Friday, November 24, 2017

Hughes 269C, N9685F, Charlottesville Aero LLC: Accident occurred November 22, 2017 in Woodlawn, Carroll County, Virginia

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Charleston, Virginia

Rotorcraft on landing, rolled over.

Charlottesville Aero LLC:  http://registry.faa.gov/N9685F

Date: 22-NOV-17
Time: 15:45:00Z
Regis#: N9685F
Aircraft Make: HUGHES
Aircraft Model: 269C
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: SUBSTANTIAL
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: WOODLAWN
State: WEST VIRGINIA

Van's RV-4, N999ZF: Fatal accident occurred October 17, 2015 in Cortland, Gage County, Nebraska

Jerry Allen Allder
Jerry was an avid fisherman, talented woodworker, and enthusiastic pilot. He was in the U.S. Navy where he attended submarine school and served on the USS Forrestal in the Mediterranean during the Vietnam War.

David A. Schneider
David graduated from Union College in 1986 with a degree in nursing. He was a member of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Midwest Aerobatic Club-Chapter 80. 


The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity: 

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Lincoln, Nebraska

Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board:

https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket Aviation - National Transportation Safety Board:https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Jerry Allen Allder: http://registry.faa.gov/N999ZF



Location: Cortland, NE
Accident Number: CEN16FA014
Date & Time: 10/17/2015, 0841 CDT
Registration: N999ZF
Aircraft: Zidek Vans RV-4
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal

On October 17, 2015, about 0841 central daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Vans RV-4 single-engine airplane, N999ZF, collided with terrain while maneuvering near Cortland, Nebraska. The private pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. The personal flight departed Crete Municipal Airport (CEK), Crete, Nebraska, at 0833, and the intended destination was Lincoln Airport (LNK), Lincoln, Nebraska.

According to available air traffic control radar track data, after departing CEK on runway 17, the airplane proceeded southeast and climbed to an altitude of about 2,600 ft mean sea level (msl). At 0836:30, the airplane turned south and descended to 2,400 ft msl. At 0837:44, the airplane turned east and continued to descend. Between 0839:23 and 0841:42, the airplane completed four low-altitude passes centered over a small lake located about 1/3 mile northeast of the intersection of West Ash Road and Southwest 29th Road. The small lake was located adjacent to a residence owned by the pilot's brother. The low-altitude passes and associated course reversals were completed within a 1/2 mile radius of the small lake. According to available topography data, the terrain elevation immediately surrounding the lake was about 1,470 ft msl.

According to radar track data, the airplane's first low pass over the lake was from southeast to northwest at an altitude at or below 100 ft above ground level (agl). The airplane then entered a climbing right turn to about 1,900 ft msl before it descended back toward the lake from north to south at an altitude at or below 100 ft agl. The airplane then completed a 180° turn at 1,600 ft msl before it descended for a low pass from south to north at an altitude at or below 100 ft agl. The airplane then entered a climbing right turn to about 1,800 ft msl before it descended for a fourth and final low pass from northeast to southwest at an altitude at or below 100 ft agl. Following the fourth low pass, the airplane entered a climb on a southwest heading to about 2,000 ft msl before it entered a sharp right turn toward north. The final radar return was recorded at 0841:42 and showed the airplane at 1,700 ft msl and about 472 ft east of the initial ground impact point.

The pilot's brother stated that he witnessed the airplane complete several low-altitude passes over his property immediately before the accident. He stated that following the final low pass, the airplane pitched up into a climbing right turn. He stated that, during the climbing turn, the airplane suddenly pitched nose-down and descended rapidly. The airplane recovered briefly to a wings-level attitude before it quickly rolled wings-left and -right and entered a descending right turn into terrain.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 68, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Front
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification:
Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam:
11/01/2013
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 07/16/2014
Flight Time: 512.5 hours (Total, all aircraft), 148.3 hours (Total, this make and model), 501.9 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 15.8 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 5.9 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft)

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 68-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on November 1, 2013, with a limitation for corrective lenses. On the application for his current medical certificate, the pilot reported having accumulated 323 total hours of flight experience, of which 35 hours were flown within the previous 6 months.

The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was dated October 14, 2015, at which time he had accumulated 512.5 hours total flight time. All logged flight time had been completed in single-engine airplanes. He had logged 501.9 hours as pilot-in-command, 3.4 hours at night, and 4.3 hours in simulated instrument conditions. He had flown 91.7 hours during the year before the accident, 47.8 hours during the 6 months before the accident, 15.8 hours during the 90 days before the accident, and 5.9 hours during the month before the accident. The pilot had accumulated 148.3 hours in the accident airplane make/model. His last flight review was completed in the accident airplane on July 16, 2014.
  
Pilot-Rated Passenger Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 54, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Rear
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 02/04/2013
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 07/18/2014
Flight Time: 245.8 hours (Total, all aircraft)

According to FAA records, the 54-year-old passenger held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 4, 2013, with a limitation for corrective lenses. The medical certificate expired on February 28, 2015. On the application for his expired medical certificate, the pilot reported having accumulated 222.4 total hours of flight experience, of which 18.5 hours were flown within the previous 6 months. The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was for a flight review on July 18, 2014, at which time he had accumulated 245.8 hours total flight time. The pilot had not logged any flight time during the year before the accident.



Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: Zidek
Registration: N999ZF
Model/Series: Vans RV-4
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1996
Amateur Built: Yes
Airworthiness Certificate: Experimental
Serial Number: 2407
Landing Gear Type: Tailwheel
Seats: 2
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 11/15/2014, Conditional
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 1600 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 590.5 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT: C91A installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: IO-320-D1C
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 160 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held:  None

The airplane, serial number 2407, was a single-engine, low-wing, fixed conventional landing gear, monoplane of conventional aluminum construction, configured to seat two occupants in a tandem seating arrangement. The airplane was powered by a 160-horsepower, 4-cylinder Lycoming IO-320-D1C reciprocating engine, serial number L-5910-55A. The engine provided thrust through a fixed-pitch, two-blade, Sensenich 70CM7S16-0-79 propeller, serial number 31698K. The airplane had a useful load of 628 pounds, a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 1,600 pounds, and a total fuel capacity of 32 gallons. A previous owner assembled the airplane from a kit. The FAA issued the airplane a special airworthiness certificate with an experimental classification and associated operating limitations on October 22, 1996. The pilot was the registered owner of the airplane, and FAA records indicated that he purchased the airplane in November 2013.

The airplane's recording tachometer was destroyed during the postimpact fire, which precluded a determination of the airplane's total service time at the time of the accident. According to the maintenance logbooks, the last condition inspection was completed on November 15, 2014, at 590.5 total airframe hours. At the time of the condition inspection, the engine had also accumulated 590.5 hours since new. The final logbook entry, dated October 8, 2015, was for an engine oil change at 674.5 total airframe/engine hours. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues.




Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: LNK, 1219 ft msl
Observation Time: 0854 CDT
Distance from Accident Site: 25 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 360°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: 8°C / -1°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 9 knots, 120°
Visibility (RVR): 
Altimeter Setting: 30.49 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):

Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Crete, NE (CEK)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Lincoln, NE (LNK)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 0833 CDT
Type of Airspace: Class G

At 0854, the LNK automated surface observing system located about 25 miles north of the accident site reported: wind 120° at 9 knots, a clear sky, 10 miles surface visibility, temperature 8°C, dew point -1°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.49 inches of mercury.




Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: Unknown
Total Injuries: 2 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude:  40.495000, -96.764722

The accident site was in a harvested soybean field. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a 265° magnetic heading and measured about 92 ft long. The initial impact crater contained the propeller and the right main landing gear. The impact crater also exhibited a well-defined propeller slash mark in the terrain. The estimated angle between the propeller slash mark and the surrounding terrain was about 30°. The two-blade propeller exhibited chordwise scratches near both blade tips. One propeller blade exhibited significant S-shape bending along its span.  A large area of burnt ground and vegetation surrounded the main wreckage, which consisted of the fuselage, empennage, both wings, and the engine. A majority of the fuselage, including the cockpit and cabin, had been consumed during the post-impact fire. Flight control continuity could not be established due to impact and fire damage; however, all observed separations were consistent with overstress or damage caused by prolonged exposure to fire.

The engine remained partially attached to the firewall. Internal engine and valve train continuity were confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The internal oil pump discharged oil in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The mechanical fuel pump exhibited fire damage and did not function. Neither magneto provided a spark when rotated by hand; however, both magnetos exhibited damage consistent with impact and prolonged exposure to fire. The upper spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. The fuel metering assembly had separated from the engine and exhibited impact related damage. The postaccident examination revealed no evidence of pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal engine operation.

Medical And Pathological Information

The Douglas County Coroner's Office, located in Omaha, Nebraska, performed autopsies on the pilot and pilot-rated passenger at the request of the Gage County Attorney. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to multiple blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident.

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens obtained during each autopsy. The pilot's toxicology results were negative for ethanol. Ibuprofen was detected in the urine. Ibuprofen, sold under multiple brand names, is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory analgesic drug that is not considered impairing.


The pilot-rated passenger toxicology results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Oxymetazoline was detected in urine but not in blood. Oxymetazoline, sold under multiple brand names, is an over-the-counter topical decongestant that is not considered impairing.


Friends and family gather at the scene of the plane crash on October 17th, 2015.



NTSB Identification: CEN16FA014
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, October 17, 2015 in Cortland, NE
Aircraft: Zidek Vans RV-4, registration: N999ZF
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On October 17, 2015, about 0841 central daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Zidek model Vans RV-4 single-engine airplane, N999ZF, was destroyed during a postimpact fire after colliding with terrain while maneuvering near Cortland, Nebraska. The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 without a flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the accident site. The personal flight departed Crete Municipal Airport (CEK), Crete, Nebraska, at 0833, and had the intended destination of Lincoln Airport (LNK), Lincoln, Nebraska.

According to available air traffic control (ATC) radar data, after departing CEK on runway 17, the accident flight proceeded to the southeast and climbed to an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). At 0837:30 (hhmm:ss), the flight turned to the south and descended to 2,400 feet msl. About 19 seconds later, the flight turned to easterly course and started to descend. Between 0839:23 and 0841:42, the accident flight made multiple low-altitude passes centered over a small lake located 1/3 mile northeast of the intersection of West Ash Road and Southwest 29th Road, near Cortland, Nebraska. The low-altitude passes, and the associated course-reversals, were completed within a 1/2 mile radius of the small lake. According to available elevation data, the terrain immediately surrounding the lake was about 1,470 feet msl. The small lake was located adjacent to a residence owned by the pilot's brother.

The first low-pass of the small lake was from the southeast to the northwest at an altitude at or below 100 feet above ground level. Following the first low-pass, the flight entered a climbing right turn to about 1,900 feet msl before it entered a descent back toward the small lake on a south heading. The second low-pass was from the north to the south at an altitude at or below 100 feet above ground level. Following the second low-pass, the flight completed a 180-degree turn at approximately 1,600 feet msl before descending for a third low-pass over the small lake. The third low-pass was from the south to the north at an altitude at or below 100 feet above ground level. Following the third low-pass, the flight entered a climbing right turn to about 1,800 feet msl before it entered a descent for another low-pass over the small lake. The fourth and final low-pass was from the northeast to the southwest and was at an altitude at or below 100 feet agl. Following the final low-pass, the flight entered a climb on a southwest heading to about 2,000 feet msl before making a sharp turn toward the north. The final radar return was recorded at 0841:42 at 1,700 feet msl. The final radar return was located about 472 feet east of initial impact point with the ground.

The pilot's brother stated that he witnessed the accident airplane complete multiple low-altitude passes over his property immediately before the accident. He stated that following the final low-pass the airplane pitched-up and entered a climbing right turn. The witness stated that, during the climbing turn, the airplane suddenly pitched nose down and descended rapidly. The witness stated that the airplane recovered briefly to a level attitude before it quickly rolled wings left-and-right and entered a descending right turn into the terrain.

The main wreckage was located in a harvested soybean field. There was a wreckage debris path that measured about 92 feet long and was oriented on a 265-degree magnetic heading. The initial impact crater contained the propeller and the right main landing gear. The impact crater also exhibited a well-defined propeller slash mark in the terrain. The estimated angle between the propeller slash mark and the surrounding terrain was about 30 degrees. The two-blade propeller exhibited chordwise scratches near the blade tips. One propeller blade exhibited significant S-shape bending along its span. A large area of burnt ground and vegetation surrounded the main wreckage, which consisted of the fuselage, empennage, both wings, and the engine. A majority of the fuselage, including the cockpit and cabin, had been consumed during the postimpact fire. Flight control continuity could not be established due to impact and fire damage; however, all observed separations were consistent with overstress or damage caused by prolonged exposure to fire.

The engine remained partially attached to the firewall. Internal engine and valve train continuity was confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The internal oil-pump discharged oil in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The mechanical fuel pump exhibited fire damage and did not function. Neither magneto provided a spark when rotated by hand; however, both magnetos exhibited damage consistent with impact and prolonged exposure to fire. The upper spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. The fuel metering assembly was found separated from the engine and exhibited impact related damage. The postaccident examination revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal engine operation.

At 0854, the LNK automated surface observing system, located about 25 miles north of the accident site, reported: wind 120 degrees at 9 knots, surface visibility 10 statute miles, clear sky, temperature 8 degrees Celsius, dew point -1 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.49 inches of mercury.

Bücker Bü-133 Jungmeister, N1940J: Fatal accident occurred October 14, 2015 at Missoula International Airport (KMSO), Montana

Patrick Carter


The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Helena, Montana

Investigation Docket  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Aviation Accident Data Summary - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N1940J

Location: Missoula, MT
Accident Number: WPR16FA012
Date & Time: 10/14/2015, 1510 MDT
Registration: N1940J
Aircraft: BUCKER JUNGMEISTER BU 133
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 1 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under:  Part 91: General Aviation - Personal



HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 14, 2015, at 1510 mountain daylight time, a Bucker Jungmeister BU 133/C, airplane N1940J, crashed in a parking lot during the initial takeoff climb at the Missoula International Airport (MSO), Missoula, Montana. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by the pilot, who operated the airplane under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal cross-country flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that was destined for Alabama. No flight plan had been filed.

The pilot purchased the World War II-era single-seat biplane the day before the accident. According to the former mechanic for the airplane, on the day of the accident, the previous owner contacted him to let him know that the airplane had been sold and that the new owner/pilot was having a problem with fuel running into the cockpit. The former owner asked the mechanic if he could call the pilot. The mechanic called the pilot and left a message. When the pilot called him back, the pilot stated that he had refueled at the Dalles, Oregon, airport. After takeoff, when the pilot lowered the nose, he was getting fuel on the floor and down the tubing on the side of the cockpit. He shut off all the electrical power and continued the flight; after a while, the problem went away. The pilot also experienced the same scenario when he refueled in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. The mechanic told the pilot that it sounded like the fuel tank was not venting properly and that it was forcing out fuel until air could get into the tank. The pilot said that someone at the airport in Missoula was helping him inspect the fuel system, but they were not able to find anything wrong. The mechanic suggested that the pilot ask them to check the vent system. The pilot told the mechanic that he was going to call the tower and leave Missoula with all electrical power off. The mechanic suggested to the pilot that he not fly the airplane until the problem was fixed. The pilot reported that he had to get to Alabama, or as far east as he could by October 16. The mechanic stated that they spoke for about 10 minutes, and he found out later that the pilot had crashed about 20 minutes after they had spoken.

Witnesses located at Northstar Jet, the fixed base operator (FBO) at MSO where the pilot obtained fuel, reported that they had very little interaction with the pilot. The line crew employee reported that the pilot pumped his own fuel and spilled some fuel during the fueling process. The airplane was fueled with 14 gallons of fuel. None of the Northstar Jet personnel reported helping the pilot inspect the fuel system or seeing the pilot or anyone else perform such inspection.

Several witnesses saw the airplane takeoff. A mechanic at another FBO stated that during takeoff from runway 25, the airplane appeared to have plenty of power and sounded good. Once airborne, the airplane made a hard-right turn with the bank angle increasing. A second witness at the same FBO stated that the airplane made a steep right bank and began to descend.

A third witness reported that the airplane climbed quickly after rotation, and made an immediate right turn; the rate of climb decreased, and the airplane began to sink as it continued to turn right. After turning about 180°, the airplane "suddenly rolled about 90° to the right as the wing stalled." The airplane entered a spin and descended "almost straight down," to impact in the rental car lot at the airline terminal. Upon impact, a fire erupted.

Another witness stated that he was on the west end of the airport when he saw the airplane about 80 ft above ground level (agl) enter a hard-right turn, then the airplane descended and impacted the ground. According to this witness, the engine sounded like it was "powering up." A witness at the eastern end of the rental car parking lot stated that the engine was running at the time the airplane impacted the ground.


Patrick Carter


PERSONNEL INFORMATION

No personal logbooks were made available to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). A review of the pilot's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman medical records on file at the Airman and Medical Records Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed that the pilot was issued a second-class medical certificate on June 4, 2015. He reported 11,200 total flight hours with 150 hours accrued in the past 6 months.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The last maintenance performed on the airplane was an annual inspection completed on June 12, 2015, at an airplane total time of 2,038.9 hours. The airplane was powered by a radial piston Warner Aircraft Engines Scarab 165, serial number 2031A; at the time of the annual inspection, the engine total time was recorded as 909.4 hours, with 32.7 hours since major overhaul.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Investigators from the NTSB and an inspector from the FAA responded to the accident site. The entire airplane came to rest in the long-term parking lot on airport property, and most of the airplane was consumed by the postcrash fire.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Montana Department of Justice Forensic Science Division, Missoula, Montana, conducted a post mortem examination on the pilot. The cause of death was listed as blunt force trauma with thermal injuries and smoke inhalation.

The FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed forensic toxicology on specimens from the pilot. The results were negative for cyanide, ethanol, and drugs of abuse. The results were positive for carbon monoxide, which was detected at 10% in heart blood.



TEST AND RESEARCH

According to Northstar Jet personnel, two of their company airplanes had refueled before the accident airplane via the same truck that had fueled the accident. The two airplanes and the fuel truck were taken out of service, and the fuel was tested with no discrepancies noted.

A visual engine examination revealed no obvious mechanical problems. The engine could not be manually rotated because of engine displacement due to impact forces. The number three cylinder had separated from the crankcase and exposed the inside of the engine. The engine accessory components had sustained fire damage. Both the left and right magneto remained attached at their respective mounting pads. The left magneto was manually rotated and spark was observed at the ignition leads. The right magneto had sustained fire and impact damage, and the magneto was disassembled with no mechanical malfunctions noted.

The fuel system was subjected to and compromised by the postcrash fire. The fuel selector was removed from the airframe, and upon visual examination, no obvious mechanical deficiencies were noted. Compressed air was blown into each of its selector positions, 1,2, and both; no air escaped from the openings. The fuel selector was then manually moved through each of its positions, compressed air was blown into each position, and air was noted to come out of each fuel selector position.



Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Commercial; Private
Age: 51, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Single
Other Aircraft Rating(s): Glider
Restraint Used: 
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 06/04/2015
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 
Flight Time:  (Estimated) 11200 hours (Total, all aircraft)
  
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: BUCKER JUNGMEISTER
Registration: N1940J
Model/Series: BU 133 C
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1940
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Experimental
Serial Number: 22
Landing Gear Type: Tailwheel
Seats: 1
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 06/12/2015, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 
Time Since Last Inspection: 
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 2038.9 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Warner Aircraft Engines
ELT: Not installed
Engine Model/Series: 1650
Registered Owner: MOSS JUDITH B
Rated Power: 165 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None



Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KMSO, 3189 ft msl
Observation Time: 1453 MDT
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 340°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: 20°C / 3°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 7 knots, 320°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 30.18 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV): 
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Missoula, MT (MSO)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: 
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1510 MDT
Type of Airspace:

Airport Information

Airport: MISSOULA INTL (MSO)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 3206 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 25
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 4612 ft / 75 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: None

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: On-Ground
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude:  46.916389, -114.090556 (est)


Patrick Carter



NTSB Identification: WPR16FA012
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, October 14, 2015 in Missoula, MT
Aircraft: BUCKER JUNGMEISTER BU 133, registration: N1940J
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On October 14, 2015, at 1510 mountain daylight time, a Bucker Jungmeister BU 133/C, N1940J, crashed in a parking lot during the takeoff climb out at the Missoula International Airport (MSO), Missoula, Montana. The pilot/owner operated the airplane under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. The pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The airplane was mostly consumed in the postcrash fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that was destined for an undetermined location. No flight plan had been filed.

According to a friend of the previous airplane owner, the airplane had been purchased on October 13. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responded to the accident site. The airplane was recovered for further examination.

U.S. Navy Ends Search for Three Sailors Missing in Plane Crash: The Grumman C-2A Greyhound crashed near Japan with 11 passengers and crew onboard

A C-2A Greyhound launches from the flight deck of the USS Ronald Reagan on November 17, 2017.



The Wall Street Journal
By Alastair Gale
Updated Nov. 23, 2017 11:35 p.m. ET

TOKYO—The U.S. Navy said it has ended search-and-rescue operations for three missing sailors after one of its cargo planes crashed near Japan.

A C-2A Greyhound aircraft carrying 11 passengers and crew from Japan crashed on Wednesday en route to the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, which is operating in the Philippine Sea.

Eight people were rescued and are in good health, the Navy said.

The Navy said in a statement Friday that it ended rescue operations at 10 a.m. Japan time (8 p.m. ET Thursday). It said the names of the lost sailors were being withheld pending completion of next-of-kin notifications.

“Our thoughts and prayers are with our lost shipmates and their families,” said Rear Adm. Marc Dalton, Commander, Task Force 70, according to the statement.

The Navy said it is conducting an investigation into the cause of the crash. A Pentagon official said Wednesday there was no indication in the first hours after the crash of any foul play or attack.

The C-2A aircraft is a workhorse of the Navy that was first introduced in the 1960s and delivers passenger and cargo to aircraft carriers. The current generation of C-2A aircraft were delivered in the 1980s and have gone through upgrades in recent years to extend their lifespan.

The last fatal accident involving a C-2A was in 1973, when a U.S. Navy plane crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff in Greece, killing seven people, according to the Aviation Safety Network website. In that incident, both engines lost power due to suspected fuel contamination with water.

The most recent accident occurred in 2005, when a C-2A belly-landed at an airport in the U.S. due to problems with its landing gear.

The Navy plans to replace the C-2A in coming years with Osprey aircraft that can hover like helicopters.

The lost sailors in this week’s C-2A crash follow a total of 17 fatalities for the Navy’s Seventh Fleet after two ship collisions this year. In the wake of the collisions, the commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin, was fired. The Seventh Fleet is based in Yokosuka, Japan.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.wsj.com

Canadair CL-600-2B16 Challenger 601-3A, N600NP, Six Hundred NP LLC: Accident occurred March 01, 2015 at Marco Island Airport (KMKY), Collier County, Florida



The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Miramar, Florida
Sage-Popovich; Valparaiso, Tennessee
TSB of Canada; Gatineau, Quebec, Canada
Tactair Fluid Controls, Inc.; Liverpool, New York
Meggitt; Akron, Ohio
Bombardier; Mirabel, Quebec, Canada
Sage-Popovich; Gary, Indiana

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf 

Investigation Docket -  National Transportation Safety Board:  https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Six Hundred NP LLC: http://registry.faa.gov/N600NP




Location: Marco Island, FL
Accident Number: ERA15LA140
Date & Time: 03/01/2015, 1615 EST
Registration: N600NP
Aircraft: Bombardier Canadair CL600-2A12
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Miscellaneous/other
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor, 7 None
Flight Conducted Under:  Part 91: General Aviation - Executive/Corporate


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 1, 2015, about 1615 eastern standard time, a Bombardier Canadair CL-600-2A12 airplane, N600NP, experienced a landing overrun and subsequent collapse of the nose landing gear at Marco Island Airport (MKY), Marco Island, Florida. The two pilots, one flight attendant, and four passengers were not injured; one passenger sustained serious injuries; and one passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was being operated as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 executive/corporate flight. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed, and visual meteorological conditions prevailed at MKY about the time of the accident. The flight originated about 1554 from Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH), Marathon, Florida.

Earlier on the day of the accident, the pilot-in-command (PIC) and second-in-command (SIC) landed the airplane on a 5,008-ft-long, asphalt-grooved runway at MTH. After touchdown with the flaps fully extended, the ground spoilers and thrust reversers were deployed, and normal braking occurred. The flight crewmembers reported no discrepancies pertaining to the normal brake system, antiskid system, thrust reversers, or ground spoilers.

The PIC, who was seated in the left seat, stated that, after takeoff from MTH, they proceeded to MKY and obtained information from the automated weather observing station (AWOS), which indicated the wind was from 250° at 5 knots. Before the approach, the pilots reviewed the speeds and landing distance; the calculated required landing distance assuming a Vref of 133 knots was 3,166 ft for a dry runway and 4,166 ft for a wet runway; runway 17 was 5,000 ft long. About 10 miles south of MKY, they had the runway in sight and then requested and were approved for a visual approach from Fort Myers Approach Control. The airplane then entered the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern from the south while slowing; the flaps were extended to 20°. The PIC noted that there was rain about 2 to 3 miles east of MKY but that the runway appeared to be dry. Because of the rain, the PIC chose to fly the traffic pattern closer to the runway (0.5 mile) on the downwind leg, which he extended 1 mile to avoid the rain. When the airplane was abeam the approach end of runway 17, the SIC extended the landing gear and the flaps to 30°. The pilots then performed the Landing checklist and the antiskid test, which was normal. The PIC then armed the thrust reversers and made a "teardrop turn" to the final approach leg of the airport traffic pattern. The airplane owner, who was pilot-rated and seated in the cabin, recalled a greater bank angle on the turn from downwind to final.

During the approach, the flaps were extended to 45°, and while flying Vref plus 10 knots, the airplane encountered a couple of wind gusts. The SIC checked the AWOS again, but the wind information was the same. The flight did not encounter rain during the approach, and at 50 ft above ground level (agl), the automated callout occurred. The PIC maintained a normal glidepath at Vref plus 4 or 5 knots at the runway threshold, at which point, he placed the thrust levers in the" idle" position. The owner later reported that, while over the runway, it felt like they were floating slightly longer than normal.

The PIC reported that the touchdown was "firm" occurring between 300 and 500 ft beyond the "aiming point marking." After touchdown, he tried to extend the ground spoilers without success. He later attributed that to the complex process requiring the lever to be pulled up then moved rearward through an integral gate. When the nose landing gear (NLG) contacted the runway, he applied forward control yoke pressure and brake pressure but felt no deceleration. He indicated that he also attempted to deploy the thrust reversers but did not believe they deployed and did not see any thrust reverser deploy lights. He further stated that each piggyback lever never unlocked and that he could not get the levers into the reverse position. The owner later reported that he heard what he thought was a "tire go" during the landing roll, that he felt "heavy braking," and that he became concerned when he did not feel or hear the thrust reversers deploy.

The PIC added that he applied "moderate" brake pressure but did not feel any deceleration, which the SIC characterized the landing roll as similar to skidding on ice. The PIC informed the SIC there was no braking energy, released the brakes, turned off the antiskid, and then "re-applied the brakes pressing hard." The SIC also reported he too applied the brakes because he felt no deceleration. The PIC reported he did not feel any deceleration and again tried to deploy the thrust reversers without success. He maintained the runway centerline using the nosewheel steering and began modulating the brakes. However, the airplane did not slow as expected. After the PIC realized that he was not going to be able to stop the airplane on the runway and because there was water beyond the runway end, he intentionally veered the airplane to the right. The SIC reported the airplane departed the runway travelling about 35 knots, and rolled about 250 ft into sand. The airplane owner, who had stood up to go to the cabin entry door when it became clear to him that the airplane was not going to stop on the runway, was bounced against the sidewall between the Nos. 1 and 2 seats on the airplane's left side and sustained serious injuries.

The PIC ordered an emergency evacuation and secured the engines. At that time, the piggyback levers were still up; he then pushed them down, pulled the firewall shutoff valves, and secured the auxiliary power unit. The passengers exited the airplane, and power was secured. Shortly after, airport personnel arrived and rendered assistance. Subsequently, a passenger occupying the cockpit jumpseat complained of back pain and was taken to a hospital for treatment. The PIC later confirmed that he used nosewheel steering to maintain the runway centerline, and that, during the landing roll, he did not detect any abnormal issues with the nosewheel steering.

The SIC later reported that there was no antiskid or weight-on-wheels (WOW) annunciations or failed lights and no warnings from the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS). He indicated that he and the PIC did not discuss whether to go-around because the problem became evident when the airplane was too far down the runway.




PERSONNEL INFORMATION

PIC

The PIC held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airline transport pilot certificate with a multiengine airplane rating and type ratings in several aircraft, including the CL-600. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating and a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine, and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on January 15, 2015, with the limitation that he "must wear corrective lenses," which he was wearing at the time of the accident.

The PIC's total flight time was 8,988 hours, 840 hours of which were in the accident airplane make and model, 625 hours of which were as PIC in the accident airplane. In the 90 days before the accident, his total flight time was 65 hours, 25 hours of which were as PIC and 40 hours of which were as SIC.

He obtained his initial type rating in the CL-600 in March 2011 from CAE SimuFlite (CAE), Fort Worth, Texas. His last 14 CFR 135.297 check was performed in a Level D simulator at CAE on February 3, 2015, and his last 14 CFR 135.293 check in a CL600 was performed at CAE in August 2014.

The operator hired the PIC in February 2009 as a captain. After obtaining his PIC type rating in the CL-600 in March 2011, he flew a rotation of different aircraft for 2 years. From May 2013 to the accident date, he only flew the CL-600.

SIC

The SIC held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating and type ratings in several aircraft, including the CL-600. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating.

The SIC estimated that his total flight time was more than 17,000 hours, about 1,500 hours of which were in the accident airplane make and model and 10 hours of which were in the 90 days before the accident. He obtained his type rating in the CL600 in December 2008 from CAE, and his last 14 CFR 61.58 check in the CL600 was performed at CAE in June 2014.

The operator hired the SIC in 2007 as the chief pilot. He had flown with the captain for years. In July 2014, he took a Director of Operations position for another company but continued to be a contract pilot for the operator.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane, serial number (S/N) 3002, was manufactured in 1983 by Canadair Ltd. A Certificate for Airworthiness for Export was issued on September 9, 1983, and 20 days later, the FAA issued a transport-category Standard Airworthiness Certificate. The airplane was powered by two General Electric CF34-3A engines.

The airplane was equipped with steer-by-wire nosewheel system, which was controlled by an electronic control module that operated a hydraulic steering control valve (SCV) in response to the commands via either the handwheel and/or rudder pedals. The SCV controlled an actuator, which through a rack-and-pinion arrangement, rotated a steering cuff. The steering cuff in turn rotated the nosewheels through torque links (or scissors). The steering system was normally switched on continuously during flight and was enabled only when the aircraft was on the ground with WOW input. With no WOW input, the NLG was free castoring.

The airplane was equipped with a normal brake system, and each four-wheel brake system provided one-quarter of the total stopping force in the four-tire set (Nos. 1 and 2 on the left main landing gear [MLG] and Nos. 3 and 4 on the right MLG). Each pilot had a left and right brake pedal, which were mechanically linked at the brake control assembly located beneath the cockpit floor. The brake control assembly contained two brake control valves (BCV) that manipulated hydraulic valves via mechanical inputs. Each of the four BCVs regulated the amount of hydraulic pressure provided to each of the four-wheel brake systems through the antiskid braking system and hydraulic fuses. There were two BCV assemblies installed in the nose hydraulics compartment as a part of the brake control mechanism assembly. The upper BCV controlled the inboard brakes, and hydraulic pressure was supplied by the No. 3 hydraulic system; the lower BCV controlled the outboard brakes, and hydraulic pressure was supplied by the No. 2 hydraulic system. The BCVs were considered on-condition components.

The airplane was equipped with an antiskid braking system that consisted of a skid control unit and two dual antiskid control valves and wheel speed sensors (WSS) located in the axle of each main wheel. The system independently controlled the braking of each main wheel by automatically varying the hydraulic pressure output of each dual BCV before these outputs reached the brakes. WSSs were considered on-condition components. An arming switch on the antiskid panel controlled power to the antiskid valves from the 28-volt direct current main bus via the inboard and outboard antiskid relays and the parking brake microswitch. Therefore, the system cannot be armed when the parking brake is on (parking brake shutoff valve closed). When the parking brake is applied, the INBD FAIL and OUTBD FAIL antiskid warning lights illuminated.

The antiskid system had the following features: (1) modulated skid protection of each wheel via the primary antiskid circuits; (2) locked-wheel protection, which provided a pressure dump signal in the event of a deep skid or failure of a wheel to spin up at touchdown and a coarse backup circuit in the event of a primary antiskid circuit failure; (3) pretouchdown protection which, via input from the WOW circuitry, dumped all the wheels' brake pressure while the airplane was still airborne, but the protection was overridden as soon as the wheels have spun up to allow normal skid-controlled braking; (4) built-in test equipment to provide a check of virtually all the system circuits, both on the ground (before takeoff) and in the air (before landing); and (5) spin-up relays to inhibit thrust reverser deployment until after touchdown.

The airplane was equipped with ground spoilers that were controlled electrically via a control unit located in the underfloor avionics bay, which received electrical signals from the ground spoilers on/off/test switch, spoiler control lever, landing gear control unit, antiskid control unit, and throttle levers. Upon receiving all required signals concurrently, the spoiler control unit transmitted a signal to energize the solenoid valves of a manifold assembly located in each MLG wheel well, which, in turn, directed hydraulic pressure to the extend port of each ground spoiler actuator to extend the spoilers. The ground spoilers are armed for deployment at touchdown by setting the ground spoilers switch to the "on" position and moving the spoiler control lever to the "extend" position. The lever must be pulled up, then moved rearward through an integral gate to achieve the required position. In addition to the lever selection, the throttle levers must be set at idle and the aircraft weight must be on the landing gear (and/or wheels spin-up) before the ground spoilers can deploy.

The airplane was equipped with thrust reversers that redirected engine fan air flow forward over the nose cowl assembly. Thrust reverser selection and control are accomplished primarily by a throttle-quadrant-mounted thrust lever for each engine. Each lever is held in the stow position by a thrust reverser lever stop, which is released by lifting the stop release latch. A deploy switch for each thrust reverser was mounted in the throttle quadrant and was operated by moving the appropriate thrust reverser lever to the "deploy" position.

The airplane was maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's maintenance steering group (MSG) 3 program since January 30, 2009, which consisted of hours- or months-interval inspections of systems or components. Review of the program revealed no requirement to periodically perform an operational test of the antiskid system; however, it contained a general zonal visual inspection every 120 months of the lower internal left nose compartment, which contained the upper and lower BCVs. The zonal inspection did not require inspection of either the upper or lower BCVs input rods extension lengths. The last inspection of that zone was completed on January 18, 2013, at an airframe total time of 15,155.5 hours and 9,303 cycles.

Review of the maintenance records revealed that the airplane's last 800-hour inspection was completed on January 14, 2015, at an airplane total time of 15,737.0 hours and 9,684 cycles. The 800-hour inspection included an operational test of the nosewheel steering electronic control module and the landing gear control unit.

A review of the Aircraft Reporting Form (used by flight crewmembers to report discrepancies) for the 90 days before the accident revealed no discrepancies regarding the brakes, antiskid system, ground spoilers, or thrust reversers.

According to the current status document provided by the operator, there was no record that the upper BCV or No. 1 WSS had been removed, replaced, or repaired since the airplane was manufactured. Maintenance record entries indicated that the No. 1 tire, part number (P/N) 256K43-3, S/N 33097507, was installed on November 10, 2014, at an airframe total time of 15,699.7 hours and 9,657 cycles. At the time of the accident, the airplane had a total time of 15,771.2 and 9,705 cycles.




METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The MKY AWOS reported about the time of the accident wind from 250° at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 9,000 ft, temperature 27°C, dewpoint 20°C, and altimeter setting 30.22 inches of mercury.

The Weather Surveillance Radar 0.5°-elevation scan depicted the conditions from between 3,740 and 10,990 ft over the accident site. The scan images for 1611 and 1626, which were 4 minutes before and 11 minutes after the accident, respectively, depicted an area of echoes with maximum intensities from 45 to 50 dBZ immediately east of MKY. Plotting of the approach path to MKY onto the weather images showed that the airplane flew under the leading edge of the echoes as it entered the traffic pattern turning onto final approach. The main area of the echoes began to move over the accident site about 7 minutes after the accident with echoes of 35 to 40 dBZ, which are associated with moderate-to-heavy rain. No strong outflows or divergent signatures with the area of echoes were noted, indicating that no strong winds, gust fronts, or microbursts were associated with the echoes. Additionally, no lightning was detected, indicating that the strong echoes were only associated with rain showers and not thunderstorms during the period.

No pilot reports were made in the area surrounding the accident time nor were any Convective SIGMETs, Severe Weather Forecast Alerts, or Center Weather Advisories issued along the accident route.

Airport security cameras captured portions of the approach, landing, landing roll, and accident sequence. A review of the footage revealed that it began raining about 10 minutes after the accident.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

MKY was a public airport with a single, grooved asphalt runway, 17/35, which was 5,000 ft long by 100 ft wide and reported to be in "fair condition." Left traffic was specified for runway 17, which was a slight upsloping runway.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was equipped with an L-3 Communications/Fairchild A100A Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR); it was not equipped nor was it required to be equipped with a flight data recorder. Audio was extracted from the CVR normally and without difficulty; however, the accident flight was not recorded. Further examination of the CVR revealed that the drive mechanism's mylar belt was broken.

According to the CVR manufacturer, the broken drive belt rendered the unit incapable of recording and would not have passed the operational test required by the flight crewmembers before flight and by maintenance personnel every 800 hours. Maintenance records revealed that maintenance personnel's last operational check of the CVR occurred on January 14, 2015, about 34 hours before the accident.

The airplane was also equipped with a Honeywell Mark VII EGPWS. Examination of the unit revealed that the terrain inhibit was not active, and there were no warnings associated with the accident flight. The landing record occurred when the flight was about 800 ft before the runway threshold, which, according to the EGPWS manufacturer, occurred when the radio altimeter indicated the airplane passed below 50 ft and the landing gear were down.




WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane reportedly came to rest about 250 ft past the departure end of runway 17. Examination of the runway revealed that the first identified skid mark associated with the No.1 tire was about 2,094 ft from the approach end of the runway. Alternating light and dark skid marks with rain grooves and gaps continued for about 780 ft, at which point a dark skid mark continued for about 128 ft. At the end of the dark skid mark from the No. 1 main tire, or about 3,002 ft from the approach end of the runway, the skid mark was distorted. Along the dark skid mark associated with the No. 1 tire, minor skid marks from the No. 2 tire were noted. Dark skid marks from the Nos. 3 and 4 tires were noted 3 ft right of the runway centerline beginning just beyond the heavy skid mark from the No. 1 main tire, or about 2,900 ft from the approach end of the runway. The skid marks made on the runway by the Nos. 3 and 4 tires changed direction multiple times, which continued to the end of the runway. At the departure end of the runway, a rubber transfer skid mark associated with the NLG tire was noted inboard of the skid mark from the No. 3 tire.

Beyond the departure end of the runway, marks from all landing gear tires were noted; however, the mark from the NLG stopped about 81 ft 10 inches before the resting position of the left MLG, which was consistent with the collapse of the NLG.

Examination of the airplane revealed a hole in the lower portion of a bulkhead, a tear in the skin and frame from the right NLG trunnion attachment, a buckle in the right NLG wall, and displacement of the left NLG wall. The NLG was separated from its attachment point but remained partially attached by two flexible hydraulic hoses. The P62 and P63 connections associated with the WOW harness in the NLG area were tightly secured.

The NLG WOW harness, NLG steering harness, and hydraulic lines were disconnected due to partial separation of the NLG. The WOW harness was properly secured to the NLG, and the WOW sensors were tightly secured and safety wired. Although the gap of the NLG WOW sensors was not measured before the WOW harness was removed, according to the mechanic who removed it, the gap appeared normal. Further, a review of a picture provided by Bombardier revealed some overlap of one WOW sensor, although the strut was not compressed. The left and right NLG tires were within 2 and 1 pound per square inch (psi) of the specified limit, and the NLG strut pressure was within limits. The No. 3 system hydraulic return lines in the NLG wheel well, which were damaged, were removed, and the lines were capped.

Examination of the left wing revealed that the wing tip fairing was crushed upward. The inboard flap fairing of the inboard flap was damaged by the left MLG door, and the outboard flap fairing of the outboard flap was damaged. The thrust reverser was fully stowed. There was no observed damage to the right wing, vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, or engines; the right thrust reverser was also fully stowed.

Examination of the cockpit revealed that the nosewheel steering switch was in the "arm" position and that the ground spoiler and the antiskid switches were in the "off" position. The thrust levers were in the "cutoff" position, and the thrust reverser levers were stowed.

With electrical power applied, the WOW annunciator illuminated, and both thrust reverser switches "arm" lights illuminated. The Nos. 1, 2, and 3 quantity indicators were in the green arc range. With momentary activation of the Nos. 1, 2, and 3 hydraulic systems, the pressure in each increased to 3,000 psi, and the quantity in each indicated 60, 40, and 50%, respectively. The brake inboard and outboard pressures indicated 3,000 psi due to momentary activation of the Nos. 2 and 3 system hydraulic pumps.

Examination of the left MLG revealed that the Nos. 1 and 2 tires remained on the wheel assembly but that the No. 1 tire was on the inboard wheel half. The No. 1 tire showed evidence of flat spotting and a rupture tear, whereas the No. 2 tire pressure was within limits, but the tire was worn. The gaps of both WOW switches were within limits, and both were properly secured and safety wired. With about 1,300 lbs of fuel onboard and the airplane fully resting on the MLG, the forward end of the inboard and outboard WOW switches was flush with the forward end of the target. No defects were noted in the WOW wiring harness in the MLG area. Both WSSs were properly installed; however, the No. 1 WSS coupling subassembly, P/N 6002286, was fractured near the base. The No. 1 WSS and tire assembly were retained for further examination.

Examination of the right MLG revealed that the Nos. 3 and 4 tires and wheel halves exhibited flat spotting. The gaps of both WOW switches were within limits, and both were properly secured and safety wired. With about 1,300 lbs of fuel onboard and the airplane fully resting on the MLG, the forward end of the inboard and outboard WOW switches was 3/4 overlapped with the forward end of the target. No defects were noted in the WOW wiring harness in the MLG area. The Nos. 3 and 4 WSSs externally appeared normal, but the No. 3 WSS back shell was completely unscrewed. There was no damage to the threads.

To facilitate operational testing, the NLG WOW electrical harness was spliced back into the airplane's wiring harness, and hydraulic lines in the NLG area were capped. The airplane was configured to allow for testing without the engines operating and was then simulated being in the air. It was configured per the Approach checklist used by the flight crewmembers, which consisted of the following conditions: a) all hydraulic B pumps on, b) nosewheel steering switch armed, c) ground spoilers switch on, d) thrust reverser switches armed, and e) flaps extended 45°. Under these conditions, the antiskid was armed and tested satisfactorily, which included wheel spin-up. In the same configuration, the airplane was then simulated being on the ground with both thrust levers at idle; the ground spoilers were manually deployed 10 times satisfactorily; no discrepancies were noted.

While the airplane was simulated being on the ground, one engine was operated at a time only to idle thrust and with each thrust reverser armed, each thrust reverser solenoid on the throttle quadrant released, and each thrust reverser was deployed three times followed by a slight increase in power. Safety concerns prevented full reverse thrust application. No discrepancies were noted with either thrust reverser.

Operational testing of the brakes revealed extensive leakage from the damaged Nos. 3 and 4 brakes, which precluded further testing; they were removed for further examination, and exemplar brakes were installed. Subsequent testing revealed normal pressures at the No. 1 (left outboard), No. 3 (right inboard), and No. 4 (right outboard) brakes (between 1,850 and 2,000 pounds per square inch, gauge [psig]); however, only 150 psig was noted at the No. 2 (left inboard) brake. The issue was associated with the upper BCV. The No. 2 brake line was repositioned to the No. 3 position at the BCV, and normal pressure was noted at the No. 2 brake. The BCV assembly was retained for further examination.

Operational testing of the antiskid system was conducted at 2,000 rpm, which approximately correlated to the airplane's reported touchdown speed. Because of damage to the No. 1 WSS, no in-situ testing was performed. The Nos. 3 and 4 positions tested satisfactorily. Because the No. 1 WSS was not tested, the No. 3 WSS, which tested satisfactorily, was installed to the No. 1 wheel position and tested satisfactorily. Because of reduced brake pressure at the No. 2 brake, the No. 2 WSS was installed to the No. 3 wheel position and tested satisfactorily.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Following the accident, the PIC, SIC, and flight attendant submitted specimens for testing. The testing results for all of them were negative for drugs of abuse; testing for alcohol was not performed.




TESTS AND RESEARCH

Additional Examinations

Examination of the No. 1 tire revealed that it exhibited flat spots through the tread and a cross-shaped tear through the inner-most plies, consistent with sudden depressurization due to the rupture of the inner bladder. Detailed examination of the tire revealed no evidence of operation at low-pressure, preexisting damage, or manufacturing defects. The tire also had a tear/cut that extended to a hole at the edge of the flat-spotted area. A sharp-edged circular hole slightly more than 1/4-inch in diameter was found at the end of the cross-shaped tear. The wheel flange was found to have about the same lateral distance from center, straightness of cut/tear toward cross-shaped damage, parallel nature of the cut/tear with the wheel flange, and approximate diameter of the hole. No evidence of blue tinted rubber or reverted rubber on the interior, exterior, or in the bead areas nor of bead movement or damage was found. The interior liner exhibited no evidence of operation at low-pressure or with the sidewall collapsed. The flat-spotted and torn areas revealed the internal construction of the tire, and no design or construction anomalies were noted in these areas. The plies were straight and parallel in orientation. No loss of adhesion was found between the plies or between the tread construction and loss of tread. No evidence of repair-related damage was found.

Examination of the Nos. 3 and 4 brakes and No. 1 WSS was performed at the manufacturer's facility. Damage to both brake assemblies precluded operational testing; however, visual examination revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

Operational testing of the No. 1 WSS revealed that, even without the coupler installed (it was removed for National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] metallurgical examination), it produced a constant sinusoidal wave. The WSS manufacturer reported that, since 2010, 57 sensors had been returned but that no coupling failures had been reported. Metallurgical examination of the No. 1 WSS coupler revealed hackles and rib markings on the injection-molded polymer, consistent with overstress fracture. A shrinkage void was noted on the fracture surface. The fracture initiated in bending overstress at the corner with very small radii and reinitiated at the void.

Visual examination of the upper BCV at the manufacturer's facility revealed that the input pushrod for the No. 2 (left inboard) brake was displaced inward compared to the input pushrod for the No. 3 (right inboard) brake and was not in contact with the roller of its associated input linkage; no visible damage to the unit was noted. The upper BCV was placed on a test bench for operational testing, which confirmed the low pressure at the No. 2 (left inboard brake). Disassembly of the upper BCV revealed that the left power brake spring was fractured. Examination of the fractured spring by the NTSB Materials Laboratory revealed generally rounded and equiaxed-shaped dimple rupture features, consistent with tensile overstress, with little to no shear or torsional component. The spring composition and microstructure were consistent with the prescribed material.




Previous BCV Failures

The current BCV manufacturer reported to the NTSB that in the 385 BCVs that they repaired or overhauled between July 1992 and October 2016, excluding the accident unit, there was 1 other identified spring failure, and about 11%, or 43 units, had relaxed springs. The manufacturer did not report this information to the FAA through the service difficulty reporting (SDR) system. At the suggestion of the NTSB postaccident, the BCV manufacturer's Repair Station and Quality Control Manual were updated regarding SDR submissions.

A review of FAA SDRs concerning brakes and BCVs with the accident BCV P/N revealed no reports describing asymmetric braking or failure or malfunction of a BCV.

Bombardier reported that, since October 2003, excluding the accident airplane, operators of Challenger 600/601/3A/3R airplanes reported 142 instances in which the BCVs were removed from the airplane for various reasons (scheduled, unscheduled, etc.). In most of the 142 reports, the operator provided Bombardier with a description of the issue or reason for removal. Four of the reports noted asymmetric braking; three of these BCVs were sent to Tactair, the current manufacturer; however, all three of these BCVs had been modified without inbound evaluation; therefore, the reason for the reported asymmetric braking could not be determined.

Airplane Performance Study

The NTSB conducted a performance study using ASR-11 radar from Southwest Florida International Airport and from a tethered aerostat radar station located about 80 nautical miles from the accident site. According to the study, based on EGPWS altitude and location and shifting of radar data to align with the runway centerline, the final descent angle was 2.6°. The calculated groundspeed based on radar returns indicated that the airplane did not touch down faster than recommended. The study also indicated that, based on the security camera footage, the airplane touched down just past the 1,000 ft mark, which corroborated the flight crewmembers' statements.

Landing and Stopping Distance Information

The airplane flight manual (AFM) did not contain nor was it required to contain landing distance increases if one brake became inoperative.

The airplane manufacturer conducted stopping distance calculations based on the airplane's reported weight, weather conditions, calculated and PIC-reported Vref speed, flap extension, and estimated touchdown point and included nonuse of the ground spoilers and thrust reversers, operational antiskid and steering systems, and braking delay. The calculations showed that, with all four brakes functional, the airplane would stop on the runway with 959 ft of runway remaining. Calculations assuming the same parameters with loss of one brake per side (symmetric half braking), the airplane would have required 690 ft of additional runway; under the same conditions but with thrust reversers used, the airplane would have required 27 ft of additional runway. The calculations could not be conducted to determine the effect of the loss of two brakes on the same side (asymmetric half braking).

Brake Certification

A representative from the airplane manufacturer reported that, during certification of the brake system, the failure of the BCV power brake spring was considered acceptably low and would be evident to pilots within five landings of the failure. The airplane manufacturer representative also indicated that, during certification, the loss of two brakes on the same side was considered to be extremely remote and a low-risk condition. Failure of either the upper or lower BCV is not annunciated to the flight crewmembers.




Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Flight Instructor; Commercial
Age: 46, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: Unknown
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Multi-engine; Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 1 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 01/15/2015
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 02/03/2015
Flight Time: 8988 hours (Total, all aircraft), 844 hours (Total, this make and model), 7794 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 65 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 30 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 1 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)
  
Co-Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Commercial
Age: 65, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 5-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 1 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 02/24/2015
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 11/25/2014
Flight Time: 18500 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1500 hours (Total, this make and model), 17000 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft)
  
Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: Bombardier Canadair
Registration: N600NP
Model/Series: CL600-2A12 601
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1983
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Transport
Serial Number: 3002
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats: 13
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 01/14/2015, Continuous Airworthiness
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 42102 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 34 Hours
Engines: 2 Turbo Fan
Airframe Total Time: 15771.2 Hours at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: GE
ELT: C126 installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: CF34-3A
Registered Owner: SIX HUNDRED NP LLC
Rated Power: 9140 hp
Operator: SIX HUNDRED NP LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: MKY, 5 ft msl
Observation Time: 1615 EST
Distance from Accident Site: 
Direction from Accident Site:
Lowest Cloud Condition: Few / 9000 ft agl
Temperature/Dew Point: 27°C / 20°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 8 knots, 250°
Visibility (RVR): 
Altimeter Setting: 30.22 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV): 
Precipitation and Obscuration: 
Departure Point: Marathon, FL (MTH)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Marco Island, FL (MKY)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 1554 EST
Type of Airspace: 

Airport Information

Airport: Marco Island Airport (MKY)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 5 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 17
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 5000 ft / 100 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop; Traffic Pattern

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 3 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor, 4 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries:  1 Serious, 1 Minor, 7 None
Latitude, Longitude: 25.987778, -81.671111