Wednesday, March 14, 2012

de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver, Southeast Aviation, N82SF: Accident occurred March 13, 2012 in Ketchikan, Alaska

NTSB Identification: ANC12LA026 
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 13, 2012 in Ketchikan, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/09/2012
Aircraft: DEHAVILLAND BEAVER DHC-2, registration: N82SF
Injuries: 1 Serious, 1 Minor.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot departed from an off-airport site in marginal visual flight rules conditions. Shortly after departure, the weather worsened, and flight visibility dropped to near zero in heavy snow. He attempted to follow the shoreline at a low altitude but was unable to maintain visual contact with the ground. He stated that he saw trees immediately in front of the airplane and attempted a right turn toward what he thought was an open bay. During the turn, the right float contacted a rock outcrop, and the airplane impacted the water. The pilot did not report any mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's decision to depart in marginal visual meteorological conditions, and his continued visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions.

On March 13, 2012, about 1040 Alaska daylight time, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 (Beaver) airplane, N82SF, collided with water and terrain approximately 23 miles southwest of Ketchikan, Alaska. The airplane was being operated by Southeast Aviation, Ketchikan, as a visual flight rules on-demand charter flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The pilot sustained serious injuries and the sole passenger sustained minor injuries. Marginal visual meteorological conditions were reported at the time of departure, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The airplane departed the Niblack mine site, bound for Ketchikan, about 1033.

After the airplane failed to arrive in Ketchikan, company personnel initiated a search to see if the airplane had diverted due to weather. A worker stationed at the mine where the airplane departed from initiated a search by boat to try and locate the airplane. He found the airplane partially submerged in a cove, approximately 1.5 miles from the departure point, and picked up the pilot and passenger, who had evacuated the airplane.

During a telephone conversation with the NTSB investigator-in-charge on March 22, the pilot reported that he was departing from the Niblack mine site in marginal weather conditions. Shortly after departure, the weather worsened, and flight visibility dropped to near zero in heavy snow. He attempted to follow the shoreline at low altitude, but was unable to maintain visual contact with the ground. He then stated that he saw trees immediately in front of the airplane, and attempted a right turn toward what he thought was an open bay. During the turn, the right float contacted a rock outcrop, and the airplane impacted the water. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings, fuselage, and the horizontal stabilizer.

The closest weather reporting facility is the Ketchikan International Airport (PAKT), approximately 23 miles northeast of the accident site. At 1042, approximately the same time as the accident, a special Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was reporting, in part: Wind 150 degrees (true) at 9 knots; visibility 2.5 statute miles; light snow; sky condition, few clouds at 1,600 feet, broken clouds at 2,800 feet, overcast at 3,700 feet; temperature, 36 degrees F; dew point, 27 degrees F; altimeter, 29.21 in Hg. 

About 16 minutes after the accident, at 1056, another special METAR reported conditions at Ketchikan as; Wind, 140 degrees at 15 knots, gusting to 21 knots; visibility, 1.5 statute miles; light snow; sky condition, broken 2,000 feet, overcast 2,800 feet.


 At 1131 on 3/13/2012, Alaska State Troopers received a report of a float plane crash in the Niblack Mine area approximately 30 miles southwest of Ketchikan. U.S.C.G., Alaska State Troopers, Ketchikan Volunteer Rescue Squad, Temsco Helicopters, and Guardian Flight Services responded. The plane and the two occupants were located on a beach near the Niblack mine by a Good Samaritan vessel. The pilot Ernest Robb, age 64, of Ketchikan, and passenger Murray Richardson, age 56, of Vancouver,  BC sustained moderate non-life threatening injuries and were transported to Ketchikan Peace health Medical Center by Guardian flight services and later airlifted to Harbor View Medical Center in Seattle. Robb was flying a DeHavilland Beaver owned by Southeast Aviation of Ketchikan.  Initial investigation revealed that weather was a factor in the accident due to heavy snow and zero visibility closing in around the plane shortly after take off. The FAA, and NTSB have been notified.

Report suggests eliminating high-end North Carolina helicopter

RALEIGH, N.C. — As North Carolina pares down its state aircraft fleet, it should get rid of a pricey helicopter that flies infrequently and is used to ferry corporate bigwigs to building sites and governors to tour hurricane damage, the Legislature's fiscal watchdog agency said Wednesday.

The Program Evaluation Division suggested in a report that the Department of Transportation get rid of its Sikorsky S-76C+ helicopter, which flew on average less than six hours per month last year at an operating cost of $560,000 for 2011. The Department of Transportation said later Wednesday it's looking at selling the helicopter and replacing it with another brand that costs less to operate and could serve both law enforcement and economic development.

The report is a follow-up to a 2010 study that prompted the Legislature to direct the sale of underused planes and consolidation of some state aviation programs. Since then, the number of state-owned aircraft has fallen from 72 to 53, the evaluation division said.

Wednesday's report said the state could go further by eliminating the twin-engine Sikorsky, which was used about half the time in 2011 by the Department of Commerce. Another one-quarter of the time was used by the "executive branch." The helicopter has been a frequent vehicle for governors who tour the state during a natural disaster.

The Commerce Department also uses the helicopter to take company executives and consultants interested in building or expanding operations in the state to potential plant sites. The aircraft, bought in 1998 by the state for $6.2 million, seats seven and features leather seats, wood interior and a refreshment center to store drinks and snacks, according to DOT.

"It's a limousine," Rep. Julia Howard, R-Davie, co-chairwoman of the Program Evaluation Oversight Committee, told a colleague during the report's presentation.

The 66 hours the Sikorsky flew last year fell well below the 200 flight hours that report authors said is a conservative industry benchmark to justify owning the aircraft. The cost of operating and maintaining a twin-engine Bell helicopter, for example, could be at least 40 percent less than a Sikorsky aircraft, the report said.

Catherine Moga Bryant, the report's lead author, said the option of chartering private helicopters could pose problems because an executive-style helicopter similar to the Sikorsky would have to be flown in from other states.

Sen. Rick Gunn, R-Alamance, said he's for cost savings and efficiency, but warned the state shouldn't cut corners that would make it difficult to have a nice helicopter available in short order for executives who are deciding where to expand.

The Sikorsky "may be a limousine, but we're competing with other companies and other states," Gunn said. "These companies are on very tight timeframes."

Rep. Stephen LaRoque, R-Lenoir, suggested the state could do economic recruiting just as well in a less-expensive model: "I can't imagine a single business out there considering North Carolina cares which type of helicopter they're flown around in."

Richard Walls, the Department of Transportation's aviation director, said in an interview the Sikorsky has many safety features and operating redundancies that serve business executives well.

"It's a very, very good helicopter. It's a high-end helicopter," he added. Walls said Bell helicopters are generally considered better for law enforcement uses, but with interior upgrades they could be great dual-purpose aircraft, he said. He said proceeds from selling the Sikorsky could pay for most if not all of a Bell helicopter, which he estimated could cost $3.5 million.

The Department of Commerce is willing to share a helicopter with the Highway Patrol, but there would have to be guidelines on how to prioritize its use by the agencies, assistant department secretary Tim Crowley said. "We're of the opinion that there needs to be adequate aviation capabilities when it comes to showing sites to corporate executives," Crowley said.

Wednesday's report also suggested the Legislature should consider alternatives for two planes operated by the State Bureau of Investigation, which flew a combined 177 hours last year. The SBI's aircraft facility in Erwin also should be closed and the planes housed at a DOT facility at the Raleigh-Durham International Airport, at an annual savings of $111,000, the report said.

SBI Director Greg McLeod, in a prepared response to the report, opposed the recommendations. He said the SBI needs a confidential area to keep planes because of the sensitive nature of criminal investigations. Alternatives to owning the planes — using a DOT plane for aerial photography or using a DOT plane or a private contractor for transporting extradited fugitives — aren't feasible, McLeod wrote.

Source:  http://www.wral.com

Xcel Energy Wants Customers To Pay $1.1M For Private Jets: Planes Part Of $142M Rate Increase



Colorado regulators are questioning Xcel Energy's use of private jets while seeking a rate increase from customers.

The Minneapolis-based utility is seeking $1.1 million for use of its two corporate jets as part of a $142 million electricity-rate increase. According to the Denver Post, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission staff says ratepayers shouldn't pick up the tab.

The cost of operating one of the leased, eight-seat jets is more than $4,600 an hour. "The company's ratepayers do not benefit by these two employees commuting via the two corporate jets to their primary place of employment," a staff review said.

 The company responded in an email saying it saves time and money by not using commercial flights.

If the $142 million rate increase is approved, monthly bills for most residential customers would increase by about 6 percent or $4.01 a month. The average bill for commercial customers would go up about 4.83 percent or $5.30.The commission said more than half of the proposed increase is due to the loss of the Black Hills Electric wholesale contract, which expired at the end of 2011. The company also blames increases in property taxes.The company also is seeking to recover recent investments in the electric distribution system, costs associated with efforts to improve the state’s air quality, and a $10 million plan to clear and remove trees killed by the mountain pine beetle from around Xcel’s transmission and distribution lines.

Source:   http://www.thedenverchannel.com

Safari (Mfr: MichaelS/MichaelK), N105KM: Accident occurred March 13, 2012 in Middle Valley, Tennessee

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items  -   National Transportation Safety Board:   http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary -  National Transportation Safety Board:   http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N105KM 

NTSB Identification: ERA12LA226
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 13, 2012 in Middle Valley, TN
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/21/2014
Aircraft: MICHAEL S/MICHAEL K SAFARI, registration: N105KM
Injuries: 1 Serious,1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot of the experimental amateur-built helicopter reported that the engine shuddered twice momentarily shortly after takeoff and then lost power. After observing the engine rpm drop from about 2,700 to 1,500, the pilot initiated an autorotation and subsequently landed the helicopter on top of a tree, which began to lower toward a creek. The helicopter came to rest partially submerged in the creek and was partially consumed by a postcrash fire. Postaccident examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation; however, impact and fire damage precluded the ability to functionally check the engine and fuel system. Review of engine monitor data, which was recorded at 5-second intervals, did not reveal any drops in engine rpm or any other anomalies consistent with the pilot’s statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
A partial loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined due to the postaccident condition of the airframe and engine.


On March 13, 2012, about 1745 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built, CHR Safari helicopter, N105KM, operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during an autorotation in Hixson, Tennessee. The private pilot was not injured and a passenger was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight that was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The two seat helicopter was co-owned and co-built by the pilot. It was powered by a non-certified Superior XP IO-360 series, 380-horsepower engine and issued an experimental airworthiness certificate on September 23, 2009.

The pilot stated he flew about 1 mile from his home to reach the passenger's property. He landed in an open field and secured the helicopter before assisting the passenger on board. The helicopter was started and lifted off without incident. At an airspeed of approximately 45 knots, and between 100 and 150 feet above the ground, "the engine shuttered for an instant and came back to normal." The pilot stopped the climb, confirmed that all engine instruments were "in the green" and began a left turn back toward the takeoff area. About halfway into the 180-degree turn, the engine shuttered again. The pilot applied full throttle with no engine response and observed the engine rpm drop from about 2,700 to about 1,500, with the rotor speed in the middle of the green indicator. He then entered an autorotation and landed on top of a tree, which began to bend over, and lowered the helicopter toward a creek below. As the helicopter reached the water, it rolled on to its side and fell about 3 feet into the creek. The pilot was able to assist the passenger out of the helicopter during the time in which a fire erupted from the engine compartment. The fire was contained with water from the creek until it was extinguished by the local fire department.

Examination of the helicopter by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The engine crankshaft rotated freely, compression was obtained on all cylinders and proper magneto function was noted. Fuel mixed with water was found in the gascolater; consistent with being submerged in the creek. Damage sustained to the engine during the impact and postaccident fire prevented the ability to have it operationally test run. Additional detailed examinations of the helicopter, which included examinations of the engine, clutch and transmission systems by the helicopter kit manufacturer, did not reveal any preimpact failures.

In addition, the kit manufacturer conducted a series of test flights utilizing a similarly equipped and configured helicopter in an attempt to determine if clutch slippage could be induced under normal flight conditions. According to the kit manufacturer, clutch slippage could only be induced under conditions which were well outside the helicopter's normal operating parameters and standard procedures, such as allowing the rotor rpm to decay below 450 rpm and rapid application of the collective or throttle controls.


The helicopter was equipped with a Dynon EMS-D10 engine monitor which was configured to record information at 5 second intervals to non-volatile-memory. The engine monitor was successfully downloaded at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory, Washington, DC. Review of the data did not reveal any drops in engine rpm or any other anomalies consistent with the pilot's statement. The data during about 30 seconds prior to the autorotation showed consistent fuel flows, fuel pressures, and manifold pressures, with rpm mostly in the 2,700-2,740 range and never dropping below about 2,600 rpm.


At the time of the accident, the helicopter had been operated for about 130 total hours, and about 75 hours since its most recent condition inspection, which was performed on June 20, 2011.

The pilot/co-owner reported 1,230 hours of total flight experience, which included about 380 hours in helicopters, and approximately 147 hours in the same make and model as the accident helicopter. In addition, he had flown the accident helicopter 26 hours and 3 hours, during the 90 and 30 days that preceded the accident; respectively.


  NTSB Identification: ERA12LA226 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, March 13, 2012 in Middle Valley, TN
Aircraft: MICHAEL S/MICHAEL K SAFARI, registration: N105KM
Injuries: 1 Serious,1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On March 13, 2012, at 1745, eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur built, Michael CHR Safari helicopter, N105KM, registered to and operated by an individual, incurred substantial damage during an autorotation in Middle Valley, Tennessee. The pilot received minor injuries and the passenger was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, personal flight. The flight originated from the passenger’s private property about 1735.

The pilot stated he flew about a mile from his home to reach the passenger’s property. He landed in an open field and secured the helicopter before assisting the passenger on board, and briefed him what to expect during the flight. The helicopter was started and maneuvered about 150 feet above the ground before flying over a wooded area near the passenger’s property. Not long into the flight, the pilot felt the helicopter’s engine surge. He decided at that moment to return to the open field that he departed from. While in the turn, the engine surged again, followed by a loss of power. The pilot performed an autorotation onto the trees below. The helicopter landed on top of a tree, which lower the helicopter gently as it bent over toward the creek below. As the helicopter reached the water, it rolled on to its side. Fuel from the fuel tanks spilled and caught on fire. The pilot was able to assist the passenger out of the helicopter moments after the start of the fire and contain the flames with creek water until the local fire department arrived and extinguish the flames.

The helicopter was retained for further examination.


IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 105KM        Make/Model: EXP       Description: SAFARI ROTORCRAFT
  Date: 03/13/2012     Time: 2146

  Event Type: Incident   Highest Injury: Minor     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
  City: HIXSON   State: TN   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  N105KM SAFARI EXPERIMENTAL ROTORCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, 
  13 MILES FROM HIXSON, TN

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   0
                 # Crew:   1     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   1     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   1     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   1     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    

WEATHER: VFR

OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Unknown      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: NASHVILLE, TN  (CE19)                 Entry date: 03/14/2012 


A 91-year-old man is recovering at the Augusta Burn Center after surviving a helicopter crash Tuesday evening. It happened in Hixson, just off Barker Road inside the Branches Plantation.

Hamilton County Emergency crews tell us firefighters arrived on the scene and were able to put out the fire caused when the helicopter crashed. The pilot was Steve Michael, was flying an experimental Safari aircraft.

We're told he landed at the plantation to pick up his passenger, 91-year-old Ivan Vernon. Vernon's sister, Babs Rymer, explains that her father is adventurous and had been wanting to fly with Michael. The two men go to the same church, and Vernon was thrilled to go up in his first helicopter ride. Unfortunately, Rymer tells us she watched as the power failed and the chopper started falling. She says Michael was able to avoid the power lines, and the trees helped break the fall.

Rymer says, "It almost immediately burst into flames then because that's when I saw it because I heard the blades hit the trees. By the time I got there I saw 12 foot flames, not knowing they had gotten out."

Rymer says she feared that her father and the pilot were trapped inside, but suddenly heard Michael's voice reporting that both men were alright. "That truly is God's miracle that that happened, a whole group of angels taking care of them."

Vernon and Michael were able to hike through the woods to get help. Vernon suffered second and third degree burns on his right arm.

The National Transportation and Safety Board was at the scene Wednesday investigating the accident. Depend on us to let you know the cause once it's released.

KUWAIT: Airport landing system malfunctions

 A malfunction in a main landing system at Kuwait International Airport is the reason many aircrafts fail to land due to low visibility during sandstorms and other bad weather, says a report published yesterday.

“The instrument landing system (ILS) at the airport is outdated and has been malfunctioning for nearly a year,” said the source who preferred to keep his identity anonymous.

“The problem with the system usually appears during bad weather conditions such as sandstorms when many pilots are not able to land due to low visibility”.

The ILS is part of a limited visibility landing system used in many airports around the world to assist pilots to land during low visibility such as in fog and sandstorms.

“The Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGCA) received notice from the manufacturing company a long time ago that spare parts for the current ILS system at Kuwait International Airport are no longer manufactured”, the source said. “The DGCA is yet to request a new system since then”.

Due to the inactivity of the system, pilots resort to an approach lighting system to locate the runway during sandstorms; something the source called a “risky maneuver”.

The same source said the VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) system; a navigation system that enables aircrafts to determine their position and stay on course, also malfunctions.

A Lufthansa airplane had to land in Dammam, Saudi Arabia earlier this month. The pilot failed to land at Kuwait International Airport during a sandstorm due to errors in the landing system. — Al-Rai

Source:  http://news.kuwaittimes.net

Vehicle crashes on Afghan runway; U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta safe

KABUL, Afghanistan—An Afghan driver somehow caught fire Wednesday as he crashed a stolen truck as U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's plane was landing nearby, officials said.

No one in Panetta's party was hurt, said a Pentagon spokesman, Navy Capt. John Kirby.

In the bizarre incident, the pickup truck raced at high speed and crashed into a ditch near the ramp where Panetta's plane was going to stop at a British airfield in southern Afghanistan.

Suddenly the driver was enveloped in flames, but the truck did not explode, said Col. Gary Kolb, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, countering earlier reports. The driver was treated for burns.

It was unclear what the driver had in mind, or even if it was a failed attack. "It's too early to say right now. It may have been a coincidence," Kolb said. There were no explosives found either in the vehicle or on the driver, Kolb said.

He said a coalition service member saw the Afghan stealing the truck and tried to stop him, but the man hit the service member with the truck as he drove off. The service member was injured. Kolb did not say how seriously.

Plane crashes near Pretoria, South Africa

A man is in a serious but stable condition in a Pretoria hospital after his light aircraft crashed near the Bronkhorstspruit Dam. 
(Netcare 911)

Cape Town - A man is in a serious but stable condition in a Pretoria hospital after his light aircraft crashed near the Bronkhorstspruit Dam on Wednesday, paramedics said.

"Paramedics arrived at the scene to find the wreckage of the plane on a rocky outcrop of a hill. The pilot had been pulled from the wreckage and was lying nearby," said Netcare 911 spokesperson Jeffrey Wicks.

He had sustained trauma to his upper body but was in a stable condition, and taken to Netcare Pretoria East Hospital, Wicks said.

The pilot was the sole occupant of the aircraft.

The cause of the crash was unknown, and will be the subject of a Civil Aviation Authority investigation, he said.

Pilot gets flak for not using anti-ice

An expert witness has questioned why a pilot did not apply an application of wing anti-ice on an aircraft before taking off from the Queenstown Airport in wintry conditions.

A 54-year-old pilot, of Papakura, who has interim name suppression, appeared for the eighth day of a defended hearing before Judge Kevin Phillips in the Queenstown District Court yesterday.

The pilot has denied operating a Boeing 737 in a careless manner on June 22, 2010, a charge laid by the Civil Aviation Authority.

CAA alleges the pilot should not have taken off for Sydney after 5.14pm because Pacific Blue rules stipulated departing aircraft at Queenstown needed at least 30 minutes before civil twilight at 5.45pm.

The aircraft departed at 5.25pm.

Expert witness Colin Glasgow, a former commercial airline pilot, Air New Zealand chief pilot and CAA airline inspector, said he would have applied wing anti-ice before takeoff and was unsure why the pilot had not considered doing the same.

The temperature was 3degC at the time of takeoff and there was rain, recent snow, thick cloud cover up to high altitudes and a cold front in the area at the time, Mr Glasgow said.

Because of the area the aircraft was exposed to potential icing and wing anti-ice should have been applied before the aircraft took off, Mr Glasgow said.

He said it was a "very rare situation" to apply wing anti-ice, with himself only having to do so six times in his 39-year career, but if a pilot did not apply it in those conditions he was not sure when they would.

Defence lawyer Matthew Muir said two witnesses and experienced pilots would give evidence that they did not believe wing anti-ice would have needed to be applied before takeoff.

They would also give evidence that the Boeing 737 had a low susceptibility to wing ice and it was "exceptionally unlikely, almost hypothetical" that it would be needed and if it was, an application of de-icing could have been made taking one minute.

Mr Glasgow said that based on accidents and serious incidents around the world even 30 seconds of ice can cause problems and de-icing "eats into the performance of aircraft" as it needed to heat the wing to remove the ice.

The aircraft was also no less susceptible than any other, Mr Glasgow said.

He said he was surprised at the different stance of the other pilots.

Russians take to the skies

March 14, 2012
Aleksey Ekimovsky, Kirill Slepynin, Market Guide “Russian Transport”

Light aviation, which almost completely disappeared in the 1990s, has been making its first steps towards recovery in Russia. Small private aircraft are necessary for basic transportation in some areas of Russia; the world’s largest country has thousands of settlements not accessible by surfaced roads.

Private planes are no longer considered exotic in Russia. With a price tag about the same as a luxury car, more and more Russians are able to afford a light aircraft. Experts believe there are more than 3,000 private airplanes and helicopters in the country, even though individuals have only been able to fly legally in Russia since a 2010 government decree introduced concept of uncontrolled airspace and dropped the requirement for planes to have mandatory ATC service.

“The new rules are working and have been tested during practical flights,” said Vladimir Tyurin, chairman of the board of the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association. “The notification procedure has also been simplified. An electronic notice is processed within 30 minutes. There are fewer no-fly zones – a recently drafted instruction from the Transport Ministry will reduce the number of such zones to 400 from 1,200. Most of them are located around Moscow and the Central Federal District – the farther from Moscow, the fewer the zones, so there is less red tape for managing air traffic.”

Despite these positive moves, there are many unresolved issues, including the high import duties applied to foreign aircraft. According to Tyurin, Russians who purchase a foreign-made airplane or helicopter, must pay an additional 42 percent of its cost in customs duties and value-added tax to the federal budget. Additionally, all privately owned airplanes and helicopters, must be registered according to local procedures. If the purchased aircraft is a make that has a Type Certificate, the process is fairly simple, only a few recent Cessna, Robinson and Aeroprakt models have been awarded these certificates. Owners of thousands of aircraft made by other producers have been faced with registration problems. For instance, if a model is discontinued, the producer will not apply for a Type Certificate in Russia, but Russian officials will not register a serial plane as a “custom-made aircraft.”

“There is a way out,” said Tyurin. “You can upgrade your plane a bit by installing additional equipment that will suffice to have the model deemed to be a custom-built aircraft. This is a relatively fair means for circumventing the legislation, but it would be easier for everyone if the rules were changed and foreign Type Certificates were accepted automatically, without additional procedures wrapped in red tape, thus having foreign certification procedures recognized as safe.”

Once a plane has been registered, it must be maintained, which is harder than it sounds. “Russian aircraft maintenance rules do not cover light aviation. The requirements on maintenance centers working with light aviation are so stringent that often they are simply unprofitable,” Tyurin said. According to him, there are a few centers that service Robinson helicopters (of which there are about 300 in Russia) and Cessna airplanes (of which there are around 100), and they report profits. But the state needs to reduce unreasonable requirements in order for new maintenance centers to be set up and work with other aircraft models.

These problems are irritating, but not insurmountable; the bigger challenge for Russian owners of private planes is the lack of infrastructure. There are currently 300 airports in Russia that accept big commercial carriers, but do not welcome light aviation, and about 500 aerodromes and airfields that do accommodate small planes. In comparison, there are about 5,400 airfields for general aviation in the United States and 580 aerodromes for long-range aircraft.

Development of the infrastructure for regional transportation could have a positive impact on light aviation according to Alexei Sinitsky, editor-in-chief of “Air Transport Review.” In February, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called light aviation “the only way for a country like Russia, with its vast territory, to connect various regions. It is no good when you have to travel to a neighboring region via Moscow.”

Sinitsky doesn’t have much hope for high levels of state investment in the sector, however. “The recent victories in the struggle against red tape have been due to the enthusiasm of a few well-off and influential people, who have made amateur aviation their hobby,” he said. In some Russian regions, small airfields or landing fields remain operational only because some local businessman or Duma deputy who fell in love with the sky pilots his own airplane from there.

Source:  http://rbth.ru

Top police official, 3 officers die in Nigeria helicopter crash

The late Haruna


A police surveillance helicopter crashed in Jos on Wednesday, killing four persons on board, including a Deputy Inspector-General of Police, John Haruna.

The Commissioner of Police in Plateau, Mr. Emmanuel Ayeni, confirmed the incident and said:  "The four people on board, including a DIG, were all killed''.

He said the DIG's orderly, the pilot and an engineer were also killed.

An eyewitness said the helicopter crashed into a house, where a baby was confirmed injured, while an unspecified number of casualties were rushed to Air Force Military Hospital, Jos.

News Agency of Nigeria learnt that the helicopter was deployed for surveillance over hot spots in Jos following renewed hostilities in the area.

http://www.thenationonlineng.net

Abuja - Four senior police officers, including the deputy police chief, died on Wednesday in a helicopter crash in Nigeria.

A police spokesman said Haruna John, who led police operations and was promoted to the deputy police chief post two weeks ago, died in the crash in central city of Jos.

Witness Miriam Bako told dpa that the helicopter he was travelling in exploded in the air.

'The victims were burnt beyond recognition,' Bako said. 'A rescue mission was attempted by local residents using cutlasses and daggers to cut the plane by the time the first body came out, we knew they were all dead.'

Police have increased their reliance on helicopters after radical Islamist group Boko Haram stepped up attacks against civilians.

On Sunday, the group claimed responsibility for the killing of 10 people in a suicide attack on St Finbarr's Catholic church in Jos.

Cape May County, New Jersey: Commissioners approve resolution establishing escrow account for tenants at airport

VILLAS — Lower Township Municipal Utilities Authority (MUA) recently had 900 customers subject to a tax sale lien for non-payment.

At a Wed., March 7 MUA Board of Commissioner’s meeting, Office Supervisor Emily Oberkofler said the tax sale was for those who were delinquent as of the end of 2011. The liens go to a tax sale conducted by Lower Township, according Board Chairman Nels Johnson.

Oberkofler said the final payment date for customers to avoid a tax sale is March 16. She said the initial 900 customers eligible for tax sale has been “significantly reduced” in conjunction with termination of services.  The high number of customers eligible for tax sale is an annual event, said Oberkofler.

She said customers are sent a “reminder notice after each quarter becomes due.” Procedures for termination were previously enacted only once per year.

Now, after two quarters are delinquent, a work order for termination is generated, which Oberkofler said brings in a lot of revenue. She said it includes customers that have not paid connection fees.

For customers who are set up to make an annual installment payment but fail to do so, they owe the entire balance subject to 18 percent interest and, said Oberkofler.

Commissioners approved a resolution establishing an escrow account for tenants at the county airport. Board Chairman Nels Johnson said renters at the airport are required to for one year of water/sewer service in advance.

He said year ago, tenants “ran out” of the airport leaving behind thousands of dollars owed to the MUA.

Board Solicitor Jeff Barnes said getting a mechanism in place to give MUA some sort of security for payment has been in negotiation for five to seven years. He said collecting money from tenants that have left the airport is complicated due to the county owning the airport and Delaware Bay and River Authority leasing the property.

Barnes said MUA could not lien a property at the airport to collect unpaid utility bills.

When a tenant fills out an application for a water connection, they will be required to make a payment.

Cessna R182 Skylane RG, Julair LLC: Accident occurred June 29, 2011 in Thornton, Colorado

NTSB Identification: CEN11FA428 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, June 29, 2011 in Thornton, CO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 03/08/2012
Aircraft: CESSNA R182, registration: N2344C
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Recorded radar information showed the airplane maneuvering at an altitude of about 500 to 600 feet above ground level and a groundspeed of about 110 knots. Several witnesses saw the airplane’s wings rock before the airplane entered a steep left bank diving turn toward the ground. This occurred about the same time that the wind on the ground began gusting. The airplane impacted the ground inverted, slightly nose-down in a near flat attitude and exploded and a postimpact fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airplane showed no anomalies indicative of any systems problems prior to the accident. A study of weather conditions in the area at the time of the accident showed a fast moving thunderstorm cell over the area, which was capable of producing severe downdrafts indicative of a microburst. Flight Service Station records showed the pilot did not contact them for any services. Weather forecasts for the time-period the airplane was operating predicted fast moving thunderstorms with high wind gusts and the potential for low level wind shear and microburst conditions.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot's inadvertent encounter with a microburst while operating at a low altitude, which resulted in a loss of control from which the pilot could not recover. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s inadequate preflight planning for the forecasted severe weather conditions.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 29, 2011, at 1523 mountain daylight time, a Cessna R182, N2344C, impacted an open field in Thornton, Colorado. The commercial pilot, the sole person on board the airplane, was fatally injured. A post impact fire ensued and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to Julair, LLC, doing business as All American Aerials, Incorporated, and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight which was being operated without a flight plan. The flight departed Front Range Airport (FTG), Watkins, Colorado, approximately 1425.

The pilot's wife said she spoke with him by telephone just before he took off. She said that the he told her that he was going to go up and "shoot a couple of thousand pictures." She said that he voiced no concerns abbout the weather or how his airplane was performing.

Approach control radar recorded a track depicting a Visual Flight Rules 1200 code at the time and in the area where the airplane would have been. The radar track showed the airplane come out of FTG (elevation 5,516 feet), fly up to the Thornton area, and begin a series of turns. The airplane was operating at an altitude between 5,800 to 6,300 feet mean sea level (msl) and a groundspeed of approximately 110 knots.

A review of radar information for the last 8 minutes of the flight, showed the airplane maneuvering just south of the E-470 toll way 2.23 miles northeast of the accident site at an altitude of 6,000 feet msl. The airplane made several orbits around the area of East 138th Court and Boston Street. At 1516:03, the airplane turned west to a heading of approximately 260 degrees. The airplane continued west at an approximate groundspeed of 112 knots until 1517:58, when the airplane made a left turn to the south. The airplane continued south on an approximate heading of 170 degrees for two and a half minutes until reaching 104th Avenue. The airplane turned northeast on an approximate 045 degree heading and continued northeast until 1521:03. The airplane then turned north and flew just east of Quebec Street at an altitude of 5,500 feet msl and a groundspeed of 94 knots until reaching 123rd Avenue. The airplane then made a left turn to the south. At 1521:54, the airplane disappeared from radar. The airplane’s last recorded altitude was 5,300 feet.

Witnesses said the airplane was maneuvering over the Thornton area at a low altitude at the same time that high wind suddenly occurred on the surface. One witness said he saw the airplane’s wings “dipping” up and down, and the airplane suddenly banked steeply to the left before impacting the ground. Several witnesses said that after the airplane impacted the ground, it exploded and the fire started.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot, age 41, held a commercial pilot certificate with single and multi engine land, instrument airplane ratings. The pilot reported on renewal of his pilot insurance policy on December 6, 2010, a total flying time of 18,000 hours and 8,200 hours in the Cessna 182. The policy renewal indicated the pilot successfully completed a flight review on July 5, 2011. Pilot logbooks were never recovered and were suspected destroyed in the airplane.

The flight instructor who gave the pilot his last flight review said that that the pilot was a step above other pilots that he gave flight reviews to. He said that the day the pilot came to him for his flight review; the pilot told him that this was a checkride for him and he wanted to do everything that was in the Practical Test Standards for a private pilot. The pilot performed departure stalls, traffic pattern stalls, slow flight, turns around a point, and patterns and landings. The flight instructor said the pilot showed good knowledge and although he was not sure, thought he had some professional flight training.

Federal Aviation Administration pilot medical records indicated the pilot completed a class 2 physical in April, 2010.

A few days prior to the accident, the pilot spoke to another pilot that was based at Front Range Airport. The pilot told him that he was taking photographs of residential and commercial real estate from his airplane with a digital camera. The pilot told him that he had business in Colorado and had been in the area for about a week. The pilot told him how he flew the airplane and took photographs out of the pilot window at the same time. The pilot told him he had been doing it for some time and was pretty good at it. The pilot also told him of a time when while he was taking pictures, his airplane struck a guy wire. The pilot told him that it hit the wing just outside of the strut, but he was able to fly his airplane back and land it without incident.

The pilot’s wife spoke to the pilot by cellular telephone approximately 10 minutes before the pilot took off. She said that he was in good spirits and did not indicate that he was concerned with the weather conditions or the airplane’s capabilities. She also said that he was in good health.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a 1978 Cessna model R182. Airframe and engine logbooks were not recovered and were suspected destroyed in the airplane.

A review of work orders reflecting maintenance performed by a repair station at the pilot’s home airport in Marshfield, Wisconsin, dating back to May 2008, showed that an annual inspection was performed in April 2010. At the annual inspection, the airframe had 10,091.4 total hours. Minor maintenance was performed on the airplane by the repair station in June, September, and October 2010, and February and March 2011. The last work order, dated March 28, 2011, indicated the repair station cleaned, greased, and cycled the landing gear system and adjusted the rigging on the right nose landing gear door.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION


At 1534, the aviation routine weather report for Denver International Airport (DEN), 12 nautical miles east-southeast of the accident site was winds 190 at 15 knots gusting to 21 knots, visibility 10 miles, thunderstorm, scattered clouds at 8,000 feet msl, broken ceilings at 13,000 and 20,000 feet msl, temperature 32 degrees Celsius, dew point 1 degree Celsius, altimeter 29.99 inches, remarks; thunderstorm beginning 1532, rain beginning 1516 ending 1525, occasional lightning in the vicinity south, thunderstorm in the vicinity south moving northeast, hourly precipitation amount zero inches.

The closest Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) reporting location to the accident site was Rocky Mountain Regional Airport (BJC). The TAF obtained for the accident time was issued at 1435 and was valid for a 21-hour period beginning at 1500. The TAF forecast for BJC expected wind from 350 degrees at 9 knots, visibility greater than 6 miles, scattered cumulonimbus clouds at 8,000 feet agl, and a broken ceiling at 15,000 feet. Thunderstorms were expected in the vicinity after 1600, with a temporary variable wind at 20 knots gusting to 35 knots, thunderstorm, and light rain, with a ceiling broken at 8,000 feet in cumulonimbus clouds.

At 1038, the National Weather Service (NWS) Forecast Office in Boulder, Colorado, issued a Hazardous Weather Outlook for central and eastern Colorado, which discussed a better chance for showers and thunderstorms developing during the afternoon with the main threat from these showers and thunderstorms being gusts to 50 miles per hour.

At 1225, the NWS Forecast Office in Boulder, Colorado, issued an Area Forecast Discussion for eastern Colorado, which discussed high based convection expected to develop into the afternoon with gusts to 35 knots likely in and near any showers or thunderstorms. Higher gusts were possible based on dry adiabatic mixing and these stronger gusts could cause landing and takeoff delays.

The Denver Center Weather Service Unit issues a Meteorological Impact Statement, valid at the time of the accident for the Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDV) area, advised that the low-level wind shear and microburst potential between 1300 and 1800 was moderate to high.

COMMUNICATIONS


The pilot received takeoff clearance from Front Range tower prior to his departure. He confirmed the clearance and his intent to depart to the north. No further communications occurred between the pilot and any air traffic controlling agency.

A review of Flight Service Station records indicated the pilot did not contact them for any services.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted in a rolling prairie grass field and came to rest inverted next to a horse pen approximately 330 feet northwest of a house. The elevation of the terrain in the area was approximately 4,800 feet msl.

The airplane wreckage path was along a common heading of 090 degrees magnetic. The wreckage encompassed an area defined by an initial impact point extending 112 feet to where the airplane main wreckage came to rest.

The first impact was evidenced by a 30-inch long scrape running parallel to the wreckage path followed by a spray of dirt that extended east for approximately 15 feet. In this area were several white colored paint chips.

A second point of impact was located 43 feet east of the initial impact mark. It consisted of an 18-inch wide, 12 inch deep smooth strike in the ground which produced a hole and dislodged a large piece of dirt that was 2 feet in front of the strike. The east side of the hole was smooth and showed gray paint transfer. At the right end of the smooth side of the hole were two parallel running white stripes which equated to the white strips at the airplane’s propeller blade tips.

In the immediate vicinity of the hole were large pieces of broken clear Plexiglas. The pieces were clean except for some dirt spray. Also in this area was the airplane’s magnetic compass, pieces of the upper engine cowling, broken pieces of the forward windscreen support posts, white colored paint chips, map pages, and personal items.

Approximately five feet left and two feet aft of the hole was the airplane’s right wing tip. It was broken longitudinally along the attachment rivets. The position light had been broken out.

From the second impact point extending east for approximately 39 feet was an area of debris which contained more pieces of clear Plexiglas, pieces of the fuselage, pieces of door post, and pieces of paper. At the end of the debris area was the right window frame. It was broken out of the door. The Plexiglas was gone, and it had sustained charring from the fire. Just east of the window frame was the airplane’s right cabin door. It was broken out at the hinges, was bent aft and buckled outward, and was charred. The door handle was in the closed and locked position and the locking pin was extended.

The airplane main wreckage consisted of the majority of the airplane’s remaining structure. The fuselage remains were oriented on a south-southwesterly heading.

The cowling, cabin, baggage compartment and aft fuselage to just forward of the empennage were consumed by fire. The left wing with exception of the forward spar was consumed by fire. The inboard portion of the right wing to include the fuel tank and flap were consumed by fire. The right wing outboard of the flap to include the right aileron was charred, melted and partially consumed. The main landing gear was charred. The wheels and tires were consumed by fire.

Flight control continuity was confirmed from the aileron actuators to the remains of the mixer bar and control yokes.

The airplane’s empennage was inverted and resting on the top of the vertical stabilizer and the tip of left horizontal stabilizer. The horizontal stabilizers and elevator showed heat damage, partial melting, and paint blistering. The left horizontal stabilizer was bent upward approximately 10 degrees at mid span. The vertical stabilizer and rudder also showed heat damage and paint blistering.

Flight control continuity was confirmed from the elevator and rudder to the remains of the rudder pedals and control yokes.

The airplane engine was resting inverted on the upper cowling forward of the consumed cabin area. The firewall and engine mounts were crushed downward and bent aft. The engine was intact and showed heat damage from fire, especially the aft section where the dual magnetos, oil filter, fuel pump, and vacuum pump were installed. The crankshaft was partially fractured just aft of the flange. The propeller hub was intact. Both propeller blades were broken in their mounts and fractured approximately 10 inches outboard of the hub. The hub and blade remains showed heat damage and partial melting.

A 26-inch long section of propeller blade was located 18 feet south of the main wreckage. It was fractured laterally across the face of the blade, approximately mid span. The fracture was consistent with an overload failure. The blade section, which included the blade tip showed chordwise scratches and paint rubs consistent with a ground contact. The section was bent torsionally and showed several nicks in the leading edge.

The airplane wreckage was recovered and transported to a repair station and salvage facility for further examination.

FIRE


A post-impact fire ensued at the time the airplane impacted the ground. The fire burned an area that extended west to east along the airplane’s crash path for approximately 70 feet, and north to south for approximately 72 feet. The fire continued until county fire fighters arrived on the scene and extinguished the fire.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION


An autopsy was conducted by the Adams County Coroner on June 30, 2011. The Coroner concluded the pilot died from blunt force injuries sustained in the crash.

Results of toxicology testing of samples taken were negative for all tests conducted.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The airplane engine, systems, and instrumentation were examined at Greeley, Colorado. The engine showed heavy impact and fire damage to the accessories, wiring harness, muffler, and exhaust manifold. The case and cylinders were intact. The accessories were removed and the crankshaft and camshaft was rotated from the accessories case. The crankshaft and camshaft rotated normally. All valves, rockers, and pushrods showed normal movement. Thumb compression was confirmed on all 6 cylinders.

An examination of the flap actuator indicated the flaps were at a position approximating 10 degrees.

The landing gear was retracted. The elevator trim actuator found extended 1.4 inches, a position indicating nose up trim.

Flight and engine instruments were charred, melted, and partially consumed by fire. The fuel selector indicator and valve confirmed that the selector was in the “both” position, indicating both wing tanks were supplying fuel to the fuel pump and carburetor.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The Cessna R182 Pilots Operating Handbook shows the minimum stall speed at a weight of 3,100 pounds, most forward center of gravity, zero degrees of flap deflection, and zero degree bank angle to be 42 knots indicated airspeed. With 20 degrees of flaps extended, the stall speed decreases to 30 knots.

===
DENVER (AP) -- Investigators say a microburst was the likely cause of a Colorado plane crash that killed a pilot who ran a business taking aerial photos of real estate.

The June 29 crash killed 41-year-old Salil Sinha of Marshfield, Wis. His single-engine Cessna R182 was flying low over the north Denver suburb of Thornton when it crashed into a field.

The pilot was the only person aboard.

A National Transportation Safety Board report dated Thursday says inadequate preflight planning by Sinha was a contributing factor.

Forecasters had warned of possible wind shear, microbursts and strong gusts at the time of the crash.

Rockwell Commander 690A, Ponderosa Aviation Inc., N690SM: Accident occurred November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, Arizona

http://registry.faa.gov/N690SM
 
NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/03/2013
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) purchased the airplane and relocated it from Indiana to PAI's base at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona, about 1 week before the accident. PAI's president conducted the relocation flight under a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ferry permit due to an unaccomplished required 150-hour inspection on the airplane. The airplane's arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit, and no inspections were accomplished to render the airplane airworthy after its relocation. Although other airworthy airplanes were available, PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) (the accident pilot) and the director of operations (DO), who were co-owners of PAI along with the president, decided to use the nonairworthy airplane to conduct a personal flight from SAD to Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 110 miles away. All available evidence indicates that the DOM was aware of the airplane's airworthiness status and that this was the first time he flew in the accident airplane. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night visual meteorological conditions (VMC). After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying.

The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. The return flight was also conducted under VFR in night VMC. There was no moon, and the direction of flight was toward sparsely lit terrain. After takeoff, the air traffic control (ATC) tower controller instructed the pilot to maintain runway heading until advised due to an inbound aircraft. About 2 minutes later, the controller cleared the airplane for its requested right turn and then began a position relief briefing for the incoming controller. No subsequent communications to or from the airplane occurred, nor were any required. Radar data indicated that the airplane turned onto a course directly towards SAD and climbed to and leveled at an altitude of 4,500 feet. About 4 minutes after the right turn, while continuing on the same heading and ground track, the airplane impacted a mountain in a wings-level attitude at an elevation of about 4,500 feet.

Although the airplane was technically not airworthy due to the unaccomplished inspection, the investigation did not reveal any preimpact airframe, avionics, engine, or propeller discrepancies that would have precluded normal operation. Airplane performance derived from radar tracking data did not suggest any mechanical abnormalities or problems.

FFZ, which has an elevation of 1,394 feet mean sea level (msl), is situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain. The mountain is surrounded by sparsely lit terrain and rises to a maximum charted elevation of 5,057 feet msl. The investigation was unable to determine whether, or to what degree, the pilot conducted any preflight route and altitude planning. If such planning had been properly accomplished, it would have accounted for the mountain and provided for terrain clearance. The pilot had flown the round trip flight from SAD to FFZ several times and, most recently, had flown a trip from SAD to FFZ in night VMC 2 days before the accident. Thus, the pilot was familiar with the route and the surrounding terrain. According to the pilot's brother (PAI's president), the pilot typically used an iPad for navigation and flew using the ForeFlight software app with the "moving map" function. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depictions) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. Although iPad remnants were found in the wreckage, the investigation was unable to determine whether the pilot adhered to his normal practice of using an iPad for the flight or, if so, what its relevant display settings (such as scale or terrain depiction) were. Had the pilot been using the ForeFlight app as he normally did, he could have been able to determine that the airplane would not clear the mountain on the given flight track.

According to the pilot's brother, the pilot typically departed an airport, identified the track needed to fly directly to his destination, and turned the airplane on that track. Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its turn on course to SAD about 2 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from FFZ to SAD with the track starting about 2 miles northeast of FFZ direct to SAD revealed that while the direct line track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from the point 2 miles northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. Thus, the pilot likely set on a direct course for SAD even though the delayed right turn from FFZ put the airplane on a track that intersected the mountain. The pilot did not adjust his flight track to compensate for the delayed right turn to ensure clearance from the mountain.

In addition, a sector of the Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B airspace with a 5,000-foot floor was adjacent to the mountain range, which reduced the vertical options available to the pilot if he elected to remain clear of that airspace. The pilot's decision to remain below the overlying Class B airspace placed the airplane at an altitude below the maximum elevation of the mountain. The pilot did not request VFR flight following or minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) services. Had he requested VFR flight following services, he likely would have received safety alerts from ATC as defined in FAA Order 7110.65. Had he requested the MSAW in particular, he likely would have received an advisory that his aircraft was in unsafe proximity to terrain. Further, the investigation was unable to determine why the pilot did not request clearance to climb into the Class B airspace or fly a more southerly route that would have provided adequate terrain clearance. On the previous night VMC flight from FFZ to SAD, the pilot stayed below the Class B airspace but turned toward SAD right after departure. In response to issues raised by this accident, the FAA conducted a Performance Data Analysis Report System (PDARS) study to determine the legitimacy of a claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to be granted clearance to enter Class B airspace. The PDARS study revealed that on the day of the accident, 341 VFR aircraft were provided services by Phoenix TRACON. The PDARS study, however, was unable to document how many aircraft were actually within the Class B airspace itself or how many had been refused services; the study only documented how many had been provided services. In response to a January 20, 2012, FAA internal memo formally restating the claim that it was difficult for VFR aircraft to obtain clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, the FAA conducted a comprehensive audit of the PHX Class B airspace that spanned four different time periods and was spread among several sectors during peak traffic periods to provide the most accurate picture. Of 619 requests for VFR aircraft to enter Class B airspace, 598 (96.61%) were granted. While data was not available to refute or substantiate any claims from previous years regarding difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace, this data clearly indicated that difficulty obtaining clearance into the PHX Class B airspace did not exist during the four time periods in which the audit took place in the months after the accident.

The moonless night decreased the already low visual conspicuity of the mountain. The airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange and GPS navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display. Had the pilot conducted the flight under instrument flight rules (IFR), the resultant handling by ATC would have helped ensure terrain clearance.

The airplane was not equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS). Six years earlier, the accident airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. This modification rendered the airplane exempt from the TAWS requirement; however, this modification was not approved by the FAA or documented via a supplemental type certificate or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Modification). Per the requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.223, TAWS is not required for airplanes with fewer than six passenger seats. In this accident, onboard TAWS equipment could have provided a timely alert to help the pilot avoid the mountain.

Based on the steady flight track; the dark night conditions; the minimal ground-based lighting; and the absence of preimpact airplane, engine, or propeller anomalies that would have affected the flight, the airplane was likely under the control of the pilot and was inadvertently flown into the mountain. This controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident was likely due to the pilot's complacency (because of his familiarity with the flight route and because he selected a direct route, as he had previously done, even though he turned toward the destination later than he normally did) and lack of situational awareness. In January 2008, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under VFR at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents. The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by accomplishing several actions, including proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following IFR practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain a safe ground track and altitude combination for the moonless night visual flight rules flight, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's complacency and lack of situational awareness and his failure to use air traffic control visual flight rules flight following or minimum safe altitude warning services. Also contributing to the accident was the airplane's lack of onboard terrain awareness and warning system equipment.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI's DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot's 72-Hour History

According to the pilot's wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplemental type certificate and/or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration). Postaccident review of the documentation that was used to substantiate the seating configuration change revealed that the modified seating position plan was not one of the manufacturer's/type certificate holder's approved configurations. The document that was used to substantiate the change was determined to be an altered version of the manufacturer's original document, but it was incorrectly represented as a manufacturer's original document. Attempts to determine who made the improper and unauthorized changes to the seating configuration document, or when they were made, were unsuccessful.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included wind from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 40 miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point -1 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury. US Naval Observatory data for November 23, 2011, indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3%, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Neither FFZ nor SAD was equipped with a VOR ground navigation facility. Navigation between the two airports via available VOR stations would result in an indirect flight route.

The flight from SAD to FFZ and the accident flight were both conducted in VMC as VFR flights. No flight plan was filed for either flight, and neither pilot had requested air traffic control (ATC) flight following services. Available radar data and interviews with PAI personnel indicated that the pilot had flown between SAD and FFZ several times previously and that he tended to use his iPad, equipped with ForeFlight software and GPS, to fly directly between the two. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depiction) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot's habit pattern was to depart the airport, identify the track needed to fly directly to the destination, and turn the airplane onto that track. Remnants of an iPad were found in the wreckage. Damage precluded determination of its positive association with a particular owner, its functionality, or its operational status at the time of the accident.

Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its right turn on course to SAD about 1.5 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from two different initial locations (FFZ, and northeast of FFZ after completion of the turn) to SAD revealed that while the direct track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. That resulting ground track was also coincident with the accident flight radar data ground track.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sequence of Events

The pilot first contacted FFZ ground control at 1820:21. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway D, and he taxied as instructed without incident. At 1823:35, the pilot contacted FFZ local control and advised that he was holding short and was ready for departure. The pilot was advised to again hold short to wait for landing traffic. At 1825:00, the controller instructed the pilot to "fly straight out" until advised due to landing traffic and cleared him for takeoff from runway 4R. The airplane became airborne at 1826:14. At 1826:47, the controller issued the "right turn approved" advisory to the pilot. At that point, the airplane was still on the runway heading, about 1.45 nautical miles (nm) from FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,200 feet. The pilot responded to the transmission with "right turn approved." No further radio transmissions to or from the accident pilot were recorded.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

FFZ was equipped with two runways designated 4/22 L and R. The airplane's arrival and departure runway (4R) measured 5,101 feet by 100 feet. Airport elevation was 1,394 feet msl. The local topography consisted of a flat basin floor bounded by mountainous terrain, primarily to the north and east. FFZ was situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain, which rose very steeply to a charted maximum elevation of 5,057 feet msl, or about 3,700 feet above FFZ.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Accident Site

The accident site was on the northwest face near the top of the Flatiron region of Superstition Mountain. The accident site consisted of two basic terrain areas: a sloped area (about 45 degrees downhill to the northwest), abutted by a vertical rock formation on its southeast side.

The sloped area was primarily rock, interlaced with cracks, soil patches, boulders, and sparse vegetation. The rock formation rose about 100 feet above the southeastern edge of the sloped area. Airplane debris was scattered on the sloped area in a primary field that measured about 150 feet southeast-northwest by about 80 feet northeast-southwest. A significant amount of debris was clustered near the base of the vertical face, with some debris strewn or caught on the face. The southeast section of the sloped area and much of the vertical face were fire damaged, soot covered, or scorched. The northwest edge of the sloped debris field was about 150 feet southeast of the end of the sloped terrain, which then became very steep (sometimes near vertical) and fell irregularly away to the valley floor about 3,000 feet below.

On-Site Wreckage Observations

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain at an elevation of about 4,500 feet msl that was essentially only accessible by helicopter. The wreckage was recovered by helicopter and transported to a secure facility for subsequent detailed examination.

The airplane was highly fragmented. The debris pattern axis was oriented northwest to southeast, and the debris and fire damage were arrayed in a fan-like pattern consistent with the approximate flight direction. Most airplane components were severely impact and fire-damaged. Some debris (heavier/denser items, such as engine gearbox components and generators) was found northwest (downhill) of the main debris field, consistent with those components rolling downhill after impact. The largest wreckage section was a portion of an inboard wing box with one engine attached. Paint transfer marks on the rock face were consistent with a wings-level (roll axis) impact.

Both engines and portions of their propellers were identified in the wreckage. Propeller, engine, and gearbox damage was consistent with high power rotation at impact. All three landing gear were identified in the wreckage, and damage patterns were consistent with the landing gear being retracted at impact. Some airplane skin segments exhibited significant accordion-like crush damage. Many cockpit-related items, including instruments, instrument panel sections, and pilots' seat fragments, were found on the terrain beyond the vertical rock formation; some were several hundred feet beyond the vertical rock formation.

Damage patterns were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The majority of the first-stage compressor impeller blades were separated at the hubs. The second-stage compressor impeller blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation. There was rotational scoring on the aft side of the third-stage turbine blade platforms and metal spray deposits on the suction side of the third-stage turbine blades. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation were identified.

The blade damage to both propellers was severe, with leading-edge damage, multiple bends, twisting, concave bending of the blade chord at the tips, and tips that had fractured and separated. Two separate blade angle witness marks were each consistent with impact while at a normal (not in feather and not in reverse) operating position. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal propeller operation were identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc.

PAI was founded in 1975 by the pilot-rated passenger's father. Later, the pilot and his brother purchased the company, and, in January 2011, the pilot-rated passenger, who had worked there for many years, bought into a partnership with them.

At the time of the accident, PAI, which was based at SAD, employed 25 people, including 13 pilots (10 on a seasonal/part-time basis) and 9 maintenance personnel. PAI owned a total of 14 airplanes, including the accident airplane. The fleet included three Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690 models and nine 500 models.

PAI held a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand air carrier operations in the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. However, PAI rarely exercised the privileges of that certificate and averaged about two revenue passenger transport flights per year. PAI's primary purpose for obtaining and maintaining the certificate was to be qualified to contract with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management for air attack missions (the application of aerial resources, by both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, on a fire).

Eight of the PAI airplanes were on the 14 CFR Part 135 certificate; the accident airplane had not yet been added to the certificate.

FAA Oversight

The FAA FSDO in Scottsdale, Arizona, was the assigned certificate-holding district office for PAI and oversaw about 60 Part 135 certificated operators, no Part 121 certificated operators, and about 520 Part 91 operators.

The POI was assigned to PAI in 2007. Her duties included oversight of 12 designees and 30 check airmen and POI for 54 operators. PAI was one of 10 Part 135 operators assigned to the POI. She estimated that she had about 100 hours in Rockwell International/Aero Commander airplanes, 25 of which were in the 690 model. The POI considered PAI to be a "low-maintenance operator," meaning that PAI was compliant with FAA requirements and presented few issues of concern. She physically visited PAI about once per year. Due to the distance between the FSDO and SAD, she never made unannounced visits. Her visits would take about 2 days, during which she would oversee pilot training, examine records and recordkeeping, and conduct base inspections and ramp checks. She never gave checkrides to PAI pilots; those were conducted by another inspector. The POI qualified the pilot-rated passenger as a "good" chief pilot. He was the person at PAI with whom the POI had the most contact, and she would mainly communicate her concerns and questions to him. She did not have much familiarity with the pilot.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Homeowner's Surveillance Camera Imagery

The airplane's preimpact flightpath, impact explosion, postimpact fire, and initial arrival of search and rescue aircraft were captured on a private citizen's home surveillance camera. That camera was located about 6 miles south of and 3,700 feet lower than the impact site. A file that contained about 50 minutes of image data, during the period from about 1810 to 1900, was provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The time stamp data was provided by the camera owner and was not independently correlated or verified by the NTSB; therefore, all times are approximate.

The 1810 image depicted the mountain in silhouette form, but as night fell, the mountain disappeared from the image. No lights were visible on the mountain. Due to the night conditions, the optical resolution capability of the camera, and the distance of the airplane from the camera, the imagery provided only a macro view and associated timeline of the events. The airplane itself was not visible; its position was manifested by its blinking beacon or strobe lights only. The lights of the airplane first appeared in the field of view at 1830:00 and remained visible until 1830:48, when the lights disappeared behind the terrain. A large flash of light appeared at 1830:52, followed by a second, much larger and brighter flash about 3 seconds later. Lights indicative of a fire remained visible until about 1844, and the first responding aircraft (again only visible as lights) appeared about 1848.

Examination of the path of the airplane's lights on the image field of view did not reveal any erratic motions or changes of direction; the stability of the flightpath was similar to that depicted in the ground tracking radar data.

Weight and Balance Information

Maintenance records indicated that on at least 15 occasions, modifications that affected the airplane's weight and balance values were accomplished; however, no records of the actual revised weight and balance data were discovered during the investigation.

Calculations that used the original empty weight plus other known or presumed values resulted in an estimated accident flight weight of 8,953 pounds, which was below the maximum allowable weight, and a center of gravity within the allowable envelope.

Airplane Performance

The derived level-flight ground speed for the last 2 minutes of the flight was approximately 190 knots, which was slightly higher than the pilot's operating handbook maximum range speed for similar conditions. Surface wind data indicated that the airplane would have experienced a slight tailwind during the climbout and level-flight segments.

TAWS-Related Guidance for FAA Inspectors

Published FAA guidance for FAA inspectors to use to determine whether the airplane seating configuration changes (if properly accomplished) would have exempted the airplane from the TAWS requirement was examined in detail. The relevant FAA guidance included FAA Order 8900.1 and 14 CFR Part 1, Part 21, Part 43 (Appendix 1), Part 91, and Part 135.

Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B Airspace Information

The Phoenix metropolitan area was designated and charted as Class B airspace, centered on PHX and the PHX VOR (PXR). The airspace elevation boundaries were defined by floor and ceiling altitudes, with lateral boundaries defined by distance and bearing from defined locations. Class B airspace is typically described as having the shape of an "upside-down wedding cake," where the airspace floor altitudes increase as the distance from the center increases. Aircraft operating under VFR are prohibited from entering Class B airspace without explicit permission from the responsible ATC facility. Mountainous terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the 5-000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about 3 1/2 miles east.

The NTSB ATC group chairman's factual report provides detailed information regarding the Class B airspace around the Phoenix area. For more information, see the docket for this accident (NTSB case number WPR12MA046).

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents

The FAA defines a CFIT accident as a situation that occurs when a properly functioning aircraft "is flown under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision."

In 1998, the FAA formed the General Aviation (GA) CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) as part of the FAA "Safer Skies" program. The stated goal of the Safer Skies initiative was to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 10-year period via a comprehensive review of aviation accident causes and implementation of safety intervention strategies. In April 1999, the GA CFIT JSAT published its final report, which identified 55 interventions to address CFIT accident causes. The FAA CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) was formed to develop detailed CFIT accident reduction strategies based upon the top 10 JSAT interventions that were considered to be the most effective and feasible. The CFIT JSIT final report was published in 2000, and JSIT recommended interventions included the following:

- Improve safety culture within the aviation community,
- Promote development and use of low-cost terrain clearance and/or look-ahead device,
- Improve pilot training regarding decision-making and human factors,
- Enhance the biennial flight review and/or instrument competency check, and
- Develop and distribute mountain flying technique advisory material.

In March 2003, as part of its response to the CFIT JSIT, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC "highlights the inherent risk" that CFIT poses for GA pilots. According to the AC, one primary cause of CFIT accidents was loss of situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25) defined situational awareness as the "accurate perception of the operational and environmental factors that affect the airplane, pilot, and passengers during a specific period of time." The handbook stated that a situationally aware pilot "has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." The handbook stated that "some of the elements inside the airplane to be considered are the status of airplane systems, and also the pilot and passengers" and cautioned that "an awareness of the environmental conditions of the flight, such as spatial orientation of the airplane, and its relationship to terrain, traffic, weather, and airspace must be maintained."

The handbook stated that obstacles to maintaining situational awareness included fatigue, stress, and task overload and that a contributing factor in many accidents is a distraction that diverts the pilot's attention. Complacency was cited as another obstacle to maintaining situational awareness. When activities become routine, there is a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot's effectiveness in the cockpit. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.

NTSB Safety Alert

In January 2008, the NTSB issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under visual flight conditions at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents.

The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following instrument flight rules practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.


NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046 
 Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI’s director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI’s DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot’s 72-Hour History

According to the pilot’s wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplemental type certificate and/or FAA Form 337 (Major Repair and Alteration). Postaccident review of the documentation that was used to substantiate the seating configuration change revealed that the modified seating position plan was not one of the manufacturer's/type certificate holder's approved configurations. The document that was used to substantiate the change was determined to be an altered version of the manufacturer's original document, but it was incorrectly represented as a manufacturer's original document. Attempts to determine who made the improper and unauthorized changes to the seating configuration document, or when they were made, were unsuccessful.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included wind from 350 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 40 miles, few clouds at 20,000 feet, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point -1 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of Mercury. US Naval Observatory data for November 23, 2011, indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3%, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

Neither FFZ nor SAD was equipped with a VOR ground navigation facility. Navigation between the two airports via available VOR stations would result in an indirect flight route.

The flight from SAD to FFZ and the accident flight were both conducted in VMC as VFR flights. No flight plan was filed for either flight, and neither pilot had requested air traffic control (ATC) flight following services. Available radar data and interviews with PAI personnel indicated that the pilot had flown between SAD and FFZ several times previously and that he tended to use his iPad, equipped with ForeFlight software and GPS, to fly directly between the two. The software could display FAA VFR aeronautical charts (including FAA-published terrain depiction) and overlay airplane track and position data on the chart depiction. According to the pilot's brother, the pilot's habit pattern was to depart the airport, identify the track needed to fly directly to the destination, and turn the airplane onto that track. Remnants of an iPad were found in the wreckage. Damage precluded determination of its positive association with a particular owner, its functionality, or its operational status at the time of the accident.

Radar tracking data from the accident flight indicated that the airplane began its right turn on course to SAD about 1.5 miles northeast of FFZ. Comparison of the direct line track data from two different initial locations (FFZ, and northeast of FFZ after completion of the turn) to SAD revealed that while the direct track from FFZ to SAD passed about 3 miles south of the impact mountain, the direct track from northeast of FFZ to SAD overlaid the impact mountain location. That resulting ground track was also coincident with the accident flight radar data ground track.

COMMUNICATIONS

Sequence of Events

The pilot first contacted FFZ ground control at 1820:21. The pilot was instructed to taxi to runway 4R via taxiway D, and he taxied as instructed without incident. At 1823:35, the pilot contacted FFZ local control and advised that he was holding short and was ready for departure. The pilot was advised to again hold short to wait for landing traffic. At 1825:00, the controller instructed the pilot to "fly straight out" until advised due to landing traffic and cleared him for takeoff from runway 4R. The airplane became airborne at 1826:14. At 1826:47, the controller issued the "right turn approved" advisory to the pilot. At that point, the airplane was still on the runway heading, about 1.45 nautical miles (nm) from FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,200 feet. The pilot responded to the transmission with "right turn approved." No further radio transmissions to or from the accident pilot were recorded.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

FFZ was equipped with two runways designated 4/22 L and R. The airplane's arrival and departure runway (4R) measured 5,101 feet by 100 feet. Airport elevation was 1,394 feet msl. The local topography consisted of a flat basin floor bounded by mountainous terrain, primarily to the north and east. FFZ was situated about 15 miles west-northwest of the impact mountain, which rose very steeply to a charted maximum elevation of 5,057 feet msl, or about 3,700 feet above FFZ.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Accident Site

The accident site was on the northwest face near the top of the Flatiron region of Superstition Mountain. The accident site consisted of two basic terrain areas: a sloped area (about 45 degrees downhill to the northwest), abutted by a vertical rock formation on its southeast side.

The sloped area was primarily rock, interlaced with cracks, soil patches, boulders, and sparse vegetation. The rock formation rose about 100 feet above the southeastern edge of the sloped area. Airplane debris was scattered on the sloped area in a primary field that measured about 150 feet southeast-northwest by about 80 feet northeast-southwest. A significant amount of debris was clustered near the base of the vertical face, with some debris strewn or caught on the face. The southeast section of the sloped area and much of the vertical face were fire damaged, soot covered, or scorched. The northwest edge of the sloped debris field was about 150 feet southeast of the end of the sloped terrain, which then became very steep (sometimes near vertical) and fell irregularly away to the valley floor about 3,000 feet below.

On-Site Wreckage Observations

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain at an elevation of about 4,500 feet msl that was essentially only accessible by helicopter. The wreckage was recovered by helicopter and transported to a secure facility for subsequent detailed examination.

The airplane was highly fragmented. The debris pattern axis was oriented northwest to southeast, and the debris and fire damage were arrayed in a fan-like pattern consistent with the approximate flight direction. Most airplane components were severely impact and fire-damaged. Some debris (heavier/denser items, such as engine gearbox components and generators) was found northwest (downhill) of the main debris field, consistent with those components rolling downhill after impact. The largest wreckage section was a portion of an inboard wing box with one engine attached. Paint transfer marks on the rock face were consistent with a wings-level (roll axis) impact.

Both engines and portions of their propellers were identified in the wreckage. Propeller, engine, and gearbox damage was consistent with high power rotation at impact. All three landing gear were identified in the wreckage, and damage patterns were consistent with the landing gear being retracted at impact. Some airplane skin segments exhibited significant accordion-like crush damage. Many cockpit-related items, including instruments, instrument panel sections, and pilots' seat fragments, were found on the terrain beyond the vertical rock formation; some were several hundred feet beyond the vertical rock formation.

Damage patterns were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The majority of the first-stage compressor impeller blades were separated at the hubs. The second-stage compressor impeller blades were bent opposite the direction of rotation. There was rotational scoring on the aft side of the third-stage turbine blade platforms and metal spray deposits on the suction side of the third-stage turbine blades. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal engine operation were identified.

The blade damage to both propellers was severe, with leading-edge damage, multiple bends, twisting, concave bending of the blade chord at the tips, and tips that had fractured and separated. Two separate blade angle witness marks were each consistent with impact while at a normal (not in feather and not in reverse) operating position. No preimpact discrepancies that would have precluded normal propeller operation were identified.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Ponderosa Aviation, Inc.

PAI was founded in 1975 by the pilot-rated passenger’s father. Later, the pilot and his brother purchased the company, and, in January 2011, the pilot-rated passenger, who had worked there for many years, bought into a partnership with them.

At the time of the accident, PAI, which was based at SAD, employed 25 people, including 13 pilots (10 on a seasonal/part-time basis) and 9 maintenance personnel. PAI owned a total of 14 airplanes, including the accident airplane. The fleet included three Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690 models and nine 500 models.

PAI held a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand air carrier operations in the contiguous United States and the District of Columbia. However, PAI rarely exercised the privileges of that certificate and averaged about two revenue passenger transport flights per year. PAI's primary purpose for obtaining and maintaining the certificate was to be qualified to contract with the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management for air attack missions (the application of aerial resources, by both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, on a fire).

Eight of the PAI airplanes were on the 14 CFR Part 135 certificate; the accident airplane had not yet been added to the certificate.

FAA Oversight

The FAA FSDO in Scottsdale, Arizona, was the assigned certificate-holding district office for PAI and oversaw about 60 Part 135 certificated operators, no Part 121 certificated operators, and about 520 Part 91 operators.

The POI was assigned to PAI in 2007. Her duties included oversight of 12 designees and 30 check airmen and POI for 54 operators. PAI was one of 10 Part 135 operators assigned to the POI. She estimated that she had about 100 hours in Rockwell International/Aero Commander airplanes, 25 of which were in the 690 model. The POI considered PAI to be a "low-maintenance operator," meaning that PAI was compliant with FAA requirements and presented few issues of concern. She physically visited PAI about once per year. Due to the distance between the FSDO and SAD, she never made unannounced visits. Her visits would take about 2 days, during which she would oversee pilot training, examine records and recordkeeping, and conduct base inspections and ramp checks. She never gave checkrides to PAI pilots; those were conducted by another inspector. The POI qualified the pilot-rated passenger as a "good" chief pilot. He was the person at PAI with whom the POI had the most contact, and she would mainly communicate her concerns and questions to him. She did not have much familiarity with the pilot.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Homeowner's Surveillance Camera Imagery

The airplane’s preimpact flightpath, impact explosion, postimpact fire, and initial arrival of search and rescue aircraft were captured on a private citizen's home surveillance camera. That camera was located about 6 miles south of and 3,700 feet lower than the impact site. A file that contained about 50 minutes of image data, during the period from about 1810 to 1900, was provided to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The time stamp data was provided by the camera owner and was not independently correlated or verified by the NTSB; therefore, all times are approximate.

The 1810 image depicted the mountain in silhouette form, but as night fell, the mountain disappeared from the image. No lights were visible on the mountain. Due to the night conditions, the optical resolution capability of the camera, and the distance of the airplane from the camera, the imagery provided only a macro view and associated timeline of the events. The airplane itself was not visible; its position was manifested by its blinking beacon or strobe lights only. The lights of the airplane first appeared in the field of view at 1830:00 and remained visible until 1830:48, when the lights disappeared behind the terrain. A large flash of light appeared at 1830:52, followed by a second, much larger and brighter flash about 3 seconds later. Lights indicative of a fire remained visible until about 1844, and the first responding aircraft (again only visible as lights) appeared about 1848.

Examination of the path of the airplane's lights on the image field of view did not reveal any erratic motions or changes of direction; the stability of the flightpath was similar to that depicted in the ground tracking radar data.

Weight and Balance Information

Maintenance records indicated that on at least 15 occasions, modifications that affected the airplane's weight and balance values were accomplished; however, no records of the actual revised weight and balance data were discovered during the investigation.

Calculations that used the original empty weight plus other known or presumed values resulted in an estimated accident flight weight of 8,953 pounds, which was below the maximum allowable weight, and a center of gravity within the allowable envelope.

Airplane Performance

The derived level-flight ground speed for the last 2 minutes of the flight was approximately 190 knots, which was slightly higher than the pilot’s operating handbook maximum range speed for similar conditions. Surface wind data indicated that the airplane would have experienced a slight tailwind during the climbout and level-flight segments.

TAWS-Related Guidance for FAA Inspectors

Published FAA guidance for FAA inspectors to use to determine whether the airplane seating configuration changes (if properly accomplished) would have exempted the airplane from the TAWS requirement was examined in detail. The relevant FAA guidance included FAA Order 8900.1 and 14 CFR Part 1, Part 21, Part 43 (Appendix 1), Part 91, and Part 135.

Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) Class B Airspace Information

The Phoenix metropolitan area was designated and charted as Class B airspace, centered on PHX and the PHX VOR (PXR). The airspace elevation boundaries were defined by floor and ceiling altitudes, with lateral boundaries defined by distance and bearing from defined locations. Class B airspace is typically described as having the shape of an "upside-down wedding cake," where the airspace floor altitudes increase as the distance from the center increases. Aircraft operating under VFR are prohibited from entering Class B airspace without explicit permission from the responsible ATC facility. Mountainous terrain rises to 4,500 feet less than 1 nm east of the 5-000-foot Class B airspace, and the terrain rises to a maximum elevation of 5,057 feet about 3 1/2 miles east.

The NTSB ATC group chairman's factual report provides detailed information regarding the Class B airspace around the Phoenix area. For more information, see the docket for this accident (NTSB case number WPR12MA046).

Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accidents

The FAA defines a CFIT accident as a situation that occurs when a properly functioning aircraft "is flown under the control of a qualified pilot, into terrain (water or obstacles) with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot of the impending collision."

In 1998, the FAA formed the General Aviation (GA) CFIT Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT) as part of the FAA "Safer Skies" program. The stated goal of the Safer Skies initiative was to significantly reduce fatal accidents over a 10-year period via a comprehensive review of aviation accident causes and implementation of safety intervention strategies. In April 1999, the GA CFIT JSAT published its final report, which identified 55 interventions to address CFIT accident causes. The FAA CFIT Joint Safety Implementation Team (JSIT) was formed to develop detailed CFIT accident reduction strategies based upon the top 10 JSAT interventions that were considered to be the most effective and feasible. The CFIT JSIT final report was published in 2000, and JSIT recommended interventions included the following:

- Improve safety culture within the aviation community,
- Promote development and use of low-cost terrain clearance and/or look-ahead device,
- Improve pilot training regarding decision-making and human factors,
- Enhance the biennial flight review and/or instrument competency check, and
- Develop and distribute mountain flying technique advisory material.

In March 2003, as part of its response to the CFIT JSIT, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 61-134, "General Aviation Controlled Flight Into Terrain Awareness." The AC "highlights the inherent risk" that CFIT poses for GA pilots. According to the AC, one primary cause of CFIT accidents was loss of situational awareness.

Situational Awareness

The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25) defined situational awareness as the "accurate perception of the operational and environmental factors that affect the airplane, pilot, and passengers during a specific period of time." The handbook stated that a situationally aware pilot "has an overview of the total operation and is not fixated on one perceived significant factor." The handbook stated that "some of the elements inside the airplane to be considered are the status of airplane systems, and also the pilot and passengers" and cautioned that "an awareness of the environmental conditions of the flight, such as spatial orientation of the airplane, and its relationship to terrain, traffic, weather, and airspace must be maintained."

The handbook stated that obstacles to maintaining situational awareness included fatigue, stress, and task overload and that a contributing factor in many accidents is a distraction that diverts the pilot’s attention. Complacency was cited as another obstacle to maintaining situational awareness. When activities become routine, there is a tendency to relax and not put as much effort into performance. Like fatigue, complacency reduces a pilot’s effectiveness in the cockpit. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.

NTSB Safety Alert

In January 2008, the NTSB issued a safety alert titled "Controlled Flight Into Terrain in Visual Conditions: Nighttime Visual Flight Operations Are Resulting in Avoidable Accidents." The safety alert stated that recent investigations identified several accidents that involved CFIT by pilots operating under visual flight conditions at night in remote areas, that the pilots appeared unaware that the aircraft were in danger, and that increased altitude awareness and better preflight planning likely would have prevented the accidents.

The safety alert suggested that pilots could avoid becoming involved in a similar accident by proper preflight planning, obtaining flight route terrain familiarization via sectional charts or other topographic references, maintaining awareness of visual limitations for operations in remote areas, following instrument flight rules practices until well above surrounding terrain, advising ATC and taking action to reach a safe altitude, and employing a GPS-based terrain awareness unit.

 =========

NTSB Identification: WPR12MA046
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time (MST), a Rockwell International 690A, N690SM, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona, about 5 minutes after takeoff from Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona. The certificated commercial pilot and the five passengers, who included two adults and three children, were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, which held a Part 135 operating certificate, and which was based at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.

According to several witnesses, the children's father, who was a co-owner of Ponderosa Aviation and who lived near SAD, regularly used the operator's airplanes to transport the children, who lived near FFZ, between FFZ and SAD or vice versa. According to a fixed base operation (FBO) line serviceman who was familiar with the children and their father, on the night of the accident, the children arrived at FFZ about 15 minutes before the airplane arrived. The airplane was marshaled into a parking spot adjacent to the FBO building; it was already dark. The father was seated in the front left seat and operating the airplane, and another individual was in the front right seat. After shutdown, the father and a third individual, whom the line serviceman had not seen before, exited the airplane. The individual in the front right seat did not exit the airplane; he remained in the cockpit with a flashlight, accomplishing unknown tasks, and subsequently repositioned himself to the front left seat.

The father went into the FBO to escort the children to the airplane. The father, three children and the third individual returned to the airplane. The individual in the front left seat remained in that seat, the third individual seated himself in the front right seat, and the father and three children situated themselves in the rear of the airplane. Engine start and taxi-out appeared normal to the line serviceman, who marshaled the airplane out of its parking spot.

Review of the recorded communications between the airplane and the FFZ air traffic control tower (ATCT) revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, the ATCT local controller issued a "right turn approved" clearance to the flight. Review of the preliminary ground-based radar tracking data revealed that the takeoff roll began about 1826 MST, and the airplane began its right turn towards SAD when it was about 2 miles east of FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,600 feet above mean sea level (msl). About 1828, the airplane reached an altitude of 4,500 feet msl, where it remained, and tracked in an essentially straight line, until it impacted the terrain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56, and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The airplane's transponder was transmitting on a code of 1200 for the entire flight.

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain, at an elevation of about 4,650 feet, approximately 150 feet below the top of the local peak. Ground scars were consistent with impact in a wings-level attitude. Terrain conditions, and impact- and fire-damage precluded a thorough on-site wreckage examination. All six propeller blades, both engines, and most major flight control surfaces were identified in the wreckage. Propeller and engine damage signatures were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility, where it will be examined in detail.

According to the operator's and FAA records, the pilot had approximately 2,500 total hours of flight experience. He held multiple certificates and ratings, including a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument-airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in July 2011, and his most recent flight review was completed in September 2011.

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1976, and was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331 series turboshaft engines. The airplane was recently purchased by the operator, and was flown from Indiana to the operator's base in Arizona about 1 week prior to the accident. The airframe had accumulated a total time in service (TT) of approximately 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a TT since major overhaul (SMOH) of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a TTSMOH of 1,482 hours.

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included winds from 350 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 40 miles; few clouds at 20,000 feet; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point -1 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. U.S. Naval Observatory data for November 23 indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3 percent, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.

 On Thursday, Karen Perry will pack up her house and leave it.

The toys must be boxed and the backyard swing set dismantled. The model airplanes, hanging in her sons' bedroom, will be taken down and the door closed on the princesses that decorate her daughter's walls.

The children's clothes must be gathered up and sorted through and their beds carted away, and I cannot imagine how she will do it, how she can stand it.

Karen Perry is about to lose her Gold Canyon home. On Thursday, she will walk away.

"We tried so hard to save it …," she told me this week. "It's hard not to get emotional about it. But then again, I have to remind myself that the house, it's a thing. It doesn't have a life of its own. The memories that I have, they can't be taken from me. The things that were most important to me about the house are no longer here."

It could be said that Karen is something of an expert on loss. Her marriage ended two years ago. A few days after the divorce was final, she endured a double mastectomy.

Then in November, she was wondering how the world could so suddenly collapse. At 6:31 on the evening before Thanksgiving, a twin-engine plane slammed into the Superstitions and in an instant her three children were gone.

And Karen? She was left to live on.

Within weeks, the foreclosure notice came. Like so many Arizonans, Karen was upside down in her house. After her divorce in February 2010, she couldn't afford the $3,300-a-month payments, but she couldn't bear to leave. Two of her three children had special needs and their world had already been tossed upside down with the divorce.

She tried to get a loan modification, but still the payments were too rich for a flight attendant's salary. So it wasn't a shock when word came, just weeks after the plane crash, that she would lose her house.

Her real-estate agent, Nicole Hamming, and her attorney, Scott Drucker, spent months trying to find a way that Karen could do a short sale on her house then rent it back, to give her time to grieve.

This, after all, is where her children, Morgan, 9, and Logan, 8, and the baby, 6-year-old Luke, were growing up. It's where she can feel them still.

Until Thursday, that is.

This week, Freddie Mac OK'd the short sale but denied Karen's request to waive the requirement that it be an "arm's length" transaction. Freddie Mac requires that the buyer and seller have no connection when a property is being sold for less than owed.

The arm's length rule was put in place in September 2010 to combat mortgage fraud, according to Freddie Mac spokesman Brad German. Previously, borrowers had been short-selling to straw buyers, who then returned the property to them, at a greatly reduced price.

Under the arm's length rule, Karen can't stay long term in the house even if the buyer is willing to rent it to her at the market rate.

"I'm told this was looked at by the business unit," German said, "and I'm told that they do not see a reason to be changing our rules, that we stick by our rules. That the rules are there for a reason."

While I can appreciate the reason, it seems to me that on occasion circumstance should trump rule. Like maybe every time a mother loses all of her children on the night before Thanksgiving.

A mother who knows she must go but can't yet let go.

Would it really have rocked the real-estate world to give Karen Perry a break?

German told me she could, under Freddie Mac's rules, remain for up to 90 days, provided the buyer agreed. But that offer didn't come through until late Friday. By then, Karen had resigned herself to moving.

She'll spend the next few days saying goodbye. Friends will pack away the children's things and the well-loved swing set will go to a good home. A local company, Sure Clean Restoration, has donated boxes and packing materials. Hamming is looking for someone to donate use of a moving van. (If you can help, call her at 480-363-0814.)

On Monday, Karen hopes to find a house in Gold Canyon that she can rent for a year, someplace big enough to hold one woman, two dogs and a so-very-short lifetime of memories.

Source:  http://www.usatoday.com

NTSB Identification: WPR12FA046
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, November 23, 2011 in Apache Junction, AZ
Aircraft: ROCKWELL 690, registration: N690SM
Injuries: 6 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time (MST), a Rockwell International 690A, N690SM, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona, about 5 minutes after takeoff from Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona. The certificated commercial pilot and the five passengers, who included two adults and three children, were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, which held a Part 135 operating certificate, and which was based at Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona. The personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.

According to several witnesses, the children's father, who was a co-owner of Ponderosa Aviation and who lived near SAD, regularly used the operator's airplanes to transport the children, who lived near FFZ, between FFZ and SAD or vice versa. According to a fixed base operation (FBO) line serviceman who was familiar with the children and their father, on the night of the accident, the children arrived at FFZ about 15 minutes before the airplane arrived. The airplane was marshaled into a parking spot adjacent to the FBO building; it was already dark. The father was seated in the front left seat and operating the airplane, and another individual was in the front right seat. After shutdown, the father and a third individual, whom the line serviceman had not seen before, exited the airplane. The individual in the front right seat did not exit the airplane; he remained in the cockpit with a flashlight, accomplishing unknown tasks, and subsequently repositioned himself to the front left seat.

The father went into the FBO to escort the children to the airplane. The father, three children and the third individual returned to the airplane. The individual in the front left seat remained in that seat, the third individual seated himself in the front right seat, and the father and three children situated themselves in the rear of the airplane. Engine start and taxi-out appeared normal to the line serviceman, who marshaled the airplane out of its parking spot.

Review of the recorded communications between the airplane and the FFZ air traffic control tower (ATCT) revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, the ATCT local controller issued a "right turn approved" clearance to the flight. Review of the preliminary ground-based radar tracking data revealed that the takeoff roll began about 1826 MST, and the airplane began its right turn towards SAD when it was about 2 miles east of FFZ, and climbing through an altitude of about 2,600 feet above mean sea level (msl). About 1828, the airplane reached an altitude of 4,500 feet msl, where it remained, and tracked in an essentially straight line, until it impacted the terrain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56, and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The airplane's transponder was transmitting on a code of 1200 for the entire flight.

The impact site was located on steep rocky terrain, at an elevation of about 4,650 feet, approximately 150 feet below the top of the local peak. Ground scars were consistent with impact in a wings-level attitude. Terrain conditions, and impact- and fire-damage precluded a thorough on-site wreckage examination. All six propeller blades, both engines, and most major flight control surfaces were identified in the wreckage. Propeller and engine damage signatures were consistent with the engines developing power at the time of impact. The wreckage was recovered to a secure facility, where it will be examined in detail.

According to the operator's and FAA records, the pilot had approximately 2,500 total hours of flight experience. He held multiple certificates and ratings, including a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument-airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in July 2011, and his most recent flight review was completed in September 2011.

According to FAA information, the airplane was manufactured in 1976, and was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331 series turboshaft engines. The airplane was recently purchased by the operator, and was flown from Indiana to the operator's base in Arizona about 1 week prior to the accident. The airframe had accumulated a total time in service (TT) of approximately 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a TT since major overhaul (SMOH) of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a TTSMOH of 1,482 hours.

The FFZ 1854 automated weather observation included winds from 350 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 40 miles; few clouds at 20,000 feet; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point -1 degrees C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. U.S. Naval Observatory data for November 23 indicated that the moon, which was a waning crescent of 3 percent, set at 1605, and local sunset occurred at 1721.