Tuesday, July 22, 2014

Meet aerobatic pilot Dan Marcotte

WCAX.COM Local Vermont News, Weather and Sports-  

SWANTON, Vt. - It's just another day at the office for Dan Marcotte.

"Some days it's good; some days it's not," he said. "No different than any other office."

The Bakersfield native is an aerobatic pilot, making a living entertaining audiences at air shows. Today, he's letting us tag along.

"Alright, see you in a few minutes," Marcotte said.

And with that, his ultimate biplane is off. Marcotte soars to 1,200 feet at 230mph, flipping, rolling and diving dangerously close to the runway. It's an adrenaline junkie's dream.

"It's just me being a motor head looking for another source of an engine carting me around," he said.

Marcotte's love of motorsports started at 16. His need for speed grew from racing stock and land speed cars to airplanes. In 2003, he gave air show competitions a shot and ignited a new passion.

"The excitement, the speed, the exhilaration of the G-loading, being able to twist and turn-- the freedom of being in an airplane is unlike any other motorsport," Marcotte explained.

Marcotte says his job is to push his plane to its limit to dazzle fans. He performs in about 14 air shows a year.

"It was awesome to see him get out here and do some tricks for us," said Chris Abbott Coch, a spectator.

But earning a living in this industry can be tough.

"When I started flying shows, I was flying anything," Marcotte said. "I'd fly weddings, high school graduations, racetrack intermission events. I mean you name it, I'd put an airshow to it."

For the first five years his paycheck only covered his expenses. Marcotte says better money comes with name recognition. Aerobatic pilots must first prove they can be safe and entertaining.

"Just because you can fly an airplane upside-down or do a loop doesn't mean you're going to be entertaining to a crowd of people," Marcotte said.

For Marcotte it's a labor of love sandwiched between his full-time profession. He's a welder, fabricator and mechanic at the Franklin County State Airport. But on lunch breaks it's all about perfecting tumbles, tail slides and spins. If weather's bad, Marcotte hits the bike and weights. Aerobatic pilots must be in tiptop cardiovascular shape.

"It's one of the most demanding jobs I've ever done," Marcotte said. "You can't be fatigued because you are playing in an arena that's extremely unforgiving."

An arena that pushes his body to the brink, with gravity taking its toll.

"If you push negative 6 Gs, that's 1,200 pounds trying to pull you out of the cockpit... 

Your head is swelling up, your eyes are swelling, sometimes you burst blood vessels in your eyes," Marcotte said. "As a land creature, you're never subjected to those things until you start doing things like aerobatic piloting."

Reporter Jennifer Reading: Do you worry about safety?

Dan Marcotte: I do. Constantly... You have to take every precaution for yourself and for the sake of your family to make sure that you've rehearsed things like egress techniques-- getting out of the airplane.

Something Marcotte knows all too well. In April, he survived a fiery crash. At 3,000 feet his propeller broke, instantly ripping the engine from his plane. Marcotte had no choice but to pull his parachute and jump. He landed in a tree unscathed.

"The fear was where the airplane went," he said. "The worst feeling in the world is not knowing where the airplane went."

Turns out the plane plummeted to Highgate, crashed on the shoulder of Interstate 89 and burst into flames.

"Fortunately it didn't land in the travel; it stayed off to the side," Vt. State Police Lt. Garry Scott said.

Marcotte is picking up the pieces, purchased a new plane and is getting used to his new digs. He even let me test out the tight quarters.

"And that's what your office would look like if you were an air show pilot in an ultimate biplane," he said.

But I won't be taking off anytime soon. I'll leave this odd job to the pros.

I had a blast with Dan Marcotte! Click here for more about Marcotte or his air shows.

Story, photos and video: http://www.wcax.com

A Look At General Aviation Safety (With Audio)

On Saturday morning, a Mooney single engine aircraft crashed three-quarters of a mile from the Lake Placid airport, killing the three people aboard, only the latest small plane crash in a region that has seen several in recent years. In the aftermath of that accident, WAMC’s North Country Bureau Chief Pat Bradley takes a look at general aviation safety.

On the same day of the Lake Placid crash, there were three other fatal general aviation accidents in the country. The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating crashes that killed three people in Arizona and Florida and one person in Texas who was using an experimental aircraft.

Preliminary data from the NTSB’s 2009-2010 Transportation Administrator’s Fact Book on general aviation activity show that in 2010, there were 1,435 accidents with 450 fatalities. General aviation ranked fourth, trailing 32,885 highway fatalities, 672 recreational boating deaths, and 813 rail fatalities.

The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, or AOPA, is the largest general aviation association. AOPA Foundation and Air Safety Institute President Bruce Landsberg jokes that general aviation is probably the most regulated personal activity on the planet. Landsberg, the industry co-chair of the General Aviation Joint Safety Committee, says there are extremely high standards for the airplanes, pilots and instructors.  “In general aviation roughly 75 to 80 percent of the accidents are caused by the pilot either doing something, or not doing something, that they should have done. I did just a little back-of-the-envelope research here, but over the last five years there have been 22 fatal accidents in the state of New York.  During almost the same time period for automobiles there were nearly 6,000 people killed.”

While there is a risk to flying, Landsberg notes that it is not unreasonable if the pilot is careful and the aircraft is well maintained. And, he says, there is a great emphasis on flight instruction safety.  “We make the point that not only do you have to physically be able to control the airplane and teach your students to physically control the airplane,  but we want people to assess  circumstances and say ‘okay this looks like it has a high risk potential’ and make sure your student understands.”

President and CEO of Professional Flight Training Al Itani is a designated pilot examiner for the FAA’s Albany Flight Standards District Office. Based at the Schenectady County Airport, Itani says all pilots must receive continual training to remain certified.  “Most of the time we spend during training is emergency procedures. You’ve got a single engine airplane, when you lose an engine, how do you manage that situation? We simulate an engine failure and we test them for that. But you know, there’s no way you can figure out how a person will react in a really high pressure scenario. But they are very, very well trained and we don’t get  too many accidents. Not  like cars.”

The AOPA’s Bruce Landsberg has seen preliminary reports on the weekend accident in Lake Placid.  “From what we know at this point, and I will stress that my comments are preliminary, we had two airplanes approaching a non-towered airport from opposite directions. That’s perfectly fine. So they each turned away from the other and then re-entered the traffic pattern. The Mooney pilot,  when he started his go-around, did not retract his flaps. In a go-around you do need to retract them. And when he started to make a turn back towards the airport, or was on final, the aircraft stalled and they lost lift and fell to the ground. Flying is not without risk, but it can be very, very safe.”

An annual inspection of every airplane is an FAA requirement.

Story and Audio:  http://wamc.org

Aviation expert criticizes crash report

Cessna 152 ZK-TOD and Cessna 152 ZK-JGB, Accident occurred July 26, 2010 near Taonui airfield, Feilding (New Zealand)

Captain Gary Parata, accredited air accident investigator at the coroner's hearing into the deaths of Flight Training Manawatu chief instructor Jessica Neeson, 27, and student pilot Patricia Smallman, 64. 



Flight instructor Jess Neeson and a student pilot were killed when two planes collided in Manawatu in July 2010 


PATRICIA SMALLMAN: Died on July 26, 2010. The 64-year-old student pilot died with her flight instructor when their Cessna 152 collided with another plane over Feilding. 


Captain Gary Parata has criticized a report into the mid-air crash at Feilding, saying it has not done enough to help other pilots avoid the same fate. 

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission released a report last year into the crash, citing the possibility all three pilots did not understand each other's radio communications.

The report also said the two planes should have been visible by all three pilots, but they had failed to see each other.

Jessica Neeson's responsibility as the senior person in her plane was singled out.

"The first priority for an instructor, as the pilot-in-command, is to maintain command of their aircraft and ensure its safety before attending to the training needs of the student pilot," the report said.

The report made recommendations, including saying pilots must make "clear, concise, accurate and timely radio transmissions", and that people need to keep a good lookout, watch out for blind spots and be aware of the limitations of the human eye.

But air crash investigator Parata said during the coroner's inquest yesterday that he was disappointed with the report.

There wasn't much about how people could improve their flying.

"It says: ‘See and be seen' and ‘hear and be heard', but we know all this already. We are not learning anything. They need to make suggestions as to how to do that better."

When the report was released, Neeson's mother Lyn Neeson told the Manawatu Standard she was also unimpressed with it.

She said it unfairly singled out her daughter because she was the instructor.

Her daughter would have been "actively listening" to any radio calls. She was also unimpressed at the commission's finding that high-intensity and anti-collision lighting and high-visibility paints could allow aircraft to be detected earlier.

She said it should be mandatory for planes in spaces like Taonui Aerodrome to be brighter.

During the inquest, coroner Tim Scott suggested to multiple witnesses that painting planes bright colors could help make them more visible.

Parata said most planes were white because the airline industry was "conservative", while Flight Training Manawatu chief executive Michael Bryant said certain bright colours could make planes harder to see in certain conditions. 


Source:  http://www.stuff.co.nz

John Travolta Can't Stop Former Pilot's Lawsuit Over Secrets (Exclusive)

A California appeals court allows Douglas Gotterba to challenge the validity of a confidentiality agreement.

Douglas Gotterba, who worked for John Travolta's aircraft company Alto in the 1980s, will get the opportunity to argue in a lawsuit that he holds no confidentiality duties to the actor. On Tuesday, the airline pilot was given the go-ahead sign by a California appeals court.

Gotterba worked for Travolta for six years. According to press interviews he's given, he claims that his relationship with Travolta was more than professional. He stopped working for the actor in 1987, at which point he entered into a written termination agreement with Alto.


Read more here:  http://www.hollywoodreporter.com

Cape freeholders interested in partnership with Lower Township on building at Cape May County Airport (KWWD)

LOWER TOWNSHIP — Cape May County is interested in helping renovate the Public Safety Building at the Cape May Airport and using half of it for a new county central dispatch and emergency management facility.

The plan, however, depends on the township building passing structural analysis tests expected to be done in about one month and even then it may not have the support of Township Council, where three members want to move the police to the Villas section.

Freeholder Director Jerry Thornton said the county has been looking for a building for about one year and has also visited sites in Woodbine and Upper Township. The 55,000-square-foot Public Safety Building houses police, fire safety, municipal court and the local rescue squad. It has the space and is in a good location on high ground for emergency situations, Thornton said.

“It’s too much room for Lower Township. We could take half and they take half. Then I’ll have an emergency management building and they will save millions,” said Thornton.

The township estimates it would cost almost $4 million to construct a new police station in the Villas. Thornton said if the county builds a new building it would cost $4 million to $6 million.

Instead, he argues the two entities could split the cost of renovating the Public Safety Building, including a new roof estimated to cost around $2 million. The building has been criticized for being an energy hog but the two parties would at least split those costs.

“Maybe we can both get away with saving a few million dollars. The county is definitely interested in making a deal,” said Thornton.

The building is owned by the township, but the land under it is owned by the county. The township leased the land in 1995 when the police outgrew their small station in the Villas.

Council is split on the issue with the three independents on council pushing to construct a new police station in the Villas and the two Republicans wanting to wait for the county to make a decision.

The two Republicans, Erik Simonsen and Tom Conrad, on Monday night voted against doing some engineering work for a new police station, including soil tests, and back in May they voted against awarding a $192,000 contract to an architect. They lost both 3-2 votes. They did support some earlier votes, including buying a property in the Villas for parking the new police station would need.

Simonsen wants to wait until the county analysis is completed.

“I don’t know what the haste is if you can save the taxpayers a couple million dollars,” said Simonsen.

Mayor Mike Beck argues the building is not worth renovating. The township has already put $4.1 million into the building and it still has roof and mold problems. Beck projects it will cost another $5.8 million over the next decade.

The mayor also argues a police station should not be located at an airport but should be in a populated area served by public transportation. He also argues it should be connected to other government services. The new station would be next to Township Hall.

“The decision has already been made. We’ve been debating it for 10 years. The worst decision in this town’s history was to move over there,” said Beck.

Simonson is not only worried about the costs. He questions whether there is enough parking at the township complex and worries those waiting for court cases will be next to a school. While the courts would also move to the Villas, Simonsen said there is no plan to house the rescue squad or the fire safety office.

Beck argues the mere presence of a police station in the Villas will make people feel safer. Plans for a new station call for a 12,600-square-foot facility with a 1,700-square-foot garage.


Source:  http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com

Plane crash survivor drops lawsuit against dead pilot: Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain, Keystone Air Service Ltd, C-GOSU

Brian Shead, with his wife Tracey (right), spoke to the reporters on January 26, 2012 about being the sole survivor of the January 10, 2012  plane crash of a Piper Navajo at North Spirit Lake.
KEN GIGLIOTTI / WINNIPEG FREE PRESS 



WINNIPEG – Two lawsuits against a pilot responsible for a plane crash in northern Ontario that killed him and three others have been dropped after the airline admitted responsibility.

Court documents show the sole survivor of the 2012 crash, Brian Shead, and the family of victim Colette Eisinger are still seeking damages from Keystone Air Service.

A Transportation Safety Board investigation concluded that poor weather, ice on the wings and the pilot’s inexperience landing in icy conditions contributed to the deadly crash in North Spirit Lake First Nation. Keystone admitted in its statement of defence that the fatal crash was caused by pilot error, which makes the airline “vicariously liable.”

“Further, the accident was not caused or contributed to by any negligence on the part of the passengers who were wholly innocent,” the statement said.

The airline argues, however, that it is not responsible for damages in either case and it called those claims “exaggerated, excessive, too remote and not recoverable at law.”

“Keystone denies that the plaintiff sustained the injuries or damages as alleged, or at all,” the airline said in its statement of defence in Shead’s lawsuit. It also argued that the accident happened while Shead was employed by a Winnipeg company which provides financial services for First Nations, so he can’t sue according to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

Shead’s lawsuit alleged that the pilot, Fariborz Abasabady, was incompetent and the airline was negligent in not providing proper training to him.

The family of Eisinger, who was 39, is seeking general and punitive damages and wants to be reimbursed for the cost of her funeral.

Anthony Lafontaine Guerra, Shead’s lawyer, said they decided to drop the suit against the pilot’s family in April once Keystone accepted responsibility in March. Eisinger’s family dropped the suit against the pilot’s estate July 10.

“The only issue that remains is a determination of damages which will likely be resolved by way of settlement out of court,” Guerra said.

Any settlement would probably be covered by a confidentiality agreement, he added.

Neither a lawyer for Keystone, nor a lawyer for Eisinger’s father, Gerry Robson, responded to a request for comment.

The ill-fated plane left from Winnipeg on Jan. 10, 2012 but was forced to circle the runway servicing the North Spirit Lake First Nation for almost half an hour while the strip was plowed. As the plane circled, ice built up on its wings and tail — a buildup that caused the plane to stall and crash when it eventually tried to land.

Although residents of the reserve, about 400 kilometres north of Dryden, Ont., rushed to the site and tried to put out the flames with snow, they couldn’t save those trapped inside.

Abasabady, who was 41, died along with Eisinger, Ben van Hoek, 62 — president of Aboriginal Strategies Inc., where Eisinger worked as an accountant — and Martha Campbell, 38, a band worker for the North Spirit Lake First Nation.

Shead, who also worked at Aboriginal Strategies, was injured but tried to unstrap the other passengers and put out the fire on the plane’s wing. He has said he managed to pull the pilot out of the cockpit window before collapsing in the snow.

In his statement of claim, Shead said the ordeal left him with multiple injuries. He was in hospital for three weeks and required surgery, medication, physiotherapy and stitches, the lawsuit said.

Shead is seeking unspecified damages for “pain and suffering,” as well as “loss of enjoyment of life” and “out-of-pocket expenses.” He is also claiming compensation for belongings that were destroyed in the crash, including a laptop, a pair of jeans, a winter jacket and a mobile phone carrying case.

Source:  http://metronews.ca

Commercial Aviation Back in the Cross Hairs of Regional Violence: Fresh Concerns About Flight Routing and Airports Previously Viewed as Safe for Travellers

The Wall Street Journal
By Robert Wall, Rory Jones and Jon Ostrower
Updated July 22, 2014 5:04 p.m. ET



Tuesday's rocket attack near Tel Aviv's airport and, days before, the downing of Malaysia Airlines  Flight 17 in Ukraine come as the global commercial aviation industry finds itself increasingly in the cross hairs of regional violence.

The shooting down of the Malaysia Airlines passenger jet over eastern Ukraine's troubled skies last week has already sparked questions among aviation executives and regulators about the global system for avoiding unsafe airspace.

At the same time, a spate of regional conflicts far from eastern Ukraine are also targeting aircraft—convulsing airports that, while located in tense regions, had until recently been viewed by the aviation industry as relatively safe for travelers.

On Tuesday, Delta Air Lines Inc.,  United Continental Holdings Inc.,  American Airlines Group,  Air Canada and a handful of European carriers suspended service to Israel after a rocket that was fired from Gaza landed near Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion International Airport. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration imposed a temporary flight ban to the airport on U.S. carriers, and its European counterpart was poised to follow suit.

A spokeswoman for Israeli flag carrier El Al confirmed the airline is flying as scheduled.

Israeli forces are locked in a fierce ground war with Hamas, the Islamist political and militant group that the U.S. labels a terrorist organization. Hamas, meanwhile, has showered parts of Israel with increasingly sophisticated rockets that are launched at ground targets, unlike the Buk antiaircraft system allegedly used against Flight 17, but which still can damage planes at the airport.

In addition to serving Jerusalem and Israel's business hub of Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion International Airport has become the gateway for a flood of global tech-industry executives, bankers and venture capitalists flying to and from country's booming technology firms.

The violence hasn't been restricted to Ukraine and Israel. Over the past weekend, four empty Libyan jetliners were set aflame during an insurgent assault against Tripoli's international airport.

Then a week ago, Kabul's international airport came under attack from insurgents using assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. Afghan security forces repelled that attack, but in an earlier raid on the facility, Taliban fighters destroyed the helicopter used by Afghanistan's president. Last month, an insurgent raid on Karachi's main airport killed 28 people and damaged one of Emirates Airline's planes.

Tripoli, Kabul and Karachi aren't frequent stops for Western travelers, but all three serve as important regional hubs. And a steady stream of Western aid workers, diplomats, contractors and—in the case of Tripoli—oil executives give them outsize importance as international air-travel destinations.

None of these recent airport attacks appear to be connected. But their sudden confluence has aviation executives worried the events could spook passengers by again painting commercial aviation as easy pickings for insurgents and terrorists. "The airline community is being targeted," said one senior airline executive. "No other industry suffers like this."

Tel Aviv's airport stayed open on Tuesday, and Israeli aviation officials said it remains safe. Decisions about the safety of a route are mostly left up to individual airlines. But executives and regulators have been on the defensive about how they make those decisions ever since the Malaysia Airlines crash last week.

On Thursday, Flight 17 was plying a well-traveled route over eastern Ukraine, which Kiev authorities had deemed safe. U.S. and Ukrainian officials say it was shot down by a sophisticated antiaircraft weapon.

The incident has raised questions about whether commercial aircraft should have been allowed in the region. There also has been a ratcheting up of scrutiny of commercial overflights of other war zones.

Terrorists have long targeted commercial aircraft, for which accidents often result in high death tolls and big headlines. The industry suffered a spate of hijackings in the 1970s. A bomb brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988. And terrorists commandeered four jets on Sept. 11, 2001, crashing two into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon in Washington DC. A fourth plane that day crashed in Pennsylvania, as passengers battled the hijackers. The attacks claimed nearly 3,000 victims.

"Aviation has always been a target and it will always be a target," said Philip Baum, managing director of Green Light Ltd., an aviation-security consulting firm in London.

The Malaysia Airlines disaster has some aviation officials and executives calling for a rethink of how aircraft are routed over war-torn territory. On Monday, the Flight Safety Foundation, an internationally recognized aviation-safety advocacy group, said airlines should review their procedures. And executives find themselves on the defensive again.

Shooting down the Malaysia Airlines flight was a terrible crime, said Tony Tyler, chief executive of the International Air Transport Association, or IATA, the airline industry's principal trade body said earlier this week. "But flying remains safe."

—Susan Carey in Chicago and Sara Toth Stub in Jerusalem contributed to this article.

Corrections & Amplifications

Israel's main international airport is the Ben Gurion International Airport in Tel Aviv. A previous version of this article misspelled the airport's name. 


Original Source:  http://online.wsj.com

Le Mars Municipal Airport (KLRJ) receives Department of Transportation dollars

LE MARS -- The Le Mars Municipal Airport has been awarded a grant from the U.S. Department of Transportation.

Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, announced in a press release Tuesday that the airport was awarded $50,839.

Le Mars was one of four Iowa airports to receive a share of the just over $7 million awarded by the DOT, the press release stated.

The $50,839 awarded to the Le Mars airport are to be used to design the rehabilitation of the existing terminal apron pavement.

Earl Draayer, airport manager, said that rehabilitation includes extending and resurfacing the apron where the airplanes are parked.

He said the apron project is part of the city's Airport Improvement Program.

Harkin said the funding announced Tuesday will help ensure those airports are "well-equipped."

"Ensuring Iowa's airports have the resources they need to update, repair or replace their facilities is important to maintain safety and efficiency of operations," he stated.

Harkin is a senior member of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the subcommittee that funds the DOT.

Along with Le Mars, the other three airports and their awards are:

* Cedar Rapids Airport, $6 million to renovate main terminal lobby ticketing, waiting and baggage claim areas.

* Fort Dodge Regional Airport, $450,000 to rehabilitate a runway.

* Shenandoah Municipal Airport, $514,881 to reconstruct a taxiway.

Source:  http://www.lemarssentinel.com

Aerodynamic Stall / Spin: Mooney M20F, N6467Q; accident occurred July 19, 2014 in North Elba, New York

http://registry.faa.gov/N6467Q 

NTSB Identification: ERA14FA345 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, July 19, 2014 in North Elba, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 08/05/2015
Aircraft: MOONEY M20F, registration: N6467Q
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The accident airplane and another airplane approached the single runway from opposite directions. A witness reported hearing the pilot of the accident airplane reporting positions relative to the airport; he did not hear the pilot of the other airplane make any transmissions. Postaccident interviews with the pilot of the other airplane revealed that he was using a portable radio that likely became disabled due to its location and/or configuration in the cockpit; however, due to the type of airspace, neither airplane was required to have radio communications. As both airplanes approached the runway, both pilots saw the other airplane and successfully completed go-arounds to the right. The accident airplane then entered a steep climb, and, as it made a crosswind turn, the nose dropped, and the airplane entered a spin to the ground. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear were down and that the flaps were likely somewhat extended; however, the degree to which they were extended or whether they were in transit could not be determined. Wreckage damage indicated that the airplane was in a left spin at the time of impact. No preexisting mechanical anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed for the airplane’s configuration and flight profile, which resulted in an exceedance of the wing’s critical angle-of-attack and a subsequent aerodynamic stall/spin. 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 19, 2014, about 1040 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20F, N6467Q, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in North Elba, New York. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was not operating on flight plan, from Potsdam Municipal Airport (PTD), Potsdam, New York, to Lake Placid Airport (LKP), Lake Placid, New York. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

New York State Police (NYSP) interviews revealed that, on July 17, 2014, the pilot and his girlfriend departed their home airport in Parkersburg, West Virginia, spending the night in Nantucket, Massachusetts. They then arrived at PTD on the afternoon of July 18, 2014, intending to spend the next two nights visiting his daughter who was attending a local university. The pilot and his daughter decided to fly the next day, with the daughter bringing a friend from school. After dinner, the pilot familiarized himself online with the area, and the day of the accident left the hotel about 0900, with his daughter and her friend, expecting to return between 1400 and 1500.

According to a commercial (scenic flight) pilot at LKP, he was outside the administration building when he heard a radio transmission over the loud speaker, with the pilot identifying himself as "Mooney" and the last three identifiers of his airplane. The Mooney pilot was requesting an airport "advisory, which is normal procedure." The commercial pilot went inside and advised the Mooney pilot that "the winds were calm and no other reported traffic." The Mooney pilot responded and said that he was inbound for landing on runway 14.

The commercial pilot went back outside and later overheard the Mooney pilot on the loud speaker saying he was seeing another airplane. The Mooney pilot was trying to talk to the other airplane, which the commercial pilot had not yet seen. Shortly after that, the commercial pilot saw the other airplane, which he knew to be locally-based, approach the airport passing overhead from northwest to southeast, and entering left traffic to land on runway 32. He then saw the Mooney approaching the airport from the northwest.

About 5 minutes later, the commercial pilot heard over the loud speaker, "Lake Placid, Mooney, two mile final or short final runway one four." At the time, the commercial pilot had his back to the runway, but turned around after hearing the Mooney engine go to full power. He then saw the airplane pitching up at a steep angle while banking right at a steep angle, and it appeared as though the right wing may have struck the runway. The commercial pilot continued to watch the Mooney, and "saw that the pilot appeared to have recovered the aircraft. He started a shallow turn to the right and started to climb along the right side of the runway."

As the Mooney continued to climb, the commercial pilot saw the local airplane about 100 to 200 feet over the trees, approaching from the opposite direction to land on runway 32. "They looked as though they saw each other and started to each climb to their right sides of the [runway]." The commercial pilot then heard the Mooney pilot transmit something over the radio; he couldn't recall what it was, but that it sounded angry, followed later by his transmitting in a calmer voice, "I will follow you in."

The commercial pilot continued to watch the Mooney as it flew past the end of the runway. He noticed that the Mooney's landing gear were still down and the airplane was climbing at "a steeper than normal angle at a slow speed." The Mooney then started to make a left turn, and the nose "dropped." The airplane entered a counterclockwise spin toward the ground, descending "so fast it didn't even make a complete turn before it went out of sight."

The commercial pilot subsequently took off in another airplane and flew over the crash site, and noted that the accident airplane was on fire with the entire cabin engulfed in flames.

The commercial pilot did not note hearing any transmissions from the local pilot.

A witness near the impact site did not see the Mooney, but noted that, "almost simultaneously I heard the engine stop followed by a huge thud."

Additional witnesses confirmed that the two airplanes went around after approaching the runway from opposite directions, also confirming the Mooney's hard right turn, possibly dragging a wing, followed by a steep climb and a stall/spin. A golfer who was on a nearby course stated that he saw the belly of the airplane with the right wing up, left wing down, and that the airplane was in a nose dive with the left wing as a pivot point.

In written statement, the local pilot noted that he had departed LKP earlier that morning from runway 32, and that he monitored UNICOM (Universal Communications) frequency 122.8 [MHz], which was the local airport frequency. He switched frequency before stopping at another airport and spending some time there. On his way back to LKP, he switched back to 122.8, but approaching the airport, he "never heard or observed any air traffic in the lake Placid area." The pilot flew over the airport and the wind sock indicated wind slightly favoring runway 32. The pilot flew over the ski jumps, flew a [left] base leg and continued to descend the airplane. He then turned the airplane on to final approach, and initially didn't see any other aircraft. He then saw another airplane that appeared to be departing runway 14, so he turned his airplane to the right, and then flew a left traffic pattern to a landing on runway 14. He further noted, "I never heard any radio transmissions from any plane or UNICOM."

AIRPORT INFORMATION

LKP had a single, southeast-northwest, 4,196-foot by 60-foot runway, designated 14 toward the southeast and 32 toward the northwest. Runway elevation was 1,743 feet, and there was no control tower or ground-based radio-transmission recording devices. The UNICOM frequency was 122.8 MHz.

The airport was located in Class G airspace, which, per FAA regulations, did not require radio communications.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot, age 63, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane, single engine land rating. His latest Federal Aviation Administration third class medical certificate was issued on June 24, 2014. On his application, the pilot indicated 729 hours of flight time.

The pilot's logbook was charred, with remaining pages mostly smeared from fire-fighting water contact. Although the date was destroyed due to burn damage, the pilot's latest flight review was logged one flight prior to his May 2, 2014, instrument proficiency check. The last flight logged was four flights later (date also destroyed) between two North Carolina airports. At the time, the pilot had logged 729 total flight hours with time in make and model unknown.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

Accident Airplane

The airplane was powered by a Lycoming IO-360 engine driving a two-bladed aluminum propeller. The aircraft logbook indicated that, as of the latest annual inspection on January 30, 2014, a total airframe time of 3,404 hours, total engine time the same, engine time since major overhaul 806 hours, and propeller time since new of 385 hours.

There were no flight data or cockpit voice recording devices on the airplane.

Other Airplane

According to the local pilot, his 1946 Luscombe 8A did not have an electrical system, "or any installed electrical equipment other than an ELT. The radio that is often used in this airplane is a small, battery operated handheld that rests atop the elevator trim mechanism which is located between the seat cushions in the cramped and noisy cabin. It delivers varying degrees of performance and reliability and encourages 'see-and-be-seen' flying to include use of standard rectangular traffic patterns. The aircraft is based at Lake Placid Airport which is used by radio equipped and non-radio equipped aircraft and there is seasonal glider activity."

In addition, "the handheld radio is sensitive to movement or jarring that may alter volume settings or cause other malfunctions as a result of loosened or disconnected wires that protrude from the top and side of the radio. The radio must be lifted from its normal position to change frequency and adjust squelch. Returning to Lake Placid at an altitude of 3,000 feet the radio was tuned to 122.8 9 [Mhz] and seemed to be operating properly as it was receiving distant transmissions but none pertinent to Lake Placid Airport. After some adjustment, the radio was returned to its normal position for the descent and pattern entry….The radio was again quiet and the traffic pattern was empty….The radio was silent and the only observed activity was an airplane taxiing near the fuel ramp."

After the go-around, the pilot thought he heard a "faint, unreadable transmission, and he radioed that [he] was aborting the approach to 32 and entering the traffic pattern for a landing on 14. The radio was quiet."

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Weather, recorded at an airport 13 nautical miles northwest, at 1051, included clear skies, visibility 10 statute miles, wind from 220 degrees true at 3 knots, altimeter setting 30.28 inches Hg.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The wreckage was located mostly on the side of a small levee about 075 degrees, 0.60 nm from the center of LKP, in the vicinity of 44 degrees, 16.03 minutes north latitude, 073 degrees, 56.94 minutes west longitude.

There were two damaged pine trees leading to the impact site, at an estimated 30 feet from the main wreckage. Direction from the pine trees to the wreckage was about 120 degrees magnetic. Damage found about 12 feet above the ground on the left pine tree was consistent with impact damage found near the tip of the airplane's left wing. Damage found about 15 feet above the ground on the right pine tree was consistent with the distance from the airplane's left wing damage to its propeller. Damage between the two pine trees was consistent with about a 25- to 30-degree left-wing-down airplane position at tree impact.

The wreckage came to rest with the left wing and engine at the base of the levee, and with the right wing partially bent over the top of the levee. Ground indentations, paint chips, a small area of surface abrasions, spar damage and wingtip compression were together consistent with the right wing having flexed downward and forward upon initial impact.

The tail section was bent to the right in relation to the rest of the fuselage, consistent with nose-left rotation at impact.

With NTSB concurrence, the occupants were removed from the airplane prior to NTSB arrival. To facilitate removal, part of the airplane's tubular structure had been cut away.

Extensive charring and fusing of materials were noted in the cockpit area as well as a semi-flattening of the instrument panel. There was no evidence of an in-flight fire.

All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident scene, and flight control continuity was confirmed from the control surfaces to entry points of the charred cockpit.

Engine control positions at the time of impact could not be confirmed due to impact forces and the postcrash fire.

The landing gear would have normally been actuated manually via mechanical linkage through a "Johnson bar" located between the front seats. The Johnson bar was found parallel to the semi-flattened instrument panel, consistent with the landing gear being in the down position. In addition, one main landing gear was found partially extended and one fully extended; and both tires exhibited dirt skid marks and staining consistent with their being out of the wheel wells when the airplane impacted the ground. The nose landing gear was destroyed.

Flap positions could not be definitively determined. Flaps, which were normally hydraulically operated and mechanically linked, were observed to be extended or partially extended to various degrees along the wings at the scene. The flap relief valve handle, which normally releases hydraulic pressure at a slow rate to allow springs or air forces to raise the flaps, was found in the "Up" or "Release" position, but was attached to the deformed instrument panel.

The airplane's wings were subsequently removed and the wreckage was transported to a secure NYSP holding yard. There, with additional charred material removed, the mechanical trim and flap indicators were found. The indicators would have normally been mounted vertically in the airplane below the engine controls and forward of the Johnson bar. However, with the fire and crushing, they were found almost horizontal, to the right of the Johnson bar. Indications as found had the trim indicator at the "Takeoff" position, and the flap indicator between "Landing" and "Takeoff."

The propeller was examined both at the scene and at the NYSP holding yard. There was no significant torsional bending, yet there was significant leading edge burnishing and chordwise markings on both propeller blades, consistent with the propeller passing through the sandy river soil mix prevalent at the accident site.

The engine was also examined at the holding yard with no evidence of preexisting mechanical anomalies found. In addition, there was scoring on the starter Bendix housing and grinding on the starter ring gear, consistent with the engine attempting to pull the propeller through the soil.

Subsequent to the accident, a wavy scrape mark was found in the right half of the runway in the vicinity of a taxiway that led to the ramp. NYSP photographs revealed that the mark was continuous with various branches "Y"ing off and rejoining the main scrape. The scrape was 17 feet in length and appeared deepest at its southernmost point. Looking toward the southeast, down runway 14, the scrape veered gradually to the left, which was inconsistent with an airplane seen turning hard to the right. Examination of the airplane's right wing tip revealed a pristine wingtip position light and no structural damage that would have been consistent with the wingtip scraping the runway.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy of the pilot, performed at the Adirondack Medical Center, Saranac Lake, New York, determined the cause of death to be "blunt force trauma." No significant natural disease, including no coronary atherosclerosis, was identified.

Toxicological testing, performed by the FAA's Forensic Toxicology Research Team, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, found metoprolol in urine and in cavity blood (no amounts noted.) According to the FAA Aeromedical Research web site, metoprolol "is a beta-adrenergic receptor antagonist, "beta blocker," used in the treatment of hypertension and certain arrhythmias."


NTSB Identification: ERA14FA345
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, July 19, 2014 in North Elba, NY
Aircraft: MOONEY M20F, registration: N6467Q
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On July 19, 2014, about 1040 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20F, N6467Q, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in North Elba, New York. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was not operating on flight plan, from Potsdam Municipal Airport (PTD), Potsdam, New York, to Lake Placid Airport (LKP), Lake Placid, New York. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

New York State Police (NYSP) interviews revealed that, on July 17, 2014, the pilot and his girlfriend originally departed their home airport in Parkersburg, West Virginia, spending the night in Nantucket, Massachusetts. They then arrived at PTD on the afternoon of July 18, 2014, intending to spend the next two nights visiting his daughter who was attending a local university. The pilot and his daughter decided to fly the next day, with the daughter bringing a friend from school. After dinner, the pilot familiarized himself online with the area, and the day of the accident left the hotel about 0900, with his daughter and her friend, expecting to return between 1400 and 1500.

LKP had a single, southeast-northwest, 4,196-foot by 60-foot runway, designated 14 to the southeast and 32 to the northwest. Runway elevation was 1,743 feet, and there was no control tower. The UNICOM (Universal Communications) frequency was 122.8 MHz.

According to a charter pilot at LKP, he was outside the administration building when he heard a radio transmission over the loud speaker, with the pilot identifying himself as "Mooney" and the last three identifiers of his airplane. The Mooney pilot was requesting an airport "advisory, which is normal procedure." The charter pilot went inside and advised the Mooney pilot that "the winds were calm and no other reported traffic." The Mooney pilot responded and said that he was inbound for landing on runway 14.

The charter pilot went back outside and later overheard the Mooney pilot on the loud speaker saying he was seeing another airplane. The Mooney pilot was trying to talk to the other airplane, which the charter pilot had not yet seen. Shortly after that, the charter pilot saw the other airplane, which he knew to be locally-based, approach the airport passing overhead from northwest to southeast, and entering left traffic to land on runway 32. He then saw the Mooney approaching the airport from the northwest.

About 5 minutes later, the charter pilot heard over the loud speaker, "Lake Placid, Mooney, two mile final or short final runway one four." At the time, the charter pilot had his back to the runway, but turned around after hearing the Mooney engine go to full power. He then saw the airplane pitching up at a steep angle while banking right at a steep angle, and it appeared as though the right wing may have struck the runway. The charter pilot continued to watch the Mooney, and "saw that the pilot appeared to have recovered the aircraft. He started a shallow turn to the right and started to climb along the right side of the runway."

As the Mooney continued to climb, the charter pilot saw the local airplane about 100 to 200 feet over the trees, approaching from the opposite direction to land on runway 32. "They looked as though they saw each other and started to each climb to their right sides of the [runway]." The charter pilot then heard the Mooney pilot transmit something over the radio; he couldn't recall what it was, but that it sounded angry, followed later by his transmitting in a calmer voice, "I will follow you in."

The charter pilot continued to watch the Mooney as it flew past the end of the runway. He noticed that the Mooney's landing gear were still down and the airplane was climbing at "a steeper than normal angle at a slow speed." The Mooney then started to make a left turn, and the nose "dropped." The airplane entered a counterclockwise spin toward the ground, descending "so fast it didn't even make a complete turn before it went out of sight."

The charter pilot did not note hearing any transmissions from the local pilot.

A witness near the impact site did not see the Mooney, but noted that, "almost simultaneously I heard the engine stop followed by a huge thud."

Additional witnesses confirmed that the two airplanes went around after approaching the runway from opposite directions, also confirming the Mooney's hard right turn followed by a steep climb, possibly dragging a wing, and a stall/spin. A golfer who was on a nearby course stated that he saw the belly of the airplane with the right wing up, left wing down, and that the airplane was in a nose dive with the left wing as a pivot point.

In written statement, the local pilot noted that he had departed LKP earlier that morning from runway 32, and that he monitored UNICOM frequency 122.8, which was the local airport frequency. He switched frequency before stopping at another airport and spending some time there. On his way back to LKP, he switched back to 122.8, but approaching the airport, he "never heard or observed any air traffic in the lake Placid area." The pilot flew over the airport and the wind sock indicated wind slightly favoring runway 32. The pilot flew over the ski jumps, flew a [left] base leg and continued to descend the airplane. He then turned the airplane on to final approach, and initially didn't see any other aircraft. He then saw another airplane that appeared to be departing runway 14, so he turned his airplane to the right, and then flew a left traffic pattern to a landing on runway 14. He further noted, "I never heard any radio transmissions from any plane or UNICOM."

The wreckage was located mostly on the side of a small levee about 075 degrees, 0.60 nm from the center of LKP, in the vicinity of 44 degrees, 16.03 minutes north latitude, 073 degrees, 56.94 minutes west longitude. The wreckage came to rest with the left wing and engine at the base of the levee, and with the right wing partially bent over the top of the levee. Ground indentations, paint chips, a small area of surface abrasions, spar damage and wingtip compression were together consistent with the right wing having flexed downward and forward upon initial impact.

The tail section was bent to the right in relation to the rest of the fuselage, consistent with left rotation at impact.

There were two damaged pine trees leading to the impact site, an estimated 30 feet from the main wreckage. Direction from the pine trees to the wreckage was about 120 degrees magnetic. Damage found about 12 feet above the ground on the left pine tree was consistent with impact damage found near the tip of the airplane's left wing. Damage found about 15 feet above the ground on the right pine tree was consistent with the distance from the airplane's left wing damage to its propeller. Damage between the two pine trees was consistent with about a 25- to 30-degree left-wing-down airplane position at tree impact.

With concurrence, the occupants were removed from the airplane prior to NTSB arrival. To facilitate removal, part of the airplane's tubular structure had been cut away. Upon NTSB arrival, extensive charring and fusing of materials were noted in the cockpit area as well as semi-flattening of the instrument panel. There was no evidence of an in-flight fire.

All flight control surfaces were accounted for at the accident scene, and flight control continuity was confirmed from the control surfaces to entry points of the charred cockpit.

Engine control positions at the time of impact could not be confirmed due to impact forces and the postcrash fire.

The landing gear would have normally been actuated manually by direct mechanical linkage through a "Johnson bar" located between the front seats. The Johnson bar was found parallel to the semi-flattened instrument panel, consistent with the landing gear being in the down position. In addition, one main landing gear was found partially extended and one fully extended; and both tires exhibited dirt skid marks and staining consistent with their being out of the wheel wells when the airplane impacted the ground. The nose landing gear was destroyed.

Flap positions could not be definitively determined. Flaps, which were normally hydraulically operated and mechanically linked, were observed to be extended or partially extended to various degrees along the wings at the scene. The flap relief valve handle, which normally releases hydraulic pressure at a slow rate to allow springs or air forces to raise the flaps, was found in the "Up" or "Release" position, but was attached to the deformed instrument panel.

The airplane's wings were subsequently removed and the wreckage transported to a secure NYSP holding yard. There, with additional charred material removed, the mechanical trim and flap indicators were found. The indicators would have normally been mounted vertically in the airplane below the engine controls and forward of the Johnson bar. However, with the fire and crushing, they were found almost horizontal, to the right of the Johnson bar. Indications as found had the trim indicator at the "Takeoff" position, and the flap indicator between "Landing" and "Takeoff."

The propeller was examined both at the scene and at the NYSP holding yard. There was no significant torsional bending, yet there was significant leading edge burnishing and chordwise markings on both propeller blades, consistent with the propeller passing through the sandy river soil mix prevalent at the accident site.

The engine was also examined at the holding yard with no evidence of preexisting mechanical anomalies found. In addition, there was scoring on the starter Bendix housing and grinding on the starter ring gear, consistent with the engine attempting to pull the propeller through the soil.

There were no flight data or cockpit voice recording devices on the airplane.

Subsequent to the accident, a wavy scrape mark was found in the right half of the runway in the vicinity of a taxiway that led to the ramp. NYSP photographs revealed that the mark was continuous with various branches "Y"ing off and rejoining the main scrape. The scrape was 17 feet in length and appeared deepest at its southernmost point. Looking toward the southeast, down runway 14, the scrape veered gradually to the left, which was inconsistent with an airplane seen turning hard to the right. Examination of the airplane's right wing tip revealed a pristine wingtip position light and no structural damage that would have been consistent with the wingtip scraping the runway.

Hughes 369D, Olympic Air Inc, N5225C: Accident occurred July 22, 2014 in Oso, Snohomish County, Washington

http://registry.faa.gov/N5225C

NTSB Identification: WPR14LA308
14 CFR Part 133: Rotorcraft Ext. Load
Accident occurred Tuesday, July 22, 2014 in Oso, WA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/20/2016
Aircraft: MDHI 369D, registration: N5225C
Injuries: 1 Serious.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The commercial pilot was performing external load operations in the helicopter when one main rotor blade separated, which resulted in a loss of control and collision with terrain. The helicopter rolled downhill, and the airframe sustained substantial damage. On-site examination of the wreckage revealed that four of the main rotor blades were fragmented into many pieces. The fifth main rotor blade was found about 900 ft from the main wreckage and exhibited less damage; postaccident examination of this rotor blade revealed that it had separated due to fatigue cracking that had initiated near the root end of the blade at the second-most outboard bolt hole through the spar, skin, and doubler. 

Further examination revealed that the fatigue cracks in the separated blade had initiated due to disbondment at the interface between the adhesive film on the blade subassembly and the upper and lower root fittings. Examination of the root fitting assembly revealed paint cracks along the root fitting/blade interfaces, indicative of complete or partial disbondment of the root fittings. When the remaining attachment bolts were removed, the root fittings cleanly separated from the blade subassembly. 

The helicopter manufacturer had previously issued a service bulletin indicating that disbondment of the root fitting was caused by a high number of torque events/external lifts per hour that exceeded the helicopter’s “original design fatigue spectrum.” Further, the Federal Aviation Administration had previously issued an airworthiness directive (AD), which instructed the operator to determine and record the number of torque events (TE) accumulated on each main rotor blade. It stated that, on or before accumulating an additional 200 TEs or at the end of each day’s operations, whichever occurred first, the operator was required to record and update the total accumulated TEs. For each blade that had accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and 750 or more hours time in service (TIS), before further flight, unless accomplished previously, the operator was to perform a main rotor blade TE inspection. The AD also required a recurrent main rotor blade TE inspection at intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35 hours TIS, whichever occurred first. A review of maintenance records indicated that the blades on the helicopter had accumulated about 1,123 hours TIS and 232,674 TEs since installation. The examination of all of the blades suggested that initial indications of root fitting disbondment, specifically paint cracking around the root fitting/blade interface, occurred sufficiently early to have been detected if the inspections had been performed in accordance with the AD.

The pilot stated that he obtained an airframe and powerplant certificate so that he could perform the TE inspections. He added that he averaged about 200 TEs per hour and that he tried to comply with the AD as best as he could on work sites. On a typical job, he usually did not perform the TE inspections until he got home at night. He read the AD and maintenance manual to determine how to inspect the blades and noted that the inspection procedures stated that the inspector should inspect the root end for cracks. He stated that he looked primarily at the root fitting and metal for cracks, not necessarily the bond line. He added that the intent of inspecting the bond line was not clear to him until the helicopter and blade manufacturers published service notices after the accident, which included color photographs; the photographs showed examples of possible evidence of initial failure of the adhesive bond between the main rotor blade and doubler. 

The fracture on the accident blade initially occurred at the second-most outboard bolt hole, which was outside the indicated inspection area for chordwise cracks. Because the crack was outside the indicated inspection area, it was possible that the crack could have been missed or misidentified during an inspection. However, the crack initiated at the disbondment of the root fittings, which was part of the inspection procedure. As a result of the accident, the helicopter and blade manufacturers changed the TE inspection procedure to inspect further inboard.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot/mechanic’s failure to properly perform required inspections of the main rotor blades at the necessary intervals, which resulted in an in-flight separation of a main rotor blade due to disbonding and fatigue cracking. Contributing to the accident was the lack of clear guidance in the helicopter maintenance inspection instructions, which allowed for the possible misinterpretation by maintenance personnel of their intent.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT 

On July 22, 2014, about 1120 Pacific daylight time, an MDHI 369D, N5225C, collided with terrain and rolled downhill several times near Oso, Washington. Olympic Air was operating the helicopter under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 133. The commercial pilot sustained serious injuries, and the helicopter airframe sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence. The local external load flight departed at an undetermined time. Visual (VMC) meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. 

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector examined the wreckage on site. He noted that the main rotor blades fragmented into many pieces that were scattered along the hillside. He identified four of the five blades. During recovery, personnel located the fifth blade about 900 feet away, and with much less damage. 

TESTS AND RESEARCH 

Follow Up Examination July 28, 2014 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) and investigators from Boeing and Rolls-Royce examined the wreckage in Auburn, Washington, on July 28, 2014. A complete report is part of the public docket for this accident. 

There was no evidence of preimpact damage to the airframe. There were no anomalies with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. 

Four of the five main rotor blades exhibited substantial damage. They were bent, buckled, had spar damage, leading edge gouges and dents, and trailing edge separation. Some blades were warped and fragmented. 

The fifth blade, serial number (SN) 091B, had substantially less damage than the other four blades. The blade subassembly was liberated from the root assembly; it fractured with bonding separation at the blade root, and the blade airfoil was relatively intact. 

All five main rotor blades were manufactured by Helicopter Technology Company (HTC), LLC, under Parts Manufacturing Authority (PMA) issued by the FAA. 

Follow Up Examination 

The NTSB IIC and another NTSB investigator examined the wreckage on September 23, 2014. They retrieved the blade roots for all five main rotor blades, and submitted them to the NTSB Material's Laboratory for examination. 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Material's Laboratory Blade Examination 

There were several components that comprised the main rotor blade assembly. Skin doublers were bonded to the outside of the blade at the root end. Upper and lower root fittings were joined to the root end of the blade subassembly with a blue-colored film adhesive on a scrim cloth carrier and five attachment bolts. Three of the attachment bolts were arranged spanwise along the fitting, and two bolts (inboard of the aforementioned three spanwise bolts) at the root end were arranged chordwise relative to one another. For the purposes of this investigation, the bolt located at the outboard end of the root fitting was labeled as the "No. 1 attachment bolt," and the bolt adjacent to it was labeled as the "No. 2 attachment bolt." 

According to the manufacturer of the main rotor blade assemblies, the blade and fittings were joined as follows: 

1. A primer containing strontium was applied to each fitting and the doubler 
2. The adhesive film was sandwiched between the fittings and the blade and the adhesive was cured 
3. The excess adhesive was trimmed from the edge of the fitting 
4. A sealant was applied around the edge of the fitting 
5. Paint coatings were then applied 

Examination of Separated Rotor Blade 

Visual examination prior to disassembly revealed that rotor blade SN 091B was fractured primarily chordwise through the second bolt hole from the outboard end of the root fitting, about 3 inches from the inboard end of the blade subassembly. On the inboard end of the separated blade subassembly, blue-colored adhesive film remained bonded to the upper and lower surfaces in the area that mated to the inner surfaces of the upper and lower root fittings. There were cracks in the white paint along the interface between the retained root end of the blade subassembly and both upper and lower root fittings. The No. 1 attachment bolt was missing, and was not recovered. The No. 1 attachment bolt hole in the upper fitting had been enlarged to a size and shape similar to the bolt head of the other attachment bolts. The No. 1 attachment bolt hole in the lower fitting had also been enlarged into an elongated slot with a width similar to the minor thread diameter of the other attachment bolts; the slot was elongated in a primarily outboard direction. 

The remaining four attachment bolts were found in their installed configuration, and removed from the rotor blade root assembly, upon which the upper and lower root fittings separated from the blade subassembly. Blue-colored adhesive remained bonded to the blade subassembly; no evidence of blue-colored adhesive was observed on the inner surfaces of the upper and lower root fittings, which was consistent with disbonding of both root fittings from the blade subassembly. Wear debris was observed on the bonding faces of the upper and lower root fittings around the No. 1 and No. 2 attachment bolt holes. The adhesive film on the liberated portion of the blade subassembly exhibited a rubbed appearance around the first and second bolt holes as well. 

The fracture through the blade subassembly at the No. 2 attachment bolt hole was further examined. Flat, comparatively smooth fracture faces, and periodic crack arrest marks consistent with fatigue were observed on the upper and lower spar arms, the upper and lower blade skin, and the upper and lower doublers. Fatigue initiation sites were observed at three distinct locations: 1) at both forward and aft edges of the upper side of the No. 2 attachment bolt hole, 2) at both forward and aft edges of the lower side of the No. 2 attachment bolt hole, and 3) at the forward surface of the spar (adjacent to the brass leading edge weight). 

The fatigue initiation sites were examined for any notable features indicative of pre-existing damage or defects, but none were found. 

The disbondment between the adhesive and one of the fittings (the lower fitting) was examined in greater detail on a chordwise cross section of the blade subassembly. Sealant was observed between the adhesive layer and the fitting up to approximately 0.14 inch in from the edge of the fitting. The debris previously observed on the plan view image appeared as patches of debris on top of and adjacent to the sealant. 

The primer along the disbonded interface was examined. White particles were observed within a thin discontinuous layer that was bonded to the adhesive layer. Examination of the particles revealed the presence of strontium, a constituent of the primer that was applied to the fitting prior to the bonding process. 

The primer was similarly characterized at the trailing edge of the fitting. As above, the primer was bonded to the adhesive layer. The sealant was observed on top of the primer, and a thin discontinuous layer of debris was observed on top of the sealant. Examination of the debris indicated that, among additional elements, the debris contained titanium, consistent with wear debris from the fitting. 

Intact Rotor Blades 

The four remaining intact rotor blade assemblies were examined visually for cracks in the paint around the perimeter of the upper and lower fittings. Cracks were observed around the perimeter of the upper and lower fittings on blade SN 085B. No paint cracks were observed on the other three blades. 

The root fitting assembly attachment bolts on all of the blade assemblies were removed. On blade SN 085B, removal of the attachment bolts revealed disbonding of the upper root fitting from the blade subassembly, similar to the disbonding observed on blade SN 091B. The lower root fitting for blade SN 085B did not separate from the blade subassembly. Both upper and lower root fittings for the remaining three blades did not separate after removal of the attachment bolts. Examination of blade SN 085B using a stereomicroscope did not reveal evidence of cracks emanating from the root fitting attachment bolt holes. 

For further details on the NTSB Materials Laboratory Blade Examination, see the Materials Laboratory Factual Report No. 15-026 in the docket for this investigation. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 

FAA Air Worthiness Directive (AD) History 

The FAA issued AD 96-10-09; it required initial and repetitive inspections at intervals not to exceed 100 hours of time in service of each main rotor blade root for either cracks, paint and sealant cracking, or separation between the lower surface root end fitting and the doubler. The actions specified in this AD were intended to prevent failure of a blade resulting in separation of the blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. 

FAA AD 2005-21-02 instructed the operator to determine and record the number of torque events (TE) accumulated on each blade. On or before accumulating an additional 200 TEs or at the end of each day's operations, whichever occurred first, the operator was required to record and update the accumulated TEs total. For each blade that had accumulated 13,720 or more TEs and 750 or more hours TIS, before further flight, unless accomplished previously, the operator was to perform a main rotor blade TE inspection. The AD also required a recurrent main rotor blade TE inspection at intervals not to exceed 200 TEs or 35 hours TIS, whichever occurred first. 

A review of maintenance records indicated that the blades on the accident helicopter had accumulated about 1,123 hours and 232,674 TEs since installation. 

MD Helicopters Service Bulletin 

MD Helicopters service bulletin (SB), SB369E-095R2, described the purported causes of disbondment, the inspection procedure to detect disbondment, and instructions for determining the inspection interval. The cause of the disbondment was purported to be," a high number of torque events/external lifts per hour which exceed the original design fatigue spectrum." The SB referenced MD Helicopter, Inc., Handbook of Maintenance Instructions CSP-HMI-2, Sec. 62-10-00 for instruction on performing a Main Rotor Blade Torque Event Inspection. Among other requirements, the procedure included: lifting the blade off the droop stop at the outboard end of the blade; inspecting the bottom side of the blade using a bright light and 10x magnifying glass to inspect for chordwise cracks protruding from under root fitting, doubler, and skin; and inspecting the area around the lower root fitting for missing cracked adhesive/paint. The SB continued with similar instructions for examination of the top of the blades after placing the blade on the droop stop. 

Following the accident, MD Helicopters issued Service Letter 14-SE-049. It emphasized to all owners/operators the importance of performing the main rotor blade inspections as prescribed in Airworthiness Directives, mandated by Maintenance Manual (Airworthiness Limitations), or described by Service Bulletin at the designated inspection intervals. It noted that the inspections and intervals were critical for safe flight and continued airworthiness. This service letter also included color photographs of examples of adhesive/paint cracks that result in rejection of the blade. It noted that the example cracks were possible evidence of movement and or initial failure of the adhesive bond between the M/R blade root end and doubler. 

HTC issued Service Notice 2100-5 following the accident. The purpose of the notice was to emphasize the importance of performing the entire required main rotor blade root fitting periodic inspections. It noted that it was imperative that owners and operators understand the definition of a TE and how to keep track of them. It stated that helicopters involved in external lift work with repeated pick-ups and drop-offs may require multiple inspections daily due to the accumulation of high rates of TEs per hour. It stated that failure to comply with these inspection requirements may result in the loss of a main rotor blade during operation. 

Pilot Statement 

The pilot stated that he obtained an airframe and powerplant certificate (A&P) so that he could perform the TE inspections. He would average 100 turns per hour in clear cuts, which was 200 torque events. He tried to comply with the AD as best as he could on work sites. On a typical job, he usually didn't do the TE inspections until he got home at night, and he didn't always use the 10X magnifier in the rain. He read the AD and maintenance manual on how the blade inspection should be done. He read in the inspection procedures that the inspector was to inspect the root end for cracks, but he was looking primarily at the root fitting and metal for cracks, not necessarily the bond line. He stated that the intent of inspecting the bond line was not clear to him until the service notices published by the helicopter and blade manufacturer as a result of the accident, which included the color pictures.


LARCH LAKE, Wash. - A helicopter pilot is injured but apparently conscious after crashing in a rural area of Snohomish County, officials said.

Rescuers and medics rushed to the scene, a clear-cut in the forest near Larch Lake, at about noon after receiving reports of an aircraft down.

The chopper was demolished in the crash. But it did not catch fire, and the pilot survived the impact.

Aerial footage shot by KOMO's Air 4 showed that the pilot was able to move his arms as medics placing him on a gurney. He was then airlifted to an Everett hospital.

The aircraft was identified as 1979 Hughes helicopter owned by Olympic Air Inc., based in Shelton.


Story, Photo Gallery, Comments:   http://www.komonews.com


STEVENS PASS — The Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office is investigating reports of a helicopter crash near Larch Lake. 

Details of the possible crash were sparse at 12 p.m. Tuesday.  

Larch Lake is in the Chiwaukum Range, south of Highway 2 and Lake Wenatchee. It is a considered a high-alpine lake with an elevation around 6,000 feet.