Friday, April 21, 2017

Bellanca 7GCBC Citabria, N5042P: Fatal accident occurred May 14, 2015 in Juntura, Malheur County, Oregon

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: WPR15FA161
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, May 14, 2015 in Juntura, OR
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/25/2017
Aircraft: BELLANCA 7GCBC, registration: N5042P
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The private pilot was flying his airplane in visual meteorological conditions in support of a cattle drive. A witness observed the airplane complete three to four passes before impacting power lines at an altitude about 100 ft above ground level. The witness reported that the engine sounded normal leading up to the impact, and a postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to see and avoid power lines while intentionally maneuvering at low altitude for the aerial observation flight.

Mike Bentz 



The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:  

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office;  Boise, Idaho 

Aviation Accident Factual Report -  National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Docket And Docket Items - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms


http://registry.faa.gov/N5042P 




NTSB Identification: WPR15FA161
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, May 14, 2015 in Juntura, OR
Aircraft: BELLANCA 7GCBC, registration: N5042P
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 14, 2015, at 1032 mountain daylight time, a Bellanca 7GCBC, N5042P, impacted wires while maneuvering near Juntura, Oregon. The private pilot was fatally injured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the aerial observation flight to drive cattle, which was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. No flight plan had been filed for the flight that departed a private airport in Juntura.

A witness reported that after getting up that morning, she had gone to make sure the property gate was closed, as she knew there was a cattle drive that morning. Upon returning to the house, she was cleaning the kitchen, when she heard the accident airplane flying overhead. She estimated that the airplane flew over three to four times. On the last pass, the accident pass, she had moved to the sliding glass door in the kitchen, and watched as the airplane flew straight and level into the wires. The airplane nosed over, impacted the ground, and came to rest inverted about 200 yards from her house. She described the engine sound before the accident as "normal."

According to responding law enforcement personnel, downed power lines were entwined in the wreckage. The responding sergeant reported a strong fuel smell inside the cockpit. He also reported that the pilot had initially survived the accident.

Both witnesses and local law enforcement stated that the pilot was a local area farmer/resident, that would routinely use his airplane for cattle drives, and was familiar with the area.

MEDICAL INFORMATION

The autopsy was performed by the Office of the State of Oregon Medical Examiner. The cause of death was listed as multiple blunt force injuries. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology testing on specimens from the pilot. The results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, volatiles, and tested drugs.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The high-wing, single-engine airplane was manufactured in 1979. It was powered by a Textron Lycoming (Avco Lycoming) O-320-A2B, 150-horsepower reciprocating engine. The airplane's records were not located; therefore, the airplane's maintenance history could not be determined.

PILOT INFORMATION

The 51-year old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on January 21, 2013, with the limitation that the holder shall possess glasses for near/intermediate vision. The pilot reported 120 total hours of flight experience on his medical certificate application, with 30 hours in the previous 6 months. The pilot's medical certificate expired for all classes in January 2015.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 0953 automated weather observation at Burns Municipal Airport (BNO) Weather for BNO about 39 miles southwest of the accident site, reported wind from 257 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, a broken cloud ceiling at 9,000 ft, temperature 12°C, dew point 02 °C, altimeter setting of 29.82 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located in Juntura Valley; in a relatively flat area covered with scrub brush and rocks. The first identified point of contact was a set of power lines located about 700 ft southwest of the main wreckage. The airplane stuck the top three power lines; the power poles were about 100 ft tall. The first identified ground impact was about 10 ft from the main wreckage.

The entire airplane came to rest inverted at the accident site. Portions of the two lower power lines were wrapped around the airplane. Both wings and empennage remained attached to the fuselage. The left wing had impacted a small tree that ruptured the fuel tank. The right wing fuel tank had not been compromised, and contained about 3 ½ gallons of fuel. 

Flight control continuity was established from the tail section to the cockpit and from both wings to the cockpit.

The engine remained attached to the engine mounts and firewall. The propeller assembly separated from the propeller flange. The fuel line from the gascolator to the carburetor had separated at the gascolator fitting; however, when the carburetor was elevated, fuel flowed out of the separated line. The carburetor sustained impact damage; the butterfly valve remained attached to the throttle cable, but had separated from the top portion of the carburetor. The top four spark plugs were removed, and, according to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug chart AV-27, the spark plug signatures were consistent with normal operation. Manual rotation of the crankshaft flange produced thumb compression at each of the cylinders in firing order, which established mechanical and valve train continuity. Due to damaged P-lead wires, the magnetos were removed and manually rotated via their respective drive shafts; both magnetos produced spark at each post. A detailed report is in the docket for this accident.

North American P-51D Mustang, N1451D, Bridgewood Holdings LLC: Fatal accident occurred July 04, 2014 in Durango, Colorado

John Earley pilots his P-51 Mustang in the company of fight instructor Mike Schlarb at the Durango-La Plata County Airport in 2014. Both men died when the P-51 crashed.




A lawsuit was filed last week against the estate of a pilot who had high levels of THC from marijuana in his system when he crashed a World War II plane in 2014, court documents say.

Mona Schlarb, the widow of flight instructor Michael Schlarb, filed a lawsuit against the estate of the man who was flying the plane when it crashed with her husband on board, killing both men.

Schlarb’s lawsuit aims to send a message that the legalization of marijuana should not give anybody the impression he or she can fly under the influence, lawyer James McDonough said.

“Under the circumstances, she does want to send a message and she does want to make a statement with this case,” he said.

Flight instructor Michael Schlarb was teaching John C. Earley Jr. to fly when Earley crashed the plane, killing both men near the Durango-La Plata County Airport, according to a report from the National Transportation Safety Board.

Shortly after takeoff, the P-51 Mustang banked left about 90 degrees, pitched up slightly and then banked past 90 degrees. After that, the airplane’s nose pitched down to about a 45-degree angle and the airplane hit the ground, the NTSB report said.

Earley failed to compensate for the P-51 Mustang’s tendency to enter a roll after takeoff likely because he had used marijuana, the report said.

The flight instructor did not have enough time to regain control of the plane because it was flying at low altitude, the report said.

The lawsuit claims that Earley’s conduct is comparable to manslaughter and it should be classified as a felony killing.

Schlarb asks Earley’s estate to compensate her for her husband’s funeral and burial expenses, the loss of her husband’s support and counseling. She also asks to be compensated for her grief, impairment of her quality of life, inconvenience and pain and suffering.

The lawsuit also names Bridgewood Holdings as a defendant in the case. The company owned the plane, but it is not clear what position Earley held, McDonough said.

Earley was listed as the person who formed the company in 2013, according to Colorado Secretary of State documents.

James Link of Ouray is listed as the agent for the company, according to documents filed with the Colorado Secretary of State in March. Link could not be reached for comment.

Earley was CEO of Saddle Butte Pipeline and is survived by his wife, Jodi, and two daughters. His wife could not be reached for comment.

Original article can be found here: https://durangoherald.com

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items -  National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary -  National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Bridgewood Holdings LLC: http://registry.faa.gov/N1451D

NTSB Identification: CEN14FA339
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, July 04, 2014 in Durango, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 08/31/2016
Aircraft: NORTH AMERICAN/AERO CLASSICS P 51D, registration: N1451D
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot was seated in the front seat and the flight instructor in the rear seat during an instructional flight. The pilot had not received an endorsement to fly solo in the airplane. Witnesses reported that, shortly after departure, the airplane entered a hard left bank to about 90 degrees, pitched up slightly, and then banked past 90 degrees to an inverted position. The airplane's nose then pitched down to about a 45-degree angle and then impacted terrain. The witness's description of the flight is consistent with a torque roll, which can occur after takeoff in airplanes that have a high-performance engine such as that installed in the accident airplane, and subsequent loss of control. Witnesses also indicated that the pilot typically dipped the left wing during takeoff to wave, and it is possible that the pilot did this during the accident flight and that this contributed to the torque roll. Due to the low altitude at the time of the torque roll, the flight instructor would not have had sufficient time to enter control inputs to regain control of the airplane before it impacted terrain.

Toxicology testing for the pilot detected tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active compound in marijuana, and its inactive metabolite in his cavity blood and lung tissue. It was determined there was enough THC in the pilot's system to have been impairing, and it is likely that this led to his failure to appropriately compensate for the risk of a torque roll in the high-performance airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to compensate for the high-performance airplane's tendency to enter a torque roll during the initial climb, which resulted in the airplane entering a torque roll and the subsequent loss of control at too low of an altitude to recover. Contributing to the pilot's failure to compensate for the airplane's tendency to enter a torque roll was his impairment from tetrahydrocannabinol. 




**This report was modified on August 30, 2016. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.**

HISTORY OF FLIGHT 

On July 4, 2014 at 0927 mountain daylight time, a North American P-51 Mustang airplane, N1451D, impacted terrain near the Durango-La Plata County Airport (DRO), Durango, Colorado, shortly after takeoff. The airplane was owned and operated by Bridgewood Holdings, LLC, Durango, Colorado. The airplane was substantially damaged. The flight instructor, who occupied the rear seat, and the pilot, who occupied the front seat, were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the instructional flight, which was being operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

In statements provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) by local law enforcement, and written statements provided to the IIC, witnesses reported the airplane departed runway 3 and entered a hard left bank to approximately 90 degrees. The nose pitched up slightly and continued to bank past 90 degrees to an inverted position, and then the nose pitched down to approximately a 45 degree angle. The witnesses stated they lost sight of the airplane when their view was blocked by a hangar, unable to see the ground impact. Additionally, witnesses reported that the pilot usually "dipped the left wing" of the airplane to wave as he flew over.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION 

Flight Instructor

The flight instructor, age 53, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane single and multi-engine, and glider airplane ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single and multi-engine land, glider and instrument airplane. Additionally, he held an airframe and powerplant mechanic certificate. 

His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class airman medical certificate was issued on April 10, 2014, with the limitation: must have available glasses for near vision.

The flight instructor reported on his medical certificate application that he had accumulated 12,400 total flight hours, with 130 hours in the previous 6 months. The flight instructor's pilot logbook indicated he had 12,414 total flight hours as of July 1, 2014, with 3,609 in single-engine land airplanes and 26 flight hours in the accident airplane, all flown with the pilot.

The flight instructor began instructing the accident pilot in June 2013, providing training for completion of his private pilot certificate in September 2013 and high performance airplane check out in October 2013. He last flew in the accident airplane with the accident pilot receiving instruction on June 24, 2014 during a 4-hour flight. 

A review of the instructor's log book noted an entry dated February 1, 2014 which annotated he was 'competent to act as pilot-in-command of a North American P-51D.' 

Pilot

The pilot, age 51, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. His FAA third-class airman medical certificate was issued on March 29, 2013, with the limitation: must wear corrective lenses. The pilot did not report total flight hours accumulated on his medical certificate application. The pilot's logbook indicated he had 263 total flight hours as of June 31, 2014, with 53 of those flight hours being in the accident airplane make and model. His last flight in the accident airplane was on June 24, 2014 during a 4-hour flight with the accident instructor pilot. A review of the pilot's log book noted the pilot recorded 71 flight hours in a Beechcraft T-6 Texan. 

The flight instructor flew with the pilot for his private certificate flight training in the Husky and completed his checkout in the BE33 Bonanza and the T-6.

A review of the P51's operating limitations revealed that, in order to act as pilot-in-command; a log book endorsement was required. The review of the pilot's log book did not reveal an endorsement for the P51.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a P-51D Mustang, serial number 44-74446A N1451D. The airplane's Special Airworthiness Certificate was issued on October 9, 1975. The airplane was manufactured in 1944, and was a two-seat, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane, and was powered by Packard Merlin V-1650-7 engine, rated at 1,490 horsepower. This super-charged reciprocating engine had 12 cylinders and was liquid cooled. The engine drove a metal, 4-blade Hamilton Standard 24D50-105 variable pitch propeller.

According to the airplane's logbooks, the most recent annual [condition] inspection of the airframe and engine was accomplished on September 12, 2013, at a Hobbs time of 630.0 hours and airframe total time of 2,381.3 hours. The airplane tachometer was not located in the wreckage; therefore, the airframe's total time at the time of the accident could not be determined.

The aircraft was modified with a dual flight control system to enable the rear seat passenger to manipulate the primary flight controls. The dual flight control system consisted of a rear control stick, elevator controls, rudder controls and throttle quadrant. In August of 2011, a mechanic (inspector authorization (IA)) approved this major repair and alteration of the aircraft.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 0853, the DRO automated weather reporting facility reported wind from 100 degrees at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles, temperature 19 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 07 degrees C, and an altimeter reading of 30.39 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

Durango-La Plata County Airport is a non-towered airport operating under Class-E airspace. The airport is equipped with one runway. Runway 3/21 is 9,201 feet in length and 150-feet wide. The reported field elevation of the airport is 6,689 feet mean sea level.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted a public road on the northwest side of the airport at a nose-down angle. The wreckage path continued into a field at an approximate 290 degree orientation from the initial impact and was approximately 120 feet long. The entire airplane was fragmented. The wreckage was examined at the accident site on July 5, 2014, all of the major airframe components were contained within the wreckage distribution path. The entire fuselage was crushed and almost unrecognizable.

The airplane was recovered and taken to a storage facility where a detailed examination of the airframe and engine was completed on August 21, 2014. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. A layout of the main airframe pieces confirmed all of the major airframe parts and flight controls were present. Although the engine was impact damaged, the gearing system for the magnetos and cam shaft were intact and able to be rotated. The propeller blades exhibited curling at the blade tips with chordwise scraping consistent with power at the time of impact.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION 

The FAA Bioaeronautical Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology testing for the flight instructor and the pilot. 

The flight instructor's toxicology results were negative for carbon monoxide, alcohol and drugs. 

The pilot's toxicology results were negative for carbon monoxide and alcohol. His toxicology tested positive for 0.0063 ug/ml of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, the active compound in marijuana) and 0.0308 ug/ml of tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (THC-COOH, an inactive metabolite of marijuana) in cavity blood. In addition, 0.0743 ug/g of THC and 0.0133 ug/g of THC-COOH were identified in lung tissue. No other tested-for substances were identified.

Although now available for medicinal use in some states and decriminalized in limited amounts in Washington and Colorado, marijuana continues to be labeled as a Schedule 1 Controlled Substance by the Drug Enforcement Administration. Marijuana's primary psychoactive compound, THC, has mood altering effects including inducing euphoria and relaxation. In addition, marijuana causes alterations in motor behavior, perception, cognition, memory, and learning. Specific performance effects include decreased ability to concentrate and maintain attention, impairment of hand-eye coordination is dose-related over a wide range of dosages. For additional details, refer to the NTSB Medical Officer's Factual Report in the public docket for this accident.

Post mortem examinations of the flight instructor and pilot were conducted under the authority of Rocky Mountain Forensic Services, PLLC, Loma, Colorado on July 7, 2014. The cause of death for both pilots was attributed to "multiple injuries consistent with an airplane accident."

TESTS AND RESEARCH

After the aircraft accident a fuel quality inspection was completed by the local fixed-based operator on the airport that regularly refueled the accident airplane.

Separate samples of aviation gasoline were tested from the above-ground fuel storage tank and two fuel trucks containing aviation gas (avgas). The above-ground storage tank was tested from the filter sump and the tank drain. The first fuel truck was tested at both sump drains, the filter sump, and both fuel delivery nozzles. The second fuel truck was tested at the single sump drain, the filter sump, and the fuel delivery nozzle. 

The most recent bulk delivery of avgas was approximately 8,500 gallons of fuel received on 7/2/2014. Additionally, the fuel filters indicated the most recent filter change for the fuel storage tank was 10/17/2013, and the two fuel trucks 10/10/2013 and 10/15/2012, respectively.

There was no evidence of debris or other contamination. The color of the fuel was absent indication of contamination from jet fuel or diesel fuel.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Excerpt from the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Information, FAA- H-8083-25A, Chapter 4:

Torque Reaction

Torque reaction involves Newton's Third Law of Physics—for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. As applied to the aircraft, this means that as the internal engine parts and propeller are revolving in one direction, an equal force is trying to rotate the aircraft in the opposite direction. 

When the aircraft is airborne, this force is acting around the longitudinal axis, tending to make the aircraft roll. To compensate for roll tendency, some of the older aircraft are rigged in a manner to create more lift on the wing that is being forced downward. The more modern aircraft are designed with the engine offset to counteract this effect of torque.

NOTE: Most United States built aircraft engines rotate the propeller clockwise, as viewed from the pilot's seat. The discussion here is with reference to those engines.

Generally, the compensating factors are permanently set so that they compensate for this force at cruising speed, since most of the aircraft's operating lift is at that speed. However, aileron trim tabs permit further adjustment for other speeds.

When the aircraft's wheels are on the ground during the takeoff roll, an additional turning moment around the vertical axis is induced by torque reaction. As the left side of the aircraft is being forced down by torque reaction, more weight is being placed on the left main landing gear. This results in more ground friction, or drag, on the left tire than on the right, causing a further turning moment to the left. The magnitude of this moment is dependent on many variables. Some of these variables are:

1. Size and horsepower of engine,

2. Size of propeller and the rpm,

3. Size of the aircraft, and

4. Condition of the ground surface.

This yawing moment on the takeoff roll is corrected by the pilot's proper use of the rudder or rudder trim.

Piper PA-28-140 Cherokee, N5985U: Fatal accident occurred February 11, 2015 near Air Harbor Airport (W88), Greensboro, Guilford County, North Carolina

Frank Richard Mascia Jr., of Greensboro, North Carolina



The  National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration Flight Standards District Office;  Greensboro, North Carolina
Piper Aircraft Corporation; Vero Beach, Florida
Lycoming Aircraft Engines; Williamsport, Pennsylvania 

Aviation Accident Final Report  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N5985U 

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA128
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 11, 2015 in Greensboro, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/20/2017
Aircraft: PIPER PA28, registration: N5985U
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On the day of the accident, the private pilot rented the airplane from a fixed base operator. A witness saw the pilot start the airplane and taxi to the end of the runway, where the pilot performed an engine run-up. Two witnesses reported that the takeoff sounded normal; however, they did not hear the airplane continue around the airport traffic pattern. One of the witnesses then drove to the end of runway where he found the wreckage. Examination of the accident site and airplane revealed that the airplane had descended and impacted trees after departure. There was no evidence of engine power at the time of impact. Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions; however, only trace amounts of fuel were found in both the carburetor float bowl and the engine-driven fuel pump. Examination of the fuel system revealed that the fuel strainer and electric fuel pump were both devoid of fuel.

The fuel selector was likely original to the airplane, and had not been modified in accordance with mandatory service bulletins issued by the manufacturer to reduce the possibility of pilot mismanagement of the fuel system through inadvertent selection to the "OFF" position. Examination of the fuel selector control revealed that the valve handle was in the right tank position at the time of the accident; however, testing of the valve with air indicated that the valve was closed. Subsequent attempts to manipulate the selector valve revealed that it was stiff to rotate, and positive engagement of the detents could not be consistently obtained. Further attempts to flow air through the valve produced intermittent results, which indicated that the plug cock inside the fuel valve was not functioning properly and could reduce or block the fuel flow, resulting in a partial or complete loss of engine power. Disassembly of the fuel selector valve revealed rotational scoring in the valve body and on the plug cock, which displayed discoloration and heavily-worn detents. Spectroscopy of the debris particles found in the valve body and embedded in the plug cock indicated that the debris was the result of excessive wear of the valve components.

Both the owner, who was also the operator and maintenance personnel stated that they checked the fuel selector valve during an annual inspection that was completed about 11 hours prior to the accident. Review of maintenance and operator records revealed several discrepancies, including when the most recent annual inspection had occurred, whether the items required by the inspection were accomplished, and if the annual inspection engine run was performed by an individual unqualified to do so. The condition of the fuel selector valve cast doubt as to whether much of the maintenance had been properly performed, since inspection in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration and manufacturer guidelines would have revealed that the fuel selector valve was not airworthy.

Although an autopsy and toxicology testing of the pilot revealed evidence of coronary artery disease and unreported use of antidepressant medication, it is unlikely that these factors impaired the pilot's ability to safely operate the airplane. Given the condition of the airplane's fuel selector valve, it is likely that the engine experienced a total loss of power shortly after takeoff due to fuel starvation, which resulted in the airplane's descent into terrain, leaving the pilot with few options.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
A total loss of engine power after takeoff due to fuel starvation as a result of excessive wear of the fuel selector valve. Also causal was the owner/operator and maintenance personnel's inadequate maintenance, and inadequate postmaintenance inspection.




HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 11, 2015, about 1415 eastern daylight time, a privately owned and operated Piper PA-28-140, N5985U, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and terrain after takeoff from Air Harbor Airport (W88), Greensboro, North Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight, which was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

On the day of the accident, the pilot had rented the airplane from the owner/operator. A witness observed the pilot start the airplane and taxi to an area near the end of runway 27 where he performed an engine run-up. Two witnesses reported that the takeoff sounded normal; however, they did not hear the airplane continue around the airport traffic pattern. As a result, one of the witnesses drove to the end of runway 27 where he found the wreckage. He approached the airplane and saw that fuel was flowing out of the wing area. He then called 911.

PILOT INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on January 20, 2014. According to the pilot's records, he had accrued about 359 total hours of flight experience, 63 of which were in the accident airplane make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a single-engine, unpressurized, low-wing monoplane manufactured in 1970. It was manufactured using conventional metal construction. It was equipped with tricycle landing gear and wing flaps and was powered by a 4-cylinder, 150 horsepower, Lycoming O-320-E2A, air-cooled engine, which drove a metal, two-bladed, fixed-pitch Sensenich propeller.

According to the individual listed on the airplane's registration at the time of the accident, he sold the airplane on August 21, 2013 to the owner/operator. Review of FAA records revealed that, at the time of the accident (approximately 1 1/2 years later), the owner/operator still had not registered the airplane.

When asked about the reason for the sale of the airplane, the previous owner advised that "it had been sitting for several years without flying." A review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated that the last annual inspection performed before the sale, occurred on January 3, 2008, at 3,690.9 total hours of operation. The first annual inspection performed after the sale occurred on January 1, 2014, at 3,709.4 total hours of operation.

The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on January 6, 2015. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 3,787.86 total hours of operation, and the engine had accrued 1,466.86 hours since major overhaul. In addition, the airplane had been operated about 11 hours since the inspection. Review of the rental sheet for the airplane indicated that the engine run for the annual inspection did not occur until January 21, 2015, and was 6 minutes (0.1 hour) in duration. Further review of maintenance records indicated that, at the time of the accident, the transponder inspection was out of date, and FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2010-15-10, which required inspection of the control wheel shafts, had not been accomplished.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 1354 recorded weather at Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina, located 8 nautical miles southwest of the accident site, included: calm winds, 10 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 15,000 ft above ground level, temperature 9°C, dew point -1°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.96 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

Air Harbor Airport was owned by Guilford Lake Aviation, LLC, and was located 6 miles north of Greensboro, North Carolina at an elevation of 822 ft mean sea level (msl). It was classified by the FAA as a privately owned, non-towered, public use airport. The airport was equipped with one runway oriented in a 9/27 configuration, which measured 2,460 ft long by 65 ft wide.

The pilot rented the airplane from Murphy Aviation, the service provider at the airport that provided fuel, maintenance, parking, tie downs, and airplane rentals.

The owner/operator of the airplane was the airport manager and also owned Murphy Aviation. He was listed by the State of North Carolina as the registered agent for Guilford Lakes Aviation LLC, and in the past had also done business at the airport as Air Harbor Airport, Inc.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site revealed that, after takeoff from runway 27, the airplane turned left, descended, and then struck approximately 65 foot high trees, about 400 feet from the end of the runway. The airplane first made contact with the trees about 45 ft above ground level, then dropped to the forest floor, coming to rest on its left side wedged between two trees on a magnetic heading of 192° at an elevation of approximately 769 feet msl.

The fuselage exhibited multiple areas of crush and compression damage, and the aft fuselage had been bent about 45° to the left during the impact sequence. The cabin was mostly intact. Examination of the restraint system revealed that the airplane had been equipped with lap belts but was not equipped with shoulder harnesses.

The left wing exhibited crush and compression damage on the leading edges and compression damage at the inboard trailing edge. It remained intact, with the exception of an approximate 4-ft long outboard section that had been separated from the left wing during the impact with trees.

The right wing was almost completely separated from the fuselage at the wing root, and it exhibited impact damage in several places, including a large depressed area at approximately mid-span, where the wing skin had been crushed aft to the wing spar.

The rudder and stabilator remained attached to their mounting points and moved freely. Internal examination of the rudder revealed the presence of wasp nests.

The stall warning vane was in place and operated normally when checked with a volt/ohm meter.

Examination of the instrument panel and flight controls revealed that the throttle was in the full power position, the mixture control was full rich, and the carburetor heat was off. The fuel primer was in and locked. The auxiliary electric fuel pump was "ON." The airspeed indicator needle indicated about 66 knots. The tachometer indicated about 1,100 rpm. The flap handle was in the flaps-retracted position and flight control continuity was established from the ailerons, stabilator, and rudder to the cockpit controls.

Examination of the propeller revealed that the propeller spinner exhibited crush damage on the tip. One side of the spinner and the propeller remained partially attached to the crankshaft flange. The flange was bent and three propeller bolts were broken. One propeller blade was bent aft about 10° about mid-span. The other propeller blade was bent aft about 30° about mid-span. Its tip was bent forward about 10°. There was no evidence of leading edge gouging or chordwise scratching on either blade.

The engine remained attached to the firewall at its mount. The engine was removed from the firewall, suspended from a lift, and partially disassembled to facilitate examination. The drivetrain was rotated and continuity from the crankshaft to the rear gears and valve train was confirmed. Compression and suction were observed on all four cylinders. The interiors of the cylinders were examined using a lighted borescope and no anomalies were noted. Both magnetos produced spark when rotated. The spark plugs appeared normal with the exception of the No. 2 cylinder's bottom spark plug, which was impact-damaged. Oil was present in the engine, and both the oil suction screen and oil filter were clean absent of debris.

The carburetor remained attached to the engine. It was removed and partially disassembled, and about 2 teaspoons of fuel were observed in the float bowl. The carburetor fuel inlet screen was absent of debris and the carburetor internal components were undamaged. The engine-driven fuel pump remained attached to the engine and was impact-damaged. The pump was removed and partially disassembled. A small amount of fuel drained from the pump when it was tilted. No damage to the rubber pump diaphragms or check valves was noted.

The fuel strainer and electric fuel pump were removed and disassembled; both were devoid of fuel. The strainer and pump fuel screens contained no debris.

The fuel selector valve handle was found in the right tank position. The fuel selector valve was then removed from the airplane. With the handle in the right tank position, air was applied to the selector valve but would not pass through the valve. Subsequent attempts to manipulate the selector valve revealed that it was stiff to rotate, and positive engagements of the detents could not consistently be obtained. Further attempts to flow air through the valve produced intermittent results. Disassembly of the fuel selector valve revealed rotational scoring in the valve body and on the plug cock, which also displayed discoloration and worn detents.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

On his most recent FAA medical certification application, the 74-year-old pilot reported that he had glaucoma treated with timolol, prostatic hypertrophy treated with alfuzosin, and was using the cholesterol-lowering medication atorvastatin.

Autopsy

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Chief Medical Examiner. The cause of death was multiple crushing blunt force injuries.

The autopsy revealed evidence of atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease. The pilot's heart weighed 450 grams (average heart weight for a 172-lb man is 345 grams, with a range from 261-455 grams) with concentric left ventricular myocardial hypertrophy. The coronary arteries exhibited up to 70%, 50%, and 60% luminal stenosis of the left anterior descending, circumflex, and right coronary arteries, respectively. The myocardium showed no evidence of scarring.

Toxicological Testing

Toxicological testing was conducted at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Toxicology identified alfuzosin and timolol; both had been reported during the pilot's FAA medical examinations. Additionally, citalopram and its metabolite, N-Desmethylcitalopram, were detected; this medication was not reported to the FAA. FAA toxicological testing does not distinguish between citalopram and the isomer escitalopram.

Both citalopram and escitalopram are prescription antidepressants marketed with the names Celexa and Lexapro, respectively. The medications carry the warning; "May impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks (e.g., driving, operating heavy machinery)."

According to the FAA's Guide for Aviation Medical Examiners, pilots treated for depression with citalopram or escitalopram may be considered for a special issuance medical certificate if the pilot has been clinically stable, as well as on a stable dose of medication without any aeromedically significant side effects and/or an increase in symptoms.

According to his family, the pilot was in good health, but had a history of anxiety that was well-managed with escitalopram without noted side effects.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Fuel System Description and Review

The airplane was equipped with two 25-gallon fuel tanks, which were secured to the leading edge structure of each wing by screws and nut plates. Each tank had an individual fuel drain at the bottom inboard corner, which was used to check for water or sediment. From the outlet of each tank, fuel lines were routed through the wings to the fuel selector valve located on the left side panel forward of the pilot's seat. From the fuel selector valve, a line led to the fuel strainer bowl, which was mounted on the front of the engine firewall. The fuel line then routed from the strainer bowl to the electric fuel pump, engine driven fuel pump, and carburetor.

Examination of the fuel selector control revealed that it was likely original to the airplane. It had four selectable positions: LEFT TANK, RIGHT TANK, OFF, and OFF, indicating that it had not been modified per Piper Service Bulletin No. 840, issued in 1986, or per Piper Service Bulletin No. 840A, which superseded the previous bulletin and was issued in 2013. The modification would have reconfigured the fuel selector so it had a spring-loaded metal stop and only three selectable positions: L TANK, R TANK, and FUEL OFF. Piper Aircraft considered that compliance with these service bulletins was mandatory, which was clearly stated on the service bulletin, to reduce the possibility of pilot mismanagement of the fuel system through inadvertent selection of the "OFF" position, which could result in power interruption or engine stoppage.

The electric fuel pump was provided in case the engine-driven fuel pump failed; the electric fuel pump was required to be on for takeoff, landing, and when switching tanks. Examination of the pump indicated that it was functional, and the electric fuel pump switch was found in the "ON" position following the accident.

The fuel strainer, which was equipped with a quick drain, was located on the lower left front of the engine firewall and was accessible outside of the nose section. A witness, who saw the airplane taxiing before the accident, observed what he believed was possibly fuel "atomizing" in front of the left wing of the airplane. He advised that it appeared to be coming from the front of the wing root area near the firewall (near where the fuel strainer was located) and dispersing aft over the wing. Examination of the fuel strainer had revealed though, that the quick drain was closed. During further examination of the fuel system for a source of the fuel the witness observed, it was discovered that, fuel staining was seen inside the wings, and the rubber fuel tank vent tube couplers were found age-hardened, split, and leaking.

Fuel Valve Inspection Guidance

According to the Piper Cherokee Service Manual, the operation of the fuel selector valve was required to be confirmed during inspections. The manual advised that, when the fuel selector handle was not in a positive selector detent position, more than one fuel port would be open at the same time. The manual stated, "It should be ascertained that the fuel selector is positioned in a detent, which can be easily felt when moving the handle through its various positions."

According to FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1B, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair, when inspecting fuel crossfeed, firewall shutoff, and tank selector valves, these valves must be inspected for leakage and proper operation. In the case of selector valves, this means the operation of each handle or control needs to be checked to see that it indicates the actual position of the selector valve to the placard location. Movement of the selector handle should be smooth and free of binding, and stops and detents should exhibit positive action and smooth operational feel, as worn or missing detents and stops could cause unreliable positioning of the fuel selector valve. Inaccurate positioning of fuel selector valves could also be caused by worn mechanical linkages between the selector handle and the valve unit. Universal joints, pins, gears, splines, cams, levers, etc., should be checked for wear and excessive clearance, which prevent the valve from positioning accurately or from obtaining fully "off" and "on" positions. An improper fuel valve position setting could seriously reduce engine power by restricting the available fuel flow.

High Resolution Photography of Valve Body and Plug Cock

Comparison of the fuel selector valve to an exemplar valve removed from another airplane with about 2,206 total hours of operation revealed that the exemplar valve rotated smoothly, and the detents could be felt positively when the valve was selected to each position.

High resolution photography of the fuel selector valve revealed the presence of staining, corrosion, and debris, and the plug cock had debris embedded in its surface. None of the noted anomalies observed in the accident airplane's fuel selector valve were observed with the same severity in the exemplar valve.

Materials Identification and Spectroscopy

Positive material identification was used to determine the materials composition of the valve body, valve stem, and position washer.

Spectroscopy of the debris particles found in the valve body and embedded in the plug cock, revealed that the debris particles contained elements like the ones that made up the composition of the valve body, valve shaft, and position washer.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Information Provided by the Chief Mechanic

The owner/operator's chief mechanic stated that he had assisted the owner in putting the airplane back into service after the owner purchased it. They had replaced all the hoses in the engine compartment, but did not do any work aft of the firewall with the exception of replacing the battery.

The chief mechanic also stated that he performed the airplane's last two annual inspections. He advised that entries for the last annual inspection were incorrect, and the annual was actually completed on January 21, 2015. He used Piper guidelines as well as 14 CFR Part 43 during the inspections of the airplane. The fuel selector was "stiff" to turn, but he thought it was not any tighter than any other older Piper he had worked on, and it seemed to work fine.

According to the chief mechanic, the owner/operator and the mechanic's helper also assisted with the annual inspection. He and the mechanic's helper had worked separate from the owner/operator and had not performed any work on the fuel selector. He and the mechanic's helper would always "check behind each other." He stated that had performed AD 2010-15-10 regarding inspection of the control wheel shafts, but had not entered it into the maintenance records. He stated that he was not in the airplane when the mechanic's helper performed the engine run-up following completion of the annual inspection, so he did not know if he had "exercised the fuel valve in the airplane."

The chief mechanic stated that he did not feel that anything was unairworthy with the airplane, and he was not aware that the owner had not registered the airplane after purchasing it.

Information Provided by the Mechanic's Helper

The mechanic's helper stated that his work was supervised by the owner/operator or the chief mechanic. He had performed most of the annual inspection as well as the engine run, which he performed alone. He was unaware that the engine run was part of the annual inspection and that a certificated mechanic with an inspection authorization was required to perform the engine run. He remembered that he had function-tested the fuel selector as part of the annual inspection and that he cycled it on and off and made sure it had "feel." He also pressurized it with the electric fuel pump and did not notice any fuel leaks. He was unaware that he was required to list his name in the maintenance records when performing work as a mechanic's helper.

He had started working for the owner/operator 8 years before the accident and had performed some of the work on the airplane to bring it back into service. He remembered that they had changed all the hoses forward of the firewall after the purchase, but they had not performed any work on the fuel selector, fuel lines, or vent lines, other than making sure that the vent lines were clear. He was aware that there were numerous discrepancies in the maintenance records for the airplane, including an undocumented oil change. He also knew that the airplane had been purchased by the owner in 2013, but was still registered to the previous owner.

Information Provided by the Owner/Operator


The owner/operator stated that, during the annual inspection, he never felt any "galling, binding, or anything else" when he checked the fuel selector valve. The mechanic's helper then checked it, then he checked the fuel strainer and they ran the electric pump. He never noticed any fuel staining.


He stated that, "there were no complaints or squawks prior to the accident." He also stated that after he purchased the airplane, and, before returning it to service, they "replaced all rubber lines firewall forward." 





Frank Mascia widow sues airport where he rented plane before crash


GREENSBORO — The widow of Frank Richard Mascia Jr. has filed a wrongful death suit against the owner of Air Harbor Airport, where he rented the plane in which he died on Feb. 11, 2015.

Sandra F. Mascia filed the suit on Feb. 9 , stating that the airport’s owners, Ronald O. Murphy and Tyson Murphy, rented Frank Mascia, 74, a Piper airplane without ensuring it was air worthy.

The suit claims the airport’s mechanic, Gary L. Crum, failed to perform an “inspection engine run” on the plane after an annual inspection on Jan. 6, 2015.

Federal aviation investigators, in their initial report, said Mascia’s Piper PA-28 Cherokee took off and turned left before it hit trees about 45 feet above the ground.

The plane then fell to the ground, coming to rest wedged between two trees.

Mascia died of blunt-force trauma in the crash, according to his autopsy.

Representatives of the airport did not respond immediately to calls seeking comment.

No wind blew, and the sky was clear about 2:15 p.m. on Feb. 11, when Mascia, a former chief executive officer of United Healthcare and board member for Guilford Battleground Co., taxied out to the end of the airport’s runway.

Witnesses said he performed an engine run-up, a check of the engine done just before takeoff. They heard the plane taking off but didn’t hear it turn back as part of the traffic pattern.

“NTSB investigators found that after the fuel selector valve was removed, while the handle (was) in the right tank position, when using an air source, no air could be blown through the selector valve,” the lawsuit states. “Upon information and belief, as a result of the condition of the fuel selector valve at the time defendants rented the Piper airplane to Mr. Mascia, the Piper airplane’s fuel system did not function properly to provide adequate fuel to the engine.”

The suit says a pilot would not have detected the problem during normal run-up procedures. And that the defendant “failed to warn Mr. Mascia regarding the condition and the lack of airworthiness” of the plane.

The suit asks for damages in excess of $25,000 — the minimum claim in N.C. Superior Court. District Court handles claims lower than $25,000.

It asks for a trial by jury, that defendants pay legal fees and that the court grant further relief it deems just.

Original article can be found here: http://www.greensboro.com

Idaho Falls Regional Airport (KIDA) receives perfect Federal Aviation Administration safety rating

The Idaho Falls Regional Airport earned a perfect safety rating for the second consecutive year.

The airport passed the Federal Aviation Administration’s safety inspection with “zero discrepancies,” a city of Idaho Falls news release said. That’s the highest rating a commercial airport can receive.

“Operating an airport is no easy task. It takes consistent and meticulous operations and maintenance,” Airport Director Craig Davis said in the release. “We have great employees who take pride in running a safe and secure operation to keep the traveling public safe. I am very proud of all of them.”

Airports undergo annual FAA safety inspections to renew their operating certificates. The release said the inspections focus on areas including aircraft rescue and firefighting equipment, training and response times, condition of runways and taxiways, as well as fuel storage and handling, among others.

The release said the FAA noted “the need for additional snow removal equipment to meet the growing needs of airport operations.”

“It is very rare for an airport to receive this honor just once — let alone twice,” Idaho Falls Mayor Rebecca Casper said in the release. “Two perfect ratings in a row speaks volumes about the management team and employees at (the airport).”

Original article can be found here: http://www.postregister.com

Small town America skittish about privatizing nation’s air traffic control

President Donald Trump’s proposal to turn over management of the nation’s air traffic control system to a private entity is encountering nervous resistance from rural America.

Small town aviation, farm and business interests fear the president’s plan to create the non-government body and likely finance it with user fees could benefit big city airports and commercial airlines, but create economic stress on remote communities.

“This could be expensive for our industry,” said Andrew Moore, executive director of the National Agricultural Aviation Association, whose members include aerial crop dusting and firefighting interests.

Moore said he’s concerned takeoff and landing fees of $100 per trip proposed in the past could be resurrected, adding that “some of our planes do 60 to 100 takeoffs and landings a day when they’re dusting crops.”

The present system, under the management of the Federal Aviation Administration, is working just fine, according to Moore. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” he said.

Trump’s plan to transfer day-to-day management of air traffic control to an independent, nonprofit organization surfaced in his preliminary budget sent to Congress a month ago.

There were few financial details but the Trump administration said the change is needed to save money and bring the system into the 21st century, making it “more efficient and innovative while maintaining safety.”

The FAA would continue its role of developing and enforcing aviation safety standards but fewer federal dollars would be needed to operate the agency -- dollars that Trump said he needs to build up the nation’s military and combat illegal immigration.

In addition, the president has proposed eliminating the 40-year-old, $283 million a year subsidy for commercial airlines to serve smaller markets.

“It’s a double whammy for us,” said Selena Shilad, executive director, of the Alliance for Aviation Across America, the national advocacy group for small airports.

Shilad said she’s concerned private management could be dominated by the major airlines, who support the president’s plan as necessary to free both the operation and funding of the air traffic system from the uncertainty and squabbling of Washington politics.

She said the big airlines could concentrate air traffic improvements at major airports and cut back on service to small town airports, with their fewer flights and passengers. She also warned of possible higher cost flights to and from smaller airports, and increased user fees for crop dusters.

That, in turn, her organization said in a letter to congressional leaders, would bring economic grief to farmers, businesses and less populated states that rely on general aviation airports for shipping, crop dusting, fighting grass and woodland fires as well as connecting flights to major airports.

Anyone who thinks the big airlines would not act that way need only review the recent controversy over United Airlines forcibly removing a seated passenger from a plane in Chicago to make room for an off-duty crew member, said Shilad.

“The airlines make the case they can modernize the system faster and better,” she said. “But you only need to read the news headlines to question that premise.”

Airlines for America, the trade group for the nation’s airlines, did not respond to a request for comment. But it has said previously a private agency handling air traffic would benefit both airline passengers and taxpayers.

Republican Congressman Bill Shuster from western Pennsylvania unsuccessfully sponsored legislation last year to turn over the air traffic control system to a private, non-profit entity that would be overseen by a 13-member board, including aviation experts and airline representatives.

He said his bill provided that no special aviation interest would have a majority on the board, and that small town airports did not need to worry about being marginalized.

Shuster, chairman of the House Transportation Committee, believes an independent organization focused only on air traffic could operate more efficiently than the FAA, with its huge bureaucracy and variety of responsibilities.

"I will never support policies that harm small airports and air service for rural communities in my district and across the country,” Shuster said in a statement. “These connections to the national aviation system are essential to local economic development, business opportunities, and job creation."

The FAA has been dogged for years by expensive efforts to modernize the nation’s air traffic control system. It is currently working on plans to replace older radar tracking with a system that uses GPS technology.

Despite Shuster’s assurances, locations with smaller airports around the country are clearly concerned. In a letter last month to congressional leaders, 115 mayors in small towns like Terre Haute, Indiana, called the privatization plan “risky.”

Jason Bonham, manager of the Central Kentucky Regional Airport near Richmond, said new fees would hurt small industrial companies that use the airport to move goods and staff. He also said it could discourage companies from moving into smaller communities for fear the local airport might close.

“Airports are vital infrastructure for communities like ours,” said Bonham.

Original article can be found here:  http://www.sharonherald.com