Wednesday, November 21, 2012

Cessna 152, N48787: Aircraft force landed on a highway - Talkeetna, Alaska

A rented airplane landed on the Parks Highway near Willow Tuesday following what its pilot described as an engine failure, Alaska State Troopers said. 

Chienwen Liu, 39, rented the Cessna 152 in Anchorage and flew with a passenger, Fang Lin, 37, to Talkeetna Tuesday afternoon, troopers said. Liu told troopers that about 10 minutes into their flight back to Anchorage, the plane's engine quit. Liu could not restart the engine and decided to land on the highway, near Mile 94.5, troopers said.

A witness called 911 about 6:40 p.m., and troopers found the plane and its occupants in a highway pullout. Liu and Lin were uninjured, and the plane was not damaged, troopers said.

Inspectors with the Federal Aviation Administration drove north from Anchorage on Wednesday to check the plane's engine, according to Clint Johnson, an investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. Because there were no injuries or damage reported, the NTSB does not plan to investigate the incident, Johnson said.

Johnson said the plane had been rented from Take Flight Alaska, an Anchorage-based air tour, charter and flight instruction service.


Story and reaction/comments:   http://www.adn.com

http://registry.faa.gov/N48787

http://www.airport-data.com/aircraft/N48787

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 48787        Make/Model: C152      Description: 152, A152, Aerobat
  Date: 11/21/2012     Time: 0400

  Event Type: Incident   Highest Injury: None     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: None

LOCATION
  City: TALKEETNA   State: AK   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT FORCE LANDED ON A HIGHWAY, NEAR TALKEETNA, AK

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   0
                 # Crew:   1     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   1     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Pleasure      Phase: Landing      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: ANCHORAGE, AK  (AL03)                 Entry date: 11/21/2012  

Cuba cancels 2 charter firms’ flights: Cuba suspende permisos a dos agencias de vuelos chárter en Miami

Two of the largest operators of charter flights to Cuba had their permits suspended by the Cuban government. No reason was given.

By Juan Carlos Chavez

Cuba has decided to suspend, beginning Nov. 27, charter-flight operating permits to fly to the island for Airline Brokers and C&T Charters, two of the most important and recognized agencies of this type in South Florida.

Havanatur Celimar, the Cuban state agency that administers and regulates the operations, announced the decision Wednesday.

Reasons for the sudden decision remained unclear. However, sources linked to the industry said that the order could be related to delays in payments and other obligations.

In a statement published on the Airline Brokers website, its owner, Vivian Mannerud, said that the suspension was the result of a “re-evaluation of flights in the market as well as other topics.”

“At this time, Airline Brokers is trying to ascertain whether other providers of charter flights to Cuba can accommodate all the passengers affected by this cancellation,” the statement said. “Airline Brokers will contact you or the travel agency where you bought your ticket. If you cannot be accommodated on another flight, your ticket will be refunded at the same agency where you paid for it. Airline Brokers is making all possible arrangements in the quickest possible way to help accommodate all the passengers. Contact your travel agency as soon as possible.”

Airline Brokers has a long history of chartered flights to the island. Just a few days ago, it coordinated the shipping of humanitarian aid sent to people affected by Hurricane Sandy in eastern Cuba. It also worked with the Archdiocese of Miami and the Cuban Catholic Church in the transportation of hundreds of parishioners during the visit of Pope Benedict XVI on March 26-28, which included the celebration of Masses in Santiago de Cuba and Havana.

Airline Brokers operates seven flights a week from the Miami and Fort Lauderdale airports to the cities of Havana and Cienfuegos. It is one of eight companies that organize charter flights to Cuba.

In April, its office was destroyed by a fire that was later ruled to have been set intentionally. The fire forced Mannerud’s company to open a new office in Coral Gables, whose inauguration was officiated by the archbishop of Miami, Thomas Wenski.

The fire started at dawn on April 27 in a portion of an office complex primarily occupied by attorneys and other professionals.. The investigation is continuing.

The other agency, C&T Charters, operates charter flights to Havana and Camaguey from air terminals in Miami, Chicago and New York. Its owner is John H. Cabañas, who for a long time has had close contact with the Cuban government. The agency has provided its services uninterruptedly since June 1991. It has offices in Miami, the Keys and New York.

El Nuevo Herald tried to reach both Mannerud and Cabañas by phone to comment on the sudden suspension, but the calls were not returned.

Airline Brokers and C&T Charters are the only U.S. companies that organize travel for special pilgrimages.

The news of the cancellation comes at a delicate time due to the upcoming Christmas and New Year holidays.

Recently, Cuba’s Office of National Statistics reported that 400,000 citizens living in foreign countries visited the island in 2011, among them 300,000 living in the United States.

Cuba expanded its airports in Havana and Cienfuegos (in the south-central area), Camagüey, Holguín and Santiago de Cuba (in the east), besides Santa Clara (in the center) and Manzanillo (also in the east).

It is calculated that in the short term, doors will be opened on both sides of the Florida Straits, as well as in other destinations, due to a greater and more intense flow of passengers after Cuba’s announcement of new immigration regulations for its citizens..

In October, Cuba announced immigration reform that will become effective on Jan. 14.

The reform eliminates the need of the exit permit and the invitation letter currently required of citizens to be allowed to travel abroad.

http://www.miamiherald.com


Cuba decidió suspender a partir del 27 de noviembre los permisos de operaciones para vuelos chárter hacia la isla a Airline Brokers y C & T Charters, dos de las más importantes y reconocidas agencias de este tipo en el sur de la Florida. La decisión fue comunicada por Havanatur Celimar, entidad estatal que administra y regula las operaciones del ramo.

En un comunicado publicado en la página web de Airline Brokers, su propietaria Vivian Mannerud calificó la suspensión como resultado de una “re-evaluación de vuelos en el mercado, y otros temas”, aseguró.

“En estos momentos, Airline Brokers está determinando si otros proveedores de charters a Cuba pueden acomodar a todos los pasajeros afectados por esta cancelación. Airline Brokers lo contactará a usted o su agencia de viajes donde usted compró su boleto. Si no se pudiera acomodar en otro vuelo, su pago completo será devuelto en la misma agencia donde usted pagó su boleto”, precisó el comunicado. “Airline Brokers está haciendo todos los arreglos posibles y en la manera más rápida para ayudar a acomodar todos los pasajeros. Contacte su agencia de viaje lo antes posible”. 

El comunicado destacó las tres décadas de la agencia en el ramo. También explicó que continuará realizando otros trámites y servicios a sus clientes.

“Airline Brokers agradece los últimos 30 años de servicio en el mercado de U.S. – Cuba. Gracias por darnos su negocio y comprensión en estos momentos. Airline Brokers seguirá haciendo trámites, venta de boletos, y todo servicio con viajes a Cuba”.

Airline Brokers tiene un nutrido y largo historial de vuelos fletados a la isla. Hace unos días coordinó los envíos de ayuda humanitaria a los damnificados del huracán Sandy en el oriente cubano. También trabajó con la Arquidiócesis de Miami y la Iglesia Católica cubana en el traslado de cientos de feligreses durante la visita del Papa Benedicto XVI, realizada del 26 al 28 de marzo. La agenda abarcó misas en Santiago de Cuba y La Habana.

Semanalmente Airline Brokers opera siete vuelos desde los aeropuertos de Miami y Fort Lauderdale hacia La Habana y Cienfuegos. Es una de las ocho compañías que organiza vuelos chárter a Cuba y cuyas oficinas fueron destruidas recientemente en un incendio intencional en abril. La situación obligó a la empresa de Mannerud a inaugurar una nueva oficina en Coral Gables. El acto estuvo presidido por el arzobispo de Miami, Thomas Wenski. 

El siniestro se inició en la madrugada del 27 de abril en un edificio que forma parte de un complejo de oficinas mayormente ocupadas por bufetes de abogados y otros profesionales del rubro. Los sospechosos utilizaron una botella con sustancias acelerantes de combustión, según las pesquisas. El atentado provocó llamas en tres lugares separados de la oficina. La investigación continúa.

Mientras tanto, C & T Charters es una agencia que opera vuelos fletados hacia La Habana y Camagüey desde las terminales aéreas de Miami, Chicago y Nueva York. Su propietario es John H. Cabañas, un empresario que durante mucho tiempo ha mantenido estrechos contactos con las autoridades del gobierno cubano. La agencia ofrece servicios ininterrumpidamente desde junio de 1991. Tiene oficinas en Miami, los Cayos y Nueva York.

Los detalles sobre la repentina decisión de Havanatur son aún inciertos. Sin embargo, fuentes vinculadas a la industria comentaron que la orden podría estar relacionada con el atraso de pagos impositivos y otras obligaciones.

El Nuevo Herald intentó comunicarse telefónicamente con Mannerud y Cabañas para que comentasen sobre la repentina suspensión. Varias llamadas no fueron respondidas. Airline Brokers y C & T Charters son las únicas compañías de Estados Unidos que organizan viajes de peregrinación especiales.

La noticia sobre la cancelación llega en un momento delicado por la cercanía de las fiestas navideñas y las vacaciones de fin de año. 

Recientemente la Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de Cuba (ONE) reportó que 400,000 ciudadanos que viven en el extranjero visitaron la isla en el 2011, entre ellos 300,000 que viven en Estados Unidos. Cuba amplió sus aeropuertos receptores de pasajeros en La Habana y Cienfuegos (centro-sur), Camagüey, Holguín y Santiago de Cuba (este), a los que sumó los de Santa Clara (centro) y Manzanillo.

Asimismo se estima que, en el corto plazo, se abrirá las puertas a un mayor e intenso flujo de pasajeros a ambos lados del Estrecho de la Florida y otros destinos debido al anuncio de nuevas regulaciones y políticas de carácter migratorio.

A mediados de octubre Cuba dictó una reforma migratoria que entrará en vigor el 14 de enero del 2013. Las reformas eliminan los permisos de salida exigidos a sus ciudadanos y la carta de invitación para viajar al extranjero. 

http://www.elnuevoherald.com

Read more here: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/2012/11/21/1348879/cuba-suspende-permisos-de-dos.html#storylink=cpy

COLORADO: Rooftop adornment in Centennial just plane interesting

Courtesy photo 
Moyer's plane sitting in the parking lot of his building near 7000 Broadway Avenue in Centennial.

Most people store airplanes in hangars. Thomas Moyer stores his on top of a building he owns near 7000 S. Broadway in Centennial. 

 Moyer, who is not a pilot, said he purchased the unusual lightweight plane about eight years ago from a muffler shop in Raleigh, N.C.

“It had been hanging from the ceiling there for quite some time,” said Moyer. “So I bought it and had it shipped here about eight years ago, just for something to do.”

When pushed, Moyer admits he has hopes of taking the small aircraft, which he identifies as a Mohawk O-2, and converting it to a light sport aircraft, which has less-restrictive licensing requirements to operate.

The FAA defines a light sport aircraft as an aircraft, other than a helicopter or other craft capable of vertical takeoff and landing, that has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 1,320 lbs.

Also, with its designation as “experimental,” the plane would not be subject to some certifications required by commercial manufacturers of aircraft.

“But it's been up there on the roof for quite some time now, and it's in pretty rough shape,” he said. “At this point, it would cost an awful lot money to repair the engines and make it operational.”

Moyer said much of the detail about the aircraft's history has escaped him.

“This was one of two prototypes that was made by company in North Carolina,” he said. “The company went out of business in the 1980s.”

At one time, product liability laws sent many manufacturers of general aviation aircraft into a tailspin, essentially making them liable for the product for eternity.

Lawsuits forced many smaller manufacturers out of business.

Although its wings have been removed and weather has taken its toll, Moyer said the little high-wing twin-engine plane was among one of the safest to fly at the time, and even had a parachute.

http://www.ourcoloradonews.com

Rockwell Commander 690A, Ponderosa Aviation Inc., N690SM: Fatal accident occurred November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, Arizona

NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/03/2013
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) purchased the airplane and relocated it from Indiana to PAI's base at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona, about 1 week before the accident. PAI's president conducted the relocation flight under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ferry permit due to an unaccomplished required 150-hour inspection on the airplane. The airplane's arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit, and no inspections were accomplished to render the airplane airworthy after its relocation. Although other airworthy airplanes were available, PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) (the accident pilot) and the director of operations (DO), who were co-owners of PAI along with the president, decided to use the nonairworthy airplane to conduct a personal flight from SAD to Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 110 miles away. All available evidence indicates that the DOM was aware of the airplane's airworthiness status and that this was the first time he flew in the accident airplane. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night visual meteorological conditions (VMC). After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying.

The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. The return flight was also conducted under VFR in night VMC. There was no moon, and the direction of flight was toward sparsely lit terrain. After takeoff, the air traffic control (ATC) tower controller instructed the pilot to maintain runway heading until advised due to an inbound aircraft. About 2 minutes later, the controller cleared the airplane for its requested right turn and then began a position relief briefing for the incoming controller. No subsequent communications to or from the airplane occurred, nor were any required. Radar data indicated that the airplane turned onto a course directly towards SAD and climbed to and leveled at an altitude of 4,500 feet. About 4 minutes after the right turn, while continuing on the same heading and ground track, the airplane impacted a mountain in a wings-level attitude at an elevation of about 4,500 feet.

Although the airplane was technically not airworthy due to the unaccomplished inspection, the investigation did not reveal any preimpact airframe, avionics, engine, or propeller discrepancies that would have precluded normal operation. Airplane performance derived from radar tracking data did not suggest any mechanical abnormalities or problems.

FFZ, which has an elevation of 1,394 feet mean sea level (msl), is situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain. The mountain is surrounded by sparsely lit terrain and rises to a maximum charted elevation of 5,057 feet msl. The investigation was unable to determine whether, or to what degree, the pilot conducted any preflight route and altitude planning. If such planning had been properly accomplished, it would have accounted for the mountain and provided for terrain clearance. The pilot had flown the round trip flight from SAD to FFZ several times and, most recently, had flown a trip from SAD to FFZ in night VMC 2 days before the accident. Thus, the pilot was familiar with the route and the surrounding terrain. According to the pilot's brother (PAI's president), the pilot typically used an iPad for navigation and flew using the ForeFlight software app with the "moving map" function. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depictions) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. Although iPad remnants were found in the wreckage, the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot adhered to his normal practice of using an iPad for the flight or, if so, what its relevant display settings (such as scale or terrain depiction) were. Had the pilot been using the ForeFlight app as he normally did, he could have been able to determine that the airplane would not clear the mountain on the given flight track.

According to the pilot's brother, the pilot typically departed an airport, identified the track needed to fly directly to his destination, and turned the airplane on that track. Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its turn on course to SAD about 2 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from FFZ to SAD with the track starting about 2 miles northeast of FFZ direct to SAD revealed that while the direct line track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from the point 2 miles northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. Thus, the pilot likely set on a direct course for SAD even though the delayed right turn from FFZ put the airplane on a track that intersected the mountain. The pilot did not adjust his flight track to compensate for the delayed right turn to ensure clearance from the mountain.

In addition, a sector of the Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B airspace with a 5,000-foot floor was adjacent to the mountain range, which reduced the vertical options available to the pilot if he elected to remain clear of that airspace. The pilot's decision to remain below the overlying Class B airspace placed the airplane at an altitude below the maximum elevation of the mountain. The pilot did not request VFR flight following or minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) services. Had he requested VFR flight following services, he likely would have received safety alerts from ATC as defined in FAA Order 7110.65. Had he requested the MSAW in particular, he likely would have received an advisory that his aircraft was in unsafe proximity to terrain. Further, the investigation was unable to determine why the pilot did not request clearance to climb into the Class B airspace or fly a more southerly route that would have provided adequate terrain clearance. On the previous night VMC flight from FFZ to SAD, the pilot stayed below the Class B airspace but turned toward SAD right after departure. In response to issues raised by this accident, the FAA conducted a Performance Data Analysis Report System (PDARS) study to determine the legitimacy of a claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to be granted clearance to enter Class B airspace. The PDARS study revealed that on the day of the accident, 341 VFR aircraft were provided services by Phoenix TRACON. The PDARS study, however, was unable to document how many aircraft were actually within the Class B airspace itself or how many had been refused services; the study only documented how many had been provided services. In response to a January 20, 2012, FAA internal memo formally restating the claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to obtain clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, the FAA conducted a comprehensive audit of the PHX Class B airspace that spanned four different time periods and was spread among several sectors during peak traffic periods to provide the most accurate picture. Of 619 requests for VFR aircraft to enter Class B airspace, 598 (96.61%) were granted. While data was not available to refute or substantiate any claims from previous years regarding difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, this data clearly indicated that difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace did not exist during the four time periods in which the audit took place in the months after the accident.

The moonless night decreased the already low visual conspicuity of the mountain. The airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange and GPS navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display. Had the pilot conducted the flight under instrument flight rules (IFR), the resultant handling by ATC would have helped ensure terrain clearance.

The airplane was not equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS). Six years earlier, the accident airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. This modification rendered the airplane exempt from the TAWS requirement; however, this modification was not approved by the FAA or documented via a supplemental type certificate or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Modification). Per the requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.223, TAWS is not required for airplanes with fewer than six passenger seats. In this accident, onboard TAWS equipment could have provided a timely alert to help the pilot avoid the mountain.

Based on the steady flight track; the dark night conditions; the minimal ground-based lighting; and the absence of preimpact airplane, engine, or propeller anomalies that would have affected the flight, the airplane was likely under the control of the pilot and was inadvertently flown into the mountain. This controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident was likely due to the pilot's complacency (because of his familiarity with the flight route and because he selected a direct route, as he had previously done, even though he turned toward the destination later than he normally did) and lack of situational awareness. In January 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under VFR at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents. The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by accomplishing several actions, including proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following IFR practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's failure to maintain a safe ground track and altitude combination for the moonless night visual flight rules flight, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's complacency and lack of situational awareness and his failure to use air traffic control visual flight rules flight following or minimum safe altitude warning services. Also contributing to the accident was the airplane's lack of onboard terrain awareness and warning system equipment.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI's DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot's 72-Hour History

According to the pilot's wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplemental type certificate and/or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration). Postaccident review of the documentation that was used to substantiate the seating configuration change revealed that the modified seating position plan was not one of the manufacturer's/type certificate holder's approved configurations. The document that was used to substantiate the change was determined to be an altered version of the manufacturer's original document, but it was incorrectly represented as a manufacturer's original document. Attempts to determine who made the improper and unauthorized changes to the seating configuration document, or when they were made, were unsuccessful.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included wind from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 40 miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point -1 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury. US Naval Observatory data for November 23, 2011, indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3%, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Neither FFZ nor SAD was equipped with a VOR ground navigation facility. Navigation between the two airports via available VOR stations would result in an indirect flight route.

The flight from SAD to FFZ and the accident flight were both conducted in VMC as VFR flights. No flight plan was filed for either flight, and neither pilot had requested air traffic control (ATC) flight following services. Available radar data and interviews with PAI personnel indicated that the pilot had flown between SAD and FFZ several times previously and that he tended to use his iPad, equipped with ForeFlight software and GPS, to fly directly between the two. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depiction) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot's habit pattern was to depart the airport, identify the track needed to fly directly to the destination, and turn the airplane onto that track. Remnants of an iPad were found in the wreckage. Damage precluded determination of its positive association with a particular owner, its functionality, or its operational status at the time of the accident.

Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its right turn on course to SAD about 1.5 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from two different initial locations (FFZ, and northeast of FFZ after completion of the turn) to SAD revealed that while the direct track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. That resulting ground track was also coincident with the accident flight radar data ground track.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sequence of Events

The pilot first contacted FFZ ground control at 1820:21. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway D, and he taxied as instructed without incident. At 1823:35, the pilot contacted FFZ local control and advised that he was holding short and was ready for departure. The pilot was advised to again hold short to wait for landing traffic. At 1825:00, the controller instructed the pilot to "fly straight out" until advised due to landing traffic and cleared him for takeoff from runway 4R. The airplane became airborne at 1826:14. At 1826:47, the controller issued the "right turn approved" advisory to the pilot. At that point, the airplane was still on the runway heading, about 1.45 nautical miles (nm) from FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,200 feet. The pilot responded to the transmission with "right turn approved." No further radio transmissions to or from the accident pilot were recorded.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

FFZ was equipped with two runways designated 4/22 L and R. The airplane's arrival and departure runway (4R) measured 5,101 feet by 100 feet. Airport elevation was 1,394 feet msl. The local topography consisted of a flat basin floor bounded by mountainous terrain, primarily to the north and east. FFZ was situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain, which rose very steeply to a charted maximum elevation of 5,057 feet msl, or about 3,700 feet above FFZ.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Accident Site

The accident site was on the northwest face near the top of the Flatiron region of Superstition Mountain. The accident site consisted of two basic terrain areas: a sloped area (about 45 degrees downhill to the northwest), abutted by a vertical rock formation on its southeast side.

The sloped area was primarily rock, interlaced with cracks, soil patches, boulders, and sparse vegetation. The rock formation rose about 100 feet above the southeastern edge of the sloped area. Airplane debris was scattered on the sloped area in a primary field that measured about 150 feet southeast-northwest by about 80 feet northeast-southwest. A significant amount of debris was clustered near the base of the vertical face, with some debris strewn or caught on the face. The southeast section of the sloped area and much of the vertical face were fire damaged, soot covered, or scorched. The northwest edge of the sloped debris field was about 150 feet southeast of the end of the sloped terrain, which then became very steep (sometimes near vertical) and fell irregularly away to the valley floor about 3,000 feet below.

On-Site Wreckage Observations

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain at an elevation of about 4,500 feet msl that was essentially only accessible by helicopter. The wreckage was recovered by helicopter and transported to a secure facility for subsequent detailed examination.

The airplane was highly fragmented. The debris pattern axis was oriented northwest to southeast, and the debris and fire damage were arrayed in a fan-like pattern consistent with the approximate flight direction. Most airplane components were severely impact and fire-damaged. Some debris (heavier/denser items, such as engine gearbox components and generators) was found northwest (downhill) of the main debris field, consistent with those components rolling downhill after impact. The largest wreckage section was a portion of an inboard wing box with one engine attached. Paint transfer marks on the rock face were consistent with a wings-level (roll axis) impact.

Both engines and portions of their propellers were identified in the wreckage. Propeller, engine, and gearbox damage was consistent with high power rotation at impact. All three landing gear were identified in the wreckage, and damage patterns were consistent with the landing gear being retracted at impact. Some airplane skin segments exhibited significant accordion-like crush damage. Many cockpit-related items, including instruments, instrument panel sections, and pilots' seat fragments, were found on the terrain beyond the vertical rock formation; some were several hundred feet beyond the vertical rock formation.

Damage patterns were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The majority of the first-stage compressor impeller blades were separated at the hubs. The second-stage compressor impeller blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation. There was rotational scoring on the aft side of the third-stage turbine blade platforms and metal spray deposits on the suction side of the third-stage turbine blades. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation were identified.

The blade damage to both propellers was severe, with leading-edge damage, multiple bends, twisting, concave bending of the blade chord at the tips, and tips that had fractured and separated. Two separate blade angle witness marks were each consistent with impact while at a normal (not in feather and not in reverse) operating position. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal propeller operation were identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc.

PAI was founded in 1975 by the pilot-rated passenger's father. Later, the pilot and his brother purchased the company, and, in January 2011, the pilot-rated passenger, who had worked there for many years, bought into a partnership with them.

At the time of the accident, PAI, which was based at SAD, employed 25 people, including 13 pilots (10 on a seasonal/part-time basis) and 9 maintenance personnel. PAI owned a total of 14 airplanes, including the accident airplane. The fleet included three Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690 models and nine 500 models.

PAI held a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand air carrier operations in the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. However, PAI rarely exercised the privileges of that certificate and averaged about two revenue passenger transport flights per year. PAI's primary purpose for obtaining and maintaining the certificate was to be qualified to contract with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management for air attack missions (the application of aerial resources, by both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, on a fire).

Eight of the PAI airplanes were on the 14 CFR Part 135 certificate; the accident airplane had not yet been added to the certificate.

FAA Oversight

The FAA FSDO in Scottsdale, Arizona, was the assigned certificate-holding district office for PAI and oversaw about 60 Part 135 certificated operators, no Part 121 certificated operators, and about 520 Part 91 operators.

The POI was assigned to PAI in 2007. Her duties included oversight of 12 designees and 30 check airmen and POI for 54 operators. PAI was one of 10 Part 135 operators assigned to the POI. She estimated that she had about 100 hours in Rockwell International/Aero Commander airplanes, 25 of which were in the 690 model. The POI considered PAI to be a "low-maintenance operator," meaning that PAI was compliant with FAA requirements and presented few issues of concern. She physically visited PAI about once per year. Due to the distance between the FSDO and SAD, she never made unannounced visits. Her visits would take about 2 days, during which she would oversee pilot training, examine records and recordkeeping, and conduct base inspections and ramp checks. She never gave checkrides to PAI pilots; those were conducted by another inspector. The POI qualified the pilot-rated passenger as a "good" chief pilot. He was the person at PAI with whom the POI had the most contact, and she would mainly communicate her concerns and questions to him. She did not have much familiarity with the pilot.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Homeowner's Surveillance Camera Imagery

The airplane's preimpact flightpath, impact explosion, postimpact fire, and initial arrival of search and rescue aircraft were captured on a private citizen's home surveillance camera. That camera was located about 6 miles south of and 3,700 feet lower than the impact site. A file that contained about 50 minutes of image data, during the period from about 1810 to 1900, was provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The time stamp data was provided by the camera owner and was not independently correlated or verified by the NTSB; therefore, all times are approximate.

The 1810 image depicted the mountain in silhouette form, but as night fell, the mountain disappeared from the image. No lights were visible on the mountain. Due to the night conditions, the optical resolution capability of the camera, and the distance of the airplane from the camera, the imagery provided only a macro view and associated timeline of the events. The airplane itself was not visible; its position was manifested by its blinking beacon or strobe lights only. The lights of the airplane first appeared in the field of view at 1830:00 and remained visible until 1830:48, when the lights disappeared behind the terrain. A large flash of light appeared at 1830:52, followed by a second, much larger and brighter flash about 3 seconds later. Lights indicative of a fire remained visible until about 1844, and the first responding aircraft (again only visible as lights) appeared about 1848.

Examination of the path of the airplane's lights on the image field of view did not reveal any erratic motions or changes of direction; the stability of the flightpath was similar to that depicted in the ground tracking radar data.

Weight and Balance Information

Maintenance records indicated that on at least 15 occasions, modifications that affected the airplane's weight and balance values were accomplished; however, no records of the actual revised weight and balance data were discovered during the investigation.

Calculations that used the original empty weight plus other known or presumed values resulted in an estimated accident flight weight of 8,953 pounds, which was below the maximum allowable weight, and a center of gravity within the allowable envelope.

Airplane Performance

The derived level-flight ground speed for the last 2 minutes of the flight was approximately 190 knots, which was slightly higher than the pilot's operating handbook maximum range speed for similar conditions. Surface wind data indicated that the airplane would have experienced a slight tailwind during the climbout and level-flight segments.

TAWS-Related Guidance for FAA Inspectors

Published FAA guidance for FAA inspectors to use to determine whether the airplane seating configuration changes (if properly accomplished) would have exempted the airplane from the TAWS requirement was examined in detail. The relevant FAA guidance included FAA Order 8900.1 and 14 CFR Part 1, Part 21, Part 43 (Appendix 1), Part 91, and Part 135.

Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B Airspace Information

The Phoenix metropolitan area was designated and charted as Class B airspace, centered on PHX and the PHX VOR (PXR). The airspace elevation boundaries were defined by floor and ceiling altitudes, with lateral boundaries defined by distance and bearing from defined locations. Class B airspace is typically described as having the shape of an "upside-down wedding cake," where the airspace floor altitudes increase as the distance from the center increases. Aircraft operating under VFR are prohibited from entering Class B airspace without explicit permission from the responsible ATC facility. Mountainous terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the 5-000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about 3 1/2 miles east.

The NTSB ATC group chairman's factual report provides detailed information regarding the Class B airspace around the Phoenix area. For more information, see the docket for this accident (NTSB case number WPR12MA046).

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents

The FAA defines a CFIT accident as a situation that occurs when a properly functioning aircraft "is flown under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision."

In 1998, the FAA formed the General Aviation (GA) CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) as part of the FAA "Safer Skies" program. The stated goal of the Safer Skies initiative was to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 10-year period via a comprehensive review of aviation accident causes and implementation of safety intervention strategies. In April 1999, the GA CFIT JSAT published its final report, which identified 55 interventions to address CFIT accident causes. The FAA CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) was formed to develop detailed CFIT accident reduction strategies based upon the top 10 JSAT interventions that were considered to be the most effective and feasible. The CFIT JSIT final report was published in 2000, and JSIT recommended interventions included the following:

- Improve safety culture within the aviation community,
- Promote development and use of low-cost terrain clearance and/or look-ahead device,
- Improve pilot training regarding decision-making and human factors,
- Enhance the biennial flight review and/or instrument competency check, and
- Develop and distribute mountain flying technique advisory material.

In March 2003, as part of its response to the CFIT JSIT, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC "highlights the inherent risk" that CFIT poses for GA pilots. According to the AC, one primary cause of CFIT accidents was loss of situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25) defined situational awareness as the "accurate perception of the operational and environmental factors that affect the airplane, pilot, and passengers during a specific period of time." The handbook stated that a situationally aware pilot "has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." The handbook stated that "some of the elements inside the airplane to be considered are the status of airplane systems, and also the pilot and passengers" and cautioned that "an awareness of the environmental conditions of the flight, such as spatial orientation of the airplane, and its relationship to terrain, traffic, weather, and airspace must be maintained."

The handbook stated that obstacles to maintaining situational awareness included fatigue, stress, and task overload and that a contributing factor in many accidents is a distraction that diverts the pilot's attention. Complacency was cited as another obstacle to maintaining situational awareness. When activities become routine, there is a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot's effectiveness in the cockpit. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.

NTSB Safety Alert

In January 2008, the NTSB issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under visual flight conditions at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents.

The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following instrument flight rules practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.



GILBERT, AZ - One year ago, on the day before Thanksgiving, a plane carrying six people crashed into the Superstition Mountains. 

 All of those on board died including three children.

Wednesday, the school one of the children attended unveiled a special memorial in their honor.

Their mother, Karen Perry, tells ABC15 the day caps an extremely emotional month.

"I miss them terribly," said Perry.  "If I could change it, I'd have them here right now."

Perry says she's done a lot of reflecting over the past year, not just on what she's lost but also the good that's come from the tragedy.

Perry points what happened Wednesday morning at Lauren's Institute For Education in Gilbert as an example of the good that's resulted from the plane crash.

The school opened a reading corner and a library in honor of Perry's three children.

Luke, Morgan and Logan Perry were flying with their dad last Thanksgiving-eve to Safford when the plane went down in the Superstition Mountains.

Luke Perry was a student at L.I.F.E.

Karen Perry tells ABC15 her son loved books and so a place where children can go to read, she says, is a fitting tribute to not only Luke but all her children.

"Their memories live on," said Karen Perry. "The children are not forgotten. That means a lot to me. I don't want them to be forgotten. I want them to be remembered in a positive way."

The actual anniversary of the crash is Friday.

Karen Perry says, she plans to hike the mountain with some friends to put a plaque in her kids memory at the crash site.

Perry also plans to spend the night up on the mountain and hike down the next day.

Passenger kicked off plane tells his side of story

 

NEW YORK (WABC) -- A choir minister is telling his side of the story after he was kicked off a Spirit Airlines flight. 

 He was accused of threatening to blow up the plane Monday, but he says he was just complaining about the airline's baggage fees.

Sam Aristil is a beloved minister in Washington Heights who's never been in trouble before Monday.

He was handcuffed, pulled off a plane and charged with two felonies based on a complaint of a fellow passenger.

"You flatly say, you never said, 'I'm going to blow up this plane?'" Investigative reporter Sarah Wallace asked.

"Never, I never said that," said Sam Aristil, accused of making threat.

But authorities claim 30-year-old Sam Aristil made a threat on a Spirit Airlines plane headed to Fort Lauderdale from La Guardia this past Monday while sitting with a married couple.

The husband reportedly complained that Aristil threatened to blow up the plane because he was upset at baggage fees.

"We were talking about the fees for the bags," Aristil said.

"Were you angry or agitated," Wallace asked.

"Not at all," Aristil said.

"Did you ever mention a bomb or anything that might be a threat?" Wallace asked.

"No," Aristil said.

Aristil, who's been a minister and choir director at the St. Luke AME church in Washington Heights for seven years, says he made two phone calls from the plane before it left the gate, speaking in Creole, his native language. "Maybe just my conversation made them uncomfortable," Aristil said.

"So they made it up?" Wallace asked.

"They made it up," Aristil said.

The husband apparently also complained that Aristil pulled a scarf over his head.

"Why pull the scarf up?" Wallace asked.

"I was sick and getting a cold," Aristil said.

He says he fell asleep.

"You wake up, and there are officers," Wallace said, "The next thing you know cops are standing in front of you with guns, and they cuffed you and you had no idea what was going on."

"I said, 'Guys please tell me what's going on,' it was embarrassing," Aristil said.

He spent 36 hours in jail before members of his church could raise the $10,000 bail.

The DA's office had asked for $150,000.

"We have an individual who's a minister, who deals with the public, whose reputation has been tainted," said Paul Martin, Aristil's attorney.

Aristil says his family heard his name on the news.

"I know they know I didn't do it but to have them see me, and think, this is my son," Aristil said.

The minister says even worse than missing Thanksgiving with his family in Florida is trying to explain what happened with that other passenger.

"I felt something about me made him uncomfortable probably because of my race, my language," Aristil said, "I just hope this man can find it in his heart to apologize because this is wrong, this is wrong."

It's not an unusual scarf.

He had it on when Eyewitness News met him at the church where his supporters are steadfast.

They bailed him out Tuesday night.

The DA's office had asked for $150,000 bond but a judge released him on $10,000.


Source:  http://abclocal.go.com

Vietnam’s aviation market too attractive to foreign airlines

VietNamNet Bridge – After several years of eyeing the Vietnamese aviation market, foreign airlines now move ahead with their plans to increase their presence in Vietnam.
 

At the Vietnam-Ukraine Business Forum held in Hanoi late last week, Ukraine Prime Minister M. Azarov, emphasized that Ukraine really wishes to cooperate with Vietnam in the aviation sector.

The Prime Minister said it is the aviation industry which is one of the greatest advantages of Ukraine. It has Antonov, the aircraft factory which specializes in making very large transport aircrafts, inter-regional passenger airplanes with modern and safe technologies which are in no way inferior to any kinds of planes made in Europe or the US.

A lot of foreign aviation complexes have been taking steps to set their foot on the Vietnamese market.

David Cunningham, President of FedEx Express in Asia Pacific, has revealed that FedEx has applied for setting up a 100 percent foreign owned business in Vietnam.

In an effort to expand the Vietnamese market, Emirates airlines from the Gulf has recently launched Boeing 777-300ER for the direct air route HCM City – Dubai.

Prior to that, in June 2012, Emirates began providing direct flights between HCM City and Dubai with Airbus 330-200. However, later, in order to satisfy the increasingly high demand, Emirates has decided to use Boeing 777, which allows increasing the passenger transport capability by 50 percent.

Also from the Gulf, Etihad Airways of UAE plans to provide direct flights between Dhabi in UAE and HCM City in Vietnam in October 2013.

Etihad Airways’ General Director James Hogan, said HCM City would be the new destination of the airline in South East Asia, together with Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Singapore.

He said that the daily flights of Etihad would not only target businessmen and travelers to Vietnam, but also strive to push up the trade and cooperation between UAE and Vietnam.

The airline has said it would exploit the new air route with Airbus A330-200. Eihad can also carry 10 tons of cargo on every flight between the two cities, especially garments and food products.

To date, Etihad has code-sharing flights with Vietnam Airlines to serve the Eithad’s passengers who want to travel from Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to HCM City and Hanoi.

Etihad has also signed a strategic agreement with Air France-KLM on the code-sharing flights of the two airlines, commencing from October 28, 2012. Meanwhile, the Hanoi – Abu Dhabi air route would be opened soon.

Qatar Airways from the Gulf has been providing the flights between Vietnam and Qatar, with the aircraft landing at both the Noi Bai airport in Hanoi and Tan Son Nhat airport in HCM City.

Kazakh Air Astana has revealed its plan to launch the direct air route from Almaty to HCM City, slated for mid-December, or early January 2013. The flights, two a week, would be taken with Boeing 757 with transits in Bangkok.

Indian Jet Airways is conducting market surveys in its plan to open the Mumbai – HCM City air route in the future. This is the next step taken by Jet Airways after it signed a memorandum of understanding with Vietnam Airlines in October 2011 on the opening of the air route HCM City – Bangkok – Mumbai.

Turkey is also moving ahead with the plan to provide direct flights between Turkey and Vietnam. At present, Turkish Airlines provides four flights a week from Istanbul to HCM City.


http://english.vietnamnet.vn

Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee Six, Superior Pallet Co., N717RL: Accident occurred November 13, 2012 in Jackson, Missisippi

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA055
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, November 13, 2012 in Jackson, MS
Probable Cause Approval Date: 03/07/2014
Aircraft: PIPER PA-32-300, registration: N717RL
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Before the accident flight, the airplane had sat in its hangar for the previous 2 months with its fuel tanks half full under varying temperature conditions. The pilot had planned on flying to a safety seminar that began at 1630, so he had the airplane pulled out of its hangar, and its main fuel tanks were topped off from a fuel truck. After his arrival at the airport shortly before 1700, the pilot performed a preflight inspection. The manager of the hangar facility described the pilot’s preflight inspection as “real quick.” A lineman observed the pilot in a position to reach the fuel strainer valve, but he did not see the pilot sumping the main fuel tanks. When the lineman drove by the airplane, he saw a puddle about 1 foot in diameter on the tarmac beneath the fuel strainer, but he did not note anything under either main fuel tank drain. The lineman also noted that the airplane had an underinflated tire, but, due to other duties, he could not warn the pilot before he taxied the airplane away. About 2 minutes after takeoff, the pilot reported an "engine problem" to air traffic control and turned the airplane back toward the airport. The airplane subsequently descended at a steep angle, consistent with a stall, into a house located in a populated area. The airplane impacted the roof, came to rest upside down, and was subsequently mostly consumed in a postcrash fire.

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed evidence indicating that the airplane was not under power at the time of the accident; the fuel-injected engine was charred and the propeller did not exhibit torsional bending or leading edge damage that would have been present if it had been under power. No preexisting mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal engine operation. However, when the fuel flow divider was opened, water was found in it, which likely resulted in the loss of engine power. Water typically enters fuel tanks via three sources: leakage, normally through a fuel cap; contaminated fuel sources; and fuel tank condensation. The fuel cap was likely not the source of water since the airplane was stored in a hangar. Contaminated fuel from the fuel truck was also not the likely source of water since the truck was reportedly sumped daily. Further, on the day of the accident, five airplanes received fuel from the same truck before the accident airplane with no reports of any performance anomalies, and a clean fuel sample was taken from the truck about 20 minutes after the accident. It is more likely that condensation occurred in the half-filled fuel tanks during the previous 2 months that the airplane was sitting in the hangar under varying temperature conditions.

Regardless, the pilot had an opportunity to eliminate the condensation during the preflight inspection. However, as noted previously, not enough evidence existed to determine whether the pilot actually drained each main tank to ensure that all of the water was removed. It is likely that the pilot either did not sufficiently drain the main fuel tanks or that he was relying on draining the main fuel tanks through the fuel strainer and fuel lines and did not sufficiently drain them all. Given witness statements indicating that the pilot was in a hurry and his oversight of the underinflated tire, it is likely that the pilot’s preflight inspection was inadequate, which resulted in his failure to notice the fuel tank condensation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection, which resulted in his failure to note the water in the fuel tank due to condensation, which subsequently shut down the engine in flight. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's self-induced pressure to expedite the departure.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 13, 2012, about 1715 central standard time, a Piper PA-32-300, N717RL, was substantially damaged when it impacted a house in Jackson, Mississippi. The airline transport pilot (ATP) and the two pilot-rated passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, from Hawkins Field (HKS), Jackson, Mississippi, to John Bell Williams Airport (JVW), Raymond, Mississippi. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the owner of the company to which the airplane was registered, and who was also a student pilot of the ATP, the ATP and he were going to fly to JVW to attend a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety seminar. The owner was subsequently unable to go, but advised the ATP that the airplane needed to be flown since it hadn't flown since Labor Day [September 3rd]. The owner was unaware that the other two pilots were onboard.

Announcements for the safety seminar indicated that it was scheduled to begin at 1630.

According to the manager and a lineman at a local fixed base operator (FBO), the airplane was pulled out of its hangar and the main fuel tanks were topped off prior to the arrival of the ATP and the passengers, shortly before 1700. Both indicated that the ATP's preflight inspection was much quicker than normal. The lineman, while subsequently refueling another airplane, only looked at the accident airplane periodically, but did see the ATP walking around it with the two passengers following him, and also saw him in the position required to activate the fuel strainer lever in the interior, right side of the cabin. The lineman later drove by the airplane and noticed a puddle, an estimated 1 foot in diameter, on the tarmac below the fuel strainer.

The lineman also stated that the airplane's right tire was low, but that the airplane started and departed before he could inform the ATP. He further observed that the ATP was in the front left seat, and that the younger passenger was in the front right seat.

The lineman advised the FBO manager of the underinflated tire, who then watched the airplane during the run-up, and also the takeoff in case assistance was needed. The manager noted that the engine run-up was much quicker than he was accustomed to seeing. He then saw the airplane taxi onto runway 16, and heard an "abrupt" addition of power for takeoff. The airplane subsequently lifted off in the vicinity of taxiway Bravo, with the engine sounding "normal, real strong."

An audition of tower communications revealed that, at 1708, the pilot called for taxi. The tower controller approved taxi to either runway 16 or 34, pilot's discretion, and the ATP chose runway 16.

At 1712, a pilot requested and was cleared for takeoff, and was advised to then turn right, on course.

At 1713, the airplane was cleared to contact Jackson Departure Control.

A combined FAA radar depiction with voice overlay first revealed the airplane when it was just south of the departure end of runway 16 at an altitude of 500 feet.

At 1713:50, while the airplane was passing through about 700 feet, a pilot contacted departure control. The controller requested that the pilot "ident" and he provided the local altimeter setting. The pilot did not respond.

At 1714:05, the airplane reached 1,000 feet, followed by a descent to 900 feet.

At 1714:15, a pilot stated "we got an engine problem, we're turning back toward Hawkins." The controller responded, "requiring any assistance, you can turn left or right direct Hawkins," and the pilot replied, "we're headed back, we'll try to make it."

The controller then stated, "understand you're declaring an emergency," but there were no further transmissions from the airplane. Radar indicated a right, descending turn, with the last contact at 500 feet.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

The airplane, manufactured in 1972, was powered by a Lycoming TIO-540-series engine.

The airplane's latest annual inspection occurred on March 2, 2012, at 4,385 total airframe hours, and 751 hours since engine overhaul. Based on the ATP's logbook, the airplane flew an estimated 28 additional hours before the accident.

According to the owner, the airplane had been sitting in its hangar with the fuel tanks half full. A fuel log and the FBO lineman indicated that just prior to the flight, the ATP requested that the main fuel tanks be topped off with fuel, which resulted in 28.4 gallons being pumped.

PILOT INFORMATION

The ATP, age 65, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and rotorcraft-helicopter ratings. He also had commercial privileges for airplane single engine sea, glider, and lighter-than-air balloon aircraft. In addition, he held type ratings for four helicopter types and a Lear 45. He was also a certificated flight instructor, ground instructor, and mechanic. The pilot's latest FAA second class medical certificate was dated August 14, 2012.

According to the ATP's logbook, he had accumulated 17,775 total flight hours, with 2,664 hours in single engine land airplanes, 2,804 hours in multiengine land airplanes, and 9 hours in the 30 days prior to the accident.

On an insurance application for the accident airplane dated March 30, 2012, the ATP indicated 294 hours in make and model. Logbook entries indicated that subsequent to that date, he had an additional 28 hours in make and model. Logbook entries also indicated 142 hours in the accident airplane, with the last flight in that airplane prior to the accident flight occurring on September 3, 2012.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The HKS Tower observation, at 1715, included clear skies, wind from 010 degrees true at 3 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, temperature 11 degrees C, dew point -2 degrees C, altimeter setting 30.33 inches Hg.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The majority of the airplane came to rest upside down in a house located in a populated area about 185 degrees true, 0.8 nautical miles south of the departure end of runway 16, in the vicinity of 32 degrees, 18.93 minutes north latitude, 090 degrees, 13.28 minutes west longitude.

Tree damage indicated an approximately 60-degree descent, heading 310 degrees magnetic. Except for the left wing, which was lying in the yard next door, the airplane was mostly consumed in a postcrash fire, inside the house. All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the scene. Fire damage precluded flight control continuity beyond cable separation points.

The airplane's instrument panel was completely destroyed; however, charred remnants from a hand-held GPS receiver were recovered and forwarded to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for a data recovery attempt which was not successful.

Engine power control positions could not be determined, and the fuel tank selector position at the time of impact could also not be ascertained. The fuel tank selector was examined at the NTSB Materials Laboratory; however, no witness marks or other identifying features were found to note what tank position the fuel selector was in.

The Lycoming IO-540-series engine was also charred, with all accessories exhibiting thermal damage. The engine was removed from its upside-down position, and placed on a flatbed trailer for further examination. The propeller, which had one blade tip burned off, did not exhibit torsional bending or leading edge damage.

Propeller rotation confirmed crankshaft continuity to the back of the engine as well as valve movement. Top spark plugs were removed, and cylinder compression was confirmed; however, as compressions were tested, dirty water, consistent with fire suppression water mixed with engine fluids, was ejected from the spark plug holes. When the fuel flow divider (spider) was opened, water (noted visually and by taste) was found in the lower part that was clear with the exception of a small amount of white particulate matter.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Autopsies were conducted on all occupants at the Mississippi State Medical Examiner's Office, Jackson Mississippi, where cause of death was determined to be "inhalation of products of combustion, aircraft crash." The Medical Examiner also confirmed that the occupant of the left front seat was the ATP.

Toxicological testing was subsequently performed by the FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, where it was determined that all three occupants had elevated levels of carbon monoxide in their blood. The ATP had no evidence of drugs in his system.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- Fuel System –

From the Cherokee Six 300 flight manual, "Standard fuel capacity…is 84 gallons, all of which is useable except for approximately one pint in each of the four tanks. The two main inboard tanks…hold 25 gallons each…the tip tanks hold 17 gallons each.

The fuel selector control is located below the center of the instrument panel on the sloping face of the control tunnel…When using less than the standard 84 gallon capacity of the tanks, fuel should be distributed equally between each side, filling the tip tanks first."

The fuel system should be drained daily prior to first flight and after refueling to avoid the accumulation of water or sediment. Each fuel tank is equipped with an individual quick drain located at the lower inboard rear corner of each tank. The fuel strainer and a system quick drain valve are located in the fuselage at the lowest point of the fuel system.

It is important that the fuel system be drained in the following manner:

1. Drain each tank through its individual quick drain located at the lower inboard rear corner of the tank, making sure that enough fuel has been drained to ensure that all water and sediment is removed.
2. Place a container under the fuel sump drain outlet, which is located under the fuselage.
3. Drain the fuel strainer by pressing down on the lever located on the right-hand side of the cabin below the forward edge of the rear seat. The fuel selector must be positioned in the following sequence: off position, left tip, left main, right main, and right tip while draining the strainer to ensure that the fuel lines between each tank outlet and each strainer are drained as well as the strainer. When the fuel tanks are full, it will take approximately 11 seconds to drain all the fuel in one of the lines between a tip tank and the fuel selector, and approximately 6 seconds to drain all the fuel in one of the lines from a main tank to the fuel strainer. When the tanks are less than full, it will take a few seconds longer.
4. Examine the contents of the container placed under the fuel sump drain outlet for water and sediment and dispose of the contents.

- Fuel Quality -

According to the manager of the FBO, the fuel truck was sumped daily. A fuel sample was taken from the truck after the accident by FBO personnel within 20 minutes of the accident, examined, and found to contain no water, debris or other anomalies. It was not retained by authorities prior to NTSB visit to HKS, but remained with the FBO and was not subsequently tested.

According to the FBO fueling log, on the date of the accident, the airplane received 28.4 gallons of fuel from the FBO's fuel truck. The log also indicated that five airplanes had been fueled before the accident airplane, receiving a total of 279.1 gallons from the fuel truck, and after the fuel sample was taken subsequent to the accident, one additional airplane was fueled, receiving a total of 44.9 gallons from the fuel truck.

There were no reports received of fuel quality issues with any of the other fueled airplanes.

- Drain Test -

An exemplar PA-32-260 (according to the Piper representative to the investigation, the fuel system is the same for the -260 as the -300) was utilized to attempt a comparison with the approximately 1-foot the fuel stain seen on the ramp after the preflight inspection.

After an initial 1-2 second initial draining of the fuel from the exemplar airplane, there was about a 1-foot stain on the asphalt underneath it. Due to the amount of fuel to be drained, subsequent attempts were drained into a calibrated beaker with stopwatch timings for each attempt, and the fuel was then returned to the airplane. For 6 seconds of draining, the quantity averaged about 130 ml per draining, and for 12 seconds of draining, the quantity averaged about 260 ml per draining.

Pour tests were then made utilizing water, resulting initially in about a 1 ½-foot puddle for each 130 ml pour, and about a 2-foot puddle for each 260 ml pour. After about 10 minutes, the puddles had expanded significantly more, but in irregular shapes. Noted, however, was because of possible differences, such as slope and surface roughness between the test and the prevailing conditions at HKS, an exact comparison could not be made.


NTSB Identification: ERA13FA055 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, November 13, 2012 in Jackson, MS
Aircraft: PIPER PA-32-300, registration: N717RL
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 13, 2012, about 1715 central standard time, a Piper PA-32-300, N717RL, was substantially damaged when it impacted a house in Jackson, Mississippi. The airline transport pilot (ATP) and the two pilot-rated passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight, from Hawkins Field (HKS), Jackson, Mississippi, to John Bell Williams Airport (JVW), Raymond, Mississippi. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the owner of the company to which the airplane was registered, and who was also a student pilot of the ATP, the ATP and he were going to fly to JVW to attend a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety seminar. The owner was subsequently unable to go, but advised the ATP that the airplane needed to be flown since it hadn't flown since September 3rd. The owner was unaware that the other two pilots were onboard.

Announcements for the safety seminar indicated that it was scheduled to begin at 1630.

According to the manager and a lineman at a local fixed base operator, the airplane was pulled out of its hangar and the main fuel tanks were topped off prior to the arrival of the ATP and the passengers, shortly before 1700. Both indicated that the ATP's preflight inspection was much quicker than normal. The lineman, who was refueling another airplane, only looked at the accident airplane periodically, but did see the ATP walking around it, and also saw him in the position required to activate the fuel strainer lever in the interior, right side of the cabin. The lineman later drove by the airplane, and noticed a puddle, an estimated 1 foot in diameter, on the tarmac below the strainer.

The lineman also noticed that the airplane's right tire was low, but the airplane started up and departed before he could inform the ATP. He further observed that the ATP was in the front left seat, and that the younger passenger was in the front right seat.

The manager also noted that the engine run-up was much quicker than he was accustomed, and because of the low tire, he decided to watch the takeoff. He saw the airplane taxi onto runway 16, and heard an abrupt addition of power for the takeoff. The airplane then lifted off in the vicinity of taxiway Bravo, with the engine sounding "normal; real strong."

A preliminary audition of tower communications revealed that at 1708, the pilot called for taxi. The tower controller approved taxi to either runway 16 or 34, pilot's discretion, and the pilot chose runway 16.

At 1712, the pilot requested and was cleared for takeoff, and to then turn right, on course.

At 1713, the pilot was cleared to contact Jackson Departure Control.

A combined FAA radar depiction with voice overlay first revealed the airplane when it was just south of the departure end of runway 16 at 500 feet.

At 1713:50, while the airplane was passing through about 700 feet, the pilot contacted departure control. The controller requested that the pilot "ident" and he provided the local altimeter setting. The pilot did not respond.

At 1714:05, the airplane reached 1,000 feet, followed by a descent to 900 feet.

At 1714:15, the pilot stated "we got an engine problem, we're turning back toward Hawkins." The controller responded, "requiring any assistance, you can turn left or right direct Hawkins," and the pilot replied, "we're headed back, we'll try to make it."

The controller then stated, "understand you're declaring an emergency," but there were no further transmissions from the airplane. Radar indicated a right, descending turn, with the last contact at 500 feet.

The majority of the airplane came to rest upside down in a house located about 185 degrees true, 0.8 nautical miles south of the departure end of runway 16, in the vicinity of 32 degrees, 18.93 minutes north latitude, 090 degrees, 13.28 minutes west longitude.

Tree damage indicated an approximately 60-degree descent, heading 310 degrees magnetic. Except for the left wing, which was lying in the yard next door, the airplane was mostly consumed in a postcrash fire, inside the house. All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the scene. Fire damage precluded flight control continuity beyond cable separation points.

The airplane's instrument panel was completely destroyed; however, charred remnants from a hand-held GPS receiver were recovered and forwarded to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory for a data recovery attempt.

Engine power control positions could not be determined, and the fuel selector position at the time of impact could also not be ascertained. However, the fuel selector was retained for further examination at the NTSB Materials Laboratory.

The Lycoming IO-540-series engine was also charred, with all accessories exhibiting thermal damage. The engine was removed from its upside-down position, and placed on a flatbed trailer for further examination. The propeller, which had one blade tip burned off, did not exhibit torsional bending or leading edge damage.

Propeller rotation confirmed crankshaft continuity to the back of the engine as well as valve movement. Top spark plugs were removed, and cylinder compression was confirmed; however, as compressions were tested, dirty water, consistent with fire suppression water mixed with engine fluids, was ejected from the spark plug holes. When the fuel flow divider (spider) was opened, water was found in the lower part that was clear with the exception of a small amount of white particulate matter. Attempts to determine the source of that water, whether from fire suppression or the fuel supply system itself, are ongoing.


 
Civil Air Patrol 
Mississippi Wing members:   From left, Col. John E. Tilton Jr., Lt. Col. David Williams and Capt. William C. Young.
 

Jackson, Mississippi- Loretta Jamison got second degree burns after a plane crashed into her house. The crash happened Tuesday at her home on Marcus L. Butler Driver in West Jackson. Three passengers, who are also experienced pilots, took off from Hawkins Air Field. Officials say the lead pilot experienced engine problems and wanted to return to the airport. Jamison was in her home when the plane crashed. She escaped through the window and suffered second degree burns. She's now in and out of the hospital and the family is staying in the motel. Her attorney says he's conducting his own investigation before he moves forward with any legal action. 

Source:  http://www2.wjtv.com

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 717RL        Make/Model: PA32      Description: PA-32 Cherokee Six
  Date: 11/13/2012     Time: 2315

  Event Type: Accident   Highest Injury: Fatal     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
  City: JACKSON   State: MS   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO A HOUSE, 3 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE FATALLY INURED, 2 
  PERSONS ON THE GROUND SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, NEAR HAWKINS FIELD, 
  JACKSON, MS

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   3
                 # Crew:   3     Fat:   3     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   2     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Unknown      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: JACKSON, MS  (SW31)                   Entry date: 11/14/2012  

http://registry.faa.gov/N717RL

Fort Worth Alliance (KAFW), Fort Worth, Texas: Airport chief plans to retire after 23 years

 
Star-Telegram / Paul Moseley
 Alliance Airport's director, Tim Ward, left, is stepping down after running the airport since it opened in 1989. His replacement is Tom Harris, right. 

Star-Telegram / Paul Moseley 
Alliance Airport's director, Tim Ward (left), is stepping down after running the airport since it opened in 1989. His replacement is Tom Harris (right).


FORT WORTH -- When Tim Ward stood on Alliance Airport's runway on opening day in December 1989, he spun around and saw nothing. 

 There were no office buildings and no hangars. It was just a concrete runway and lots of grass fields.

"I think about standing on this apron in December of '89 and looking around 360 degrees and not seeing any vertical development. And look at what exists out here today," Ward said with a smile.

After 23 years of running Alliance Airport, Ward is retiring at the end of the year. During his tenure, he has produced 21 air shows and built a fixed-base operation to serve private planes that has received numerous industry awards, including 14 ExxonMobil Gold Tiger Spirit Awards for customer service.

Ward has also overseen the funding and management of a $240 million runway extension project scheduled for completion in 2016. The project will extend runways to 11,000 feet and will include moving roads, railways and dirt to accommodate the extension.

"He's kept that thing moving, and we continue to progress to the point where now most of the funding is in place for the runway extensions," Hillwood Properties President Mike Berry said. "It's a pretty big achievement and a great testament to his leadership."

Ward has also hired his replacement, Tom Harris -- twice. When Ward was working to develop Austin's airport in the 1980s, he hired Harris to help with operations.

And when he took the job at Alliance, he hired Harris again. Since 2000, Harris has worked on real estate development for Hillwood.

Harris said he will continue the runway project and focus on the Alliance learning center concept, where workers can receive continuous training in aviation and aerospace as part of programs with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Tarrant County College and the University of North Texas.

"Getting the learning center of excellence focused on aviation logistics development built is very, very important for Alliance," Harris said.

He said he is already moving into some of the daily operations handled by Ward.

As he enters retirement, Ward said, he plans to stay in his Colleyville home and play more golf.

"I'm ready to not have that responsibility of the 24-hour operation," Ward said. "I'm ready to travel a little bit and enjoy my days and not be driven by the clock."

Read more here: http://www.star-telegram.com


 http://www.airnav.com/airport/AFW