Friday, September 11, 2015

Casa Grande Municipal Airport (KCGZ) wants more corporate jet traffic to Phoenix

Seeing an opportunity, Casa Grande Municipal Airport Manager Richard Wilkie marketed the airport as an alternative destination for people flying into the Phoenix area to attend Super Bowl XLIX.

As a result, the airport served 13 corporate jets, allowing the city to also promote what Casa Grande has to offer potential businesses.  

“During the Super Bowl, (the Phoenix area) is a controlled airspace. It’s locked down. If you didn’t get in by a certain window and in fact, in order to land during the Super Bowl, you actually had to schedule flights into some of the major airports,” Wilkie said. “We were offering how easy it is to fly in here. You fly in when you want. We had a few transportation companies and provided that to the people who flew in. “We tried to promote local, ‘hey you can come in, stay the night and zip up to the Super Bowl and then come back down. It’s easy because there is not a wait.”’

Wilkie said major sporting events in the Valley provide an opportunity for the city to market itself to potential businesses.

“A lot of the people going (to the Super Bowl) have a lot of money and they own their planes,” Wilkie said. “With the Super Bowl, Pro Bowl, the Phoenix Open, it was just ‘let’s try and capture as much as we can.’”

It’s a strategy that he said will continue as the Valley is set to host the college football National Championship game in January and the NCAA Final Four in 2017. It’s also part of a larger plan for the airport that Wilkie presented to the City Council Monday that includes close to $600,000 in improvements.

The improvements include an estimated $254,000 for hangar repairs, involving weather stripping, sliding repairs and gutters to help with some of the flooding issues that airport users have complained about.

Other improvements include a new aviation-grade fuel tank, fuel delivery truck, exterior enhancements for the terminal and pavement maintenance, which Wilkie said is always one of the larger expenses.

“Because we live in the desert and the heat and the cold environment, cracks will expand. With that much pavement out there, cracks will happen,” he said. “(The airport) is a return investment — a positive attitude that could lead into a potential business opportunity in the community.”

Future improvements include new hangars, including a multi-use hangar that would support the two fly-in events that occur at the airport, recruitment of additional commercial operations and an extension of the runway.

Wilkie said the runway extension won’t be designed to accommodate commercial airline traffic. Instead it will be designed to allow for heavier, larger Gulfstream corporate jets that the current runway can’t accommodate during the summer months because of the heat.  

“When you take off, you wouldn’t be able to fully fuel your aircraft,” Wilkie said of the current runway and the summer heat. “What we are trying to do with the extension of the runway is we are trying to accommodate any of those aircraft throughout the year so they can utilize the facilities, fuel up and then take off fully loaded.”

Currently the airport is not a towered airport, but that could change as operations increase.

Wilkie said if PhoenixMart proceeds as planned, the air traffic could well exceed the threshold the FAA sets for the need for a towered airport.

Source: http://www.trivalleycentral.com

Eurocopter AS350B3 Ecureuil, N253HP: Accident occurred September 09, 2015 in Draper, Utah

NTSB Identification: GAA15CA258 
14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 09, 2015 in Draper, UT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/15/2016
Aircraft: AIRBUS AS350, registration: N253HP
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker. 

A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade. 

The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage. 

The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The ground recovery team member's failure to secure a rescue rope during the helicopter loading process in steep terrain, resulting in the rope fouling the helicopter's main rotor system.

The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker. 

A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade. 

The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage. 

The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

The United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service (for the National Search and Rescue Academy) has published a manual, Helicopter Rescue Techniques (2013). This manual describes the various rescue techniques that can be employed with helicopters. This manual states in part;

Helicopters provide an outstanding rescue tool, but they have specific operating limitations. Recognize that the consequences of a poorly managed helicopter rescue can be swift and fatal. Rescuers need to understand these limits and have the professional discipline not to exceed them during an emergency. As accident investigators repeatedly conclude, "self-imposed psychological pressure" causes us to make poor decisions when adrenaline clouds our judgment. Poor decision-making is preventable yet, tragically, it is a factor in the vast majority of helicopter rescue accidents. 

The option of delaying the mission in favor of safer operating conditions is repeatedly overlooked and requires considerable discipline on the part of a rescue team. Remarkably, accidents with the same root cause occur over and over. As rescuers, we must learn from these mistakes and break this dangerous pattern of repetition. 

The Mountain Rescue Association (MRA) has published a manual, Helicopters in Search and Rescue Intermediate Level (2008). This manual provides intermediate level knowledge with utilizing helicopters for search and rescue operations. This manual states in part; 

In certain situation, pilots and rescuers may choose to perform a hovering or one-skid recovery of a rescue victim.

The factors to be taken into account in selecting a site for a hovering recovery are generally the same as those for selecting a helispot. In these conditions, a smaller ground area, rougher terrain and steeper slope are permissible. On the other hand, it is extremely important that there be plenty of room for both the main rotor and the tail rotor boom, since the pilot may have to turn the helicopter in the event changes in wind direction. An experienced hand signaler, one that the pilot knows is competent, should be at the site and all ground personnel should be within the pilot's view, if at all possible. In the case of one-skid recoveries on rock outcrops, this may be impractical.

The MRA has also published another manual, Situational Awareness in Mountain Rescue (2008). This manual describes the three stages of Situational Awareness during mountain rescue operations. This manual states in part;

"Situational Awareness" is "the degree of accuracy by which one's perception of his/her current environment mirrors reality." Situational Awareness can also be looked at as a constantly evolving picture of the state of the environment. It is the perception and comprehension of the relevant elements in an incident within a volume of time and space. In this regard, Situational Awareness is not an event, but rather a process that only ends when the search and rescue incident is concluded.

Situational Awareness requires the human operator to quickly detect, integrate and interpret data gathered from the environment. In the case of search and rescue operations, the "human detector" can be anything from the incident commander to a "field grunt." That is the beauty (and challenge) of Situational Awareness – it requires and demands awareness by all users.

Stage I – Perception of Relevant Information

The first stage of Situational Awareness – perception – is arguably the most important stage. After all, without perception of information, one cannot really comprehend, interpret and draw conclusions. 

Many accidents in search and rescue operations result from a series of different things happening. There are often a number of contributing factors that, if occurring individually, might not have resulted in an accident. Break any rescue accident down, and you will often find that there were a number of elements that came together to make that accident possible. 

In this important perception stage of Situational Awareness, rescuers need to be very attentive – not only to the occurrence of situations that are beyond their expectations, but to the frequency and number of those situations. This perception stage requires that you OBSERVE! In order to be an effective observer, one must remain attentive. This can be one of the greatest challenges to a search and rescue professional, as periods of inactivity and boredom can hamper one's ability to be an effective observer.

Stage II – Comprehension and Interpretation of the Relevant Information

The second stage of Situational Awareness is the stage wherein one attempts to comprehend and interpret the data collected in the first stage. While the collection of data and the perception of the relevant information are important, the comprehension and interpretation of that data cannot be overlooked. 

The key to this stage of Situational Awareness is that it requires one to have and utilize key training and experience.

Stage III – Projection into the Future

The third stage of Situational Awareness – projection into the future – is the stage where one puts it all together. Once the clues are interpreted, the next step is to project how that information will affect the future of the operation.

STATE OF UTAH: http://registry.faa.gov/N253HP

NTSB Identification: GAA15CA258

14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 09, 2015 in Draper, UT
Aircraft: AIRBUS AS350, registration: N253HP
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker. 

A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade. 

The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage. 

The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

Helicopter Rescue Missions 

The United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service (for the National Search and Rescue Academy) has published a manual, Helicopter Rescue Techniques (2013). This manual describes the various rescue techniques that can be employed with helicopters. This manual states in part; 

Helicopters provide an outstanding rescue tool, but they have specific operating limitations. Recognize that the consequences of a poorly managed helicopter rescue can be swift and fatal. Rescuers need to understand these limits and have the professional discipline not to exceed them during an emergency. As accident investigators repeatedly conclude, "self-imposed psychological pressure" causes us to make poor decisions when adrenaline clouds our judgment. Poor decision-making is preventable yet, tragically, it is a factor in the vast majority of helicopter rescue accidents. 

The option of delaying the mission in favor of safer operating conditions is repeatedly overlooked and requires considerable discipline on the part of a rescue team. Remarkably, accidents with the same root cause occur over and over. As rescuers, we must learn from these mistakes and break this dangerous pattern of repetition. 

Hovering and One-Skid Recoveries 

The Mountain Rescue Association (MRA) has published a manual, Helicopters in Search and Rescue Intermediate Level (2008). This manual provides intermediate level knowledge with utilizing helicopters for search and rescue operations. This manual states in part; 

In certain situation, pilots and rescuers may choose to perform a hovering or one-skid recovery of a rescue victim. 

The factors to be taken into account in selecting a site for a hovering recovery are generally the same as those for selecting a helispot. In these conditions, a smaller ground area, rougher terrain and steeper slope are permissible. On the other hand, it is extremely important that there be plenty of room for both the main rotor and the tail rotor boom, since the pilot may have to turn the helicopter in the event changes in wind direction. An experienced hand signaler, one that the pilot knows is competent, should be at the site and all ground personnel should be within the pilot's view, if at all possible. In the case of one-skid recoveries on rock outcrops, this may be impractical.

Situational Awareness

The MRA has also published another manual, Situational Awareness in Mountain Rescue (2008). This manual describes the three stages of Situational Awareness during mountain rescue operations. This manual states in part; 

"Situational Awareness" is "the degree of accuracy by which one's perception of his/her current environment mirrors reality." Situational Awareness can also be looked at as a constantly evolving picture of the state of the environment. It is the perception and comprehension of the relevant elements in an incident within a volume of time and space. In this regard, Situational Awareness is not an event, but rather a process that only ends when the search and rescue incident is concluded. 

Situational Awareness requires the human operator to quickly detect, integrate and interpret data gathered from the environment. In the case of search and rescue operations, the "human detector" can be anything from the incident commander to a "field grunt." That is the beauty (and challenge) of Situational Awareness – it requires and demands awareness by all users. 

Stage I – Perception of Relevant Information 

The first stage of Situational Awareness – perception – is arguably the most important stage. After all, without perception of information, one cannot really comprehend, interpret and draw conclusions. 

Many accidents in search and rescue operations result from a series of different things happening. There are often a number of contributing factors that, if occurring individually, might not have resulted in an accident. Break any rescue accident down, and you will often find that there were a number of elements that came together to make that accident possible. 

In this important perception stage of Situational Awareness, rescuers need to be very attentive – not only to the occurrence of situations that are beyond their expectations, but to the frequency and number of those situations. This perception stage requires that you OBSERVE! In order to be an effective observer, one must remain attentive. This can be one of the greatest challenges to a search and rescue professional, as periods of inactivity and boredom can hamper one's ability to be an effective observer. 

Stage II – Comprehension and Interpretation of the Relevant Information 

The second stage of Situational Awareness is the stage wherein one attempts to comprehend and interpret the data collected in the first stage. While the collection of data and the perception of the relevant information are important, the comprehension and interpretation of that data cannot be overlooked. 

The key to this stage of Situational Awareness is that it requires one to have and utilize key training and experience. 

Stage III – Projection into the Future 

The third stage of Situational Awareness – projection into the future – is the stage where one puts it all together. Once the clues are interpreted, the next step is to project how that information will affect the future of the operation.




DRAPER — A Utah Department of Public Safety helicopter attempting to retrieve the body of a fallen hiker in Corner Canyon nearly crashed in a terrifying close call on Wednesday, the agency reported.

Luke Bowman, chief pilot for the Utah Highway Patrol's aero bureau, said the pilot, Kent Harrison, and another officer on board were attempting to meet with rescuers on a cliff ledge. The crews were attempting a "skid load," intending to rest one skid on the ledge while essentially keeping the chopper hovering, when a rope became tangled in the craft's main rotor.

"The pilot, at that point, applies some aggressive maneuvers to maneuver the aircraft away from the cliff and the people on the ground," Bowman said.

The chopper's rotor was spinning at full power, sending the craft spinning and sending the helicopter's tail toward the rescuers on the ledge, Bowman said. The tail passed over the heads of the rescuers and hit the cliff wall, and the chopper continued to spin as it headed toward the ground.

Harrison began to prepare for a crash landing, but managed to steady the craft and determined he had enough control to fly down to a park in Highland, Bowman said.

As Harrison applied more power as he prepared to land, however, the chopper began to shake again. Fearing a crash, the pilot called for a medical response before he attempted to put the craft down.

"He was convinced at that point that, when he did go to land, that they were going to roll and they wouldn't be able to control it well enough to land," Bowman said. "They were actually able to land pretty uneventfully. … They were able to land upright on the landing gear in the park."

After the emergency was averted, the crews successfully completed their mission of retrieving the body of 43-year-old Kerry Crowley, a South Jordan woman believed to have died in an accidental fall.

The chopper — which is the department's newest and best helicopter — has been pulled from service since the near-crash and is significantly banged-up, Bowman said. However, the aircraft's engine and other mechanics pose an even greater concern.

In the meantime, the department will rely on some of its older units.

Bowman complimented Harrison's flying, applauding his ability to keep himself and the people around him safe in an emergency.

"I've talked extensively with him and spent the day with him yesterday going over the situation," Bowman said. "He's doing really good, and I think he did an phenomenal job. … He had a situation and he did his job and dealt with it, and now he has kind of moved on. He's not really one to emotionally dwell on things."

The accident will be reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board.

Story, comments and photo gallery:  http://www.ksl.com



Mooney M20TN Acclaim, N370MM: Fatal accident occurred September 10, 2015 in Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey

Dr. Michael Moir

 


Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA349
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 10, 2015 in Atlantic City, AO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/18/2017
Aircraft: MOONEY AIRPLANE CO INC M20TN, registration: N370MM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The commercial pilot departed Michigan on a personal cross-country flight in the autopilot-equipped airplane destined for New Jersey. Air traffic control records indicated that after the airplane departed, about 1200, a controller instructed the pilot to climb to 25,000 ft mean sea level (msl). At 1216, the pilot read back the assigned altitude and continued toward the destination. About 23 minutes later, the controller attempted to contact the pilot; however, the pilot did not respond. Controllers' repeated attempts to contact the pilot throughout the remainder of the flight were unsuccessful as the airplane continued flying a straight course toward the destination.

According to radar data, about 2 hours 22 minutes after the pilot's last transmission and while about 5 miles northwest of the destination, the airplane began descending out of 25,000 ft msl while on a southeast heading until it impacted the Atlantic Ocean about 8 minutes later. Given that the pilot refueled the airplane several days before the flight and filed a flight plan that indicated that the airplane's fuel onboard would allow for 6 hours of flight, it is likely that both fuel tanks had 51 gallons of fuel onboard. Fuel consumption calculations indicate that the airplane would consume up to 22.6 gallons of fuel per hour at cruise flight at 25,000 ft. Therefore, it is likely that the amount of fuel consumed on the day of the flight, given initial takeoff and climb consumption in addition to the 2 hours 22 minute cruise flight, would have been equivalent to the fuel available in one tank. Without pilot action to switch fuel tanks, the engine became starved of fuel and the airplane began its descent to the ocean.

An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

During an examination of the oxygen system on the airplane, a fitting, which connected an oxygen line to a regulator on the tank, was found loose and could be moved in both directions by hand without resistance. The oxygen system was serviced with oxygen 5 flight hours before the accident and had a capacity of at least 11 hours of oxygen for pilot-only operations; however, it is likely that the loose oxygen line allowed oxygen to escape and drained the oxygen canister more quickly than the pilot expected. Therefore, although the pilot was found wearing an oxygen mask, given the high altitude the airplane was at for the duration of the flight, the pilot's failure to respond to controller contact, and evidence indicating that he would have had reduced availability of supplemental oxygen, it is likely that the pilot became incapacitated due to hypoxia. The airplane's continued flight at 25,000 ft msl and its descent profile were consistent with the airplane operating under autopilot control and then descending to water impact due to fuel starvation.

The servicing of the oxygen system was performed at the time of an annual inspection, which should have included an inspection of the oxygen system for leaks.

Toxicology testing of specimens from the pilot detected 26 mg/dL ethanol in the blood; given that no ethanol was detected elsewhere, the low level of ethanol detected in pilot's blood was likely due to postmortem production not from ingestion; therefore, ethanol likely did not contribute to the accident. Diphenhydramine, an impairing medication that causes sedation, altered mood, and impaired cognitive and psychomotor performance, was detected in the liver and cavity blood. Because diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem distribution, levels may have been significantly lower than the detected postmortem levels ; therefore, it could not be determined whether the pilot's use of diphenhydramine contributed to the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
A loose oxygen line, which was not detected by maintenance personnel during a recent annual inspection, that allowed oxygen to escape and drain the oxygen canister more quickly than the pilot expected. This reduced the pilot's availability of supplemental oxygen and led to his experiencing hypoxia and the airplane subsequently flying on autopilot until it eventually lost power due to fuel starvation.

Dr. Michael Moir
~

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Continental Motors Inc.; Mobile, Alabama 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N370MM





NTSB Identification: ERA15LA349
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 10, 2015 in Atlantic City, AO
Aircraft: MOONEY AIRPLANE CO INC M20TN, registration: N370MM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 10, 2015, about 1448 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20TN airplane, N370MM, impacted the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was owned by the pilot and the flight was being conducted as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site about the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from Gaylord Regional Airport (GLR), Gaylord, Michigan, about 1200 and was destined for Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey.

According to the pilot's logbook and a fuel receipt, he flew the accident airplane for 1 hour on September 7, 2015, and then fueled the airplane with 11.4 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. There were no other fuel transactions or flights between that time and the day of the accident. The pilot reported in his flight plan that there was sufficient fuel onboard the airplane for 6 hours of flight.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) records, the airplane departed GLR about 1200, and at 1214:04, the pilot checked in and informed the controller that he was climbing from 17,600 to 21,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The controller then instructed the pilot to climb to 25,000 ft msl, and the pilot read back the assigned altitude and continued toward the destination.

About 23 minutes later, while the autopilot-equipped airplane was in cruise flight, the ARTCC controller attempted to contact the pilot with a frequency change; however, the pilot did not respond. The controllers' repeated attempts to contact the pilot throughout the remainder of the flight were unsuccessful as the airplane continued flying a straight course toward ACY at 25,000 ft msl. According to radar data, at 1438 and while about 5 miles northwest of ACY, the airplane began descending from 25,000 ft msl and continued to descend at an average descent rate of about 1,600 ft per minute on a southeast heading until it impacted the Atlantic Ocean about 8 minutes later. As the airplane was descending, two F-16 airplanes departed ACY to relay search and rescue information, and the pilots subsequently found debris.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to the pilot's logbook, he held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on October 26, 2013, with no limitations. He recorded 4,900 hours of total flight experience, 2.5 hours of which were in the 90 days before the accident.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 2007 and registered to the pilot in December 2007. The most recent annual inspection was performed on June 12, 2015, at which time it had accumulated 472.2 total hours of time in service.

According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the airplane was equipped with extended range tanks where fuel was "carried in two integrally sealed sections of the forward, inboard area of the wing." The total usable fuel capacity was 102 gallons, 51 gallons per side. The pilot could set the fuel selector valve to the "left" tank, "right" tank, or "off" position via a recessed three-position handle aft of the console on the floor.

The airplane was also equipped with a four-place oxygen system that provided supplementary oxygen necessary for continuous flight at high altitude. Four oxygen outlets were provided in the overhead panel between the pilot and copilot seats. Oxygen would flow from the outlets only when a mask hose was connected. The pilot's mask was a permanent rebreathing-type mask with a vinyl plastic hose and a built-in microphone for radio communication while using oxygen. The oxygen cylinder filler valve was located under a spring-loaded door aft of the baggage door. When in service, the 77.1 cubic-ft tank could supply at least 11 hours of oxygen for a pilot-only operation depending on flight altitude. The airplane was equipped with an oxygen system quantity indicator in the pilot's arm rest. According to a receipt from the most recent annual inspection, the oxygen bottle was serviced at that time. Further, according to stickers placed on the oxygen regulator and the tank, they were both overhauled in May 2013.

Review of the Mooney 100 Hour-Annual Inspection Guide revealed that it included an inspection of the "oxygen system for leaks, proper ON/OFF valve operation & filler for safety of operation…"

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1454, the weather reported at ACY indicated variable wind at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 700 and 3,400 ft above ground level, temperature 24°C, dew point 22°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.75 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane was located by the United States Coast Guard off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey, in about 45-ft-deep water. On September 12, 2015, the airplane was recovered and moved to a salvage facility to facilitate further examination.

The fuselage was severely impact damaged. The inboard 2-ft-long section of the left wing remained attached to the fuselage. The outboard section of the left wing was impact separated and not recovered. The empennage was impact separated from the fuselage. The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the empennage. The bottom 1-ft-long section of the rudder exhibited impact damage. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator remained attached to the empennage at all attachment points. The left and right elevator counterweights were impact separated and not recovered. The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator remained attached to the empennage but was impact damaged in the positive direction. The right wing was impact separated from the fuselage and not recovered. Control cable continuity was confirmed from the rudder and elevator to the cockpit through control tube fractures and separations. In addition, control continuity was established from the yoke to both wing roots through control tube fractures and separations.

Both front seats remained attached to the fuselage. Two oxygen lines were secured to the top portion of the cabin. An oxygen pulse oximeter was located in the cabin area of the wreckage, and the pilot was found wearing an oxygen mask. A Hobbs meter was located in the aft section of the fuselage and indicated 477.2 hours of flight time.

The engine was impact separated from the airframe. The rocker box covers were removed, and engine continuity was confirmed from the propeller through the aft section of the engine. All three propeller blades were bent; two of the blades were bent in the same direction, and the third blade was bent in the opposite direction. The fuel line from the fuel manifold valve to the fuel metering unit was removed, and a drop of fluid was noted coming out of the line. The fluid had an odor similar to 100 LL aviation fuel. There were no preimpact anomalies noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation.

An oxygen tank was located aft of the aft bulkhead. An elbow fitting that was connected to the oxygen regulator assembly, which connected an oxygen line to the tank, was found loose. The fitting could be moved in both directions by hand without resistance.

Three Garmin G1000 SD cards were removed from the wreckage and sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for data download. The G1000 SD cards contained firmware versions and navigation databases that did not record data. No accident data were recovered from the SD cards.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Office of the State Medical Examiner for the State of New Jersey performed an autopsy on the pilot. The autopsy report indicated that the pilot died due to "multiple blunt injuries."

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of fluid and tissue specimens from the pilot. The specimens tested negative for carbon monoxide, and 26 mg/dL ethanol was detected in the blood. No ethanol was detected in muscle and brain tissue specimens. Diphenhydramine was detected in the liver, and 0.071 ug/ml diphenhydramine was detected in the blood. In addition, chlorthalidone was detected in the liver and blood.

Ethanol can be produced in tissues by postmortem microbial activity, which can result in considerable variations in levels in different tissues. Ingested alcohol is generally distributed throughout the body and levels in different postmortem tissues are usually similar.

Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine used to treat allergy symptoms and as a sleep aid and carries the following Federal Drug Administration warning: "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g. driving, operating heavy machinery)." Diphenhydramine may also result in altered mood and impaired cognitive and psychomotor performance.. In fact, in a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The therapeutic range for diphenhydramine is 0.0250 to 0.1120 ug/ml. Diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, which can result in central postmortem levels being about two to three times higher than peripheral levels. Chlorthalidone is a diuretic prescription blood pressure medication that may decrease the recurrence of kidney stones and is not considered impairing.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Performance Calculations

According to the POH, the fuel consumption for the flight using best-power performance data at 25,000 ft pressure altitude, depending on the selected manifold pressure and outside air temperature, would have been between 12.0 and 22.6 gallons of fuel per hour.

Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge – Hypoxia

According to the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapter 17, "Aeromedical Factors,"

Hypoxia means 'reduced oxygen' or 'not enough oxygen.'… Hypoxia can be caused by several factors, including an insufficient supply of oxygen, inadequate transportation of oxygen, or the inability of the body tissues to use oxygen…High-altitude flying can place a pilot in danger of becoming hypoxic. Oxygen starvation causes the brain and other vital organs to become impaired…the symptoms of hypoxia vary with the individual.…As altitude increases above 10,000 feet, the symptoms of hypoxia increase in severity, and the time of useful consciousness rapidly decreases.

According to the time of useful consciousness chart in the handbook, a pilot has 3 to 5 minutes of useful consciousness at 25,000 ft msl.

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA349 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 10, 2015 in
Aircraft: MOONEY AIRPLANE CO INC M20TN, registration: N370MM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On September 10, 2015, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20T, N370MM, sustained substantial damage when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the personal flight. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight originated from Gaylord Regional Airport (GLR), Gaylord, Michigan, around 1220, with an intended destination of Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey.

According to Federal Aviation Administration Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) records, the airplane departed GLR and was instructed to climb to 25,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot read back the assigned altitude and continued toward the destination. Subsequently, the ARTCC lost radio contact with the airplane. The airplane flew for approximately two hours without radio communications prior to descending and impacting the water.

Approximately 5 miles northwest of the ACY, the airplane began descending and continued to descend while on a southeast heading. As the airplane was descending, two F-16 airplanes departed ACY in order to relay search and rescue information. Radar contact was lost approximately 15 miles southeast of ACY.

The airplane was located by the United States Coast Guard off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey, in about 45 feet of water. On September 12, 2015, the airplane was recovered, and the airframe and engine were retained for further examination.
=======

A leaking oxygen tank probably led to a Gaylord pilot's fatal 2015 crash into the Atlantic Ocean, the NTSB has found.

Gaylord dentist Michael Moir, 68, died on Sept. 10, 2015, after losing contact with air traffic controllers for more than two hours from his home airport en route to an airplane safety conference in Atlantic City.

The loss of radio contact prompted harried attempts to reach him by controllers and pilots across Ontario and the eastern United States, according to radio transcripts, culminating with the dispatch of two F-16 fighters.

The NTSB found the hose that connected the oxygen tank to Moir’s oxygen mask, used for flying at altitudes above 10,000 feet, was loose. It went undetected in a June 2015 annual inspection of the plane and probably allowed Moir’s tank to drain, rendering him incapacitated, said the report issued earlier this week.

“Although the pilot was found wearing an oxygen mask, given the high altitude the airplane was at for the duration of the flight, the pilot’s failure to respond to controller contact, and evidence indicating that he would have had reduced availability of supplemental oxygen, it is likely that the pilot became incapacitated due to hypoxia,” the NTSB found.

Hypoxia is a debilitating loss of oxygen that slows motor skills and can cause confusion and a loss of consciousness.
Dr. Michael Moir.

“The airplane’s continued flight at 25,000 (feet above sea level) and its descent profile were consistent with the airplane operating under autopilot control and then descending to water impact due to fuel starvation,” the report said. The plane likely had more fuel, but required the pilot to switch between two tanks, one in each wing, a task Moir would have been unable to complete.

Dr. Gregory Pinnell, founder and flight surgeon for Saginaw-based Air Docs, said pilots have very few minutes of useful consciousness without supplemental oxygen at such a high altitude, although they may not lose consciousness altogether.

“That’s a commonly misunderstood thing about the time of useful consciousness,” he said. “It doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re not awake, but you’re functionally incapacitated.”

Efforts to reach Moir were complicated by at least one report that he had responded to a controller at Allentown, Pa. It was unclear, however, whether the controller heard Moir or one of many controllers or pilots trying to reach him as he flew over Ontario, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Hypoxia continues to be a dogged killer of pilots at high altitudes, partially because its effects are varied. One of the most famous US crashes resulting from loss of oxygen involved the death of professional golfer Payne Stewart in 1999.

"They say hypoxia fatalities are a serial killer and they're absolutely right, we never seem to get away from them," Pinnell said. "In the general aviation, every once in a while they seem to happen."

Moir was born in Detroit in 1946 and left behind a wife, Jean, and son, Keith.


His crash, at 2:48 p.m. on Sept. 10, came as pilots from around the nation attended a conference for Mooney airplanes, the type of single-engine plane Moir was flying. The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Continental Motors Inc.; Mobile, Alabama 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N370MM

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA349
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 10, 2015 in Atlantic City, AO
Aircraft: MOONEY AIRPLANE CO INC M20TN, registration: N370MM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 10, 2015, about 1448 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20TN airplane, N370MM, impacted the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was owned by the pilot and the flight was being conducted as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site about the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed. The flight originated from Gaylord Regional Airport (GLR), Gaylord, Michigan, about 1200 and was destined for Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey.

According to the pilot's logbook and a fuel receipt, he flew the accident airplane for 1 hour on September 7, 2015, and then fueled the airplane with 11.4 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. There were no other fuel transactions or flights between that time and the day of the accident. The pilot reported in his flight plan that there was sufficient fuel onboard the airplane for 6 hours of flight.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) records, the airplane departed GLR about 1200, and at 1214:04, the pilot checked in and informed the controller that he was climbing from 17,600 to 21,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The controller then instructed the pilot to climb to 25,000 ft msl, and the pilot read back the assigned altitude and continued toward the destination.

About 23 minutes later, while the autopilot-equipped airplane was in cruise flight, the ARTCC controller attempted to contact the pilot with a frequency change; however, the pilot did not respond. The controllers' repeated attempts to contact the pilot throughout the remainder of the flight were unsuccessful as the airplane continued flying a straight course toward ACY at 25,000 ft msl. According to radar data, at 1438 and while about 5 miles northwest of ACY, the airplane began descending from 25,000 ft msl and continued to descend at an average descent rate of about 1,600 ft per minute on a southeast heading until it impacted the Atlantic Ocean about 8 minutes later. As the airplane was descending, two F-16 airplanes departed ACY to relay search and rescue information, and the pilots subsequently found debris.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to the pilot's logbook, he held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on October 26, 2013, with no limitations. He recorded 4,900 hours of total flight experience, 2.5 hours of which were in the 90 days before the accident.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 2007 and registered to the pilot in December 2007. The most recent annual inspection was performed on June 12, 2015, at which time it had accumulated 472.2 total hours of time in service.

According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the airplane was equipped with extended range tanks where fuel was "carried in two integrally sealed sections of the forward, inboard area of the wing." The total usable fuel capacity was 102 gallons, 51 gallons per side. The pilot could set the fuel selector valve to the "left" tank, "right" tank, or "off" position via a recessed three-position handle aft of the console on the floor.

The airplane was also equipped with a four-place oxygen system that provided supplementary oxygen necessary for continuous flight at high altitude. Four oxygen outlets were provided in the overhead panel between the pilot and copilot seats. Oxygen would flow from the outlets only when a mask hose was connected. The pilot's mask was a permanent rebreathing-type mask with a vinyl plastic hose and a built-in microphone for radio communication while using oxygen. The oxygen cylinder filler valve was located under a spring-loaded door aft of the baggage door. When in service, the 77.1 cubic-ft tank could supply at least 11 hours of oxygen for a pilot-only operation depending on flight altitude. The airplane was equipped with an oxygen system quantity indicator in the pilot's arm rest. According to a receipt from the most recent annual inspection, the oxygen bottle was serviced at that time. Further, according to stickers placed on the oxygen regulator and the tank, they were both overhauled in May 2013.

Review of the Mooney 100 Hour-Annual Inspection Guide revealed that it included an inspection of the "oxygen system for leaks, proper ON/OFF valve operation & filler for safety of operation…"

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1454, the weather reported at ACY indicated variable wind at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 700 and 3,400 ft above ground level, temperature 24°C, dew point 22°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.75 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane was located by the United States Coast Guard off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey, in about 45-ft-deep water. On September 12, 2015, the airplane was recovered and moved to a salvage facility to facilitate further examination.

The fuselage was severely impact damaged. The inboard 2-ft-long section of the left wing remained attached to the fuselage. The outboard section of the left wing was impact separated and not recovered. The empennage was impact separated from the fuselage. The vertical stabilizer and rudder remained attached to the empennage. The bottom 1-ft-long section of the rudder exhibited impact damage. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator remained attached to the empennage at all attachment points. The left and right elevator counterweights were impact separated and not recovered. The right horizontal stabilizer and elevator remained attached to the empennage but was impact damaged in the positive direction. The right wing was impact separated from the fuselage and not recovered. Control cable continuity was confirmed from the rudder and elevator to the cockpit through control tube fractures and separations. In addition, control continuity was established from the yoke to both wing roots through control tube fractures and separations.

Both front seats remained attached to the fuselage. Two oxygen lines were secured to the top portion of the cabin. An oxygen pulse oximeter was located in the cabin area of the wreckage, and the pilot was found wearing an oxygen mask. A Hobbs meter was located in the aft section of the fuselage and indicated 477.2 hours of flight time.

The engine was impact separated from the airframe. The rocker box covers were removed, and engine continuity was confirmed from the propeller through the aft section of the engine. All three propeller blades were bent; two of the blades were bent in the same direction, and the third blade was bent in the opposite direction. The fuel line from the fuel manifold valve to the fuel metering unit was removed, and a drop of fluid was noted coming out of the line. The fluid had an odor similar to 100 LL aviation fuel. There were no preimpact anomalies noted with the engine that would have precluded normal operation.

An oxygen tank was located aft of the aft bulkhead. An elbow fitting that was connected to the oxygen regulator assembly, which connected an oxygen line to the tank, was found loose. The fitting could be moved in both directions by hand without resistance.

Three Garmin G1000 SD cards were removed from the wreckage and sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for data download. The G1000 SD cards contained firmware versions and navigation databases that did not record data. No accident data were recovered from the SD cards.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Office of the State Medical Examiner for the State of New Jersey performed an autopsy on the pilot. The autopsy report indicated that the pilot died due to "multiple blunt injuries."

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of fluid and tissue specimens from the pilot. The specimens tested negative for carbon monoxide, and 26 mg/dL ethanol was detected in the blood. No ethanol was detected in muscle and brain tissue specimens. Diphenhydramine was detected in the liver, and 0.071 ug/ml diphenhydramine was detected in the blood. In addition, chlorthalidone was detected in the liver and blood.

Ethanol can be produced in tissues by postmortem microbial activity, which can result in considerable variations in levels in different tissues. Ingested alcohol is generally distributed throughout the body and levels in different postmortem tissues are usually similar.

Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine used to treat allergy symptoms and as a sleep aid and carries the following Federal Drug Administration warning: "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g. driving, operating heavy machinery)." Diphenhydramine may also result in altered mood and impaired cognitive and psychomotor performance.. In fact, in a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The therapeutic range for diphenhydramine is 0.0250 to 0.1120 ug/ml. Diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, which can result in central postmortem levels being about two to three times higher than peripheral levels. Chlorthalidone is a diuretic prescription blood pressure medication that may decrease the recurrence of kidney stones and is not considered impairing.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Performance Calculations

According to the POH, the fuel consumption for the flight using best-power performance data at 25,000 ft pressure altitude, depending on the selected manifold pressure and outside air temperature, would have been between 12.0 and 22.6 gallons of fuel per hour.

Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge – Hypoxia

According to the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapter 17, "Aeromedical Factors,"

Hypoxia means 'reduced oxygen' or 'not enough oxygen.'… Hypoxia can be caused by several factors, including an insufficient supply of oxygen, inadequate transportation of oxygen, or the inability of the body tissues to use oxygen…High-altitude flying can place a pilot in danger of becoming hypoxic. Oxygen starvation causes the brain and other vital organs to become impaired…the symptoms of hypoxia vary with the individual.…As altitude increases above 10,000 feet, the symptoms of hypoxia increase in severity, and the time of useful consciousness rapidly decreases.


According to the time of useful consciousness chart in the handbook, a pilot has 3 to 5 minutes of useful consciousness at 25,000 ft msl.

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA349 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, September 10, 2015 in
Aircraft: MOONEY AIRPLANE CO INC M20TN, registration: N370MM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On September 10, 2015, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20T, N370MM, sustained substantial damage when it impacted the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the personal flight. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight originated from Gaylord Regional Airport (GLR), Gaylord, Michigan, around 1220, with an intended destination of Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), Atlantic City, New Jersey.

According to Federal Aviation Administration Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) records, the airplane departed GLR and was instructed to climb to 25,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot read back the assigned altitude and continued toward the destination. Subsequently, the ARTCC lost radio contact with the airplane. The airplane flew for approximately two hours without radio communications prior to descending and impacting the water.

Approximately 5 miles northwest of the ACY, the airplane began descending and continued to descend while on a southeast heading. As the airplane was descending, two F-16 airplanes departed ACY in order to relay search and rescue information. Radar contact was lost approximately 15 miles southeast of ACY.

The airplane was located by the United States Coast Guard off the coast of Atlantic City, New Jersey, in about 45 feet of water. On September 12, 2015, the airplane was recovered, and the airframe and engine were retained for further examination.




ATLANTIC CITY, N.J. — Gaylord Community Productions will be missing a talented performer in future productions following a fatal plane crash in the Atlantic Ocean Sept. 10.

Michael Moir, 68, of Gaylord, died upon impact in what the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General is considering an accident when his plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean seven miles from the Atlantic City coastline.

In an email, Paul Loriquet, director of communications for New Jersey attorney general's office, said the results of Moir's autopsy from the Southern Regional Medical Examiner’s Office revealed the cause of death as “blunt impacts of torso and extremities with fracture and avisceral injuries”. Loriquet added the manner of death was ruled an accident.

Al Glasby, treasurer for Gaylord Community Productions and former pharmacy department manager at Otsego Memorial Hospital, worked with Moir — who worked as an oral surgeon — professionally for around 11 years, during a time where both men worked at OMH.

Both men became friends and also worked together on several productions and performances through Gaylord Community Productions.

“He was in several shows and always was a positive, energetic, cheerful performer,” Glasby said.

The last production Moir was featured in was “Broadway Showstoppers." He performed in several other productions, though one he will especially be remembered for his first role in “The Sound of Music” when he played Captain von Trapp in a 1999 production.

Glasby recalled the rapport Moir had with the von Trapp children and how he was able to enthrall all who watched.

“His sincerity and humor and ability to communicate,” are all things Glasby said he will remember. “He was up and bright all the time. He was able to capture the hearts of all the children in the von Trapp family and audiences that attended the show. He was just a bright entertaining figure on stage.”

In addition to his experiences with Gaylord Community Productions, Moir was also an avid pilot of several decades.

He departed on what would be his final flight in his Mooney M20 from the Gaylord Regional Airport at or around noon Sept. 10, according to Matt Barresi, Gaylord Regional Airport manager. The Federal Aviation Administration confirmed the plane was headed for Atlantic City International Airport and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Atlantic City at approximately 2:45 p.m.

Officials from the National Transportation Safety Board said Thursday the crash remains under investigation and the cause of the crash could take 12 to 18 months to determine. Officials said accident report is expected to be published soon.

Associated Press reports indicated flight tracking software showed the plane traveled past the Atlantic City International Airport at around 20,000 feet. The plane then began to quickly descend, going from a drop rate of 1,113 feet per minute to 5,438 feet per minute over the course of two minutes while heading east and out to sea, the data showed.

FlightAware data analyst Ryan Jorgenson called that descent rate "not normal", according to the report. He said weather data showed there was low visibility at the airport around the time the plane flew over and there were thunderstorms in the area as well.

The aircraft held a steady course for Atlantic City before making a steep descent over the ocean, according to the AP report, and officials said Moir made no radio contact with air traffic control for approximately two hours before the crash.

Glasby said Gaylord Community Productions will soon begin rehearsing for its next play, “Mary Poppins”, though he said it is sad to know that Moir will not be a part of it.

“We are all sad,” he said. “We have been praying and had high hopes that it would be a rescue operation. We are deeply saddened by the final information conveyed to us.”

Though nothing has been set yet, Glasby said Gaylord Community Productions is sure have some kind of remembrance or dedication in Moir's memory.

According to the Nelson Funeral Home website, there will be a Mass of Christian Burial at noon Saturday, Sept. 19 for Moir at St. Mary Cathedral, 606 N. Ohio Ave. Visitation at Nelson Funeral Home, 135 N. Center Ave., will take place from 10 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. Saturday.

http://www.petoskeynews.com




SOMERS POINT — The Mooney M20TN Acclaim plane that crashed 7 miles off Atlantic City Thursday afternoon has been recovered and turned over to federal officials, a salvage company official says.

John Ryan, owner of TowboatUS, said his company recovered the plane about 8 p.m. Saturday. When the plane was brought up, a body was found inside, Ryan said.

Pilot Michael Moir was headed to Atlantic City International Airport for a safety program for Mooney pilots when his plane went down.

“We had the coordinates, and we were able to locate it quickly,” Ryan said Sunday afternoon, adding that federal officials had come by his Bay Avenue salvage yard to examine the plane Sunday. “The rough weather conditions made it a little more difficult to bring up.”

The aircraft departed from Gaylord Airport in Michigan at noon Thursday, according to FlightAware, a flight-tracking system. The site’s tracker shows the plane heading on a steady course for Atlantic City before making a steep descent over the ocean. Moir was a dentist in Gaylord and had been flying planes for more than four decades.

A family member confirmed to The Press that they had been notified that the plane and a body had been found.

Neither the State Police nor the Coast Guard could confirm the plane had been located. Each agency referred questions to the other. The Federal Aviation Administration referred all questions to the National Transportation  Safety Board. Representatives of the board did not return calls seeking comment.

Jean Moir, Michael Moir’s wife, confirmed to The Press on Thursday that her was husband was the pilot of the downed plane.

Moir’s aircraft hadn’t made radio contact with air traffic control for two hours prior to the crash about 2:45 p.m., officials said.

The Coast Guard reached the debris field Thursday afternoon and couldn’t find the occupant of the Mooney, officials said. Upon initial response, the Coast Guard deployed dive teams, search boats and a helicopter to the debris site. By Friday afternoon, the Coast Guard had suspended its search for Moir.




Dr. Michael Moir
Michael Moir, the pilot of the Mooney M20TN Acclaim plane that crashed seven miles off Atlantic City’s coast Thursday afternoon, was heading to Atlantic City for a safety program for pilots who flew Mooney planes.

“He never missed one,” said his wife, Jean Moir.“He liked to go and talk to the other pilots about issues they may be having.”

Jean Moir, who confirmed to The Press that the her husband was the pilot of the downed plane, said the 68-year-old Army veteran, learned to fly with funding from the GI Bill.

He was supposed to go to the safety program put on by the Mooney Aircraft Pilots Association, she said. Calls to the association about the program were not returned Friday.

Moir’s nephew, James Simpson, 32, said Friday he and other family members are looking for answers and holding out hope there was a chance his uncle could still be alive.

The plane’s debris field was located Thursday, but no body has been found.

“He was a very smart and charismatic man,” Simpson, of Rochester Hills, Michigan, said in a phone interview Friday. “He was always very quick with a joke or lightened the situation. He had a presence he gave off. He was the man in the room, a leader and commanded a lot of respect.”

Simpson said he flew with Moir once when he was very young.

Moir was a dentist in Gaylord, Michigan, where he flew from Thursday afternoon.

An experienced pilot, he last saw his wife 45 minutes before his plane left. He stopped by the tennis courts to say goodbye, she said.

The aircraft departed from the Michigan airport at noon Thursday, according to FlightAware, a flight-tracking system. The site’s tracker shows the plane heading on a steady course for Atlantic City before making a steep descent over the ocean.

National Transportation Safety Board spokesman, Eric Weiss, said Moir’s aircraft didn’t make radio contact with air traffic control for two hours prior to the crash at about 2:45 p.m.

The United States Coast Guard reached the debris field Thursday afternoon and couldn’t find the occupant of the Mooney M20TN Acclaim, Weiss said.

Upon initial response, the Coast Guard deployed dive teams, search boats and a helicopter to the debris site.

Friday afternoon, the Coast Guard suspended its search for Moir. There is still no information on what might have led to the crash.

“Due to the amount of time that has elapsed since the plane crash and the information we have gathered from our searches, we made the difficult decision to suspend active search efforts pending further developments,” said Capt. Benjamin Cooper, the commanding officer of Coast Guard Sector Delaware Bay.

For now, Simpson and the family still hope that Moir is found.

“It’s just time to work with family,” Simpson said when he learned that the Coast Guard suspended search efforts. “We will move forward and see how our family wants to deal with everything.”

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