Friday, September 01, 2017

How airplanes fly those giant banner ads — it's more dangerous than you think



If you've ever spent time on a US beach during the summer, you've probably noticed a parade of airplanes towing giant banners advertising companies like Dunkin' Donuts or Geico. We spent a couple of days with the men and women who get these banners flying, and it's no easy task. 

You might think the airplanes simply take off with the banners attached. Alas, that is incorrect. It takes a challenging and risky maneuver to attach the banner to the airplane before it flies. We spent a couple of days with Banner Tow USA, a company that operates out of the Westerly State Airport in Rhode Island to find out what goes into flying these giant billboards in the sky.

Watch video here ➤ http://www.businessinsider.com

Cessna 172S Skyhawk SP, N473ER, Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University Inc: Incident occurred September 01, 2017 on Crescent Beach, St. Johns County, Florida

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Orlando, Florida

Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University Inc

http://registry.faa.gov/N473ER


Aircraft force landed on a beach.

Date: 01-SEP-17
Time: 17:20:00Z
Regis#: N473ER
Aircraft Make: CESSNA
Aircraft Model: C172
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: NONE
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: MATANZAS
State: FLORIDA





An Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University flight instructor was forced Friday afternoon to make an emergency landing on Crescent Beach just north of Flagler County.

No one was hurt and the Cessna 172 training aircraft was not damaged.

“He was headed to Daytona Beach at the time of the malfunction and was able to avoid beachgoers and landed roughly a half-mile north of the Crescent Beach access ramp,” said James Roddey, a university spokesman. The school, in an email, did not provide the pilot’s name.

Ken Byrnes, chair of the Flight Department said: “The pilot did a great job in this emergency situation.”

A post on the St. Johns County Fire Rescue Facebook page said the cause of the landing was under investigation and efforts were underway to remove the plane from the beach prior to high tide.

Original article ➤ http://www.news-journalonline.com




An Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University instructor on a test flight out of Daytona Beach made a safe landing Friday afternoon on Crescent Beach, according to St. Johns County Fire Rescue.

The school’s Cessna 172S NAV III was headed back to Daytona Beach when something forced the pilot to make an emergency landing, according to university spokesman James Roddey. The pilot was the only one on board and touched down on an empty stretch of hard-packed low-tide sand, then taxied to a stop about a half-mile north of the Crescent Beach access ramp, according to St. Johns Fire-Rescue.

“He did a great job in this emergency situation. He landed safely, exactly as he teaches his students,” Roddey said.

Roddey said the Federal Aviation Administration is investigating what caused the emergency landing.

Original article can be found here ➤ http://jacksonville.com

Civil Air Patrol pilots to help in Texas hurricane effort



Suburban members of the Civil Air Patrol are answering the call to help Texans in the wake of Hurricane Harvey.

A three-member team left Friday morning from the Lake in the Hills Airport, and another team is due to depart Saturday from the Chicago Executive Airport in Wheeling.

Transport mission pilot is Capt. Dave Hooper of Inverness. Joining him in the Cessna 182 are pilot Capt. Tommy Briden of Crystal Lake and Capt. Rick Jensen of Rockford.




Their assignment: Primarily, to take photos for the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Texas agencies, to help them determine the highest priority for rescue responses. The photos will also document the extent of the damage.

The three belong to Group 22 of the Illinois Wing, Great Lakes Region of the CAP. There are seven squadrons in Group 22.

Briden and Hooper are retired American Airlines pilots. Jensen, who is not a pilot, is an accountant. He will man the camera, as the plane is flown at about 1,000 feet.

They got the call for the Texas trip Thursday morning. Group 22 expects to provide help for at least a week, and possibly as long as four weeks, with members rotating in and out.

Besides taking photographs and video, the team could do other jobs, such as helping search for people.

"Emergency service is one of the main goals of the Civil Air Patrol, so we look forward to this mission," Hooper said.

Friday's flight was delayed about an hour by reports of bad weather over Tennessee, where Harvey -- now a tropical depression -- caused flooding Thursday.

The all-volunteer patrol is an auxiliary of the Air Force, which supplies the planes.




The squadron meets weekly. Its primary goal is to look for downed light aircraft. "These pop up at any moment, any time," Hooper said.

Most recently, Group 22 photographed Fox River flooding.

After Hurricane Sandy struck the East Coast in 2012, CAP was able to provide FEMA with a "stitched" composite aerial view of the entire effected area, the first time that had been accomplished. Besides helping with rescue, the photo also documented the hurricane's impact on infrastructure.

The CAP also fosters interest in aviation with youths. It runs a cadet program for people 12 to 21, which is how Jensen first became involved, when he was a teen. He rejoined several years ago when his son joined. At age 18, cadets can become senior members.

The patrol can also be called on for Homeland Security tasks and drug interdiction missions.

Story, video and photo gallery ➤ http://www.dailyherald.com

Katie Lake: ‘Something about having the world below you’

Katie Lake prepares to take flight. Lake is working toward her pilot’s license and flew her first solo flight over her parents Brookville home at age 18.



BROOKVILLE —   “Time to spread your wings and leave the nest,” is a time honored cliche that Brookville High School and Miami Valley Career Technology Center graduate Katie Lake took a little more literally than most.

At age 18 Lake made her first solo flight over her parents’ home.

Lake said that she was hooked on flying the first time she flew in a small-engine plane. “There is just something about looking out your window and seeing the clouds that makes time freeze. I’ve always liked the idea of a job that’s not behind a desk or inside somewhere. I like the idea of something different and a job where I can improve,” said Lake.

She said she was nervous on her solo flight but that it was great to finally see all of her hard work pay off. “I was really excited to say I flew a plane by myself. When the wheels left the ground it felt like all the weight on my shoulders left. I felt completely free like I could conquer the world and go anywhere. There is just something about having the world below you and a blue sky that I love. I remember not being able to stop smiling.”

Even outside of work and school Lake said she prefers more adventurous pursuits. She said that she has always enjoyed anything that goes fast and prefers to spend her time outdoors whether fishing, boating, snowboarding or around fast cars. Lake said her favorite car is a Corvette.

Although she is barely out of high school Lake has training in aviation maintenance, certifications in Airframe and Powerplant and has logged enough hours allow her to fly solo as far as the Piqua airport. Her dreams however, go a bit further than that.

Lake said she is currently making use of her, certifications doing maintenance at the Phillipsburg airport. She says her ultimate goal is to be a pilot with the airlines but she still has a way to go.

Darry Largent her flight instructor at Philipsburg Airport said that Lake still has about 20 hours of instruction and solo flight, including cross country training before she can be tested for her private pilot certificate but seems fairly confident in her abilities.

“She’s very smart, a quick learner, excellent hand eye coordination, and never forgets anything,” said Largent.

Although she would prefer to fly, Lake said that if she someday couldn’t she would still want to work with airplanes in some way. She say she plans to continue her education to earn more certificates including instrument, multi-engine, complex aircraft, commercial, CFI (certified flight instructor), ATP (airline transport pilot) and possibly her seaplane rating.

Eric Bickel, one of Lake’s Aviation Maintenance Instructors at Miami Valley Career Technology Center, has worked with her for over a year and speaks highly of her abilities and work ethic. “In that time (as Lake’s instructor), I have seen many desirable qualities in this young woman. She is both eager to learn and is hard working at what she learns. Katie is very mature and well thought for her age.”

In addition to working at the Phillipsburg Airport, Lake is attending Sinclair Community College. After two years she says she plans to transfer to a university, possibly Bowling Green State University or some other university with aviation curriculum and continue toward a four-year degree. In the meantime she says she plans to continue flying as much as possible. “I plan to get in as much as I can while working and going to school,” said Lake.

Original article ➤ http://www.mydaytondailynews.com

United Aims to Resume Full Houston Schedule by September 8: ‘Our employees are currently rallying to restore service faster than originally anticipated,’ airline says



The Wall Street Journal
By Susan Carey
Sept. 1, 2017 8:02 p.m. ET

United Continental Holdings Inc. UAL 0.76% plans to resume service at Houston’s main airport by Sept. 8, more than a week earlier than it had planned to return to full strength following Tropical Storm Harvey.

“Our employees are currently rallying to restore service faster than originally anticipated,” United said Friday.

George Bush Intercontinental Airport, United’s second-biggest hub, allowed some flights to arrive and take off Wednesday as floodwaters covering the roads that connect the airport to Houston started to recede.

The new concern for airlines in Houston is whether they can guarantee jet-fuel supplies, given that some pipelines have been shut and the Houston energy complex was crippled by the rainmaking monster of a storm.

United didn’t comment on its access to jet fuel in Houston.

United normally operates about 480 flights a day in and out of Bush, only 20 fewer than at its main hub, Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. The third-largest U.S. airline by traffic said its Houston lobbies, check-in counters, terminals and airline clubs are up and running.

United operated 37 special flights to Bush, with Federal Aviation Administration permission, to bring supplies and crews and relieve employees who were working at the airport. Some 400 United employees flew in to help, and nearly 1,200 displaced travelers were transported between Houston and Chicago.

Other airlines that operate fewer flights to Houston also started flying to Bush this week, including Delta Air Lines Inc. and American Airlines Group Inc. Discounter Spirit Airlines Inc. resumed operations on Friday, according to flight-tracking website Flightaware.com.

William P. Hobby Airport, the smaller airfield closer to downtown Houston, reopened on Wednesday. Southwest Airlines Co. , the big operator there, doesn’t expect to resume flights until Saturday.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.wsj.com

Jihlavan KP–5 ASA (Skyleader 500), N440JM: Fatal accident occurred May 24, 2016 in Rhoadesville, Orange County, Virginia

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: ERA16FA194
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 24, 2016 in Rhoadesville, VA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 09/06/2017
Aircraft: JIHLAVAN AIRPLANES SRO KP 5 ASA, registration: N440JM
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The sport pilot had recently purchased the airframe-parachute-equipped light sport airplane and was receiving instruction in it to satisfy insurance requirements. Radar data indicated that, during the flight, the airplane's groundspeed decreased from 94 to 62 knots, consistent with airwork including slow flight and stall practice. Subsequently, several witnesses observed the airplane descending nose-down with the parachute still attached, but with the canopy only partially inflated, before the airplane impacted terrain. The parachute handle was located on the left side of the instrument panel, and the sport pilot likely activated the parachute due to inadvertent spin entry. The previous owner of the airplane stated that he had to be vigilant during stall practice because the airplane always seemed to yaw abruptly right and into a spin, more so than any other airplane he had flown.

The parachute attached to the airframe via four risers. Two of the risers shared a front anchor attached to the aluminum bulkhead behind the seats. The other two risers attached to a rear anchor located at each wing root. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the two front risers remained attached to the shared front anchor but that the anchor had separated from the airframe. The two rear risers had separated in overstress. The front anchor was designed to carry the majority load. The remaining two rear risers were designed to stabilize the airplane in an optimal descent attitude and could not carry the full load if the front anchor failed. Metallurgical examination of the separated front anchor revealed that it had been bolted into aluminum bulkhead skin that was about 0.022-inch thick. Although the anchor and seven of its eight bolts remained intact, the surrounding aluminum skin of the airplane had separated from the airplane in overstress. Without any additional supporting structure such as longerons, stringers, or bathtub fittings, it is likely the thin aluminum skin could not withstand the force applied to the front anchor during parachute deployment. The investigation noted that the first in-flight deployment of the parachute on the make and model airplane was on the accident airplane during the accident flight. During certification, one test deployment was performed on the ground. Further, the airplane manufacturer was unable to provide any data or testing of the amount of shock force the surrounding aluminum skin could withstand during deployment.

The airplane's maximum takeoff weight was 1,279 lbs. According to the parachute manufacturer, the parachute could be deployed at a maximum weight of 1,350 lbs and a maximum speed of 138 mph. A representative of the parachute manufacturer stated that, although the engine should be off during parachute deployment, it did not have as significant an effect on deployment as airplane speed and weight. Although the airplane was about 50 lbs over its maximum takeoff weight at the time of deployment, it was under the parachute manufacturer maximum weight of 1,350 lbs. Additionally, the pilot likely activated the parachute in the early stages of a spin and closer to stall speed, significantly slower than the 138-mph parachute limit.

The sport pilot had chronic pain treated with multiple medications, including Methadone, an impairing opioid medication, which was detected in blood at levels consistent with chronic use. Further, the sport pilot had insomnia and depression treated with quetiapine and doxepin, both of which are sedating medications. The pilot's recent use of the combination of two potentially impairing medications likely impaired his cognitive and psychomotor function to some degree. However, the investigation could not determine if the pilot's impairment led to a situation that required activation of the parachute. Additionally, there was no evidence that the decision to activate the parachute was inappropriate. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot was impaired by the combination of medications, but there is no evidence that his impairment contributed to the cause of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilots' loss of control that necessitated the activation of the parachute system and the airplane manufacturer's inadequate design of the front parachute anchor attachment structure, which resulted in a failure of the parachute after it was deployed in flight and precluded the pilots from safely recovering from the spin.

John Joseph “JJ” Quinn Jr.

Charles Neal Caldwell

A 2011 photo of White Hawk Flight Training instructor John Joseph “JJ” Quinn Jr., left, at the Culpeper County Airport and one of his many students, Bennett Miller. Quinn, 81, was the passenger in a fatal plane crash on May 24, 2016 in Orange County.


Beloved Culpeper pilot J.J. Quinn, Jr., right, accepted a check in December for Angel Flight, a volunteer organization for which he provided hundreds of flights for the ill. He tragically died May 24, 2016 in a plane crash in Orange County.


The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Richmond, Virginia

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N440JM



NTSB Identification: ERA16FA194
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 24, 2016 in Rhoadesville, VA
Aircraft: JIHLAVAN AIRPLANES SRO KP 5 ASA, registration: N440JM
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 24, 2016, about 1625 eastern daylight time, an experimental light sport Jihlavan KP 5 ASA (Skyleader 500), N440JM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in Rhoadesville, Virginia. The sport pilot/owner and the flight instructor were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which originated from Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR), Culpeper, Virginia, about 1530. The instructional flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

The sport pilot had recently purchased the airplane and had another pilot ferry it from California to CJR. The airplane arrived at CJR on May 13, 2016. According to an insurance adjuster, the sport pilot had less than 5 hours of flight experience in the make and model airplane. Therefore, his insurance policy required that he receive a "checkout" flight by a certificated flight instructor. The flight was required to include a minimum of 2 hours dual instruction with 15 takeoffs and landings. When the sport pilot inquired about obtaining flight instruction, the airport manager at CJR referred him to the flight instructor.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) data, no air traffic control services were provided to the flight. Radar returns indicated that, after departing CJR, the airplane flew southwest to Orange County Airport (OMH), Orange, Virginia. There, radar indications disappeared and reappeared four times, consistent with approaches below radar coverage to runway 26. After the fourth approach, the airplane proceeded northeast and later turned east before disappearing from radar. There were no altitude readouts from the airplane during the entire flight. As the airplane traveled east toward the end of the data, the groundspeed slowed from 94 to 62 knots, consistent with slow flight and stall practice. The last target was recorded near the accident site at 1624:28.

According to several witnesses near the accident site, they heard what sounded like thunder or a "crack." They then saw a parachute deployment and the airplane's nose pointed straight down before impacting the ground. Witnesses could not determine the airplane's altitude at the time other than that it was low, nor could they report whether the engine was operating.

One witness provided a photograph of the airplane descending with the parachute still attached and partially inflated.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 57, held a sport pilot certificate with endorsements for airplane single-engine land and powered-parachute land. He did not possess an FAA medical certificate nor was he required to. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that he had accumulated a total flight experience of about 121 hours, of which 2.5 hours were in the accident airplane. The pilot had flown 4.5 and 0 hours during the 90- and 30-day periods preceding the accident, respectively. Further review of his logbook revealed that the 2.5 hours of experience in the accident airplane consisted of two flights on March 20, 2016, and March 22, 2016, in California. The pilot recorded those flights in his logbook as prebuy flights. During the second prebuy flight, the pilot also recorded "Slowflight Stalls" in his logbook. Additionally, the pilot recorded those two flights as dual instruction received; however, there were no accompanying endorsements from a flight instructor. Other than the 2.5 hours in the accident airplane, the pilot did not have any prior experience in the accident airplane make and model.

The flight instructor, age 81, held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land. He also held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and airplane single-engine sea. Additionally, he held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on March 1, 2016. Review of the flight instructor's logbook revealed that he had accumulated a total flight experience of about 32,840 hours, of which 100 and 43 hours were flown during the 90- and 30-day periods preceding the accident, respectively. There was no record of the flight instructor having any prior experience in the accident airplane make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The two-seat, low-wing, retractable tricycle landing gear-equipped airplane, serial number 5141163M, was manufactured in 2007. It was powered by a Rotax 914 UL, 115-horsepower engine, equipped with a DUC Swirl ground-adjustable three-blade propeller. The airplane was issued an FAA special light sport aircraft (S-LSA) airworthiness certificate in 2008, which was superseded by an FAA experimental light sport aircraft (E-LSA) airworthiness certificate in 2010. According to the previous owner of the airplane, he chose to have the airplane subsequently recertified as an E-LSA, rather than an S-LSA because he could perform more of the maintenance work himself under the E-LSA certification. The previous owner further stated that he had to be vigilant during stall practice because the airplane always seemed to yaw abruptly right and into a spin, more so than any other airplane he had ever flown. The airplane's maximum gross takeoff weight was 1,279 lbs.

Review of the airplane's logbook revealed that its most recent annual condition inspection was completed on May 6, 2016. At that time, the airframe and engine had accumulated 534 hours since new.

Review of the airplane's Pilot's Operating Handbook revealed, "Acrobatic, intentionally driven stalls and spins are prohibited!"

The airplane was equipped with a Galaxy Rescue Systems (GRS) ballistic parachute. According to the manufacturer label, the model parachute could be deployed at a maximum weight of 1,350 lbs and maximum speed of 138 mph. Review of the parachute manual revealed instructions for the engine to be turned off before activation. The parachute attached to the airframe via four risers (cables) and three anchors. Two of the risers shared an anchor (front) attached by eight bolts with nuts to the aluminum bulkhead behind the seats. The other two risers (rear) attached to an anchor located at each wing root near the trailing edge of the wing. According to a representative of the parachute manufacturer, the double-riser front anchor was designed to carry the majority load. The remaining two rear risers were designed to stabilize the airplane in an optimal descending attitude and could not carry the full load if the double-riser front anchor failed. Specifically, the double-riser front anchor could withstand a maximum shock/load of 40.1 kiloNewtons [kN] (9,015 pounds of force [lbf]), and the two rear risers could withstand a maximum shock/load of 13.3 kN (2,990 lbf) each. The representative added that the data were for the anchors and risers and that data for the actual anchor-to-airframe attachment would have to be provided by the airplane manufacturer.

The GRS also included a drogue parachute to assist in main parachute deployment. The parachute manufacturer representative further stated that, although the engine should be off during parachute deployment, it did not have a significant effect on the parachute deployment. Rather, airplane speed and weight had a greater effect on the parachute deployment and performance.

According to a representative of the airplane manufacturer, the first in-flight deployment of the parachute on the make and model airplane was on the accident airplane during the accident flight. During certification, one test deployment was performed on the ground. The representative further stated that they could not perform additional testing on the front anchor attachment because the design had been changed about 8 years before the accident. The current design (Skyleader 600) included two front anchors rather than one. The manufacturer no longer had any airplanes with a single front anchor to test.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Orange County Airport (OMH), Orange, Virginia, was located about 9 miles west of the accident site. The 1635 recorded weather at OMH included calm wind, visibility 10 miles, and scattered clouds at 11,000 ft.



WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The wreckage was located in open terrain at an elevation of about 400 ft. The airplane was found upside down and complete with the exception of some smaller pieces that were found nearby. When the airplane was righted, significant fore-to-aft crushing damage was noted to the nose section and to both wings.

The airplane was subsequently moved to a temporary storage facility where it was laid out, and the presence of all flight control surfaces was confirmed, as was control continuity from each flight control surface to the cockpit controls.

At the accident scene, the drogue parachute was found in a nearby field, and the main parachute was found in trees about 100 yards east of the wreckage. At the temporary storage facility, the parachute's fabric canopy was spread out and observed to be undamaged. The two individual risers that had been attached to wing anchors were found separated near their respective anchors with the wire ends broomstrawed, consistent with overload separation. The other two risers were found still attached to their shared single anchor; however, that anchor was itself separated from the airframe. The cockpit parachute activation handle, located on the pilot's side of the instrument panel, appeared to have been pulled (system was activated.)

An engine monitoring system (EMS), electronic flight information system (EFIS), and engine control unit (ECU) were retained and forwarded to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory. Attempted data download from the units revealed that the EMS and EFIS did not record any data; however, data were successfully downloaded and plotted from the ECU. Review of the data revealed that the ECU recorded about the last 20 minutes of the accident flight. About 11 minutes before the end of the data, the engine rpm averaged about 2,000, consistent with the last approach and landing. Subsequently, the engine rpm averaged between 4,000 and 5,000 to the end of the data.

Metallurgical examination of the two separated risers revealed overstress features. Additionally, pull-testing of the separated risers revealed that they exceeded their design specification by about 1,000 lbf. Metallurgical examination of the separated anchor revealed that it had been bolted into aluminum bulkhead skin that was approximately 0.022-inch thick. Although the anchor and seven of its eight bolts remained intact, the surrounding aluminum skin of the airplane had separated, consistent with overstress. There were no longerons, stringers, or bathtub fittings to transfer the parachute deployment loads into the airframe. The airplane manufacturer was unable to provide any data or testing of the amount of shock force the surrounding aluminum skin could withstand (for more information, see the Materials Laboratory Factual Report and Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report in the public docket for this investigation).

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The State of Virginia Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Manassas, Virginia, conducted autopsies on the pilot and flight instructor. The autopsy reports noted the cause of death for both pilots as "blunt force trauma."

The FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of specimens from the pilot and flight instructor. The results for the flight instructor were negative for alcohol and drugs. The results for the pilot were as follows:

"Carvedilol detected in Liver
Carvedilol detected in Blood
Doxazosin detected in Liver
Doxazosin detected in Blood
2.099 (ug/mL, ug/g) Doxepin detected in Liver
0.451 (ug/mL, ug/g) Doxepin detected in Blood
Methadone detected in Liver
Nordoxepin detected in Liver
Nordoxepin detected in Blood
0.592 (ug/mL, ug/g) Quetiapine detected in Liver
Quetiapine NOT detected in Blood
Blood unsuitable for analysis of Methadone."

According to the pilot's personal medical records, his chronic medical conditions included obstructive sleep apnea, high blood pressure, elevated cholesterol, heart disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and benign prostatic hypertrophy; these were all reportedly controlled, and the treatments are generally considered not to be impairing. In addition, he had an unspecified clotting disorder treated and controlled with apixaban. Because of the clotting disorder and bleeding into his muscles, he had severe myositis ossificans (bone formation in the muscle tissue), which resulted in limited range of motion and chronic pain treated with the impairing opioid medications methadone and oxycodone. The pilot had a remote history of strokes and heart disease, but no abnormal findings were documented on recent neurological and cardiac examinations. Further, the autopsy did not identify any significant natural disease in the heart or brain. Finally, he had a history of insomnia and depression treated with the impairing medications seroquel and doxepin. Although there was no evidence of depression on recent examinations, both psychoactive medications had been prescribed specifically for their sedating effects.

Title 14 CFR Part 61.23(c)(1) allows sport pilots to use a valid and current U.S. driver's license in lieu of a medical certificate. However, further review of 61.23(c)(2)(iv) revealed that the sport pilot must "Not know or have reason to know of any medical condition that would make that person unable to operate a light-sport aircraft in a safe manner."

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

According to the manufacturer, the airplane's basic empty weight was 819.82 lbs. Review of fueling records revealed that on the day of the accident, 9.1 gallons of fuel were added to the airplane, and its total fuel capacity was 16.9 gallons (101.4 lbs). Review of autopsy reports revealed that the pilot weighed 270 lbs and that the flight instructor weighed 170 lbs, which resulted in a total airplane weight of 1,361.22 lbs, or 82.22 lbs above the airplane's maximum takeoff weight of 1,279 lbs. The airplane had flown about 1 hour before parachute deployment, and a fuel consumption rate of 5 gallons per hour corresponded to an airplane weight about 50 lbs above its maximum takeoff weight of 1,279 lbs at the time of parachute deployment.

The airplane manufacturer and FAA Office of Accident Investigation, Recommendation and Analysis Division were notified about the overstress failure of the airplane structure to which the front anchor attached. A search of FAA data revealed fifteen other U.S.-registered Skyleader 500 airplanes.







NTSB Identification: ERA16FA194
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 24, 2016 in Rhoadesville, VA
Aircraft: JIHLAVAN AIRPLANES SRO KP 5 ASA, registration: N440JM
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On May 24, 2016, about 1625 eastern daylight time, an experimental light sport Jihlavan KP 5 ASA (Skyleader 500), N440JM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in Rhoadesville, Virginia. The sport pilot/owner and the flight instructor were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the local flight from Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR), Culpeper, Virginia. The instructional flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to a friend of the sport pilot/owner, he had recently purchased the airplane, and had it ferried from California to CJR. The sport pilot was required by his insurance company to have 4 hours of dual operation before being able to fly the airplane solo. CJR records indicated that the airplane arrived on May 13, 2016, and the sport pilot's logbook indicated that he had flown the airplane twice on May 20, 2016, for a total of 2.5 hours, with "dual received" flight time noted for both flights. 

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sources, no air traffic control services were provided. However, radar returns indicated that after departing CJR about 1530, the airplane headed southwest to Orange County Airport (OMH), Orange, Virginia. There, radar indications disappeared and reappeared four times, consistent with approaches below radar coverage to runway 26. After the fourth approach, the airplane proceeded northeast, and later turned east before disappearing from radar. There were no altitude readouts from the airplane during the entire flight.

According to several witnesses near the accident site, they heard what sounded like thunder or a "crack." They then saw a parachute deployment and the airplane nosed straight down before impacting the ground. Witnesses could not determine the airplane's altitude at the time other than it was low, or whether the engine was operating. 

The wreckage was located on open terrain in the vicinity of 38 degrees 15.917 minutes north latitude, 077 degrees, 51.465 minutes west longitude, at an elevation of about 400 feet. The airplane was found upside down and complete, with the exception of some smaller pieces in close proximity. When the airplane was righted, significant fore-to-aft crushing damage was noted to the nose section and to both wings. 

The airplane was subsequently moved to a temporary storage facility where it was laid out and the presence of all flight control surfaces was confirmed, as was control continuity from the each flight control surface to the cockpit controls. 

The airplane was equipped with a ballistic parachute system. The ballistic parachute system included a fabric canopy attached to the airframe via four metal-wire risers. Two of the risers were individually attached to the airframe via their respective anchors, while the other two risers were together attached to a third airframe anchor. A drogue parachute assisted in main parachute deployment.

At the accident scene, the drogue parachute was found in a nearby field and the main parachute was found in trees about 100 yards east of the wreckage. At the temporary storage facility, the parachute's fabric canopy was spread out and observed to be undamaged. The two individual risers were found to be separated near their respective airframe anchors with the wire ends broomstrawed, consistent with overload separation. The other two risers were found still attached to their single anchor; however, that anchor was itself separated from the airframe. The cockpit parachute activation handle appeared pulled (system was activated.)

The airplane was subsequently moved to a long-term aircraft storage facility. 

Due to the extent of observed damage and heavy mud impaction, the engine was not examined at the temporary facility but will be at the long-term facility. 

There were no dedicated recording devices onboard the airplane; however, there were some avionics that could have retained non-volatile data. The heavily damaged avionics were removed, and data downloads will be attempted.

We must act to protect manned aircraft from irresponsible drone operators

By Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.) and Rep. Jim Langevin (D-R.I.), Opinion Contributors


There’s a buzz in the air. Farmers are learning how to use drones to better manage their crops. Businesses are exploring the potential of drones for delivery services. Unmanned aircraft are even being used to improve hurricane forecasting and assist with search and rescue missions. Of course, the number of recreational drones in the air is also growing every year. But drones, as with any technological innovation, bring new risks— especially to other aircraft with which they share the skies.

Flying has never been safer, but recreational drone use poses new threats to aviation safety. We know from the heroic story of Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger — who landed a plane on the Hudson River— that birds can compromise an engine and take down an aircraft. A metal drone could do just as much or even more damage. 

Pilots and others are reporting increasing numbers of encounters with drones flying dangerously close to aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has received reports of more than 1,800 drones engaged in hazardous or unauthorized activity over the last 12 months— an average of more than four per day. Computer models show that the ingestion of a drone as small as eight pounds could have a devastating impact on an aircraft engine. We also know that drones are capable of causing catastrophic damage to airplane control surfaces, flaps, and other essential components.

The FAA has the authority to impose civil penalties on individuals operating drones in a manner that puts people and property at risk, but there currently is no criminal provision that directly addresses the unsafe operation of drones. Last month, we re-introduced the Drone& Operator Safety Act in the Senate and House of Representatives, which would, for the first time, make it a criminal offense to knowingly or recklessly fly a drone in a way that interferes with, or disrupts the operation of, a manned aircraft. It would also expressly prohibit flying drones in an airport’s arrival or departure flight path without permission from the airport’s air traffic control tower.

We know that most operators fly their drones responsibly, but there have been too many incidents where drones have come dangerously close to manned aircraft. This bill will help protect pilots and passengers from that risky behavior.

In crafting this legislation, we’ve worked with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, airport administrators, pilots and other stakeholders who are committed to safe travel. We’ve also heard from representatives of the recreational drone community, and we’re committed to addressing their concerns. It is time for Congress to pass the Drone Operator Safety Act to penalize drone operators who recklessly endanger aircraft. It’s a commonsense way to prevent a few bad actors from giving this new technology a bad name. We want drone operators to be able to enjoy their hobby and businesses to be able to harness the potential of unmanned aircraft, and we want air travelers to be safe. With the right rules in place, the sky’s the limit.

Whitehouse is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Langevin represents Rhode Island's 2nd District and is a member of the Homeland Security Committee.

Original article can be found here ➤ http://origin-nyi.thehill.com

Universal Stinson 108, N9063K: Accident occurred June 25, 2016 in Big Lake, Alaska

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: ANC16LA035
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, June 25, 2016 in Big Lake, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/17/2017
Aircraft: UNIVERSAL STINSON 108, registration: N9063K
Injuries: 2 Minor, 1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The private pilot stated that, about 35 minutes into the personal, local flight and while circling a friend’s cabin about 550 ft above ground level, the engine began to “sputter,” followed by a total loss of engine power. He subsequently made a forced landing in an area of densely populated trees, during which the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.

A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Although the wing fuel tanks had been modified and no Federal Aviation Administration major repair and alteration form nor entry in the airplane’s maintenance records were found regarding the modification, no evidence was found indicating that the modification led to the loss of engine power. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
A total loss of engine power during cruise flight for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Anchorage, Alaska

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N9063K

NTSB Identification: ANC16LA035
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, June 25, 2016 in Big Lake, AK
Aircraft: UNIVERSAL STINSON 108, registration: N9063K
Injuries: 2 Minor, 1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On June 25, 2016, about 1800 Alaska daylight time, a Stinson 108 airplane, N9063K, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing, following a loss of engine power near Big Lake, AK. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot, as a visual flight rules (VFR) flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 when the accident occurred. Of the three people on board, the certificated private pilot and one passenger sustained minor injuries and one passenger was uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Merrill Field Airport (PAMR), Anchorage, Alaska, at about 1725.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on June 25, the pilot stated that the purpose of the flight was to take two family members, who were visiting from out of town, on a sightseeing flight. About 35 minutes into the flight, while circling a friend's cabin at about 550 feet above ground level, the engine began to sputter followed by a total loss of engine power. He made a forced landing in an area of densely populated spruce and birch trees. During the forced landing, the airplane sustained substantial damage to wings and fuselage. 

On October 12, 2016, the NTSB IIC, along with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety inspector from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office examined the airframe and engine at the facilities of Alaska Claims Services, Inc., Wasilla, Alaska. 

The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft. Both propeller blades exhibited aft bending with minimal torsional "S" twisting. 

Examination of the Continental O-470R engine revealed no anomalies, contamination, or evidence of malfunction in any of the engine accessories. The cylinders, pistons, valve train, crankshaft, and other internal components were all without evidence of anomaly or malfunction. The engine was rotated by the propeller. When the engine was rotated, blue spark was observed on the top ignition leads.

Examination of the airplane's wing fuel tanks revealed that the tanks had been modified. An additional section had been welded on to the factory fuel tank with lightening holes drilled in the factory end. Each tank was placarded near the filler cap on the exterior of the wing "FUEL 80/87 MINIMUM GRADE 20 GALLONS." The fuel selector inside the cockpit was placarded "18 GAL." No FAA form 337 (major repair and alteration) or logbook entry was located in the airplane's maintenance records for the modification of the fuel system.

The examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The closest weather reporting facility was Wasilla Airport, Wasilla, AK, about 19 miles east of the accident site. At 1756, a weather observation from Wasilla Airport was reporting, in part: wind from 080 degrees at 4 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, few clouds at 4,600 feet, scattered clouds at 5,500 feet, broken clouds at 7,500 feet; temperature, 66°F; dew point 48 °F; altimeter, 29.89 inHG.


After repeated attempts, the pilot did not submit an NTSB Pilot/Operator Accident Report form (NTSB Form 6120.1) as required.

NTSB Identification: ANC16LA035
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, June 25, 2016 in Big Lake, AK
Aircraft: UNIVERSAL STINSON 108, registration: N9063K
Injuries: 2 Minor, 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On June 25, 2016, about 1800 Alaska daylight time, a Stinson 108 airplane, N9063K, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing, following a loss of engine power near Big Lake, Alaska. The airplane was registered to, and operated by, the pilot as a visual flight rules (VFR) flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 when the accident occurred. Of the three people on board, the certificated private pilot and one passenger sustained minor injuries, and one passenger was uninjured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Merrill Field, Anchorage, Alaska, at about 1725.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge on June 26, the pilot stated that the purpose of the flight was to take two family members, who were visiting from out of town, on a sightseeing flight. About 35 minutes into the flight, while circling a friend's cabin at about 550 feet above ground level, the engine began to sputter followed by a total loss of engine power. He made a forced landing in an area of densely populated spruce and birch trees. During the forced landing the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage.

The airplane was equipped with a Continental Motors O-470R engine. 

The closest weather reporting facility was Wasilla Airport, Wasilla, Alaska, about 19 miles east of the accident site. At 1756, a weather observation from Wasilla Airport was reporting, in part: wind from 080 degrees at 4 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, few clouds at 4,600 feet, scattered clouds at 5,500 feet, broken clouds at 7,500 feet; temperature 66 degrees F; dew point 48 degrees F; altimeter 29.89 inHg.

An examination of the engine is pending.

Should Massachusetts require police to obtain search warrants to use drones for investigations?

YES

Patrick M. O’Connor

State senator, Weymouth Republican


Drones are rapidly becoming a prevalent commodity in our society. The wide range of drone usages has led to some questions over the legal boundaries of this new technology, and whether it can infringe on our basic privacy rights. Currently, there is no legal framework for drone use on the federal level, leaving it up to the states to put these protections in place. That is why I have filed a bill to lay the groundwork in Massachusetts for the use of drones by law enforcement.

One of the most useful applications we have seen for drones is in public safety efforts. Drones can be an extremely useful tool in criminal investigations, as they can provide a much broader scope of the situation and ensure greater safety for police on the front lines. It is important that we establish clear, legal guidelines for police to effectively use drones while protecting our fundamental rights to privacy laid out in the Fourth Amendment.

Any criminal investigation that would require a warrant for surveillance should equally require a warrant for surveillance by drone. This would be a reasonable requirement that is in line with all other methods of surveillance during an investigation. Massachusetts needs a statute to address the cases that will inevitably arise from instances where an individual feels that his or her privacy has been violated.

Ultimately, Massachusetts needs a foundation for law enforcement to utilize drones. We also need the protection of civil liberties for those abiding by the law. Requiring law enforcement to obtain search warrants would legitimize drone use in criminal investigations while enhancing the effectiveness of this new technology.

This is a new and rapidly expanding technology, and I believe it is important to put some regulations in place before civil rights cases start to emerge and the technology is attacked. We need to make sure this doesn’t happen, because drones can be an invaluable asset to our law enforcement, such as in search and rescue missions or ensuring safety during large crowd gatherings. We need to be ahead of the curve with this growing technology by ensuring that it doesn’t go unchecked.

NO

Christopher D. Delmonte

Bridgewater chief of police; president, Plymouth County Police Chiefs Association


Police chiefs and the men and women of Massachusetts law enforcement are keenly aware of and daily protect the core values and principles found in both our US Constitution and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. We are vigilant to balance effective modern policing strategies and respecting the public’s expectations of privacy. It is at the heart of our mission.

But I oppose legislation on Beacon Hill that would set restrictions on the use of drones by law enforcement, including the requirement to seek a search warrant. Drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, are an emerging technology and relatively inexpensive tool for police to obtain information during an evolving critical incident. Accurate and timely information is invaluable for good decision making, and ultimately keeps people safe.

Traditionally, we have relied on helicopters from time to time, but their value is dependent on weather conditions and carries personnel risks and expenses. Publicly available online imagery can also be helpful, but that is a static commercially-based product that does not provide important finer details of the exact condition officers are facing. Smartphone maps in the field may also provide general overviews of the street and land area, but have little value in a rapidly changing and evolving incident.

Drones can be deployed quickly on scene by a single trained officer to remotely survey the scene of a violent encounter or missing person in the woods; search remote land areas, marsh, and waterways normally inaccessible or that pose significant risk to ground searchers; survey large areas devastated by a natural disaster to locate survivors or evaluate structural integrity; or simply survey a crime or crash scene with greater detail and accuracy.

We recognize this new technology raises legitimate privacy concerns that should be addressed, but drones cannot see through walls and only view what is already accessible generally to the public through other means. Burdening municipalities with unnecessary and unreasonably broad legislation will only have a chilling effect on an otherwise common sense public safety asset. If the technology is being abused, hold accountable those responsible. If there is a pressing need for legislation in this area, it is to fund proper training for its use.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.bostonglobe.com