Monday, April 10, 2017

Cessna 150G, N6619S: Aircraft suffered hail damage while parked on airport ramp




















AIRCRAFT:   1967 Cessna 150G, N6619S, serial number 15067419

ENGINE - M&M, S/N:  1967 Continental O-200A, serial number 67232-7A

PROPELLER – M&M, S/N:  McCauley A101/DCM6948, Hub #G7030

APPROXIMATE TOTAL HOURS (estimated TT & TSMO from logbooks or other information):

ENGINE:   As of Oct. 1, 2016; Tach 935.0, Engine TT 3060.1, TSMOH 51.0 (engine overhauled 8/1/2012 at Tach 884.1, TT 3009.1)

PROPELLER:    As of Oct 1, 2016; Prop TT 3050.1; TSMOH 51.0     

AIRFRAME: As of Oct. 1, 2016; Tach 935.0, TT 3060.1                     
     
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT:  Aircraft suffered hail damage while parked on airport ramp.

DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGES: Aircraft exhibits pea-size hail dents in moderate coverage and depth, on both upper surfaces of LH & RH wings, RH & LH ailerons, RH & LH flaps, RH & LH horizontal stabs and elevators, trim tab, some minor light dents on fuselage empennage. There appears to be no damage to spinner, windshields, upper cowling, vertical fin and rudder, propeller. Aircraft displays pre-existing minor rust/ corrosion, minor cosmetic and blemishes on all white paint scheme. Hobbs shows 1028.3, Tach 0947.8, Avionics are King KT 76A, KX 170B, portable Garmin GPSMap 196 with hard wire, not IFR equipped.

LOCATION OF AIRCRAFT:  St. Clair County Airport, Pell City, AL.  

REMARKS: Logbooks stored with adjuster’s office, Atlanta, GA. Prior written permission required from insurance company if visual/physical inspection is requested.   

Read more here:   http://www.avclaims.com/N6619S.htm

Cessna 150M, N3601V (and) General Dynamics F-16C Fighting Falcon, US Air Force, 96-0085: Fatal accident occurred July 07, 2015 in Moncks Corner, South Carolina

The federal government has conceded it was at fault for the fatal 2015 midair crash between a civilian airplane and a fighter jet over Moncks Corner.

The U.S. Attorney's Office submitted its response Thursday to a lawsuit filed in April, according to court documents. The lawsuit alleges the Federal Aviation Administration personnel responsible for air traffic control on July 7, 2015, failed to react appropriately when a Cessna piloted by 30-year-old Joseph Johnson got on a collision course with an F-16 fighter jet piloted by Air Force Maj. Aaron Johnson (no relation).

Joseph Johnson's 68-year-old father, Michael, was also aboard the civilian plane. Both were killed.

"The United States admits that its employees’ acts and omissions proximately caused the subject accident and resulted in the deaths of Michael and Joseph Johnson," the government's response said. "Accordingly, the United States does not contest its liability for their deaths in this case but does contest the existence, type and quantum of damages available to Plaintiffs."

First Assistant U.S. Attorney Lance Crick, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Columbia, said he could not comment on ongoing litigation. 

Mary Schiavo, an attorney representing the Johnson family for the Motley Rice law firm in Mount Pleasant, called the government's response an important first step.

"Obviously it's important for the government to accept responsibility," Schiavo said. "It was certainly appropriate but a bit overdue."

Attorneys for the family intend to pursue a jury trial to decide whether the family will be awarded damages, she said.

Schiavo also praised the government's attorneys for acknowledging that Joseph Johnson, who was flying the Cessna, was blameless in the crash.

The Johnsons' Cessna took off from Berkeley County Airport in Moncks Corner and was headed to Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach. At 11 a.m., an air traffic control radar received a warning that the airplanes were two miles apart and just moments away from a collision. A controller sent an alert to the F-16, at first telling Johnson the Cessna was two miles away and straight ahead.

The Air Force pilot was then sent the transmission: “If you don’t have that traffic in sight, turn left heading one eight zero immediately,” according to air traffic control transcripts obtained by Motley Rice. Johnson began to turn the F-16.

Seconds later, the fighter jet shore the Cessna in two.

Aaron Johnson parachuted to safety while the civilian plane fell toward the Cooper River.

Michael and Joseph Johnson were killed. It was four minutes since they'd taken off.

http://www.postandcourier.com

Joseph Johnson of Moncks Corner, South Carolina


Michael Elman Johnson of Pinopolis, South Carolina 



The family of a father and son killed when an Air Force jet cleaved their civilian Cessna in half mid-air over rural Berkeley County filed a wrongful death lawsuit last week against the federal government.

The suit, filed by the Motley Rice law firm, alleges the Federal Aviation Administration personnel responsible for air traffic control that day failed to react appropriately to the situation.

The FAA “did not take action until a collision was imminent,” attorneys said.

Jim Brauchle, lead attorney on the case, said family of the two men killed in the crash feel forgotten. The firm has been negotiating with the government for about six months to no end, Brauchle said. 

"The families are very disappointed and feel the government hasn’t taken responsibility for this accident," he said. 

The suit details that the Cessna, a small two-seat airplane, was hit four minutes after taking off from Berkeley County Airport in Moncks Corner on July 7, 2015. Joseph Johnson, 30, and Michael Johnson, 68, were headed to Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach.

Air traffic control radar received a warning at 11 a.m. that the two airplanes were two miles apart and just moments away from a collision. A controller sent an alert to the F-16, piloted by Air Force Maj. Aaron Johnson (no relation), at first telling Johnson the Cessna was two miles away and straight ahead.

The Air Force pilot was then sent the transmission: “If you don’t have that traffic in sight, turn left heading one eight zero immediately,” according to air traffic control transcripts obtained by the law firm. Johnson began to turn the F-16.

Seconds later, the Air Force plane sliced the Cessna in half, and it careened out of control toward the Cooper River. Both Michael and Joseph Johnson were killed in the crash. Aaron Johnson parachuted to safety.

Brauchle, a former U.S. Air Force navigator, said given that a crash was imminent, the controller should have had more urgency. 

"She gave too much control up to the aircraft, instead of being direct with what he should have done," he said.

The government's response to the suit is due July 3. 

Original article can be found here:   http://www.postandcourier.com



The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; West Columbia, South Carolina
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas
United States Air Force; Albuquerque, New Mexico
FAA/AJI; Washington, DC
National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Washington, DC
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics; Fort Worth, Texas

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Joseph Elman Johnson: http://registry.faa.gov/N3601V





NTSB Identification: ERA15MA259A
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, July 07, 2015 in Moncks Corner, SC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/15/2016
Aircraft: CESSNA 150M, registration: N3601V
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Minor.

NTSB Identification: ERA15MA259B
14 CFR Armed Forces
Accident occurred Tuesday, July 07, 2015 in Moncks Corner, SC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/15/2016
Aircraft: LOCKHEED-MARTIN F-16CM, registration: 96-0085

Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Minor.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot of the F-16, who was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, was in contact with air traffic control (ATC) and was provided radar vectors for a practice instrument approach to Charleston Air Force Base/International Airport (CHS), Charleston, South Carolina; the F-16 descended to an altitude of about 1,600 ft mean sea level as instructed by the air traffic controller. Shortly thereafter, the Cessna departed under visual flight rules (VFR) from a nearby nontowered airport; the Cessna pilot was not in contact with ATC, nor was he required to be, and had not requested traffic advisory (flight-following) services. As the Cessna continued its departure climb, the airplanes converged to within about 3.5 nautical miles (nm) laterally and 400 ft vertically, triggering a conflict alert (CA) on the controller's radar display and an aural alarm. About 3 seconds later, the air traffic controller issued a traffic advisory notifying the F-16 pilot of the position, distance, and indicated altitude of the radar target that corresponded to the Cessna, stating that the aircraft type was unknown. When the F-16 pilot replied that he was looking for the traffic, the controller issued a conditional instruction to the F-16 pilot to turn left if he did not see the airplane. The F-16 pilot did not see the airplane and responded, asking "confirm two miles?" The controller responded, "if you don't have that traffic in sight turn left heading 180 immediately." As the controller began this transmission, the F-16 pilot initiated a standard rate (approximately) left turn using the autopilot so that he could continue to visually search for the traffic; however, the airplanes continued to converge and eventually collided about 40 seconds after the controller's traffic advisory notifying the F-16 pilot of traffic. (Figure 1 in the factual report for this accident shows the calculated flight tracks for the Cessna and F-16.)

Air Traffic Controller and F-16 Pilot Performance

During postaccident interviews, the controller reported that when she observed the Cessna's target on her radar display as it departed, she thought that the airplane would remain within its local traffic pattern, which was not the case. Therefore, it was not until the airplanes were within about 3.5 nm and 400 vertical ft of one another that the controller notified the F-16 pilot of the presence of the traffic by issuing the traffic advisory, which was about 3 seconds after the ATC radar CA alarmed. (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 2-1-21, "Traffic Advisories," states, in part, that a controller should "Unless an aircraft is operating within Class A airspace or omission is requested by the pilot, issue traffic advisories to all aircraft (IFR or VFR) on your frequency when, in your judgment, their proximity may diminish to less than the applicable separation minima. Where no separation minima applies, such as for VFR aircraft outside of Class B/Class C airspace, or a TRSA [terminal radar service area], issue traffic advisories to those aircraft on your frequency when in your judgment their proximity warrants it. …") 

When the controller issued the traffic advisory, about 40 seconds before the eventual collision, the F-16 and the Cessna had a closure rate of about 300 knots. If the F-16 pilot had reported the Cessna in sight after the controller's traffic advisory, the controller likely would have directed the F-16 pilot to maintain visual separation, which is a common controller technique to separate aircraft. While the controller tried to ensure separation between the airplanes, her attempt at establishing visual separation at so close a range and with the airplanes converging at such a high rate of speed left few options if visual separation could not be obtained. 

The options available to the controller when issuing instructions to the F-16 pilot to avoid the conflict included a turn, climb, some combination thereof, or not issuing an instruction at all. (An instruction to descend was not an option because the F-16 was already at the minimum vectoring altitude for the area.) The controller indicated in a postaccident interview that she chose not to instruct the F-16 to climb because the altitude indicated for the Cessna's radar target was unconfirmed (the Cessna pilot had not contacted ATC). An element informing the controller's decision-making as to which instruction to provide was likely the flow of other traffic into the airport at that time. Arriving aircraft, including the accident F-16, were being sequenced to runway 15 via the final approach course extending from the approach end of the runway. Given the traffic flow, the left turn instruction to the F-16 would have kept the airplane on a heading closer toward, rather than farther from, its destination and would have made returning the F-16 to the intended final approach course much easier. However, the controller's instruction to the F-16 pilot to turn left required the F-16's path to cross in front of the Cessna. Although this decision was not contrary to FAA guidance for air traffic controllers, it was the least conservative decision, as it was most dependent on the F-16 pilot's timely action for its success.

Further, the controller issued the instruction to turn left if the F-16 pilot did not have the Cessna in sight. The F-16 pilot responded to the controller's conditional instruction with a question ("confirm two miles?") that indicated confusion about the distance of the traffic. The F-16 pilot's attempt to visually acquire the Cessna per the controller's conditional instruction likely resulted in a slight delay in his beginning the turn. The collision likely would have been avoided had the F-16 pilot initiated the left turn, as ATC instructed, when he realized that he did not have the traffic in sight. About 7 seconds elapsed between the beginning of the controller's first conditional instruction to turn and the beginning of her subsequent conditional instruction to the F-16 pilot to turn "immediately." Analysis of the radio transmission recordings and the F-16's flight recorder data showed that, as the controller was making the subsequent conditional instruction, the F-16 pilot began turning to the left, which pointed his aircraft toward the Cessna. 

Due to the closure rate, the close proximity of the two airplanes, and human cognitive limitations, the controller did not recover from her ineffective visual separation plan, which placed the airplanes in closer proximity to each other, and switch to an alternative method of separation. The controller's best course of action would have been to instruct the F-16 pilot to turn before the airplanes came into close proximity with each other and preferably in a direction that did not cross in front of the Cessna's path.

In postaccident interviews, the controller stated that when she issued the command to the F-16 pilot to turn left "immediately," she expected that the F-16 pilot would perform a high performance maneuver and that she believed that fighter airplanes could "turn on a dime." The FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) Pilot-Controller Glossary defines "immediately" as a term used by ATC or pilots "when such action compliance is required to avoid an imminent situation." Further, the AIM states that controllers should use the term "immediately" to "impress urgency of an imminent situation" and that "expeditious compliance by the pilot is expected and necessary for safety." As described above, the F-16 pilot did not meet her expectation that the turn be conducted at a greater-than-standard rate. 

The controller's expectation of the F-16 pilot's performance was based on her assumption that a fighter airplane would perform a high performance turn to the heading; however, this expectation of performance was not clearly communicated. Based on the controller's instructions and the actions of the F-16 pilot in response, it is clear that the term "immediately" held different expectations for both parties. Although the controller's use of the term "immediately" was in keeping with FAA guidance, further clarification of her expectation, such as directing the pilot to "expedite the turn," would have removed any ambiguity.

See-and-Avoid Concept

According to 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.113, "Right-of-Way Rules," "when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." The concept that pilots are primarily responsible for collision avoidance was similarly stressed in US Air Force training documents. In addition, FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48C, "Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance," which was in effect at the time of the accident, stated that the see-and-avoid concept requires vigilance at all times by each pilot, regardless of whether the flight is conducted under IFR or VFR. (AC 90-48D replaced AC 90-48C in 2016 and contains the same statement.)

The see-and-avoid concept relies on a pilot to look through the cockpit windows, identify other aircraft, decide if any aircraft are collision threats, and, if necessary, take the appropriate action to avert a collision. There are inherent limitations of this concept, including limitations of the human visual and information processing systems, pilot tasks that compete with the requirement to scan for traffic, the limited field of view from the cockpit, and environmental factors that could diminish the visibility of other aircraft.

Factors Impacting the Pilots' Ability to Detect Other Traffic

The collision occurred in a relatively low-density air traffic environment in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The Cessna was equipped with an operating transponder and single communication radio but was not equipped with any technologies in the cockpit that display or alert of traffic conflicts, such as traffic advisory systems, traffic alert and collision avoidance systems, or automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast systems. The Cessna had departed from a nontowered airport and was still in close proximity to the airport when the collision occurred. The Cessna pilot had not requested or received flight-following services from ATC at the time of the collision, nor was he required to do so. Based on his proximity to the departure airport, it is reasonable to expect that the Cessna pilot likely was monitoring that airport's common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) for awareness of airplanes in the vicinity of the airport, as recommended by the FAA's AIM. Based on statements from the Cessna pilot's flight instructor and from his logbook entries, which both cited past experience communicating with ATC, it is also reasonable to assume that had the collision not occurred, the pilot likely would have contacted ATC at some point during the flight to request flight-following services.

Due to the Cessna's lack of technologies in the cockpit that display or alert of traffic conflicts and the pilot's lack of contact with ATC, his ability to detect other traffic in the area was limited to the see-and-avoid concept. While not required, had the Cessna been equipped with a second communication radio, the pilot could have used it to contact ATC while still monitoring the departure airport's CTAF. Had the Cessna pilot contacted ATC after departing and received ATC services, the controller would have had verification of the Cessna's altitude readout and its route of flight, which would have helped her decision-making process. The controller also could have provided the Cessna pilot awareness of the F-16. 

The F-16 was operating under IFR in VMC. The F-16 pilot's ability to detect other traffic was limited to the see-and-avoid concept, supplemented with ATC traffic advisories. While the F-16 pilot could use the airplane's tactical radar system to enhance his awareness of air traffic, it was designed to acquire fast-moving enemy aircraft rather than slow-moving, small aircraft and was thus unable to effectively detect the Cessna. (The radar system did detect a target 20 miles away, which is likely what led the F-16 pilot to question the location of the traffic that the controller had indicated was 2 miles away.) The F-16 was not otherwise equipped with any technologies in the cockpit that display or alert of traffic conflicts. The F-16 pilot did eventually visually acquire the Cessna but only when the airplanes were within about 430 ft of one another, about 1 second before the accident.

A factor that can affect the visibility of traffic in VMC is sun glare, which can prevent a pilot from detecting another aircraft when it is close to the position of the sun in the sky. For the F-16 pilot, the sun would have been behind and to his left as the airplanes approached one another. Although the Cessna pilot would have been heading toward the sun, the sun's calculated position would likely have been above a point obstructed by the Cessna's cabin roof and would not have been visible to the Cessna pilot. Thus, sun glare was not a factor in this accident.

Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility Study

Our aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study showed that, as the accident airplanes were on converging courses, they each would have appeared as small, stationary, or slow-moving objects to the pilots. Given the physiological limitations of vision, both pilots would have had difficulty detecting the other airplane. Specifically, the study showed that the Cessna would have appeared as a relatively small object through the F-16's canopy, slowly moving from the center of the transparent heads-up display (HUD) to the left of the HUD. As the F-16 started the left turn as instructed by the air traffic controller, the Cessna moved back toward the center of the HUD and then off to its right side, where it may have been obscured by the right structural post of the HUD. It was not visible again until about 2 seconds before the collision. (Figures 3a and 5a in the factual report for this accident show the simulated cockpit visibility from the F-16 at 1100:18 and 1100:56, respectively.) The F-16 pilot reported that before the controller alerted him to the presence of traffic, he was actively searching for traffic both visually and using the airplane's targeting radar. He reported that after the controller advised him of traffic, he was looking "aggressively" to find it. By the time he was able to visually acquire the Cessna, it was too late to avert the collision.

Our investigation could not determine to what extent the Cessna pilot was actively conducting a visual scan for other aircraft. Our aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study showed that the F-16 would have remained as a relatively small and slow-moving object out the Cessna's left window (between the Cessna's 9 and 10 o'clock positions) until less than 5 seconds before the collision. Given the speed of the F-16, the Cessna pilot likely would not have had adequate time to recognize and avoid the impending collision.

Cockpit Display of Traffic Information

Although the Cessna and F-16 pilots were responsible for seeing and avoiding each other, our aircraft performance and cockpit visibility study showed that, due to the physiological limitations of vision and the relative positions of the airplanes, both pilots would have had difficulty detecting the other airplane. Research indicates that any mechanism to augment and focus pilots' visual searches can enhance their ability to visually acquire traffic. (AC 90-48D highlights aircraft systems and technologies available to improve safety and aid in collision avoidance, and our report regarding a midair collision over the Hudson River [AAR-10/05] states that "traffic advisory systems can provide pilots with additional information to facilitate pilot efforts to maintain awareness of and visual contact with nearby aircraft to reduce the likelihood of a collision. …") One such method to focus a pilot's attention and visual scan is through the use of cockpit displays and aural alerts of potential traffic conflicts. Several technologies can provide this type of alerting by passively observing and/or actively querying traffic. While the accident airplanes were not equipped with these types of systems, their presence in one or both cockpits might have changed the outcome of the event. (The images from our in-cockpit traffic display simulation are representative of the minimum operations specifications contained in RTCA document DO-317B, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Aircraft Surveillance Applications System [dated June 17, 2014], but do not duplicate the implementation or presentation of any particular operational display exactly; the actual images presented to a pilot depend on the range scale and background graphics selected by the pilot.)

Because the Cessna pilot was not in contact with ATC and was relying solely on the see-and-avoid concept, an indication of approaching traffic might have allowed him to visually acquire the F-16 and take action to avoid it. While most systems are limited to aiding pilots in their visual acquisition of a target and do not provide resolution advisories (specific maneuvering instructions intended to avoid the collision), the augmentation of a pilot's situational awareness might allow the pilot to change the flightpath in anticipation of a conflict and, thus, avoid airplanes coming in close proximity to one another. The Cessna pilot might have noted the presence of the F-16 and its level altitude of about 1,600 ft as he continued his departure climb. With this information, the Cessna pilot might have arrested his airplane's climb as he began a visual search, thus creating an additional vertical buffer between his airplane and the approaching F-16.

While the F-16 pilot's visual search was augmented by the controller's traffic advisory, a successful outcome would have depended upon the pilot's visual acquisition of the target airplane in time to take evasive action. Our in-cockpit traffic display simulation showed that the F-16 pilot might have first observed the Cessna when it was about 15 nm away, or nearly 3 minutes before the collision. As the F-16 closed to within 6 nm of the Cessna, or slightly more than 1 minute before the collision, the conflict might have become even more apparent to the pilot showing that not only were the airplanes in close proximity laterally but also that they were only separated vertically by 600 ft. As the F-16 pilot was beginning his left turn as instructed by ATC, the presence of the Cessna would have been aurally annunciated, and its traffic symbol would have changed from a cyan color to a yellow color. The information presented on the in-cockpit traffic display would have clearly indicated that the airplanes were on a collision course that might not be resolved by a left turn and that the vertical separation between the airplanes had decreased to 300 ft. 

Consequently, an in-cockpit traffic display could have helped the F-16 pilot recognize the potential for a collision in advance of the controller's instruction to turn left. The earlier warning also could have provided him additional time to conduct his visual search for the Cessna and potentially take other preemptive action to avoid the collision. Had the F-16 been equipped with a system that was able to provide the pilot with resolution advisories, the F-16 pilot could have taken action in response to that alarm to avoid the collision, even without acquiring the Cessna visually.

Postaccident Actions

In November 2016, we issued safety recommendations to the FAA and Midwest Air Traffic Control, Robinson Aviation, and Serco (companies that operate federal contract towers) to (1) brief all air traffic controllers and their supervisors on the ATC errors in this midair collision and one that occurred on August 16, 2015, near San Diego, California; and (2) include these midair collisions as examples in instructor-led initial and recurrent training for air traffic controllers on controller judgment, vigilance, and/or safety awareness.

In November 2016, we also issued a safety alert titled "Prevent Midair Collisions: Don't Depend on Vision Alone" to inform pilots of the benefits of using technologies that provide traffic displays or alerts in the cockpit to help separate safely. (In May 2015 [revised in December 2015], we issued a safety alert titled "See and Be Seen: Your Life Depends on It" regarding the importance of maintaining adequate visual lookout.)

After the accident, the Cessna's departure airport engaged in several outreach efforts (including posting midair collision avoidance materials locally and having outreach meetings with pilots) to raise awareness regarding midair collisions and encourage contact with ATC. The airport also updated its chart supplement to note the presence of military and other traffic arriving at and departing from CHS.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The approach controller's failure to provide an appropriate resolution to the conflict between the F-16 and the Cessna. Contributing to the accident were the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, resulting in both pilots' inability to take evasive action in time to avert the collision. 


NTSB Air Safety Investigator Dennis Diaz 




Gulfstream expanding services for growing Asia Pacific fleet



Savannah-based Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. announced Monday that it continues to add resources for operators in the Asia-Pacific region, home to the company’s largest and fastest-growing international fleet.

“Our Asia-Pacific fleet grew by 25 aircraft in 2016 and is now well over 300,” said Derek Zimmerman, president of Gulfstream Product Support.

“Strong customer response to our aircraft over the past several years in the region, especially Greater China, has resulted in us building a significant support presence there, which we enhance and supplement whenever possible.

“As always, we are committed to providing our customers first-class support throughout their Gulfstream ownership experience.”

Zimmerman is in Shanghai for the Asian Business Aviation Conference & Exhibition, which runs Tuesday through Thursday. Three Gulfstream business jets – the super-midsize G280, the high-performance G550 and the company flagship G650ER – are on display.

ABACE is Asia’s biggest business aviation event, bringing together the most influential providers of business aviation products and services with the entrepreneurs, decision-makers and others using business aircraft.

It’s also an opportunity to strengthen business ties.

Gulfstream now has 314 aircraft operating in Asia-Pacific region. More than 180 of those are based in the Greater China region, which encompasses China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

Zimmerman said the company has strengthened its depth of customer support in the area, doubling the number of field service representatives in Hong Kong from two to four. The company also has two field service representatives in China and one each in Japan, Singapore, Australia and India.

“The additional field service representatives give Gulfstream operators easy local access to our growing network,” Zimmerman said. “Their technical expertise complements our robust and strategically located presence in the region and is a resource that can be called upon 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”

At Gulfstream Beijing, the first factory-owned business jet service center in China, technicians have serviced more than 600 aircraft in the facility’s four-plus years of operation at Beijing Capital International Airport.

Earlier this year, Gulfstream Beijing was certified as an authorized maintenance organization by the Cayman Islands, which means the site’s technicians can perform maintenance on aircraft registered in that British territory. They are also authorized to work on most Gulfstream aircraft registered in the U.S., China, Macau and Hong Kong.

To support its growing fleet in the Asia Pacific, Gulfstream maintains a parts inventory of approximately $55 million, strategically placed in Hong Kong, Beijing, Singapore and Melbourne.

ABOUT GULFSTREAM

Savannah-based Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), designs, develops, manufactures, markets, services and supports a line of technologically advanced business-jet aircraft. Gulfstream’s fleet of business jets includes the Gulfstream G280, G550,G500, G600, G650 and the G650 ER. Gulfstream also offers aircraft ownership services via Gulfstream Pre-Owned Aircraft Sales.

ON THE WEB

www.gulfstream.com

www.generaldynamics.com

Original article can be found here:  http://savannahnow.com

‘Grim Reaper’ fighter jets to make loud exit from Pease




PORTSMOUTH — A squadron of F-15C fighter jets that have stayed at the Air National Guard Base at Pease will begin leaving early Tuesday morning.

David Mullen, the executive director of the Pease Development Authority, acknowledged they won’t be going quietly.

“My understanding is they’re going to use their afterburners when they take off,” Mullen said. “They take off, then turn on their afterburners and go straight up, it’s like a rocket ship.”

“We do get calls when that happens,” Mullen said.

The PDA issued a “community advisory” on Monday, letting area residents know that the F-15Cs would be leaving Pease.

In the advisory, Sandra McDonough, the PDA’s operations specialist, noted that the fighter jets are “required to utilize the engines’ afterburners as an operational necessity with this aircraft.”

“Consequently, area residents may perceive a significant noise event as a result of the jet aircraft departures,” she added.

The F15Cs will begin leaving at 3 a.m. on Tuesday, with six jets leaving the airport, followed by six more at 5 a.m. on Wednesday and the final two at 7 a.m. on Thursday, airport officials said.

“It’s really something to see,” Mullen said about the fighter jets using their afterburners. “It’s like a mini-air show.”

The jets are part of the 493rd U.S. Air Force wing out of England.

Andrew Pomeroy, airport operations manager for the Pease Development Authority, said pilots from the 493rd wing landed at Pease on Sunday, April 2.

The 493rd fighter squadron, who are nicknamed the “Grim Reapers,” are part of the Air Force’s 48th fighter wing, and are located at RAF Lakenheath, England.

The F-15Cs, which are also called F-15 Eagles, “are an all-weather, extremely maneuverable, tactical fighter designed to permit the Air Force to gain and maintain air supremacy over the battlefield,” according to the official website for the Royal Air Force Base where the 493rd is stationed. “The Eagle’s air superiority is achieved through a mixture of unprecedented maneuverability and acceleration, range, weapons and avionics. It can penetrate enemy defense and outperform and outfight any current enemy aircraft.”

Original article can be found here:  http://www.seacoastonline.com

Nepal Airlines captain nabbed with undeclared USD $93,000 from Tribhuvan International Airport

Apr 10, 2017- A captain of the Nepal Airlines has been arrested with a huge amount of undeclared United States dollars from the Tribhuvan International Airport (TIA) in the Capital on Sunday.

According to SSP Chabilal Joshi of the Metropolitan Police Range, Kathmandu, captain Subarna Awal was nabbed with USD 93,000 while he was entering the airport for a flight to Dubai last night.

Following the incident, captain Mahesh Man Dangol was assigned to fly the NAC flight RA 229 to the destination.

Original article can be found here: http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com

Team Rocket F1 Rocket, N3839Y: Accident occurred April 07, 2017 at Bessemer Airport (KEKY), Jefferson County, Alabama

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

NTSB Identification: GAA17CA220 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 07, 2017 in Bessimer, AL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 07/05/2017
Aircraft: SHILT JERRY C F-1 ROCKET, registration: N3839Y
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that, during the landing roll as the tailwheel was almost in contact with the ground, the airplane started to veer to the right. He attempted to correct to the left but lost directional control, and the airplane ground looped to the left. 

The airplane sustained substantial damage to its right wing and firewall.

The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The automated weather observation system on the airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 340° at 10 knots, gusting to 17 knots. The pilot landed on runway 23.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during the landing rollout in gusting crosswind conditions. 

The pilot reported that during the landing roll as the tailwheel was almost in contact with the ground, the airplane started to veer to the right. He attempted to correct to the left, but lost directional control, and the airplane ground looped to the left. 

During the ground loop, the airplane sustained substantial damage to its right wing and firewall.

The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The automated weather observation system on the airport, about the time of the accident, reported the wind at 340° at 10 knots, gusting to 17 knots. The pilot landed on runway 23.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Birmingham, Alabama

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N3839Y

NTSB Identification: GAA17CA220
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 07, 2017 in Bessimer, AL
Aircraft: SHILT JERRY C F-1 ROCKET, registration: N3839Y
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that during the landing roll as the tailwheel was almost in contact with the ground, the airplane started to veer to the right. He attempted to correct to the left, but lost directional control, and the airplane ground looped to the left.

During the ground loop, the airplane sustained substantial damage to its right wing and firewall.

The pilot reported that there were no pre-accident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The automated weather observation system on the airport, about the time of the accident, reported the wind at 340° at 10 knots, gusting to 17 knots. The pilot landed on runway 23.

Piper PA-22-150, N7236D: Incident occurred April 08, 2017 in Talkeetna, Alaska

http://registry.faa.gov/N7236D

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Anchorage, Alaska

Aircraft after departure, fuel tank cover separated from aircraft. 

Date: 08-APR-17
Time: 01:00:00Z
Regis#: N7236D
Aircraft Make: PIPER
Aircraft Model: PA22
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: MINOR
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: UNKNOWN (UNK)
City: TALKEETNA
State: ALASKA

Cessna 180J Skywagon, N52035: Incident occurred April 07, 2017 at Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (KLAL), Polk County, Florida

http://registry.faa.gov/N52035

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Orlando, Florida 

Aircraft on landing, ground looped and wing struck the ground.

Date: 07-APR-17
Time: 16:05:00Z
Regis#: N52035
Aircraft Make: CESSNA
Aircraft Model: C180
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: MINOR
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: LAKELAND
State: FLORIDA

Beech A60, Benvenuti Aviation LLC, N928PT: Incident occurred April 08, 2017 in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida

Benvenuti Aviation LLC:   http://registry.faa.gov/N928PT 

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Tampa, Florida

Aircraft on landing, gear collapsed. 

Date: 08-APR-17
Time: 20:00:00Z
Regis#: N928PT
Aircraft Make: BEECH
Aircraft Model: BE60
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: UNKNOWN
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: TAMPA
State: FLORIDA

Titan experimental T-51B, N751TA: Accident occurred April 08, 2017 in South Lakeland, Polk County, Florida

http://registry.faa.gov/N751TA

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Orlando, Florida 

Aircraft on landing, gear collapsed.  

Date: 08-APR-17
Time: 16:30:00Z
Regis#: N751TA
Aircraft Make: TITAN EXPERIMENTAL
Aircraft Model: T51B
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: SUBSTANTIAL
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: SOUTH LAKELAND
State: FLORIDA

Cessna 414, Aeromack LLC, N56H: Accident occurred April 07, 2017 at Fulton County Airport (KFTY), Atlanta, Georgia

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident. 

Additional Participating Entity:  
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Atlanta, Georgia

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report -  National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
 
Aeromack LLC: http://registry.faa.gov/N56H

NTSB Identification: ERA17LA151
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 07, 2017 in Atlanta, GA
Aircraft: CESSNA 414, registration: N56H
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 7, 2017, at 1250 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 414, N56H, was substantially damaged while attempting to land at Fulton County Airport-Brown Field (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia. The airline transport pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to Aeromack LLC and operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed near the accident site at the time of the accident, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed and active for the flight, which originated from McKinnon St Simons Island Airport (SSI), Brunswick, Georgia.

The pilot stated that while at 400 ft on a 1-mile final to runway 32 at FTY, a multiengine airplane was cleared onto the runway in front of him. This occurred at a point in the approach when the pilot normally would have completed his final pre-landing checklist/call-out, which consisted of checking the fuel, flaps for approach, landing gear down, and approach stabilized. The pilot also stated that the winds were "howling" with gusts to 25 knots. He stated that the other airplane on the runway was a "distraction" and that he did not "remember doing my usual call outs."

The pilot continued his approach as the other airplane cleared the runway. During landing, the pilot felt the airplane settle and he attempted to pull up, but the airplane continued to descend onto the runway. He heard what sounded like "tires screeching" followed by the fuselage scraping along the runway. When the airplane came to a stop, the pilot reported that the landing gear handle was in the down position and the circuit breaker was in the off position.

A Federal Aviation Administration Inspector examined the airplane after the accident,t and confirmed that both engines and propellers were damaged. The underside of the fuselage was also structurally damaged. In addition, the landing gear doors exhibited abrasion through their entire thickness.


The airplane was retained for further examination.

Beech C90-1 King Air, Central Virginia Aviation Inc., N167BB: Accident occurred April 09, 2017 at Chicago Executive Airport (KPWK), Palwaukee, Illinois

Central Virginia Aviation Inc:   http://registry.faa.gov/N167BB

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Des Plaines, Illinois 

Aircraft landed gear up.

Date: 09-APR-17
Time: 22:00:00Z
Regis#: N167BB
Aircraft Make: BEECH
Aircraft Model: C90
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: SUBSTANTIAL
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: PALWAUKEE
State: ILLINOIS

Piper PA-22-135 Tri-Pacer, N2389A: Accident occurred April 07, 2017 near Greensburg Municipal Airport (I34), Decatur County, Indiana

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident. 

Additional Participating Entity: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Cleveland, Ohio

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N2389A

NTSB Identification: CEN17LA154

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, April 07, 2017 in Greensburg, IN
Aircraft: PIPER PA-22-135, registration: N2389A
Injuries: 1 Minor, 2 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


On April 7, 2017, at 1835 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-22-135, N2389A, impacted terrain near the Greensburg Municipal Airport (I34), Greensburg, Indiana. The pilot received minor injuries and two passengers were uninjured. The aircraft sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 and was not operating on a flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight that departed from Upper Cumberland Regional Airport, Sparta, Tennessee, at 1535, and was destined to I34.


The airplane was on approach to runway 36 at I34 when it experienced an uncontrolled left roll. The pilot attempted a forced landing but impacted terrain.

Piper PA-28R-201 Cherokee Arrow III, Plane Nonsense Inc., N281ND: Incident occurred April 07, 2017 in Bedford, Middlesex County, Massachusetts

Plane Nonsense Inc: http://registry.faa.gov/N281ND

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Boston, Massachusetts 

Aircraft on landing, nose gear collapsed.

Date: 07-APR-17
Time: 19:27:00Z
Regis#: N281ND
Aircraft Make: PIPER
Aircraft Model: PA28
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: MINOR
Activity: INSTRUCTION
Flight Phase: UNKNOWN (UNK)
City: BEDFORD
State: MASSACHUSETTS