Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Airport authority set to name new manager: Joseph A. Hardy Connellsville Airport (KVVS), Connellsville, Pennsylvania

The Fayette County Airport Authority will meet Wednesday to name a manager for the Joseph A. Hardy/Connellsville Airport.

Authority Chairman Fred Davis said Monday that candidates for the position are being interviewed by board members Sam Cortis and Matt Thomas.

“I tasked (Cortis) and (Thomas) to do the interviews because (Cortis) formerly managed the airport and (Thomas) is a human resource manager with a Fortune 500 company,” said Davis. “I would anticipate that the list will be trimmed before we meet Wednesday.”

Board member Myrna Giannopolis said that approximately a dozen applicants had submitted their resume to the authority by the March 8 deadline.

According to the advertisement, the position requires a wide range of qualifications, including “a thorough understanding” of aircraft and aviation safety procedures on the airport grounds and airspace; good communication, networking, marketing and entrepreneurial skills; ability to manage and/or perform equipment maintenance operation of various types of equipment and the ability to train employees to safely operate the equipment; manage or perform ground maintenance, including vegetation control, snow removal, storm water and runway/taxiway surfaces.

The successful candidate should additionally possess a commercial driver’s license(CDL), have knowledge of all airport services, possess customer service skills and aid the authority in developing a business plan and budget, according to the job description.

The manager will additionally oversee the work of a bookkeeper and administrative assistant.

While a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot’s license is not required, it is “strongly” preferred, according to the advertisement. The starting salary is $42,000 and includes health benefits.

The manager’s position was opened in January, when former manager —Mary Lou Fast — agreed to a layoff. Her departure coincided with the resignation of former Chairman Terrence “Tuffy” Shallenberger. The Fayette County Commission chose Cortis to fill Shallenberger’s unexpired term on the board.

“We need a manager to operate the airport and be familiar with the FAA regulations,” said Davis, adding that the safety of those on the ground and in the air is the top priority for the authority.

Davis said that the addition of the CDL will allow for the manager to perform some of the work that was previously done by outside contractors.

“We want to reduce our costs, and having a manager with a commercial license will allow that to happen,” he said.

The authority board will also discuss ongoing deficiencies as documented in a July 5, 2011, FAA inspection report.

According to a Feb. 4 letter to the board, the “unauthorized uses of airport property and the failure to collect Fair Market Value (FMV) rent to maintain a self-sustaining rate structure and address other deficiencies” remain unresolved.

“(The unresolved deficiencies) indicate to us that (the authority) is not making a good faith effort to fulfill its federal obligation with the grant assurances in a timely manner,” said Mahendra Raghubeer, FAA airports compliance program manager.

Davis said that the authority has, and continues to work toward compliance to ensure federal grants continue to flow to the airport.

“Some of the issues have been addressed, and some are being addressed in an ongoing fashion,” said Davis. “Our former solicitor has responded to them and we are awaiting their response.

“Once we see (the FAA) response, we will address any remaining issues.”

The board will meet at 5:30 p.m. Wednesday in the airport conference room.


Source:  http://www.heraldstandard.com

Embraer's presence helps attract supplier: Brazilian engineering company eager to land at Melbourne International Airport (KMLB), Florida

A subsidiary of a Brazilian aviation company has plans to come to Melbourne International Airport, a project expected to create at least 50 jobs during the next three years.

The investment by Archo Solutions Engineering USA Corp. could also lead to at least 36 spinoff jobs, representing a total annual payroll of $3.87 million. Archo is a subsidiary of Solutions Designs & Engineering of São Paolo, Brazil.

Archo provides engineering and other support services to aviation companies. Embraer, the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer with a plant at the airport, is one of Archo’s biggest clients.

The Melbourne Airport Authority, which meets Wednesday morning, must approve the agreement with Archo.

“Melbourne is a major aviation and aerospace cluster that will grow over the next 10 years, and we will grow with them,” said Ivan Avila, Archo’s chief operations officer. Archo was in Brevard last week to sign the initial agreement with airport officials.

Research park executives began courting Archo in May at the Expo Aero Brasil 2012. Archo worked primarily with John Thomas, Florida Tech’s assistant vice president for economic development and community affairs.

“We are working diligently to build a world-class, international aviation-aerospace community at the research park, and Archo clearly exemplifies the type of tenant we desire,” Thomas said.

Avila also credited officials at the airport, the Economic Development Commission of Florida’s Space Coast and others with creating a supportive environment that persuaded Archo to choose Melbourne .

The growing presence of Brazilian jet maker Embraer strongly influenced Archo’s decision, Avila said.

“We’ve been talking to Embraer, and they have a vision for Melbourne,” he said. “We are following that vision.”

The Archo lease adds to the airport’s growing list of aerospace tenants, including Embraer, Northrop Grumman, Rockwell Collins, AAR and MidairUSA.

“The international market is taking notice of the airport’s significant growth in aviation and aerospace manufacturing,” said Executive Director Richard Ennis.


Story and Photo:  http://www.floridatoday.com

Learjet 25, Starwood Management LLC, N345MC: Accident occurred December 09, 2012 in Monterrey, Mexico

NTSB Identification: DCA13RA025 
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Unknown
Accident occurred Sunday, December 09, 2012 in Monterrey, Mexico
Aircraft: LEARJET INC 25, registration: N345MC
Injuries: 7 Fatal.

The foreign authority was the source of this information.

On December 9, 2012, at 0333 Central Standard Time, a Learjet 25, N345MC, crashed in mountainous terrain at an elevation of about 5,600 feet above mean sea level approximately 70 miles south of Monterrey, Mexico. The flight departed General Mariano Escobedo International Airport (MMMY), Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico at 0319 and was enroute to Lic. Adolfo Lopez Mateo International Airport (MMTO), Toluca, Estado de Mexico, Mexico. The two crew members and five passengers on board were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil of Mexico (DGAC) is investigating the accident. The NTSB has designated a U.S. Accredited Representative under the provisions of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13 as the State of Manufacture and Registry of the aircraft.

Inquiries regarding this incident should be directed to:

Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil
Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes
Providencia No. 807 — 6° piso
Colonia del Valle
Codigo Postal 03100
México, D.F.
Mexico



The family of deceased pilot Miguel Perez Soto – who was flying the plane carrying Jenni Rivera and her entourage when it crashed – has come forward.


Just days after the announcement that Miguel Perez Soto’s two sons and wife filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Jenni Rivera’s company, the trio has come forward to shed some light on the 78-year-old flying the plane on the evening the famous Mexican singer passed away.

In an exclusive interview with Noticiero Telemundo on Monday, Isabel Carrero Gomez alongside her two sons Miguel Perez Carrero and Mauricio Perez Carrero gave their side of the story regarding the man who has been a central figure in the plane crash that killed Rivera and five others.

“My father was famous for adhering to safety measures,” said son Miguel.

The lawsuit the family filed March 8 maintains that the fatal crash was due to the plane’s condition. They intend to disprove that the Mexican citizen suffered a heart attack or was incapacitated in some way, as Starwood’s Director of Operations Christian Esquino Núñez suggested was a possibility in an interview on “Al Rojo Vivo con Maria Celeste.”

“He had flown with Jenni Rivera before, but he didn’t fly the plane just because he knew her,” said Mauricio, who said his father had mentioned Rivera’s interest in purchasing the Learjet25 before its crash. “The company that owns the plane had to hire the best pilot in the world to fly the best artist.”

Read more:  http://nbclatino.com

Many Small Plane Crashes Avoidable With Better Pilot Training, NTSB Says

ABC News Jim Avila reports on the training of private pilots.

For private plane pilots, their final terrifying, twisting view of earth that leads to a crash is all too common and devastating, but that could be avoided with proper training, the National Transportation Safety Board tells ABC News.

 Rich Stowell, a pilot and instructor for 25 years, gave ABC News a firsthand look, some 3,000 feet above the sprawling Santa Paula, Calif., soil, when the small single engine plane we were in stalled and entered a death spiral headed straight down.

"Typically the last thing they will ever see," Stowell told ABC News.

Sometimes they get lucky, like the Idaho pilot who walked away this past fall when his plane stalled into the treetops.

But too often they don't.

Just this weekend, there were nine fatalities in 11 small plane crashes nationwide. A twin-engine jet crashed into a house in South Bend, Ind., killing two on Sunday. While a twin-engine turbo prop in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., killed three when it crashed into an auto pound.

NTSB chief Deborah Hersman told ABC News that 97 percent of aviation fatalities occur in general aviation, not commercial flights.

"The NTSB is so concerned with general aviation safety that we have placed this on our 'most wanted' list of transportation safety improvements," Hersman said. 

In fact, while domestic commercial airplanes are on a safety streak of no fatalities in more than three years, small planes average five accidents per day, accounting for nearly 500 American deaths in small planes each year.

More private pilots are in the air now than ever, and the leading cause of death is pilot loss of control.

"Frankly, almost all of these accidents are preventable," Hersman said.

Stowell, who is known nationally as The Spin Doctor, has recovered from spin dives more than 33,000 times.

He says private pilots don't get the training they need to recover from emergencies, which is why he now teaches private pilots to overcome panic and human instincts to help them survive straight stalls, barrel rolls caused by high wind or turbulence, and that deadly spin toward the ground.

"(The first time) it would be such an overload the pilot's typically freeze on the controls, and again, they're typically occurring close enough to the ground when they're entering the spin it's already too late," Stowell said. "I usually tell pilots, the first thousand spins are the hardest."

Lesson No. 1, Stowell said, is to resist the temptation to pull up when going down. Because when an airplane stalls, it doesn't have enough speed to fly, so contrary to the natural impulse the pilot must push the controls towards the ground to pick up enough speed to recover.

"We have to replace survival instinct with the brain telling the body, 'no you have to do this and do that,'" he said.

Few of the pilots controlling America's 220,000 private aircraft today have the needed experience to avoid a tragedy, but a skill the NTSB is hoping to change through their newly issued "Safety Alerts" and related videos to be released this spring.

 1. Is Your Aircraft Talking to You? Listen! -- don't let shortness of time or financial incentives lead you to skipping or ignoring signs of a problem. 


2. Reduced Visual References Require Vigilance -- about 2/3 of accidents occur during inclement weather so be aware that spatial disorientation could be a problem. 

3. Avoid Aerodynamic Stalls at Low Altitude -- be aware of conditions your conditions and avoid distractions. 

4. Mechanics: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety -- system or component failures are among most common reasons for fatality, so make sure maintenance and inspections follow protocol.

5. Pilots: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety -- understand that several small risks equal a big one.

Story and Video:  http://abcnews.go.com

A bargain: General Dynamics spends $264,517 for personal use of Gulfstream aircraft by CEO

Ever wonder how much companies spend shuttling CEOs around on private jets? In the case of General Dynamics Corp., it was $264,517 during 2012.

If that seems like a bargain, it is. General Dynamics has a distinct advantage over some other companies: easy access to airplanes, because subsidiary Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. manufactures them.

Personal use of company aircraft is solely for the chairman and CEO, which was Jay Johnson in 2012, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Use of the aircraft was necessary “to help ensure Mr. Johnson’s security and accessibility,” according to the filing. The $264,517 cost went toward fuel costs, trip-related maintenance expenses, landing fees, trip-related hangar and parking fees, onboard catering expenses and crew expenses.

Read more here:   http://www.bizjournals.com

Waste Watch: Closing Lake Murray State Park Airport (1F1) Could Cost Oklahoma Taxpayers (With Video)

ARDMORE, OK-- The Oklahoma Aeronautics Commission (OAC) voted unanimously to close down the airport at Lake Murray State Park.  The airport landed the number four spot in Senator Tom Coburn's "Wastebook 2012."

"There just comes a time to do the right thing," said Victor Bird, Director of the OAC.

The decision to shut down the airport follows a Fox-25 investigation tracking the money at what some consider a rarely used air strip.  Records from the OAC show the last time any money was used at Lake Murray State Park Airport was in 2008.

OAC records also show the money given to Lake Murray State Park Airport was transferred to other Oklahoma Airports with higher traffic, like Ardmore Municipal Airport, Duncan Municipal Airport, and Davis Field Taxiway.

Bird says each airport in FAA's General Aviation Entitlement Program is only allowed $150,000 each year.  He believes the FAA should allow more money to be given to higher need airports.

"The program needs to be changed to allow us that flexibility," said Bird, "and so we don't need to play this transfer game."

The business of transferring money from one airport to another has some pilots, like Darrell Mink with KMA Aviation questioning what the OAC is doing with taxpayer money.  Mink is concerned over the cost of closing the airport at Lake Murray State Park.

"If you doze it up, that's going to cost you money," said Mink.

Although the cost of getting rid of the air strip stirs some concern, another major concern is how much Oklahoma taxpayer money could go to the federal government in penalties.  As the OAC moves forward with closing the Lake Murray air strip, it could cost Oklahoma $184,000, which is the total federal investment on the airport.

Bird says the OAC plans to ask the US Secretary of Transportation for permission to reinvest that $184,000 into Oklahoma aviation.

Some critics of the OAC are skeptical about how that money will be spent.

 "I'm a little leery with the way they've handled the money that they've been given in the past," said Mink.

Mink says although pilots in the Ardmore area are disappointed to see another airport close, he has a simple message for the OAC as officials move forward with their decision.

"Let's make sure we know how we're going to spend the money wisely, before we do something that's drastic like closing that airport," said Mink.

The FAA says Lake Murray State Park Airport is just one of 497 airports under review, if FAA officials determine the airport is no longer significant to aviation, OAC will not need to pay back the federal investment.  An FAA spokesman says officials expect to complete the review in late 2013.

Story and Video:  http://www.okcfox.com

Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA, Digicut Systems, N26DK: Accident occurred March 17, 2013 in South Bend, Indiana

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.

According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.

At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."

The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."

At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"

At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."

At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the passenger-rated-pilot "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."

At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.

At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.

After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)

At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.

At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.

No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

--- Pilot ---

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.

The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.

According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.

--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---

According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.

A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.

According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.

The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.

The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.

Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.

The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position.

During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is "RESET" by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary "RESET" toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Buss, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.

In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.

The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle was pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.

COMMUNICATIONS

The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.

--- Fuselage ---

The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface.

--- Wings ---

The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.

--- Stabilizers ---

The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.

--- Landing Gear ---

The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.

The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.

The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint erosion that was consistent with door being abraded in the closed position. Additionally, there was evidence that the left tire had pressed against the interior of the door when the exterior abrasion had occurred. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.

--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---

Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.

The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.

The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position. 

The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.

The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.

The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.

The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.

Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.

--- Engines ---

A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.

A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.

The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.

The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

--- Sound Spectrum Study ---

A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.

--- Surveillance Video Study ---

There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.

--- Mobile Device Examinations ---

Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.

The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.

The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.

The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.

Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.

ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION

One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.

======

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal,3 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures and terrain following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Regional Airport (KSBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger occupying the cockpit seats were fatally injured. An additional two passengers and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (KRVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1358 central daylight time.

According to preliminary air traffic control information, at 1610:31, the accident pilot established radio communications with South Bend Approach Control while at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE intersection and told the pilot to expect a visual approach to runway 9R. At 1611:44, the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:06, the flight was cleared to 3,000 feet msl. At 1615:00, the approach controller told the pilot to make a 5-degree left turn to align with runway 9R and asked the pilot to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:07, the pilot declared an emergency because of a lack of engine power, reporting that they were "dead stick" and without any power. About 23 seconds later, at 1615:30, the pilot transmitted "we've lost all power, and we have no hydraulics." When the controller asked if the airplane remained controllable, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller advised that all runways at KSBN were available for landing and issued the current winds, which were 130-degrees at 10 knots. At 1615:22, the pilot transmitted that the airplane’s navigational systems were inoperative and requested a radar vector toward the airport. The controller replied that the airport was 9 miles directly ahead of the airplane’s current position. At 1616:12, the controller told the pilot to turn 10-degrees left to intersect runway 9R. At 1616:15, the pilot replied "26DK, turning left." No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:58, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to runway 9R with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low descent into a nearby residential community.




A surveillance camera from a nearby business captured what could be the only video of a plane falling from the sky Sunday afternoon.

The black and white video shows the Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA essentially spiral and nose dive into three homes on Iowa St. at exactly 4:22:48 p.m. Directly after impact, the tape shows smoke drifting into the afternoon sky from the wreckage.

Plastics Solutions Inc., located along Voorde Dr. about two blocks northwest of the crash site, captured the footage. The company maintains 28 cameras, 20 within its 90,000 square foot plant, and eight on the exterior.

The business, which supplies plastic parts to automobile companies like Subaru, employs about 90 people. None of those workers were in the plant at the time of the crash.

NewsCenter 16 also contacted the South Bend Regional Airport to see if its system of cameras caught the failed emergency landing along runway 9R-27L. Airport officials would neither confirm or deny if it had any video surveillance, claiming if they did, it was in the hands of the National Transportation Safety Board and not going to be made public at this time.


Raw Video:   http://www.wndu.com