Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Window crack forces National Guard training flight to land



WARWICK, R.I. (WPRI) — A military plane made an emergency landing at T.F. Green Airport in Warwick Tuesday after the crew noticed a crack in one of the cockpit windows. 

Rhode Island National Guard LTC Peter Parente said the C-130 Hercules was about 13 minutes into a routine training flight out of Quonset when the crack was discovered.

The pilots consulted with Quonset National Guard Base and decided to cut the flight short and immediately touch down at T.F. Green. Parente said the plane couldn’t go back to Quonset because the Instrument Landing System there is offline for upgrades, which is necessary for landing in stormy weather.

The worry was that the temperature difference between the air in the cabin and the air outside the plane would cause the crack to worsen, however the C-130 was able to safely land at the airport without the window breaking.

LTC Parente said the window will be fixed at T.F. Green and the plane will be flown back to Quonset once the weather improves.

- Story and Video:  http://wpri.com

TL Ultralight SRO Stingsport, N177N: Accident occurred July 05, 2012 in Piru, California

NTSB Identification: WPR12FA295
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, July 05, 2012 in Piru, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/11/2014
Aircraft: TL ULTRALIGHT SRO STINGSPORT, registration: N177N
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The flight instructor and commercial pilot were conducting a flight review during daytime visual flight rules conditions. Multiple witnesses near the accident site reported observing the accident airplane descending in a nose-low attitude while spinning. Witness reports, findings from the wreckage examination and recovered GPS data are consistent with the airplane entering a stall as part of the flight review and a subsequent spin. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane was equipped with dual flight controls; however, it could not be determined which pilot was manipulating the controls at the time of the accident nor could it be determined why neither pilot was able to recover from the spin. The airplane was also equipped with a rescue ballistic parachute system. The arming handle was found fractured from the cabin roof due to a force on the handle that loaded the adhesive joint in peel mode. The arming pin was not engaged within the arming handle and exhibited a permanent bend. Fretting wear deposits were present on the retaining pin shank, suggesting that the pin was most likely engaged within the handle a significant portion of the time when the airplane was in motion. It could not be determined if the arming pin was removed before the flight or at some point during the flight. The parachute was not deployed. Medical record review revealed that the left seat pilot had significant preexisting heart disease. However, due to the limitations of the available medical evidence, the investigation could not determine if the pilot had an acute cardiac event during the flight that degraded his ability to operate the aircraft. Toxicology tests for the pilot were positive for Metoprolol, Ticlopidine, and Valsartan, which are commonly used to treat high blood pressure and angina, to control heart rate in some arrhythmias, and to reduce the risk of stroke. Toxicology testing for the flight instructor, who was seated in the right seat, revealed evidence of previous marijuana use; however no active compound was detected in the postmortem blood, thus it is unlikely that he was experiencing acute impairment from marijuana at the time of the accident.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot’s failure to recover from a stall, which resulted in a spin. Contributing to the accident was the instructor’s inadequate remedial action.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 5, 2012, about 1324 Pacific daylight time, a TL Ultralight SRO Stingsport, N177N, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Piru, California. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The certified flight instructor and commercial pilot receiving instruction were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the instructional flight. The local flight originated from Whiteman Airpark (WHP), Van Nuys, California, at 1300.

Multiple witnesses driving on Highway 126 within the vicinity of the accident site reported observing the accident airplane descending in a nose low attitude while spinning in a counter-clockwise direction before it descended below a tree line.

Friends of the pilot and flight instructor reported that the purpose of the flight was to conduct a flight review for the pilot.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

It was not determined which one of the two pilots, a commercial pilot and owner of the airplane seated in the left seat or the certified flight instructor seated in the right seat, was manipulating the flight controls when the accident occurred.

The pilot, age 89, held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land, single-engine sea, and instrument airplane ratings. The most recent third class medical certificate was issued to the pilot November 3, 2005. The pilot reported on his most recent medical application that he accumulated a total of 3,600 hours of flight time. Review of the pilot's logbook revealed that as of the most recent entry dated May 22, 2012, he had accumulated 3,999.3 total hours of flight time.

The flight instructor, age 59, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The most recent second class medical certificate issued to the pilot was on June 28, 2011, with no limitations stated. The flight instructor reported on his most recent medical certificate application that he had accumulated a total of 13,000 hours of flight time and 200 hours within the previous six months. The flight instructor's logbooks were not located.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The light sport two-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane, serial number (S/N) TLUSA 153, was manufactured in 2007. It was powered by a Rotax 912ULS engine, serial number 5647034, rated at 100 horsepower, driving a Wood comp ground adjustable three bladed wooden propeller. The airplane was equipped with a Galaxy Rescue Parachute System (GRS).

Review of the airframe, engine, and propeller logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on July 1, 2012, at a Hobbs time of 214.1 hours and tachometer time of 215.9 hours. The airplane had accumulated about 1 hour of flight time since the annual inspection at the time of the accident.

Review of the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Section 4, Normal Procedures, page 12, Pre Taxi checklist states under item 8, "GRS Safety Pin -- REMOVED and STOWED." Within the note section of page 13, the POH states in part "…Carefully remove the safety pin from the GRS activation handle. Stow it in a place where it can be easily reached after landing for securing it back into place. The canopy locking lever on the pilot's side is a recommended storing location. Then you will be reminded to secure the chute when you reach for the canopy latch to exit the cockpit."

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A review of recorded data from the Camarillo Airport (CMA) automated weather observation station, located about 20 miles southwest of the accident site, revealed at 1255 conditions were wind variable at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, overcast cloud layer at 1,600 feet, temperature 18 degrees Celsius, dew point 15 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury. At 1355, CMA reported a broken cloud layer at 1,800 feet.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane came to rest upright within an open field adjacent to an orange tree orchard on an approximate heading of about 294 degrees magnetic. Wreckage debris remained within about 20 feet of the main wreckage. A large indention within the ground was located about 1 foot in front of the engine and contained two propeller blades.

The fuselage was mostly intact and exhibited impact damage to the forward and lower areas of the fuselage. The Galaxy Rescue Parachute System's handle was found displaced from its respective mount location on the cabin roof structure. The securing pin was found removed and located within the main wreckage. The handle appeared to have remained within its housing and not actuated. The left wing remained attached to the fuselage. The left aileron and flap remained attached via all their respective mounts. The left flap appeared to be in a partially extended position. The right wing remained attached to the fuselage. The right aileron and flap remained attached via all their respective mounts. The right flap appeared to be in a partially extended position.

The empennage was partially separated and displaced 45 degrees to the right, about one foot forward of the horizontal stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer and horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the empennage structure. The rudder was partially separated and remained attached via its lower mount. The elevator remained attached to its mounts, and the trim tab remained attached to the elevator.

Flight control continuity was established from the left and right cockpit controls to all primary flight control surfaces.

The engine remained attached to the engine mount structure. The 1/3 cylinder and 2/4 cylinder side carburetors remained attached. Both carburetors were disassembled and found unremarkable. The top spark plugs were removed and exhibited signatures consistent with normal operation. Rotational continuity was established throughout the engine and valve train when the propeller was rotated by hand. Thumb compression was obtained on all four cylinders.

The propeller assembly remained attached to the engine crankshaft propeller flange. One propeller blade remained attached to the propeller hub and the remaining two blades were separated just outboard of the hub. The separated blades exhibited slight chord wise scratching.

No evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunction was observed during the examination of the engine and airframe.

The cabin roof structure surrounding the parachute handle mount area, parachute arming handle, and arming pin were sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Materials Laboratory for further examination.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

According to the FAA medical case review; the 89-year-old pilot had a history of high blood pressure and coronary artery disease treated with bypass surgery and medications. He had not renewed his medical certificate since it expired November 30, 2006.

The Ventura County Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy on the pilot on July 7, 2012. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was "...blunt force injuries." The autopsy noted a palpable subcutaneous pacemaker. The pacemaker was not interrogated. The cardiovascular system examination was limited by the degree of injury; the heart was not intact. The coronary arteries were not examined. The brain was not examined.


The FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on the pilot. According to CAMI's report, no carbon monoxide was detected in the blood and no ethanol was detected in the vitreous. Metoprolol and Valsartan were detected in the blood and urine. Ticlopidine was detected in the urine but not the blood. Metoprolol is a beta blocker used to treat patients with cardiovascular disease. Valsartan is an angiotensin receptor blocker used to treat high blood pressure. Ticlopidine is used to prevent platelet aggregation (clotting) in patients at risk for strokes and also in people with coronary artery stents.

According to the FAA medical case review; the 59-year-old flight instructor had a second class medical certificate with no restrictions or limitations.

The Ventura County Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy on the flight instructor on July 7, 2012. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was "...blunt force injuries."

The FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on the flight instructor. According to CAMI's report, no carbon monoxide was detected in the blood and no ethanol was detected in the vitreous. Tetrahydrocannabinol was detected in the lung (0.0244 ug/ml) but not in the blood. Tetrahydrocannabinol is the psychoactive compound found in marijuana. Tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid was detected in the blood (0.0071 ug/ml), in the urine (0.071 ug/ml) and in the lung (0.006 ug/ml). Tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid is the inactive metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol. Additionally, terazosin was detected in the blood and urine. Terazosin is an alpha blocker used to treat benign prostate disease.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Two handheld global positioning system (GPS), Garmin GPSMAP 396 units were recovered from the airplane. The units were sent to the NTSB Office of Research and Engineering Recorders Laboratory for data extraction. The data revealed a flight track from the day of the accident showed the flight's departure from runway 12 at WHP, where the flight performed two take off and landings within the airport traffic pattern before proceeding on a northwesterly course.

The data depicted that as the accident airplane continued on a northwesterly course, a 360-degree right turn and 360-degree left turn were performed followed by a 90-degree turn to the right and left. About 3 miles south of the accident site, a 45-degree turn to a northerly heading was observed at an altitude of 4,774 feet mean sea level (msl) and ground speed of 91 knots. The following 10 recorded data points over a time period of 80 seconds depicted an increase in altitude to about 5,148 feet msl, and a decrease in ground speed to 55 knots followed by an increase of ground speed to 95 knots at an altitude of 5,056 feet msl, about 0.7 miles south of the accident site. The next two data points spanning 19 seconds showed a decrease in ground speed to 65 knots at an altitude of 5,020 feet msl, almost directly above the accident site. The remainder of the recorded data depicted a reduction in ground speed and a vertical descent to the accident site. For more information, see the GPS Factual Report within the public docket for this accident.

Examination of the roof structure, parachute release cable and handle assembly, and arming pin was conducted by a Senior Materials Laboratory technician. The cabin roof structure exhibited a disbonded area where the parachute arming-handle mounting-bracket was adhesively bonded to the roof structure. Higher magnification images of the faying surfaces of the adhesive bonding area on the mounting bracket and the roof structure revealed that the mounting bracket was loaded in peel with the disbonding crack propagating from the radiused bend in the bracket toward the square edge. The balance of the faying surfaces were too rough to establish interfacial contact sufficient to allow adhesive wetting between the adherends. Traces of roof structure paint were observed in areas between the faying surfaces.

Examination of the parachute arming handle through-holes with a 5X to 50X stereo- zoom microscope under white light revealed drilled and chamfered holes with a red anodized surface treatment. No heavy scratches, gouges or other indications of abusive use were present.

Examination of the arming pin revealed that permanent bending of the pin shank approximately 90 degrees to the plane of the slot cut through the pin shank. Fretting wear deposits were present on the surface of the arming pin shank consistent with shank contact with the surfaces of the through-holes in the parachute arming handle.

Scanning electron microscopy and standardless semi-quantitative energy-dispersive spectroscopy (ESD) were conducted on the arming-pin shank surfaces. The EDS analysis indicated that the fretting wear deposits are primarily composed of the oxidized constituents of the aluminum alloy used in the parachute arming handle. For further details on the laboratory examination of the arming handle, pin, and cabin roof, see the Materials Laboratory report within the public docket for this accident.

http://registry.faa.gov/N177N

http://tl-ultralight.cz

NTSB Identification: WPR12FA295
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, July 05, 2012 in Piru, CA
Aircraft: TL ULTRALIGHT SRO STINGSPORT, registration: N177N
Injuries: 2 Fatal.


This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On July 5, 2012, about 1324 Pacific daylight time, a TL Ultralight SRO Stingsport, N177N, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Piru, California. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The certified flight instructor and commercial pilot receiving instruction were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the instructional flight. The local flight originated from Whiteman Airpark, Van Nuys,  California, at 1300.

Multiple witnesses driving on Highway 126 within the vicinity of the accident site reported observing the accident airplane descending in a nose low attitude while spinning in a counter-clockwise direction before it descended below a tree line.

Examination of the accident site by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) revealed that the airplane came to rest upright in an open field. Wreckage debris remained within about 20 feet of the main wreckage and all major structural components of the airplane were present. The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination.



Harry Bell


Michael Boolen


[KHTS] – More than two years after a fatal Piru-area plane crash killed the 2011 SCV Man of the Year and his co-pilot, a federal aviation report shed little light on the circumstances of the incident.

The factual findings, which were released recently on the National Transportation Safety Board website, are expected to be followed within a couple of weeks by a Probable Cause Report, an NTSB official said Tuesday.

The Probable Cause Report is expected to include NTSB investigators’ determination for the cause of the crash.

Harry Bell, 89, and co-pilot, Michael Dwain Boolen, 59, of Pacoima, both died of “blunt force injuries,” according to a report released Thursday in federal officials’ Factual Report.

“Multiple witnesses driving on Highway 126 within the vicinity of the accident site reported observing the accident airplane descending in a nose low attitude while spinning in a counter-clockwise direction before it descended below a tree line,” according to the report.

A federal aviation report detailed the sequence of events and the status of the two men in the cockpit; however, the report fails to identify whether Bell or Boolen was in charge of the aircraft, noting only that both were capable of controlling the craft before its final descent.

The fact-finding reports notes there’s an additional investigation that’s ongoing into the recovered materials, including microscopy and other lab tests.

The report doesn’t identify any mechanical concerns with the aircraft based on a National Transportation Safety Bureau investigation.

The two were flying a TL Ultralight SRO Stingsport, a small two-person propeller-driven aircraft in 2012, when it crashed in Piru about 24 minutes after takeoff from Van Nuys.

The crash site is across the street from the Rancho Camulos historic site, about 100 feet from Highway 126.

Friends stated Boolen was working on a flight review for Bell when the two crashed.

Bell held a commercial pilot certificate with approximately 4,000 hours of airtime logged, and the 89-year-old pilot had a history of high blood pressure and coronary artery disease treated with bypass surgery and medications, according to the FAA medical case review.

He had not renewed his medical certificate since it expired Nov. 30, 2006.

Boolen, a flight instructor, reported on his most recent medical certificate application that he had accumulated a total of 13,000 hours of flight time and 200 hours within the previous six months.

The airplane had accumulated about one hour of flight time since its annual inspection before its final flight.

The plane had a Galaxy Rescue Parachute System, but the system was reportedly undeployed, according to the report.

“The Galaxy Rescue Parachute System’s handle was found displaced from its respective mount location on the cabin roof structure,” the report stated. “The securing pin was found removed and located within the main wreckage. The handle appeared to have remained within its housing and not actuated.”

Sgt. Eric Buschow of the Ventura County Sheriff’s Department said that members of the sheriff’s bomb squad were sent to the scene to deactivate a small rocket device used to deploy a parachute in the event the aircraft experienced an emergency.

“On these lightweights, a parachute can deploy and slow down the landing if they have an emergency,” Buschow said. “For some reason, they didn’t activate it. We had to deactivate it to remove the danger to our officers and the coroner.”


From a previous story on SCVHistory.com | Leon Worden:

Harry Allen Bell was born July 2, 1923, five years after the end of World War I — “the war to end all wars.” In the United States, the 1920s were a decade of extremes: a new prosperity had swept into some parts of the country prompting novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald to write about America’s growing fascination with flappers, jazz, fancy cars, and airplane barnstorming.

On the darker side, the Harding presidency was rocked by scandal when shady land dealings were exposed in California’s Teapot Dome Scheme; discrimination had risen to a high pitch in Oklahoma prompting the governor to declare war on the terrorist activities carried out by the Ku Klux Klan; and the politically astute were becoming alarmed about the growing unrest in Germany and the rise of a fanatical National Socialist Party leader named Adolf Hitler.

These events were a world away from the small Michigan farm that was tended by Harry’s parents, Harry O. and Thelma Bell. Harry and his sister Ruth, who was born a few years later, not only helped out on their parents’ land, but their grandparents’ as well. In a vivid contrast to the bright, flashing lights of America’s big cities, one of Harry’s chores was to keep the oil lamps lit on his grandparents’ farm because they had no electricity.

Harry became an engineer on B-24 bombers, completing 50 missions in Europe before being released stateside. On those missions Harry. learned literally to “act on the fly.” One minute he could be top turret gunner, the next he was rushing to patch up enemy fighter and flak damage, and the next, tending to wounded crew members. Staying alive was a big part of every mission.Harry graduated from high school on June 16, 1938. Besides the typical teenage preoccupation with girls and all things mechanical, Harry developed a love of airplanes that would dramatically shape his future. He enrolled in flying school and just naturally assumed that his country would use his skills when he joined the Army Air Corps right after Pearl Harbor was bombed. His bubble was burst when halfway through pilot training, the Army began pulling men out randomly to engage in active combat.

Perhaps nothing can illustrate more clearly the actions of “Our Country’s Greatest Generation” than Harry’s own reminiscing in a World War II publication:

Our bomb group headquarters was in an old winery in Cerignola, Italy where we could watch girls stomp grapes as we were briefed for our missions. We flew our first two missions individually with a seasoned crew. Then we got an old dog of a plane, an olive-drab aircraft. Now the fun began. Up early and down to the Bomb Group headquarters for our briefing as we watched the Italian girls stomp the grapes. I thought about security and wondered if the girls could pass on anything to the enemy.

From briefing to breakfast, then to a bin where we kept our sheepskins, our parachutes and our flak suits. And then on to our B-24. Pre-flight, takeoff, form up, and climb to 40 below zero, usually about 23,000 feet. We would level off at the assigned altitude following our lead plane. Now it becomes real fun! Oxygen mask on, icicles on your chin, open gun-port windows, nice 140 mph breeze, throat mike, and COLD!

Harry returned from the war with seven battle stars and seven air medals. Of the 1,200 airmen in his 757 Air Squadron, only six hundred made it home.

Back on U.S. soil, it was time to put his war experiences behind him. A young woman who caught his eye at a Michigan dance helped him do that when she consented to be his wife several months later. Harry and Barbara Bell were married on Nov. 17, 1945. The young couple set up housekeeping while Harry completed his studies at Central Michigan College, graduating as a civil engineer.

According to Harry, his first “real” job was in a six-man engineering department for the Los Angeles Transit Lines. That led to a 15-year job working as an associate civil engineer with the office of the Los Angeles County Engineer. Harry opened the County Engineering Office in Lancaster and sat on the County Planning Commission as an advisor on grading and drainage.

Barbara and Harry moved to Lancaster where daughter Janet was born in 1955 and son Ken in 1958. Between business and family obligations, Harry kept his love of flying alive purchasing his own private plane to make annual trips back to his Michigan homestead. Through his association with the Los Angeles Shriners, Harry would also use his plane to fly Third World children suffering from severe injuries and birth defects to Children’s Hospital.

In the early 60s, another civil engineer applying for a grading permit walked into Harry’s office. The two began talking business, but soon found a personal connection that led to a life-long friendship. Ed Bolden, SCV’s 1970 Man of the Year, not only became a friend, but a partner as well, in real estate and engineering businesses.

Harry and Barbara moved their family to Saugus in 1965 and Harry immediately became involved in a myriad of organizations that helped shape our valley into the thriving community it is today. A few of his contributions to the development of the SCV include being one of five local realtors who founded the SCV Real Estate Board, serving on the formation committee of Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, and lobbying to make Castaic Lake a public rather than a private entity.

Harry served as president of the Real Estate Board twice and was named a Realtor of the Year two times. In addition to being a Shriner, he is also a Mason 32nd Degree, a founding member of the local Elks Lodge, and an active member of the SCV Rotary Club for 48 years. Rotary International’s annual conventions gave him and Barbara a chance to visit other countries and meet foreign speaking Rotarians who were also dedicated to the Rotary motto “Service Above Self.” One of Harry’s proudest moments as a Rotarian was welcoming his daughter.

Story and Comments:   http://scvnews.com


Michael Boolen and family | Facebook photo





















The plane crashed near buildings and a residence off Highway 126 east of Piru.

Flying back in time with the Fokker aircraft in Western Australia

Fifty five years ago, MacRobertson Miller Airlines, known as MMA, introduced the Fokker F27 Friendship and F28 aircraft to Western Australia.

The initial Fokker fleet had a large impact on aviation in the state, allowing MMA to fly longer distances.

Local Geraldton historian and aviation enthusiast Tony Parasiliti remembered hearing them fly over the town.

"They had the Rolls Royce engines and it was quite a distinctive sound, it was symphonic to me," he said.

"They were graceful in their appearance and sound - it was just a beautiful machine."

The first Fokker Friendship aircraft landed in Geraldton on December 22, 1959.

It was a brand new aircraft and was formally named The Swan by the former Department of Civil Aviation.

"The Fokker that we had here, they used to fly it almost 15 hours a day," explained Tony.

"The Swan was the first one to reach 10,000 hours before it did its overhaul."

If it was a nice day and their schedule permitted, pilots of the MMA Fokker would often alter their route when descending into Geraldton to fly over the old lighthouse.

Its high wings meant passengers had a very clear view of the town from the air.

Co-founder of MMA Horrie Miller was passionate about the Fokker fleet.

"On the day [the F27] arrived, someone said 'oh yuck, she doesn't look as good as the DC3' and Horrie, all he could say was 'I've never seen a low-winged bird'."

The 10 Fokkers MMA flew around the country saw a fair bit of drama in their days.

United States astronaut Wally Schirra travelled to Carnarvon in an F27 in 1966.

"He was an astronaut on the Gemini and Apollo space programs," Tony said.

"And he was the first astronaut to go up to Carnarvon and visit the tracking station there."

A few years earlier, one aircraft caught Beatlemania and flew the famous foursome from Adelaide to Melbourne.

A decade on, in 1972, an Ansett Fokker was hijacked on its way into Alice Springs.

"It was the second or third hijack this country had ever seen," Tony said.

Thankfully, the crew, passengers and aircraft made it through unscathed.

The Swan aircraft carried nearly 2 million passengers in its time flying to and from Geraldton.

MacRobertson Miller Airlines eventually became part of Ansett Australia and the Fokkers were rebranded.

After Ansett collapsed in 2002, the Fokkers were sold off.

Tony said up until June this year, one of the WA Fokker F27 Friendship planes was still being flown with the Peruvian airforce.

- Story and Photo:  http://www.abc.net.au


One of MMA's Fokkers at Perth Airport in July 1969
 (Supplied:Nigel K Daw)

Boeing to Cut Production of Jumbo Jet: Aircraft Maker to Reduce 747-8 Deliveries to 1.3 a Month From 1.5 as Demand Slows

The Wall Street Journal
By JON OSTROWER


Updated Dec. 9, 2014 12:25 p.m. ET

Boeing Co. will reduce monthly production of its 747-8 jetliner to 1.3 aircraft a month from 1.5, as demand continues to slow for the storied jumbo jet.

The aerospace giant on Tuesday said it would make the reduction, which will lower annual deliveries of the 747 to approximately 16 from 18, in September 2015. The planned cut enables “us to continue to run a healthy business,” Boeing said.

The four-engine 747, with its distinctive hump, was long an icon of international jet travel, but demand has dwindled as airlines have opted for smaller, twin-engine jetliners and the need for big cargo freighters has ebbed. Boeing last year said it was cutting 747 output to 1.5 aircraft a month from 1.75.

The 747-8 version of the freighter, which Boeing first delivered in 2011, was intended to refresh the jumbo jet with a longer body, new General Electric Co. engines and a reshaped wing. A 747-8 passenger model, capable of holding 467 passengers, followed in early 2012 and is operated today by Deutsche Lufthansa AG and Air China Ltd. Both versions list for about $368 million, before discounts.

But Boeing this year hasn’t managed to grow sales of the 747-8, with two cancellations negating two new orders. The company has a remaining backlog of 39 aircraft through November, including 26 passenger and 13 freighter aircraft.

Boeing’s statement on Tuesday said it is “making this minor adjustment because the near-term recovery in the cargo market has not been as robust as expected” and it continues to believe in the “long-term strength of the freighter market.”


Source: http://www.wsj.com

Cessna 152, C-GZSX, Pacific Aviation Academy: Accident occurred December 09, 2014 at Pitt Meadows Regional Airport (CYPK), Pitt Meadows, BC




A pilot of a small plane was injured in an emergency landing Tuesday at Pitt Meadows Regional Airport. 

Airport spokesperson Ashley Hilland said the plane involved was a Cessna 152 and only one person was on board.

According to Pitt Meadows fire chief Don Jolley, the plane was just taking off at about 2:55 p.m. when the pilot decared an emergency.

"He tried to land, he couldn't make it back to the runway."

Instead, the pilot was able to land on the taxi way that connects the seaplane ramp on the Fraser River with the airport. Jolley added the pilot did a good job in making it to the taxi way to land the plane.

The aircraft sustained some damage and there was also a significant fuel leak. Firefighters spread absorbent material on the ground to contain the leak and keep the fuel from flowing into the river.

Jolley said the pilot was evacuated by air ambulance after passersby rescued him from the aircraft.



The pilot of a small plane pulled himself from the cockpit of his downed Cessna after crash landing at Pitt Meadows Regional Airport Tuesday afternoon, say fire officials.

Firefighters and police officers raced to the airport after receiving calls around 2:50 p.m. that a plane had gone down, said Sandy Mallan, an administrative assistant at Pitt Meadows Fire Rescue Service.

When they arrived at the airport, they found the downed craft near a float plane ramp, located just a few hundred metres away from the airport runways.

The pilot - the lone occupant of the plane - was located at the site, conscious and suffering from non life-threatening injuries.

He was flown to hospital in an air ambulance, said Ashley Hilland, a property manager at the airport.

Hilland said airport officials don't yet know what caused the crash, nor do they know whether the plane was attempting to land or take off.

Mounties remained on the scene after the crash as investigators begin to piece together what went wrong during the flight.

Source: http://www.vancouversun.com




PITT MEADOWS (NEWS1130) – Emergency responders say the crash of a Cessna airplane at the Pitt Meadoes Airport has sent the pilot to hospital. 

 Fire Chief Don Jolley of Pitt Meadows Fire and Rescue says the incident occurred mid-afternoon when the small plane declared an emergency landing about 40 kilometres east of Vancouver.

Instead, he says the plane crashed on a taxi way at the airport, and its single occupant was airlifted to Royal Columbia Hospital in New Westminster.

Airport spokeswoman Ashley Hilland says the pilot was in stable condition and officials won’t know what caused the incident until a full assessment of the scene is complete.

The airport’s website says it operates three paved and one water runway and in 2011 was the third busiest airport in the Lower Mainland.

Sarasota Bradenton International Airport (KSRQ) uses loud, scary sounds to keep birds away from planes


SARASOTA, FL (WFLA) - Federal investigators in Maryland are working to determine the cause of a plane crash that killed six people in Gaithersburg.

A bird strike may have been factor, since radio traffic reported a number of birds in the area prior to the crash. The FAA says in 2013, there were 10,856 bird strikes. Birds can cause severe damage or destruction to aircraft, so airport officials take it seriously.

At Sarasota Bradenton International Airport, there is a team of workers who comb the grounds every day to scare off the animals. They use a variety of devices to ward them away. 

Supervisor of Operations Roger Widrick has been spending the last 26 years shooting at birds."The bigger the bird, the more damage it can do to an airplane,” said Widrick.

Federal regulations allow airports to kill the animals if needed, but here in Sarasota, airport officials use fear instead.

They fire blank pistols with small pyrotechnic devices called ‘bangers' and ‘screamers'. ‘Bangers' fly thirty feet and cause a loud bang. ‘Screamers' fly 150 feet and emit a shrilling, whistling noise.

They also fire ‘shell crackers' out of shotguns. These pyrotechnic devices fly 300 feet and create a loud bang.

"By scaring them we create a behavior modification that teaches them this is not a good place for them to be,” explained Widrick.

In addition, airport crews keep the grass cut low, and design their retention ponds to discourage wading birds.

Airport officials want to make the runway a very uncomfortable spot, so animals will avoid it.

- Source:  http://www.wfla.com

 
A propane cannon & pyrotechnic noisemakers are used to scare off birds at Sarasota Bradenton International Airport .


Family of Perry Inhofe files lawsuit in connection with plane crash that killed senator's son: Mitsubishi MU-2B-25, Anasazi Winds LLC, N856JT, accident occurred November 10, 2013 in Owasso, Oklahoma

The family of a U.S. senator's son killed in a 2013 plane crash has filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against the plane's manufacturers. 

The suit was filed Tuesday in Tulsa County District Court on behalf of Perry Dyson Inhofe II, 51, a licensed pilot, flight instructor and Tulsa physician who died when his Mitsubishi MU-2 twin-engine plane crashed Nov. 10, 2013 near Owasso. Inhofe was the son of U.S. Senator Jim Inhofe.

A National Transportation Safety Board report on the crash claims Inhofe II “did not appropriately manage” the aircraft, having to fly on just one engine before it went down. A probable cause report said Inhofe II, reported a “control problem” and “left engine shutdown” moments before the crash and that the plane should have been flyable flyable in a one-engine-inoperative condition, as weather did not impact its performance.


But in documents that name Honeywell International Inc., Standard Aero, Standard Aero (Alliance) Inc. and Intercontinenal Jet Service as defendants, the Inhofe family claims the crash was due to the negligence of aircraft manufacturers that allegedly failed to provide proper maintenance on the aircraft's engine and its parts.


“… This accident has devastated the Inhofe family, and we intend to find accountability from those responsible," William Angelley, a Dallas aviation attorney representing Inhofe's family, said in a statement.


“The NTSB missed this one. The cause of the left engine failure is clear, and my investigators found it within thirty minutes. Plus, it’s right there in the NTSB’s own data. If they didn’t see evidence of the malfunction, they either weren’t looking or didn’t know what they were doing.”


The NTSB often relies on representatives from the various manufacturers to assist in complex investigations, the attorney said.


“And, that can be a real problem,” Angelley said. "NTSB investigators are not always familiar with the intricacies of large aircraft engines, and that certainly creates the potential for them to be misled or misdirected by manufacturers looking to avoid liability.”


Angelley, whose lawsuit asks for at least $75,000 in damages, also takes issue with the NTSB’s criticism of Inhofe’s handling of the left engine emergency.


“The probable cause report states that the airplane should have been flyable on that one engine, but that is absolute nonsense,” he said.


Angelley said that the left engine failed after the plane’s gear and flaps had already been lowered.


“That set up an impossible situation for Dr. Inhofe," the attorney said. "Virtually no one could have recovered from that. There was simply too much drag and not enough power.”

Angelley also pointed out that there is no procedure in the MU-2 manual for responding to an engine failure when the landing gear and flaps are already down.

“The lawsuit we filed for Nancy and her children really has one central purpose,” Angelley said. “They need to be taken care of by those that caused this tragedy. The family has lost a father, a husband, a friend and a provider and they are facing the same challenges anyone else would in that situation.”


According to a recent story by USA Today, the NTSB typically assigns more people to investigations of crashes that kill prominent and politically connected people and celebrities. At least seven NTSB investigators, three Federal Aviation Administration inspectors and four manufacturing companies tested Inhofe's airplane's engines, propellers, valves and switches, as well as testing other factors, USA Today reported.


The normal probe of a fatal private-airplane crash involves four to five people, according to a USA Today review of 600 NTSB investigations since early 2011. An NTSB official told the national publication that a larger initial team is dispatched to a high-profile crash to accelerate the investigation and get information to the public faster.


According to USA Today, the NTSB used the Perry Inhofe crash to advocate for safety upgrades in the aircraft model he was flying, which had been scrutinized before by both the NTSB and FAA because of its crash history.


Inhofe II was traveling from Salina, Kansas, to Tulsa on his first solo fight in the plane, investigators said. Radar and air traffic control exchanges indicated that the plane was operating normally along its flight path before it overshot a runway on its approach to Tulsa International Airport, the NTSB report said.


The aircraft went down about 3:45 p.m. Nov. 10, 2013, in a wooded area and around five miles north of the airport runway.


Story and Comments:  http://www.tulsaworld.com


http://registry.faa.gov/N856JT

 NTSB Identification: CEN14FA046
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, November 10, 2013 in Owasso, OK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/23/2014
Aircraft: MITSUBISHI MU 2B-25, registration: N856JT
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


Radar and air traffic control communications indicated that the Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 was operating normally and flew a nominal flightpath from takeoff through the beginning of the approach until the airplane overshot the extended centerline of the landing runway, tracking to the east and left of course by about 0.2 nautical mile then briefly tracking back toward the centerline. The airplane then entered a 360-degree turn to the left, east of the centerline and at an altitude far below what would be expected for a nominal flightpath and intentional maneuvering flight given the airplane's distance from the airport, which was about 5 miles.


As the airplane was in its sustained left turn tracking away from the airport, the controller queried the pilot, who stated that he had a "control problem" and subsequently stated he had a "left engine shutdown." This was the last communication received from the pilot. Witnesses saw the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view.


Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear was in the extended position, the flaps were extended 20 degrees, and the left engine propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the left engine showed the fuel shutoff valve was in the closed position, consistent with the engine being in an inoperative condition. As examined, the airplane was not configured in accordance with the airplane flight manual engine shutdown and single-engine landing procedures, which state that the airplane should remain in a clean configuration with flaps set to 5 degrees at the beginning of the final approach descent and the landing gear retracted until landing is assured. Thermal damage to the cockpit instrumentation precluded determining the preimpact position of fuel control and engine switches.


The investigation found that the airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with federal regulations and that the recovered airplane components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures. The investigation also determined that the pilot was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable federal regulations, including Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108, which is required for MU-2B pilots and adequate for the operation of MU-2B series airplanes. The pilot had recently completed the SFAR No. 108 training in Kansas and was returning to Tulsa. At the time of the accident, he had about 12 hours total time in the airplane make and model, and the flight was the first time he operated the airplane as a solo pilot. The investigation found no evidence indicating any preexisting medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected the pilot's performance on the day of the accident.


Based on aircraft performance calculations, the airplane should have been flyable in a one-engine-inoperative condition; the day visual meteorological conditions at the time of the accident do not support a loss of control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, the available evidence indicates that the pilot did not appropriately manage a one-engine-inoperative condition, leading to a loss of control from which he did not recover.


The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with any type of crash-resistant recorder. Although radar data and air traffic control voice communications were available during the investigation to determine the airplane's altitude and flightpath and estimate its motions (pitch, bank, yaw attitudes), the exact movements and trim state of the airplane are unknown, and other details of the airplane's performance (such as power settings) can only be estimated. In addition, because the airplane was not equipped with any type of recording device, the pilot's control and system inputs and other actions are unknown.


The lack of available data significantly increased the difficulty of determining the specific causes that led to this accident, and it was not possible to determine the reasons for the left engine shutdown or evaluate the pilot's recognition of and response to an engine problem. Recorded video images from the accident flight would possibly have shown where the pilot's attention was directed during the reported problems, his interaction with the airplane controls and systems, and the status of many cockpit switches and instruments. Recorded flight data would have provided information about the engines' operating parameters and the airplane's motions. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's loss of airplane control during a known one-engine-inoperative condition. The reasons for the loss of control and engine shutdown could not be determined because the airplane was not equipped with a crash-resistant recorder and postaccident examination and testing did not reveal evidence of any malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.

**This report was revised on August 21, 2014. Please see the docket for this accident for the original report.**

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 10, 2013, about 1546 central standard time, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 twin-engine airplane, N856JT, impacted wooded terrain while maneuvering near Owasso, Oklahoma. The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant of the airplane, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Anasazi Winds, LLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and an instrument flight plan had been filed. The flight departed Salina Regional Airport (SLN), Salina, Kansas, about 1503 and was en route to Tulsa International Airport (TUL), Tulsa, Oklahoma.

After takeoff, the airplane was radar identified by the Kansas City Center (ZKC) sector R66 controller, and the pilot was cleared to climb to 9,000 feet. About 1506, the pilot was cleared to climb to 17,000 feet. The flight proceeded normally, and at 1518, the pilot was instructed to contact the ZKC sector R72 controller. The pilot did so and was issued the Chanute altimeter setting, 30.30 inches of mercury. About 1527, the R72 controller instructed the pilot to descend at his discretion and maintain 10,000 feet. The pilot reported leaving 17,000 feet. About 1532, the R72 controller instructed the pilot to contact Tulsa approach control, and the pilot acknowledged.

At 1534:09, the pilot contacted Tulsa approach. He reported leaving 11,600 feet for 10,000 feet and having received automatic terminal information service information Charlie. The controller advised the pilot to expect vectors for a visual approach to TUL runway 18L, and the pilot acknowledged the information. At 1537:46, the controller instructed the pilot to turn 10 degrees left and descend to 6,000 feet. At 1540:07, the controller asked the pilot to turn another 10 degrees left and instructed him to descend to 2,500 feet. The pilot acknowledged the instructions.

At 1542:04, the controller advised the pilot that TUL was at the pilot's one o'clock position and 10 miles and asked the pilot to report the airport in sight. The pilot immediately replied, "In sight." The controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach to runway 18L and instructed him to contact TUL tower. The pilot acknowledged both the approach clearance and the frequency change.

The pilot contacted TUL tower at 1542:20 and again reported the airport in sight. The tower controller cleared the pilot to land on runway 18L and asked him to reduce speed to 150 knots or less for spacing behind an aircraft that would be departing from runway 18L. The pilot replied that he was reducing speed and acknowledged the runway assignment.

After the airplane passed the runway 18L outer marker, the airplane began a left turn. At 1544:48, when the airplane was about 90 degrees from the runway approach path, the tower controller transmitted, "Mitsubishi six Juliet tango tower." The pilot replied, "I've got a control problem." The controller responded, "Okay uh you can just maneuver there – if you can maneuver to the west and uh do you need assistance now?" At 1545:06, the pilot replied, " I've got a left engine shutdown."

At 1545:11, the tower controller contacted the approach controller to advise him that N856JT had a control problem and that other aircraft might have to be cleared out of the area.

At 1545:38, the tower controller transmitted, "Six Juliet Tango are you uh declaring an emergency uh well we'll declare emergency for runway 18L – you say you have an engine out and souls on board and fuel remaining if you have time." The controller made two additional attempts to contact the pilot at 1546:06 and 1546:55, but there was no response. According to the tower's Accident/Incident Notification Record completed after the accident, notification of emergency services occurred about 1546.

Radar data showed the airplane complete a 360-degree left turn near the runway 18L outer marker at 1,100 feet mean sea level (msl) then radar contact was lost.

Seven witnesses observed the airplane in a shallow left turn; the reported altitudes ranged from 400 to 800 feet above ground level (agl). Four witnesses recalled the landing gear in the extended position during the turn, and two witnesses observed that one engine propeller appeared not to be rotating or slowly rotating. One of the witnesses reported seeing a stream of black exhaust following the airplane and four reported not seeing any smoke. Four of the witnesses reported an unusual engine or propeller noise from the airplane, and four did not comment on the engine or propeller noise. Some of the witnesses observed the airplane in a left turn toward the west before the wings began to rock left and right at a 10-15 degree bank angle. Shortly thereafter, the airplane was seen in a bank to the right followed by a "hard" bank to the left. Some of the witnesses observed the airplane spiral toward the ground and disappear from view.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 51, held a commercial pilot certificate, with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot's most recent flight instructor renewal was completed on October 6, 2013, when he added an airplane multiengine endorsement. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical certificate was dated October 15, 2013, and had no limitations. The pilot's application for his medical certificate indicated no use of any medications and no medical history conditions.

According to pilot logbooks recovered at the accident site, which were partially consumed by fire, and other logbooks provided to investigators, the pilot had accumulated at least 2,874.4 total flight hours, of which 1,534.9 were in multiengine airplanes. The pilot accumulated most of his multiengine time in a Cessna 421B, which he owned since 2010.

Interviews with individuals who were in contact with the pilot and cellular telephone records were used to construct the pilot's 72-hour history before the accident. No abnormal routines or health issues were reported or noted.

Interviews were conducted with three pilots who flew with the accident pilot in the months before the accident. Although interviewed separately and not associated with each other, all three pilots had similar descriptions of the accident pilot. They described the pilot as a very good aviator who was studious and modest regarding his pilot skills. All three attested to the pilot's practice of flying in accordance with manufacturer guidance and meticulously following manufacturer checklists. None of the interviewed pilots recalled the pilot displaying any negative or bad flying habits.

Pilot's MU-2B-25 Training

Piloting a Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplane requires adherence to special training, experience, and operating conditions, which are provided in Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) No. 108 (published February 6, 2008, and effective February 5, 2009). Pilots cannot act as pilot-in-command (PIC) of an MU-2B series airplane unless they have logged a minimum of 100 flight hours as PIC in multiengine airplanes. For initial training, the SFAR requires a minimum of 20 hours of ground instruction and a minimum of 12 hours of flight instruction, with a minimum of 6 hours accomplished in the airplane, a level C simulator, or a level D simulator. Pilots must also satisfactorily complete a training course final phase check.

The accident pilot's MU-2B-25 ground school was conducted November 4-10, 2013, at Professional Flight Training, L.C. (PFT), Salina, Kansas. He was the sole student in the class and the training cadre consisted of one SFAR-certified flight instructor who was the school's owner. The instructor reported that ground school with the pilot took about 32 hours, which was consistent with the time normally allotted to teach new pilots. According to the MU-2B flight instructor, the pilot reported to him that he had no previous MU-2B or turbine airplane flight experience before the SFAR training.

The entire flight portion of the pilot's training was conducted in the accident airplane. The first flight was conducted on November 7, 2013, around the local area of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The second flight was conducted between Tulsa and Salina, Kansas. After the airplane landed at SLN, the remaining flights were flown in the local area of Salina. The instructor created training records for each flight, and the maneuvers flown were graded by assigning a rating of one through four, indicating poor, fair, average, and excellent, respectively. The pilot's scores on the first flight were about 2.8, or just below "average." On each subsequent flight, the pilot progressed, with no evidence of regression in any area. On the final flight, his maneuvers were about 3.8, or nearly "excellent."

Documentation provided by the instructor recorded the time allotted for training. Two total hour metrics were tracked for each flight: the Hobbs meter time and a block time. The Hobbs time recorded airplane operation with weight off of the landing gear, which was determined by a squat switch on the left main landing gear. The block time recorded the time from when the airplane began taxiing from parking to the runway and the time that it returned to parking. During training, the accident airplane recorded 11.5 hours of Hobbs time and 16 hours 35 minutes of block time.

On November 10, 2013, the morning of the accident, the pilot satisfactorily completed the phase check and received an SFAR endorsement in the MU-2B-25. The accident flight from SLN to TUL was the first time the pilot flew as a single pilot in the MU-2B-25 airplane.

MU-2B Stall Training

In addition to MU-2B ground training, pilots are flight trained in stall recognition and recovery in accordance with flight profiles contained in SFAR No. 108. Pilots must perform approaches to stalls in takeoff, clean, and landing configurations with at least one approach-to-stall maneuver flown while in a 15-30 degree bank turn. Accelerated stalls are performed with both 20-degree and 0 flap configurations. A pilot must recover the airplane at the first indication of a stall, provided by either airframe buffet or the control wheel shaker. The final phase check includes three approach-to-stall maneuvers.

The accident pilot flew three training flights during which landing configuration stalls were performed. In addition, he performed a landing configuration stall maneuver during his final phase check flight, which took place on the morning of the accident.

The Approach to Stall flight profile in the SFAR indicates that, when stall recognition occurs, the pilot should apply maximum engine power and adjust pitch as necessary to minimize the loss of altitude. The SFAR stall recovery procedure is different than the one outlined in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-109, Stall and Stick Pusher Training, dated August 6, 2012. The AC "emphasizes reducing the angle of attack (AOA) at the first indication of a stall as the primary means of approach-to-stall or stall recovery." The AC changed the flight profiles used for general pilot certification and evaluation but did not alter the flight profiles in the SFAR. A change to the SFAR flight profiles must be accomplished through the notice of proposed rulemaking process. To date, MU-2B instructors and evaluators are required to instruct in the method that emphasizes minimizing altitude loss per the SFAR. The accident pilot's instructor taught the SFAR method but also instructed him on the AC's AOA recovery method.

In addition to his exposure to both recovery methods in his MU-2B-25 training, the pilot demonstrated knowledge of both methods of recovery in previous airplanes. The FAA's designated pilot examiner for the pilot's airplane multiengine instructor rating reported that, for a ground instructor topic, the pilot taught stall recovery procedures, explaining both methods appropriately.

Single Engine and Minimum Controllable Airspeed (Vmc) Training

Like stall training, single engine procedures and Vmc awareness training were taught during the pilot's ground and flight training, as required for completion of the SFAR flight phase check. Single engine training was performed using zero thrust on one engine and by shutting down an engine using an airborne Negative Torque Sensor (NTS) system check (the NTS system is described later in this report). A demonstration of Vmc occurred on two training flights, and the pilot performed at least one engine shutdown in flight to demonstrate proficiency with an airborne NTS check. Maneuvers with one engine inoperative and a loss of directional control were performed on three training flights and during the pilot's final flight phase check. This maneuver requires the airplane to be configured with flaps at 20 degrees, the landing gear retracted, one engine set at zero thrust, and the other engine set to takeoff power. The airplane is pitched up to reduce the airspeed. As the airplane slows to Vmc + 10 knots, the instructor blocks the rudder to cause a loss of directional control. At the first indication of a loss of directional control, the pilot reduces airplane pitch and engine power to recover control of the airplane. The pilot had also performed a single engine landing on the morning of the accident during his final phase check.

Pilot Training Notes

The pilot's handwritten notes from his SFAR training were found in the airplane but were partially consumed by fire. Included in the pilot notes were the following:

- For engine out, center ball
- **120 knots, never go below; 1. Takeoff 2. Landing assured
- Vxse = 125 knots
- Single-engine flight - remain clean configuration until beginning of approach segment. In approach segment, gear up, flaps 5 degrees, then when landing assured, gear down, [flaps] 20 degrees
- (5 degrees flaps) Blue line, Vxse 130, Vyse 140

MU-2 Pilot Checklist

SFAR No. 108 specifies the use of a pilot checklist (MU-2B-25 (A2PC) YET 06248B) that was accepted by the FAA's Flight Standardization Board (FSB) in 2010. This checklist and the earlier FSB-accepted version are the only checklists accepted for use in MU-2B airplanes during flight operations and training. The expanded checklist accepted in 2010 includes a single page checklist, which is a condensed version of the normal procedures and is commonly known as a quick reference checklist.

The flight instructor reported that the pilot routinely flew with the single page checklist in a pouch located to the left side of the pilot's seat. The expanded pilot checklist was normally stowed behind the co-pilot's seat. A fire-damaged copy of the pilot's checklist was discovered in the wreckage located near the aft facing passenger seat just aft of the co-pilot's seat. The single page quick reference checklist was not located in the plastic retaining sleeve of the expanded checklist and was not located elsewhere in the wreckage; it was possibly consumed by fire.

Flight Instructor's Training Checklist

PFT developed a training checklist that was not accepted by the FAA's Flight Standardization Board for training or operation of the MU-2B-25 airplane. Each page of the checklist is labeled as the following: "For Training Purposes Only", and another page contains the following note: "This checklist is for training purposes only. For further detail, the FAA-approved airplane flight manual checklist will be the governing authority." The training checklist comprised items from the accepted checklist, as well as expanded information for the airplane's ground safety checks and NTS airborne checks. However, the training checklist excluded and/or did not follow most of the SFAR No. 108 accepted checklist content. The checklist was also labeled as applicable to other MU-2B airplane models (MU-2B-40 and MU-2B-60) and did not mention the MU-2B-25.

The flight instructor reported using the training checklist solely to accomplish the first flight of training since it contains information that the instructor finds beneficial for pilots new to MU-2B series airplanes. The instructor also reported that pilots normally transition away from the PFT training checklist by the second or third flight. The FAA-accepted checklist was then used for the remainder of training, with the PFT training checklist as a supplemental training aid, if needed.

Examination of the airplane wreckage found a partially consumed PFT training checklist melted to the circuit breaker panel to the left of the pilot's seat. Another PFT training checklist was found in the aft portion of the fuselage.

Interviews with pilots who previously completed training with the PFT MU-2B instructor reported different experiences concerning the unaccepted training checklist. One former trainee reported never using the PFT checklist in flight and emphasized that only the FAA-accepted checklist was used. Another former trainee used the PFT checklist as the sole checklist for almost every flight. His perception was that the instructor pilot wanted to use the PFT training checklist for every flight.

During the course of the investigation, the cockpits of 10 MU-2Bs were examined by a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator. Unaccepted checklists were found adjacent to the pilot seats in two airplanes along with the accepted checklist, which was not within the pilot's reach. One airplane had two different checklists on board the airplane within the pilot's reach; however, neither was an accepted checklist. The correct checklist was observed in the remaining seven airplanes.

Flight Instructor's Qualification

The instructor who conducted the accident pilot's training was SFAR-endorsed. He estimated that he had flown at least 16,000 hours in MU-2B series airplanes. He began instructing in the MU-2B in 1998 and estimated about 3,000 flight hours as an MU-2B instructor. On August 4, 2013, he renewed his flight instructor's certificate and on August 31, 2013, he completed an MU-2B-20 recurrent training course.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was manufactured in 1973 by Mitsubishi as model MU-2B-25, serial number 306, and was a high-performance, twin-engine, high-wing, turboprop-powered airplane. It was issued a standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category on March 1, 1974, and registered to Anasazi Winds, LLC on September 26, 2013. The airplane was equipped with two 750 shaft horsepower (shp) (maximum continuous power rating of 715 shp) Honeywell TPE331-10AV-511M engines, flat rated to 665 shp, per a supplemental type certificate (STC) and Hartzell Propeller HC-B3TN-5M three-blade, single-acting, constant-speed, hydraulically-actuated propellers with feathering and reversing capability.

According to the airplane records and information obtained by a maintenance facility, the most recent inspection was a combined 100 hour/annual inspection completed on September 19, 2013, at a total airframe time of 6,581.4 hours (about 12.9 hours before the accident flight), and the engines had accumulated 936.4 hours since overhaul.

Weight and Balance Information

Using loading and empty weight information based on estimated weights, fuel load, and wreckage documentation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., computed that the weight and center of gravity of the airplane at landing would have been 8,510 pounds and 30.27 percent mean aerodynamic chord, respectively, which was within weight and balance limits. A gross weight of 8,510 pounds was used for the performance calculations discussed further in this report.

Avionics Information

The airplane was configured with a Garmin G600 integrated avionics system, standard engine gauges, and a standard annunciator panel. The Garmin system was installed after the pilot purchased the airplane and before his flight training in the airplane. The pilot chose to install the Garmin system because it was the same system in his Cessna 421B airplane. It was estimated the pilot had 3 years and a minimum of 325 hours flying a G600-equipped airplane.

The Garmin G600 is capable of displaying both a primary flight display and a multifunction display. The airspeed indicator is presented in a rolling tape format. The airspeed's numeric display consists of white numbers on a black background located in the middle of the rolling tape.

Located on the right side of the tape is a narrow color-coded speed range strip. During installation of the system, select airspeeds are entered into the system to properly display on the speed range tape. At the bottom of the speed range tape, the tape can be colored red until Vso (stall speed in landing configuration), and above Vso, the range is typically white and green, or solid green, to display the airplane's normal operating range. For Vno (maximum speed for normal operations) through Vne (never exceed speed), the range is typically depicted as a caution range in yellow until Vne, where the range tape displays a red and white "barber pole" pattern. Vmc is typically depicted as a red horizontal line.

Other Cockpit Instrumentation

The engine instrumentation gauges are analog displays, located in the left center portion of the cockpit and arranged in two columns. Each column displays information pertaining to its corresponding engine (for example, the left column's engine torque gauge displays the left engine's torque). The pilot's standby airspeed indicator, located to the left of the G600, has a white arc indicating a flap operating range from 77-175 knots and a green arc indicating a normal operating range from 101-250 knots.

Annunciator Lights

Two red master caution lights (LH Engine, RH Engine) and a yellow caution annunciator are located in the center of the instrument panel directly below the glare shield. A corresponding annunciator panel is located to the left of the left seat pilot's left leg and contains a series of caution and warning lights.

Stall Warning System

The airplane was equipped with a control wheel shaker stall warning system. This system uses a lift transducer on the leading edge of the right wing that actuates based on the airflow over the wing. The transducer sends an electrical signal, which is adjusted for the flap setting. When the airplane is about 4-9 knots above stall speed, a vibration or shaking motion is applied to the control wheel, which is audible in the cockpit.

Pilots are exposed to the control wheel shaker through two manners. The control wheel shaker is tested before each flight to ensure proper operation, and pilots likely encounter the control wheel shaker while performing the approach-to-stall maneuvers during SFAR training.

Autopilot System

The airplane was modified with a Bendix M4D autopilot system per an STC. The M4D is a multiaxis autopilot that controls roll, pitch, yaw, and pitch trim. The autopilot system can be used if one engine is inoperative, provided that the airplane is properly trimmed. This system was integrated with the installed avionics and passed a functional flight check on November 6, 2013.

Negative Torque Sensing System

According to the MU-2B-25 Pilots Operating Manual, in addition to the manual feathering system, the NTS system provides automatic propeller drag limiting in the event of an engine failure. If an engine fails in flight, the propeller drives the engine by aerodynamic (negative) torque, and the propeller feathering valve operates to dump the oil (from the propeller dome), inducing propeller feathering as in the manual feathering operation. As soon as the negative torque is eliminated, the propeller feathering valve automatically moves back to the normal position and stops dumping oil. Thus, the propeller windmilling drag will remain very low, with no serious effect on airplane maneuvers, even during sudden engine failure. The NTS system is a drag reduction system only; it is not an automatic feathering system. The propeller on the affected engine must be manually feathered for minimum drag.

Fuel System

The airplane was equipped with five fuel tanks: a main (center) tank with a capacity of 159 gallons total, 156 gallons usable; left and right outer wing tanks with a capacity of 15 gallons each, 15 gallons usable each; and left and right tip tanks with a capacity of 93 gallons each, 90 gallons usable each. Total usable fuel is 366 gallons. Within the main tank is a fuel manifold that supplies fuel to each engine's fuel system through a left and right airframe fuel shutoff valve (main valve).

The airframe fuel system is controlled by four switches on the instrument panel: left and right main valve switches, located on the lower right side of the pilot's instrument panel, to control the fuel shutoff valve in the fuel supply line to each engine, and the left and right tip tank/outer tank switches, located just below the main valve switches.

Main Valve Fuel Switches

The main valve fuel switches are two-position toggles used to open and close the respective fuel valves between the main fuel tank and left and right engines. The switches have a doghouse-shaped gate between the OPEN and CLOSED positions. The OPEN position is on the upper side of the doghouse-shaped gate, and the CLOSED position is on the lower side of the gate. The fuel switch is typically left in the OPEN position. According to the MU-2B-25 checklist shutdown procedures, all cockpit switches should be turned off except for the main fuel switches. According to Mitsubishi, the fuel switches are used by maintenance personnel to turn off the fuel and should not typically be used by the pilot during a flight.

Tip Tank/Outer Tank Fuel Switches

The tip tank/outer tank switches control the air shutoff valve in the pressurized air line to each tip tank, the two fuel shutoff valves in the fuel transfer line from each tip tank to center tank, and the electric transfer pump in the outer wing tank. The fuel transfer system allows fuel to be transferred from each wing tip tank to the center (main) tank or from its outer wing tank to the center tank. In the TIP TANK position, fuel is transferred from the tip tank into the center (main) tank by air pressure. When the switch is in the OUTER TANK position, fuel from the outer wing tank is transferred into the center tank. The center fuel tank will be maintained near a full level throughout the transfer process, as all fuel is fed into the center tank.

Fuel Servicing

The airplane was refueled with 180 gallons of Jet A fuel before the accident flight, for a total of 279 gallons. According to the fixed based operator, the airplane was serviced with a "standard PFT MU-2 fuel load," which was 45 gallons in each tip tank and top off of the outer wing tanks and main fuel tank.

Fuel Shutoff Valve (FSOV)

The engine-mounted FSOV is a two-position solenoid valve that must be electrically powered to be in the OPEN state. It is normally electrically powered in the CLOSED state by the direct circuit from the STOP position of the run-crank-stop (RCS) switch to the close side of the solenoid valve. When the engine is not operating, two electrical solenoids in the valve extend a ball valve (which is a rod with a ball on the end) so that the ball closes the orifice and prevents the flow of fuel to the engine. When the engine is operating, the ball valve is retracted, creating an opening for the fuel to pass through to the engine. A Belleville washer (spring) holds the ball valve in the commanded position, either OPEN or CLOSED.

The FSOV can also be closed mechanically by selecting the condition lever to the EMERGENCY STOP position. While the condition lever is in EMERGENCY STOP, the valve cannot be electrically actuated. The valve cannot be opened mechanically; it can only be closed mechanically.

By selecting the RCS switch to the STOP position, the fuel valve will close and shut off fuel to the engine, and the engine will begin to spool down immediately. If the RCS switch is returned to the RUN position, the valve will open, but the engine will not relight unless the autoignition switch is in either the AUTO or ON positions, or the pilot depresses the engine start switch and the unfeather switch per the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Airstart procedure. In addition, the speed switch must sense an engine rpm of 10 percent or greater, or the speed switch will not open the FSOV and initiate ignition.

Run-Crank-Stop (RCS) Switch

The RCS switch for each engine, located on the center pedestal between the power and condition levers, is used on the ground for normal engine start and shutdown. The switches electrically open and close the FSOVs, thereby turning the fuel flow to the engines on and off, respectively. Each switch is a three-position gated switch with a single gate between the RUN (forward) and CRANK (center) positions. The switch is spring loaded to move from the STOP (aft) to the CRANK position. During normal operations, the switch is moved to the RUN position for engine start and not moved from the RUN position until the engine is shut down on the ground (with the exception of an NTS in-flight check).

When the airplane is secured on the ground, the RCS switch toggle is spring loaded in the CRANK position. For engine start, the RCS switch toggle is lifted and moved forward to the RUN position. When the RCS switch is positioned to RUN, and if the engine rpm is greater than 10 percent, the FSOV open solenoid is momentarily powered and allows fuel to flow to the engine fuel nozzles. For normal engine shutdown on the ground, the toggle must be lifted up, moved back, and held in the STOP position.

According to the MU-2B-25 engine shutdown checklist, the RCS switch must be held in the STOP position until the engine rpm has decreased below 50 percent. When the toggle is held in the STOP position, the FSOV close solenoid cuts off the flow of fuel to the engine, thereby shutting it down. In addition, when the toggle switch is held in the STOP position, it powers the fuel nozzle purge solenoid open, which vents stored compressor discharge pressure air out through the fuel nozzles. This action clears any residual fuel from the lines to prevent it from back-draining into the combustor, as well as prevents the build-up of partially burned fuel residue in the fuel nozzles' internal passages.

According to the instructor, the pilot was knowledgeable of the RCS switch locations and their function within the systems of the MU-2B-25. During flight training, the instructor shut down each engine in flight on separate occasions using the RCS switch. As mentioned earlier, the pilot performed at least one in-flight shutdown using the RCS switch to demonstrate proficiency in performing an airborne NTS check.

Other Cockpit Switches

Switches similar to and near the RCS switch are two gated engine power auto limit switches (ENG PWR LIMIT) and two gated ignition switches. The engine power auto limit switches are two-position switches with a single gate. These switches are located to the left of the center pedestal and behind and to the right the pilot's control wheel. The ignition switches are three-position switches with two gates to select CONTINUOUS, OFF, or AUTO IGNITION. These switches are located to the right of the center pedestal.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1553, the TUL automated surface observing system, located 5 miles south of the accident site, reported the wind from 140 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 9,000 feet, temperature 19 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 6 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.26 inches of mercury.

COMMUNICATIONS

No problems with communications equipment were reported.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Tulsa International Airport, TUL, is a public, controlled airport located about 5 miles northeast of Tulsa, Oklahoma, at a surveyed elevation of 677.5 feet. The airport features two concrete runways, runway 18L/36R, which is 9,999 feet by 150 feet, and runway 8/26, which is 7,376 feet by 150 feet. Runway 18R/36L is asphalt and 6,101 feet by 150 feet.

The runway 18L threshold is at an elevation of 626.5 feet, and the runway slopes upward at a 0.4-percent gradient. The runway contains a four-light precision approach path indicator (PAPI) on its left side with a 2.75 -degree glidepath. The listed obstruction to the runway is a 41-foot tree, which is located 1,894 feet from the runway and requires a 41:1 slope to clear.

According to the instrument landing system (ILS) approach plate for runway 18L, the outer marker, identified as OWASO, is 5.6 nautical miles (nm) from the end of runway 18L. The glideslope/glidepath crossing altitude at OWASO is 2,346 feet msl.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, or cockpit image recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located in wooded terrain about 5 miles north of TUL at a GPS elevation of about 650 feet. The airplane came to rest upright on a measured magnetic heading of 109 degrees. Several small trees displayed breaks and fractures that were consistent with the airplane impact sequence. The main wreckage area consisted of all major airplane structures and components. Postimpact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage and wing structure. The airplane impacted terrain in a slightly nose-down, left-wing-down attitude which was consistent with the crush damage to the forward fuselage, wings, and wing-tip fuel tanks relative to ground level.

The main wreckage consisted of the cockpit, fuselage, left and right wings, left and right engines, and empennage. All of the flight control surfaces were located in the wreckage debris. The cockpit, including the instrument panel, windscreen, and flight crew seats, was destroyed by postimpact fire. No instrument readings or navigation/communication radio settings were discernible due to thermal damage. The cockpit throttle quadrant was removed for further examination. The cabin area was destroyed by postimpact fire. Charred remains of airplane manuals, pilot logbooks, airplane logbooks, and other miscellaneous papers were located throughout the fuselage structure.

The flight control cables and linkage system were examined for continuity. The elevator and rudder push-pull rods and cables exhibited continuity from the flight controls to the control surfaces. The wing spoiler cables exhibited continuity from the control yokes to the mixing unit located in the center wing section. The push-pull tubes from the mixing unit to the spoilers were destroyed by thermal damage. The attach points of the push-pull tubes to the spoiler bell cranks exhibited continuity. The rudder trim was found in the neutral position, and the elevator trim was found in the 2-3 degrees nose-up position. The left seat right rudder pedal was found in the full-forward position.

The left engine propeller blades were found in a feathered position, and the propeller assembly remained attached to the engine. The right propeller blades exhibited bending, twisting, and leading edge gouge damage. An approximately 4-inch piece of one propeller blade tip was separated and was not located. The blade tip separation fracture surfaces were consistent with an overload failure. The right propeller assembly remained attached to the engine. The left and right engines remained partially attached to the airframe.

The landing gear and landing gear jackscrew were found in the extended position. The flap actuator jackscrew measurement corresponded with the flaps being in the 20-degree position.

On November 12, 2013, the NTSB completed the on-scene examination/wreckage documentation, and a recovery company removed all remaining airplane wreckage from the accident site. The engines, propellers, and miscellaneous airframe structure surrounding the engines were transported to a facility in Tulsa to prepare for shipment for further examination. Details of the engine and propeller examinations are found later in this report.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The autopsy ruled the cause of death as the result of multiple blunt force injuries and the manner of death as an accident. No unusual findings were discovered during the autopsy.

Biological specimens from the pilot's body were forwarded to the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute for toxicological testing. These specimens tested negative for ethanol and detected the presence of ibuprofen. Ibuprofen is a nonnarcotic analgesic and anti-inflammatory agent used to treat aches and pains, and as an antipyretic to reduce fever.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Aircraft Performance Radar Study

The aircraft performance radar study used Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR) data to calculate the position and orientation (pitch, yaw, and roll angles) of the airplane in the minutes preceding the accident. This information was then used to estimate various performance parameters of interest, including horizontal and vertical speeds, terrain clearance, AOA and proximity to stall, and required engine power.

The ASR-9 radar at TUL received returns from the airplane starting at 15:30:13, when the airplane was 60 nm northwest of the TUL runway 18L threshold and descending through 14,500 feet msl. The TUL ASR continued to track the airplane throughout its approach to TUL, including the last minutes of the flight.

From 15:43:37 to 15:44:04, as the airplane was on final approach between 6.1 and 5.1 nm from runway 18L, there was a 27-second gap in the ASR secondary data (corresponding to five missing radar returns). However, during this time, three primary returns consistent with the position of the airplane were received by the ASR. In addition, the Chelsea/Afton, Oklahoma ATCBI-6 (QAF) radar received secondary returns from the airplane. The QAF secondary returns indicate that the gap in the TUL secondary returns was not due to a problem with the airplane's transponder but to some other unknown cause.

The data indicated that at 15:42:50, the airplane was descending on a southeasterly heading through 2,500 feet msl about 8 nm north of the TUL runway 18L threshold. About 15:43:00, the airplane leveled off briefly at 2,200 feet msl and started a right turn toward the runway. At this time, the airplane was already below the PAPI glidepath for TUL runway 18L. The airplane crossed the extended runway centerline at 15:43:19 and continued the right turn to correct back to the centerline. When the airplane resumed its descent at 15:43:25, the PAPI would have displayed four red lights, indicating that the airplane was below the PAPI centerline.

About 15:44:00, as the airplane was descending through 1,400 feet msl, it started a left turn that continued to the end of the radar data, with the airplane almost completing a full 360-degree turn. During this turn, the pilot reported to air traffic control (ATC) that "I've got a control problem" (at 15:44:51) and that " I've got a left engine shutdown" (at 15:45:06). The airplane crashed less than 0.05 nm southwest of the last radar return, about 5 nm north of the runway threshold, and about 0.05 nm left (east) of the extended runway centerline.

The airspeed data presented in the study indicated that the airplane was operating close to the 20-degrees flaps, one-engine inoperative minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc, 20) of 93 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) during the time that the pilot reported control and engine problems. In addition, the calculations indicated that shortly before the end of the radar data, the airplane's lift coefficient (CL) reached the maximum CL (CLmax) for the flaps 20 configuration, which suggested that the final descent of the airplane into the ground followed an aerodynamic stall of the wing. This finding was consistent with the condition of the wreckage, its location very close to the last radar point, and witness statements.

The CL and airspeed data computed from the radar returns indicated that the flaps must have been deployed at some time before 15:44:18, because the airplane's calculated CL exceeded the CLmax for 0-degrees flaps beyond this time, but the airplane continued flying. Consideration of the power requirements computed from the radar data suggested that the flaps may have been deployed to 20 degrees around 15:43:30, shortly after the airplane decelerated below the speed at which flaps 20 could be extended (140 KCAS).

The roll angle computed from the radar data indicated that the airplane required about 13 degrees of roll during the right turn between 15:42:55 and 15:43:50, as the airplane maneuvered to line up with the extended runway centerline. The roll angle required during the final 360 -degree left turn was about 15 to 25 degrees, with the roll angle increasing from about 5 degrees left to 22 degrees left between 15:44:20 and 15:44:30. This increase in roll angle corresponded to the time that the airplane arrested its deceleration and descent (that is, decay in energy) and leveled at about 95 KCAS and 1,100 feet msl, or about 400 feet agl. Associated with this level-off was an increase in required horsepower. The power increased to about the maximum available from one engine for the corresponding flight conditions. Because, as suggested by the pilot's reports of an engine problem, the increase in horsepower was only available from one engine, then any thrust asymmetry between the two engines would also increase and would increase the rudder deflection and/or sideslip angle required to compensate for the asymmetry. Consequently, the increase in roll angle at this time may reflect these changing parameters affecting the trim of the airplane.

Also, by 15:44:15, the airspeed had already decayed to around 95 KCAS, close to the Vmc, 20 of 93 KCAS. Consequently, with full power on the operating engine, and at this speed, the airplane was close to the limit of controllability. The airplane may have been easier to control at lower power settings on the operating engine but may still have presented a challenging situation to the pilot, given the low energy state of the airplane and its proximity to the ground.

During the final 360-degree left turn, the highest priority to ensure the safety of the flight would have been to increase the control margin by increasing the airspeed further above the 93 KCAS Vmc, 20 speed. However, to increase the speed, a pilot would have to increase power on the operating engine (thereby exacerbating the thrust asymmetry and control problem at low speed, even if additional power were available), trade altitude for airspeed (which a pilot may be reluctant to do if the airplane is already at a low altitude), or perform some combination of these actions. A pilot could also increase the speed and margin from Vmc, 20, by retracting the landing gear, thereby lowering the airplane's drag. Hence, at the time the power was increased between 15:44:10 and 15:44:30, the airplane was already in a difficult situation because of the combination of low altitude, low airspeed, and the reported problem with the left engine.

Engine Examination

The engines were disassembled at Honeywell's facilities in Phoenix, Arizona, under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the engines did not reveal evidence of preimpact malfunctions.

Disassembly of the right engine revealed the compressor section 1st stage impeller shroud inner diameter was coated with dirt. After the dirt was removed, there was a continuous rub on the rear of the shroud from about the 8- to 12 -o'clock position and an intermittent rub from about 1- to 3 -o'clock. The rub marks on the shroud corresponded to the rub marks and displaced material on the first stage impeller. One 1st stage impeller blade leading edge was bent opposite the direction of rotation. The impeller was covered with dirt. The edges of the impeller blades had circumferential rub marks and material displaced opposite the direction of rotation that corresponded to the rub marks on the shroud. Dirt and organic material was found at the rear of the combustion chamber on the inside of the liner. The 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-stage turbine stators had a slight amount of metal spray on the suction side of the airfoils. The 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-stage turbine rotors were intact and did not have any apparent damage to the respective airfoils that were all full length and straight. The turbine blades had a slight amount of metal spray on the suction side of the airfoils, and the blades did not have any circumferential rub marks on the tips.

Disassembly of the left engine revealed the compressor section 1st- and 2nd-stage impeller shroud inner diameters did not have any circumferential scoring or rub marks. The 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-stage turbine rotors were intact and did not have any apparent damage to the respective airfoils, which were all full length and straight. The blade tips did not have any circumferential rub marks, and the blades did not have any metal spray materials on the airfoils.

The left engine's FSOV was removed from the engine during the engine disassembly and was flow-checked with air. No air flowed through the valve even though the manual close lever was in the OPEN position. Subsequent testing of the left engine FSOV at three different facilities confirmed the valve operated normally. The disassembly of the left engine FSOV confirmed the latch assembly was intact. When the right engine FSOV was flow-checked after it was removed from the engine, air flowed through the valve. The right engine FSOV could not be tested due to fire damage. All of the external components related to the generation or control of engine power, including the fuel controls and propeller governors, were removed from both of the engines and tested, with no significant abnormalities noted.

Propeller Examination

The propellers were disassembled at Ottosen Propellers facility in Phoenix, Arizona, under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the propellers did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction.

Disassembly and examination of the left propeller assembly revealed that all three blades remained attached to the hub. The propeller hub with the propeller blades still attached was mounted on a fixture. When air was supplied to the propeller, the piston unit moved upward and the blades moved symmetrically from the feather position to the start lock position. When the air was disconnected and the start lock pins were unlocked, the piston went down and the blades moved symmetrically back to the feathered position. There were imprints on the blade butts of all three blades that corresponded to the base of the spindle, with the blades being in the feathered position.

Disassembly and examination of the right propeller assembly revealed that all three blades remained attached to the hub. All three blades were bent and twisted. Two blades were missing their blade tips, and the fracture surfaces had shear lips for the full length of the fractures. The pitch change link arms were intact; however, they were found disconnected at the propeller clamp studs. When air was supplied to the propeller, the piston unit moved upwards, and when the air was disconnected, the piston went down. Blade butt imprints corresponded to the base of the spindle, with the blades being in the middle of the operating range.

Cockpit Switches

The airplane wreckage and miscellaneous debris were examined at the wreckage storage facility to locate any cockpit switches. Several cockpit switches were found during the examination and displayed significant thermal damage. The switches were retained for further examination in an attempt to identify specific switches and the switch position at the time of the accident.

The switches were examined at the NTSB Material Laboratory in Washington DC. The remains of the RCS switches were located, including the toggle and switch body of one of the RCS switches. The toggle of this switch was found in the RUN position. The other RCS switch consisted of only the toggle, and it was not possible to determine its position. It was also not possible to determine which switches corresponded to the left or right engines.

The two tip tank/outer tank switches were missing their bottoms and the internal wiring. One tip tank/outer tank switch toggle was centered, corresponding to the OFF position, and one tip tank/outer tank switch toggle was in the up position, corresponding to the TIP TANK position. It was not possible to determine which switches corresponded to the left or right fuel tanks.

Several toggle switches with rounded point-shaped toggles and doghouse-shaped gates were recovered. The examination of an MU-2B-25 cockpit revealed there were several toggle switches with dog house-shaped gates and round point toggles installed in the instrument panel, so it was not possible to identify what these particular switches represented from the accident airplane. In addition, because the shape of the switch bodies is symmetrical, it was not possible to determine the position of any of the switches.

Throttle Quadrant

The throttle quadrant sustained extensive fire and thermal damage. The power levers, condition levers, and condition lever bell cranks were missing. The upper part of each power lever bell crank, to which the power levers are attached, was missing; but, on the bottom of the bell crank, the lug to which the linkage is attached was bent and folded over to the right. The connecting link with the nut and bolt was still attached to the left engine's power lever bell crank lower lug.

When viewing an exemplar throttle quadrant, the cross-shaft spindle that passes through the bell cranks for the power and condition levers has two screws at what appear to be top dead center. When the power levers on the exemplar throttle quadrant were positioned to the maximum power position, the upper part of the bell crank was slightly forward of vertical, and the lower part of the bell crank to which the connecting link was attached is slightly aft of vertical. When the accident airplane's throttle quadrant was positioned so that the two screws were at top dead center, the two bent and folded lower lugs of the bell cranks appeared to be slightly aft of vertical. The lower lugs of the bell cranks still had the connecting links with the nuts and bolts attached.

Engine Shutdown Testing

On February 12, 2014, members of the Powerplants Group convened at Turbine Aircraft Services, Addison, Texas, to conduct engine shutdown tests on a MU-2B airplane using the RCS switch.

For Test 1, both engines were started and allowed to idle for 5 minutes. The engine ignition was then set to its off position. The interturbine temperature (ITT) on both engines was about 530 degrees C. The left engine was shut down first followed by the right engine. The RCS switch was moved from the RUN position to the STOP position, where it was held for 3 seconds, then returned to the RUN position. It took the left and right engines ITT to reach 300 degrees C in 3.16 and 4.44 seconds, respectively. The engines continued to spool down until they stopped. White smoke was observed from both engines' tailpipes.

For Test 2, after the engines had stopped per Test 1, the ITT slowly increased so that it was about 350 degrees C. Because of the ITT and the white smoke coming from the engines' tailpipes, both of the engines were dry motored with the starter (that is, they were run on the starter with the fuel and ignition turned off) and the RCS switch in the CRANK position to get the ITT below 300 degrees C. Both engines were started, the engine ignition was set to auto, and the engines were allowed to idle for 3 minutes. The ITT on both engines was about 530 degrees C. The left engine was shut down first followed by the right engine by moving the respective RCS switch from the RUN position to the STOP position, where it was held for 3 seconds, then returned to RUN. The time for the left and right engines ITT to reach 300 degrees C was 3.87 and 3.54 seconds, respectively. The ignition lights flashed on, the engines spooled down until rpm was 75 percent, ITT increased to about 700 degrees C, and rpm slowly increased to about 95 percent. ITT then decreased to about 530 degrees C.

Following the two shutdown tests, the engines were shut down normally by just moving the RCS switch to stop. These shutdowns were not timed, and the engines did not smoke after they were shut down and stopped.

Airplane Flight Manual Checklist Emergency Procedures

Section 3 of the MU-2B-25 AFM provides information regarding airplane emergencies, the warning or alerts associated with a particular emergency, and the procedures to follow once the emergency has been identified. Some of those procedures are listed as follows.

Engine Failure After Liftoff – Continued Climb (in part)

1. Landing Gear – Up



2. Airspeed – Vxse Minimum for Flap Configuration



3. Condition Lever (Failed Engine) – Emergency Stop



4. Power Lever (Failed Engine) – Takeoff

WARNING – If an engine failure occurs after liftoff, continued climb is not assured unless operating engine is producing power in accordance with the power assurance chart and the airplane flight manual procedures are followed.

WARNING – Identify failed engine by power asymmetry and engine instruments. Do not retard failed engine power lever. Place failed engine power lever to takeoff position during feathering of the propeller and leave there for the remainder of the flight.

CAUTION – Run-Crank-Stop Switch must remain in RUN position.

5. Landing light – Retract



6. Airspeed – Vyse Minimum for Flap Configuration



7. Flaps – 5 degrees



8. Airspeed – 140 KCAS minimum or 135 KCAS minimum (if not modified by S/R 010)

NOTE – For airplanes not modified by S/R 010, do not exceed 140 KCAS until flaps are Up.

9. Flaps – Up



10. Airspeed – 150 KCAS



11. Engine Power Limit Switches – Manual

CAUTION – Prior to placing the engine power limit switches to the manual position, the operating engine's power lever should be positioned so that the engine will not exceed the Torque/ITT limits.

12. Power (Operating Engine) – As required

WARNING – Air conditioning and pressurization system must remain off to attain full climb capability.

13. Engine Shutdown Procedure (Failed Engine) – Accomplish

NOTE – Single engine climb rates are best attained with wings level by use of rudder to correct for yawing tendency and using the minimum amount of spoiler necessary to maintain lateral control.

Engine Shutdown Procedure

If engine failure occurs, or if a sudden loss or significant fluctuation (plus/minus 7.5 percent) of indicated torque pressure occurs, as indicated by airplane yaw, promptly shut down the affected engine and determine the cause prior to further operation.

1. Failed Engine Condition Lever - EMERGENCY STOP

2. Failed Engine Power Lever - TAKEOFF

WARNING - Identify failed engine by power asymmetry and engine instruments. Do not retard failed engine power lever. Place failed engine power lever to takeoff position during the feathering of propeller and leave there for the remainder of the flight.

CAUTION - Run-crank-stop switch must remain in "run" position

3. Trim – Set

4. Power - As required

5. Failed Engine DC Generator Switch – Off

5A. Ignition Switch - Off (Affected Engine)

6. Air Conditioning and Pressurization System - Select operating engine bleed air or ram air (if thrust critical)

NOTE - Ram air position will depressurize cabin. Oxygen may be required.

7. Engine Power Limit Switches - Manual

CAUTION - Prior to placing the engine power limit switches to the [manual] position, the operating engine's power lever should be positioned so that the engine will not exceed the torque/ITT limits.

8. Operating Engine Power Level - Set as required

8A. Voltammeters - Check

NOTE - Both voltammeters should indicate between 27 and 29.5 volts. Amperage on the side of the operating engine should be less than 200 amps.

9. Operating Engine DC Generator Load - Reduce to essential items (if necessary)

10. Prop Synchronizer (if installed) - Off

Single Engine Landing Procedure

CAUTION - The use of 40 degrees flaps with an engine inoperative is not recommended. Always maintain airspeed above Vxse for flap settings being used until landing is assured.

Before Landing Checklist - Use normal procedures except as follows:

1. Inoperative Engine - Secured (Use Engine Shutdown Procedure)

2. Fuel Quantity and Balance - Check within limitations

3. Cabin Air Selector Switch - Off or Ram

4. Condition Lever (Operating Engine) - Takeoff Land

5. Power Lever (Operating Engine) - Set as required to maintain airspeed and desired flight path

6. Landing Gear - Up

7. Flaps - Up (Vxse = 135 KCAS)

8. Airspeed - 150 KCAS

Beginning Final Approach Descent or Base Leg (approximately 1,000 feet agl):

9. Flaps - 5 degrees (Vxse = 130 KCAS)

10 Airspeed - 140 KCAS (modified by S/R 010); 130 KCAS (not modified by S/R 010)

When Landing is Assured:

11. Landing Gear - Down

12. Power Lever (Operating Engine) - As required to maintain airspeed and desired flight path

13. Flaps - 20 degrees (Vxse = 125 KCAS)

14. Airspeed - 105 KCAS when over runway

WARNING - Do not attempt a go around below 400 feet agl or after 20 degrees of flaps are selected. Altitude loss may approach 400 feet, during transition from approach to climb configuration (Gear down, flaps 20 degrees to Gear up, flaps up).

CAUTION - Up to 20 percent additional runway may be required using this procedure when compared to the normal two engine landing distance.

After Touchdown:

15. Reverse Thrust - As required to maintain directional control

CAUTION - On other than dry, hard surface runways, it is possible to apply more reverse thrust than can be counteracted by rudder, brakes, and nosewheel steering.

Airstart Procedure

CAUTION - Ensure engine stoppage was not the result of malfunction which might make it dangerous to attempt a restart

1. Airspeed - 100 to 180 KCAS (150 KCAS Recommended)

2. Altitude - Below 15,000 feet pressure altitude

3. Interstage Turbine Temperature - Below 200 degrees C (if feasible)

4. Prop Synchronizer (if installed) – Off

5. Condition Lever – Taxi

6. Power Lever - Middle of flight idle and takeoff

NOTE - If possible, perform equalizing cooling of engine rotor assembly by wind milling in using unfeather switch intermittently before airstart. If ITT drops during standing of propeller followed after equalizing cooling, perform equalizing cooling again if possible by wind milling about one minute in using unfeather switch intermittently just before airstart even if ITT is below 200 degrees C because thermal distortion of engine rotor assembly may occur.

7. Start Selector Switch - Air Start and Safe

8. Ignition Switch – Off

9. Run-Crank-Stop Switch – Run

10. Engine Start Switch - Press Momentarily (Start Indicator Light Illuminates)

11. Unfeather Switch - Press and Hold to 30 percent rpm minimum

12. Fuel Enrichment Switch - Press and Hold Up to Light Off

a. ITT - Monitor (Maximum 1149 degrees C)

b. Within 15 seconds past 10 percent rpm or by 25 percent rpm - Indicated combustion or abort start (Place Condition Lever to EMERGENCY STOP)

c. Above 25 percent rpm with Slow Acceleration - Use fuel enrichment switch

d. If Acceleration stagnates and ITT continues to rise

Condition Lever - EMERGENCY STOP

NOTE - If abort was caused by high ITT, reduce altitude and increase airspeed, if possible, before attempting restart. If abort was caused by no combustion, reduce altitude and reduce airspeed, if possible before attempting a restart.

CAUTION - Do not allow engine to windmill in the 18 percent to 28 percent rpm range.

13. Condition Lever - As required

14. Power Lever - As required

15. DC Generator Switch - On/Reset if necessary

15A. Ignition Switch - Auto (Ignition Annunciator Light extinguished if Auto-Ignition System installed)

16. Air Conditioning and Pressurization System - Both


MU-2B-25 (A2PC) Pilot Checklist Normal Procedures

Section 5 of the MU-2B-25 A2PC pilot checklist provides information regarding airplane normal procedures. Some of those procedures are listed as follows.

Descent Procedures

1. Cabin Altitude – Set

Set Cabin Pressure Controller pointer to field elevation plus 1,000 feet. Adjust rate control knob so that the airplane will be fully depressurized prior to landing. Generally, a 300 to 500 fpm cabin descent rate will be comfortable and ensure proper depressurization.

2. Tip Tank/Outer Tank Switch – Off



3. Altimeters – Set



4. Windshield Defog – As required



5. Ignition Switches – As required

Select CONT (auto ignition installed) or ON (manual ignition installed) in icing conditions or heavy participation. Observe duty cycle limitations. In other than these conditions, select AUTO (auto ignition installed) or OFF (manual ignition installed).

CAUTION – Ignition shall be selected to CONT (if auto ignition installed) or ON (if manual ignition installed) during approach and landing while in or shortly following flight in actual or potential icing condition.

6. Anti-ice/De-ice – As required (Add 10 percent KIAS in icing)



a. Pitot Anti-ice – On



i. Pitot and Static Anti-ice (if installed) – On



b. Windshield Heat (if installed) – Low

If descent through icing conditions is anticipated, turn on all anti-ice and de-ice equipment.



7. Taxi Lights (if installed) – As required

Recommended on for descent

Approach Procedures (in part)

1. Landing Data – Computed



2. Fuel Quantity/Balance – Check In-Limits



Tip fuel must be below 65 gallons or an overweight landing inspection will be required. Balance within 22 gallons.



3. Propeller Synchronizer (if installed) – Off



4. Differential Pressure – Zero

Confirm cabin will be depressurized prior to landing.



5. Condition Levers – Takeoff land

Provides maximum thrust in the event of a go-around.



6. Power – As required



7. Airspeed – 140 KCAS minimum (modified by S/R 010); 130 KCAS minimum (not modified by S/R 010)



8. Cabin Sign – On

Brief Passengers



9. Anti-ice System – As required (add 10 percent KIAS in icing)



10. Engine Power Limit Switches – Auto



11. Landing Lights – As required (below 175 KCAS)



12. Flaps – 5 degrees (below 175 KCAS)



Professional Flight Training, L.C. Checklist Normal Procedures (****For Training Purposes Only****)

As stated earlier in this report, the instructor provided the pilot a checklist for training purposes only during his MU-2B-25 SFAR training program. Some of the normal checklist procedures are listed as follows.

Descent

1. Cabin Altitude Selector – Set



2. Fuel Transfer Switches – Tips Manual or Off



3. Altimeters – Set

4. Anti/De-ice Systems – As required



5. Lights – As required



Approach and Landing

1. Cabin Altitude Diff Pressure – Check for Zero



2. Anti/De-ice Systems – As required



3. Lights – As required



4. Cabin Signs – On



5. Windshield Heat – As required



6. Auto Ignition – Auto or continuous



7. Landing Gear – Down



8. Prop Sync – Off



9. Flaps – 5 degrees



10. Auto Pilot/Yaw Damper – Off



11. Fuel Transfer Switches – Balanced/Off



12. Landing Gear – Check 3 Green



13. Power – 20 percent [torque] or greater



14. Flaps – 20 degrees



15. Airspeed (computed) - Check

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Flight Recorder Systems

The NTSB notes that the airplane was not required to have any type of crash-resistant recorder installed. Previous NTSB recommendations have addressed the need for recording information on airplane types such as the one involved in this accident. Recorders can help investigators identify safety issues that might otherwise be undetectable, which is critical to the prevention of future accidents.

On May 6, 2013, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-13-13 and asked the FAA to do the following:

Require all existing turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system. The crash-resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197, "Information Collection and Monitoring Systems."

On December 10, 2013, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-13-13 "Open—Unacceptable Response" because the FAA stated that it had not found any compelling evidence to require installation of cockpit recording systems as recommended. Accordingly, the FAA reiterated that it planned no further action to mandate flight deck recording systems and considered its actions complete. Despite the FAA's position, the lack of recording systems on aircraft remains an important safety issue, and the NTSB therefore believes that it would be premature to close the recommendation.