Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Cape Air to have country’s only woman airline president

Cape Air chief administration officer Linda Markham will be the next president of the Hyannis-based carrier, becoming the only woman president or chief executive of a North American airline, according to Cape Air. She will succeed president Dave Bushy, who is retiring, on March 18.

Markham, 49, started Cape Air’s human resources department in 2002 and worked her way up to executive vice president and chief administrative officer in 2010. She had no aviation experience before she joined Cape Air, which also operates Nantucket Airlines and has 1,000 employees and serves 37 cities. But now she’s hooked.

“Once you get bit by the bug, it’s really hard to leave,” she said.

Cape Air founder and chief executive Dan Wolf, who is also a state senator, said that having the country’s only woman airline president is significant only because it’s surprising that most carriers are run by men.

“It’s a stark reminder of how far we have to go,” he said. 


Source:  http://www.boston.com

Hernando airport's name not worth expensive fight

In Print: Thursday, February 14, 2013
   

At what moment will the Brooksville-Tampa Regional Airport include the input of aviation professionals and not be run by a puppet, a puppeteer and a puppet maker?

I am sure the residents of Hernando County enjoy knowing we are spending tax dollars to contest Tampa International Airport's interest in protecting its own identity simply because we lack the creativity and marketing strategy to develop our own brand unique to the history of our airport and county.

The County Commission was told that there were focus groups, studies, and surveys done to vet the name change, yet when I queried the depth of the vetting I was told that approximately $800 was spent, and most of that was on food and drinks for one meeting with a moderator.

Additionally, I have continued to ask how much the rebranding is going to cost the taxpayers to include the legal services to defend the name change, with no accurate response.

I guess the airport administration is still trying to figure out the cost of that horse even though they have already have committed to the cart.

If Brooksville-Tampa Regional Airport is the extent of our creativity in marketing why not just let Tampa Aviation Authority run our airport and save the hundreds of thousands for the salaries of our airport administration?

If the money to fight this legal battle was to come from Don Silvernell's, Gary Schraut's, or any of the commissioners' pockets, I feel more confident that the creative juices would flow once again.

Could the airport use a name change? Sure, why not.

Is it worth spending thousands or tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands to legally contest TIA's claim to its name? I certainly don't think so.

I ask every resident of Hernando County, if it was your money, which it is, would you seriously spend your money on defending a name change to Brooksville-Tampa Regional Airport or would you just build your own identity?

Robert S. Rey, Brooksville


Source:  http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/letters

Piper PA46-500TP, Croft Aviation LLC , N32CA: Accident occurred February 13, 2013 in Grand Island, Nebraska

NTSB Identification: CEN13LA171
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 13, 2013 in Grand Island, NE
Probable Cause Approval Date: 03/24/2014
Aircraft: PIPER PA46, registration: N32CA
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that the airplane began to roll forward about 1 minute after engine start and impacted a building. The pilot stated that, though the airplane slowed when he pumped the brakes several times, he could not stop it using both toe brakes. An employee of the fixed based operator who witnessed the accident stated that the airplane’s propeller was operating “at high speed” as it moved forward into a grass area before impacting the building. The pilot reported that the engine was stopped before impact. Postaccident examination of the airplane braking system revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Available evidence suggests that the pilot did not reduce engine power and effectively apply the brakes in sufficient time to stop the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control after engine start.

On February 13, 2013, about 1430 central standard time, a Piper PA46-500TP, N32CA, rolled forward and struck a building after the engine was started. The airplane sustained substantial damage to a wing. The pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Croft Aviation LLC and was operated by the pilot under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that was destined to Centennial Airport, Denver, Colorado. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

A fixed base operator (FBO) employee stated that he was standing in front of the airplane waiting for it to start. The airplane started and about a minute later, it began to move forward. As the airplane was moving forward, the employee signaled the pilot to move straight ahead. After the airplane moved about 13 feet, the employee signaled the pilot to turn right. To the employee's "shock," the airplane continued forward and into a grass area with the propeller at "high speed." The employee ran and turned around to see the airplane impact a rock pier at a building. The propeller flung pieces of stone. The left wing was "pouring" out fuel.

The pilot stated that the airplane was on the ramp facing a building. Upon engine start, the airplane moved forward with pressure on both toe brakes. The brakes were pumped several times before they began to slow the airplane but did not stop the airplane before it impacted building.

A Federal Aviation Administration inspector stated that he was able to stop the airplane and a tow vehicle while the airplane was being towed. Examination of the brake system revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.


http://registry.faa.gov/N32CA

  
NTSB Identification: CEN13LA171 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 13, 2013 in Grand Island, NE
Aircraft: PIPER PA46, registration: N32CA
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On February 13, 2013, a Piper PA46-500TP, N32CA, rolled forward and struck a building after the engine was started. The airplane sustained substantial damage to a wing. The pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Croft Aviation LLC and was operated by the pilot under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that was destined to Centennial Airport, Denver, Colorado. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

============

 No one was injured when a small plane hit the Trego Dugan terminal at the Central Nebraska Regional Airport Wednesday afternoon.

Just before 3 p.m. the Grand Island Fire Department and the airport's fire personnel were called to the scene because fuel was leaking from the plane.

Airport Executive Director Mike Olson said the Piper Meridian had been parked near the building and the pilot was preparing to taxi onto a runway. After he started the engine, he lost power to the brakes and the nose wheel so he couldn't stop the plane. The single-engine plane struck the front of the Trego Dugan terminal, breaking a window on the building, Olson said.

The plane's nose was dented. Olson said the plane is likely totaled because the turbo prop would have come to an abrupt stop when the plane hit the building and that would have damaged the engine.

The plane leaked fuel and a hazardous material team was on scene to assist with cleanup. Power was cut to the terminal and the building was temporarily closed to the public, he said.

"We're being cautious," Olson said.

The plane is owned by Croft Aviation LLC in Westminster, Colo. The fixed-wing, single-engine turbo-prop plane was manufactured in 2005 and has been owned by Croft Aviation since May 2012, according to the Federal Aviation Administration.

According to FlightAware's online activity log, the plane left Sturgis, Minn., Tuesday and flew to Chicago. It left Chicago Wednesday en route to the Rocky Mountain Metropolitan airport. The pilot, whose name wasn't listed on the activity log, made a stop in Grand Island on the way to Colorado.


Story:   http://www.starherald.com

Global Aviation Holdings Emerges From Chapter 11

Feb. 13, 2013, 4:52 p.m. EST

PEACHTREE CITY, Ga., Feb. 13, 2013 /PRNewswire via COMTEX/ -- Global Aviation Holdings Inc. (the "Company') announced today that its plan of reorganization (the "Plan"), which was approved by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York on December 6, 2012, became effective today allowing the Company to complete its financial restructuring and emerge from Chapter 11.

The Plan reflects a global settlement with the Company's first and second lien lenders, the official committee of unsecured creditors, and the Company's labor unions, allowing the Company to exit from bankruptcy with reduced debt, a rationalized and lower cost fleet, and new five-year collective bargaining agreements with four of its five represented work groups. In connection with the Plan, the Company also secured an exit financing facility of $35 million. The exit facility, liquidity on hand, and reduced cost structure provide the necessary framework to effectively compete in today's marketplace.

"With today's successful emergence from Chapter 11, we are well positioned for success and can devote our full attention to growth and business development," stated Rob Binns, CEO. "We are emerging from bankruptcy as a much stronger company with significantly reduced debt and the appropriate aircraft fleet and operational structure to compete in today's challenging economic environment."

Binns added, "We want to thank our customers, suppliers, lenders, advisors, and dedicated employees for their support throughout the Chapter 11 process. The commitment of our stakeholders has been a key component to completing the necessary financial and operational restructuring of the Company."

Global Aviation Holdings Inc., based in Peachtree City, Ga., is the parent company of North American Airlines and World Airways. Global is the largest commercial provider of charter air transportation for the U.S. military, and a major provider of worldwide commercial global passenger and cargo air transportation services. North American Airlines, founded in 1989, operates passenger charter flights using B767-300ER aircraft. World Airways, founded in 1948, operates cargo and passenger charter flights using B747-400 and MD-11 aircraft. For more information, visit http://www.glah.com , http://www.flynaa.com , and http://www.woa.com .

SOURCE Global Aviation Holdings Inc. 


http://www.marketwatch.com

Cirrus SR22, N963CD: Impromptu interview - Video part of Black History Month - Mrs Williams, East Gadsden High School


Video by jowalker92 
Published on Feb 10, 2013

 Quincy Municipal Airport

"Mrs Williams (my sister) part 3 of video flying over East Gadsden High School were she teaches. Video is part of Black History Month were she did an impromptu interview of me regarding flying."

Boeing Looking at Interim 787 Fixes

February 13, 2013, 7:16 p.m. ET

By ANDY PASZTOR And JON OSTROWER
The Wall Street Journal


Two test flights of the Boeing Co. 787 Dreamliner have so far failed to replicate or identify the cause of the battery malfunctions that grounded the jet, leaving the company increasingly focused on some low-tech interim fixes, according to government and industry officials.

With the global fleet of 50 Dreamliners out of service since mid-January, the officials anticipate the tough work of developing, testing and installing long-term battery fixes is likely to keep the planes on the ground until at least April.

More test flights are planned—including efforts to test potential fixes—although no significant new clues emerged to help pinpoint the cause of the problem. But to try to get the planes back in the air quickly, Boeing is now stepping up work on putting the lithium-ion batteries in a sturdy container to keep heat, flames and toxic chemicals from escaping if the power packs overheat. People familiar with the design of the container say titanium is a possible material for its construction.

The protective covering also would aim to keep moisture from the battery's internal workings, which experts said in some circumstances can lead to short-circuits and other problems.

Even in the past few days, according to people familiar with the details, the concept has gained traction and prompted increased discussions between Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration, because the likely timetable for various longer-term fixes has lengthened.

Any proposed short-term fix also is likely to include enhanced temperature sensors and other features to more quickly warn pilots about malfunctioning or overheating batteries aboard 787s.

The so-called containment box has some important precedents. When lithium-ion batteries are used aboard U.S. commercial or government satellites, safety experts say they often are enclosed in some type of external titanium protection. The thickness of the metal, which melts only at extremely high temperatures, is about one-quarter of an inch, according to one U.S. government expert.

Without discussing details of possible fixes, a Boeing spokesman said company experts are "working tirelessly in cooperation with our customers and the appropriate regulatory and investigative authorities," adding that "everyone is working to get to the answer as quickly as possible, and good progress is being made."

An FAA spokeswoman didn't have any immediate comment.

On a parallel track, according to government and industry experts, Boeing continues to look for longer-term, more complex solutions to avoid battery dangers. They include increased separation between cells inside the battery, keeping cells from shifting or swelling and preventing microscopic buildup of metal deposits that can cause short-circuits. But experts agree those efforts have been complicated and delayed due to the slow progress of accident probes on both sides of the Pacific.

At this point, however, it isn't clear if federal regulators—or congressional committees tracking developments—will accept short-term fixes that target symptoms rather than causes of the hazards. Leaders of the FAA and the U.S. Transportation Department previously said they wouldn't allow 787s to return to service until investigators identified the root cause of the two battery incidents that occurred last month aboard Dreamliners operated by two Japanese airlines and until Boeing installed and tested fixes to ensure such events couldn't reoccur.

Maintaining that position, though, may become more difficult for the agency if the investigation drags on without a clear-cut answer, while the Chicago plane maker and its airline customers clamor for relief.

Boeing's vice president of marketing, Randy Tinseth, told a supplier conference in Lynnwood, Wash., on Wednesday that the company's plans to build five 787s per month in its two Dreamliner factories would continue unabated. Boeing's Everett, Wash., plant builds four each month and its new North Charleston, S.C., plant supplies the balance. But as the production continues uninterrupted by the ongoing grounding, Boeing may be challenged to find space for all the completed 787s.

More than 50 undelivered production 787s are spread across Boeing's factories in Washington state and South Carolina, including at least 40 jets in Everett. Boeing has occupied smaller runways at its main campus with early 787s that already required heavy modification before delivery, but the plane maker is moving newly built aircraft to storage to make room on its flight lines. Whatever the interim or final fix for the 787's battery woes will be, each already-finished plane would need to be modified before delivery.

The space crunch is made even more severe by on-going construction on a ramp area in Everett that has been able to hold as many as six 787s in storage in the past. Boeing is converting the space to an operations depot for its modified 747s "Dreamlifters" that carry parts of the 787 around the world.

"We have space now, but won't speculate on the future," says Boeing spokesman Marc Birtel.


Source:  http://online.wsj.com

Beech B19 Musketeer Sport, N2059L: Ephrata Municipal Airport (KEPH), Washington

UPDATE: We're now learning that the small plane crashed while trying to take off. The pilot was in the process of taking off when a gust of wind caught it and caused one of the wings to dip, that's when the wing hit the ground that sent the plane into a sign. There are no injuries to report.
 

EPHRATA, Wash. -- A small airplane crashed and went off the runway at the Ephrata Municipal Airport. A Big Bend Community College spokesman said nobody was hurt during the crash Wednesday afternoon.

The plane was being flown by a Big Bend Community College flight instructor and a student pilot.  Director of Campus Safety & Security Kyle Foreman said only two people were on the plane which seats four.

Foreman said it is unclear what caused the plane to taxi off the runway.

A student and instructors were training around 1 p.m. Foreman said the flight instructor was teaching a touch-and-go landing when something went wrong. The pilot lost control and hit a sign and a light on the runway. Foreman said the plane came to a stop off of the runway.


The crash damaged the plane and it can not be flown according to Foreman.

Leaders at Big Bend Community are investigating. Foreman said the Federal Aviation Administration is expected to join the investigation.


Story:   http://www.krem.com

Landing strip nixed for take off

PRINCETON — The Bureau County Board says more information is needed on a request for a conditional use permit by a rural Walnut farmer to build a private grass landing strip on family property.

At Tuesday’s meeting, Marc Wilt addressed the county board, saying the board’s approval of the conditional use permit is the first step in the process of building the landing strip on property which his family has owned since 1933. If local approval is granted, Wilt’s proposal would then be sent to the Illinois Department of Transportation’ Division of Aeronautics, which will determine if the proposal meets all state rules and requirements and if any alterations or changes are needed. The proposal will also be sent to the Federal Aviation Administration for an air space determination. The whole process could take about two years, Wilt said.

In presenting Wilt’s conditional use request to the county board, Zoning Committee Chairman Marsha Lilley said the developers of the proposed Walnut Ridge wind farm did have some concerns about the proposed landing strip, specifically whether the landing strip would interfere with the building of already-permitted wind turbines in that area.

Lilley said the Zoning Committee recommended on a 4 to 3 vote that the county board send Wilt’s conditional use permit request back to the Bureau County Zoning Board of Appeals to hear additional testimony on the possible impact of the landing strip.

Bureau County State’s Attorney Patrick Herrmann said the question to be answered is whether or not the proposed landing strip would interfere with the already-permitted use granted by the county board for the wind turbines. Expert testimony from a pilot could tell the committee and board how much land is needed to safely land a private plane.

Bureau County Zoning Officer Kris Donarski read a letter from Bill French, representing the Walnut Ridge developers, expressing his concerns about the location of the proposed landing strip. The county had granted conditional use permits for 150 Walnut Ridge turbines in 2008, with an extension granted in 2011 for another three years. The Walnut Ridge developers do not oppose the landing strip, but the company does have concerns about its location, he said.

In his comments, board member Joe Bassetti said he had no problem with the landing strip if it could be done safely. But since there is a safety question, his recommendation was to send the request back to the Zoning Board of Appeals for further study,

Board member Marshann Entwhistle said Wilt has to start the process with approval by the county board before he can send his proposal to the Illinois Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration for their review and approval.

If the Walnut Ridge developers determine the landing strip hindered their own project, which has precedence, there could be a lawsuit filed against the county, Herrmann said.

After further discussion, Lilley’s motion to send Wilt’s request back to the Zoning Board of Appeals was approved on a voice vote, though not a unanimous one.

Story:  http://www.bcrnews.com

Beechcraft B100 King Air, N499SW: Accident occurred December 19, 2012 in Libby, Montana

NTSB Identification: WPR13FA073
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, December 19, 2012 in Libby, MT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2015
Aircraft: BEECH B100, registration: N499SW
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

When the flight was about 7 miles from the airport and approaching it from the south in dark night conditions, the noncertificated pilot canceled the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A police officer who was on patrol in the local area reported that he observed a twin-engine airplane come out of the clouds about 500 ft above ground level and then bank left over the town, which was north of the airport. The airplane then turned left and re-entered the clouds. The officer went to the airport to investigate, but he did not see the airplane. He reported that it was dark, but clear, at the airport and that he could see stars; there was snow on the ground. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated but that the pilot-controlled runway lighting was not. The Federal Aviation Administration issued an alert notice, and the wreckage was located about 7 hours later 2 miles north of the airport. The airplane had collided with several trees on downsloping terrain; the debris path was about 290 ft long. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The town and airport were located within a sparsely populated area that had limited lighting conditions, which, along with the clouds and 35 percent moon illumination, would have restricted the pilot’s visual references. These conditions likely led to his being geographically disoriented (lost) and his subsequent failure to maintain sufficient altitude to clear terrain. Although the pilot did not possess a valid pilot’s certificate, a review of his logbooks indicated that he had considerable experience flying the airplane, usually while accompanied by another pilot, and that he had flown in both visual and IFR conditions. A previous student pilot medical certificate indicated that the pilot was color blind and listed limitations for flying at night and for using color signals. The pilot had applied for another student pilot certificate 2 months before the accident, but this certificate was deferred pending a medical review.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The noncertificated pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from terrain while maneuvering to land in dark night conditions likely due to his geographic disorientation (lost). Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s improper decision to fly at night with a known visual limitation.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 19, 2012, about 0002 mountain standard time (MST), a Beech B100, N499SW, collided with trees near Libby, Montana. Stinger Welding was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The non-certificated pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries; the airplane was destroyed from impact forces. The cross-country personal flight departed Coolidge, Arizona, about 2025 MST with Libby as the planned destination. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the nearest official reporting station, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the pilot had been cleared for the GPS-A instrument approach procedure for the Libby Airport (S59), which was located 7 nm south-southeast of Libby. The pilot acknowledged that clearance at 2353. At 2359, the airplane target was about 7 miles south of the airport; the pilot reported the field in sight, and cancelled the IFR flight plan. Recorded radar data indicated that the airplane was at a Mode C altitude of 11,700 feet mean sea level at that time, and the beacon code changed from 6057 to 1200.

A track obtained from the FilghtAware internet site indicated a target at 2320 at 26,000 feet that was heading in the direction of Libby. The target began a descent at 2340:65. At 2359:10, and 11,700 feet mode C altitude, the beacon code changed to 1200. The target continued to descend, and crossed the Libby Airport, elevation 2,601 feet, at 0000:46 at 8,300 feet. The track continued north; the last target was at 0001:58 and a Mode C altitude of 5,000 feet; this was about 3 miles south of Libby and over 4 miles north of the airport.

A police officer reported that he observed a twin-engine airplane come out of the clouds over the city of Libby about 500 feet above ground level. It turned left, and went back into the clouds. The officer thought that it was probably going to the airport; he went to the airport to investigate, but observed no airplane. It was dark, but clear, at the airport with about 3 inches of snow on the ground, and he could see stars. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated, but not the pilot controlled runway lighting. He listened for an airplane, but heard nothing.

When the pilot did not appear at a company function at midday on December 18, they reported him overdue. The Prescott, Arizona, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 1102 MST; the wreckage was located at 1835.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of FAA medical records revealed that the 54-year-old pilot first applied for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate in August 2004. On that Medical Certification Application, the pilot reported having 500 hours total time with 200 hours in the previous 6 months. No alcohol or medication usage was reported; however, the pilot was determined to be red/green color blind.

On June 9, 2010, the pilot reported on an application for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate that he had 925 hours total time with 150 hours in the previous 6 months. He was issued a third-class medical certificate that was deemed not valid for night flying or using color signal control.

On May 16, 2012, the pilot received a driving while intoxicated (DWI) citation in Libby.

The pilot reported on an application for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate dated October 16, 2012, that he had a total time of 980 hours with 235 hours logged in the previous 6 months. Item 52 for color vision indicated fail. This application reported a new diagnosis of hypertension, and use of medications to control it. This application reported yes in item 17 (v) for history of arrest of conviction for driving while intoxicated. The FAA deferred the issuance of the Student Pilot and Medical Certificate, indicating that they were investigating a failure to report within 60 days the alcohol-related motor vehicle action that occurred in Montana on May 16, 2012. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) reviewed copies of the pilot's logbooks beginning on March 21, 2010, and ending November 4, 2012. The entries indicated a total time of 978 hours during that time period. Time logged for the 90 days prior to the accident was 34 hours. The logbooks recorded numerous trips to Libby with three entries in the previous 90 days. The last solo flight endorsement, in a Cessna 340, was signed off by a certified flight instructor in August 2011. The logbook contained several entries for flights in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions.

The IIC interviewed the chief pilot for the company, who was hired to fly the Stinger Company's Cessna CJ2 jet, which they purchased about 4 years earlier. The accident pilot owned the company, and would typically have the chief pilot arrange for a contract pilot to fly with him in the accident airplane. The chief pilot was standing by to fly the owner in the CJ2, but the owner never contacted him or requested another pilot for the accident airplane.

The IIC interviewed a contract pilot who flew with the accident pilot on December 16, 2012; this was their only flight together. It was a 6-hour round trip from Coolidge to La Paz, Mexico. The airplane was in perfect condition; everything was working, and they had no squawks. The pilot had paper charts, as well as charts on an iPad. The contract pilot felt that the pilot handled the airplane well, was competent, and understood all of the systems. The pilot coached the contract pilot on the systems installed including the autopilot. They used it on the outbound trip, and it operated properly. They used the approach mode into La Paz including vertical navigation. The pilot had no complaints of physical ailments or lack of sleep, and fuelled the airplane himself.

The passenger was a company employee who was not a pilot.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Beech B100, serial number BE89. The airplane's logbooks were not provided and examined. 

The IIC interviewed Stinger Welding's aviation maintenance chief, whose 4-year employment was terminated about 1 month after the accident. He stated that the airplane typically flew 200-400 hours a year; the company had flown it about 800 hours since its acquisition. The chief was not aware of any unresolved squawks as the owner usually had him take care of maintenance needs immediately. The airplane had been out of service for maintenance for a long time the previous year, having taken almost 7 months to get the propeller out of the shop due to the repair cost. The maintenance chief said that the owner kept the onboard Garmin GPS databases up to date. The airplane was operated under Part 91 CFR, and inspections being delayed were: the 6-year landing gear inspection was past due; the 12-month items were due; and the 3-year wing structure and wing bolt inspection was due.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

The closest official weather observation station was Sandpoint, Idaho (KSZT), which was 46 nautical miles (nm) west of the accident site at an elevation of 2,131 feet mean sea level (msl). An aviation routine weather report (METAR) issued at 2355 MST stated: wind from 220 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 10 miles; sky 2,800 feet overcast; temperature 0/32 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; dew point -3/27 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; altimeter 29.72 inches of mercury. Illumination of the moon was 35 percent.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/ Facility Directory, Northwest Pacific U. S., indicated that Libby Airport had an Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)-A, which broadcast on frequency 118.575.

Libby runway 15/33 was 5,000 feet long and 75 feet wide; the runway surface was asphalt. The airport elevation was 2,601 feet.

The airport was located within the general confines of the Kootenai National Forest, and beyond the town of Libby; the area was lightly inhabited.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The IIC and investigators from the FAA and Honeywell examined the wreckage on site. Detailed examination notes are part of the public docket. The center of the debris field was about 2.5 miles north of the airport at an elevation of 4,180 feet.

A description of the debris field references debris from left and right of the centerline of the debris path; the debris was through trees on a slope that went downhill from left to right. The debris path was about 290 feet long along a magnetic bearing of 125 degrees. 

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a topped tree with branches on the ground below it and in the direction of the debris field. About 50 feet from the tree were composite shards, and a piece of the composite engine nacelle, which had a hole punched in it.

The next point of contact was a 4-foot-tall tree stump with shiny splinters on the stump. The lower portion of the tree had been displaced about 30 feet in the direction of the debris field with the top folded back toward the stump. Underneath the tree trunk were the nose gear and control surfaces followed by wing pieces.

One engine and propeller with all four blades attached was about 50 feet from the stump, and on the right side of the debris path. This was later determined to be the right engine. Next on the left side of the debris path was the outboard half of one propeller blade; another propeller blade was about 10 feet further into the debris field.

Midway into the debris field were several trees with sheet metal wrapped around them. Near the midpoint of the debris field, a portion of the instrument panel had imbedded into a tree about 15 feet above the ground. The wiring bundle hung down the tree trunk to ground level. To the left of the instrument panel was one of the largest pieces of wreckage. This piece contained the left and right horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, and part of one wing with the landing gear strut attached. The rudder separated, but was a few feet left of this piece.

Next in the debris field was a 6- by 8-foot piece of twisted metal, which contained the throttle quadrant.

About 100 feet right of the debris path centerline and downhill from the throttle quadrant was a 10-foot section of the aft cabin. This section was connected by steel cables and wires to a 4- by 7-foot piece of twisted metal.

The furthest large piece of wreckage was the second engine; this was later determined to be the left engine. The left propeller hub with two blades attached had separated from the engine; the other two blades were located earlier within the debris field.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Division, Department of Justice, State of Montana, completed an autopsy, and determined that the cause of death was blunt force injuries.

The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot.

Analysis of the specimens indicated no carbon monoxide detected in blood (cavity), no test performed for cyanide, no ethanol detected in muscle or kidney, and no findings for tested drugs.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The IIC and investigators from the FAA, Textron Aviation, and Honeywell examined the wreckage at Avtech, Kent, Washington, on February 13, 2013.

Detailed examination notes are part of the public docket. Investigators observed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engines.

The engines had been modified from Honeywell models to National Flight Services, INC., models per a supplemental type certificate (STC SE002292AT), and installed in the airplane per STC SA00856AT.

The left engine was TPE331-6-511B, serial number P-27185C based on a Beechcraft data tag on the engine. The starter/generator input shaft fractured and separated; the fracture surface was angular and twisted.

No metallic debris was adhering to the engine chip detector.

The engine inlet fractured and separated from the engine gearcase housing. Earthen debris was observed on the first stage compressor impeller. Vanes of the first stage impeller were bent opposite the direction of rotation.

Overall, the compressor case and plenum displayed crush damage. Upon removal of the airframe exhaust, investigators observed earthen debris within the engine exhaust. There was a fine layer of dried mud/earthen debris on the forward suction side of the third stage turbine blades. Investigators observed metal spray deposits on the third stage turbine stator vanes.

All four propeller blades exhibited leading edge damage; a section of one blade was not recovered with the aircraft wreckage, but this blade's tip was recovered.

The right engine was a TPE331-6-511B, serial number P27190C. 

Investigators observed rotational scoring in multiple locations on the propeller shaft. The first stage compressor impeller displayed tearing and battering damage; some vanes were bent opposite the direction of rotation. Investigators observed wood debris in the engine inlet area.

Investigators observed metal spray deposits noted on the suction side of the third stage turbine stator vanes.


All four of the right propeller's blades displayed leading edge damage and chordwise scoring. One tip fractured and separated; it was not recovered. All blades bent aft at midspan; they exhibited s-bending and tip curling.

=====


MCA Financial, Group, Inc., the Arizona court-appointed receiver for Stinger Welding, Inc., on Monday issued a statement spelling an end for the bridge and span manufacturer.

According to the release from John W. Boyd, the senior managing partner for MCA Financial, “based on ... analysis, the decision has been made to begin an orderly wind down of Stinger’s operations in Montana.”

The brief, one-paragraph release stated the receiver, Lincoln County Port Authority and Kootenai River Development officials “are cooperating in an effort to attract a new user for the Stinger facility in Libby. Additional information will be provided as it becomes available.”

Last week, the receiver dramatically cut the role of Stinger Vice President Steve Patrick, effectively ending his day-to-day operation of the facility. However, Patrick is being retained in a consulting role.

Stinger Welding was the brainchild of CEO Carl Douglas who breathed life into the business as he tried to make a go of the business in Northwest Montana. However, Douglas was killed in a plane crash on Dec. 18 when his aircraft slammed into Swede Mountain just after midnight.  


Source:   http://www.thewesternnews.com

NTSB Identification: WPR13FA073
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 18, 2012 in Libby, MT
Aircraft: BEECH B100, registration: N499SW
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On December 18, 2012, about 0002 mountain standard time (MST), a Beech B100, N499SW, collided with trees at Libby, Montana. Stinger Welding was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The noncertificated pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage from impact forces. The cross-country personal flight departed Coolidge, Arizona, about 2025 MST on December 17th, with Libby as the planned destination. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the nearest official reporting station of Sandpoint, Idaho, 264 degrees at 46 miles, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the pilot had been cleared for the GPS-A instrument approach procedure for the Libby Airport. The clearance had a crossing restriction of 10,700 feet at the PACCE intersection, which was the initial approach fix for the GPS-A approach. The pilot acknowledged that clearance at 2353. At 2359, the airplane target was about 7 miles south of the airport; the pilot reported the field in sight, and cancelled the IFR flight plan.

A police officer reported that he observed an airplane fly over the city of Libby, which was north of the airport; the airplane then turned toward the airport. The officer went to the airport to investigate, but observed no airplane. He noted that it was foggy in town, but the airport was clear. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated, but not the pilot controlled runway lighting.

When the pilot did not appear at a company function at midday on December 18, they reported him overdue. The Prescott, Arizona, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 1102 MST; the wreckage was located at 1835.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) and investigators from the FAA and Honeywell examined the wreckage on site. A description of the debris field references debris from left and right of the centerline of the debris path. The debris was through trees on a slope that went downhill from left to right.

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a topped tree with branches on the ground below it and in the direction of the debris field. About 50 feet from the tree were composite shards, and a piece of the composite engine nacelle, which had a hole punched in it.

The next point of contact was a 4-foot tree stump with shiny splinters on the stump. The lower portion of the tree had been displaced about 30 feet in the direction of the debris field with the top folded back toward the stump. Underneath the tree trunk were the nose gear and a couple of control surfaces followed by wing pieces.

One engine with the propeller attached was about 50 feet from the stump, and on the right side of the debris path. Next on the left side of the debris path was the outboard half of one propeller blade; another propeller blade was about 10 feet further into the debris field.

Midway into the debris field were several trees with sheet metal wrapped around them. Near the midpoint of the debris field, a portion of the instrument panel had imbedded into a tree about 15 feet above the ground. The wiring bundle hung down the tree trunk to ground level. To the left of the instrument panel was one of the largest pieces of wreckage. This piece contained the left and right horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, and part of one wing with the landing gear strut attached. The rudder separated, but was a few feet left of this piece.

Next in the debris field was a 6- by 8-foot piece of twisted metal, which contained the throttle quadrant.

About 100 feet right of the debris path centerline and downhill from the throttle quadrant was a 10-foot section of the aft cabin. This section was connected by steel cables and wires to a 4- by 7-foot piece of twisted metal.

The furthest large piece of wreckage was the second engine; the propeller hub with two blades attached had separated.                   

Cessna T337C Super Skymaster, Royalair Aviation Inc., N2576S: Accident occurred February 13, 2013 in New Smyrna Beach, Florida

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA131
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 13, 2013 in New Smyrna Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/23/2014
Aircraft: CESSNA T337C, registration: N2576S
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Shortly after taking off on the test flight, the pilot transmitted “mayday mayday” over the control tower’s radio frequency. According to eyewitnesses, the airplane was in a left-wing-down attitude when it impacted a tree, power lines, and then another tree before coming to rest in a pasture. A review of data downloaded from the engine data monitor revealed that the rear engine exhibited erratic fuel flow beginning 2 days before the accident and continuing through the accident flight. Further, the engine data monitor indicated that the rear engine’s propeller was under low-to-no power with a low pitch angle at the time of impact. The front engine exhibited no abnormalities or malfunctions, and the investigation found no other anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

During postaccident examination, the engine-driven fuel pump was removed and bench tested where it exhibited fuel flow higher than manufacturer guidelines with low fuel pressure. In order to meet bench test standards, an adjustment equal to three turns of the adjustment screw was made. The fuel pump then operated normally and was placed back on the engine; however, the engine still did not attain full power. Further examination revealed potential debris between the throttle assembly’s brass and stainless steel plates. After removal of the debris and reassembly of the throttle assembly, it operated within the normal range. Although the source of the debris could not be definitively determined, it likely originated in either in the fuel or a fuel tank.

Maintenance records indicate that two days before the accident, the fuel pump was removed, repaired, and reinstalled after work was completed on the rear fuel selector valve. After the pump was reinstalled, the mechanic adjusted the continuous flow fuel injection system using the airplane’s JPI engine monitor system and an external low pressure gauge to set the takeoff fuel flow; he then refueled the plane from containers in which he had stored the fuel in order to service the fuel pump. The following day, the pilot and the mechanic again adjusted the fuel pump’s fuel flow after conducting an unsatisfactory engine run-up . After the adjustment, the run-up appeared to be normal. Directives from the engine’s manufacturer recommended using a Model 20 ATM-C Porta Test Unit or equivalent to ensure the fuel injection system meets all pressure and flow specifications. Using a JPI engine monitor and an external gauge would have given inaccurate results without a properly calibrated fuel pump, and the mechanic’s recalibration of the engine-driven fuel pump’s adjustment screw would have only masked the debris issue within the throttle assembly.
Further, review of the manufacturer’s approved engine-out emergency procedures indicated that with a rear engine failure, the propeller should be immediately feathered and the landing gear retracted after obstacle clearance. Therefore, even with a loss of rear engine power, the airplane’s operating manual indicated that the airplane would have been able to climb at least 275 feet per minute with one engine, assuming the required pilot inputs were made. Had those single-engine climb performance conditions been met, the airplane likely would have been able to, at a minimum, maintain altitude until a safe landing could have been accomplished. However, as the rear propeller was found with a low pitch angle and the landing gear was found in the down and locked position after the accident, the airplane had not been configured for maximum single-engine performance as outlined in the engine-out procedures.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

Maintenance personnel's failure to follow procedures and published directives in calibrating the continuous flow fuel system and failure to accurately diagnose debris in the throttle assembly, resulting in a loss of power in one engine. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to comply with published engine out procedures, which resulted in an off-airport landing and subsequent impact with a tree and the ground.


 HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 13, 2013, at 1314 eastern standard time, a Cessna T337C, N2576S, was destroyed when it impacted the ground in a farm pasture shortly after departure from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (EVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local maintenance test flight. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The local flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to transcripts of voice recording from the FAA contract Air Traffic Control tower at EVB, the airplane was issued a takeoff clearance with a left turn approved at 1312:40. At 1314:06, the pilot transmitted "mayday mayday" over the tower frequency. The flight was subsequently cleared to land on any runway but no further communication was received from the flight.

According to two eyewitnesses, the airplane was observed in a left wing down bank when it impacted a tree, powerlines, and then another tree prior to coming to rest. The witnesses further stated that they heard the engine producing power; however, they could not determine if both engines were operating or producing power.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land, a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, and airplane multiengine sea. He also had a flight instructor certificate for airplane single-engine, multiengine, and instrument airplane. He held a second-class medical certificate which was issued on August 23, 2012, and had two restrictions of "not valid for any class after" and "must wear corrective lenses." At the pilot's most recent medical he had reported 4,186 total flight hours and 50 of those flight hours were in the 6 months preceding the medical application.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA and airplane maintenance records the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on June 1, 1968 and was registered to RoyalAir Aviation, Inc. on April 24, 2007. It was equipped with two engines. The front engine was a Continental Motors TSIO-360A3B, 210-hp engine and the rear engine was a Continental Motors TSIO-360 AcAB, 210-hp engine. It was also equipped with two McCauley propellers. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on May 1, 2012. Paperwork located in the hangar, which included an FAA form 8130-1, indicated that on January 15, 2013 an engine driven fuel pump was tested and recorded as "tested good set to factory flows."

According to the aircraft Owner's Manual, the airplane had a total fuel capacity of 131 gallons. The fuel system comprised of two main fuel tanks with a capacity of 46 gallons each and two auxiliary tanks with a capacity for 19.5 gallons each. The last located recorded fueling was accomplished on October 28, 2012 at EVB. The airplane had been fueled with 58.09 gallons of fuel.

According to a mechanic who had performed maintenance on the airplane, the most recent work performed was due to the lack of full travel on the rear fuel selector valve. During operation of the selector valve it would only go from the "OFF" position to the "ON" position and would not allow the use of the auxiliary tank position. The airplane was defueled into clean containers and then the mechanic removed the "Right Hand Selector" valve, sent the valve to a repair facility, which was subsequently returned and reinstalled. The rigging was verified and "Full travel was confirmed and resistance was normal," on the fuel selector valve. In addition, the engine driven fuel pump was removed, repaired and reinstalled on February 11, 2013. According to the mechanic the pilot reported having difficulty starting in the "super rich" position as well as black smoke was reported coming from the rear engine by others that observed it. After the engine driven fuel pump was reinstalled, the mechanic adjusted the continuous flow fuel injection system per the guidance of Teledyne Continental Motors Service Information Directive 97-3E. He stated that he utilized the JPI engine monitor and an external low pressure gauge to set the takeoff fuel flow between 20 and 21 gallons per hour. He further reported that the pilot had the differential gauge as required in the guidance for the adjustment of the continuous fuel flow system; however, they utilized the JPI as well. The mechanic returned the fuel from the containers to the airplane and at that time, the tanks were "about eighty percent full." On the Monday prior to the accident, the pilot and the mechanic operated both engines and the pilot was going to test fly the airplane the following day. On the day prior to the accident, during the run-up, the pilot did not like the run-up on the rear engine and they readjusted the settings until 31 inches of manifold and a fuel burn of 20 gallons per hour was achieved. After the adjustment, the run-up appeared to be normal; however, due to the lateness of the day and the sun setting the pilot elected to "test fly" the airplane the following day.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 1347 recorded weather observation at EVB, included wind from 230 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots, 7 miles visibility, broken clouds at 1500 feet above ground level (agl), temperature 28 degrees C, dew point 18 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.86 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The airport is a publically owned airport and at the time of the accident had an operating control tower. The airport was equipped with three runways designated as runway 7/25, 11/29, and 02/20. The runways were reported as "in fair condition" or "in good condition" at the time of the accident. Runway 7/25 was a 5,000-foot-long by 75-foot-wide runway, runway 11/29 was a 4,319-foot-long by 100-foot-wide, and runway 02/20 was a 4,000-foot-long by 100-foot-wide runway. The airport was 10 feet above mean sea level.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a tree approximately 60 feet agl, power lines, and then another tree about 25 feet agl prior to coming to a rest in a cow pasture that was approximately 1,000-feet long and 200-feet wide. The accident flight path was oriented on a 076 degree heading and the debris path began just prior to the final tree strike and terminated 227 feet past and was approximately 98 feet wide. The final tree strike was located 186 feet from a power pole and power line which ran nearly perpendicular to the debris path. The accident location was 5,373 feet and 215 degrees from the midfield point of the departure runway. According to local authorities, upon arrival at the accident site the top line of the power line was severed.

Examination of the debris path revealed that the nose gear strut and the right front seatbelt and shoulder harness were imbedded in the tree approximately 25 feet agl. The seat belt remained latched but was separated from the aircraft structure. The left and right wing remained attached to each other via the cross control cable and the roof of the cabin area. Both wings came to rest inverted about 75 feet from the final tree strike. The tail section and rudders were impact separated and came to rest in the immediate vicinity of the final tree strike. The left tail boom structure was located to the left of the debris field and, in close proximity to the final tree strike. The main cabin floor area and main landing gear were located approximately 24 feet from the final tree strike and came to rest upright. The landing gear was found in the down and locked position. The forward engine was located approximately 112 feet along the debris field, from the final tree strike. The furthest located piece was the right rudder counter weight which was located 227 feet from the final tree strike.

Examination of the left wing revealed wire strike marks along the wing's leading edge approximately 32 to 39 inches inboard of the wing tip. The wire strike was oriented at an approximate 45 degree angle to the leading edge. The left wing exhibited extensive crush and impact damage along the entire span. The fuel tanks were breached, devoid of fuel, and the fuel caps remained secured and seated. The left outboard flap was separated from the flap tracks while the left inboard flap remained attached. Flap control cable continuity was confirmed from the flap motor, located in the ceiling of the cabin area, to the bellcranks; however, the cables exhibited numerous tensile overload fractures in the vicinity of the wing roots. The left aileron remained attached and cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the associated fracture points out to the aileron. The aileron cable exhibited tensile overload at all fracture points. The left aileron was fractured; the inboard section of the aileron remained attached to the wing while the outboard section separated from the structure. The left aileron was equipped with a factory installed ground adjustment trim tab on the trailing edge of the inboard end and no deflection was noted. The left aileron was also equipped with an aftermarket electronic trim tab on the trailing edge near the outboard end of the aileron; the aftermarket trim tab sustained impact damage and was bent downward.

The right wing exhibited impact crush damage. The right outboard flap was impact separated from the flap tracks while the right inboard flap remained attached. Flap control cable continuity was confirmed from the flap motor located in the ceiling of the cabin area to the bellcranks; however, the cables exhibited numerous tensile overload fractures. The right aileron remained attached and cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the associated fracture points out to the aileron. The aileron cable exhibited tensile overload at all fracture points. The right wing's fuel caps remained attached, seated correctly, and locked in position. Fuel was present in the inboard fuel tank and the outboard fuel tank.

The rudders remained attached to the vertical stabilizers; however, the empennage was impact separated from the tail booms just prior to the up curve on the leading edge. Cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the rudder pedals to the rudders with the right rudder cable overloaded at the aft position in the tail section. The right rudder cable exhibited tensile overload 3 feet forward of the turnbuckle. All separations exhibited tensile overload. The right rudder counter weight was located at the furthest point of the debris path; however, the left rudder counterweight was located in the vicinity of the rudder and the area surrounding the counterweight location appeared to be impact damaged. Elevator cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the elevator bellcrank although numerous tensile overload fractures were present along the entire span.

The front engine, rear engine, and cockpit exhibited impact crushing and the engines were impacted separated from their associated airframe attach points but remained attached to their respective firewall. Both propellers remained attached to the propeller flange and the spinner remained attached; however, the rear engine's propeller was devoid of S-bending or tip curling except from one blade which exhibited signs similar to a wire strike.

The rear engine was located about 10 feet from the final tree strike and in a small grove of trees. The propeller appeared to have minor damage and exhibited marks similar to a wire strike on one of the blades. The rear engine's fuel line leading to the fuel manifold had approximately 3 tablespoons of fluid which exhibited a smell similar to aviation fuel.

The forward engine's propeller blade exhibited slight S-bending and was bent in the aft direction. Engine continuity was confirmed from the propeller hub to the rear accessory pad via hand rotation utilizing the propeller. Thumb compression was confirmed on all cylinders during hand rotation. The bottom spark plugs were removed, appeared to be light gray in color, and were normal in wear.

The left shoulder harness and seat belt remained buckled with minor webstretching noted; however, it did not remain attached to the fuselage and was torn near the attach point. The remaining seat belts remained attached to their respective mounting points, except the right rear seat's inside lap belt, which was impact separated. The flap motor and worm gear were located and the exposed threads were measured and indicated 3.26 inches, which correlated to a 10 degree flap setting.

The cockpit exhibited extensive impact and crush damage. The throttle lever associated with the front engine was in the idle position and the throttle lever associated with the rear engine was in the approximate mid range position. The mixture and propeller levers associated with each engine were in the full forward position. However, due to extensive damage the levers were not attached to the associated control cables. The flap handle was located in the 10 degree detent. The cowl flaps for both engines were in the "CLOSED" position. The airplane was equipped with a JPI EDM760 engine monitor system which was removed and sent to the NTSB Recorder Laboratory for download.

Various types of paperwork were located by local authorities following the accident and turned over to the NTSB. Review of the various paper products yielded a hand written note dated February 12, 2013, and indicated that "1800 rpm RE won't idle under 1300 (dies) Mag check R Mag 600 rpm drop, L Mag 400 rpm drop."

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot on February 14, 2013, by the Office of the Medical Examiner, Daytona Beach, Florida. The autopsy findings included "extensive blunt force injuries," and the report listed the specific injuries.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated no ethanol or drugs of abuse were detected.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Propeller Examinations

Both propellers were sent to the McCauley Propeller Systems in Wichita, Kansas, and examined on April 24, 2013 with oversight provided by an FAA inspector. According to their report the rear engine propeller was examined and appeared to be either at a low or possibly no power at time of impact and no indication of rotation was present. The propeller blade angle was at low pitch and the propeller blades and internal mechanism exhibited very little damage. The bearings and raceways were intact and appeared normal. In addition, oil integrity was confirmed at the propeller bearing.

The front engine propeller was examined and one of the blades was unable to be removed due to impact damage. The other blade was examined and indicated rotational scoring between the stops in the "normal operating range." The front propeller hub had a mark from a blade counterweight impact during the accident sequence. The position of this mark indicated a propeller blade angle of approximately low pitch/ latch position at impact. The spring and bearings were intact and appeared to have no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

A detailed report about the examinations can be found in the "Front and Rear Propeller Examination Report" located in the public docket for this accident.

Engine Data Monitor

An engine data monitor was recovered from the cockpit and forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, for download. Review of the downloaded data revealed there were 11 recorded events, which began in October 2012. According to the data, the rear engine fuel flow exhibited an erratic fuel flow beginning on February 11, 2013, which continued through the accident flight. The data readouts are located in the public docket associated with this accident.

Fuel Selector Valves

The left and right wing mounted fuel selector valves were removed from the airplane and examined with the engines at the manufacturing facility in Mobile, Alabama, in May 2013, under the supervision of an NTSB investigator. Compressed air was blown through all of the ports and airflow was noted on the selected detents. The detents were checked and operated normally with no abnormalities noted. The right wing fuel selector valve was mounted on a test stand utilizing a slaved fuel pump, and fuel flowed through the valve unabated.

Engine Examinations

The front engine was examined at the manufacturing facility in Mobile, Alabama, in May 2013, under the supervision of an NTSB investigator. During the examination, several components were removed and replaced to facilitate an engine run. The engine was placed on a test stand, was started and operated at various power settings with no abnormalities or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation noted.

The rear engine was examined at the manufacturing facility in Mobile, Alabama, in May 2013, under the supervision of an NTSB investigator. The engine was examined and the valve rocker covers were removed to facilitate examination of the gaskets and the rocker arms. All cylinders appeared normal and the engine was prepared for an engine run in a test cell. The engine was started and smoke was observed coming out of the turbo exhaust while at 1000 rpm. The engine was idled for several minutes then accelerated to 1600 rpm and the fuel flow was high with low fuel pressure according to manufacturing guidelines. The engine was then accelerated to a full power setting but would not produce power above 1800 rpm and the fuel flow remained high with low fuel pressure. A noticeable surge was audibly detected and black smoke was observed continuously exiting the turbo exhaust. The engine was reduced to idle and the surging continued and was captured on a video recording. The rear engine's throttle assembly was removed and the throttle assembly from the front engine was utilized in its place. The engine was operated with the front engine's throttle assembly and was found to operate smoothly; however, was not able to achieve full takeoff power. The engine driven fuel pump was then removed and bench tested. The fuel pump bench test revealed that the fuel would have high flow and low pressure. The adjustment screw was measured at 0.4645 inches. Adjustments were made that equaled three turns of the adjustment bolt, which equaled 0.0675 total inches of adjustment. Then the fuel pump was adjusted to bench test standards and was operated normally. The rear engine would not develop full power at full throttle setting. After removal and testing of the throttle assembly and engine driven fuel pump, scoring was noted between the brass and stainless steel plates within the fuel metering valve inside the throttle assembly indicated the possibility of debris. The spring on the brass plate indicated the possibility of pinching against the sidewall of the fuel metering valve; however, after examination and reassembly of the unit it operated within a normal range.

More details about the examinations can be found in the "Engine Examination Report" in the public docket for this accident.

Cessna T337 Owner's Manual

According to Section IV "Operational Data", after takeoff and during the initial climb, at an airplane weight of 3,700 pounds, the indicated airspeed at 50 feet agl should be 79 mph. In addition, after takeoff and during the initial climb, at an airplane weight of 4,500 pounds, the indicated airspeed at 50 feet agl should be 87 mph. According to the chart "Single Engine Maximum Rate-of-Climb Data" with an aircraft weight of 3,700 pounds, outside air temperature of 82 degrees F [28 degrees C], and sea level, the single engine climb performance with the rear engine inoperative and the propeller feathered is about 540 feet per minute rate of climb. An airplane weight of 4,500 pounds, outside air temperature 82 degrees F [28 degrees C], and sea level, the single engine climb performance with the rear engine inoperative and the propeller feathered is about 275 feet per minute rate of climb. The section further indicated that at a gross weight of 4,500 pounds, the airplane will stall at 74 mph calibrated airspeed with a 0 degrees angle of bank and flaps at one-third. The airplane will stall at 79 mph calibrated airspeed, in a 30-degree angle of bank, with one-third flaps. Then, the airplane will stall at 105 mph calibrated airspeed, in a 60-degree angle of bank, with one-third flaps.


According to Section II "Description and Operating Details," it indicated that the landing gear retraction "is normally not started until one or two hundred feet of altitude have been obtained after take-off. Retraction at very low altitude should be avoided since the landing gear swings downward approximately two feet as it starts the retraction cycle. In addition, the landing gear would extend slowly in the event of an engine-out after take-off, and might not be completely down while a wheels-down landing could still be made on the runway."

Section III "Emergency Procedures" provides an "Engine Out After Takeoff" checklist for airspeed above 85 mph (without sufficient runway ahead) which includes:

1. Throttles – Full forward.
2. Propellers – High RPM (full forward).
3. Determine inoperative engine (from engine RPM).
4. Propeller –
Front Engine Inoperative – Feather propeller if gear is up and locked, or down and locked.
Rear Engine Inoperative – Feather immediately.
5. Wing Flaps – Retract in small increments (if extended).
6. Climb out at 100 MPH (96 mph with obstacles ahead).
7. Landing Gear –
Front Engine Inoperative – Leave extended.
Rear Engine Inoperative – Retract after obstacles are cleared.
8. Cowl Flaps (Operative Engine) – Open to single-engine position.
9. Secure inoperative engine as follows:
a. Ignition Switch – "OFF."
b. Alternator Switch – "OFF."
c. Mixture – Idle cut-off.
d. Cowl Flaps – "CLOSED."
e. Fuel Selector – "FUEL OFF."

Service Information Directive (SID) 97-3E

According to SID 97-3E provided by the engine manufacturer to adjust the continuous flow fuel injection system, "a complete set of tools and test equipment is essential for correct setup of TCM [Teledyne Continental Motors] fuel injection system. Various combinations of these tools and equipment will be used, depending on the engine model. A proper inventory of tools and equipment for fuel system adjustment will include the following:
1. TCM recommends the Model 20 ATM-C Porta Test Unit P/N 630045-20 ATM-C or equivalent to insure the fuel injection system meets all pressure and flow specifications.

An alternative procedure would be to use calibrated gauges.
1. One (1) calibrated 0-60 PSI gauge, graduated in 1 PSI increments. This gauge will be used for unmetered pressure measurement.
2. One (1) calibrated 0-30 PSI gauge, graduated in .2 PSI (maximum) increments. This gauge will be used for metered pressure measurements and verification of aircraft fuel flow gauge indications on normally aspirated engines only.
3. One (1) calibrated differential gauge, 0-30 PSID maximum, graduated in .2 PSI (maximum) increments. This gauge will be used for metered pressure measurements and verification of aircraft fuel flow gauge on turbocharged engines only.

NOTE: Pressure gauges must be accurate within ±1 %. Pressure gauges must be checked for accuracy and, if necessary, calibrated at least once each calendar year."

In addition, the SID provided a warning that the "use of inaccurate gauges will result in incorrect adjustment of the engine fuel system, possible cylinder wear due to lean operation, pre-ignition, detonation, loss of power and severe engine damage."



 http://registry.faa.gov/N2576S
 
NTSB Identification: ERA13FA131
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 13, 2013 in New Smyrna Beach, FL
Aircraft: CESSNA T337C, registration: N2576S
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On February 13, 2013, about 1314 eastern standard time, a Cessna T337C, N2576S, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain in a farm pasture shortly after departure from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (EVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airline transport pilot was fatally injured. The local personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration contract Air Traffic Control tower at EVB, the airplane was cleared for takeoff and was given a clearance with a left turn approved. Shortly after takeoff, about 300 feet above ground level, the pilot transmitted mayday over the tower frequency. The flight was subsequently cleared to land on any runway but no further communication was received from the flight.

According to eyewitnesses, the airplane was observed in a left wing down bank when it impacted a tree, powerlines, and then another tree prior to coming to rest. The witnesses further stated that they heard the engine producing power; however, they could not determine if both engines were operating with power.

An examination of the wreckage revealed that all major components of the airplane were present at the accident location. In addition, fuel was present in both the left and right wing tanks. 

 
 
Paul Rooy, shown in a 2009 photo at New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport, was killed Wednesday when his Cessna 337 crashed near the airport on Wednesday. Rooy is the president of Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport and was the plane's only occupant. 
News-Journal file



NEW SMYRNA BEACH -- Paul Rooy had flown his Cessna 337 into the heart of South America. He also piloted the plane when he and his wife traveled to the Caribbean Islands to deliver medical supplies and to find new homes for pets that had been displaced by disasters.

 “It was truly a workhorse,” said Mike Holoman, a longtime friend of Rooy said of the six-seat, twin-engine prop plane. “I mean, I’ve flown in the same plane halfway across the United States with him and his wife.

Federal investigators have begun their investigation to determine what caused that same small aircraft piloted by Rooy to crash Wednesday in a cow pasture shortly after takeoff from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport. Rooy was killed in the crash and was the only person on board.

Shawn Etcher, air safety investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C., said Rooy, 56, was headed west after takeoff. The pilot took a left turn and then shortly thereafter said “mayday.”

“That was his last transmission,” Etcher said while at the crash scene Thursday.

The plane then struck a tree before hitting power lines and crashing into the field, Etcher said.

A witness on the scene, Rick Chapman, said he saw the plane hit the tree and power lines before it “disintegrated.” No one on the ground was injured.

Federal officials gathered wreckage that would be taken back with them to Washington. A preliminary NTSB report on the crash will be ready in the next five to 10 days. Plane crash investigations like this can take three months to a year to complete, Etcher said.

Rooy, a local patent attorney, was a certified engineer as well as president of the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport and one of the founders of the annual New Smyrna Beach Balloon & Sky Fest.

“He was very involved in the community,” said Holoman, a fellow pilot who is the treasurer for the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport. “He was very charitable in all that he did, not just in words but in deeds.”

That altruistic nature was evident in the humanitarian relief organization that Rooy ran with his wife, Mary Lightfine, called Volunteers Without Boundaries. Holoman said the couple would travel to disaster areas and bring back pets left homeless by disasters and find them new homes in the U.S.

“They did a lot of humanitarian work, he and his wife,” said Rhonda Walker, manager of the New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport. “I know that they flew some supplies to some other disaster areas and dropped them off.”

Walker said Rooy and other local pilots formed the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport in part as a response to a group of neighbors who had complained about noise from the airfield, and helped try to solve the issues.

“He wanted to show the best sides of the airport, the economic side, and that every pilot isn’t out to make the neighborhoods go nuts on us,” Walker said.

However, Holoman said the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport was mainly about keeping the airport open and thriving, especially after one of the runways had closed.

“He was all about making the airport viable, making it an economic benefit for the community,” Walker said. “He did a lot for this airport so his shoes are going to be hard to fill.”

Rooy and Lightfine took off from the New Smyrna airport two years ago in the Cessna T 337C Skymaster and flew to South America.

“They charted it as they flew on one of those messaging systems,” Walker said. “So you could know exactly where he was at any time and he would give any updates of things that they saw along the way.

“We watched him on that whole journey,” she said.

Etcher said there wasn’t any obvious weather issues during the short flight Wednesday — the crash was reported at 1:13 p.m. — but said it was a little “choppy.” That will be part of what investigators look at when they consider contributors to the crash including pilot error, mechanical malfunction or the environment.

Walker said the crash was the second with a fatality involving a plane that took off from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport since she began working there in 1998. In September 2007, 74-year old Bruce Smith was killed when his single-engine airplane slammed into trees at the airport. He had just taken off when he radioed the control tower he was having problems with the aircraft.

Wednesday’s crash was the third fatal plane crash in Volusia and Flagler counties within a year.

Source:   http://www.news-journalonline.com

http://www.news-journalonline.com

The remains of a small plane are strewn about a pasture off of Tumblin Dr., west of New Smyrna Beach, on Wednesday, Feb.13, afternoon, 2013, News-Journal / Peter Bauer












NEW SMYRNA BEACH -- Federal officials were at the scene Thursday of a plane crash the day before that killed a local attorney who also was the president of a New Smyrna Beach airport group. 

 Shawn Etcher, air safety investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C., said Paul Rooy, 56, took off in his Cessna 337 from New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport and headed west. The pilot then took a left turn.

Rooy's last transmission was "mayday," Etcher said. The plane then struck a tree before hitting a power line and crashing into a field.

A witness on the scene, Rick Chapman, said he saw the six-seat, twin-engine prop plane hit the tree and power lines before it "disintegrated."

No one else was on board and no one on the ground was injured.

Etcher said there wasn't any obvious weather issues during the short flight -- the crash was reported at 1:13 p.m. -- but said it was a little "choppy." That will be part of what investigators look at when they consider contributors to the crash including pilot error, mechanical malfunction or the environment.

A preliminary NTSB report on the crash will be ready in the next five to 10 days, Etcher said. Plane crash investigations like this can take three months to a year to complete.

Federal officials were gathering the wreckage Thursday which will be taken back with them to Washington.

The aircraft is registered to Royalair Aviation Inc. out of Daytona Beach, which is owned by Rooy. Family members have not spoken about Rooy's death.

Dr. Arlen Stauffer, chairman of New Smyrna Beach Balloon & Sky Fest, said Rooy was known as a leader in the community and an experienced pilot.

Wednesday's crash was the third fatal plane wreck in Volusia and Flagler counties within a year.


VOLUSIA COUNTY, Fla. -- One person is dead following the crash of a twin-engine airplane in New Smyrna Beach Wednesday afternoon.  According to the Volusia County Sheriff's Office, the Cessna 337 crashed just after takeoff from the New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport.

"It clipped the top of this tree and clipped the power line there and hit that rotten big tall pine tree over there and just disintegrated like it was made out of balsa wood when it hit the ground," said Pat Chapman, who witnessed the crash.

The plane broke apart on impact, killing the pilot, a sheriff's spokesman said.

Deputies identified the pilot as Paul Rooy, age 56, of Daytona Beach.

The crash happened in an empty field near a New Smyrna city sports complex.

According to officials, they believe Rooy radioed that he had an emergency.

Eyewitnesses said they could tell from the ground that something was wrong, and it appeared to them that the plane was trying to return to the airport.

"It was like he took off and must have gotten into some kind of trouble and tried to make a circle maybe going back to the airport and didn't make it," said Chapman.

No one else was aboard the plane and no injuries were reported on the ground, according to the Sheriff's Office.

The Volusia County Sheriff's Office, the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board will be involved in investigations surrounding the crash.


Story and Photos:  http://www.actionnewsjax.com


NEW SMYRNA BEACH -- The pilot of a crashed plane is dead after a witness said the aircraft hit a tree, "disintegrated" and exploded in a field west of New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport.

The plane, a six-seat, two-engine Cessna 337, is registered to Paul Rooy, president of the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport, records show. Officials have not identified the person killed.

The plane had taken off from the New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport and went down sometime later in an open field near the city's sports complex, said Volusia County sheriff's spokesman Gary Davidson. The tower manager at the airport called in the crash at 1:13 p.m.

The plane, a 1968 model, broke apart upon impact, killing the pilot, Davidson said. No one else was on board, and no one on the ground was injured, he said.

The aircraft is registered to Royalair Aviation Inc. out of Daytona Beach. State records show Royalair Aviation is owned by Rooy, a patent attorney, and that Rooy is president of the Friends of New Smyrna Beach Airport. The Friends organization advocates for businesses and private pilots who use the airport. In recent years Rooy and the organization had been in an ongoing battle with residents complaining about airplane noise.

A call Wednesday afternoon to Rooy's law office on South Ridgewood Avenue in Daytona Beach went to his voicemail. Rooy's home is in Daytona Beach Shores.

The Volusia County Sheriff's Office is conducting a routine death investigation, while the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board will be called in to investigate the cause of the crash.

Rick Chapman saw the crash while standing outside with his wife, when the plane went down on some property near their New Smyrna Beach home.

“He clipped one of my trees and then hit the power lines,” Chapman, 60, said. “That plane disintegrated.”

Chapman didn't expect anyone survived the crash, but he still ran to where the plane hit just in case.

Chapman said he saw one man dead inside of the plane.

“If there's anybody else, I didn't find them,” Chapman said.

Chapman said there was no fire, but the plane did explode on impact.

He said he and his wife saw the plane getting closer and closer and knew what was about to happen.

“I think he was trying to squeeze between two trees,” Chapman said. “He missed my barn by about 100 feet.”

Chapman said cows immediately rushed over to where the plane crashed, and neighbors and officials are having to bait them with hay to get them away from the crash site.