Monday, November 18, 2013

Mooney M20J, Sierra Bravo Corp., N201HF: Accident occurred October 25, 2010 in Lander, Wyoming

NTSB Identification: WPR11FA032 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, October 25, 2010 in Lander, WY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/04/2012
Aircraft: MOONEY M20J, registration: N201HF
Injuries: 4 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The owner/pilot and his three sons flew in the single engine, normally aspirated airplane from the Minneapolis, Minnesota, area to Jackson, Wyoming, to attend a family function. The return trip was planned for Sunday, but the pilot canceled that flight due to winter weather conditions. Also due to weather concerns, he booked a Monday return to Minnesota via commercial airline. However, that commercial flight was canceled for non-weather reasons, and the pilot chose to return in his airplane. He contacted flight services twice by telephone to obtain weather briefings and filed a flight plan. Both weather briefings included AIRMETs for mountain obscuration, turbulence, and icing along the planned flight route and altitude. About 2 hours after the second call, the pilot filed a second instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan by computer, with a proposed departure time 10 minutes after the filing time. About 20 minutes after filing, the pilot was issued a clearance that differed from the one he had requested. The differences included a departure to the south instead of the north, an off-airway segment, and a clearance altitude 5,000 feet higher than originally requested. The assigned altitude was lower than and counter to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published requirements for the area in which the pilot was flying, but neither the pilot nor the controller questioned the altitude assignment. The airplane departed 8 minutes after the clearance was issued.

About 30 minutes after takeoff, when the airplane was on the off-airway segment, radar coverage from the Rock Springs Air Route Surveillance Radar was lost because the system at the FAA facility that was handling the airplane was intentionally made unavailable to controllers due to data reliability concerns. However, controllers at another FAA facility that was not handling the airplane continued to successfully use that same data. Four minutes later, the pilot filed a report with flight services that he was encountering light turbulence and a trace of rime icing. About 6 minutes later, the airplane was reacquired by ground radar. The controller then asked the pilot to climb to 16,000 feet, the minimum IFR altitude in that sector. Two minutes later, the pilot reported that he might not be able to reach 16,000 feet. About 2 minutes after that, the pilot reported that he was in a "severe mountain wave," and that he was "descending rapidly." There were no further communications from or radar targets associated with the airplane. The wreckage was located 7 days later, at an elevation of about 11,000 feet. Damage patterns were consistent with impact while the airplane was in a left spin. Examination of the engine and airframe did not reveal any preexisting mechanical deficiencies or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot appeared intent on returning home that day and had made alternate travel plans, which were foiled for reasons beyond his control. His repeated checks of the weather and multiple flight plans indicated that he was attempting to take advantage of the continuously changing conditions and depart in his airplane as soon as a short-term window of opportunity arose. This self-imposed time pressure, coupled with his lack of recent IFR experience, likely resulted in his acceptance of the non-conforming clearance. While the pilot was responsible for accepting a clearance that did not comply with minimum instrument altitude requirements, air traffic control (ATC) services were deficient in not ensuring that the clearance complied with FAA requirements. The controller should have been aware of the minimum instrument altitudes in his area of responsibility and ensured compliance with them. The decision of the FAA facility handling the airplane to not utilize certain radar data diminished the performance of the minimum safe altitude warning system by preventing the system from detecting a hazardous situation and depriving the controller of a timely altitude alert, which might have enabled him to better assist the pilot.

The airplane took off at or near its maximum certificated gross weight. Although the information was available to him, the pilot was either unaware of or discounted the fact that the clearance route that he was issued and accepted required a minimum altitude near the performance limits of the airplane, and that altitude was significantly higher than the altitude he had requested. The altitudes filed for by the pilot and assigned by ATC were also above the freezing level and in forecast icing conditions. The assigned altitude also required supplemental oxygen for all four persons on board, but the onboard system was only configured for two persons. Meteorological information indicated that IFR conditions, turbulence, and icing were likely present in the vicinity of the descent, and possibly more significant than previously reported by the pilot. It could not be determined whether the airplane was actually in a mountain wave, but the pilot was unable to arrest the airplane’s descent. Those factors, combined with the small difference between the airplane's stall speed and best climb speed, likely resulted in the stall and subsequent spin of the airplane. Although it would not have aided the airplane occupants in this case, if the airplane had been equipped with a 406-MHz emergency locator transmitter, it is likely that the time and resources expended to locate the wreckage would have been significantly reduced.

Based on the findings of this accident, the NTSB issued three safety recommendations to the FAA. Safety recommendation A-11-32 asked the FAA to “establish Standard Instrument Departure procedures that provide transition routes and minimum instrument flight rules altitude information for aircraft cleared over commonly used navigational fixes from Jackson Hole Airport and similarly situated airports.” The FAA has established standard instrument departure procedures with minimum altitude information for Jackson Hole Airport and continues to survey other mountainous airports; thus, safety recommendation A-11-32 is classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” Safety recommendation A-11-33 asked the FAA to “modify en route automation modernization software such that en route minimum safe altitude warning alerts are provided for aircraft in coast track status that are receiving automatic position updates.” Safety recommendation A-11-34 asked the FAA to “modify en route automation modernization software such that cautionary warnings are provided to controllers when an aircraft is predicted to enter a minimum instrument flight rules altitude (MIA) polygon below the MIA.” The FAA is researching whether the en route automation modernization software can be modified to address safety recommendations A-11-33 and -34, which are classified “Open—Acceptable Response.”

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's decision to depart into known adverse weather conditions over mountainous terrain, which required operation near the limits of the airplane's performance capability and which resulted in a loss of airplane control and subsequent ground impact. Contributing to the accident was an improper clearance issued by the air traffic controller and the pilot's acceptance of that clearance. Also contributing to the accident was the extended loss of radar data from the Rock Springs Air Route Surveillance Radar, which caused loss of radar contact and consequent loss of minimum safe altitude warning protection for the flight.

Full Narrative: 

The federal government and a company that provides air traffic control services at the Jackson Hole Airport have entered confidential settlements to end lawsuits brought by estates of a Minnesota man and his three sons who died in a plane crash after taking off from the airport.
Luke Bucklin, 41, of Minneapolis, 14-year-old twins Nate and Nick, and 12-year-old Noah all died when they crashed in Wyoming's rugged Wind River Range on Oct. 25, 2010.
The National Transportation Safety Board concluded last year that Bucklin's decision to fly his heavily loaded plane over mountains in snowy weather probably caused the accident. But the NTSB also noted that an air traffic controller employed by Serco Inc., a Virginia-based company, instructed Bucklin to fly over the mountains at too low an altitude.
Luke Bucklin's estate brought a federal lawsuit against Serco in federal court in Cheyenne last fall. Michelle Bucklin, Luke Bucklin's former wife who is from Arizona, filed a similar lawsuit against Serco in federal court this year in Cheyenne on behalf of the estates of her three sons.
U.S. District Judge Alan B. Johnson earlier this month dismissed the lawsuit of Luke Bucklin's estate after the parties filed notice they had reached a settlement. He dismissed the lawsuit brought by the children's estates last month following a settlement in that case.
Kathleen M. Byrne, a Colorado lawyer representing Serco in both lawsuits, declined to comment.
Mark Hallberg, a lawyer in St. Paul, Minn., who represents Luke Bucklin's estate, said Monday that the estate had filed notice of legal action against the FAA but hadn't filed a lawsuit against the federal agency.
Hallberg said both Serco and the FAA have agreed to confidential settlements. He said the claim against Serco has been resolved while the U.S. Department of Justice is still working to get final approval and payment of the FAA settlement.
"I'm confident that that the matter will be settled, and will be finalized the way we have agreed upon," Hallberg said of the FAA claim. "The family has chosen not to disclose the amount of the settlement, but it is a substantial settlement."
Allison Price, spokeswoman for the Justice Department, confirmed Monday that the government had settled the administrative claim from Luke Bucklin's estate. She said she couldn't reveal any information about the terms of the settlement or say whether the FAA had changed any policies as a result of the crash.
Hallberg said the investigation by Bucklin's legal team uncovered a number of documents that he said showed the air traffic control system had failed Bucklin.
"While he was sitting on the runway, they rerouted his flight, changed his flight plan, and routed him over a route that he had not planned to travel," Hallberg said. "And they approved a flight level that was unsafe, in violation of federal regulations."
Bucklin was president and co-founder of the Bloomington, Minn.-based Web development company Sierra Bravo Corp. He had flown his single-engine, 1977 Mooney propeller plane to Jackson to attend a family event.
On his return flight, Bucklin took off with his three sons in a snowstorm and soon ran into trouble as he tried to cross the Wind River Range, an extremely rugged group of mountains that includes Wyoming's highest peak, Mount Gannett, which reaches just over 13,800 feet.
Hallberg said he didn't believe that Bucklin would have flown over the mountain range if he had known it was dangerous.
Hallberg said he believes the NTSB report pointed the finger at Bucklin and minimized the role of the FAA. "I think our investigation and the settlement make it pretty clear that the FAA bears a significant responsibility for this crash," he said.
Frederick Harrison, a lawyer in Rock Springs, represented Michelle Bucklin and the estates of the three boys.
"It's a tragedy any time you have three sons and a father die," Harrison said Friday. "They died needlessly. They didn't have to die, if the FAA and the Serco people at the tower had been doing their job and directed the aircraft to fly at the proper altitude in a snowstorm. This wouldn't have happened if they had been doing their job."

Wyoming plane crash search and recovery cost estimated at $185K

Mpls. custody fight pits women who grieved over Wyo. plane crash

NTSB Identification: WPR11FA032

Brown's Seaplane Base Is Still Flying High After 50 Years: Winter Haven, Florida

 Jon Brown, left, and Chuck Brown at Jack Brown's Seaplane Base in Winter Haven on Nov. 7. Jon Brown, 66, uses yellow single-engine Piper Cubs to teach pilots from around the world how to take off and land on water.


By Ryan E. Little 

Published: Sunday, November 17, 2013 at 11:23 p.m.
Last Modified: Sunday, November 17, 2013 at 11:23 p.m.

WINTER HAVEN | From up here, the alligators look small. They're bigger when you land.

But Jon Brown, in a warm, trusting tone, says not to worry. The smoother conditions are more troublesome.

With about 30,000 hours of dropping in and out of lakes around the Winter Haven Airport, Brown may be the foremost authority.

His business, Brown's Seaplane Base in Winter Haven, is celebrating 50 years in a business known for mediocre money. But through a touch of luck and applied focus, Brown has turned his father's company into one of the best-known seaplane operations in the world.

Jimmy Buffett even trained here.

Jon Brown, 66, operates the school now, using yellow, single-engine Piper Cubs to train students from around the world in how to take off and land on water. His father started the business in 1963. The company boasts it has trained more pilots than any other seaplane base in the world.

It's bound to keep it up, too. It trains more seaplane pilots than all the 120 or so other schools in the country, according to the Lakeland-headquartered Seaplane Pilots Association.

"When everyone else is shut down because their water is frozen, they're actively providing an escape for people to come," executive director Steve McCaughey said.

"(Polk County is) just kind of a nirvana for us as seaplane pilots. You can just bob from lake to lake to lake."


Today, Brown's Seaplane Base consists of a small building, a worn wooden deck and porch, and an aged worn hanger with enough airplane parts to build at least three full Piper J-3s — the single-engine airplanes that drop in and out of Lake Jessie daily.

In the summer, things are quiet. There are just a few students on any given day. But in the winter, business is flying high.

A student pays $1,400 or $2,100 for 5 to 6 hours of training and testing, depending on the plane. They come with a pilot's license. They leave with a seaplane certification.

The costs have climbed quite high over 50 years. In 1963, it was $100, Jon Brown said.

"With three of us in college, I came home and said, ‘Dad, you've got to come up on the rates a little bit" Jon Brown said with a laugh.

It went up $25.

"Money wasn't a big thing for dad."

And keeping it tight still keeps costs down.

Every morning at 5:30 a.m., Jon Brown is still the first to arrive. He puts on a pot of coffee in the deck porch and cleans the bathrooms.

It's not the kind of work a top seaplane pilot might be expected to do, but it keeps the place going.

"It's a crazy way to make a living, but we get to meet the nicest people from all over the world," said Frances Brown, Jon Brown's wife. It's the people who keep her and her husband going.

"Some famous people, mostly just nice people. But most everyone always leaves a happy person," Frances Brown said.


Jon Brown joined the family business in 1973. Two years later, his father Jack Brown died when single-engine plane he was ferrying to North Carolina crashed because of mechanical failure.

Jon Brown employs nine people, including three fulltime flight instructors, and his brother, Chuck Brown.

His wife is there more times than not. And employees love where they work.

"It's just unique," said office manager Pat Owens, a three-year employee. "Where else would you find this? To be on the water every day and meet people from all over the world ... it makes you want to get up and come to work."


What keeps people coming back to the base to pay $185 an hour to fly a plane is the nostalgia.

"The world gets worse. Brown's always remains the same," said Thom Zink, 57, who's been to the base about 20 times over the last seven years. He's coming again in two weeks

"I really can't find a whole lot of places in this world I'd rather be than flying a seaplane in Winter Haven and hanging out with the Browns."

Even though the base doesn't sell food, again and again, customers talk about a nice meal on the porch.

It's a bring-your-own sort of place.

In 2004, after Polk County was hit with three hurricanes that damaged most of the county, a contractor wanted to do the porch up better.

"There were some of the old pilots around and they said, ‘Don't, touch, this, place,'" Jon Brown said.

"I haven't done much to this place since my dad had it. I may have put a coat of paint on it, but it's pretty much the same way my dad had it."

That's the secret: Old planes, old tricks and nostalgic love.

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