Friday, February 9, 2018

Hector International Airport (KFAR) worker going 76 mph won’t be charged in fatal crash on runway

Darry G. Arveson Jr.
March 19, 1969 - July 31, 2017



FARGO – A man who drove an SUV that hit and killed a worker striping a runway last summer at Hector International Airport will not be charged, a prosecutor with the Cass County State’s Attorney’s Office said.

Ryan Younggren said Thursday that he informed the Fargo Police Department and Darren Anderson, referred to as the defendant, that he did not believe he had enough evidence to file charges in the case to gain a unanimous verdict from a jury.

The “decline” to charge report was issued Jan. 31.

According to the report, Anderson, the assistant director for the airport, hit and killed Darry Arveson, 48, an employee of West River Striping of Mandan, on a runway closed for maintenance about 12:40 a.m. on July 31, 2017. Anderson was driving a 2015 Chevrolet Traverse with a passenger.

Arveson, of Glen Ullin, was driving a paint cart, a small vehicle about the size of a lawn mower. He was outlining center white stripes on the runway with black paint.

When the crash occurred, Arveson was driving the cart north on the far east side of the runway about 70 feet from the center stripes. All the runway lights were off to signal planes not to land, so it was very dark, the report said.

Anderson was called to escort a paint truck back to the far north end of the runway. Data boxes from his vehicle indicate he accelerated up to 93 mph then decelerated to 76 mph at the time of the crash.

The report notes that there are no speed limits or regulations for vehicles traveling on runways, meaning vehicles drive at an “as needed” speed.

A radio call moments before the crash cautioning Anderson to watch for the paint cart was not answered.

Arveson was killed immediately in the collision. The cart had no lights of any kind, and Arveson had been painting using a small headlamp. An accident reconstruction found that much of his reflective security vest would have been obscured by the cart seat.

The report said lights from another runway may also have affected Anderson’s ability to see the paint cart.

Anderson said in an interview that he had been traveling quickly to clear maintenance equipment from the east-west runway prior to the arrival of a commuter plane. Records show the plane landed about 30 minutes after the crash.

Younggren said he would have had to prove Anderson had been criminally reckless or negligent in controlling his vehicle.

Younggren said police demonstrations suggested Anderson could have avoided the crash if he had been keenly looking for obstructions or knew the cart’s location. Also, if he had been traveling slower, he would have had more time to react.

However, with the paint cart in an unexpected location, a lack of lighting and reflective materials, and no regulations for speed on the runways, Younggren said he didn’t believe a conviction could be obtained.

Original article can be found here ➤ http://bismarcktribune.com

ICON Aircraft

N467BA Jet Mist Holdings LLC: http://registry.faa.gov/N467BA



SANIBEL, Florida- A small plane made an emergency landing in the Gulf of Mexico near the Sanibel Lighthouse on Friday.

The plane started taking on water and an emergency rescue had to be made.

This is the second plane to be stuck in the water Friday. 

A rental plane landed earlier in San Carlos Bay due to mechanical failure, but no one was injured during the landing.

The pilot was towed to shore by a boater, and the owner of the rental plane came from Tampa Bay to help with repair.

The plane stuck near the Sanibel Lighthouse was on the way to repair the plane that was originally stuck in San Carlos Bay.

No fuel leaked into the water and the incident has been turned over to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.

Story, comments, video and photo ➤  http://www.nbc-2.com




A plane wound up having to be towed out of San Carlos Bay Friday afternoon.

After successfully landing the ICON A5 amphibious light-sport plane it started taking on water and was unable to take off again.

The plane was towed by a boater into the beach area near the Sanibel fishing pier, surprising many beach goers.

The owner is on the way from Tampa to repair the disabled plane. There is no fuel leakage and no injuries.

A plane that arrived to help tow the disabled plane back to shore reportedly got stuck in shallow water as well.

Story, video and photo gallery ➤ http://www.winknews.com







SANIBEL, Florida  -- An ICON A5 plane was seen sitting in the shallow waters off the tip of Sanibel Island Friday.

The plane came down off Lighthouse Beach Park.

Boats from several agencies, including Sanibel Police and the U.S. Coast Guard, responded to the scene.

There were no injuries reported.

Crews are working to pump water out of the plane so it can be removed.

The ICON A5, an amphibious light-sport aircraft that made its debut in 2014.  That's the same type of aircraft the former pitcher Roy Halladay fatally crashed last November.

Story, video and photo gallery ➤ https://www.fox4now.com

How to travel like a boss

Lee Arnold, executive chairman of Colliers International Florida, always travels first class — when he’s not flying himself to meetings in his private plane, that is.



If there’s anyone who has mastered the art and science of business travel, it’s Lee Arnold, executive chairman of Colliers International Florida. Arnold travels across Florida and the United States, even to some international locations such as the Bahamas, in his own aircraft, a Beechcraft Baron.

Not only does he travel in the plane, he pilots it himself. Arnold, 67, has been flying since he was 15. He got his pilot’s license at 16 and his commercial license at 18, and he worked as a flight instructor and charter pilot before getting involved in commercial real estate.

Arnold continues to fly his own plane to meetings a couple of times a week. But when he’s not in the cockpit and has to fly commercial airlines, he flies business class, without fail — and makes no apologies for it.

“Sure, the flight might cost $800 more, but what’s an executive worth to you if they’re burned out? It sounds flippant to say that is just a little bit of extra money, but I think you can easily make an argument for the cost of first class,” he says. “When you’re already paying executives a huge amount of money to be visible and effective in front of people, you’ve got to keep them healthy, and you’ve got to keep them happy. Otherwise, they’re just wasting time.”

Arnold’s key travel tips include:

Pack and prep: “I like making my own travel arrangements instead of having my assistant do it. It’ll save time,” Arnold says. “Also, if you are packing, pack alone — your wife will add extra shirts that you don’t need. And if you don’t pack the right handkerchief, underwear, razor or whatever, so what? You can buy anything you need once you reach your destination.”

Arnold doesn’t bother packing a business suit when he travels. “I don’t pack my suit because they will hang it up for you in business class,” he says. “Also, I’m anti-tie, especially when traveling.” His travel attire usually consists of a black pair of pants made from a comfortable, denim-like material; a gray, custom, wrinkle-resistant sport coat made by Tom James that he can store in the overhead compartment; and a pair of New Balance light running shoes.

Time sensitive: Arnold usually takes a cab or Uber to the airport. If he has to drive himself, he always opts for valet parking because it saves him at least 20 to 30 minutes — valuable time that could be spent working. He also sets an alarm on his phone for 15 minutes before the flight is scheduled to take off, in case he gets involved in a conversation with a fellow traveler and loses track of the time.

Light and hydrate: Arnold always brings a small flashlight and extra water with him onboard. He recalls once being on a flight that had been grounded on the tarmac for seven hours. Water was rationed. “Bottled water is an absolute must,” he says. “Dehydration really has a negative impact on the body.”

The flashlight, Arnold says, will come in handy in cases of extreme emergency, like an airport shutdown. And yes, that’s something he’s experienced. “When I got off the airplane, nothing worked,” he says. “I go into the terminal and it’s dark, so I turn on my flashlight and see all of these people huddled around, covering up their stuff because there’s no police.”

Seat system: If given the chance to choose your seating assignment, always take it, Arnold recommends, regardless of the extra cost. You want to be as close to the front of the plane as possible, to speed your debarkation, and you don’t want to be near the bulkhead because you won’t be able to store items on the floor in front of you.

Hear this: Noise-canceling headphones or ear buds are also essential in-flight tools for the business traveler, in Arnold’s book. “If you get a bad seat mate, put your headset on and go for glory,” Arnold says. “Just say, ‘I’m sorry but I have to listen to this, it’s really important.’”

Flight time: Arnold never takes red-eye flights unless absolutely necessary, due to their disruptive effects on the body and its natural circadian rhythms. “And don’t take sleeping pills,” he says. “It’s hard to put on an emergency oxygen mask if you’re comatose.”

Research reports: Even if your trip is scheduled to last just a day or less, Arnold says it’s essential to gather information about the city you’ll be visiting. “If I’m landing in a convention city, I always rent a car ahead of time,” he says. “Otherwise, you’ll risk winding up in a cab line.”

And don’t overlook the effectiveness of public transit. During the aforementioned airport shutdown, Arnold says all vehicle traffic to the airport was blocked. But the trains were still running, so he jumped aboard the local metro line and before long was enjoying the comforts of his downtown hotel.

Stay calm, travel on: Arnold, who says business travel is “a science, and for me it’s even a hobby,” is also adamant about practicing what he calls “relaxed travel.” If your luggage is delayed or lost, “go into Zen mode,” he says. “Don’t allow negative things to take your eye off the ball.”

The golden age of truly luxurious air travel is gone — and likely never coming back — so the difference between a pleasant and unpleasant business trip experience is often attitudinal, Arnold adds.

“Business travel today is a constantly evolving challenge,” he says. “More people are traveling than ever before, and the planes are all full, so it’s all about going into it with the right attitude, getting to the airport early and knowing what the weather is doing.”

Air up there

Lee Arnold’s Business Travel Essentials (the short list):

• iPad Pro
• Bottled water
• Flashlight
• Apple Wallet app (for storing boarding passes electronically)
• FlightAware app (allows travelers to track the whereabouts of the inbound jet that they’ll be boarding for their outbound flight. Arnold says it’s usually more accurate than flight status updates issued by airports and carriers.)
• Notability app (for storing PDFs, slides, meeting agendas, etc., electronically)
• Backup power packs for mobile phone and iPad Pro
• Five-way, quick-charge USB charger for mobile devices
• Executive travel backpack (instead of a briefcase)
• Small pocketknife for personal protection when traveling abroad (but be sure to pack it in your checked luggage rather than trying to carry it on)
• Moisturizing skin cream with SPF rating
• TED Talk podcasts
• Bose headphones
• iBooks app
• Wall Street Journal (digital edition downloaded to iPad)
• Earplugs or noise-canceling headphones
• Neck brace (for sleeping on long-haul flights) 

Original article ➤ https://www.businessobserverfl.com

Schweizer 269C, N521AR, operated by Canyon State Aero LLC: Accident occurred April 27, 2017 in Coolidge, Pinal County, Arizona

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Scottsdale, Arizona
Lycoming Engines; Mesa, Arizona

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N521AR



Location: Coolidge, AZ
Accident Number: WPR17LA093
Date & Time: 04/27/2017, 0945 MST
Registration: N521AR
Aircraft: SCHWEIZER 269C
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Loss of engine power (partial)
Injuries: 1 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Instructional 

On April 27, 2017, about 0945 mountain standard time, a Schweizer 269C, N521AR, was substantially damaged subsequent to a hard landing near Coolidge, Arizona. The helicopter was operated by Canyon State Aero, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. The cross-country instructional flight departed Falcon Field Airport (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 0915 with a planned destination of Coolidge, Arizona. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was training in preparation towards a commercial certificate. While traveling south about 2,000 to 2,100 ft mean sea level, and 65 to 70 knots airspeed, he scanned manifold pressure, altitude, airspeed and engine/rotor rpm. Everything appeared normal. Shortly thereafter, he noticed a change in the sound of the engine, and that the rpm gauge indicated a drop. The pilot checked the throttle to make sure it had not rolled back out of the friction. He then rolled the throttle further, however there was no response. He rolled it slightly off and again there was no response. The helicopter was close to the ground at this time, so he chose a spot to land on the open desert floor. Just before touchdown, he flared and the helicopter impacted the ground hard and rolled over onto its right side.

During the postaccident engine examination, the bottom spark plugs were removed. According to the Champion Spark Plugs Check-A-Plug Chart AV-27, the spark plug electrodes displayed coloration consistent with normal wear. The crankshaft was rotated by hand with no binding noted. Thumb compression was observed in each cylinder. Mechanical continuity was established to the accessory section. During the engine control continuity check, the throttle arm at the fuel injector servo would not move when a corresponding input was applied at the collective throttle grip. Further examination revealed that the throttle cable was found to have separated within the cable housing, and in an area where the cable housing was slightly bent. The cable housing was securely mounted at each end and exhibited no visual evidence that it had been damaged during the accident sequence. The cable was removed from the housing. There was no kinking or evidence of binding observed. The cable was found worn and had separated near the servo end about 1 inch from where it swaged to the rigid portion.

The engine was then prepared for an engine run. The engine was started with the starter using standard procedures. Once the engine was at operating temperature, the throttle was advanced to an rpm to facilitate a magneto check utilizing the cockpit mounted ignition switch. Both magnetos operated at each of their respective switch detents and within manufacturers specifications. The engine ran smoothly throughout the operational check.

The engine manufacturer participant reported that the subject cable is not controlled by any hourly or calendar life limits, and there was no way to disassemble the cable from the housing to facilitate an internal examination. Further examination of the helicopter maintenance logbooks did not provide a history for the subject cable.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 47, Male
Airplane Rating(s): None
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): Helicopter
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Helicopter
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 2 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 10/11/2016
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time: 156 hours (Total, all aircraft), 130 hours (Total, this make and model), 6 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 76 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 25 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft) 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: SCHWEIZER
Registration: N521AR
Model/Series: 269C UNDESIGNATED
Aircraft Category: Helicopter
Year of Manufacture: 1999
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: S1785
Landing Gear Type: Skid
Seats: 2
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 04/17/2017, 100 Hour
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 2050 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 14 Hours
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 4147.8 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT: Not installed
Engine Model/Series: HIO360-D1A
Registered Owner: CANYON STATE AERO LLC
Rated Power: 190
Operator: CANYON STATE AERO LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KP08, 1574 ft msl
Observation Time: 1655 UTC
Distance from Accident Site: 5 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 119°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: 21°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting:
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: MESA, AZ (FFZ)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: COOLIDGE, AZ (P08)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 0915 MST
Type of Airspace: Class G 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Minor
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Minor
Latitude, Longitude:  32.977778, -111.517500

NTSB Identification: WPR17LA093
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, April 27, 2017 in Coolidge, AZ
Aircraft: SCHWEIZER 269C, registration: N521AR
Injuries: 1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 27, 2017, about 0945 mountain standard time, a Schweizer 269C, N521AR, sustained substantial damage subsequent to a hard landing near Coolidge, Arizona. The helicopter was operated by Canyon State Aero, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The private pilot sustained minor injuries. The cross-country instructional flight departed Falcon Field Airport (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 0915 with a planned destination of Coolidge, Arizona. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported that it was a training flight and that he was working towards a commercial certificate. The pilot reported that in level flight he noticed a change in the sound of the engine. He then noticed that the RPM dual tachometer was below the normal limit, and attempted to correct the anomaly by increasing the throttle with the twist grip. He noted there was no response to the RPM and he attempted to make a landing in the open desert. He flared just before touchdown, and the helicopter landed hard and rolled onto its right side. The pilot noted that he did not observe the rotor/engine tachometer needles split prior to landing.

The helicopter was recovered for further examination.

Cirrus SR22, N678Z, registered to N678Z LLC and operated by the pilot: Accident occurred June 18, 2016 near Colorado Springs, El Paso County, Colorado

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Denver, Colorado
Cirrus; Duluth, Minnesota
BRS Aerospace; Saint Paul, Minnesota
Continental Motors; Mobile, Alabama
Cirrus Owners & Pilots Association; Las Vegas, Nevada
Wisconsin Aviation; Watertown, Wisconsin

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N678Z



Location: Colorado Springs, CO
Accident Number: CEN16LA223
Date & Time: 06/18/2016, 1411 MDT
Registration: N678Z
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Loss of engine power (partial)
Injuries: 3 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Instructional 

On June 18, 2016, about 1411 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N678Z, descended under the canopy of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and impacted terrain near Colorado Springs, Colorado, following an inflight loss of engine power. The pilot, a safety pilot in the right seat, and a pilot rated rear-seated passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the impact. The airplane was registered to N678Z LLC and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of the accident and the flight was not operated on a flight plan. The local flight originated about 1345 from the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (COS), near Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The pilot of the accident airplane reported that he was participating in a Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association flying clinic. He departed from COS with two passengers to conduct training in a local practice area located about 15 miles east of COS. The pilot stated that after 20 minutes of air work, at approximately 8,500 feet above mean sea level (msl), he noticed a roughness in the engine and that the oil pressure reading indicated within the green arc but lower than normal. The engine continued to run rough and lose power. Air traffic controllers were advised that the flight was headed back to COS with an engine problem. He said that with the reduced engine power available, the airplane began losing altitude and airspeed. The pilot determined the flight could not make a landing at COS, which was about 11 nautical miles west of the airplane's position, or Meadow Lake Airport, which was about 6 nautical miles north. He indicated that no suitable landing areas were identified and he pulled the CAPS handle. The CAPS rocket fired and separated from its lanyard. The parachute subsequently deployed. The airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. The impact occurred with the aft harness in a snubbed position, prior to tail drop. The airplane subsequently stabilized upright on its main landing gear.

The safety pilot seated in the front right seat of the accident airplane, reported that he flew the accident airplane earlier in the morning during the demonstration phase of training and noted no issues or anomalies with the accident airplane. He indicated that his purpose during the flight was to demonstrate and teach formation-flying techniques. He reported that after a preflight brief he held an additional briefing emphasizing that the airplane owner would be the pilot-in-command and is responsible for all emergencies as he, as a safety pilot, was not familiar with the owner's equipment.

According to the safety pilot, the rear seated passenger noticed the oil light illuminated before the takeoff run when the engine was at idle. However, the light went off during the engine run up so he did not think it was a problem. The safety pilot related that he had observed his oil pressure light illuminated while at idle numerous times with a warm engine.

The safety pilot indicated that the takeoff, rendezvous, and initial formation training were normal. As a wingman, the pilot is usually unaware of the flight's location, altitude, or airspeed. Additionally, he said that a wingman's attention revolves around the lead airplane where you do not have time to monitor engine instrumentation. The safety pilot said, "If you have never flown as a wingman you just don't understand how much you have to trust your plane while keeping your eyes on lead AT ALL TIMES. I even commented on this during the initial 4-hour brief - if you have a weak engine don't fly. When there is a lead change it takes a moment for you to figure out where you are."

The safety pilot reported that this loss of engine power during the flight was extremely subtle. At no time did he notice any indications out of normal parameters. The pilot mentioned his oil pressure looked low at 27 psi. The safety pilot asked what was normal but the pilot did not know. The safety pilot stated that the oil pressure and all other engine indications were within their respective green arcs, showing normal engine parameters. The accident airplane had fallen behind the lead airplane and was five plane lengths away on his right wing. The safety pilot said that a slow "pinging" about every 10 - 15 seconds started and that is when the pilot elected to return to the airport. The formation flew as briefed where the accident airplane took over as the lead airplane. The pilot informed air traffic control of engine problem. An intermediate engine power setting was set and all of the engine indications remained within their green arcs. The safety pilot reported that the pinging interval started to decrease and that the engine did not sputter.

An air traffic controller advised the flight of bearings and distances to three nearby airfields. The safety pilot stated that with the remaining altitude, they immediately knew they could not reach any of them. He noticed and told the pilot the airspeed was low with an indication of 100 knots while the airplane was at 7,100 feet msl. The pilot told him that the throttle was full forward. The safety pilot immediately transmitted a Mayday call and advised the pilot to deploy the CAPS.

The safety pilot reported that the pilot in command would pull the CAPS unless incapacitated, as briefed during preflight briefing. According to the safety pilot, the pilot's previous and overriding training habit kicked as he looked for a place to land. The pilot verified with the safety pilot that he intended to deploy the CAPS and pulled the CAPS handle at the safety pilot's second request. The airplane's altitude was 7,000 feet msl and its indicated airspeed was 80 knots. The handle came out and down. However, it took a strong second pull to get the rocket to fire. The safety pilot estimated that the CAPS deployment occurred about 800 feet above ground level (agl).

The safety pilot said that there was a huge deceleration after the CAPS deployment. There was a moment of weightlessness and then the airplane pitched nose down. The safety pilot, in part, said:

All I saw was the ground rushing up rapidly. ... We violently impacted nose down. I screamed in pain. It felt as if I was stabbed in my neck and lower back, all on the left side. It took a few seconds to access my condition. Wiggle fingers and toes, move head, etc. When I realized I was alive I looked over at [the pilot]. It initially looked like he was slumped over to the left but then observed him move with purpose. He stated his door was jammed, grabbed the hammer and started whacking away at the forward part of his door window. [The rear seated passenger] ... told me to try my door. It opened, I crawled out and went to move the seat forward but [the rear seated passenger] had already slithered out so I went down the wing.

The safety pilot flying in the other formation airplane, in part, said:  I observed N678Z deploy CAPS, and informed Approach that I saw a "good chute". I did not look at the altimeter, but I recall thinking that we were very low. N678Z struck the ground within just a few seconds, in a nose-low attitude that I estimate at about 80 degrees. A large dust cloud was raised; the impact appeared violent to me, and I was not sure that it was survivable by any of the occupants.

The passenger in the rear seat of the accident airplane helped the accident pilot egress out of the right-side door. The safety pilot in the accident airplane reported that first responders helped deflate and wrap up the chute. After that, his neck started hurting again. The three occupants were subsequently transported to a hospital to be evaluated. 



Pilot Information

Certificate: Commercial
Age: 64, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 06/01/2015
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 06/13/2015
Flight Time:  1289 hours (Total, all aircraft), 30 hours (Total, this make and model), 1170 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 40 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 23 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft) 

The 64-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land and instrument ratings. He held a flight instructor certificate for single engine airplanes. He also held a third-class medical certificate that was issued on June 1, 2016, with a limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot reported that he had accumulated 1,289 hours of total flight time and accumulated 30 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
Registration: N678Z
Model/Series: SR22 NO SERIES
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2002
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 0311
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 11/13/2015, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3400 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 788 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: CONT MOTOR
ELT: C91  installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: IO-550-N
Registered Owner: N678Z, LLC
Rated Power: 310 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

N678Z, a 2002 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0311, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, Continental Motors model IO-550-N engine with serial number 686307, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on November 13, 2015. The airplane accumulated 787.9 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection. Another entry indicated that a Forced Aeromotive Technologies, Inc. (FAT) supercharger was installed on the engine on June 11, 2016, and the airplane accumulated 817.6 hours of total flight time at the time of that installation.

According to technical information from the supercharger manufacturer's website, the supercharger is belt driven off the accessory drive, similar to the alternator. The supercharger will run much cooler than a turbocharger and should result in much lower maintenance costs. It will add 7 to 8,000 feet of altitude performance to the Cirrus SR-22. The supercharger's impeller speed is a function of engine RPM and therefore over-speed and bootstrapping are not operational considerations. There are no manifold pressure fluctuations while adjusting the throttle, or mixture. Additionally, according to the manufacturer, after landing idle cool down periods are not necessary and the manifold pressure is limited to 29.60 inches at full engine power.

Engine manifold pressure is maintained automatically by an electronic boost controller designed for the SR22 by FAT. The controller reacts to throttle changes in less than one second. The boost controller is not affected by cold oil temperatures or cold take off conditions and will operate quickly to control boost even down to -50° F.

The airplane was equipped with an Avidyne Multi-Function Display (MFD). The MFD unit can display engine information, pilot checklists, terrain/map information, approach chart information and other airplane/operational information depending on the specific configuration and options that are installed. One of the options available is a display of comprehensive engine monitoring and performance data. Each MFD contains a compact flash (CF) memory card. This memory card contains all the software that the MFD needs to operate. Additionally, this card contains checklists, approach charts, and map information that the unit uses to generate the various cockpit displays.

During operation, the MFD display receives information from several other devices that are installed on the airplane. Specifically, the MFD receives GPS position, time and track data from the airplane's GPS receiver. The MFD may also receive information from the airplane concerning altitude, engine and electrical system parameters, and outside air temperature. This data is also stored on the unit's CF memory card.

The MFD generates new data files for each MFD power-on cycle. The oldest file is dropped and replaced by a new recording once the storage limit has been reached. MFD data are sampled every six seconds and recorded to memory once every minute. If an interruption of power occurs during the minute between MFD memory write cycles, data sampled during that portion of a minute are not recorded.

The airplane was fitted with a CAPS designed to recover the airplane and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fiberglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly, which attached the parachute to the fuselage. Upon deployment by the pilot, a rocket fires from the parachute bay located behind the cabin, knocking the cover panel off the parachute bay in the process. The pickup collar assembly is carried by the rocket for rapid deployment of the parachute. 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KCOS, 6170 ft msl
Observation Time: 1354 MDT
Distance from Accident Site: 11 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 274°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Few / 7000 ft agl
Temperature/Dew Point: 29°C / 11°C
Lowest Ceiling:
Visibility: 9 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 9 knots/ 16 knots, 170°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 30.36 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: COLORADO SPRINGS, CO (COS)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: COLORADO SPRINGS, CO (COS)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1345 MDT
Type of Airspace: 

At 1354, the recorded weather at COS was: Wind 170° at 9 knots gusting to 16 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; sky condition few clouds at 7000 feet; temperature 29° C; dew point 11° C; altimeter 30.36 inches of mercury. 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Minor
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 1 Minor
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor
Latitude, Longitude: 38.797778, -104.461389 (est) 

The airplane was found upright about 11 miles east of COS. Its engine and cowling were bent upward forward of the firewall. The CAPS parachute was found deployed. A recovery company relocated the wreckage. The CF memory chip from the MFD, the engine, and components of the CAPS system, to include the rocket lanyard, incremental bridle, incremental bridle sheath, deployment bag, and retaining harness, were subsequently shipped for additional examinations. However, the rocket, the pickup collar, pickup collar support, and the cable stop sleeves from the pickup collar assembly were not recovered.

Examination of the wreckage revealed a witness mark on the lower forward left side of the vertical stabilizer. The hour meter indicated 823.0 hours. The electric fuel pump was able to pump a fluid when electric power was applied. Disassembly of the pump did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented its operation. 

Tests And Research

The engine was shipped to and examined at Continental Motors in Mobile, Alabama. Both front engine mounts were damaged and replaced with exemplar mounts. The engine was mounted on a test stand and placed in a test cell. During the initial engine test run, the engine reached an indicated manifold pressure of 35 inches of mercury at 2,700 RPM. The altitude control valve was connected and the indicated engine performance was within the supplemental type certificate holder's specifications and no anomalies were noted.

The CF memory chip from the MFD was shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Recorder Laboratory. The MFD card was received in good condition and a senior recorder specialist downloaded and examined the card's data. The recorder specialist subsequently produced a report that showed the MFD card contained 138 data files, representing data from 69 electrical power cycles. The last 2 files recorded were identified as the accident flight. The data from the accident flight and the previous 11 engine cycles before the accident were plotted. According to the pilot, some preceding flights were to retrieve the airplane after the installation of the supercharger and then to return back to Centennial Airport (APA), near Denver, from COS for a 2-hour inspection. The engine was reported to have operated nominally on the flights to/from APA, as well as on the first flight on the day of the accident. Some of the recorded engine cycles occurred with the airplane on the ground and were only a few minutes in duration. Although review of the engine operation data showed fluctuations in their values, the recorded data did not reveal any anomalies that could explain the engine power loss.

The occupants of the other airplane in the formation flight collected GPS and photographic data during the accident airplane's power loss and descent. A review of the images revealed the parachute traveled aftward and below the airplane. The parachute subsequently inflated, the airplane descended downward in a nose low attitude, and impacted terrain in a nose low attitude.

The CAPS components were shipped to the NTSB Materials Laboratory. A senior materials engineer examined the components and produced Materials Laboratory Factual Report No. 17-009.

In the accident airplane, the cable for the rocket lanyard (included in the pickup collar assembly) had separated.

As designed, the rocket lanyard from the pickup collar assembly attach to the incremental bridle. The other end of the incremental bridle is attached to lanyard on the parachute deployment bag. The folded parachute is contained within the deployment bag. When stowed, the retaining harness covers the top of the deployment bag and retains the deployment bag in the airplane parachute bay.

During a deployment, the rocket is launched, carrying the pickup collar assembly, incremental bridle, and parachute deployment bag with it. The incremental bridle is positioned between the rocket lanyard and the deployment bag and is designed to absorb the impact associated with the acceleration difference between the rocket and the deployment bag during deployment. As assembled, the middle portion of the incremental bridle is folded to a shorter length, and the folded segment is stitched together. The stitches in the folded segment separate until the velocity of the deployment bag matches the velocity of the rocket. During a typical deployment, some stitches in the incremental bridle remain intact, and a portion of the incremental bridle remains folded. Ten rows of stitches remained intact in the incremental bridle from the accident airplane.

The pickup collar assembly includes a zinc-coated steel pickup collar, aluminum pickup collar support, and rocket lanyard. The rocket lanyard consists of two lengths of a single stainless steel cable that connect the pickup collar to the incremental bridle. The cable for the lanyard loops through and around the pickup collar and pickup collar support, and cable eyes at each end are connected to a loop at one end of the incremental bridle. The cable bends 90° at two locations on either side of the pickup collar support, and the center of the cable is routed around the center tube of the support. Cable stop sleeves made of copper are attached to the cable adjacent to the pickup collar. During manufacturing, each pickup collar assembly is proof tested to a tensile load of 1,000 pounds.

The submitted cable from the accident airplane for the rocket lanyard was separated into two segments that were arbitrarily labeled segments A and B. Teflon tubes, which cover each leg of the lanyard between the pickup collar and the cable eyes, were also included. The Teflon tube that had covered the segment A lanyard was displaced along the length of the cable segment and was covering the separation. The Teflon tube from segment B was completely separated from the cable. Based on engineering drawings, the calculated total length of the rocket lanyard cable in the pickup collar assembly is 105.1 inches ± 1.0 inch.

The rocket lanyard cable was constructed of 7 strands (6 strands wrapped around a core strand) with 7 wires per strand consistent with manufacturer specifications. The lengths of segment A and segment B were measured from the separation to the end of the cable eye. Segment A was 55.38 inches long, and segment B was 50.50 inches long, for a measured total cable length of 105.88 inches, consistent with the cable length calculated from the engineering drawings.

The cable segments were closely examined visually and using an optical stereomicroscope for contact damage, deformation, and metal transfer. Individual wires showed necking deformation and chisel-type separation features consistent with overstress separation. A material consistent with red grease was present on the surfaces of the cable, and no evidence of corrosion was observed.

Orange metal deposits consistent with copper were observed along the surface of cable segment A between approximately 0.5 inches and 5.3 inches from the separation. The deposits were consistent with material transfer from a copper cable stop sleeve.

On segment B, isolated areas of orange metal deposits consistent with copper were observed on two of the wires approximately 0.28 to 0.34 inch from the separation. Further from the separation on segment B, the outer surfaces of wires on two strands were flattened consistent with sliding contact damage at a location between 0.07 to 0.09 inch from the separation. On most of the wires with the contact damage, gray metal was observed at the edge of the flattened surface on the side furthest from the separation.

The separation end of segment B was examined using a scanning electron microscope (SEM).  The SEM examination revealed portions of the area with sliding contact appeared relatively lighter gray than the surrounding material, consistent with the presence of an element with a higher atomic weight. Analysis of the area using energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS) showed the bright areas showed a peak indicating the presence of zinc.

The gray metal adjacent to the sliding contact areas was also examined using SEM and EDS. The EDS analysis of the gray metal at the edges of the sliding contact damage resulted in spectra consistent with stainless steel, matching the spectra obtained from intact areas of the lanyard cable wires.

Two lengths of cables were cut from each rocket lanyard segment to facilitate tension tests to fracture. Four tension specimens were fabricated. The test specimens fractured at peak loads of 905 pounds, 916 pounds, 893 pounds, and 930 pounds. All specimens broke within the crimp for the cable eyes. The specified minimum cable strength as listed in the current Military Standard MIL-DTL-83420N is 920 pounds.

The cover flap of the retaining harness has a pocket on its flap exterior. The clear plastic face of the pocket is intended to observe parachute documents. The plastic pocket face from the accident retaining harness was detached from the fabric border on three of the four sides and was discolored and distorted consistent with exposure to heat. No evidence of abrasion was observed on the plastic surfaces.

Pulled stitches were observed in the fabric of the retaining harness near the sleeve for the incremental bridle. The sleeve was located on the right side of the retaining harness cover flap. Stitches between the cover flap and the side flap were broken just above the sleeve. Pulled stitches were also observed at the upper end of the sleeve where it was attached to the cover flap.

Pull tests were conducted with the exemplar incremental bridle folded and inserted into the sleeve on the retaining harness cover flap in two configurations. In the first pull test, the incremental bridle was inserted so that the rocket lanyard end of the bridle was adjacent to the cover flap. In the second test, the incremental bridle was inserted so that the deployment bag end of the bridle exited the sleeve adjacent to the cover flap. To simulate the shape of a retaining harness installed on a packed parachute, the retaining harness was clamped to a table with wood planks extending into the cover flap cavity, and the cover flap cavity was stuffed with packing paper. For each test configuration, a force gage was attached to the exemplar pickup collar, and the collar was pulled while the restraining harness was held in place by the clamped wood planks. In the test 1 configuration where the lanyard end exited the sleeve adjacent to the cover flap, the incremental bridle pulled out of the sleeve at a load of 9 pounds. In the test 2 configuration where deployment bag end of the bridle exited the sleeve adjacent to the cover flap, the incremental bridle remained within the sleeve up to a load of 90 pounds, at which point the test was interrupted. In Cirrus Design's Packed Parachute Assembly Specification document number 90814, revision J, dated October 7, 2015, the procedure states, "Insert incremental bridle assembly into the pouch of the retaining strap." However, the document does not specify the orientation of the inserted incremental bridle.

Cirrus Aircraft completed tension tests to failure on 5 exemplar pickup collar assemblies. Reported peak loads for the assembly tension tests were 2,080 pounds, 1,838 pounds, 1,802 pounds, 1,927 pounds, and 1,925 pounds. Cirrus Aircraft also completed impact load tests to failure on additional exemplar pickup collar assemblies accomplished by dropping a 3,000-pound weight from a 48-inch height. The fractured pickup collar assemblies from 5 tension tests and 2 impact load tests were then sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination.

In the 5 tension tests, fractures of the rocket lanyard cable from the collar assembly test specimens occurred in 2 or 3 locations. Three of the test assemblies fractured in 2 locations, and the remaining 2 assemblies fractured in 3 locations. The primary fracture in each case occurred in the lanyard cable at the location where the cable bent around the flange on the pickup collar. Secondary fractures in the lanyard cables occurred at the lower side of the sleeve as the sleeve was loaded against the lower end of the pickup collar. The lower ends of the pickup collars in each test assembly were bent downward and outward consistent with the downward loading from contact with the sleeves.

In tests resulting in 2 fractures, a secondary fracture occurred in the rocket lanyard cable just below the sleeve opposite from the primary fracture, leaving a 4.7-inch to 5.5-inch segment of cable with the sleeve attached. On the other side of the pickup collar in these tests, the sleeve adjacent to the primary fracture slipped off the fractured end as the sleeve was loaded against the lower end of the pickup collar. In tests resulting in 3 fractures, secondary fractures occurred in the lanyard cable at the lower side of both sleeves, leaving a short segment (0.8-inch to 0.9-inch length) of cable within the sleeve adjacent to the primary fracture and an approximately 5-inch to 5.5-inch length of cable with the other sleeve attached.

In the 3 tests with 2 fractures, copper metal transfer was observed adjacent to the primary fracture in the area where the sleeve had originally been installed up to the fracture location. In one of the tests with 2 fractures, copper metal transfer was also observed adjacent to the secondary fracture consistent with sleeve movement prior to cable fracture at the secondary fracture location.

In the 2 impact tests, the rocket lanyard cable from the pickup collar assembly fractured in one location. The location of the fracture in each case corresponded to the location of the 90° bend. The two cable segments measured 50.13 inches and 54.88 inches long on one impact test assembly, and the segments measured 50.38 inches and 54.88 inches long on the other impact test assembly. The lower ends of the pickup collars in each test assembly were bent downward and outward consistent with the downward loading from contact with the sleeves. Copper metal transfer was observed on the cable surfaces between the locations of the stop sleeve installation and the fractured end on each cable segment. 

Additional Information

The safety representative from Cirrus Design provided correspondence in reference to the investigation, which, in part, stated:

Prior to this investigation, and part of the development of our 200 lbs increased gross weight project, we had to develop a larger diameter parachute that in turn required a more powerful rocket motor. The trickle-down effect also required a thicker rocket lanyard, new incremental bridle and a new pick-up collar/collar support. As a result, we developed two larger, more powerful rocket motors (known as the 3,600 and 3,400). Both with electronic (top down) ignition. The 3,600 was developed for new production in the SR22 and SR22T (Generation 5, 200 lbs increase gross weight) aircraft. The 3,400 was later developed for new production in the SR20 (Generation 5, 100 lbs increase gross weight) and as an electronic upgrade for older SR20, SR22 and SR22T (Generation 1-3) aircraft. The 3,600 system, with its larger diameter cable lanyard, redesigned bridle and bridle sheath, redesigned pick-up collar and pick-up collar support, entered production in January 2013. The similar 3,400 system entered production in April 2013. 

There were approximately 5,330 airplanes built prior to the implementation of electronic rocket ignition on the production line in January 2013. (As a reference, approximately 1,490 electronic rocket ignition aircraft have been produced since then.) As of December 5, 2017, approximately 2,600 aircraft in the field (roughly 50%) had already been converted to electronic rocket ignition. We expect an additional 800 aircraft in the field (roughly 15%) to be converted in 2018. By the end of 2018, over 65% of the older airplanes will have been converted to an electronic rocket ignition. The remaining 35% of older airplanes will be converted as they reach their scheduled ten-year repacks between 2019 and mid-2023. Overall, by the end of 2018, nearly 75% of the entire Cirrus fleet will be equipped with electronic rocket ignition and the host of upgrades that system provides.

The safety representative from the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) produced a factual analysis report of images taken from the other formation airplane. The COPA report, in part, indicated the analysis of the images suggests that the accident airplane was approximately 472 ft agl in a photograph taken very shortly after CAPS activation.

In the Cirrus Design correspondence, the safety representative, in part, stated that the CAPS was deployed at a low altitude and touchdown under a fully inflated canopy occurred prior to tail drop. The nose low attitude is a designed stage in the deployment sequence. A subsequent stage, referred to as "tail drop," would occur at a time in the deployment sequence that is dependent on the type of reefing line cutters used (8 or 10 second cutters). To achieve tail drop, requires time and/or altitude. On site photos revealed that at some point, after touchdown, the reefing line cutters fired, and the rear harness became unsnubbed.




NTSB Identification: CEN16LA223
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, June 18, 2016 in ColoradoSprings, CO
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N678Z
Injuries: 1 Serious, 2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On June 18, 2016, about 1411 mountain daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N678Z, descended under the canopy of the cirrus airframe parachute system (CAPS) and impacted terrain near Colorado Springs, Colorado, following an inflight loss of engine power. The pilot, a pilot rated rear-seated passenger sustained minor injuries and a pilot rated passenger in the right seat sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the impact. The airplane was registered to an individual and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an instructional flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of the accident and the flight was not operated on a flight plan. The local flight originated about 1345 from the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Airport (COS), near Colorado Springs, Colorado.

According to a preliminary statement, the pilot of the accident airplane reported that he was participating in a Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association flying clinic. He departed from COS with two others on board for training in a local practice area located about 15 miles east of COS. The pilot stated that after 20 minutes of air work, at approximately 8,500 feet above mean sea level, the oil pressure reading indicated in the green but lower than normal and he noticed a roughness in the engine. The roughness continued and the airplane was losing power. Air traffic controllers were advised that the flight was headed back to COS with an engine problem. He said that with the power available, the airplane began losing altitude and airspeed. The pilot determined the flight could not make a landing at COS, which was about 11 nautical miles west of the airplane's present position, or Meadow Lake Airport, which was about 6 nautical miles north. He indicated that no suitable landing areas were identified and he pulled the parachute handle. The parachute deployed and the airplane impacted the ground nose low and it stabilized upright on its main landing gear.

According to the safety pilot seated in the front right seat of the accident airplane, he flew the accident airplane in the morning during the demonstration phase of training with no issues noted. Circumstances arose where the pilot rated passenger in the rear seat did not have a headset and the rear-seated passenger chose to observe in silence due to time constraints.

The safety pilot indicated that his purpose during the flight was to illustrate formation-flying techniques and then help new pilots with safely learning those skills. He reported that after a preflight brief he held an additional briefing emphasizing that the aircraft owner is the pilot in command and is responsible for all emergencies as he, as a safety pilot, is not familiar with the owner's equipment.

According to the safety pilot, a 10-second interval departure was used. During the takeoff roll, the rear seated passenger noticed the oil light was on just prior to takeoff when the engine was at idle. However, the light went off during the engine run up so he did not think it was a problem. The safety pilot related that he had observed his oil pressure light on while at idle numerous times with a warm engine.

The safety pilot indicated that the takeoff, rendezvous, and initial formation training were normal. As a wingman, you are usually unaware of your location, altitude, or airspeed. He said that your whole world revolves around the lead aircraft where you do not even have time to monitor your engine. The safety pilot said, "If you have never flown as a wingman you just don't understand how much you have to trust your plane while keeping your eyes on lead AT ALL TIMES. I even commented on this during the initial 4-hour brief - if you have a weak engine don't fly. When there is a lead change it takes a moment for you to figure out where you are."

The safety pilot reported that this engine failure was extremely subtle. At no time did he notice anything out of the green. The pilot mentioned his oil pressure looked low at 27 psi and he asked what was normal but the pilot did not know. It was still in the green and we looked at the other engine parameters, all in the green. The accident airplane had fallen behind the lead airplane and was five plane lengths away on his right wing. The safety pilot said that a slow "pinging" about every 10 - 15 seconds started and that is when the pilot elected to return to the airport. The formation flew as briefed where the accident airplane took over as the lead airplane. The pilot informed air traffic control of engine problem. An intermediate power setting was set and the engine indications remained in the green. The pinging interval started to decrease and the engine never sputtered.

A controller advised the flight of bearings and distances to three airfields. The safety pilot stated that with the remaining altitude, they immediately knew they could not make any of them. He noticed and told the pilot the airspeed was low with an indication of 100 knots while the airplane was at 7,100 feet above mean sea level. The pilot told him that the throttle was full forward and the safety pilot immediately called Mayday, Mayday, Mayday and called for the CAPS deployment.

The safety pilot reported that the PIC would pull the CAPS unless incapacitated, as briefed during preflight briefing. According to the safety pilot, the pilot's previous and overriding training habit kicked in so he looked for a place to land. The pilot asked for confirmation, realized that the CAPS was the correct option, and pulled the CAPS handle at the safety pilot's second request. The airplane's altitude was 7,000 feet above mean sea level and its airspeed was 80 knots. The handle came out and down. However, it took a strong second pull to get the rocket to fire. The safety pilot estimated that the CAPS deployment occurred about 800 feet above ground level.

The safety pilot said that there was a huge deceleration after the CAPS deployment. There was a moment of weightlessness and then the nose pitched down. The safety pilot, in part, said:

All I saw was the ground rushing up rapidly. ... We violently impacted nose down. I screamed in pain. It felt as if I was stabbed in my neck and lower back, all on the left side. It took a few seconds to access my condition. Wiggle fingers and toes, move head, etc. When I realized I was alive I looked over at [the pilot]. It initially looked like he was slumped over to the left but then observed him move with purpose. He stated his door was jammed, grabbed the hammer and started whacking away at the forward part of his door window. [The rear seated passenger] ... told me to try my door. It opened, I crawled out and went to move the seat forward but [the rear seated passenger] had already slithered out so I went down the wing.

The safety pilot flying in the other formation airplane, in part, said: 

I observed N678Z deploy CAPS, and informed Approach that I saw a "good chute". I did not look at the altimeter, but I recall thinking that we were very low. N678Z struck the ground within just a few seconds, in a nose-low attitude that I estimate at about 80 degrees. A large dust cloud was raised; the impact appeared violent to me, and I was not sure that it was survivable by any of the occupants.

The passenger in the rear seat of the accident airplane helped the accident pilot egress out of the right side door. The safety pilot reported that first responding people helped deflate and wrap up the chute. After that, his neck started hurting again. The three occupants were subsequently transported to a hospital.

The 64-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine land and instrument ratings. He held a flight instructor certificate for single engine airplanes. He also held a third-class medical certificate that was issued on June 1, 2016, with a limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot reported that he had accumulated 1,289 hours of total flight time and accumulated 30 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

N678Z, a 2002 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0311, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, Continental Motors model IO-550 engine, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on November 13, 2015. The airplane accumulated 787.9 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection. Another entry indicated that a Forced Aeromotive Technologies, Inc. supercharger was installed on the engine on June 11, 2016.

According to technical information from the supercharger manufacturer's website, the supercharger is belt driven off the accessory drive, similar to the alternator. It will run much cooler than a turbocharger and should result in much lower maintenance costs. It will add 7 to 8,000 feet of altitude performance to the Cirrus SR-22. Impeller speed is a function of engine RPM and therefore over speed and bootstrapping are not considerations. There are no MP fluctuations while adjusting the throttle, or mixture. Idle cool down periods are not necessary. Manifold pressure is limited to 29.6 inches at full power.

Manifold pressure is maintained automatically by a state of the art electronic boost controller designed for the SR22 by FAT. The controller generally reacts to throttle changes in less than one second. The boost controller is not affected by cold oil temperatures or cold take off conditions and will operate quickly to control boost even down to -50F.

The aircraft was fitted with a CAPS designed to recover the aircraft and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fibreglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly which attached the parachute to the fuselage.

At 1354, the recorded weather at COS was: Wind 170 degrees at 9 knots gusting to 16 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; sky condition few clouds at 7000 feet; temperature 29 degrees C; dew point 11 degrees C; altimeter 30.36 inches of mercury.

The airplane was found upright about 11 miles east of COS. Its engine and cowling were bent upward forward of the firewall. The CAPS parachute was found deployed. A recovery company relocated the wreckage. The engine will be shipped to its manufacturer for a detailed examination. The memory chip from the avionics display will be shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board Recorder Laboratory to see if it contains data in reference to the accident flight.

The occupants of the other airplane in the formation flight collected GPS and photographic data during the accident airplane's power loss and descent. This data will be reviewed during the subsequent accident investigation.