with weight off of the left landing gear squat switch, the landing gear handle solenoid unlocks, and the pilot can move the handle to the up (retract) position. The pilot then receives a GEAR UNLOCKED indicator light; an electrical signal is sent to close the bypass valve, and to energize the landing gear control valve. The hydraulic fluid pressurizes and routes through the landing gear control valve to the retract side of the hydraulic system. The fluid then flows to the landing gear actuators which raise and mechanically lock the gear. Once all three gears are in the up position the bypass opens to reduce pressure, the control valve is positioned to neutral, and the GEAR UNLOCKED indicator light extinguishes. 

To extend the landing gear, the system works identical with the exception that the landing gear control valve routes fluid through the uplocks to release them before going to the extend side of the actuating cylinders. Also, when the landing gear is down and locked the pilot will get three green gear safe lights.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1441, the weather reported at EUG was wind from 200 degrees at 9 knots, 10 statute miles of visibility, scattered clouds at 3,300 feet above ground level (agl) and 4,300 feet agl, broken clouds at 5,000 feet agl, temperature 13 degrees C, dewpoint 6 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.32 inches of mercury. 

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Mahlon Sweet Field Airport (EUG) is located about 7 miles northwest of Eugene, Oregon and has a field elevation of 374 feet. The airport has two runways, runway 16R/34L and 16L/34R both of which are grooved asphalt runways and in good condition. The accident occurred on runway 16R, which is 8,009 feet long and 150 feet wide; the pilot reported that the runway was dry at the time of the accident. 

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that the flight crew read through the landing checklists. The recording also captured the sound of the landing gear extending and the flight crew verifying "three green." After touchdown, a thump and another thump was heard followed immediately by the gear warning horn. The airplane rolled down the runway for a few seconds and the recording captured the landing gear collapse, followed by the sound of the airplane sliding. [Additional information can be found in the CVR group chairman's report located in the public docket.]

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Examination at Mahlon Sweet Field Airport in Eugene, Oregon 

Initial examination of the airplane revealed the left wing sustained scrape damage, which punctured the left wing fuel tank. In addition, a communications antenna was pushed through the pressure vessel. A cockpit inspection revealed the landing gear handle was in the down position, the anti-skid was on, and the flaps were fully extended. All of the circuit breakers were engaged with the exception of the CVR and AHRS AUX BATT CHG, which were intentionally pulled after the accident as directed by the National Transportation Safety Board investigator in charge. The landing gear handle was intentionally bumped numerous times to ensure that it could not be accidentally bumped into the retract position.

Examination of the landing gears revealed that all were fully retracted and engaged in their respective uplocks. The right wing skin and gear assembly sustained black circular marks. The sidewall of the tire showed a circular abrasion around the perimeter of the sidewall, which also extended slightly around the perimeter of the rim. There were no black circular marks on the left wing skin, tire, and gear assembly; however, there were linear abrasions on the rim and tire sidewall. The nose landing gear doors were damaged and would not open by hand. When the landing gear was manually released from inside the cockpit all gears dropped, but did not lock in the down position. It was noted that the nose landing gear uplock was heard releasing prior to the wheel dropping. 

The CVR, enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS), landing gear handle, gear control printed circuit board (PCB), gear monitoring PCB, and all three landing gear actuators were removed from the airplane for further examination. The airplane was repaired to accommodate a ferry flight to the Citation Service Center in Wichita, Kansas. 

Examination at Honeywell Aerospace in Redmond, Washington.

Review of data obtained from the EGPWS did not reveal any warnings or abnormalities prior to touchdown. [Additional information can be found in the 'Component Examination – EGPWS' document located in the public docket.]

Examination at the Citation Service Center in Wichita, Kansas

Once back at the Citation Service Center, the landing gear handle was tested to acceptance test procedures (ATP) standards and passed. The front knob was removed followed by the face plate. The internal components were examined and one of the three screws securing the PCB was loose; however, no anomalies were noted that would have affected the outcome of the flight.

The landing gear actuators were functionally tested to ATP standards and passed. All three landing gear actuators fully extended and retracted, and there were no indications of internal or external leaks. The unlock and extend pressures were tested, and were within specification requirements. The actuators were later taken to the manufacturer for disassembly, and no anomalies were noted. [Additional information can be found in the 'Component Exam - Nabtesco Aerospace Inc' document located in the public docket.]

Additional testing was conducted on the airplane; the electrical wiring was visually inspected. All lines were continuous and remained intact with the exception of some electrical wires that appeared to be chewed by a rodent. Those wires were later determined to not be associated with the landing gear system. Some aircraft wiring and connectors were found installed in the tailcone in an area that might collect water from the outside elements. These connectors were filled with tap water, and no shorts were observed within the connectors. 

The landing gear control PCB and gear monitoring PCB were visually inspected with no anomalies noted. Both PCB's were tested to ATP standards and passed with the exception of a hard failure on the gear monitoring PCB. The hard failure was noted on a transistor that internally shorted to ground; however, this failure was not noted during prior testing.

The hydraulic lines were visually inspected; all lines were continuous and remained intact. Pressure was added to the hydraulic system and no failures were observed. The cockpit warning lights and sounds were tested and functioned normally. The landing gear handle system was tested and responded normally. Instrumentation was added to the airplane to record system inputs, outputs, and responses during testing. 

The airplane's hydraulically operated equipment was activated in many normal and abnormal ways. The hydraulic system operated as designed, even when the airplane received simultaneous signals from different components. [Additional information can be found in the 'Airframe Exam – Wichita, Kansas' document located in the public docket.] The check valve was removed from the airplane and functioned normally when tested. The return system filter was removed, examined, and was clear of debris. The manifold assembly, which houses a relief valve and the control valves for all hydraulic actuated systems, was removed from the airplane and taken to the manufacturer for further examination.

Examination at PneuDraulics in Rancho Cucamonga, California

Upon arrival at PneuDraulics, the manifold assembly was tested to ATP standards; during which, the test bench return flow was restricted to obtain appropriate pressures. Initial results showed normal indications with the exception of an internal leakage at the flap control valve. Continued testing showed that the flap valve was slow to respond. When cycled various times with the extend solenoid energized, the valve would either respond slowly or move to the retract position, which is a reverse command. During one of the reverse commands, the valve was tapped with a rubber mallet and the valve slowly transitioned from the retract to extend position. 

The manifold relief valve was removed and debris was noted within the fluid drained. The relief valve was tested to ATP standards and it did not pass due to lower than acceptable cracking pressure, pressure drop at rated flow, reseat pressure, and reseat leakage. The pressure relief valve was dissembled; all fluid and debris was flushed. Unusual wear marks were noted on some of the internal components; however, these components do not contact other components within the system. No other damage was noted on the seals or other internal parts. 

A new relief valve, which tested to ATP standards, was installed onto the manifold and the flap control valve still showed a slow response. The flap control valve was removed from the manifold for further testing and examination. 

The flap control valve was tested to, and passed, ATP standards with the exception of two internal leakage requirements when solenoid A (extend solenoid) was energized. Both the extend and retract control solenoids were removed for further examination. When tested, the extend solenoid passed the ATP; however a failed pressure drop test revealed too much backpressure to the return when de-energized. The extend solenoid was disassembled and there were no visual anomalies. Solenoid B (retract solenoid) was also tested to ATP standards and had a higher leakage than normal when energized. The retracted solenoid was disassembled and there were no internal visual anomalies. Some small debris was noted within the solenoid. The remainder of the flap control valve was disassembled and some scoring was noted along the spool surface, however that is not uncommon. Otherwise, there were no anomalies noted with the control valve spool and chamber.

The gear control valve was also removed from the manifold assembly. After ensuring a proper test bench setup the gear control valve was tested and passed all components of the ATP. The gear and flap control valves, and the manifold assembly were dimensionally tested; no blockages or burrs where noted throughout any of the units. 

The flap control valve and manifold were reassembled near original configuration to facilitate additional testing and examination. During testing, the spool position, high pressure solenoid ball, and the return ball were manipulated in an attempt to recreate the command reversal that was previously witnessed. Despite testing in various configurations, the reversal was not duplicated; however, it was found that if the spool is not centered (when the system is not energized) it can favor either the retract or extend side of the system. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

On April 15, 2008 a Cessna 560XL, N613QS was substantially damaged during an uncommanded gear retraction while landing at the Westchester County Airport in White Plains, New York [NTSB accident number NYC08LA162]. The subsequent investigation was not able to determine the cause of the gear collapse. This investigation differed in the fact that a landing gear extend hydraulic line was compromised consistent with overpressure.


NTSB Identification: WPR12FA193 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 27, 2012 in Eugene, OR
Aircraft: CESSNA 560XL, registration: N101PG
Injuries: 3 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 27, 2012, about 1430 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna Citation 560XL, N101PG, sustained substantial damage to the left wing and front pressure bulkhead following a landing gear collapse while landing at Mahlon Sweet Field Airport (EUG), Eugene, Oregon. The airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, and one passenger were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Pape Group Inc., as a cross country corporate transportation flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, Ohio, with an intermediate stop at Centennial Airport (APA) in Denver, Colorado.

The flight crew reported that after an uneventful flight, during the approach to land, the landing gear was extended and both crew members confirmed that indications in the cockpit were that the landing gear was in the down and locked position. Shortly after a normal touchdown, the landing gear warning horn was heard and the left main landing gear collapsed followed immediately by the nose and right main landing gear. The airplane slid down the runway about 1,500 feet before coming to a rest.

Systems tests and an examination of the airplane are in progress.






An airplane crashed while landing at the Eugene Airport today after its front landing gear failed on the runway.

The accident occurred at approximately 2:30 p.m. when the pilots of a 12-seat Cessna Citation 560 attempted to touch down at the airport. Due to complications with the front landing gear, the airplane crashed along the runway and prompted an emergency response. The two pilots and the one passenger on board the plane were not injured.

Firefighers stationed at the airport responded immediately to the scene of the accident, followed by additional crews from the Eugene Fire Department and the Lane Rural Fire Department. Workers at the Eugene Airport also helped contain a fuel spill on-scene before Northwest Hazmat arrived for a clean-up of the area.

The accident caused no disruption in activity, and the airport remains open this afternoon.


EUGENE, Ore. (KMTR) --
An airplane with three people on board skidded to a stop in the middle of the main runway at the Eugene airport Friday afternoon.

NewsSource 16 has learned the front landing gear of the airplane failed as it landed. The nose of the plane then smashed into the pavement as the craft came to a stop on it's belly in the middle of the runway.

A pilot, co-pilot and passenger were not hurt.

The airplane is a 12 seat Cessna Citation.

Because the plane is blocking a portion of the airstrip, air traffic is being diverted to a second runway.

A small amount of fuel did leak and emergency response teams are mopping it up.

Names of those on board the plane have not been released.

The National Transportation Safety Board is now investigating.