http://registry.faa.gov/N678DR
NTSB Identification: ERA12FA508
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, August 15, 2012 in Clifton Park, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 08/13/2013
Aircraft: BEECH A36TC, registration: N678DR
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
NTSB
investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or
conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel,
and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft
accident report.
The pilot and passenger were departing on an
instrument flight rules business flight. During the initial climb, at an
altitude of about 800 feet above the ground, the pilot advised air
traffic control that the airplane had lost engine power. The pilot
subsequently performed a forced landing; however, the airplane struck
several trees about 1,000 feet short of an open field. Examination of
the airframe revealed no deficiencies of the fuel or fuel system, and a
test run of the engine showed that it was capable of producing power.
However, during the test run, the right magneto was found to be
non-functional, and further disassembly of the component revealed that
its contact points were corroded. Once the corrosion was cleaned away,
the magneto functioned normally on a test bench.
The
investigation was unable to determine a definitive cause for the
reported total loss of engine power, although a non-functional right
magneto could result in a partial loss of power and/or perceived rough
engine operation. According to the airframe manufacturer’s procedure for
a loss of engine power immediately after liftoff, the auxiliary fuel
pump should only be placed in the “HI” position in the event of an
engine-driven fuel pump failure. With the engine-driven fuel pump
operating, the engine would “run rich and may quit depending on throttle
setting, temperature and altitude.” Due to the extent of the damage
surrounding the auxiliary fuel pump switch, its preimpact position could
not be determined.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined during the postaccident investigation and testing.
On
August 15, 2012, at 0727 eastern daylight time, a Beech A36TC, N678DR,
was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and terrain during a
forced landing nearClifton Park, New York. The certificated airline
transport pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were fatally injured.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight
rules flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed from Albany
International Airport (ALB), Albany, New York at 0724, and was destined
for Plattsburg Airport (PBG), Plattsburg, New York. The business flight
was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 91.
Review of air traffic control (ATC)
information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
revealed that the pilot contacted ATC about 0720 and requested clearance
to taxi for departure. The controller initially advised the pilot to
taxi to runway 1 via taxiway D and A. The pilot subsequently advised the
controller that he could accept an intersection departure from runway 1
at D, and was subsequently issued that clearance. At 0722, the pilot
requested to depart from runway 1 at D, but was advised that there would
be a 3 minute delay due to wake turbulence from a previously departed
Boeing 737. The pilot then requested to “waive” the delay, and was
issued a takeoff clearance about 1 minute later. In addition to a
warning of wake turbulence, the pilot was issued a departure heading of
040 degrees.
The airplane departed from runway 1 at 0724, turned
northeast, and continued to climb. At 0725, at an altitude of 1,100 feet
msl, the pilot advised ATC, “eight delta romeo just lost our engine”.
No further transmissions were received from the pilot, and radar contact
was lost about 30 seconds later at an altitude of 300 feet msl.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The
pilot, age 68, held an airline transport pilot certificate with
numerous ratings, including airplane single engine land, as well as a
flight instructor certificate with numerous ratings including airplane
single engine. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was
issued on March 1, 2012 with the limitation, “must have available
glasses for near vision.” A review of the pilot’s flight logs showed
that he had accumulated 11,008 total hours of flight experience, 1,110
hours of which were in the accident airplane make and model. During the
90 days preceding the accident, the pilot had accumulated 143 hours of
flight experience, 34 hours of which were in the accident airplane.
According
to the pilot’s son, the pilot was a friend of the accident airplane’s
owners, and was allowed to utilize the airplane anytime he needed. He
further described that the pilot flew very often, and had previously
flown many people in the accident airplane. While the passenger did hold
a pilot certificate, he had not flown a great deal in the recent past.
The purpose of the flight was for the pilot and passenger to attend a
business meeting in Plattsburg, New York.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According
to airworthiness records maintained by the FAA, the airplane was
manufactured in 1981 and was equipped with a Continental Motors
TSIO-520-UB turbo-supercharged, fuel injected engine. Review of
maintenance records showed that a factory rebuilt engine was installed
on the airplane in May 1996, at an aircraft total time of 1,591 flight
hours. The airplane’s most recent annual inspection was completed on
October 15, 2011 at 3,190 total aircraft hours. At the time of the
accident, the airframe had accumulated 3,364 total flight hours, and the
engine had accumulated 1,773 total flight hours since its installation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The
ALB airport was comprised of two intersecting runways oriented in a
1/19 and 10/28 configuration, at an elevation of 285 feet. Runway 1 was
8,500 feet long by 150 feet wide. Taxiway A ran parallel to runway 1 and
was located to the west of the runway. Taxiway D intersected runway 1
about 3,250 feet beyond the runway approach threshold. From that
intersection, about 5,250 feet of runway was available for a departure.
The
airplane was most recently serviced with 85 gallons of 100LL fuel by a
fixed base operator at ALB on the day preceding the accident. Following
the accident, a fuel quality assurance review was conducted by the fixed
based operator, and no deficiencies were noted during the inspection.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The
0753 weather observation at ALB included calm winds, 10 statute miles
visibility with patches of fog present to the west and southwest, few
clouds at 100 feet, scattered clouds at 8,000 feet, a broken ceiling at
13,000 feet, and a broken ceiling at 25,000 feet. The temperature was 19
degrees Celsius (C), the dew point was 18 degrees C, and the altimeter
setting was 29.90 inches of mercury.
FLIGHT RECORDERS
The
airplane was not equipped with any flight data recording devices, nor
was it required to be; however, a hand-held global positioning system
(GPS) receiver was recovered from the wreckage, and found to contain
data pertaining to the accident flight. The initial data point was
recorded at 0721, as the airplane taxied toward runway 1 at ALB via
taxiway D. The airplane subsequently taxied onto runway 1 at 0723, at
the point where the runway intersected taxiway D.
The airplane
accelerated down the runway and began climbing at 0724:26, and 8 seconds
later had climbed to a GPS-derived altitude of 341 feet, at a GPS
groundspeed of 88 knots. At that point, the airplane began a right turn
about 1,600 feet prior to reaching the runway departure end. The
airplane continued to climb while on an approximate 40-degree magnetic
track. At 0725:50, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 1,115
feet, at a GPS groundspeed of 111 knots, about 2 nautical miles
northeast of the runway 1 departure end.
Over the next 30
seconds, the airplane turned about 90 degrees left as it descended and
slowed. By 0726:24, the airplane had established a heading of 305
degrees, descended to 627 feet, and slowed to a GPS groundspeed of 85
knots. About 25 seconds later, the airplane’s final position was
recorded at an altitude of 302 feet and a GPS groundspeed of 76 knots.
A
plot of the airplane’s position for the final moments of the flight
showed that an open field about 1,000 feet long, and aligned with the
airplane’s final approach path, was located about 1,000 feet west of its
final GPS-recorded position. Additionally, a two-lane asphalt road
paralleled the airplane’s final approach path; however utility wires
paralleled and crossed the road at numerous points in the vicinity of
the accident site.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The
accident site was located in a residential area approximately 3 miles
northeast of ALB, at an elevation of 260 feet. The initial impact point
(IIP) was identified by several damaged tree limbs, at a height of about
30 feet, and was located about 45 feet west of the airplane’s final
GPS-recorded position. The wreckage path about was about 150 feet long,
and oriented approximately 320 degrees magnetic. A ground scar, along
with the outboard portion of the right wing and aileron, were located
about 95 feet beyond the IIP, along the wreckage path. The main portion
of the wreckage consisted of the fuselage and inboard portions of both
wings, and was located about 45 feet from the ground scar. The fuselage
remained upright, and was oriented on a 280-degree magnetic heading. The
outboard portion of the left wing was located about 10 feet beyond the
main wreckage.
The left wing remained attached to the fuselage by
all four of its attachment bolts. The outboard portion of the wing
separated in the vicinity of the landing gear, and the left main landing
gear remained stowed in its well. The right wing also remained attached
to the fuselage by its attachment bolts, with the outboard portion
separating near the outer portion of the flap. The right main landing
gear remained stowed within its well. The landing gear actuator was in
the retracted position.
Control continuity was confirmed from the
control column to the elevator and left aileron, and through a fracture
of the right aileron bellcrank to the right aileron, and rudder control
continuity was confirmed from both rudder pedals to the rudder.
Measurement of the left and right elevator trim tab actuators revealed
extensions corresponding to a 10-degree tab-down position (nose up
trim). Measurement of both flap actuator rods corresponded to a flaps
retracted position.
The fuel selector was found in the left tank
position. Examination of the fuel system revealed that it remained
continuous from the firewall, through the selector valve, to both fuel
tanks, with no breaches or obstructions noted. Residual fuel was
observed in both main and both auxiliary wingtip fuel tanks. The color
and odor of the fuel appeared consistent with 100LL aviation fuel, and
all samples taken were absent of water or debris. The auxiliary fuel
pump switch was found in the HIGH position, though the structure
surrounding the switch was deformed consistent with impact.
The
pilot and copilot seats remained attached to the seat rails with no
deformation noted. The mounting points and buckles for both the pilot
and copilot restraints appeared intact and undamaged, and first
responders reported that the pilot and passenger were wearing both lap
and shoulder restraints upon arriving at the accident scene.
The
engine remained attached to the fuselage, and 2 of the 3 propeller
blades exhibited impact-related damage. One blade was bent aft about 45
degrees near the mid-span point and the other blade was bent aft about
90 degrees near the mid-span point. None of the blades exhibited
chordwise scratching or leading edge gouging.
The engine was
separated from the airframe and shipped to the manufacturer for a test
run. The impact-related damage was generally concentrated near the aft
portion of the engine. The induction system riser to the number one
cylinder, the induction system “Y” pipe, and oil cooler, along with
several fuel system fittings, were replaced to facilitate the test run.
During preparation for the test run, a red clay/dirt-like substance was
found at an impact-damaged port of the fuel metering unit. The fuel
manifold valve screen, located downstream of the fuel metering unit
within the fuel system, was examined and found to be absent of debris or
contamination.
The engine was subsequently placed in a test cell
and started normally on the first attempt without hesitation or
stumbling. The engine rpm was advanced in steps to 1,200, 1,600, and
2,450 rpm for a period of 5 minutes per step to allow for warm-up. The
throttle was then advanced to full power for 5 minutes before the
throttle was rapidly advanced from idle to full power 6 times. The
engine performed normally throughout each of the tests without any
hesitation, stumbling, or interruption of power; however, testing of the
magnetos showed that the right magneto was inoperative.
Following
the test run, the right magneto was removed from the engine and
examined. The points of the magneto exhibited corrosion. The corrosion
was subsequently cleaned from the points, and the magneto was then run
on a test stand. The magneto operated normally, and further disassembly
revealed no anomalies.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The
pilot sustained serious injuries during the accident and subsequently
succumbed to those injuries on August 28, 2013. An autopsy and
toxicological testing were not performed.
ADDITONAL INFORMATION
The
airframe manufacturer published an emergency procedure detailing the
actions pilots should take following a loss of engine power immediately
after lift-off. After eliminating the possibility of fuel exhaustion,
the procedure advised the pilot:
“2. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – LOW If a Failed Engine-Driven Fuel Pump is Suspected (Indicated by zero fuel flow):
3. Auxiliary Fuel Pump – HI”
A warning was noted below that stated:
“The
only reason for the high (HI) boost position is to supply fuel for
priming prior to starting and to supply fuel to the engine if the
engine-driven fuel pump fails. DO NOT USE THIS POSITION FOR ANY OTHER
REASON. If high (HI) boost is selected when the engine-driven pump is
operating, the engine will run rich and may quit depending on throttle
setting, temperature and altitude.”
The checklist advised that if
an ignition problem was suspected, the pilot should verify that the
magnetos were selected to the “BOTH” position.
The first step of
the procedure for a rough running engine immediately after lift-off
stated, “Ensure auxiliary fuel pump is not on HI.”
ALBANY — The family of a developer killed in a private plane crash in Clifton Park in 2012 is suing the company he owned and the owners of the aircraft for $10 million.
The children of the late Walter Uccellini are suing The United Group of Companies Inc., the company that Uccellini founded, as well as the Albany-based Hildt Aviation and several other defendants, according to a summons filed Aug. 14 in state Supreme Court in Albany.
At the time of his death on Aug. 15, 2012, Uccellini , 67, was the president of the The United Group. The vice-president, fellow developer James Quinn, 68, who was piloting the plane, died from his injuries two weeks after the crash.
The single-engine Beechcraft, headed for Plattsburgh, crashed shortly after takeoff from Albany International Airport at 7:27 a.m.
Last year, the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of the crash to be "total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined during the post-accident investigation and testing."
The NTSB also said a corroded magneto found in the wreckage could have contributed to "a partial loss of power and/or perceived rough engine operation."
Uccellini's son and daughter, Michael J. Uccellini and Jessica F. Steffensen, executors of his estate, are suing for negligence that they allege caused personal injury and wrongful death to Uccellini. The summons alleges Quinn was negligent and that the plane had negligent servicing and maintenance.
The suit was filed by attorney John P. Calareso, who could not be reached Friday.
The defendants could not be immediately reached.
- Source: http://www.timesunion.com
James F. Quinn
~
State Police Capt. John McCarthy speaks to reporters at the scene of the place crash on August 15, 2012.
