Monday, February 16, 2015

Special Report: Fearless Pilots

MyFoxAL.com - FOX6 WBRC Birmingham, AL


ALBANY, GA (WALB) - Three generations of a South Georgia family are proud crop dusters. The Andrews Family has more than 128 years of combined experience in the cockpits of agriculture airplanes.

South Georgians see crop dusters at work all the time, but being in the air with them is amazing. The planes fly at 130 miles per hour, about four feet off of the ground.

Bruce Andrews took the controls of one of Bruce's Flying Service crop dusters to show what it's like.

"They watch you for the crash. They thinking you are going to crash most of the time," he said.

Fred Andrews started crop dusting in 1957, beginning this family flying tradition. Sons Eddie and Bruce followed in his footsteps, and now Bruce's son Patrick is in the cockpit.

"We always been a close-knit family, and always work real close together," Andrews said.

They say piloting has better benefits than most jobs.

"It's just getting up and you can see different things," explained Eddie Andrews.

"I started mixing when I was very young, and been around airplanes pretty much all my life," Patrick Andrews said.

Technology like GPS computer controlled spraying and turbine engines have made crop dusters more efficient over the years, but the pilots still have to fly close to the ground.

"You [sometimes] run into a wire or hit a tree or something like that. Bump the ground. Those things happen," cautioned Bruce Andrews.

But the Andrews family will carry on crop dusting across the country.

The Andrews Family plans to spray 11 months of 2015. They will be in Pennsylvania for the month of May to spray against moths. Then they will head to Nebraska and North Dakota for corn crops. After that, it's back to South Georgia for peanuts.

Fred has crashed eight planes in his career, but after 56 years he says this may be the season to stay grounded.

"Unless the bugs are biting real bad, I'm just going to watch them," he said.

Story, photo gallery and video:  http://www.myfoxal.com

Fred Andrews



Bruce Andrews






Piper Warrior PA28 -161, N9089N, General Aviation Inc: Accident occurred August 29, 2013 in Danville, Virginia

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA385
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, August 29, 2013 in Danville, VA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/12/2015
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-161, registration: N9089N
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


Several eyewitnesses reported observing the airplane performing several takeoffs and landings. One witness stated that, during one landing attempt, the airplane was low, that a go-around maneuver was initiated, and that the airplane banked sharply left and right during the maneuver. The witness reported that the second landing attempt was successful and that the airplane was then taxied back to the beginning of the runway for another takeoff. During the accident approach, the airplane was observed flaring too high and banking left. One witness stated that the pilot added power and categorized the subsequent climbout as very shallow just before the airplane impacted an antenna and terrain. A postimpact fire ensued. Examination of the wreckage revealed no abnormalities or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.


Review of flight school records revealed that the student pilot's first solo flight was 4 days before the accident and that the flight was 0.8 hour long. It could not be determined if the first solo flight was considered the student pilot's supervised solo or if the accident flight was considered the supervised solo. The flight school's standard operating procedure was to "completely go through all requirements twice"; therefore, although the accident flight was the student pilot's second solo flight, it should still have been supervised by the flight instructor.


The flight instructor reported that the student pilot was scheduled to fly about an hour earlier than when the accident flight initiated; however, due to work requirements, the student pilot had to delay the flight. The flight instructor stated that the student was "upset" about the delay. He said that they conducted three takeoffs and landings together, which took about 30 minutes, and that he then exited the airplane for the student pilot's solo flight. The flight instructor reported that, when the student pilot departed on the solo flight, he witnessed a "beautiful" landing and then went inside to check on another student. He subsequently observed the student pilot conduct more landings, which he categorized as "good."


A cell phone was located inside a thermally damaged case. The cell phone was found off; however, when activated, it indicated that a missed call occurred around the time of the accident. According to the manufacturer, the cell phone may overheat and shut down when exposed to high temperatures and will not register a call when powered off. Therefore, it is likely that the cell phone was on and that the pilot was aware of the incoming call when it was received. Although the investigation could not determine if the student pilot had become distracted by a cell phone call, the flight instructor further stated that the student was very focused on learning but that he was distracted when his cell phone rang. However, the flight instructor did not require the pilot to turn the cell phone off during flight. The flight instructor was in a position of authority and operational control and should have taken steps to ensure that the student was not distracted by the cell phone while flying.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The student pilot's failure to maintain control and climb the airplane during a go-around maneuver. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's failure to provide adequate oversight of the student pilot by ensuring that the cockpit was free of distractions.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 29, 2013, about 1945 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-161, N9089N, was destroyed when it impacted an on airport instrument landing system (ILS) glide slope antenna, the ground, and then a postaccident fire ensued at Danville Regional Airport (DAN), Danville, Virginia. The student pilot, was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local solo flight which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to several eyewitnesses, the airplane was observed performing repeated takeoffs and landings to runway 2. During one of the landing attempts the airplane "appeared too low;" the airplane's engine power could be heard increasing, and a go-around maneuver commenced. During the initial go-around the airplane rolled "sharply left…then sharply right" before it began to climb out. On the second attempt, the landing was "normal" and the airplane taxied back to the beginning of the runway for takeoff. During the accident approach, the airplane "flared high, then rolled left" and then began to climbout "very shallow" and "appeared level" prior to impacting the antenna. The witnesses reported hearing the engine power increase and just prior to impacting the antenna and then engine power decreased.

Based on certificated flight instructor (CFI) and eyewitness interviews the actual number of landing attempts could not be conclusively determined.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and General Aviation Flight, Inc., the flight school, the pilot, age 42, held a student pilot certificate dated August 14, 2013, which was also a third-class medical certificate. At the time of certificate issuance, the student pilot reported 8.8 total flight hours. Although, at the time of this writing the student pilot's logbook had not been located, flight school records showed the student had accumulated about 13 total flight hours, of which, an estimated 1.6 of those hours were solo flight. The student's first flight was accomplished on June 24, 2013. The first solo flight recorded in the flight school's record was on August 25, 2013 and was 0.8 hours in duration. The flight school documentation further stated "SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] is to completely go through all requirements twice and then to review selected ones as per student needs and desires."

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on December 11, 1986, and was registered to General Aviation, Inc on December 5, 1986. It was powered by a 160-hp Lycoming O-320-D3G engine, serial number RL-13625-39E, driving a Sensenich 2-bladed propeller. The airplane's most recent inspection, noted as an annual inspection in the logbook, was accomplished on August 6, 2013. At the time of that inspection the airplane had 13,976.8 total hours of time in service. The engine's most recent inspection, noted as a 100-hour inspection in the logbook, was accomplished on August 6, 2013, at 4,211.1 hours of total time in service and 1,876.2 total hours since major overhaul with a recorded tachometer time of 13,976.8 hours.

At the time of the inspections the tachometer was recorded as 3,976.8 hours. Prior to the accident flight the aircraft tachometer was recorded as 4020.6 hours.

The most recent recorded fueling was accomplished on August 27, 2013, at DAN. The airplane had been fueled with 20.1 gallons of fuel.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The 1953 recorded weather observation at DAN included wind from 050 degrees at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.99 inches of mercury.

On the day of the accident, official sunset was at 1950, end of civil twilight was at 2016.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The airport was a publically owned airport and at the time of the accident did not have a control tower. There were two runways designated runway 2/20, and runway 13/31. However, at the time of the accident, the airport was under construction and runway 13/31 was closed. Runway 2/20 was normally 6,502 feet long; however, due to construction, it was 3,028 feet long and 150 feet wide. The airport elevation was 571 feet above mean sea level. The ILS glide slope antenna was located about 900 feet from the runway threshold to runway 2 and about 175 feet from the west side of the paved portion of runway 2/20.

The airport, at the time of the accident had numerous published Notices to Airman (NOTAM) and some of them that affected the landing runway were:

• DAN 06/009 DAN RWY 2/20 RWY LGTS PCL OTS EXC LOW INTST
• DAN 04/007 DAN RWY 2/20 NORTH 3474 CLSD WEF 1304251528
• DAN 03/040 DAN RWY 2/20 CLSD TO ACFT WITH APCH SPEED IN EXCESS OF 121 KTS
• DAN 03/035 DAN RWY 2/20 CLSD TGL
• DAN 03/027 DAN RWY 20 PAPI OTS
• DAN 03/026 DAN RWY 2 PAPI OTS
• DAN 03/021 DAN NAV ILS RWY 2 OM OTS WEF 1303251200-1401151200
• DAN 03/017 DAN NAV ILS RWY 2 GP/LLZ OTS WEF 1303251200
• DAN 03/016 DAN RWY 2 ALS OTS WEF 1303251200
• DAN 03/015 DAN RWY 2 REIL OTS WEF 1303251200

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The ILS glide slope antenna exhibited impact damage 39.5 feet above ground level (agl). Ground scars were present between the runway and taxiway "A." The left wing was collocated with the ILS glide slope antenna. The accident flight path was oriented on a 346 degree heading and the debris path began about 20 feet prior to ILS glide slope antenna and consisted of the left wing beginning at the wing root and included the entire wing. The debris path terminated 176 feet past the antenna. The debris path included a ground scar in a position consistent with the right wing impacting the ground in a right wing low attitude. The impact mark was located 105 feet from the antenna. Two propeller strike marks were also located along the debris path. The marks were 31 inches apart and the first strike mark was about 5 inches in depth. The second mark consisted of the propeller assembly including both blades and the propeller hub. The main wreckage came to rest on a heading of 129 degrees.

Nose and Cockpit Section

The engine and cockpit exhibited fore-to-aft crushing and thermal damage. The engine remained attached to the firewall via the tubular mounts. The propeller was found separated from the engine and was located along the debris field and one of the blades, which was imbedded in the ground, exhibited minimal S-bending and leading edge damage. The ignition switch was found with the key remaining in it; however, due to thermal damage it could not be determined on the actual position. The fuel selector valve remained attached to the side wall; however, due to thermal damage the position of the switch could not be determined. According to the CFI, the selector valve was likely in the "LEFT" position when he exited the airplane prior to the student departing on the solo flight just prior to the accident. Both front seats remained attached to their respective seat tracks. The rear seats remained attached to their attach points. The left shoulder harness buckle remained attached the left side of the belt buckle. One side of the seat belt in the rear seat remained attached to the fuselage structure; however, no other seatbelts or buckles were located. The flap lever, located between the two pilot seats, was in the bottom detent, which correlated to the flaps "UP" position, which also correlated to the flap position found on both wings. The main entry located on the right side of the airplane was thermally damaged; however, the door latch was in the locked position.

A cellular phone was located in the wreckage, in a carrying case, and the case had extensive thermal damage. Removing the phone from the case revealed it was not on; and after it was turned on for examination it revealed that a missed call was received at 1946 EDT. According to the cellular phone manufacturer's online technical support, the model of phone found in the wreckage may overheat and shutdown when exposed to temperatures that exceed 35 degrees C; and it will not register a missed call when powered off.

Engine

Engine continuity was confirmed from the propeller hub to the rear accessory pad via hand rotation of the propeller flange. Thumb compression was confirmed on all cylinders during hand rotation. The top and bottom spark plugs were removed, appeared to be light gray in color, and were "normal" in wear according to Champion Spark Plug Guide. The bottom spark plugs associated with the Nos. 2 and 4 cylinder were oily to the touch. Due to thermal damage, neither magneto was able to produce spark but the impulse coupling had positive contact that was heard when rotated by hand. The fuel pump was disassembled and no noted anomalies were found with the check valve, and all gaskets exhibited thermal damage. Examination of the fuel pump actuator rod revealed that it was able to be operated by hand. The oil filter, which was thermally damaged, was removed from the engine and disassembled. The filter media was removed for examination and no metal material was found. The oil suction screen was removed and was free of debris. The vacuum pump was removed and rotated by hand, it was disassembled, and the carbon vanes remained intact. The throttle and mixture control arm positions were unreliable due to impact and thermal damage.

Right Wing

The right wing remained attached to the fuselage and exhibited impact crush damage and thermal damage at the wing root. The wing tip also exhibited impact crush damage in the negative direction beginning at the wing tip and proceeding inboard 66 inches. The flap was in the retracted or flaps "UP" position. The aileron remained attached to the wing at its wing attach point. Cable continuity was confirmed from the control yoke to the right aileron as well as the cross aileron cable, which also remained attached to the left wing's aileron bell crank. The aileron bell was found separated from the left wing; however, remained attached to both aileron cables. The right wing's fuel cap remained attached, seated correctly, and locked in position. The fuel tank contained a blue fluid with similar smell and color as 100 LL Aviation fuel. The right main landing gear remained attached to the wing attach points.

Tail Section

The rudder and stabilator remained attached to the empennage; however, the top of the rudder and the vertical stabilizer had impact damage. Cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the rudder pedals to the rudder; however, examination of the cables revealed they were off their associated pulley located in the rear of the tail section. There was no gouge or wear marks on the cables that would indicate the cables were off the pulley prior to the accident sequence. The stabilator counter weight remained intact. Elevator cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the elevator bellcrank; however, similar to the rudder, the cables were found off the pulley. There was no gouge or wear marks on the cables that would indicate the cables were off the pulley prior to the accident sequence. The pitch trim was found with five threads exposed on the bottom, which measured 11/16 of an inch of exposed threads, that correlated to a neutral trim position.

Left Wing

The left wing exhibited crush and impact damage beginning at the wing root and proceeding outward, with the larger area of damage concentrated at the wingroot. The fuel tank was breached, devoid of fuel, and the fuel cap remained secured and seated. The flap remained attached and was found in the retracted or "UP" position. The aileron bellcrank was separated from the wing attach point but did remain attached to the cable and continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column, through the separation, to the aileron. The aileron remained attached to the associated attach points. The stall micro-switch remained attached on the leading edge of the wing. The micro-switch was removed from the wing and continuity was confirmed using a multimeter when the switch was moved by hand to close the contact. The left main landing gear remained attached; however, an angle iron was found penetrating the inboard wall of the tire approximately 2 inches from the brake assembly and the tire was found deflated.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot on August 30, 2013, by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Roanoke, Virginia. The autopsy listed the cause of death as "inhalation of smoke and thermal injuries," and the report listed the specific injuries.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated neither ethanol or carbon monoxide were detected, and Amlodipine was detected in the urine and the blood; however, no quantified amount was provided.

According to the FAA Aerospace Medical Research Forensic Toxicology website, Amlodipine is a calcium channel blocker heart medication used in the treatment of hypertension.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Interview with CFI

In a recorded interview, the CFI stated that the day of the accident the student pilot was scheduled to fly at 1730; however, due to work requirements taking longer than anticipated, the student pilot had to delay the flight. The CFI described the student pilot as upset that the flight was going to be delayed. The CFI reported that the student pilot was a medical doctor and that the day of the accident a "procedure" took longer than anticipated. He further reported that the student pilot's patient, while performing the "procedure," almost expired.

Upon arrival at the airport, the CFI and student pilot flew three takeoffs and landings, for about a half an hour, prior to the CFI exiting the airplane and the student pilot conducting a solo flight. The CFI informed the student pilot not to exceed eight takeoffs and landings so the student pilot would not "get fatigued." The CFI further stated that he watched the student pilot's first landing, which he categorized as "beautiful," and then went inside the building to check on another student, came back out and "saw another good landing," went back inside the building, came back out, got on a golf cart, "saw a couple of more good landings." The golf cart was positioned on the taxiway, in order for the student pilot to see it and terminate the takeoff and landing practice as it was "time to put the airplane up." The CFI then observed the airplane "a little bit low," heard the engine increase in power, and observed the airplane level off, banked, and impact the glideslope antenna. The CFI further stated that the student pilot was very focused on flying; however, when his pager or cellular phone sounded, he would immediately reach for it. The CFI provided an example of, while in the airport traffic pattern, the CFI's cellular phone "went off" the student "…started looking like it was for his." The CFI further stated that "It's my cell phone. Forget it. And he [the student] looked at me like, forget the cell phone? He couldn't imagine somebody just ignoring a cell phone." The CFI estimated the student performed five landings prior to the accident.

Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)

According to the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), a pilot can self-assess his ability to fly by applying a personal checklist known as IMSAFE. The acronym stands for Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, and Emotion. The AIM stated that "Stress and fatigue can be an extremely hazardous combination…" The AIM also stated that "the emotions of anger, depression, and anxiety…not only decrease alertness but also may lead to taking risks…any pilot who experiences an emotionally upsetting event should not fly until satisfactorily recovered from it."

Fatigue in Aviation, Medical Facts for Pilots

According to a pilot safety brochure produced by the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Fatigue in Aviation, Medical Facts for Pilots (OK-07-193) states in part, "Fatigue leads to a decrease in your ability to carry out tasks…significant impairment in a person's ability to carry out tasks that require manual dexterity, concentration, and higher-order intellectual processing. Fatigue may happen…in a relatively short time (hours) after some significant physical or mental activity…"

Aviation Instructor's Handbook (FAA-H-8083-9A)

According to Chapter 7 "Instructor Responsibilities and Professionalism" under the section titled "Aviation Instructor Responsibilities" indicates five main responsibilities of aviation instructors. Those responsibilities are listed as "Helping Students learn. Providing adequate instruction. Demanding adequate standards of performance. Emphasizing the positive. Ensuring aviation safety." The chapter further explains that there are at least eight "Additional Responsibilities of Flight Instructors" and two of those responsibilities are "Pilot supervision" and "Student's pre-solo flight thought process."

According to Chapter 8 "Techniques of Flight Instruction" in the section titled "First Solo Flight" states in part "During the student's first solo flight, the instructor must be present to assist in answering questions or resolving any issues that arise during the flight. To ensure the solo flight is a positive, confidence-building experience for the student, the flight instructor needs to consider time of day when scheduling the flight…If possible, the flight instructor needs access to a portable radio during any supervised solo operations. A radio enables the instructor to terminate the solo operation if he or she observes a situation developing…"

Although the FAA does not specifically state everything that a CFI is responsible for; FAA approved courses do provide some specific guidance when it comes to professionalism. Some of the responsibilities taught under those courses are:

AMERICAN FLYERS FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR REFRESHER COURSE

Stage 1, Chapter 3 "Instructor Professional Responsibilities" states in part "…Although the word 'professionalism' is widely used, it is rarely defined. Though not all-inclusive, the following list gives some major considerations and qualification that should be included in the definition of professionalism.
• Professionalism exists only when a service is performed for someone or for the common good.
• Professionalism is achieved only after extended training and preparation
• True performance as a professional is based on study and research
• Professionals must be able to reason logically and accurately
• Professionalism requires the ability to make good judgmental decisions. Professionals cannot limit their actions and decisions to only standard patterns and practices
• Professionalism demands a code of ethics. Professionals must be true to themselves and to those they serve. Anything less than a sincere performance is quickly detected and immediately destroys their effectiveness."

The chapter goes onto state "Training Oversight and Student Supervision – Flight Instructors have the responsibility to provide guidance and restraint with respect to the solo operations of their students. This is by far the most important flight instructor responsibility because the instructor is the only person in a position to make the determination that a student is ready for solo operations…"

GLEIM FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR REFRESHER COURSE STUDY UNIT 9

According to Section 9.3 "Instructor Responsibilities" states in part "I. Student Pilot Supervision…B. Flight instructors have a moral and ethical obligation to provide guidance and restraint with respect to the solo operations of their student…"



Scott J. Banuelos, MD



Danville, VA-- There is now more information on the plane crash at Danville Regional Airport that left a student pilot dead in 2013.


35-year-old Dr. Scott Banuelos was killed. The National Transportation Safety Board said in their final report that Banuelos failed to maintain control and climb the airplane during a go-around maneuver. It also said the flight instructor failed to provide adequate oversight of the student pilot by ensuring the cockpit was free of distractions.


They believe a cell phone call during the flight may have been a major distraction.











Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain, N717SC, registered to Pinot Leasing, LLC, Zionsville and operated by Solutions Air Charter: Accident occurred February 16, 2015 at Chicago Midway International Airport (KMDW), Illinois

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

  http://registry.faa.gov/N727SC 

NTSB Identification: CEN15LA147
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, February 16, 2015 in Chicago, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 08/11/2015
Aircraft: PIPER PA 31-350, registration: N727SC
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that he executed a normal approach for landing. During the approach, the pilot lowered the landing gear and verified the extended position by checking the landing gear position indicators in the cockpit. Upon touchdown on the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed, and then the right main landing gear collapsed. The airplane then exited the runway surface and came to rest upright. The right wing sustained substantial damage. A postaccident examination of the landing gear system revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The collapse of the nose and right main landing gears during landing for reasons that could not be determined because examination of the landing gear system revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

On February 16, 2015, at 1445 central standard time, a Piper PA-31-350 airplane, N727SC, sustained substantial damage following a collapse of the nose and right main landing gear during landing at Chicago Midway International Airport (MDW), Chicago, Illinois. The airline transport pilot, who was the sole occupant, was not injured. The airplane was registered to Pinot Leasing, LLC, Zionsville, Indiana, and operated by Solutions Air Charter, Greenfield, Indiana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The airplane departed the Indianapolis Regional Airport (MQJ), Indianapolis, Indiana, at 1445 eastern standard time, and was destined for MDW.

The pilot reported that he executed a normal approach for landing to runway 4R at MDW. During the approach, the pilot lowered the landing gear and verified the extended position with the landing gear position indicators in the cockpit. Upon touchdown on the runway, the nose landing gear collapsed, followed by a collapse of the right main landing gear. The airplane exited the runway surface and came to rest upright. 

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector who examined the airplane, the right wing sustained substantial damage to the forward and aft spars.

On March 2, 2015, the airplane was examined by a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, a FAA inspector, and representatives from the operator. At the time of the examination, the airplane was located on an outside ramp surface with its landing gear extended and secured with straps and harness equipment. The airplane is equipped with a hydraulically actuated, retractable tricycle landing gear, and the landing gear system was visually examined. The airplane's hydraulic reservoir, located in the forward baggage compartment, did not exhibit fluid in its sight glass. The sight glass was removed and fluid was observed on a removed strip that was lowered into the sight glass opening. No evidence was found that the hydraulic system was compromised during the accident.

During the examination, the airplane power was switched on, the landing gear handle was lowered, and landing gear emergency extension was performed. During the landing gear emergency extension, the landing gear locked into the extended position and the right main inner landing gear door moved to the up position. The left main landing gear door actuator was separated from its door. Due to the unavailability of equipment to properly support the airplane, a test of landing gear retraction and extension operations was not performed. The examination of the landing gear system revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on October 1, 2014.

According to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), the hydraulic system fluid level of the reservoir should be checked every 50 hours by placing the airplane in a level position and viewing the fluid level through the sight glass located in the forward surface of the reservoir dome. If fluid is not visible, filtered hydraulic fluid (MIL-H-5606) should be added. The AFM preflight inspection checks do not include verifying the hydraulic fluid level in the sight gauge.

According to a FAA inspector who spoke with a Piper technical service representative, the amount of hydraulic fluid found in the accident airplane at the time of the examination would not impact the operation of the landing gear system.





CHICAGO (WLS) -- A twin engine plane ran off the runway while landing at Midway Airport Monday afternoon. No one was seriously injured, according to the CFD. 

Only the pilot was on board. Chicago Fire Department officials said he is shaken but does not appear to be seriously injured. He is being evacuated on the scene by paramedics. 

Officials said it appears the landing gear on the aircraft collapsed during the landing. 

The small, privately owned plane came to rest upright.  The FAA is investigating, official said. 

Story, comments and photo:  http://abc7chicago.com


A small plane slid off the runway at Chicago's Midway Airport Monday afternoon, officials said.

According to Chicago Fire Media Affairs, only the pilot was inside the plane at the time.

Officials said the pilot was "shook up" and being evaluated by fire personnel.


Chicago Department of Aviation spokeswoman Karen Pride said the aircraft experienced mechanical issues while trying to land on the runway.  
The incident did not impact any other flights at the airport, Pride said.

Story, comments and photo: http://www.nbcchicago.com

Cessna 421C Golden Eagle, Venezia Marine Inc, N229H: Accident occurred August 27, 2013 in Paris, Illinois

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA509
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, August 27, 2013 in Paris, IL
Aircraft: CESSNA 421C, registration: N229H
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 27, 2013, approximately 1120 central daylight time, a Cessna 421C Riley Turbine Rocket twin-engine airplane, N229H, impacted wooded terrain shortly after takeoff from the Edgar County Airport (PRG), Paris, Illinois. The airline transport pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed and a post-impact fire ensued. The airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., Terre Haute, Indiana, and operated by RSB Aviation, Inc., Paris, Illinois, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was en route to the Terre Haute International Airport - Hulman Field (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana.

According to RSB Aviation company personnel, prior to the flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 178 gallons of fuel, which according to a company pilot, would have topped off the fuel tanks. The pilot intended to depart PRG, pick up an individual at HUF, and then continue to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Witnesses, located inside a building on the airport, observed a portion of the airplane's takeoff roll from runway 9. They stated the airplane seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed with the accident airplane. Due to corn and other obstacles on the airport property blocking their view, and concerned with the slow takeoff roll, the witnesses exited the building and went to the edge of the runway to see if the pilot stopped the airplane or turned around. The witnesses did not observe the airplane; however, shortly thereafter, they noticed a smoke plume about 1 mile east of the airport.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 33, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating, a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine land and airplane single-engine sea ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate was dated August 13, 2012, and had no limitations. The pilot's application for his medical certificate indicated no use of any medications and no medical history conditions.

According to an insurance application dated December 4, 2012, the pilot reported he had accumulated at least 8,600 total flight hours, 4,700 total flight hours in multiengine airplanes, and 2,000 total flight hours in Cessna 421C Riley Turbine Rocket powered airplanes. The pilot's logbooks were not located during the investigation.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 by The Cessna Aircraft Company as model 421C, serial number 421C0088, and was a high-performance, twin engine, low wing, piston-powered airplane. The airplane was originally issued a standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category on April 22, 1976, and the airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., on March 5, 2009. At the time of the accident, the airplane was equipped with two 675 shaft horsepower (shp) Lycoming LTP101-600A-1A engines, flat rated to 475 shp, per a supplemental type certificate (STC), and Hartzell Propeller HC-B3TN-3C three-blade, single-acting, constant speed, hydraulically operated propellers with feathering and reversing capability. 

On January 28, 1982, in accordance with Riley Aircraft STC SA4293WE, two Lycoming turboprop engines were installed on the airplane. The airplane was then issued a new standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category on January 29, 1982. 

A review of STC SA4293WE indicated the minimum controllable airspeed is 97 knots with the inoperative engine propeller in the feathered position.

Current airframe, engine, and propeller maintenance logbooks were not located during the investigation. RSB Aviation company personnel stated the maintenance records were in the accident airplane; no evidence of maintenance records were noted within the aircraft wreckage. The airplane's current weight and balance documents were not located.

According to RSB Aviation company maintenance personnel, the airplane underwent its most recent annual inspection in May or June of 2013.

According to RSB Aviation company personnel, during the previous several weeks before the accident, the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up. A company pilot reported the following: "The left engine sometimes would 'hang' at 70 [percent] gas [generator]. Upon moving (cycling) the throttle and or cycling the fuel pump on/off, the power to the left engine would accelerate and be normal. To say another way, it was slow to accelerate on power up to 70 [percent] gas [generator] and would stop at that power setting. Moving the throttle more forward (toward full) would not do anything. This sometimes would go on for minutes before coming up and would operate normal after that." The company pilot stated the delay/lag would not occur at each engine start-up, but at intermittent times. The airplane was flown on several flights by RBS Aviation pilots with the known delay/lag condition. According to maintenance personnel and another company pilot, the known problem with the left engine had not been corrected prior to the accident flight.

During an interview with a Honeywell technical representative, he stated that at an unknown date preceding the accident, the accident pilot contacted him to inquire about troubleshooting the left engine issue. The technical representative offered several suggestions to troubleshoot the problem; however, he had not received a call back whether the issue had been resolved. 

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1155, the PRG automated weather observation system, located approximately 0.5 miles west of the accident site, reported the wind from 260 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 30 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 24 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.07 inches of mercury.

COMMUNICATION AND RADAR INFORMATION

There were no recorded air traffic communications or radar data for the accident flight.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Edgar County Airport, PRG, is a public, non-towered airport located about 5 miles north of Paris, Illinois, at a surveyed elevation of 654 feet. The airport features two asphalt runways, runway 9/27, which is 4,501 feet by 75 feet, and runway 18/36, which is 3,200 feet by 75 feet.

Runway 9 has a 38 foot tree located approximately 1,411 feet from the runway and 104 feet left of runway centerline.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, or cockpit image recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located approximately 1/2 of a mile from the departure end of runway 9. The airplane wreckage was distributed on a heading of 090 degrees for approximately 300 feet. The airplane impacted numerous trees prior to coming to rest at the base of a large tree. A post-impact fire and 2 post-impact explosions ensued. Several separated sections of the left wing, left horizontal stabilizer, and left elevator were located near the initial tree impacts. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, right wing, a portion of the left wing, both engines, and portions of the empennage.

Visual examination and aerial photographs of the departure end of runway 9 and adjacent terrain showed the airplane's main landing gear exit the end of the runway surface, travel approximately 300 feet through grass, continue to travel approximately 300 feet through 3-foot-tall soybeans, and then impact the top of 10-foot-tall corn stalks for approximately 50 feet. Damage to the soybean and corn vegetation was greater on the right path area than on the left path area. Following the damaged corn stalks, there was no evidence of the airplane impacting terrain prior to the tree impacts. 

The fuselage, to include the cockpit and cabin areas, was destroyed by fire and thermal damage. The six seat frames (2 cockpit, 4 cabin) were separated from the fuselage structure. No seat restraint webbing was observed or located. No cockpit instrument readings or navigation/communication radio settings were discernable due to thermal damage. 

The flight control cables and linkage system were examined for continuity. One elevator control cable was continuous from the ball end to a separation in the aft fuselage. The separation was consistent with an overload failure. The other elevator control cable was continuous from a damaged turn barrel near the cockpit to a separation in the aft fuselage. The separation was consistent with an overload failure. The aileron, rudder, and flap control continuity could not be determined due to damage associated with the impact and fire. Landing gear and flap positions could not be determined due to damage associated with the impact and fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) completed the on-scene examination/wreckage documentation, and a recovery company removed all remaining airplane wreckage from the accident site. The engines, propellers, and miscellaneous airframe structure were transported to Honeywell, Phoenix, Arizona, for further examination. Details of the engine and propeller examinations are found later in this report.

PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Department of Pathology, Terre Haute, Indiana. The autopsy ruled the cause of death as the result of blunt force trauma, and the manner of death as an accident. No unusual findings were discovered during the autopsy.

Biological specimens from the pilot's body were forwarded to the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute for toxicological testing. These specimens tested negative for ethanol and drugs. The specimens were unsuitable for carbon monoxide testing, and testing for cyanide was not performed.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Engine Examination

The engines were disassembled at Honeywell's facilities in Phoenix, Arizona, under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the engines did not reveal evidence of preimpact malfunctions.

The left engine external surfaces were covered in black soot and displayed deposits of solidified aluminum. The power turbine rotated freely with continuity established to the propeller. The gas producer shaft would not rotate; however, remained connected to the gearbox. The gas producer rotated with resistance after the fuel and oil pumps were removed. The accessory gearbox rotated freely through both high and low speed gear train after the power section was removed from the gearbox housing.

Disassembly of the left engine revealed the cup lock and nut were rotated 45 degrees from the anti-rotation slot to the crimped area of the cup washer. No torque on the nut was noted during the disassembly. Circumferential rubs were noted on the inner diameter of the compressor vane assembly. The axial compressor rotor was covered in black soot and the blade tips displayed rubs and material buildup on the trailing edge. The compressor impeller was covered in black soot and the blades displayed rubs at the inducer, knee, and exducer. The impeller shroud displayed a light rub at the inducer from about the 12 to 3 o'clock position (aft looking forward), rub in the knee area at 3 to 4 o'clock position, and a rub in the exducer area from the 5 to 3 o'clock position. The compressor diffuser assembly showed evidence of metallic deposits on the inlet side of the vanes. The gas producer turbine rotor assembly showed evidence of metal spray on the pressure side of the blades at the trailing edge. The power turbine nozzle assembly displayed a light circumferential rub mark at the trailing edge and evidence of metal spray on the aft side of the vanes. The power turbine rotor assembly was covered in black soot and displayed evidence of blade tip rubs at the trailing edge. The accessory gearbox module components were intact and appeared undamaged. The following items were removed and retained for further examination: fuel pump, fuel control, fuel manifold, overspeed limiter, and propeller governor.

The right engine power section was separated from the accessory gearbox and the engine was covered in white ash. The power turbine was free to rotate. The gas producer would not rotate. The high and low speed spool in the accessory gearbox would not rotate.

Disassembly of the right engine revealed the cup lock and nut were missing. Circumferential rubs were noted on the inner diameter of the compressor vane assembly. The axial compressor rotor blade tips displayed material rolled in the direction opposite of rotation. Several blades were missing material at the forward leading edge, and several blades displayed damage on the leading edge with missing material. The compressor impeller was covered in light soot and the blade tips displayed rubs on the entire length of the blade. Material buildup was noted on both sides of the blades. The impeller shroud displayed a rub with material missing at the inducer from about the 10 to 2 o'clock position (aft looking forward), static blade indications on the shroud in area of a rub in the knee, a rub in the exducer area from the 11 to 1 o'clock position, and a light rub at the exducer area from the 1 to 11 o'clock position. The gas producer turbine rotor assembly showed evidence of metal spray on the aft side of the blades, and a circumferential rub on the outer diameter of the seal plate. The power turbine nozzle assembly displayed a light 360-degree circumferential rub at the aft area of the blade. The power turbine rotor assembly forward end of shaft was fractured approximately 5 ¼ inches from forward end. The forward end of the shaft displayed a blue tint. The assembly displayed evidence of blade tip rubs at the trailing edge. The accessory gearbox module housing had missing areas due to thermal damage which exposed internal gears and bearings. 

Left Engine Fuel Pump

The left engine fuel pump was examined at Triumph Engine Control Systems, West Hartford, Connecticut, under the supervision of the NTSB. Extensive thermal damage was noted on the pump housing which precluded any functional test of the pump. Disassembly and examination of the pump did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction.

Left Engine Fuel Control

The left engine fuel control was examined at Honeywell, South Bend, Indiana, under the supervision of the NTSB. Extensive thermal damage was noted on the control, which precluded any functional test of the control. Disassembly and examination of the control did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction.

Left Engine Fuel Manifold

The left engine fuel manifold was examined at UTC Aerospace Systems Engine Components, Des Moines, Iowa, under the supervision of the FAA. Visual examination of the manifold showed it was covered in carbon and a portion of the hard line was bent. The inlet fitting threads were damaged and a new inlet fitting was installed to perform a flow test per the approved test procedure (ATP). During the flow test, the number 1 and 2 nozzles had streaking to no flow. A pressure test was performed at 650 pounds per square inch (PSI) and several leaks were noted. The nozzles were removed from the manifold to replace the O-rings and Teflon seals. A pressure test at 650 PSI was again performed and no leaks were found. The ATP was repeated and the flow improved, however, the number 1 nozzle was clogged with no flow noted.

The left engine fuel manifold was further examined at Parker Aerospace, Glendale, Arizona, under the supervision of the FAA. The 68600501 ATP was performed on the patternation test fixture, and leakage was observed from the valve expansion plug. The manifold was installed into a spray quality chamber and all nozzles, with the exception of the number 5 nozzle, showed sputtering, backflow, and very little flow. The number 5 nozzle showed nominal flow. The nozzles were removed for further examination. New nozzles were installed on the accident manifold and the new nozzles met the test requirements. The accident nozzles were installed back onto the accident manifold with new O-rings and the flow test was repeated. All pressures were higher which was consistent with reduced flow primary circuit flow.

The left engine fuel manifold was placed on a test engine at Honeywell, Phoenix, Arizona, and an engine test was performed. The engine test revealed no discrepancy in the engine operation.

Propeller Examination

The propellers were disassembled at Honeywell's facilities in Phoenix under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the propellers did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction. Extensive thermal damage precluded determination of blade angle at the time of the accident; however, evidence revealed that neither propeller was in the feather or reverse position.

Disassembly of the left propeller revealed that the propeller assembly contained extensive thermal damage. All three blades remained partially attached to the hub. All three blades rotated in their respective clamps. Propeller cycling was not possible due to thermal and impact damage. The piston had thermal damage and large portions of the piston were melted. The piston contained deep impression marks consistent with the feather stops, which was indicative of the piston being forced into the feathered position. One blade was bent 90 degrees aft at mid blade, twisted forward at the blade tip, and the tip curled. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip. Several inches of the blade tip were missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage. One blade was 90 percent missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage.

Disassembly of the right propeller revealed that the propeller assembly contained extensive thermal damage. One blade was separated from the hub, and two blades remained partially attached to the hub. Propeller cycling was not possible due to thermal and impact damage. The piston was fragmented and a few fragmented sections remained on the beta rods. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip. One blade was 50 percent missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip.

Weight and Balance Information

The airplane's current weight and balance documents were not located. Based on the airplane's flight manual (AFM), gross weight computations were made for the accident takeoff based on the airplane's original empty weight, pilot, and fuel weights. The takeoff condition was calculated for a full fuel tank condition based on company personnel statements which indicated the pilot topped off the tanks with full fuel (total fuel capacity was 290.4 gallons, of which 281 was usable). The occupant weight was obtained from the pilot's most recent airman application, which was 200 pounds. The AFM listed the maximum takeoff weight was 7,579 pounds.

For the takeoff condition, the calculated gross weight was about 7,522 pounds. 

Airplane Performance

According to the AFM and a temperature of approximately 85 F, the twin-engine climb performance at sea level is about 1,900 feet per minute, and the single-engine climb performance at sea level is about 390 feet per minute with the propeller feathered, and the gear and flaps in the up position. The total distance over a 50 foot obstacle with takeoff power on both engines is approximately 2,600 feet.

AFM Checklist Emergency Procedures

Section 3 of the Riley Turbine Rocket Cessna 421C AFM provides information regarding airplane emergencies, the warnings or alerts associated with a particular emergency, and the procedures to follow once the emergency has been identified. Some of those procedures are listed as follows.

Engine Inoperative Procedures:

1. Engine Securing Procedure: Power Lever – FLIGHT IDLE Condition Lever – FEATHER Main Tank Pumps – OFF Generator – OFF Cabin Air Switches – OFF Fuel Selector – OFF Engine Anti-Ice - OFF Air Conditioner – OFF (If Installed) 

10. Engine Failure Before Liftoff – Speed Below 105 KIAS (knots indicated airspeed) Power Levers – GROUND IDLE or REVERSE as required Brakes – AS REQUIRED CAUTION: Use of reverse power with one engine inoperative only to the amount that directional control can be maintained.

13. Engine Failure After Take-Off – Speed Above 105 KIAS 1. POWER LEVERS – 51.3 PSIG Torque (DO NOT EXCEED MGT RED LINE) 2. Landing Gear – UP after positive rate is achieved 3. Establish Bank – 5 degrees TOWARD OPERATIVE ENGINE 4. Climb to Obstacle – 110 KIAS (Best Angle of Climb Speed) 5. Accelerate to Best Single Engine Climb Speed (Vyse) – 117 KIAS 6. Trim Tabs – ADJUST (Adjust to relieve control pressures) 7. Cabin Air Switches – OFF 8. Inoperative Engine – Secure (See Sect 1-A Above) 9. As Soon As Practical – LAND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Family members and friends of the pilot expressed concerns to the NTSB regarding some possible sabotage or criminal activity to the airplane by unknown persons that may have caused the accident. In the year preceding the accident, the pilot and his company felt harassed by local officials and airport personnel. The investigation did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity that precluded the accident.


PARIS — After nearly two years, an investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) “did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity” regarding the fatal RSB Aviation crash at the Edgar County Airport.

The factual report, released May 14, is not the final Probable Cause report and only includes the factual data found during the investigation.

On Aug. 27, 2013, RSB Aviation owner and operator Rusty Bogue, 33, was piloting a Cessna 421 C Riley Turbine Rocket twin-engine airplane from the Edgar County Airport, headed to Terre Haute International Airport — Hulman Field in Terre Haute, where he was planning to pick up a passenger and continue to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Shortly after take-off, however, the airplane struck a wooded terrain approximately one half mile from the departure end of Edgar County Airport Runway 9. Bogue died of injuries sustained from the accident.
According to the factual report, “the airplane was destroyed and a post-impact fire ensued.”

Witnesses inside the airport stated the airplane “seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed.”

RSB Aviation personnel reported to investigators that during the previous several weeks before the accident, “the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up.” The report also noted that Bogue had contacted a Honeywell Aerospace technician “to inquire about troubleshooting the left engine issue.”

An autopsy performed at Terre Haute Regional Hospital ruled the cause of death as blunt force trauma and the manner of death as an accident. “No unusual findings were discovered during the autopsy.”

“Biological specimens from the pilot’s body were forwarded to the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute for toxicological testing. These specimens tested negative for ethanol and drugs,” according to the factual report.
Family members and friends of Bogue interviewed during the investigation “expressed concerns to the NTSB regarding some possible sabotage or criminal activity to the airplane by unknown persons that may have caused the accident. In the year preceding the accident, the pilot and his company felt harassed by local officials and airport personnel. The investigation did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity that precluded the accident.”

Bogue’s father, Robert Bogue, has been on a quest to find the truth about the accident since it occurred; however, the factual report released by the NTSB has left him with more questions than answers. To the Bogue patriarch, there is only one explanation.

“My feelings haven’t changed,” he said. “The plane was tampered with. Period.”

http://www.parisbeacon.com

PARIS, IL. (ECWd) – The Edgar County Airport Advisory Board held a meeting on February 9, 2015 at the airport.

During the public comment session, at about the 2:20 mark in the audio, Mr. Rob Bogue talks to the airport advisory board about their response to his FOIA request, and the fact that some people think they are special and do not need to provide a copy of their insurance policy to the airport like the lease demands.

Around the 7:27 mark is where Chris Patrick tries blowing smoke to the board about why he won’t provide a copy of his insurance certificate to the airport. He blamed it on Rob Bogue and flat-out lied when he stated that Rob Bogue called Jerry Newlin’s insurance company and told them not to pay off the insurance claim. That never happened and it appears Chris Patrick can’t quit lying even when he’s not on the board.

Chris then reads from some “Airport Manager’s Handbook” that the County has never adopted even after Chris attempted to present it and approve it all at the same meeting before he resigned as chairman (even though it was fine not to have it for the 20+ years prior when he was the airport board chairman), about exclusive use of the main hangar not being allowed, however, there are exceptions to that rule and he failed to mention them. Additionally, I believe this comment was simply another step in Patrick’s and Heltsley’s attempts at running yet another rent paying leaseholder from the airport simply because they want to.

Interestingly we find that the language in the FAA Airport Compliance manual is quite different than what Patrick would lead people to believe, nor is the language found in the FAA Grant Assurance 23 Document the same as what he read to the board. As if that is not enough, Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5190-6, Exclusive Rights at Federally Obligated Airports is yet another FAA document that is quite different than what Patrick presented.  In an effort to be thorough, we reviewed and linked to all applicable FAA and CFR codes and once again, Patrick is wrong!

FAA Airport Compliance- Since 1938, there has been a statutory prohibition on exclusive rights 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e)  “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended.”

Air Navigation Facility Defined (40102- (4) ‘‘air navigation facility’’ means a facility used, available for use, or designed for use, in aid of air navigation, including— (A) a landing area; (B) a light; (C) Apparatus or equipment for distributing weather information, signaling, radio-directional finding, or radio or other electro-magnetic communication; and (D) another structure or mechanism for guiding or controlling flight in the air or the landing and takeoff of aircraft.  (None of those definitions apply to the hanger lease Patrick wishes to question)

FAA Grant Assurance 23 – Exclusive Rights “It will permit no exclusive right for the use of the airport by any person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the public”. (there is not Exclusive right for the use of the airport issued to anyone)

49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) No Exclusive Rights at Certain Facilities.  “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended”.  (Once again, there is not exclusive right granted to the hanger lease holder.  The hanger is not an air navigation facility as defined by federal law.)

Advisory Circular 150/5190-6 – “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended.” (An“air navigation facility” includes, among other things, an airport.See “Definitions” at 49 U.S.C. § 40102.) (see definition link above)

Article and audio:   http://edgarcountywatchdogs.com

RUSTY BOGUE sits at the controls of a plane he loved to fly. He was killed August 27, 2013 when the Cessna 421 he was piloting back to Terre Haute, Ind., crashed shortly after taking off from the Edgar County Airport.

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA509
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, August 27, 2013 in Paris, IL
Aircraft: CESSNA 421C, registration: N229H
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On August 27, 2013, approximately 1120 central daylight time, a Cessna 421C twin-engine airplane, N229H, impacted wooded terrain shortly after takeoff from the Edgar County Airport (PRG), Paris, Illinois. The airline transport pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and post-impact fire. The airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., Terre Haute, Indiana, and operated by RSB Aviation, Inc, Paris, Illinois, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was en route to the Terre Haute International Airport - Hulman Field (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana.

Prior to the flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 178 gallons of fuel, which according to a company pilot, would have topped off the fuel tanks. The pilot intended to depart PRG, pick up an individual at HUF, and then continue the flight to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Witnesses observed the airplane during its takeoff roll from runway 09. They stated the airplane seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed with the accident airplane. Due to corn and other obstacles on airport property, the witnesses did not observe the airplane takeoff; however, shortly thereafter, they noticed a smoke plume about 1 mile east of the airport.

The accident site was located approximately 3/4 of a mile from the departure end of runway 09 (4,502 feet long by 75 feet wide). The airplane wreckage was distributed on a heading of 090 for approximately 300 feet. The airplane impacted numerous trees prior to coming to rest at the base of a large tree. A post-impact fire and 2 post-impact explosions ensued. Several separated sections of the left wing, left horizontal stabilizer, and left elevator were located near the initial tree impacts. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, right wing, a portion of the left wing, both engines, and portions of the empennage. The left engine propeller was found in the feathered position, and right engine propeller was found in an operating range position.

Visual examination and aerial photographs of the departure end of runway 09 and adjacent terrain showed the airplane's main landing gear exit the end of the runway surface, travel approximately 300 feet through grass, continue to travel approximately 300 feet through 3-foot-tall soybeans, and then impact the top of 10-foot-tall corn stalks for approximately 50 feet. Following the damaged corn stalks, there was no evidence of the airplane impacting terrain prior to the initial tree impacts.

The airplane was equipped with two Lycoming LTP 101-600A-1A turboprop engines. The Lycoming engines were originally installed on the airplane per a Supplemental Type Certificate in 1982. According to RSB Aviation company personnel, during the previous several weeks before the accident, the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up. After a period of time, typically about 30 seconds, the left engine would obtain 100 percent power. After the engine obtained 100 percent power, the engine would maintain the power unless the pilot commanded otherwise. The delay/lag would not occur at each engine start-up, but at intermittent times. The airplane was flown by RBS Aviation with the known delay/lag condition. According to maintenance personnel and another company pilot, the known problem with the left engine had not been corrected prior to the accident flight.