Saturday, December 22, 2012

Survivor of Nunavut plane crash recalls a mother’s anguished cries: C-GFWX Metroliner III, Perimeter Aviation chartered to Keewatin Air

A woman on a plane that crashed in Nunavut, killing an infant, says she heard the child’s frantic mother crying as she and the other survivors clamoured from the wreckage to safety.

Malaya Uppik says she doesn’t know how the tiny six-month-old was killed and she doesn’t remember much about the crash, but she can still hear the mother’s screams.

“I remember she was crying: ‘My baby. I lost my baby,“’ Ms. Uppik, 46, said from her home in Sanikiluaq. “I only hear that she was crying ‘My baby’ and ‘I lost my baby’ and that’s all I remember.”

Ms. Uppik was one of nine people — seven passengers and two pilots — on the chartered Fairchild Metro 3/23 twin-engine turbo prop when it crashed while landing Saturday night at the airport in Sanikiluaq.

Sanikiluaq is a community of 800 located on the Belcher Islands in the southeastern corner of Hudson Bay. As in all Nunavut communities, flying is the only way in and out.

RCMP say the crash occurred near the end of the runway, which sits on the north tip of Flaherty Island, roughly 150 kilometres from the Quebec shoreline. The Transportation Safety Board confirmed there was some blowing snow at the time of the crash, but said it was too early to say whether that played a role.

Flight 671 originated in Winnipeg and was chartered for Keewatin Air, which schedules three trips a week between Winnipeg and Sanikiluaq. The aircraft belonged to Winnipeg-based Perimeter Aviation.

Some of the passengers on board, including Ms. Uppik, were in Winnipeg for medical appointments and were on their way home. Ms. Uppik says the baby, a boy, came along on the trip with his mother because he was still breast feeding. RCMP would not confirm the child’s identity.

The primary language in Sanikiluaq is Inuktitut. Ms. Uppik struggled to recall what happened in English.

“When the plane crashed, I don’t remember what I was doing,” she said. “I didn’t black out, but ... when we looked like crashing, I just closed my eyes.”

When she opened them, Uppik said she heard the pilot yelling for people to get out.

“The pilot went across my seat. He cracked the window. He told us to go out right away,” she said.

The ground was slippery with fuel, but there was no fire. It was dark and she didn’t see the other passengers or how badly they were hurt.

She and another survivor were met by Ski-Doos on the runway and were loaded on a trailer for the ride back to the airport.

RCMP Sgt. Paul Solomon said none of the survivors suffered life-threatening injuries, though he didn’t have details beyond that.

“I don’t have the exact injuries, but I can tell you that the pilot and co-pilot have since been medevaced from Sanikiluaq for further medical treatment,” Sgt. Solomon said from Iqaluit.

Ms. Uppik said she bit her tongue, but was otherwise fine.

“I’m just a little bit tired right now.”

Sarah Qavvik was also on the plane. She said she suffered bruises and hit her head.

She too didn’t have any idea what caused the accident.

“It was so scary,” she said. “I’m still in shock.”

Transportation Safety Board is leading the investigation into the crash.

Spokeswoman Gayle Conners said the black box was retrieved by the RCMP and was to be taken into laboratory in Ottawa for analysis.

She said investigators are planning to interview the pilot and co-pilot, examine aircraft maintenance records and the weather to try to determine what caused the crash.

“We’re at the beginning of the investigation,” she said. “It’s the data collection phase.”

Perimeter Aviation president Mark Wehrle said that six staff from Perimeter and Keewatin were heading to the community.

“We’re arranging to go up and meet with the community and all the people involved and work with the authorities to determine the cause and go from there.”

Nunavut Premier Eva Aariak expressed her condolences in a statement.

“It is with profound sadness that I offer my condolences to everyone affected by the tragic plane crash,” she said. “During this holiday season, my thoughts and prayers are with the loved ones of the infant whose life ended far too soon, to the survivors, and to the entire community of Sanikiluaq.”


http://www.theglobeandmail.com

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/aviation/2012/a12q0216/a12q0216.asp#photo-02

Crash in Sanikiluaq claimed the life of 6-month-old infant

The pilot and co-pilot who were involved in a plane crash that killed an infant in Sanikiluaq, Nunavut, have been flown to a Winnipeg hospital for treatment.   They are both reportedly in stable condition with non-life-threatening injuries.  The plane was on its way from Winnipeg to the community when Perimeter Aviation charter Flight 671 crashed as the aircraft approached the runway around 6:13 p.m. ET Saturday. Keewatin Air had chartered the flight. The crash claimed the life of a six-month-old  infant.  All of the other six passengers survived.   [More]

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/PAG993

Piper PA-28-140 Cherokee, N8174N: Aircraft force landed in a field and the nose gear collapsed -- near Poteau, Oklahoma

http://flightaware.com/photo

http://registry.faa.gov/N8174N

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 8174N        Make/Model: PA28      Description: PA-28 CHEROKEE
  Date: 12/21/2012     Time: 2330

  Event Type: Accident   Highest Injury: None     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Substantial

LOCATION
  City: POTEAU   State: OK   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT FORCE LANDED  IN A FIELD AND THE NOSE GEAR COLLAPSED, NEAR POTEAU, 
  OK

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   0
                 # Crew:   3     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Landing      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: OKLAHOMA CITY, OK  (SW15)             Entry date: 12/26/2012 


 
Scotty White, 21, of Poteau, right, and his girlfriend, Sarah Hall, 20, of Heavener pose by the Piper Cherokee in which they were passengers late Friday afternoon when it crashed near the Robert S. Kerr Airport at Poteau.  White's father, Poteau City Councilman David White, was at the controls of the aircraft at the time of the mishap. No one was injured, witnesses said.

 
Downed plane near Airport Road in Poteau. There are no  injuries to report at this time.  David White and his son Scott White were flying the plane, initial reports indicate they are okay.  Scott says they lost fuel and were forced to land.  

Airport vendors react to Department of Transportation ruling

Atlanta News, Weather, Traffic, and Sports | FOX 5

ATLANTA -  Some minority airport vendors expressed relief and vindication following the state Department of Transportation's recent ruling in their favor.

The DOT found four politically-connected minority companies should be classified as disadvantaged.

Senior I-Team reporter Dale Russell says if the ruling stands, those companies should keep their lucrative airport contracts.

CLICK THE VIDEO TO WATCH THE FULL REPORT!

Crop-dusting plane sprays dozens of Yuma farmworkers with pesticide

| News for Yuma, Imperial Valley, El Centro, AZ  
Ten farmworkers, two in serious condition, were transported to the hospital Friday night after a crop duster sprayed them with chemicals while they were working in a field west of Avenue G and County 12th Street. 

 Emergency personnel with Rural/Metro responded to the scene at about 7:30 p.m. At first they were told only two farmworkers had been sprayed, but once on site the first responders found the “crop duster had also passed over two field worker buses, which gives us 40 more patients,” said Rural/Metro Captain Don Graham.

Many of the farmworkers were complaining of irritation to the eyes, nose, throat and skin after being exposed to the agricultural chemicals.

Because of the large number of patients involved, Rural/Metro was assisted by the Yuma Fire Department and the Somerton/Cocopah Fire Department.

Emergency personnel with Rural/Metro and YFD set up a portable decontamination zone at the site while Yuma County Sheriff's deputies cordoned off the area.

The process of decontaminating each farmworker involved stripping them down and then rinsing them off with a fire hose. The situation was made even more unpleasant because the temperature was in the mid-50s.

“Unfortunately it is cold,” Graham said. “I have had it done to me, and it is necessary. The chemical involved is a mild skin, eye and throat irritant. You just don't want it on you.”

After being sprayed off by a firehose, the patients were given gowns and blankets “to keep them warm,” Graham continued, adding those who were transported to Yuma Regional Medical Center were placed in the back of ambulances in which heaters were operating. After initial decontamination, at least 10 farmworkers were sent to YRMC for additional treatment.

Rural/Metro would not release the name of the chemical used in the incident, but noted the fungicide and insecticide mixture can cause coma in large amounts. However, Graham did not believe the farmworkers had been exposed to enough of the agchemical to cause a coma.

He said the dose they were exposed to was not full strength since the chemical had been mixed with water before being sprayed by the crop duster.

“We are talking ounces to cover an entire acre,” Graham said.

Rural/Metro would not release the name of the crop dusting company responsible for the incident, and the Yuma County Sheriff's Department personnel on scene refused to comment.No other information was available as of press time Friday.

Story and reaction/comments:   http://www.yumasun.com
 

YUMA - KSWT News 13 has learned a crop duster has sprayed about three dozen people working in a west Yuma field.

It happened this evening at Avenue G and West County 12th Street.

Rural Metro Fire Department says about 33 people were working in the field when they were doused with chemicals from a crop duster. Charly McMurdie of Rural Metro says the spray consisted of an insecticide and a fungicide. The area is being treated as a haz-mat scene.

Teams from multiple agencies were on scene, including Yuma Fire, the Yuma County Sheriff's Office and Somerton. The sprayed workers were being decontaminated on-site and then taken to the hospital in multiple ambulances.

McMurdie says at least 10 people were taken to the hospital. Eight people had minor injuries. Two people were transported with serious injuries.

At this time, it's unknown why the crop duster sprayed the field while people were in it.

KSWT News 13 will continue to follow this story and bring you further details as they become available.

Passenger who tried to headbutt captain during flight walks free

A man who tried to headbutt the captain of a transatlantic flight after taking prescription drugs and alcohol has walked free from court.

The actions of the unruly passenger on the transatlantic aircraft "could have had catastrophic consequences", a judge has said.

Judge Patrick Durcan made his comment when ordering Damian Kington (35) to pay €4,300 in compensation to British Airways (BA) and a poor box donation arising from the air rage incident that forced the flight to divert to Shannon on Wednesday.

The judge said "an attempted assault of a serious nature was discharged towards the captain of the plane by Mr Kington".

Living in New York, Australian national Mr Kington was one of 30 passengers on the exclusive business class 32-seater service BA operates between New York's JFK airport and London's City airport.

Mr Kington pleaded guilty to two related air rage offenses.

Judge Durcan at Ennis District Court, said "Mr Kington suffered a huge change in character by virtue of the unfortunate combination of drugs and alcohol".

The court heard Mr Kington consumed a Xanax and an Ambien tablet. The mixing of Ambien and alcohol by REM guitarist Peter Buck formed part of his successful defence against an air rage offence a number of years ago. The court heard Mr Kington stood over two passengers in an intimidating way and called them paedophiles.

His disruption forced the captain, Commander Mike Jones, to intervene.

In his statement to gardai, Mr Jones said that in the galley of the plane, "he (Mr Kington) swore at me, pushed me and tried to headbutt me. I stepped back to avoid getting a headbutt and then restrained him. It took two of us to restrain him." He added: "At this point I considered him a serious risk to passengers and to the safety of the flight."

Judge Durcan told the court that "the Damian Kington that is reflected so well in the references and testimonials before me ceased to exist and that for a period on the airplane a different person was wearing his clothes and was occupying his skin and physical person".

Mortified

Mr Kington – a global communications manager with an investment firm – said: "I was and still am extremely mortified by the accounts given by the witnesses and I don't have any recollection of the events or my actions. I am extremely and profusely apologetic to the passengers, the pilot, BA, this court and the gardai. It is extremely out of character and I am very remorseful. I was on new medication and it was irresponsible of me not to check."

Gda Noel O'Rourke said the incident cost BA €3,367 through €2,460 in fuel, ground handling costs of €487 and €410 in landing charges.

Solicitor for Mr Kington, Una Moylan, asked that the Probation Act be imposed.

Judge Durcan ordered Mr Kington to pay €3,367 in compensation and €1,000 to the poor box. The judge said that on the basis of the money paid and the other factors outlined, he would strike out the charge.


Source:   http://www.independent.ie

Federal Aviation Administration won't let Naples Connection take off from airport to Florida destinations

NAPLES — Naples Connection hasn't connected.

The company that planned to launch air service between the Naples Municipal Airport and four Florida cities this year lost its operating certificate, putting it out of business.

But the company, Twin Air Calypso Limited Inc., is fighting to get its certificate back.

"We are working on it," said Joel Johnson, who was overseeing the Naples Connection start-up here.

Twin Air had planned to begin scheduled air service at the Naples Municipal Airport in October, offering four weekly flights to Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Key West and Orlando using nine-passenger aircraft.

On Aug. 7, the Federal Aviation Administration revoked Twin Air's operating certificate, determining that "an emergency exists related to safety in air commerce." On Nov. 6, the U.S. Department of Transportation notified the Fort Lauderdale-based company that its on-demand air taxi registration was canceled and that it no longer could "directly engage in air transportation."

The carrier was grounded after the FAA found it illegally operated as a scheduled airline, rather than as an on-demand service, for flights between Fort Lauderdale International Airport and the Bahamas.

"We are just not settled with the FAA. We have requested a re-evaluation of the certificate and are working on getting it reissued," Johnson said.

With its certificate, Twin Air couldn't operate more than four weekly scheduled flights between two or more points, but an investigation found it had daily service from Fort Lauderdale to Treasure Cay, Marsh Harbour and Walker Cay on Abaco Island and flew six days a week to South Eleuthera Island, Governor's Harbour and North Eleuthera Island. The company operated the service on three small planes, each with fewer than 10 seats.

Twin Air has appealed the FAA's emergency order of revocation. The appeal is pending before the National Transportation Safety Board and a decision could come in the next few weeks, Johnson said.

"The board is considering it. I don't know the status of it, though," said Keith Holloway, a spokesman for the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C.

In February, the U.S. Department of Transportation reached a settlement with Twin Air, requiring it to pay a civil penalty of $70,000 and to "cease and desist from further violations." But the company didn't comply with the agreement, continuing to act as a commuter air carrier without first being found fit to do so, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation's letter canceling the company's air taxi registration.

In its defense, Twin Air has said it didn't intend to violate any rules and that it fully cooperated with an investigation by the Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings.

Twin Air is the successor company to Twin Town Leasing Co., which in 2005 was fined $20,000 and ordered to stop similar violations.

The idea for Twin Air service in Naples actually came from George Brown, the chairman and CEO of American Aviation Group Inc., who said he planned to buy Twin Air and expand it before the company lost its operating certificate. If Twin Air wins its appeal, he said, he still will be interested in buying it and suspects the carrier will still want to sell, especially with all the money it has lost since being forced out of business.

It's not all that unusual for an air carrier to get its operating certificate back, but that decision depends partly on the severity of the violations and the cooperation between the company and its regulators, Brown said.

"It's not an impossible thing. It's done all the time. People do get their license back. They do get their certification back," he said.

Ted Soliday, executive director of the Naples Municipal Airport, said anything that's done with a federal agency is a long, complicated process.

He had hoped to see the service launch at the start of the busy season so there would be "success from the start."

He said he hopes everything with the FAA will be resolved soon so Naples Connection will fly. The airport doesn't have a commuter airline and it remains a top priority for him and his board, Soliday said.

JetBlue showed some interest in flying out of the Naples airport, but backed away from those talks in October, following a letter-writing campaign by Naples residents who didn't like the idea. A weight waiver would have been required from the FAA for the carrier to fly its larger EMB 190 aircraft in and out of the city's airport.

"We are obviously very eager to get a small aircraft providing commercial service at the airport," Soliday said.


Story and photos:    http://www.naplesnews.com

http://www.flytwinair.com

http://www.flynaples.com

http://www.airnav.com/airport/KAPF

Brazil aviation faces turbulence

After a decade of soaring growth as millions of Brazilians flew for the first time, Brazil's aviation industry has come back down to earth with a thud.

Experts warn the sector is facing higher taxes and fuel costs, inadequate infrastructure and a leveling-off of demand.

"2012 can be seen as the worst year for commercial civil aviation," said Paulo Kakinoff, president of Gol, the country's second biggest airline.

"This is due to a series of factors: a nearly 60 percent hike in fuel costs, the 10 percent depreciation of the real in relation to the dollar, higher taxes and new taxes."

Fuel represents 45 percent of the airline's expenses, he said.

The national airport operator, Infraero, has slapped a 150 percent hike on its rates, which had previously not changed since 2005.

With accumulated losses of $500 million up to September, Gol was forced to cut costs, with fever services and greater plane occupancy rates, a strategy pursued by other companies.

Late last month, Gol announced it was shutting down its Webjet low-cost unit and laying off 850 employees. But this week, a judge ordered the airline to take them back.

Brazil's top airline TAM, which merged with its Chilean counterpart LAN earlier this year to become Latin America's biggest airline, was also forced to cut costs.

TAM has yet to release its latest results but in the first quarter its earnings had slumped 21.7 percent over the same period of last year.

"In 2012, we spent a lot because of poor infrastructure, higher fuel prices and new taxes," said Gianfranco Beting, a spokesman for the Azul airline, which operates new routes with smaller aircraft.

According to industry data, the top five airlines are TAM, with 41.1 percent market share, Gol with 33.9, Azul with 9.35, Trip with 4.53 and Avianca Brasil at 5.95 percent.

Azul merged with Trip and Avianca earlier this year.

Although demand in this continent-sized country of 194 million people has stabilized, experts say the potential for further growth remains huge.

In 2002, 33 million air tickets were sold, a figure which nearly trebled to 86 million last year.

"In Brazil, each person makes 0.4 trips a year. In more mature markets, the average rate is 2.7. We have a huge potential," insisted Adalberto Febeliano, of the Brazilian Airline Association.

But he said he expected demand to remain stable in 2013 coupled with a reduction in supply to maintain profit.

His group is pressing the government for lower taxes and lower fuel costs.

Most of Brazil's 70 airports are congested or in urgent need of an upgrade as the country prepares to host the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio.

The Miami-based Latin American and Caribbean Air Transport Association has expressed concern.

"The Brazilian market will continue to grow but we are concerned about the infrastructure, which has not been planned with this development in mind," it noted, lambasting the country's "lack of competitiveness."

President Dilma Rousseff slowly began privatizing some airports last year, starting with two in commercial hub Sao Paulo and one in the capital Brasilia.

Next year, she plans to grant concessions for the airports in Rio and Belo Horizonte to the private sector. Last week, she announced the construction of 800 regional airports across the country.


Source:   http://business.iafrica.com

Chicagoland Aviation, LLC: Requested Injunction Against Former Flight Instructor Crashes At Take-Off

By Peter Steinmeyer 

 A federal judge in Chicago recently wrestled with two issues that we frequently blog about: what constitutes misappropriation of confidential information, and to what extent can a current employee prepare to compete with his employer without breaching his fiduciary duty?

In Chicagoland Aviation, LLC v. Richard R. Todd, et al., flight instructor Richard Todd left his job and started a rival business. Shortly thereafter, Chicagoland Aviation sued him for, among other things, breaching his fiduciary duty by allegedly misappropriating confidential information and starting a competing business while still employed by Chicagoland Aviation. Chicagoland Aviation eventually requested a preliminary injunction, which the court denied.

The court began its analysis of Chicagoland Aviation’s breach of fiduciary duty claim by summarizing the background legal principles: “[g]enerally, employees have a duty not to improperly compete with their employer, solicit the employer’s customers, entice co-workers away from the employer, divert business opportunities, engage in self-dealing, and/or otherwise misappropriate the employer’s property or funds.”

Regarding the purported theft of confidential information, the court concluded that the information at issue was either not confidential or not misappropriated.

Read more:   http://www.tradesecretsnoncompetelaw.com

Case: 1:12-cv-01139 Document #: 137 Filed: 11/27/12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

http://www.chicagolandaviation.com

Allegiant Hawaii Service Popular at Santa Maria Public Airport/Capt G Allan Hancock Field (KSMX), Santa Maria, California

SANTA MARIA AIRPORT - Allegiant Air added the non-stop flight to and from Honolulu at the Santa Maria Airport after the runway was extended to accommodate larger aircraft.

And, like the saying goes, if you build it, they will come, and passengers have been at the Santa Maria Airport.

"I've never been there through the holidays", says traveler Karen Taylor of Arroyo Grande," this flight made it a little more accessible for people, not paying for parking, cheaper tickets, all that."

With more people coming to the airport and the terminal, there's more business for long-time terminal tenants like the car rental companies, Pepper Garcia's restaurant and next door at the airport Radisson Hotel.

"How many places can you go, with the convenience of a small airport, to Honolulu?", added traveler Mike Wright, "I think its great."

Since the Hawaii flights started less than six weeks ago, its too early for officials to calculate the direct and indirect economic impact to the airport and surrounding area.

The Wednesday flight to Honolulu was sold out.

Passengers Central Coast News spoke with, some coming from as far away as the Central Valley,say as long as Allegiant offers discount fares and the parking remains free at the Santa Maria Airport, they'll keep coming back.

"I'm hoping that if they keep this going, that they keep that free parking because it really makes it cost effective", adds Karen Taylor.

Inside the Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport (KIWA), Phoenix, Arizona; home of air service from St. Cloud

 

MESA, ARIZ. — When more than 150 people boarded an Allegiant Air flight from St. Cloud to Arizona a week ago today, they became part of the revival of not just one airfield, but two.

Flight 109 marked St. Cloud’s return to scheduled commercial air service three years after being grounded by the pullout of Delta Air Lines. It also was the airport’s first foray into regularly scheduled jet service flight.

While Dec. 15 was a very big day for St. Cloud Regional Airport, it was no small one for Phoenix/Mesa Gateway Airport. While Gateway has three commercial air carriers serving almost 40 U.S. cities from Honolulu to as far east as Grand Rapids, Mich., its history as a small hub powerhouse is short — just five years.

Even more remarkable is that its success grew from a local economic disaster: the 1993 closure of Williams Air Force Base and the resulting loss of 3,800 jobs and $300 million in annual economic activity.

A phoenix


The airport that now serves about 1.25 million passengers a year started life in 1941 as Higley Field, a pilot training facility in southwest Mesa.

It was renamed Williams Field in 1942, then became Williams Air Force Base. More than 26,000 pilots were trained there during 52 years.

But by the 1990s, it was targeted for closure by the Department of Defense in a landmark wave of base realignments. The base was decommissioned in 1993.

While the airfield reopened for civilian flight just a few months later, Williams Gateway Airport had no large-scale passenger service. It was a tiny shadow of its former self, and of Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport — one of the world’s 15 busiest — just 20 miles away.

It would be 12 years before Vision Airlines would begin scheduled commercial service with only one destination, Las Vegas. Vision would last at Gateway just over two years.

But by the time Vision left, Allegiant had arrived. The low-cost carrier was able to provide regular service to 13 cities.

That pushed the airport to begin what has been a steady drumbeat of expansion. More than 66,500 feet of space have been added since 2008, bringing the airport to eight gates with service by three airlines; Frontier and Spirit joined Allegiant at Gateway this year.

And the growth isn’t over. Two more gates are scheduled for construction in 2013, Airport Director Casey Denny said.

Passenger-friendly


What fliers love about Gateway — its easily negotiable size — is top of mind as the airport grows, Denny said.

He points out passenger-friendly details in an arrivals lobby so new it’s served only a few weeks worth of passengers; baggage carousels share a huge area with rental car desks just across the room.

Passengers who didn’t check a bag can walk straight through the airy space to the parking lot or taxi stand.

Leather seating groups with outlets for charging electronics are steps from the doors, ready for people waiting for a ride or to pick up arriving passengers.

Parking just outside the airport doors is free for 30 minutes, double that with a receipt from an airport cafe. ATMs stand prominently in the check-in and baggage claim areas. Volunteers who push wheelchairs, answer questions or give directions are seemingly everywhere. And announcements on the PA system are loud and clear.

In short, the airport is trying to be everything huge airports struggle to achieve: easy to navigate, efficient for travelers and those who are dropping off or meeting them, and comfortable.

It does throw some curves, however.

“With all the construction and expansion,” Denny said, “even we sometimes need some time to adjust to where things are this week.”

A four-lane security screening area is now open in space that was, as recently as this fall, the baggage claim. The check-in and ticketing counters will move soon to space cleared when the TSA moved one building over. Until then, a large part of the space is cordoned off with yellow tape and a vending/lounge area is clearly makeshift.

But airside, the work seems to be done. The Copper Plate, a restaurant with indoor and patio seating, offers the airport’s only bar. Paradise Bakery has specialty coffees, pastries, sandwiches and soups (there’s a smaller version in baggage claim) and several shops sell books and magazines, souvenirs and sundries.

But the airport’s best-kept secret is just outside the doors, where a courtyard lined with palms and cacti offers a place for ticketed passengers to soak up fresh air before or after a long flight.

The centerpiece happened by accident as the airport grew, Denny said, created as one building was built next to another.

“But people love it,” he said, so much that they’re intentionally making another courtyard as they do this year’s expansion.

More to come


There are bigger plans in the works though, that will eventually mean walking away from what’s been done to serve the commercial passengers.

Standing on the tarmac as an Allegiant plane disgorges arriving passengers for their walk to the terminal, Denny sweeps his arm across the runway into the distance.

That’s where the big airport will be built in the years to come, ready to handle far more traffic than the one whose growth he’s overseen.

Eventually, Denny said, all of the work on Gateway’s new facilities will be turned into a base for private flights.

But until then, “we’re concentrating on serving the customers and the airlines we have. We want (the) St. Cloud (route) to succeed. We want all of our new routes to succeed.”

Story, photos and video:   http://www.sctimes.com


http://www.phxmesagateway.org

http://www.airnav.com/airport/KIWA

CHINA: Gold awaits at end of three-leg flight

But still much needs to be done to make industry flight worthy

General aviation is an important part of China's civil aviation industry, and a stimulus to the entire sector and indeed the economy as a whole. General aviation can also be highly lucrative, often producing spectacular returns. In addition, it is effective not only in shaping the entire industry chain, but providing many job opportunities. It also serves as a base for China's commercial aviation professionals.

As reform of the country's low-airspace management continues apace, the general aviation industry is entering an era in which change will be rapid and the opportunities aplenty.

But if you cast an eye over general aviation policy and infrastructure in developed countries, it becomes clear that in China the industry is still much closer to its point of departure than its final destination.

First, China's outdated airspace-management system and strict air-traffic control system are fundamental constraints to the development of the country's general aviation. The system is administered by the military and by civil-aviation people, but the great bulk of airspace comes under the auspices of the military. At the same time, gaining approval for new routes is slow and cumbersome, which poses another serious constraint on general aviation.

Second, infrastructure is sparse. At the end of 2010 there were 286 general aviation airports and temporary landing spots, of which only 43 were certified, while in the US there were more than 20,000, and 70 percent of airports were privately owned. At the same time, China had about 1,200 registered general aviation aircraft, half a percent of the number in the US.

Third, there is also a severe shortage of professional talent. General aviation demands a lot of high technology, which in turn demands highly trained people with technical skills. Therefore, as general aviation continues to develop rapidly, the demand for pilots and crew members will continue to rise. The problem is that at the moment China's aviation professional personnel training system caters only to the needs of airlines.

As the airspace management system is reformed, general aviation policy constraints will gradually disappear, and market demand will gradually rise. Those investing in the industry will include local governments and social funds.

Low-altitude airspace management reform is now in view, and the policy bottleneck in general aviation development will gradually disappear. In 2010 the government issued guidelines on continuing reforms to low-altitude airspace management. It identified the short-term goals and overall aims of airspace reform, and divided low-altitude airspace in a reasonable way.

There will be three phases to this, first with trial reforms in particular regions. The changes will then be applied nationally, building a management and service support system that combines government rules, industry guidance and the workings of the market. In the long run the reforms will also need new regulation, operation and service systems, low-altitude airspace will need to be developed to its full potential.

The low-altitude reforms will get into full swing next year and those policies, promoting opening-up, will allow general aviation to grow rapidly.

In turn, increased demand will give a fillip to industrial restructuring. At present China's general aviation is engaged mainly in manufacturing, agriculture, forestry and flight training, and profits are limited.

As the number of wealthy Chinese rises, as more non-commercial aircraft are used to conduct business, and as air-travel market opportunities grow, the number of private aircraft, business flights, and general aviation flights will increase rapidly. They will become a driving force for the general aviation industry and a new engine for regional economies.

The author is a transport industry researcher at CIConsulting. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.


Source:   http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn

Cessna 340: How to Survive the Mayan Apocalypse

In the movie 2012, John Cusack rents a Cessna 340 that he uses to fly his family out of California just as it breaks free from the continental United States. The Cessna 340 isn't much of a technological wonder, considering that it was built in the 1970s to the early 1980s, but there are plenty available for sale

Source:   http://www.pcmag.com

Philadelphia International (KPHL), Pennsylvania: Plane returns to airport due to smoke smell

PHILADELPHIA (AP) — Officials say a plane bound for Cleveland early Saturday returned to Philadelphia International Airport after a report of a smell of smoke on board. 

 Airport spokeswoman Victoria Lupica tells The Associated Press that a United Airlines flight bound for Cleveland reported a smell of smoke shortly after takeoff and returned to the airport just before 6:30 a.m.

Lupica says the passengers were taken off the plane out of an abundance of caution. She says no smoke or fire was found on the plane.

She says the flight could continue on to Cleveland once the plane is cleared.


http://www.united.com

http://www.phl.org


http://www.airnav.com/airport/PHL
  
Have more to add? 
News tip? Tell us

Pinnacle Airlines Canadair CRJ-200, Delta Airlines, N8938A: Runway excursion at Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport (KCLE), Ohio

CLEVELAND - It was a scare for some holiday travelers Friday night at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport.  Airport spokesman Todd Payne says around 9:45 p.m. Friday, a Delta jet on its way to Cleveland from JFK Airport in New York City landed and taxied off the runway a few feet onto the grass.

Airport Commissioner Fred Szabo says the plane got stuck and had to be towed out.   Payne says the incident was weather-related and that it's not unusual for this to happen sometimes during the winter months.   No one on the 50 seat jet was injured. There was no damage. The airport was back to normal within the hour. http://www.newsnet5.com


 CLEVELAND — An incoming plane slipped off the runway at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport on Friday night after it landed safely.  Todd Payne, the Chief of Marketing & Air Service Development, confirmed to Fox 8 News that Delta flight 3899 from JFK landed around 9:47 p.m.

As the plane turned on the taxiway, the nose gear went off the runway about two feet and landed in the snow.  No one was hurt. All passengers deplaned and were taken by bus to the airport while workers towed the plane. 


Source: Fox 8 Cleveland  

http://flightaware.com/live/flight/FLG3899/history/20121222/0035Z/KJFK/KCLE
  
Have more to add? 
News tip? Tell us

http://www.delta.com

http://www.clevelandairport.com

http://www.airnav.com/airport/KCLE

Piper PA-28-160 Cherokee, N5714W: Accident occurred December 16, 2012 in Parkton, North Carolina

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA088
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, December 16, 2012 in Parkton, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/10/2014
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-160, registration: N5714W
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The instrument-rated pilot departed with nearly full fuel tanks, obtained his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and proceeded toward the destination airport, which, at the time of the accident, was IFR with a 500-foot ceiling. The pilot was vectored onto final approach for an instrument landing system approach. Radar data showed that the airplane performed s-type turns; the pilot then reported to the local controller that he had “...lost some gyros but I think we are getting it.” When the airplane was about 1 mile from the approach end of the runway at 1,300 feet, the local controller cancelled the approach clearance because the airplane was too high and advised the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 2,000 feet. Radar data indicated that the pilot turned toward an easterly heading without clearance from the controller. The pilot was then instructed to maintain an easterly heading followed by a southwesterly heading (220 degrees) consistent with a downwind leg to fly parallel to runway 4. The pilot turned well past the southwesterly heading to a northwesterly heading, and was asked by the controller if he was having any problem with the airplane such that he was unable to fly assigned headings. The pilot advised the radar controller that he “...currently [had] no gyro I think the best thing for me to climb a little bit and go to my alternate of ah Columbus or some point south.” There was an adequate supply of fuel onboard to fly to his alternate airport, which at that time was under visual meteorological conditions with 10 miles visibility and a ceiling at 5,500 feet. As a result of the loss of gyros, the pilot was flying the airplane with a partial panel. The pilot was cleared to climb direct to his alternate airport; however, extensive heading and altitude deviations were noted during this portion of the flight, which was operating in IMC. The radar controller asked the pilot if he was ok to which he replied, “uh no im not okay right now.” This verbiage and the fact that extensive altitude and heading deviations occurred were clear indications that an emergency situation existed; however, the controller did not recognize this and did not request the necessary information needed to offer assistance, as outlined in FAA Order 7110.65, 10-2-1. The controller later reported that he believed the gyro comment would have affected only the pilot’s ability to maintain heading, thus, he did not believe the loss of gyros while in instrument conditions constituted an emergency. The controller then asked the pilot if he wanted to land at the airport, and he answered, “uh the best thing to”; however, the communication was not finished. It is likely that the pilot was intending to tell the controller again that he wanted to go to his alternate airport. However, because the controller did not recognize the emergency, he continued to vector the pilot to land using an ILS approach. While thbeing vectored, when the airplane was operating in IMC, major heading and altitude changes were noted; however, when the airplane was operating at higher altitudes in VFR conditions, the pilot was able to maintain the airplane’s assigned heading and altitude. The steady flight in VFR conditions should have been a cue to the controller that safe flight was possible in visual conditions; thus he should have encouraged the pilot to continue the flight to his alternate airport as the pilot had requested. Instead, the controller vectored the pilot to intercept the localizer, advised that the flight was about 4 miles from the final approach fix, and cleared the pilot to conduct an ILS approach. The pilot managed to fly onto final approach, but while in IMC conditions, rolled to the right and crashed inverted in a wooded area about 7.5 nautical miles from the approach end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the airframe and flights controls for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the power section of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction; one propeller blade exhibited “S”-bending consistent with the engine developing power at impact. No discrepancies were noted with the airport approach systems.
Examination of the engine-driven vacuum pump, which operates the primary flight instruments consisting of the attitude indicator and directional gyro revealed fire damage to the shear shaft; however, no evidence of scoring of the interior surface of the housing was noted. Further, inspection of the gyroscopic flight instruments operated by the engine-driven vacuum pump revealed no evidence of rotational scoring; therefore, the engine-driven vacuum pump, which was about 3 years 4 months beyond the suggested replacement interval, was not operating at the moment of impact. This was consistent with the comment from the pilot that he had lost his gyro instruments. Although no determination could be made as to whether the pilot was instrument current, his inability to maintain control of the airplane while flying with a partial panel suggests he was not proficient in doing so; he failed this criteria in April 2002 during his first instrument rating checkride. In August 2004, in response to an NTSB recommendation, the FAA implemented national computer-based training to alert controllers of in-flight emergencies a pilot may encounter and the effect of the emergency. NTSB review of the current version of the CBI revealed it did not contain scenarios related to failures of the vacuum system or gyro flight instruments. Although the training provided to the controllers involved appeared to be inconsistent, it is unlikely that consistent training would have affected the outcome of the accident because specific mention of gyro malfunction was not a covered topic in the CBI training. Although the pilot had not declared an emergency, he had advised ATC personnel that he had lost his gyros, and that he was “not OK.” Further, extensive altitude and heading excursions of the aircraft were noted, all of which were clear indicators that an in-flight emergency existed. Had any of the FAA controller personnel understood either by experience or training that the pilot’s declarations or altitude and heading changes constituted an emergency, they could have declared an emergency for the pilot and obtained the necessary information required by section 10-2-1 of FAA Order 7110.65U, “Air Traffic Control.” Had that occurred, it is likely the pilot would have been vectored to an airport with VFR conditions for an uneventful landing.


The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The failure of the instrument-rated pilot to maintain control of the airplane while in instrument meteorological conditions after reporting a gyro malfunction. Contributing to the accident was the loss of primary gyro flight instruments due to the failure of the vacuum pump, the inadequate assistance provided by FAA ATC personnel, and the inadequate recurrent training of FAA ATC personnel in recognizing and responding to in-flight emergency situations.


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 16, 2012, about 1532 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28-160, N5714W, registered to and operated by a private individual, crashed in a wooded area near Parkton, North Carolina. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Summerville Airport (DYB), Summerville, South Carolina, to Fayetteville Regional Airport/Grannis Field (FAY), Fayetteville, North Carolina. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the private pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated from DYB about 1400.

The pilot departed VFR and at 1412, he established contact with Charleston air traffic control tower (ATCT) and was issued a discrete IFR transponder code. About 1 minute later the airplane was radar identified, the pilot was issued IFR clearance, and instructed to climb and maintain 5,000 feet which he acknowledged. While proceeding towards the destination airport, air traffic control (ATC) communications were transferred to Shaw Air Force Base Approach, followed by Fayetteville Approach Control.

According to a transcription of communications with Fayetteville Air Traffic Control Tower, at 1451:41, the pilot established contact with the radar controller of the East Radar position of Fayetteville ATCT, and advised the controller that the flight was at 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The radar controller instructed the pilot to advise when he had automated terminal information service (ATIS) Alpha, and to expect instrument landing system (ILS) runway 4 approach, to which he immediately acknowledged having obtained ATIS information Alpha and to expect ILS runway 4 approach. The controller then provided the altimeter setting to the pilot and he read-back correctly the last 2 digits.

At 14:57:20, the radar controller asked the pilot if he could accept direct ZODGI, which is the initial approach fix (IAF) for the ILS to runway 4. While the transcription of communication indicates the pilot's response was unintelligible, NTSB review of the certified voice tape revealed his comment was in the affirmative. The controller issued the pilot a 055 degree heading to join the localizer, and instructed him to report established on the final approach course. The pilot did not respond, so the radar controller repeated the transmission. The pilot apologized and acknowledged the instructions.

At 14:59:41, the radar controller issued the pilot a weather advisory for a small area of moderate precipitation at the pilot's one o'clock position and 3 miles, which he acknowledged. At 1504:38, the radar controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 2,300 feet and, "…verify established" on the localizer. The pilot acknowledged the altitude assignment, and stated, "…couldn't (unintelligible) isn't quite established yet sir." At 1504:51, the pilot asked if a heading of 055 was good to intercept, and the radar controller replied affirmative.

At 1506:07, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was 10 miles from the final approach fix, fly the present heading and to maintain at or above 2,300 feet until established on the localizer, cleared for ILS straight in runway 4 approach. The pilot acknowledged the instructions and advised the controller, "…I think we're established now thanks." Radar data indicates that before reaching ZODGI, the pilot flew slightly east of the final approach course, followed by a left turn flying west of the final approach course. Air traffic control communications were transferred to local control of the FAY ATCT, and at 1507:10, while west of the final approach course but before ZODGI, the pilot established contact with local control and was cleared to land. The local controller also provided the wind direction and velocity information to the pilot but he did not reply. The radar data indicated that as the flight continued towards FAY near ZODGI, the airplane flew in an easterly direction flying east of the final approach course. The airplane was observed on radar turning to the northwest and intercepting the final approach course, then turned again and flew east of the final approach course.

At 1509:43, the radar controller contacted the local controller and advised that the airplane appeared to be right of course; at that time the airplane was east of the final approach course. The radar data indicates that the pilot performed S type turns while remaining right of course and at 1510:34, the local controller questioned the pilot if he was receiving the localizer to which he replied, "having a little bit of trouble right now I seem to have lost some gyros but I think we're getting there." The local controller advised the pilot to maintain 2,000 and suggested a heading of 020 to join the localizer, which he acknowledged. At that time, coordination between the local and radar east positions occurred. At 1511:24, the local controller advised the pilot to maintain 1,900 feet until receiving the glideslope, which he acknowledged. Radar data indicates that the flight proceeded towards FAY, and at 1512:15, the pilot was advised that the flight was crossing CINLO, which is the final approach fix. At 1513:30, when the flight was at 1,700 feet msl, about 211 degrees and 2.8 nautical miles from the approach end of runway 4, the local controller asked the pilot if he was receiving the glide slope. The pilot responded, "I'm sorry sir yes sir ah, I would have [unintelligible words] I realize we're coming now."

At 1513:37, the local controller asked the pilot if he wanted, "…to come back out for another approach" to which the pilot stated that, "…I think we're doing OK if it looks OK to you." The local controller informed the pilot that he could not tell with the rate of descent and cleared the pilot for a localizer approach to runway 4. The local controller later stated during an interview that he wanted to give the pilot every opportunity to complete the approach and wanted him to worry less about the glideslope so that is the reason that he cleared him for a localizer approach. The pilot acknowledged the clearance with part of his call sign and approximately 37 seconds later, or at 1514:29, the controller cancelled the approach clearance and advised the pilot to climb and maintain 2,000 feet and fly runway heading, which he acknowledged. Radar data indicates that about that time, the airplane was at 1,300 feet and 1.0 nautical mile from the approach end of runway 4.

At 1514:40, the local controller informed the pilot that overcast clouds existed at 500 feet, the flight was at 1,200 feet about ½ mile away from the runway, and asked the pilot if he wanted to perform another approach. The pilot responded, "that'll be fine thanks one four whiskey." Coordination between the local and east radar positions occurred. Radar data indicates that beginning about 1514:29, to about 1515:03, the pilot turned right to a nearly due east heading despite the instruction from the controller to maintain runway heading. At 1515:05, the local controller advised the pilot to fly heading 090 degrees climb and maintain 2,000 feet which he correctly read back. The controller then asked the pilot what heading he was flying he reported 081 degrees. The local controller again instructed the pilot to fly heading 090 degrees, climb and maintain 2,000 feet, and to contact Fayetteville Departure Control on frequency 133.0 MHz. Coordination between the local controller and radar east radar controller occurred during which time the local controller stated, "he's having a lot of problems holding a steady heading he's trying a ninety heading right now at two thousand." The transcription does not indicate that the local controller advised the radar controller that the pilot had stated that he lost some of his gyros.

The pilot established contact with Fayetteville Approach Control at 1515:44, and he advised the Radar East controller that he was heading 095 degrees going to 090 degrees. The flight was radar identified and the controller then advised the pilot to climb and maintain 2,300 feet which the pilot acknowledged. At 1516:09, a position relief briefing of the radar east radar control position occurred. During the briefing the weather conditions at FAY was discussed and the comment was that the airport was IFR due to the ceilings. The radar east control position was manned by an OJTI (instructor) and developmental (controller in training). At 1516:42, the radar east OJTI and/or the developmental controller instructed the pilot to turn right to heading 140 degrees, which he acknowledged. At 1517:18, the radar controller advised the pilot to turn right to heading 220 degrees, though the pilot did not respond. The controller repeated the heading which the pilot read back. Radar data indicates that the pilot flew past the instructed heading and at 1517:49, the radar controller asked the pilot what heading he was on and the immediate reply was, "…three one zero" The radar controller again advised the pilot that he was to fly heading 220 degrees, to which the pilot correctly read back the heading. At 1518:01, the controller then stated, "…are you having problems with your airplane you can't um fly an appropriate heading", to which the pilot replied at 1518:05, "ok I'm currently no gyro I think the best thing for me to climb a little bit and go to my alternate of ah Columbus or some point south."

The radar controller questioned the pilot about his ability to navigate to his alternate airport without gyros and he replied he could. The controller then asked the pilot what airport he wanted to go to and at 1518:26, he replied, "…columbus would be fine sir." The radar controller cleared the flight to Columbus County Airport (CPC), and to climb and maintain 3,000 feet, which the pilot did not acknowledge. The controller repeated the clearance and the pilot did not reply. Two more attempts were made to communicate with the pilot and it wasn't until 1519:12, after the second attempt that he replied, "approach." The radar data indicates that from about 1518:36, until his comment approach at 1519:13, the airplane went from a northwesterly heading to a south-southwesterly heading with altitude deviations noted. At 1519:13, the radar controller stated, "and um it appears um your altitude is changing erratically you going up to eighteen hundred down to eighteen hundred then up to two thousand three hundred are you okay." The pilot responded at 1519:21, "uh no im not okay right now." The radar controller asked the pilot if he wanted, "…to come into Fayetteville" to which the pilot stated, "uh the best thing to" but the communication was not finished. The radar data indicates that the airplane turned to a west-southwesterly heading, followed by a left turn to an easterly heading at 1519:41

At 1519:40, the radar controller asked the pilot if he could fly southwest bound and he advised "yeah southwest." The controller then asked the pilot if he was flying southwest bound and he immediately replied that he was flying heading 253 degrees and his altitude was 2,500 feet msl, trying to climb to 3,000 feet msl. The radar data about this time indicates the airplane was heading 245 degrees and the altitude was 2,564 feet. The controller then asked the pilot if he could do a non-gyro standard rate turns to which he replied he could. The controller advised the pilot to start a left turn and about 19 seconds later told him to stop the turn. The radar data indicated that during that period, the heading began at about 248 degrees and ended at 251 degrees. At 1521:01, the radar controller advised the pilot to expect an ILS approach into FAY, and about 9 seconds later informed the pilot that he did not turn at all during the previous non-gyro start and stop times. The radar controller also asked the pilot if he knew how to do a non-gyro approach, to which he replied that he had done the drill before.

At 1521:53, the radar controller asked the pilot if he was picking up the glideslope and localizer during the first approach and he replied affirmative. The controller advised the pilot to expect an ILS approach runway 4. Radar data indicates that the flight proceeded generally in a southwesterly direction with heading deviations noted, and at 1522:27, the pilot informed the controller that he was flying heading 268 degrees. The controller then asked the pilot if the autopilot was flying the airplane or he was, to which he replied he was. The flight continued generally in a southwesterly direction while maintaining altitude until about 1523:21, at which time the flight proceeded in a southerly direction as instructed by the radar controller. Minimal heading and altitude deviations were noted in the radar data while flying in a southerly heading between 1523:26 and 1526:20. At 1526:17, the radar east controller instructed the pilot to fly west heading 270 degrees. The radar data reflects the pilot turned to and remained on a westerly heading with minimal altitude and heading deviations noted. Based on the upper sounding, pilot reports (PIREPS), and weather radar images, the airplane was in VFR conditions between about 1523 and 1527, which was the entire time the flight was flying in a southerly direction and portion of the flight while flying in a westerly direction.

At 1529:42, the radar controller advised the pilot that the flight was 4 miles from the final approach fix, turn right heading northbound on the 010 and maintain 2,000 feet until established on the localizer, cleared for ILS approach to runway 4. The pilot read back, "…heading 010 maintain 2,000 cleared for the approach." The radar reflects the airplane turned to a north-northeasterly heading and at 1531:16, the pilot advised the radar controller that the flight was established on the localizer. About that time the airplane was at 2,764 feet heading 029 degrees. The radar controller then asked the pilot if he was picking up the glide slope to which the pilot advised he was not. There were no further recorded legible transmissions from the pilot despite numerous attempts by the controller. The radar data reflects a right turn to an east-southeasterly heading beginning about 1531:17, and about 20 seconds later, or at 1531:37, a loud squeal was heard on the frequency; this was attributed to be from the accident airplane. 

One witness reported hearing a loud engine sound from a 4 cylinder engine then looked across I-95 and noted smoke from a wooded area. Another witness reported hearing the sound of the engine revved up, "like it was making a dive bomb run." The witness did not see the airplane accident but reported that the airplane flew near his house. Another witness who was inside her residence reported hearing the airplane fly near her house and reported seeing smoke and flames from the accident. The witness then went outside and directed law enforcement to the accident site.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 63, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane ratings; the instrument rating was issued August 7, 2003. He held a third class medical certificate with a limitation that the holder, "must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision" issued on March 2, 2011. On the application for the last medical certificate he indicated a total flight time of 1,006 hours.

According to FAA records, on April 11, 2002, he received notice of disapproval for his instrument airplane rating because he failed the "air traffic control clearances and procedures", "instrument approach procedures", and "emergency operations" areas of operations, with special emphasis on partial panel. His pilot logbook reflects he obtained additional flight training which included partial panel training. FAA records also indicate that on June 3, 2002, he received a second notice of disapproval for his instrument airplane rating because he failed the "air traffic control clearances and procedures", "instrument approach procedures", and "emergency operations" with emphasis of flying approaches as published. His pilot logbook reflects that he immediately received some training, but the training tapered off then increased immediately before he obtaining the instrument rating in August 2003.

Further review of the pilot's first pilot logbook which contained entries from March 24, 1999, to November 5, 2005, revealed that about the time he obtained his instrument rating, he had accrued about 67 hours simulated instrument flight and 10 hours actual instrument flight. Since obtaining his instrument rating, he logged approximately 4 hours simulated instrument flight and 16 hours actual instrument flight. Excerpts of the pilot logbook are contained in the NTSB public docket.

The pilot's wife reported that her husband's most recent (second) pilot logbook would have been on-board the airplane at the time of the accident. A thorough search among the burned wreckage did not reveal any remains of a pilot logbook; therefore, no determination could be made as to whether he was instrument current or the date of his last instrument proficiency check.

The pilot's wife provided his known sleep and wake schedule for the previous 7 days. A review of the provided schedule revealed that from December 9th through December 14th, he rested for about 6.5 hours each night, with slight variations notes. On December 15th, she reported that he went to bed after 0230, but she was not sure what time he woke up. She was also not sure what time he went to bed on December 15th, nor the time he woke up on December 16th.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1963 by Piper Aircraft Corporation as model PA-28-160, and was designated serial number 28-1215. It was powered by a 160 horsepower Lycoming O-320-D2A engine and equipped with a fixed pitch propeller. The airplane was also equipped with a single-axis autopilot control system that was installed in accordance with supplemental type certificate (STC).

The airplane's flight instruments consisted of an attitude indicator, turn coordinator, vertical speed indicator, airspeed indicator, directional gyro (DG), altimeter, and compass.

The attitude indicator and DG were powered by an engine-driven vacuum pump installed on the accessory case of the engine, and are considered gryo flight instruments. These instruments are connected to the vacuum pump by flexible hoses and stainless steel clamps. Additionally, a vacuum pump regulator and vacuum system filter are installed between the engine-driven vacuum pump and the flight instruments.

The engine-driven vacuum pump consists of a housing, rotor, vanes, inlet and outlet ports, and a shear shaft. The inlet and outlet ports have a fitting, which flexible hoses are connected.

According to the airplane maintenance manual, wear of the vanes of the vacuum pump is compensated for by a vacuum regulator. The vacuum pump regulator is adjusted to a service range of 4.8 to 5.2 inches of Mercury.

The airplane maintenance records reflect that on August 19, 2003, which at the time was owned by the accident pilot, a new engine-driven vacuum pump part number RA215CC, serial number A9749, was installed on the engine. The engine-driven vacuum pump was manufactured under FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), and was equipped with an inspection port for determining wear of the vanes. The recording tachometer time at installation was recorded to be 2960.41. The last entry in the airframe maintenance records dated January 27, 2012, associated with the last annual inspection, indicates the tachometer time was 3558.4, or an elapsed time of approximately 598 hours since the new engine-driven vacuum pump was installed. Between the date of the engine-driven vacuum pump installation and the date of the last annual inspection, there was no record of replacement or repair of the tachometer, or removal, replacement, or repair of the engine-driven vacuum pump.

The airplane maintenance records further indicate that the last altimeter, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, static system, and ATC transponder tests were performed on January 4, 2012. Copies of the maintenance record entries are contained in the NTSB public docket.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 0740 EST, or about 6 hours 20 minutes before the accident flight departed, a meteorological impact statement (MIS) for ATC planning purposes only, valid for the accident site through 1500 EST, advised of IFR conditions with rain from central Virginia through central North Carolina. The conditions were expected to slowly improve after 1200 EST to VFR.

Airmet Sierra issued at 1126 EST, or approximately 2 hours 34 minutes before the flight departed, valid for the accident time, forecast IFR conditions for the accident site with ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibilities below 3 miles with precipitation, mist, and fog.

The destination airport terminal area forecast (TAF) issued at 1241 EST, or approximately 1 hour 19 minutes before the flight departed, valid for a 24 hour period beginning at 1300 EST, expected the wind from 180 degrees at 5 knots, visibility greater than 6 miles, and overcast clouds at 300 feet above ground level (agl). Temporary conditions of a broken ceiling at 1,000 feet agl were forecast between 1300 and 1700 EST.

A surface observation weather report taken at the destination airport (FAY) at 1253 EST, or about 1 hour 7 minutes before the flight departed, indicated the wind was from 230 degrees at 4 knots, the visibility was 7 statute miles, and overcast clouds existed at 300 feet. The temperature and dew point were each 13 degrees Celsius, and the altimeter setting was 30.01 inches of Mercury.

The area forecast issued at 1345, or about 15 minutes before the flight departed, and about 2 minutes before the pilot contacted IAD DUATS, forecasted a broken ceiling between 1,500 and 2,500 feet msl, and an overcast layer between 8,000 and 10,000 feet msl with layered clouds through Flight Level 240 (24,000). Occasional visibilities between 3 and 5 miles and mist were forecast with widely scattered light rain showers.

At 1347 hours local, the pilot accessed DUATS vendor IAD. Although the records from the transaction were not requested in time and were not available, weather information that would have been available to the pilot at that time included the airmet sierra for IFR conditions, the 1253 surface observation for the destination airport, and destination airport TAF.

A surface observation weather report taken at FAY at 1543, or about 11 minutes after the accident, indicates the wind was from 210 degrees at 3 knots, the visibility was 3 statute miles with mist, scattered clouds existed at 700 feet, and overcast clouds existed at 1,300 feet. The temperature and dew point were each 14 degrees Celsius, and the altimeter setting was 29.99 inches of Mercury. The accident site was located about 8 nautical miles and 207 degrees from the center of FAY.

According to the NTSB Weather Group Factual Report, there was a high probability of clouds between the surface and 2,500 feet, then another cloud layer from 8,000 to 25,000 feet. Plotting of the aircraft's flight path overlaid onto weather radar images indicates that between 1516 to before 1522, the airplane flew through 20 to 30 dBz reflectivity values, and likely encountered precipitation while located within a cloud layer. At 1528, or approximately 4 minutes before the accident, the airplane was flying in a westerly direction and encountered weather radar echoes with reflectivity between 20 and 30 dBz, consistent with rain showers within a cloud layer. The weather radar image at 1533, or approximately 1 minute after the accident indicates the cell had moved to the east with the accident site located in an area with no weather radar reflectivity echoes. The NTSB Weather Factual Report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

On the day of the accident about 0000, the runway 4 ILS DME monitor was recorded in the FAY Daily Record of Facility Operation Log as being out of service and was carried over from the previous log.

As a result of the accident, at 1758 EST, the Runway 4 ILS navigation equipment consisting of the localizer, glide slope, DME, and outer marker were taken out of service (OTS), and a notice to Airman (NOTAM) was issued. Records provided by FAA indicate that the localizer, glide slope, DME, and outer marker were checked postaccident and the "As Found" readings were within tolerance. The navigation equipment was certified and returned to service (RTS) at 2316, as indicated by the FAY Daily Record of Facility Operation Log.

COMMUNICATIONS

The pilot was in contact with the Fayetteville Regional Airport air traffic control tower at the time of the accident. There were no reported communication difficulties.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Fayetteville Regional Airport/Grannis Field is a public use airport equipped with multiple runways designated 4/22 and 10/28. Runway 4/22 is 7,709 feet long and 150 feet wide and is serviced by an instrument landing system (ILS) or Localizer/DME, RNAV (GPS), and VOR instrument approaches.

The terminal approach chart for the ILS approach to runway 4 at FAY specifies that the minimums for a category A airplane (accident airplane) is 200 feet and ¾ mile visibility. The approach specified to maintain 2,300 feet until reaching ZODGI which is 13.3 DME from the I-GRA Localizer which is set to 110.5 MHz. From ZODGI a descent to CINLO which is the glideslope intercept point and also the final approach fix. CINLO is located 6.5DME from I-GRA Localizer. From CINLO a 3.00 degree descent commences to 200 feet and ¾ mile. The published missed approach is to climb to 1,100 feet then climbing right turn to 3,000 feet and intercept the FAY VOR/DME 131 degree radial and fly outbound to the GANDS Intersection which is 14.6 DME from the FAY VOR/DME.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane crashed in a heavily wooded area; the accident site was located at 34 degrees 52.362 minutes North latitude and 078 degrees 57.138 minutes West longitude, or approximately 7.5 nautical miles and 206 degrees from the approach end of runway 4 at FAY. A postcrash fire occurred in the immediate area.

Further examination of the accident site revealed debris along an energy path oriented on a magnetic heading of 044 degrees. Damage to trees of decreasing heights were noted between the resting position of a portion of the right wing and an impact crater located approximately 41 feet from the resting position of the right wing. The impact crater was noted to have the propeller partially buried in it. Debris along the energy path and to the left and right of the energy path centerline was noted and major components were documented.

Wreckage debris located on the right side of the energy path centerline consisted of the outer portion of the left wing, center portion of left wing, and left wing fuel tank, while debris located to the left of the energy path centerline consisted of the inboard section of the right wing. The empennage with both stabilizers and rudder was located on the energy path centerline about 40 feet from the ground impact crater. The engine assembly was located on the energy path about 21 feet from the resting point of the cockpit, cabin, and main spar. The wreckage was recovered for further examination, and components consisting of the suction gauge, attitude indicator, directional gyro, electric turn coordinator, vacuum pump regulator, KX155 communication and navigation transceiver, and Apple 64GB iPad; were secured for further examination.

Examination of the airplane following recovery revealed the airframe was extensively fragmented. All structural components with the exception of the outer section of the right wing, and a small outer section of the left wing were extensively heat damaged. All components necessary to sustain flight were accounted for at the accident site. Examination of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

Examination of the cockpit revealed the instrument panel was not identified with the exception of the portion that contained the suction gauge, and a separate section that contained the directional gyro. All remaining flight and engine instrument were separated from the panel and found loose at the accident site. The No. 2 communication transceiver which was not digital exhibited impact damage; the communication selector was in the off position. The communication frequency was between 128.20 and 127.25 MHz while the navigation frequency was between 108.75 and 108.80 MHz; the Fayetteville VOR frequency is 108.8 MHz. The VOR/LOC Converter & Glide Slope indicator and the VOR/LOC Converter indicator were extensively impact damaged which precluded any type of testing. A terminal instrument approach chart book for southeast 2 was found in the wreckage. The book was valid until November 15, 2012. The book was turned to the ILS or LOC/DME RWY 4 page of FAY; the page was torn.

Examination of the left wing revealed it was fragmented into 4 major pieces. The flap and aileron were accounted for at the accident site. The outer portion of the aileron exhibited tree contact with the tree strike oriented with the wing 90 degrees to the right of normal direction of travel. The aileron bellcrank remained attached structurally, and 1 cable remained attached to the bellcrank but that cable exhibited tension overload approximately 7 inches from the bellcrank attach. The other aileron control cable clevis remained attached to the bellcrank but the cable pulled through the clevis. The main spar exhibited bending. A tree contact was noted on the leading edge of the wing about 32 inches, or 3 ribs inboard from the wingtip end rib. The pitot mast was in-place but the lines were damaged.

Examination of the right wing revealed it was fragmented into 3 major pieces. The outer section of the wing with the attached aileron did not exhibit fire damage. The leading edge of the wing about 21 inches inboard from the wingtip end rib was torn. The flap remained attached. The aileron bellcrank was structurally separated. Both aileron control cables remained attached to the bellcrank, but one cable exhibited tension overload 66 inches inboard from the bellcrank while the other cable exhibited tension overload 62 inches inboard from the bellcrank.

Examination of the empennage revealed it was separated approximately 28 inches forward of the aft fuselage bulkhead. The full-span stabilator remained attached, and both stabilator flight control cables remained attached to the stabilator balance weight assembly. Both cables were cut. The leading edge of the right stabilator was displaced up approximately 90 degrees at the tip. Both rudder flight control cables remained connected at the bellcrank near the control surface, and the rudder remained connected to the vertical stabilizer. The vertical stabilizer was rolled to the left approximately 70 degrees.

Examination of the separated engine revealed impact and fire damage. The engine-driven vacuum pump remained secured to the accessory case of the engine, but the vacuum pump was damaged by fire and the outlet fitting was fractured. The drive coupling was melted. Both magnetos, the oil filter, starter, and alternator were separated from the engine, but the carburetor and engine-driven fuel pump were partially secured to the engine. The crankshaft flange was separated and remained attached to the propeller hub; the remaining portion of the crankshaft was noticeably bent which precluded rotation of the crankshaft by hand. The Nos. 2 and 4 cylinders were removed which allowed for visual inspection of the powertrain components which revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Examination of the impact and heat damaged carburetor revealed the control cables remained attached at their respective attach points. Disassembly inspection of the carburetor revealed impact damage to one of the brass floats consistent with hydraulic deformation, while the other float was partially separated from the float arm and exhibited heat damage. No fuel was noted in the float bowl. The engine-driven fuel pump was extensively heat damaged. Both magnetos were separated from the accessory case. One magneto was destroyed by fire and the other magneto produced spark at all ignition towers when rotated by hand. Inspection of the spark plugs revealed all exhibited normal wear and color signatures, and inspection of the ignition harness revealed it was fire and impact damaged. The oil suction screen was clean, and the oil filter element was examined and no ferrous particles were noted. The engine-driven vacuum pump was retained for further examination.

Examination of the two-bladed fixed-pitch propeller revealed one blade was fractured near the hub and the other blade was full span. The fractured blade exhibited "S" bending, leading edge twisting, and chord-wise abrasions. The other blade exhibited a smooth-radius aft approximately 90 degrees, and chord-wise abrasions.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) , Raleigh, North Carolina. The autopsy reported indicated the cause of death was "Massive blunt force trauma due to plane crash."

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and also by the OCME. The toxicology report by FAA stated testing for carbon monoxide and cyanide was not performed. No ethanol was detected in the submitted urine specimen, while unquantied amounts of chlorpheniramine, metoprolol, and pseudoephedrine were detected in the submitted muscle specimen. Chlorpheniramine, ephedrine, oxymetazoline, and pseudoephedrine were detected in the submitted urine specimen. A copy of the toxicology report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

The results of analysis by OCME indicated the carbon monoxide level was less than 5 percent saturation, and no ethanol was detected. A copy of the toxicology report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The airplane was fueled at the departure airport before departure. According to the person who fueled the airplane, both tanks were fueled bringing the level of fuel in each tank to within 1 inch of the top. There were no reported issues related to the fuel at the departure airport.

The pilot's alternate airport on his IFR flight plan was listed as Columbus County Municipal Airport (CPC), Columbus, North Carolina. The CPC Airport is located about 42 nautical miles south-southeast from FAY Airport.

Based on the true airspeed listed in the flight plan from DYB to FAY (100.0 knots), the estimated time en-route under no wind conditions from FAY to CPC Airport was calculated to be approximately 25 minutes. Based on the time the pilot first advised the controller that he wanted to proceed to CPC, his estimated time of arrival at CPC would have been about approximately 1543.

A surface observation report taken at the CPC Airport at 1535, or about 3 minutes after the accident, revealed the wind was calm, the visibility was 10 miles, scattered clouds existed at 2,900 feet, and a ceiling of broken clouds existed at 5,500 feet. The temperature and dew point were 16 and 15 degrees Celsius respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.99 inches of Mercury.

An iPad located in the wreckage was retained and sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Division located in Washington, DC. Examination of the iPad revealed impact damage to two internal chips; therefore, no data could be recovered from the device. A copy of the report from the Vehicle Recorder Division is contained in the NTSB public docket.

As previously reported, the engine-driven vacuum pump had accrued about 598 hours since installation at the last annual inspection. According to a service letter by the vacuum pump manufacturer, it is recommended that the vacuum pump be replaced after 6 years; the service letter is not mandatory.

Inspection of the suction gauge revealed the needle was off scale high, and the glass was fractured. Inspection of the gauge face was performed by NTSB Materials Laboratory personnel using a 5 and 50 power zoom stereomicroscope for needle witness marks; none were found. A copy of the NTSB Materials Laboratory Factual Report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Inspection of the electric turn coordinator was performed at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight. The results of the significantly impacted instrument examination indicate rotational scoring of the rotor assembly. A copy of the report from the manufacturer and FAA concurring statement is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Inspection of the engine-driven vacuum pump was performed at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight. The results of the examination indicate the unit exhibited extensive heat damage. The external drive gear and shear shaft were damaged beyond recognition due to heat damage. Visual inspection of the front end of the component revealed deformation consistent with impact damage. Disassembly inspection revealed the rotor was cracked and vane No. 5 was chipped. No apparent scratches or gouges were detected in the internal cavity wall. Visual inspection of the rear end of the component revealed the portion of chipped No. 5 vane was lodged in the outlet port. Inspection of the front end revealed the internal gear was damaged beyond recognition due to heat. Visual inspection of the bearing showed some deep rotational scratches. The report from the manufacturer with FAA concurring statement is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Inspection of the engine-driven vacuum pump was then performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory located in Washington, D.C. The examination of the rotor revealed the primary and secondary fractures, and fractures extending between the center hole and vane slots 5 and 6 all intersected at an area of the center hole surface approximately 0.25 inch to 0.375 inch from the aft surface. An impression was noted on the aft flange corresponding to contact with the corner between the outer surface and vane slot No. 6 on rotor piece marked B. An impression was also observed on the forward flange corresponding to the edge of vane slot No. 2 rotor piece marked B. No evidence of rotational sliding was observed at the impression on the forward or aft flanges or the corresponding locations on the rotor. A copy of the NTSB Materials Laboratory examination report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Inspection of the Honeywell (formerly Bendix-King) KX155 communication transceiver and navigation receiver was performed at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight. The examination revealed extensive impact damage to the unit and non-volatile memory chip which precluded operational testing or recovery of the stored navigation and communication frequencies. A copy of the report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Inspection of the vacuum regulator was performed at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight. The examination revealed extensive impact and heat damage which precluded operational testing. No determination could be made as to the vacuum regulator vacuum setting at the time of the accident. The unit was inspected and a copy of the report and FAA concurring statement is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Examination of the attitude indicator (AI) and directional gyro (DG) were performed at a FAA repair station with NTSB oversight. The inspection of both components revealed extensive impact damage which precluded operational testing. No scoring was noted to the rotor of the AI, while light rotational scoring of the rotor housing of the AI was noted at an area between the 4 and 7 o'clock positions; however, no corresponding scoring of the rotor was noted. Inspection of the fire and impacted DG revealed no rotational scoring to the rotor or rotor housing. A copy of the examination notes is contained in the NTSB public docket.

ADDITIONAL DATA

Previous NTSB Recommendations Concerning Controller Emergency Awareness

On December 15, 1993, as a result of an accident investigated by NTSB in which a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 crashed in instrument meteorological conditions during an approach for an emergency landing, the NTSB issued recommendation A-93-158 to FAA to enhance the emergency assistance section of Air Traffic Control Handbook 7110.65 to fully address the issue of selecting the best possible diversion airport for an IFR aircraft in an emergency status. The NTSB also submitted recommendation A-93-160 to FAA to provide expanded emergency procedures training for air traffic controllers. This recommendation also indicated that the general capabilities of airplanes in various emergency scenarios involving air traffic control should be a focal point of this training, and past air traffic control-related accident reports should be used. About 1 year later the FAA responded that it had developed a training course to address emergency procedures training for air traffic controllers and that it had developed a training aid titled, "ATC Challenge" to help improve and strengthen controllers' knowledge of other topics involving emergency situations. In June 1995, the Safety Board classified this recommendation as "Closed – Acceptable Action"; however, in January 2001, the Safety Board learned that the "ATC Challenge" was no longer in use.

On September 24, 2001, as a result of several accidents investigated by NTSB in which FAA air traffic control (ATC) controller personnel lacked awareness of emergency situations, and also because the "ATC Challenge" was no longer in use, the NTSB submitted to FAA in part recommendations A-01-35 and A-01-36. Recommendation A-01-35 recommended FAA amend FAA Order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control" paragraph 10-2-5, "Emergency Situations," to include as emergencies in part in-flight failure of attitude instruments needed to operate safely in IMC if the affected aircraft cannot remain in visual meteorological conditions for the remainder of its flight. Recommendation A-01-36 suggested FAA develop and ensure that air traffic controllers receive academic and simulator training that teaches controllers to quickly recognize and aggressively respond to potential distress and emergency situations in which pilots may require air traffic control (ATC) assistance. This included in part an understanding of common aircraft system failures that may require ATC assistance or special handing, and the application of special techniques for assisting pilots that encounter aircraft system failures. The recommendation also indicated that the training should be based on actual accidents or incidents, include a comprehensive review of successful flight assists and the techniques used, and be reviewed annually to ensure that the training materials remain current and effective.

In response to recommendation A-01-35, the FAA responded on November 29, 2001, that FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control adequately addresses this recommendation. The NTSB classified recommendation A-01-35 on July 16, 2002, as, "Closed—Reconsidered."

In response to recommendation A-01-36, the FAA developed computer-based instruction (CBI) course 57098 titled Recognizing and Responding to Aircraft Emergencies, and in August 2004, began national distribution of the course. The FAA also revised Joint Order 3120.4M, "Air Traffic Technical Training" which details the requirements for local, facility-led annual air traffic controller training which includes real-life scenarios, and addressed the potential domino effects of common inflight mechanical problems. In June 2012, the NTSB classified recommendation A-01-36 as, "Closed-Acceptable Action."

Computer-based instruction (CBI) course 57098 Recognizing and Responding to Aircraft Emergencies

NTSB review of the current course material contained in the CBI revealed it discussed different types of emergency situations, in-flight mechanical issues and possible domino effects, communication techniques, and finally notification procedures for emergency situations. Although flight equipment malfunction is mentioned as one possibly emergency, a pilot reported gyro malfunction was not discussed.

Postaccident FAA Controller Interviews

As part of the investigation, a NTSB air traffic control specialist conducted interviews of personnel of the FAY ATCT consisting of the Radar East controller, the Radar East OJTI controller, the Radar East developmental controller, the local controller, and the Front Line Manager (FLM). The local controller and the Radar East controller who were in contact with the pilot when he advised that he had either lost his gyros or was no gyro both reported those comments meant that the pilot could not maintain headings. The local controller stated he did not know that a comment from a pilot pertaining to lost gyros would affect the pilot's ability to keep the wings level, or about turns and turn rates. He also indicated he did not recall any refresher training in unusual situations or about no-gyro emergencies. The Radar East controller reported conducting emergency training quite often, but that a reported loss of gyro was not covered. The Radar East OJTI controller reported that he could not recall doing any recurrent training on emergency situations, but did state that he had completed training previously through a briefing or CBI module. He also stated that the pilot's comment concerning the gyro issue meant the pilot would have difficulty maintaining direction of flight. The Radar East developmental controller stated that training about unusual emergency situations was mostly done with monthly recurrent training via the CBI, MBI, and verbal briefs. He also advised he would not know what would happen of a pilot were to lose the gyros of the airplane. The FLM stated that the facility had conducted team briefings on emergency situations and losses of equipment, but not consistently. He also stated that a comment about loss of gyro meant the pilot could not turn or maintain headings. The Radar East OJTI, and the Radar East developmental controllers did not know the weather conditions at the alternate airport (CPC), and the Radar East developmental controller stated that in hindsight, the pilot's comment that he was not OK was an indication that he was in distress, and the flight should have continued to CPC. The NTSB ATC Group Chairman Factual report which contains the interview summaries is contained in the NTSB public docket.

FAA Order JO 7110.65U, "Air Traffic Control"

Review of Section 10 of the order titled "Emergencies" provides controllers with the following guidance on recognizing and handling emergency situations:

Section 10-1-1 Emergency Determinations:

An emergency can be either a distress or an urgency condition as defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary. The section also indicates that a pilot who encounters a distress condition should declare an emergency with the word "Mayday" preferably repeated three times, or "Pan-Pan" if an urgency condition also preferably repeated three times. If "Mayday" or "Pan-Pan" are not broadcast by the pilot but you (controller) are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency. Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be prescribed; however, when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual.

Section 10-1-2 Obtaining Information:

Obtain enough information to handle the emergency intelligently. Base your decision as to what type of assistance is needed on information and requests received from the pilot because he/she is authorized by 14 CFR Part 91 to determine a course of action.

Section 10-2-1 Information Requirements:

a. Start assistance as soon as enough information has been obtained upon which to act. Information requirements will vary, depending on the existing situation. Minimum required information for inflight emergencies is:

NOTE-
In the event of an ELT signal see para 10-2-10 Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) Signals.

1. Aircraft identification and type
2. Nature of the emergency
3. Pilot's desires

b. After initiating action, obtain the following items or any pertinent information from the pilot or aircraft operator, as necessary:

NOTE-

Normally, do not request this information from military fighter-type aircraft that are at low altitudes (i.e. on approach, immediately after departure, on a low level route, etc.). However, request the position of an aircraft that is not visually sighted or displayed on radar if the location is not given by the pilot.

1. Aircraft altitude
2. Fuel remaining in time
3. Pilot reported weather
4. Pilot capability for IFR flight
5. Time and place of last known position
6. Heading since last known position
7. Airspeed
8. Navigation equipment capability
9. NAVAID signals received
10. Visible landmarks
11. Aircraft color
12. Number of people on board
13. Point of departure and destination
14. Emergency equipment on board



 
Retired Col. Virgil T. 'Tom' Deal

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA088 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, December 16, 2012 in Parkton, NC
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-160, registration: N5714W
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On December 16, 2012, about 1532 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28-160, N5714W, registered to and operated by a private individual, crashed in a wooded area near Parkton, North Carolina. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules (IFR) plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Summerville Airport (DYB), Summerville, South Carolina, to Fayetteville Regional Airport/Grannis Field (FAY), Fayetteville, North Carolina. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the private pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight originated from DYB about 1400.

After takeoff the flight proceeded towards the destination airport. According to recorded air traffic control communications with the FAY air traffic control tower (ATCT), the pilot contacted Fayetteville Approach Control and advised the controller that he had automated terminal information service (ATIS) information Alpha and the approach controller advised the pilot to expect vectors for ILS approach to runway 4. The pilot was vectored for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 04 at FAY Airport, and air traffic control (ATC) communications were transferred to local control at the FAY ATCT.

The pilot established contact with local control and advised the controller that he was descending to 2,000 feet. The local controller cleared the pilot to land runway 4 and advised him the wind was from 240 degrees at 3 knots. About 2 minutes 26 seconds later, coordination between the local and radar east controller occurred. During that conversation it was noted that the flight was drifting right of course. The local controller then asked the pilot if he was receiving the localizer, to which he replied he was having a little bit of trouble right now and I seem to have, “…lost some gyros but I think we are getting it.” The local controller advised the pilot to maintain 2,000 and suggested a heading of 020 to join the localizer, which the pilot acknowledged.

At that time coordination between the local and radar east control positions occurred. The local controller then asked the pilot if he was picking up the glideslope to which he advised “…we are on it now.” The local controller asked the pilot if he wanted to attempt another approach but the pilot stated that, “…I think we are doing OK if it looks OK to you.” The local controller informed the pilot that he could not tell with the rate of descent and cleared the pilot for a localizer approach to runway 4. The pilot acknowledged the clearance with part of his call sign and approximately 37 seconds later, the controller cancelled the approach clearance and advised the pilot to climb and maintain 2,000 feet and fly runway heading, which he acknowledged. The controller then informed the pilot that overcast clouds existed at 500 feet, and the flight was at 1,200 feet about ½ mile away from the runway so he asked the pilot if he wanted to perform another approach. The pilot advised he did, and coordination between the local and east radar control positions occurred. The local controller then advised the pilot to fly heading 090 and climb and maintain 2,000 feet, which he acknowledged. About 4 seconds later, the controller asked the pilot his heading and he advised 081. Coordination between the local and Approach Control controller then occurred, and at that time a discussion was made about the pilot’s ability to maintain a steady heading. The local controller again instructed the pilot to maintain 090 degrees, climb and maintain 2,000 feet, and to contact Fayetteville Departure Control on frequency 133.0 MHz, which he acknowledge by reading back part of the frequency.

The pilot established contact with Fayetteville Approach Control, and he advised the departure controller that he was heading 095 going to 090 degrees. The flight was radar identified and the controller then advised the pilot to turn to heading 140 degrees, which he acknowledged. Review of recorded radar data from Fayetteville ATCT revealed that after the controller instructed the pilot to turn to heading 140 degrees, the radar recorded the pilot turned to right past the instructed heading. The voice communications then indicate that the controller advised the pilot to fly heading 220 degrees which he acknowledged. The recorded radar data indicates that the controller then asked the pilot what his current heading was and he replied 310 degrees. The controller again advised the pilot that he was to fly heading 220 degrees, to which he correctly read back the heading. The controller then asked the pilot if he was experiencing any problems with the airplane that prevented him from flying the assigned heading, to which he replied yeah and I’m currently, “…no gyro…” and I think the best thing for me is to climb a little bit and go to my alternate of ah Columbus or some point south.

The approach controller questioned the pilot about his ability to navigate to his alternate airport without gyros and he replied he could. The controller then cleared the flight to Columbus County Airport (CPC), and to climb and maintain 3,000 feet, which the pilot did not immediately acknowledge. The voice recording indicates a new controller established communication with the pilot and advised him the altitude was erratic and asked the pilot if he was OK. The pilot replied that he was not and the controller asked him if he wanted to fly to FAY Airport. The pilot began to state that the “…best thing” but the comment was truncated. The controller then asked the pilot if he could fly southwest bound and he advised “yeah southwest.” The controller then asked the pilot what heading he was flying and he advised 253 and his altitude was 2,500 trying to climb to 3,000. The controller then asked the pilot if he could do a non-gyro turn to which he replied he could. The controller advised the pilot to start a left turn and told him when to stop the left turn; however, the controller later advised the pilot that he never turned at all during the non-gyro turn instructions. The controller then asked the pilot if he could do a non-gyro approach to which he replied that he had, “done the drill before.” The controller asked the pilot that if during the first instrument approach was he picking up the glide slope and localizer to which he replied affirmative.
The controller then informed the pilot that they would again try an ILS approach to runway 4. The controller then asked the pilot his heading and he replied 268 degrees, to which the controller asked the pilot if the autopilot was flying the airplane or he was. The pilot’s reply was that he was. The controller then advised the pilot to fly southwest, and advised him that he had been flying southwest bound, but was now flying west bound. The controller asked the pilot if he could fly heading 200, to which he replied he could. The controller then asked the pilot if the airplane was equipped with a compass and reading off the cardinal headings, to which he replied affirmative. The controller then advised the pilot to fly south, which he acknowledged. Recorded radar data reflects the airplane proceeded in a southerly heading with no deviation noted. About 2 minutes 42 seconds later, the controller advised the pilot to fly heading 270 degrees, which he acknowledged. The radar data reflects the pilot turned to a westerly heading.

About 3 minutes 22 seconds later, the pilot was advised that the flight was 4 miles from the final approach fix, turn right heading northbound on the 010 and maintain 2,000 until established on the localizer, cleared for ILS approach to runway 4. The pilot read back, “…heading 010 maintain 2,000 cleared for the approach.” The radar reflects the airplane proceeded on a northerly then northeasterly heading and the controller then asked if the pilot was picking up the localizer, to which the pilot replied he was, and the controller then asked the pilot if he was picking up the glide slope to which the pilot advised he was not. The recorded radar data reflects a right turn, and about 18 seconds later, a loud squeal was heard on the frequency. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot despite numerous attempts by the controller to contact him..

One witness reported hearing a loud engine sound from a 4 cylinder engine then looked across I-95 and noted smoke from a wooded area. Another witness reported hearing the sound of the engine revved up, “like it was making a dive bomb run.” The witness did not see the airplane accident but reported that the airplane flew near his house. Another witness who was inside her residence reported hearing the airplane fly near her house and reported seeing smoke and flames from the accident. The witness then went outside and directed law enforcement to the accident site.


Friends and family of retired Col. Virgil Thomas "Tom" Deal Jr. paid their respects Friday at the first of two memorials planned for the decorated Army doctor.

Deal, 63, was killed Sunday when his plane crashed south of Fayetteville Regional Airport.

No one else was on board, officials said, and the cause of the crash remains under investigation.

Deal was remembered as a humble man who had accomplished great things during his 31-year Army career.

He was well-known throughout the military, especially within the special operations and medical communities.

Col. Peter Benson, who spoke during the ceremony, said Deal made a tremendous impact on both communities.

The man known as "the sensei" was "a leader, mentor and friend" to many, Benson said.
More than 200 people, including about a dozen high-ranking military officials that included the commanders of Army Northern Region Medical Command and Joint Special Operations Command, attended the nearly hour-long ceremony at the Airborne & Special Operations Museum in downtown Fayetteville.

Deal is survived by his wife of 42 years, Ida; his children, Wesley Deal and Susanne Glass; a brother; and several granddaughters.

Michael Deal, the brother, called Deal his hero.

Hunter Glass, Deal's son-in-law, asked those in attendance to remember Deal by doing their jobs the best they could.

"It's just not right that he's gone," Glass said. "We lost a lot. Our world came to an end, a large portion of it, on Sunday."

Deal served multiple tours at Fort Bragg, including leading the 28th Combat Support Hospital to Haiti in 2010, and was the first Army doctor to serve as command surgeon for the top three special operations commands - Army Special Operations Command and Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg and Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

He also commanded Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington , and Madigan Army Medical Center at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Most recently, Deal served as acting chief of surgery at the Fayetteville VA Medical Center.

Elizabeth Goolsby, director of the Fayetteville VA Medical Center, described Deal as a "gentle giant."

"He was a veteran who wanted to continue to serve his fellow veterans," she said.

Dr. Bruce Bolling, who served under Deal at the VA, said Deal was the best surgeon leader he ever met.

Bolling said he looked into Deal when he heard that Deal would be his boss at the VA.

After asking a retired colonel who had worked at Womack Army Medical Center who Deal was, he said he received a simple response in the form of a text message.

"They say, 'He is the best,' " Bolling said the message read.

A second memorial for Deal is scheduled for 3 p.m. Sunday at Helen Street Church of Christ in Fayetteville.

In lieu of flowers, memorials can be made to Helen Street Church of Christ at 500 Helen St., Fayetteville NC 28303 for "Vimba Vana - Tom Deal." Donations also can be made to the local Fisher House.

Story and photo:  http://www.fayobserver.com

Piper PA-28-160 Cherokee, N5714W

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 5714W        Make/Model: PA28      Description: PA-28 CHEROKEE
  Date: 12/15/2012     Time: 2034

  Event Type: Accident   Highest Injury: Fatal     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
  City: FAYETTEVILLE   State: NC   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 1 PERSON ON BOARD WAS 
  FATALLY INJURED, 6 MILES FROM FAYETTEVILLE, NC

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   1
                 # Crew:   1     Fat:   1     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Unknown      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: GREENSBORO, NC  (SO05)                Entry date: 12/17/2012