Sunday, December 30, 2012

Plane from Michigan lands along Baumann Road, near Greenville Airport (KGRE), Illinois

HIGHLAND — At 2:20 p.m. Sunday residents along rural Baumann Road about four miles east of this village heard a single engine plane slow down, and then cut its engine.

The aircraft, which took off in Michigan bound for Arkansas, had simply run out of fuel, said Highland Police Department Ptl. Rob Horner.

"We got a call from the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) that a pilot had run out of fuel and was about to land," Horner said. "The next call we got was from a passerby who said there was a plane on the road."

The impromptu landing went without a hitch, said Horner. A message went out to the nearby Greenville Airport, who sent a driver with a five-gallon can of aviation fuel that allowed the unidentified pilot to fire up his craft's engine and take off again.

Baumann Road's intersection with St. Rose Road is near where the landing took place.



NasJet, FlightSafety in pilot training pact

ARAB NEWS

Monday 31 December 2012

Last Update 30 December 2012 9:12 pm


NasJet has signed a deal with the premier provider of aviation training, FlightSafety in Dubai, to provide NasJet pilots with the latest in state-of-the-art aviation training.

Headquartered in Riyadh, NasJet is the luxury private aviation carrier operated by NAS Holdings, with a large managed fleet size of 65 aircraft exceeding a retail value of $ 1.5 billion.

NasJet is the only operator in the Middle East offering a complete range of services including aircraft sales, completions, management, flight support, fractional and charter, and enjoys one of the few licenses to operate within the Kingdom.

Flying an elite group of clients to destinations across the globe on demand, NasJet currently employs over 300 aviation experts of which 120 are full-time pilots.

FlightSafety International is the world’s leading professional aviation training company and supplier of flight simulators, visual systems and displays to commercial, government and military organizations.

The company provides more than a million hours of training each year to pilots, technicians and other aviation professionals from 154 countries and independent territories.

FlightSafety operates the world’s largest fleet of advanced full flight simulators at Learning Centers and training locations around the world.

James Dailey, chief operating officer at NasJet, comments: “Our alignment with FlightSafety enables NasJet to train toward the highest levels of safety, at multiple locations throughout the world, ultimately affording us tremendous flexibility while instilling superior skill sets concerning safety in our pilots.”

David Davenport, senior vice president at FlightSafety International, states: “NasJet flight crews will receive the highest quality training available, tailored to their specific needs and operational requirements.”

Davenport added: ‘FlightSafety’s training programs meet or exceed regulatory requirements and are designed to enhance aviation safety by helping pilots to achieve the highest level of proficiency. NasJet will also appreciate and benefit from FlightSafety’s outstanding customer service and ongoing investment in the development of new programs and services.”


http://www.arabnews.com

Beechcraft B100 King Air, N499SW: Accident occurred December 18, 2012 in Libby, Montana

NTSB Identification: WPR13FA073
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, December 19, 2012 in Libby, MT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/04/2015
Aircraft: BEECH B100, registration: N499SW
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

When the flight was about 7 miles from the airport and approaching it from the south in dark night conditions, the noncertificated pilot canceled the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A police officer who was on patrol in the local area reported that he observed a twin-engine airplane come out of the clouds about 500 ft above ground level and then bank left over the town, which was north of the airport. The airplane then turned left and re-entered the clouds. The officer went to the airport to investigate, but he did not see the airplane. He reported that it was dark, but clear, at the airport and that he could see stars; there was snow on the ground. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated but that the pilot-controlled runway lighting was not. The Federal Aviation Administration issued an alert notice, and the wreckage was located about 7 hours later 2 miles north of the airport. The airplane had collided with several trees on downsloping terrain; the debris path was about 290 ft long. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The town and airport were located within a sparsely populated area that had limited lighting conditions, which, along with the clouds and 35 percent moon illumination, would have restricted the pilot’s visual references. These conditions likely led to his being geographically disoriented (lost) and his subsequent failure to maintain sufficient altitude to clear terrain. Although the pilot did not possess a valid pilot’s certificate, a review of his logbooks indicated that he had considerable experience flying the airplane, usually while accompanied by another pilot, and that he had flown in both visual and IFR conditions. A previous student pilot medical certificate indicated that the pilot was color blind and listed limitations for flying at night and for using color signals. The pilot had applied for another student pilot certificate 2 months before the accident, but this certificate was deferred pending a medical review.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The noncertificated pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from terrain while maneuvering to land in dark night conditions likely due to his geographic disorientation (lost). Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s improper decision to fly at night with a known visual limitation.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 19, 2012, about 0002 mountain standard time (MST), a Beech B100, N499SW, collided with trees near Libby, Montana. Stinger Welding was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The non-certificated pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries; the airplane was destroyed from impact forces. The cross-country personal flight departed Coolidge, Arizona, about 2025 MST with Libby as the planned destination. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the nearest official reporting station, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the pilot had been cleared for the GPS-A instrument approach procedure for the Libby Airport (S59), which was located 7 nm south-southeast of Libby. The pilot acknowledged that clearance at 2353. At 2359, the airplane target was about 7 miles south of the airport; the pilot reported the field in sight, and cancelled the IFR flight plan. Recorded radar data indicated that the airplane was at a Mode C altitude of 11,700 feet mean sea level at that time, and the beacon code changed from 6057 to 1200.

A track obtained from the FilghtAware internet site indicated a target at 2320 at 26,000 feet that was heading in the direction of Libby. The target began a descent at 2340:65. At 2359:10, and 11,700 feet mode C altitude, the beacon code changed to 1200. The target continued to descend, and crossed the Libby Airport, elevation 2,601 feet, at 0000:46 at 8,300 feet. The track continued north; the last target was at 0001:58 and a Mode C altitude of 5,000 feet; this was about 3 miles south of Libby and over 4 miles north of the airport.

A police officer reported that he observed a twin-engine airplane come out of the clouds over the city of Libby about 500 feet above ground level. It turned left, and went back into the clouds. The officer thought that it was probably going to the airport; he went to the airport to investigate, but observed no airplane. It was dark, but clear, at the airport with about 3 inches of snow on the ground, and he could see stars. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated, but not the pilot controlled runway lighting. He listened for an airplane, but heard nothing.

When the pilot did not appear at a company function at midday on December 18, they reported him overdue. The Prescott, Arizona, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 1102 MST; the wreckage was located at 1835.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of FAA medical records revealed that the 54-year-old pilot first applied for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate in August 2004. On that Medical Certification Application, the pilot reported having 500 hours total time with 200 hours in the previous 6 months. No alcohol or medication usage was reported; however, the pilot was determined to be red/green color blind.

On June 9, 2010, the pilot reported on an application for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate that he had 925 hours total time with 150 hours in the previous 6 months. He was issued a third-class medical certificate that was deemed not valid for night flying or using color signal control.

On May 16, 2012, the pilot received a driving while intoxicated (DWI) citation in Libby.

The pilot reported on an application for an Airman Medical and Student Pilot Certificate dated October 16, 2012, that he had a total time of 980 hours with 235 hours logged in the previous 6 months. Item 52 for color vision indicated fail. This application reported a new diagnosis of hypertension, and use of medications to control it. This application reported yes in item 17 (v) for history of arrest of conviction for driving while intoxicated. The FAA deferred the issuance of the Student Pilot and Medical Certificate, indicating that they were investigating a failure to report within 60 days the alcohol-related motor vehicle action that occurred in Montana on May 16, 2012. 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) reviewed copies of the pilot's logbooks beginning on March 21, 2010, and ending November 4, 2012. The entries indicated a total time of 978 hours during that time period. Time logged for the 90 days prior to the accident was 34 hours. The logbooks recorded numerous trips to Libby with three entries in the previous 90 days. The last solo flight endorsement, in a Cessna 340, was signed off by a certified flight instructor in August 2011. The logbook contained several entries for flights in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions.

The IIC interviewed the chief pilot for the company, who was hired to fly the Stinger Company's Cessna CJ2 jet, which they purchased about 4 years earlier. The accident pilot owned the company, and would typically have the chief pilot arrange for a contract pilot to fly with him in the accident airplane. The chief pilot was standing by to fly the owner in the CJ2, but the owner never contacted him or requested another pilot for the accident airplane.

The IIC interviewed a contract pilot who flew with the accident pilot on December 16, 2012; this was their only flight together. It was a 6-hour round trip from Coolidge to La Paz, Mexico. The airplane was in perfect condition; everything was working, and they had no squawks. The pilot had paper charts, as well as charts on an iPad. The contract pilot felt that the pilot handled the airplane well, was competent, and understood all of the systems. The pilot coached the contract pilot on the systems installed including the autopilot. They used it on the outbound trip, and it operated properly. They used the approach mode into La Paz including vertical navigation. The pilot had no complaints of physical ailments or lack of sleep, and fuelled the airplane himself.

The passenger was a company employee who was not a pilot.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Beech B100, serial number BE89. The airplane's logbooks were not provided and examined. 

The IIC interviewed Stinger Welding's aviation maintenance chief, whose 4-year employment was terminated about 1 month after the accident. He stated that the airplane typically flew 200-400 hours a year; the company had flown it about 800 hours since its acquisition. The chief was not aware of any unresolved squawks as the owner usually had him take care of maintenance needs immediately. The airplane had been out of service for maintenance for a long time the previous year, having taken almost 7 months to get the propeller out of the shop due to the repair cost. The maintenance chief said that the owner kept the onboard Garmin GPS databases up to date. The airplane was operated under Part 91 CFR, and inspections being delayed were: the 6-year landing gear inspection was past due; the 12-month items were due; and the 3-year wing structure and wing bolt inspection was due.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

The closest official weather observation station was Sandpoint, Idaho (KSZT), which was 46 nautical miles (nm) west of the accident site at an elevation of 2,131 feet mean sea level (msl). An aviation routine weather report (METAR) issued at 2355 MST stated: wind from 220 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 10 miles; sky 2,800 feet overcast; temperature 0/32 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; dew point -3/27 degrees Celsius/Fahrenheit; altimeter 29.72 inches of mercury. Illumination of the moon was 35 percent.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/ Facility Directory, Northwest Pacific U. S., indicated that Libby Airport had an Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)-A, which broadcast on frequency 118.575.

Libby runway 15/33 was 5,000 feet long and 75 feet wide; the runway surface was asphalt. The airport elevation was 2,601 feet.

The airport was located within the general confines of the Kootenai National Forest, and beyond the town of Libby; the area was lightly inhabited.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The IIC and investigators from the FAA and Honeywell examined the wreckage on site. Detailed examination notes are part of the public docket. The center of the debris field was about 2.5 miles north of the airport at an elevation of 4,180 feet.

A description of the debris field references debris from left and right of the centerline of the debris path; the debris was through trees on a slope that went downhill from left to right. The debris path was about 290 feet long along a magnetic bearing of 125 degrees. 

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a topped tree with branches on the ground below it and in the direction of the debris field. About 50 feet from the tree were composite shards, and a piece of the composite engine nacelle, which had a hole punched in it.

The next point of contact was a 4-foot-tall tree stump with shiny splinters on the stump. The lower portion of the tree had been displaced about 30 feet in the direction of the debris field with the top folded back toward the stump. Underneath the tree trunk were the nose gear and control surfaces followed by wing pieces.

One engine and propeller with all four blades attached was about 50 feet from the stump, and on the right side of the debris path. This was later determined to be the right engine. Next on the left side of the debris path was the outboard half of one propeller blade; another propeller blade was about 10 feet further into the debris field.

Midway into the debris field were several trees with sheet metal wrapped around them. Near the midpoint of the debris field, a portion of the instrument panel had imbedded into a tree about 15 feet above the ground. The wiring bundle hung down the tree trunk to ground level. To the left of the instrument panel was one of the largest pieces of wreckage. This piece contained the left and right horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, and part of one wing with the landing gear strut attached. The rudder separated, but was a few feet left of this piece.

Next in the debris field was a 6- by 8-foot piece of twisted metal, which contained the throttle quadrant.

About 100 feet right of the debris path centerline and downhill from the throttle quadrant was a 10-foot section of the aft cabin. This section was connected by steel cables and wires to a 4- by 7-foot piece of twisted metal.

The furthest large piece of wreckage was the second engine; this was later determined to be the left engine. The left propeller hub with two blades attached had separated from the engine; the other two blades were located earlier within the debris field.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Division, Department of Justice, State of Montana, completed an autopsy, and determined that the cause of death was blunt force injuries.

The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing of specimens of the pilot.

Analysis of the specimens indicated no carbon monoxide detected in blood (cavity), no test performed for cyanide, no ethanol detected in muscle or kidney, and no findings for tested drugs.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The IIC and investigators from the FAA, Textron Aviation, and Honeywell examined the wreckage at Avtech, Kent, Washington, on February 13, 2013.

Detailed examination notes are part of the public docket. Investigators observed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engines.

The engines had been modified from Honeywell models to National Flight Services, INC., models per a supplemental type certificate (STC SE002292AT), and installed in the airplane per STC SA00856AT.

The left engine was TPE331-6-511B, serial number P-27185C based on a Beechcraft data tag on the engine. The starter/generator input shaft fractured and separated; the fracture surface was angular and twisted.

No metallic debris was adhering to the engine chip detector.

The engine inlet fractured and separated from the engine gearcase housing. Earthen debris was observed on the first stage compressor impeller. Vanes of the first stage impeller were bent opposite the direction of rotation.

Overall, the compressor case and plenum displayed crush damage. Upon removal of the airframe exhaust, investigators observed earthen debris within the engine exhaust. There was a fine layer of dried mud/earthen debris on the forward suction side of the third stage turbine blades. Investigators observed metal spray deposits on the third stage turbine stator vanes.

All four propeller blades exhibited leading edge damage; a section of one blade was not recovered with the aircraft wreckage, but this blade's tip was recovered.

The right engine was a TPE331-6-511B, serial number P27190C. 

Investigators observed rotational scoring in multiple locations on the propeller shaft. The first stage compressor impeller displayed tearing and battering damage; some vanes were bent opposite the direction of rotation. Investigators observed wood debris in the engine inlet area.

Investigators observed metal spray deposits noted on the suction side of the third stage turbine stator vanes.

All four of the right propeller's blades displayed leading edge damage and chordwise scoring. One tip fractured and separated; it was not recovered. All blades bent aft at midspan; they exhibited s-bending and tip curling.



 
Carl J. Douglas

NTSB Identification: WPR13FA073
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, December 18, 2012 in Libby, MT
Aircraft: BEECH B100, registration: N499SW
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On December 18, 2012, about 0002 mountain standard time (MST), a Beech B100, N499SW, collided with trees at Libby, Montana. Stinger Welding was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The noncertificated pilot and one passenger sustained fatal injuries; the airplane sustained substantial damage from impact forces. The cross-country personal flight departed Coolidge, Arizona, about 2025 MST on December 17th, with Libby as the planned destination. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the nearest official reporting station of Sandpoint, Idaho, 264 degrees at 46 miles, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reported that the pilot had been cleared for the GPS-A instrument approach procedure for the Libby Airport. The clearance had a crossing restriction of 10,700 feet at the PACCE intersection, which was the initial approach fix for the GPS-A approach. The pilot acknowledged that clearance at 2353. At 2359, the airplane target was about 7 miles south of the airport; the pilot reported the field in sight, and cancelled the IFR flight plan.

A police officer reported that he observed an airplane fly over the city of Libby, which was north of the airport; the airplane then turned toward the airport. The officer went to the airport to investigate, but observed no airplane. He noted that it was foggy in town, but the airport was clear. He also observed that the rotating beacon was illuminated, but not the pilot controlled runway lighting.

When the pilot did not appear at a company function at midday on December 18, they reported him overdue. The Prescott, Arizona, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 1102 MST; the wreckage was located at 1835.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) and investigators from the FAA and Honeywell examined the wreckage on site. A description of the debris field references debris from left and right of the centerline of the debris path. The debris was through trees on a slope that went downhill from left to right.

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a topped tree with branches on the ground below it and in the direction of the debris field. About 50 feet from the tree were composite shards, and a piece of the composite engine nacelle, which had a hole punched in it.

The next point of contact was a 4-foot tree stump with shiny splinters on the stump. The lower portion of the tree had been displaced about 30 feet in the direction of the debris field with the top folded back toward the stump. Underneath the tree trunk were the nose gear and a couple of control surfaces followed by wing pieces.

One engine with the propeller attached was about 50 feet from the stump, and on the right side of the debris path. Next on the left side of the debris path was the outboard half of one propeller blade; another propeller blade was about 10 feet further into the debris field.

Midway into the debris field were several trees with sheet metal wrapped around them. Near the midpoint of the debris field, a portion of the instrument panel had imbedded into a tree about 15 feet above the ground. The wiring bundle hung down the tree trunk to ground level. To the left of the instrument panel was one of the largest pieces of wreckage. This piece contained the left and right horizontal stabilizers, vertical stabilizer, and part of one wing with the landing gear strut attached. The rudder separated, but was a few feet left of this piece.

Next in the debris field was a 6- by 8-foot piece of twisted metal, which contained the throttle quadrant.

About 100 feet right of the debris path centerline and downhill from the throttle quadrant was a 10-foot section of the aft cabin. This section was connected by steel cables and wires to a 4- by 7-foot piece of twisted metal.

The furthest large piece of wreckage was the second engine; the propeller hub with two blades attached had separated.
--------------------------

Posted: Sunday, December 30, 2012 2:35 pm

Alan Lewis Gerstenecker/The Western News

“Our job is only to hold up the mirror — to tell and show the public what has happened.”

— Walter Cronkite 

* * * * *

Last week was one of those weeks when a journalist will look back on and say, remember when?

Yes, we remember, but there are those instances we’d just as soon forget.

Somehow, all the years and millions of typewriter and keyboard keys depressed cannot erase the memories.

Sometimes, a tragedy like the one that took the lives of Stinger Welding CEO Carl J. Douglas and employee John Smith harkens back three-plus decades to a similar snowy evening when a heavy-wet snowstorm brought down a single-engine Cessna.

I was just weeks out of college, and not really prepared for what an Illinois State Trooper and I found in a corn-stubble field. The images are vivid still.

On that April night 33 years ago, inclement weather played a part in bringing down a small aircraft that took the lives of three people, one of whom was just a boy of 10 years.

And, while the investigation of the Douglas accident is yet to be completed, the result is the same: A small aircraft was lost in the blinding nighttime snowfall, coming down in a disaster.

I knew nothing of the boy in the Pittsburgh Steelers jacket who perished with his parents in that crash so many years ago. All I know is he and his parents died as they tried to reach family for an Easter weekend.

Douglas and Smith died the same way, trying to get to their Stinger family. And while I didn’t know the lad and his parents, I did come to know Carl Douglas as someone who fiercely defended his company as he worked to keep a corporation afloat in tough economic times without the aid of a federal highway bill that could have provided multi-million dollar contracts.

No, Carl Douglas didn’t like to hear from me when I made inquiries that ultimately affected his business and his workers.

Similarly, I got no pleasure from hearing him struggle to answer. Ultimately, Douglas stopped trying to answer.

Just as it was his job to defend the company he had built, it is my job to ask the questions.

Actually, I always thought one day, I’d get the opportunity to sit down with Carl and clear the air, explain to him it is my job to make the inquiries.

It wasn’t until his death that I learned Carl and I were just about the same age — he was a 1977 high school grad, and I was two years earlier.

Instead, I came to know him from others as our staff here at The Western News put the proverbial “Cronkite mirror” up to reflect on Carl Douglas and his final days and minutes.

In the end, Carl Douglas’ story was a biography and not an autobiography. ... Told to all of us by Libby Patrolman Darren Short, Swede Mountain resident Shannon Myslicki, Ron Denowh, the family members interviewed by our Publisher Matt Bunk and reporter Ryan Murray and even an executive at the Libby Stinger Welding operation who previously introduced himself to me only as “I’m Mr. No Comment.”

All of these people are hurting for a man who built a company and died too soon.

I have no doubt under Douglas’ leadership Stinger Welding would  have succeeded, and we hope it does in his absence.

To hear his family members describe him, Carl Douglas was a loving husband and a great father, and I’m sure that’s the way he was reflected in the “Cronkite mirror” of his employees.

And like that lad in the Steelers’ jacket, it’s my guess Douglas hadn’t reached his potential either.

 I just wish I had gotten the chance to know them better.

(Alan Lewis Gerstenecker is editor of The Western News. His column appears weekly.)

Article and Photo: http://www.thewesternnews.com/opinion

Stinger, creditor sued for payment:  Steelmaker seeks $1.1 million balance 

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 499SW        Make/Model: BE10      Description: 100 KING AIR (U-21F UTE)
  Date: 12/19/2012     Time: 0702

  Event Type: Accident   Highest Injury: Fatal     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
  City: LIBBY   State: MT   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  AIRCRAFT CRASHED UNDER UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES, THE 2 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE 
  FATALLY INJURED, SUBJECT OF AN ALERT NOTICE, WRECKAGE LOCATED 3 MILES FROM 
  LIBBY, MT

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   2
                 # Crew:   1     Fat:   1     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   1     Fat:   1     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Unknown      Phase: Unknown      Operation: OTHER


  FAA FSDO: HELENA, MT  (NM05)                    Entry date: 12/20/2012 

http://registry.faa.gov/N499SW

VIDEO: "What really is going on at CARIBBEAN AIRLINES - have YOU ever heard of so many TECHNICAL problems?"

 

Published on Dec 23, 2012 

"Its all well and good passing these technical problems off as 'normal'- well they are NOT! - what is going on with their MAINTENANCE?"

Iris Riesen and Candy Chung fly high on private business jet success

Dynamic duo have excelled in male-dominated private-jet business as the industry has taken off in HK and the mainland over the past few years 

 Iris Riesen and Candy Chung know what it's like to fly high above the glass ceiling.

Both women are executives of private-jet aviation companies, an industry typically dominated by men. Riesen is managing director at Jet Aviation Hong Kong and Chung heads Global Aviation Asia in Hong Kong. Both have made a name in the industry piloting their companies as the business aviation market has taken off in the city and the mainland over the past few years.

Riesen was fascinated by the aviation industry as a young girl in Payerne, Switzerland, which is home to a military airfield. She was so into aviation that she recalls feeling uneasy unless there was a scent of the kerosene that powers jet engines in the air.

She joined Jet Aviation, a Swiss-based unit of America's General Dynamics, in 1995 after working in the flight dispatch department of Swissair, where she oversaw everything it takes to get an aircraft off the ground.

The only thing that would set her back occasionally was a debrief with an old-fashioned pilot. Back then, she said, the pilots would "give me that look of 'who do you think you are'". Her response? She just kept smiling. But for most of her time with Swissair (renamed Swiss International Air Lines in 2002) and then at Jet Aviation, she has felt recognised for her ability rather than being judged according to her gender. Still, Riesen feels she has had to work harder to prove that she knew her job as well as, if not better than, her colleagues knew theirs.

Relocating to Hong Kong to set up the local office for Jet Aviation in 2001, she found the city an open and easy place for a female executive, in contrast to an encounter she had in the United States. "I was attending a business jet conference in the US where 70 men were standing in a room. The moment I walked through the door, all of them stared at me as if I was in the wrong room."

When she arrived in Hong Kong, the private-jet market was just taking off and there was a lone operator, Metrojet, the aviation arm of Kadoorie Group, which had only one private jet.

A decade later, the number of private jets based in the city exceeds 60, and is expected to total 80 by the end of the year. Jet Aviation manages more than 10 private jets in Hong Kong. From 2008, the company expanded its maintenance operation to include the repair of airframes and engines.

The use of business jets in Hong Kong had "grown extremely fast over the past 10 years but it won't grow at that speed again", Riesen said. Besides potentially slower economic growth on the mainland, infrastructure constraints at Hong Kong's airport would hinder development, she added.

"Buying a private jet is quick but getting a parking space and maintenance service here is not that quick," Riesen said. Until the planned third runway was finished and the Hong Kong airport expanded by 2023, it would remain a headache, "and there are 20 more planes coming by year-end".

Candy Chung said it was her own curiosity that propelled her into business aviation. "Why on earth is it that the super-rich on the mainland can afford to buy fancy sports cars or a 100,000-yuan-a-head dinner but not a private jet? It really puzzled me about three years ago," she said. "Private jets are quite common in Europe. Some of my classmates at the boarding school in Britain would invite me for a retreat to Spain or France and travel on their own jets."

Three years ago, the concept of owning a private jet was still nascent on the mainland, crimped by regulatory restrictions and a lack of information about the aircraft.

"When I came to the mainland and asked the super-rich about owning a private jet, to my surprise, they all thought I was talking about Mars. I sensed that there was a huge market opportunity, so I started looking up information about private-jet acquisitions on the internet. However, there was very little information available on the web," Chung said.

She spent the following year on the road visiting air shows for business aviation across the globe, hoping to meet industry insiders who would tell her more. It was a sometimes discouraging endeavour. "I was mingling and building connections by making my way through a VIP gathering at Britain's Farnborough International Air Show. A private-jet manufacturing executive came up to me and asked about my background," she said.

"When he knew I had no aviation background but planned to sell private jets to the mainland, he said: 'It's a very professional industry for people like us who have been around for 20 years but not for a young lady like you.'"

Five air shows in Europe and the United States later, Chung has contacts that can advise on buying aircraft and knows lenders that specialise in private-jet financing and can introduce her to potential clients. In the past 18 months, she has closed 10 deals in mainland China, Singapore and Africa.

But still, Chung is conscious that her gender and age could be disadvantageous, so her marketing tactic has been to offer extra attention. "For example, when my client requests three aircraft to choose from, I will present eight or 10."

Chung said the mainland market for private jets was huge, particularly for pre-owned aircraft as buyers wanted immediate delivery - and a discount. She plans to focus on "Hong Kong-listed mainland enterprises" because it's easier to run a credit check on those companies.

Story and Photo:  http://www.scmp.com

Gadget Batteries Get New Scrutiny

By DANIEL MICHAELS And ANDY PASZTOR
The Wall Street Journal


Stricter international safety rules will kick in next year to tackle hazards from shipments of lithium batteries aboard planes, but pilot groups and power-cell makers are battling over whether there should be even tougher measures.

Each year, more than one billion rechargeable batteries—used in mobile phones, laptops, electric cars and other products—are produced globally, with a total value exceeding $9 billion, according to several industry estimates. The ubiquitous batteries normally are safe, but damaged or overheated cells can spontaneously ignite and create fierce fires—especially when thousands are jammed in cargo planes.

Debate is escalating over the safest ways to package, label and handle the potentially volatile shipments. In the U.S. alone, air-safety regulators say, lithium cells have been implicated in at least 24 combustion incidents on or around aircraft in the past three years, both in cargo and carry-on bags.

Lithium batteries are suspected of contributing to two fiery crashes of jumbo-jet freighters since 2010, including an Asiana Airlines Inc.  Boeing Co. 747 that plunged into the Pacific Ocean in July of last year.

The accidents, which killed four pilots, helped persuade the air-safety arm of the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization, to adopt stricter shipping standards that take effect Jan. 1, closing loopholes that have allowed some battery packages to avoid special precautions.

The final report is expected in coming weeks on the other accident, a United Parcel Service Inc. UPS 747 that went down in Dubai in 2010 after thick smoke obscured cockpit instruments an arm's reach from the pilots.

The report's findings, coupled with a recent call by U.S. crash investigators for improved fire-suppression systems on all cargo planes, are heightening pressure for additional action.

"Lithium batteries are becoming a big risk issue," said Alain Bassil, chief operating officer of Air France. The Air France-KLM SA unit recently decided to limit the number of batteries it carries in freighter aircraft and isolates them in compartments with enhanced firefighting equipment. On passenger planes, Air France is training cabin staff to douse smoldering personal electronics with water or juice because fire extinguishers are generally ineffective.

Pilot unions and independent safety experts want further protections, particularly because of the skyrocketing popularity of rechargeable electronics world-wide. They want strict controls on the number of batteries permitted in individual shipments, along with greater safeguards for damaged batteries and certain oversize versions that power vehicles.

Lithium-battery technology "is going to be part of our lives and transportation, so we need to step up and find a way to appropriately oversee it," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation, a global safety advocacy group.

Battery suppliers and a powerful array of consumer-electronics manufacturers oppose tougher regulations, saying they are unnecessary. "What should be done is a lot more enforcement" of existing standards, said George Kerchner, executive director of the Rechargeable Battery Association, which represents companies that produce and use 70% of the world's lithium cells.

The association, which led an industry coalition that killed earlier U.S. proposals to unilaterally tighten shipping controls, continues to emphasize that investigators haven't officially cited batteries for causing either of the two recent crashes.

Despite resistance, many aviation officials see momentum for change. "It's a top priority and a very hot-button issue for industry leaders," said Guenther Matschnigg, the top safety official at the International Air Transport Association, the largest airline trade group.

People on both sides of the issue expressed concerns about substandard batteries, often sold on the Internet as replacements or that end up in low-quality products. Cargoes of such cells, which industry officials say are mostly produced in China and shipped globally from ports around East Asia, frequently carry insufficient or misleading labels to avoid scrutiny, regulators warn. Officials worry that some governments in the region lack resources or the political will to aggressively police battery shipments.

The potential danger of lithium batteries stems from the same chemistry that makes them so useful: the ability to store a huge amount of energy. If one overheats or something slams into it, combustion can begin and a single battery can ignite others. The internal reaction can take hours to become dangerous, which means an incident that goes unnoticed on the ground can spark a fire once a plane is airborne.

For now, advocates of tighter regulation can claim several victories. January's International Civil Aviation Organization rule change will close a loophole that permitted routine air transport of battery bundles weighing up to 22 pounds without any special protective packaging, warning labels or pilot alerts about the location of such shipments. Starting next year, any battery shipment containing more than two lithium-ion batteries will have to comply fully with those detailed ICAO hazardous-goods requirements.

ICAO and postal officials around the world last month agreed to begin cracking down on bulk shipments of batteries, as well as on portable devices containing them, that are sent through the mail.

Potential dangers of lithium batteries have been widely debated among aviation officials since 2006, when a UPS DC-8 cargo jet caught fire and was destroyed on landing in Philadelphia. The crew escaped.

After that fire, and again after the UPS crash in Dubai, U.S. regulators considered tightening rules for handling lithium batteries. The latest proposals withered under intense industry and congressional opposition, and federal regulators have no plans to resurrect them. Companies that make and use the batteries argued the compliance costs would far outweigh the benefits of combating what they described as a minimal risk.

Before new global rules take effect, UPS is taking steps, on its own, to minimize exposure to battery fires. The Atlanta-based shipping company is developing a new class of flame-retardant cargo containers and aerosol fire suppressants. "We're trying to give the crew more time" to get back on the ground, said Capt. John Ransom, the company's chief pilot for McDonnell Douglas MD-11 aircraft.

"The UPS crash was a big shock to a lot of us," said Tim Clark, president of Dubai's Emirates Airline, which has put special fireproof bags in the cabins of its passenger jets in case portable electronic devices catch fire.

The cause of the 2010 UPS accident may never be determined because the inferno and the impact of the crash destroyed critical evidence. Yet many air-safety specialists are confident that bulk shipments of batteries on board aggravated the blaze.

"Whatever started the fire, lithium batteries significantly exacerbated the situation," said Capt. Mark Rogers, chairman of the dangerous-goods committee of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations.

Source:   http://online.wsj.com

Guatemalan Congresswoman Dies in Plane Crash

Governing Patriotic Party Congresswoman Catarina Castor died in the crash of a private plane in the northwestern Guatemalan province of Quiche, while the pilot was killed and another politician was injured, officials said Sunday. 

Pilot Julio Giron, 36, died in the accident and Quiche Gov. Heber Cabrera was transported to a Guatemala City hospital, where he is being treated for his injuries.

The accident happened Saturday afternoon in Nebaj, a town about 240 kilometers (149 miles) from the capital, Congressman Valentin Gramajo, leader of the Patriotic Party group in Congress, told reporters.

The 32-year-old Castor and the governor were heading to the city of Santa Cruz for a ceremony marking the 16th anniversary of the signing of the peace agreements that ended Guatemala's civil war, Gramajo said.

The pilot lost control of the plane on take-off from the air strip in Nebaj due to mechanical problems, emergency services officials said.

http://latino.foxnews.com

N507LX Replublic Airlines Flight 4914 Bombardier DHC-8: Aircraft on departure, an access panel separated onto the runway, aircraft returned and landed without incident, no injuries - Kansas City, Missouri

IDENTIFICATION
  Regis#: 507LX        Make/Model: DH8D      Description: DHC-8-400 DASH 8
  Date: 12/30/2012     Time: 1657

  Event Type: Incident   Highest Injury: None     Mid Air: N    Missing: N
  Damage: Minor

LOCATION
  City: KANSAS CITY   State: MO   Country: US

DESCRIPTION
  N507LX REPUBLIC AIRLINES FLIGHT4914 BOMBARDIER DHC-8 AIRCRAFT ON DEPARTURE, 
  AN ACCESS PANEL SEPARATED ONTO THE RUNWAY, AIRCRAFT RETURNED AND LANDED 
  WITHOUT INCIDENT, NO INJURIES, KANSAS CITY, MO

INJURY DATA      Total Fatal:   0
                 # Crew:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Pass:   0     Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    
                 # Grnd:         Fat:   0     Ser:   0     Min:   0     Unk:    


OTHER DATA
  Activity: Business      Phase: Take-off      Operation: Air Carrier


  FAA FSDO: KANSAS CITY, MO  (CE05)               Entry date: 12/31/2012 
 
 
A passenger on board the flight sent FOX 4 this photo.

KANSAS CITY, Mo. — A United flight bound for Denver Sunday morning from Kansas City International Airport had to turn around after an engine panel fell off the plane. 

Flight 4914 left KCI around 9:44 a.m. and had to circle the airfield for approximately 22 minutes before landing again.

No one was hurt and the plane was able to make a safe landing.

No other information was immediately available. FOX 4 has reached out to United Airlines and KCI for more details.

Bell 407, VT-PHH, Pawan Hans Helicopters (PHHI): Accident occurred December 30, 2012 near Katra, Reasi district, Jammu and Kashmir

Police personnel near the crashed helicopter carrying five Vaishno Devi pilgrims which made an emergency landing near Katra.



Five Vaishno Devi pilgrims from Delhi and the pilot of a Pawan Hans helicopter that they were travelling in from Katra were injured when the helicopter crash-landed at Chamera village in Reasi district on Sunday afternoon.


 While the injured pilgrims have been identified as Anita Puri, Meenakshi, Arun Kumar, Arti Devi and Raj Rani, the pilot has been identified as Captain A S Parmar. Another person on board, Chetan Kumar, escaped unhurt.

The helicopter was flying from Katra to Sanji Chhat enroute to Vaishno Devi shrine at that time, said Senior Superintendent of Police, Reasi, Raghubir Singh.

Sources said the helicopter was nearly 400 metres short of Sanji Chhat when its rear router suddenly broke and fell apart.

The victims have sustained spinal and head injuries, a doctor at Katra hospital said. While Captain Parmar and Anita Puri were airlifted to Army’s Command Hospital at Udhampur and Government Medical College at Jammu respectively, the others were taken to the Government Medical College Hospital at Jammu by road.

Villagers rushed to the spot to bring victims out of the wreckage. Senior officials from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, district administration and state police officers also reached at the site to supervise the rescue operations.

A two-member team of the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) will visit the spot, where the helicopter made an emergency landing, on Monday to inquire into the causes of the mishap.

However, this is not the first time a mishap has occurred on the Katra-Sanji Chhat corridor enroute to Vaishno Devi shrine.

Following mishaps in 1988 and 2007 due to technical snags, locals from Katra and near-by areas have repeatedly complained that helicopter operators are not adhering to the route prescribed by DGCA between Katra and Sanji Chhat.

http://www.indianexpress.com

Swearingen SA227-BC Metro III, EC-ITP: Cork, Ireland, plane crash families sue American manufacturer in Illinois court

An American plane manufacturer is to be sued by the Irish relatives of the victims of a horror smash in Cork two years ago.

Four passengers and the pilot and co-pilot died when a twin turbo prop Fairchild Metroliner crash-landed in thick fog.

The plane, operated by the Manx 2 airline, crashed on its third attempt when it flipped over.

Now the families of the four Irish victims are to sue the American company for millions of dollars in compensation.

Six passengers who survived the horror crash may also sue according to a report in the Irish Sun.

A lawsuit on behalf of the families has been lodged in Cook County Circuit Court in Illinois.

The deceased are named in the document as Patrick Cullinane, Richard Noble, Michael Evans and Brendan McAleese, a cousin of the husband of former Irish President Mary McAleese.

The report says that the families are suing M7 Aerospace, the plane’s manufacturer, and Honeywell International and Woodward Governor Company, the makers of sub-components for the plane.

The lawsuit claims: “The aircraft contained conditions which rendered it defective and not reasonably safe.”

A full safety report into the fatal Cork crash will be published in 2013.


http://www.irishcentral.com

Cirrus SR22, N436KS: Accident occurred September 15, 2012 in Willard, Missouri

NTSB Identification: CEN12FA633 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, September 15, 2012 in Willard, MO
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/05/2013
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N436KS
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system approach in night instrument meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. Radar track data indicated that the airplane crossed the final approach course near the initial approach fix, about 11 miles from the runway. The airplane drifted through the localizer about 0.25 mile before crossing the localizer again and drifting about 0.25 mile to the opposite side of the localizer. The airplane flightpath then paralleled the localizer briefly. The track data indicated that the airplane entered a left turn, which resulted in about a 90-degree course change. About that time, the pilot requested radar vectors to execute a second approach. The airplane entered a second left turn that continued until the final radar data point, which was located about 420 feet from the accident site. During the second left turn, about 9 seconds before the final radar data point, the pilot transmitted, "I need some help." The data indicated that the accident airplane descended at an average rate of 6,000 feet per minute during the final 10 seconds of data. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The airplane impacted an open area of a lightly wooded pasture located about 6 miles north-northwest of the destination airport. A witness reported hearing an airplane engine surge to high power about four times, followed by what sounded like a high speed dive. She heard the initial impact followed by an explosion. The postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The location and condition of the airframe parachute system were consistent with partial deployment at the time of ground impact. Based on the performance information depicted by the radar data, the pilot's request for assistance, and examination of the airplane at the accident scene, it is most likely the pilot became spatially disoriented in night meteorological conditions and subsequently lost control of the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot's loss of airplane control as a result of spatial disorientation experienced in night instrument meteorological conditions.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 15, 2012, at 0021 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design SR22 airplane, N436KS, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Willard, Missouri. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was registered to and operated by JL2, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Lee's Summit Municipal Airport (LXT) about 2330 on September 14, 2012. The intended destination was the Springfield-Branson National Airport (SGF), Springfield, Missouri.

At 2338, the pilot contacted the Kansas City Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility and requested an IFR clearance to SGF. The pilot was subsequently issued an IFR clearance and the flight proceeded on course to SGF. A cruising altitude of 7,000 feet mean sea level (msl) was assigned.

About 0002, control of the flight was transferred to the Springfield TRACON. The flight was about 50 miles north of SGF at that time. At 0014, air traffic control instructed the pilot to cross the initial approach fix (BVRLY intersection) at or above 3,000 feet msl, and cleared the pilot for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 14 at SGF. The flight was about 18 miles north of SGF. The pilot was instructed to contact the control tower at that time.

At 0017, the pilot contacted the SGF air traffic control tower. At that time, the tower controller cleared the pilot to land at that time. At 0020:31 (hhmm:ss), the pilot requested radar vectors in order to execute a second approach. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain 3,000 feet msl and turn left to a heading of 360 degrees. The pilot subsequently acknowledged the clearance. At 0021:17, the pilot contacted the controller and the controller acknowledged. At 0021:21, the pilot transmitted, "I need some help." No further communications were received from the pilot.

Radar track data depicted the accident airplane approaching SGF from the north-northwest on an approximate magnetic course of 157 degrees. After an en route descent, the airplane leveled at an altitude of 2,900 feet msl about 16 miles north-northwest of SGF. About 0018:00, the airplane flight path crossed the ILS runway 14 localizer near the initial approach fix (BVRLY intersection). The airplane drifted about 0.25 miles southwest of the localizer before crossing the localizer again, and drifting about 0.25 miles northeast of the localizer. Beginning about 0019:44, he airplane flight path appeared to parallel the localizer, about 0.12 miles northeast, for about the next 40 seconds.

The track data indicated that, about 0020:09, the airplane entered a left turn to become established on an approximate 064-degree magnetic course. About 0020:38, the airplane entered a second left turn that continued until the final radar data point, which was recorded at 0021:28. The final radar data point was located about 420 feet west-northwest of the accident site. The data indicated that the accident airplane descended from 2,800 feet msl at 0021:18 to 1,800 feet msl at 0021:28; an average descent rate of 6,000 feet per minute.

A witness reported hearing a low flying airplane prior to the accident. She noted the engine surged with high power about four times, followed by what sounded like a high speed dive. She stated that she heard the initial impact followed by an explosion. She observed the glow of the postimpact fire from her bedroom window. Her husband notified local authorities and they both responded to the accident site.

The airplane impacted an open area of a lightly wooded pasture located about 6 miles north-northwest of SGF. The elevation of the accident site was about 1,120 feet.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a third class airman medical certificate without limitations on October 7, 2011. On the application for that medical certificate, the pilot reported a total flight time of 731.9 hours, with 97.2 hours flown within the preceding 6 months. The pilot's logbook was not available to the NTSB for review.

According to the pilot's flight instructor, the accident pilot had completed a flight review on January 23, 2012. The flight instructor estimated the pilot's total flight time at 1,000 hours, with about 75 hours of actual instrument time and 650 hours in Cirrus airplanes.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a 2002 Cirrus Design SR22, serial number 0202. It was a low wing, four place, single engine airplane, with a fixed tricycle landing gear configuration. The airplane was powered by a 310-horsepower Continental Motors IO-550-N reciprocating engine, serial number 686271. The accident airplane was issued a normal category, standard airworthiness certificate in April 2002.

The aircraft maintenance logbooks were not available to the NTSB for review. Maintenance work orders provided by a mechanic indicated that an annual inspection was completed on September 1, 2011, at 2,001 hours total airframe time. An engine oil change was accomplished on April 10, 2012 at 2,070 hours total airframe time.

A logbook that appeared to contain flights in the airplane was recovered at the accident site. The most recent entry was dated September 9, 2012. The entry included an ending airframe service time of 2,172.8 hours. The preceding entry, dated September 8, 2012, included a notation for a dual VHF Omni Range (VOR) equipment check that appeared to have been signed by the pilot. The log contained entries totaling 14.5 hours within the preceding 30 days, and about 70.3 hours within the preceding 90 days.

The airframe manufacturer stated that the accident airplane was equipped with four seats and four corresponding restraints (seatbelts/shoulder harnesses) at the time of manufacture. The manufacturer was not aware of any available modifications to increase the seating capacity of the airplane. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Type Certificate Data Sheet applicable to the accident airplane noted a seating capacity of four. Aircraft records on file with the FAA did not include any modifications to the seating arrangement or occupant restraint systems.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Weather conditions recorded by the SGF Automated Surface Observing System, at 0020, were: wind from 070 degrees at 6 knots, 8 miles visibility, overcast clouds at 700 feet above ground level (agl), temperature 16 degrees Celsius, dew point 14 degrees Celsius, dew point 30.27 inches of mercury.

The area forecast current at the time of the accident noted overcast ceilings at 3,000 feet with cloud tops to 15,000 feet, and visibilities of 3 to 5 mile in light rain and mist. The terminal forecast for SGF current at the time of the accident noted overcast clouds at 300 feet agl with 6 miles visibility in mist and rain showers in the vicinity of the airport. An airman's meteorological information (AIRMET) advisory noted that IFR conditions were expected over southwestern Missouri, which included the accident site, with ceilings below 1,000 feet agl and visibility below 3 miles. There were no significant meteorological information (SIGMET), convective SIGMET, or weather watches in effect for Missouri at the time of the accident.

Civil twilight ended at 1948, with the moon setting at 1818. The moon was more than 15 degrees below the horizon at the time of the accident. The subsequent moonrise occurred at 0627, with the beginning of civil twilight at 0630.

There was no record of the pilot obtaining an official weather briefing from a flight service briefer; nor was there any record of weather information being accessed via the Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS). However, two IFR flight plans were filed through DUATS. An IFR flight plan from SGF to LXT was filed at 1604, and an IFR flight plan for the return flight from LXT to SGF was filed at 2257.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Springfield-Branson National Airport (SGF) was served by two paved runways. Runway 14 was 8,000 feet by 150 feet and constructed of grooved concrete. Approach and landing guidance to runway 14 consisted of an ILS approach procedure, a 4-light precision approach path indicator (PAPI), a medium intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights (MALSR), and high intensity runway edge lights.

The ILS runway 14 approach procedure specified a minimum initial (glide slope intercept) altitude of 2,900 feet msl, with a 3.00-degree glide slope. The published decision height for a straight-in approach was 1,462 feet msl, with one-half mile visibility required for landing.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located in an open area of a lightly wooded pasture about 6 miles north-northwest of SGF. Linear ground impact marks consistent with being formed by the wing leading edges emanated from the main impact crater. Based on the ground impact markings, the airplane was oriented on an approximate heading of 340 degrees at the time of impact. The debris field extended to approximately 110 feet east, 140 feet northeast, and 70 feet north of the main impact crater. Significant portions of the airframe were consumed or damaged by a postimpact fire. Isolated areas of the surrounding vegetation were also affected by the postimpact fire.

The entire airframe was fragmented. The main impact crater contained the propeller, engine, instrument panel, and portions of the fuselage. The airplane flight control surfaces and wing flaps were located within the debris field. The ailerons and flaps had separated from the wings and were deformed consistent with impact forces. The aileron control cables were frayed and separated consistent with impact forces.

The empennage was separated from the airframe. It came to rest inverted about 10 feet east of the main impact crater. The elevator remained attached to the stabilizer and both appeared to be otherwise intact. The left horizontal and vertical stabilizers, left elevator, and rudder were consumed by the postimpact fire. A portion of the rudder remained attached to the lower rudder hinge. Elevator and rudder control continuity was confirmed between the empennage and the cockpit area.

The engine was located in the impact crater. It remained partially attached to the engine mount and airframe firewall. Portions of the firewall were deformed into/around the engine accessory section. The crankcase, cylinders, induction system, and exhaust system exhibited damage consistent with impact forces. All of the cylinders remained attached to the crankcase. The magnetos had separated from the engine and the ignition harness was damaged.

The three-bladed propeller assembly, with the propeller flange attached, separated from the engine. The engine crankshaft was fractured aft of the propeller flange. The appearance of the fracture surface was consistent with an overstress failure. One propeller blade had separated at the hub and was recovered from the impact crater. The remaining two propeller blades remained attached to the hub. The propeller blades exhibited S-bending and chordwise scratches.

The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) components remained attached to the airframe. The activation cable was continuous from the cockpit activation handle to the igniter assembly. The safety pin was not located with the activation handle consistent with it being removed prior to flight. The packed parachute assembly was located about 40 feet from the main impact crater. The parachute risers and suspension lines extended from the main impact crater to the parachute assembly and were oriented approximately perpendicular to the linear impact marks emanating from the main impact crater.

The postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy of the pilot was conducted at the Boone/Callaway County Medical Examiner's Office, on September 17, 2012. The pilot's death was attributed to blunt trauma injuries sustained in the accident.

The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology report was negative for all drugs in the screening profile. The report stated that 10 (mg/dL, mg/hg) ethanol was detected in blood samples. The report also noted that the ethanol was likely due to sources other than ingestion.


 http://registry.faa.gov/N436KS


Suit filed over fatal SW Missouri plane crash  

Posted:  June 11, 2013


SPRINGFIELD, Mo. (AP) - A new lawsuit blames pilot "negligence and carelessness" for causing a southwest Missouri plane crash that killed five people.

The suit was filed Monday in Springfield by Janis Melton, the mother of one of the victims, 46-year-old Robin Melton. It seeks unspecified damages from the estate of the pilot, 44-year-old John Lambert of Springfield.

Melton, Lambert and Lambert's three children were killed in the crash on Sept. 15 after flying back from a Kansas City Royals game. The single-engine plane went down near Willard, Mo., about six miles from Springfield-Branson National Airport.

There was no listed attorney for Lambert's estate.

The lawsuit seeks unspecified damages.

A National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the cause of the crash continues and isn't expected to be complete until September at the earliest.

 
NTSB Identification: CEN12FA633 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, September 15, 2012 in Willard, MO
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N436KS
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On September 15, 2012, about 0023 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design SR22, N436KS, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Willard, Missouri. The pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The aircraft was registered to and operated by JL2, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from Lee’s Summit Municipal Airport (LXT) about 2340 on September 14, 2012. The intended destination was the Springfield-Branson National Airport (SGF), Springfield, Missouri.

Springfield Approach was providing air traffic control services to the flight at the time of the accident. The pilot contacted Springfield Approach about 0002 as the flight entered their airspace. About 0017, the pilot was cleared for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 14 at SGF. The pilot was instructed to contact the control tower at that time. At 0020, about 3 minutes after establishing contact with the control tower, the pilot requested radar vectors in order to execute a second ILS approach. About 30 seconds later, radar contact was lost. The controller’s attempts to contact the flight were not successful.

The accident site was located in a pasture about 6 miles northwest of SGF. Ground impact was located in an open area of the lightly wooded pasture field. The airplane was fragmented. The main impact crater contained the propeller, engine, instrument panel, and portions of the fuselage. Linear ground impact marks, consistent with being formed by the wings, emanated from the main impact crater. Based on the ground impact markings, the airplane was oriented on an approximate heading of 340 degrees at the time of impact. The debris field extended to approximately 110 feet east of the main impact crater. Located within the debris field were the airplane flight control surfaces and wing flaps.


 
On Saturday, September 15, 2012, John M. Lambert, 44, Grayson M. Lambert, 16, McKinley Rae Lambert 15, and Joshua Robert Lambert, 10, died in a tragic plane crash when returning to Springfield from a Kansas City Royals baseball game. Also with them was family friend Robin Melton, 46.

 
Robin E. Melton


SPRINGFIELD, Mo. -- Three months ago, a small plane flown by a Springfield man crashed in a field six miles from the airport. All five people on board died instantly.

For the families of John Lambert, his three kids, and his friend Robin Melton, that day in September seems like a never-ending nightmare.

"I think that as parents you think this will never happen to you and I just think that it's not real. I see them every day in my mind. Talk to them every day. Yeah, it's like it's a dream, really it's a nightmare," explained Trisha Lambert, John Lambert's mother.

"It's a nightmare because we miss them. We truly do," agreed John's dad Mike. "We'll always miss them. But they have always been here. And we have memories that fill the blank spaces."

Memories of fallen family members pepper the Lambert household. Homemade birthday cards from the kids to their dad sit on a shelf. Pictures of the happy family line a wall. For John's parents, it is a simple way to remember.

"(John and Robin's) influence touched so many people and so many people who needed help got help through them. And that's just the way they were. They cared about the community, they cared about people," said Mike Lambert.

That caring spirit continues even after death. Lambert's parents distributed money donated to the family to causes John and the kids believe in. They have taken a tragedy and turned it into good will towards others.

"For McKinley, we donated to the American Heart Association. She had open-heart surgery when she was 12-years-old and then in 2010 she was their poster girl," smiled the proud grandmother. "Grayson, we made a donation to the Glendale debate club. He just came alive in the debate team."

For the youngest child, Joshua, money went for a new church playground. For John, a lifetime scholarship is set up in his name, and donations to the Drury Business School and Swimming program were made in his honor.

All the donations are a way for the family to memorialize and celebrate the lives lost.

"We just feel really positive about what's been done in all four of their names. And it's just very, it's a wonderful feeling," said Trisha Lambert.

For the New Year, Lambert's parents hope people will remember the family and see how much can be accomplished, even when life is cut short.

"We have the wonderful memories and we hold onto those, we hold onto those very tight, and celebrate their lives," the mother said. "Our faith tells us there's a promise that our family will be in heaven and so I've felt that from the very beginning. I've felt a peace about the five of them being with the Lord. I'm not saying that my heart's not broken and I didn't cry. I cried so much I didn't know how to cry anymore. But I celebrated the fact that the promise is being fulfilled and that they are safe. I know that Josh and McKinley and Grayson are looking after the Newtown children."

As the National Transportation Safety Board continue to investigate the cause of the crash, Lamberts parents said they have a new lease on life. They constantly learn new things about their son and grandchildren and continue to be amazed at how many people supported the family after the crash.

"Faith, friends and close family have lifted us up and took care of us. After it all, we fell like we are stronger, but we've had to be stronger," John's father said. "John could see the best in people. And people saw the best in him."

Story and video:  http://www.kspr.com

Seawind 3000 (built by Larry E. Sapp), N514KT: Accident occurred April 02, 2012 in Deland, Florida

http://registry.faa.gov/N514KT

NTSB Identification: ERA12FA265  
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, April 02, 2012 in Deland, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/02/2013
Aircraft: SAPP LARRY E SEAWIND 3000, registration: N514KT
Injuries: 3 Serious,2 Minor.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot/owner flew the experimental amateur-built amphibious airplane with a pilot-rated passenger on a long cross-country flight to a land-based airport the day before the accident. The pilots landed the airplane uneventfully after the cross-country flight; however, while they were en route, the airplane’s transponder malfunctioned. The next day, the pilots departed to have the transponder replaced at a nearby maintenance facility. The airplane lost total engine power shortly after takeoff, stalled, and descended into a supermarket located about 1 mile from the departure end of the runway, where it was consumed by a postcrash fire.

The pilot-rated passenger reported that there were no problems with the airplane’s takeoff roll and initial climb; however, when the pilot turned to the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern, the engine lost total power. A pilot at the departure airport reported that the accident airplane rotated about 500 feet before the end of the runway and began a shallow climb, while mostly maintaining a high pitch angle. Shortly thereafter, he observed the airplane stall and enter a descending left spin, before it disappeared behind a tree line.

Postaccident examination of wreckage did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal engine operation; however, the condition of the wreckage precluded the investigators from functionally checking the engine, its associated components, and fuel system. In addition, it could not be determined if debris that was found in the airplane’s fuel system was present before the postcrash fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined because the damage and postimpact fire precluded thorough examination of the engine and its systems.


HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 2, 2012, about 1920 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built amphibious Seawind 3000, N514KT, owned and operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged when it impacted a building shortly after takeoff from the Deland Municipal Airport (DED), Deland, Florida. The private pilot owner and a commercial pilot passenger were seriously injured (The private pilot owner succumbed to his injuries on May 26, 2012). One person inside the building was seriously injured, and two other individuals inside the building sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for the Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB), Daytona Beach, Florida. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to witnesses and information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot/owner and pilot-rated passenger flew from the Aurora Municipal Airport (ARR), Aurora, Illinois, to DED on April 1, 2012, with a refueling stop in Tennessee, to begin training for a seaplane rating on the morning of the accident. The training was to be conducted on a lake in Altamonte Springs, Florida, utilizing a float equipped Maule M-7-235. The owner originally intended to land in Sanford, Florida; however, he elected to land at DED after the airplane's transponder malfunctioned while en route. The purpose of the accident flight was to fly to DAB to have the transponder replaced at a maintenance facility.

During a telephone conversation with an employee at the maintenance facility, the pilot/owner reported that he was new to the airplane, which he had purchased about 6 weeks earlier, after it had not been flown for about 3 years.

The airplane departed from runway 23, a 4,301-foot-long, asphalt runway.

The passenger reported that there were no problems with the airplane’s takeoff roll and initial climb. As the pilot turned crosswind, the engine suddenly quit. His next recollection was rolling on the floor of a supermarket. The passenger did not hear any engine sputtering or observe any other anomalies during the flight. He was also not able to recall the point at which the airplane lifted off the runway, the altitude the engine lost power, or any instrument indications.
 
A pilot at DED reported that he landed on runway 23, and while taxiing, observed the accident airplane depart. The airplane rotated about 500 feet prior to the end of the runway, and began a shallow climb, while mostly maintaining a high pitch angle. Shortly thereafter, he observed the airplane "stall" and enter a descending left spin, before it disappeared behind a tree line. He did not hear any communications from the accident airplane over the airport common traffic advisory frequency after the takeoff.

A witness, who was in a car that was parked outside the front entrance of the supermarket, reported that she heard one or two "sputtering" engine sounds. She then looked up and observed the airplane in a climb attitude, very low in the sky. The airplane turned left and immediately descended straight down, nose first into the roof of the supermarket.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot/owner, age 60, held a private pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on September 9, 2010. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 450 hours. The pilot reported 495 hours of total flight experience, which included 15 hours during the previous 12 months, on an insurance application dated September 22, 2009.

The pilot/owner’s logbooks were not located and his total flight experience and his flight experience in make and model could not be determined. 

The passenger, age 52, held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine, multiengine and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate, prior to the accident, was issued on January 3, 2012. At that time, he reported 4,000 hours of total flight experience.

The passenger had known the pilot since 1994. He was not aware of the pilot’s intention to purchase the accident airplane. He was aware that the pilot was previously interested in purchasing the certified version of the Seawind upon its release. The passenger had flown with the pilot in the accident airplane for about 1 hour, about 1 week prior to the accident. He believed the pilot had received some initial training in the airplane from the individual who brokered the sale; however, he was not able to estimate the pilot’s flight experience in make and model.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The amphibian, four-seat, high-wing, retractable-gear, composite airplane, serial number 60, was manufactured from a kit in 2002. It was powered by a tail-mounted Lycoming IO-540-K1G5D, serial number L-18822-48A, 300-horsepower engine, equipped with a three-bladed Hartzell HC-E3YR-1RF constant-speed propeller assembly.

According to records obtained from the FAA, the airplane was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate in July 2002, and was purchased by the private pilot on January 7, 2012.

The airframe and engine logbooks were not located.

According to Lycoming, the engine was manufactured in 1978 and subsequently shipped to Piper Aircraft Company.

A search of the NTSB accident database revealed that the same serial number engine that was installed on the accident airplane was previously installed on a Piper PA32RT-300, N2221G that was involved in a fatal accident on March 7, 1993, after it experienced a partial loss of engine power during takeoff, in Big Bear City, California (NTSB Accident Number - LAX93FA141). At that time, the engine had been operated for about 3,800 total hours and about 1,030 hours since it was overhauled during February 1985.

An engine repair invoice from a repair station in Zephyrhills, Florida, revealed that the engine was overhauled during October 2001.

The airplane listing information provided by the pilot’s representative indicated that the airplane had been operated for 400 hours, which included the engine being operated for 400 total hours since overhaul. The listing also noted that the airplane was equipped with long range fuel tanks (110 gallons), had undergone a condition inspection on May 3, 2011, and the sale price included 10 hours of dual instruction. The broker was fatally injured in a Seawind 3000 accident that occurred in Sarasota, Florida, on January 12, 2013 (NTSB Accident Number – ERA13FA109).

A third individual, who was a friend of the passenger, and was also attending the seaplane training reported that the pilot/owner told him the that the airplane performed well during the flight from Illinois to Florida, and cruised at 155 knots, with a fuel burn of 17 gallons per hour. The pilot/owner also mentioned to him that the airplane was purchased from an estate sale and had not been flown for a 3 year period.

According to fueling records obtained from a fixed-base operator at McMinn County Airport (MMI), Athens, Texas, the airplane was “topped-off” with 50.8 gallons of 100-low-lead aviation gasoline on April 1, 2012.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The reported weather at DED, elevation 80 feet, at 1935 was: wind 240 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 7 statute miles; sky clear; temperature 29 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 15 degrees C; altimeter 29.87 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The airplane descended into the roof of a supermarket, located about 1 mile from the departure end of runway 23. The airplane penetrated the roof, and impacted shelving before coming to rest upright, on a heading of about 260 degrees.

The airplane was initially examined at the accident site and then recovered to a storage facility for additional examination.

A postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit and consumed the airframe, with the exception of the outboard 8 feet of the right wing and small composite fragments. The outboard 56 inches of the right aileron and outboard 11-inches of the right flap remained attached. Both right wing fuel tank caps remained installed. The right elevator tip was located on the roof top. All three landing gear were located in the debris, as was the top portion of the vertical fin.

All primary flight controls were connected at their respective control columns and pedals in the cockpit. Flight control continuity for the elevator was confirmed from the cockpit to the elevator bellcrank control tube. The right aileron control cable remained attached to the control surface. The left aileron cable was intact to a charred portion of the left aileron bellcrank. The rudder control cables were continuous from the cockpit, to about the mid-cabin area.

The propeller assembly remained attached to the crankshaft flange. One propeller blade was melted about 24 inches from the hub. A second blade was separated about 17 inches from the hub, with its outboard section located in the debris. A third blade was intact. Two of the propeller blades had curled tips and contained a series of small leading edge gouges. All of the propeller blades were relatively straight, with no twisting damage. The propeller pitch change mechanism remained intact; however, it did not display any witness marks associated with propeller blade angle position.

The engine, including all accessories sustained fire damage. A subsequent teardown of the engine at Lycoming Engines, Williamsport, Pennsylvania, did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions. The engine was rotated about 350 degrees, with corresponding valve continuity and piston movement, prior to coming to a hard stop. During disassembly, a piece of molten metal was located between a connecting rod and counterweight, which resulted in restricted movement. The spark plugs were removed and their electrodes were found intact. The fuel injector fuel inlet screen was found properly installed and absent of contamination. It was also noted that the engine crankcase numbers did not match. In addition, five of the six cylinders contained different part numbers. According to a Lycoming representative, two of the cylinders (Nos. 1 and 2) were not approved for installation on the IO-540K series engine.

The engine fuel flow transducer, fuel line and fitting, which were heavily fire damaged, were examined at the Safety Board’s Material’s Laboratory, Washington, DC., in an attempt to identify if debris found in those components may have been present prior to the accident. A black colored particulate was removed from the transducer and similar material was removed from the fuel line. Examination of the particles utilizing a Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) micro-spectrometer with a germanium attenuated total reflectance (ATR) accessory revealed no significant spectral patterns, which was consistent with little or no organic material present. The samples were then analyzed by scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and quantitative standardless energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy (EDS), which revealed the presence of materials found within the engine and fuel system. Due to the extent of the fire damage to the transducer, fuel lines, and fitting it was not possible to determine if the debris was present prior to the fire.       


NTSB Identification: ERA12FA265 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, April 02, 2012 in Deland, FL
Aircraft: SAPP LARRY E SEAWIND 3000, registration: N514KT
Injuries: 3 Serious,2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 2, 2012, about 1920 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Seawind 3000, N514KT, owned and operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged when it impacted a building shortly after takeoff from the Deland Municipal Airport (DED), Deland, Florida. The certificated private pilot owner and a commercial pilot in the airplane were seriously injured. One person inside the building was seriously injured, and two other individuals inside the building sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the flight that was destined for the Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB), Daytona Beach, Florida. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to records obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the amphibious airplane was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate in July 2002, and was purchased by the private pilot during January 2012.

According to witnesses and information obtained from the FAA, the pilot/owner and pilot-rated passenger flew from Aurora, Illinois, to DED on April 1, 2012, with a refueling stop in Tennessee, to begin training for a seaplane rating in Altamonte Springs, Florida, on the morning of the accident. The owner originally intended to land in Sanford, Florida; however, he elected to land at DED after the airplane's transponder malfunctioned while en route. The purpose of the accident flight was to fly to DAB to have the transponder replaced at a maintenance facility.

During a telephone conversation with an employee at the maintenance facility, the pilot/owner reported that he was new to the airplane, which he had purchased about 6 weeks earlier, after it had not been flown for about 3 years.

The airplane departed from runway 23, a 4,301-foot-long, asphalt runway.

A pilot at DED reported that he landed on runway 23, and while taxiing, observed the accident airplane depart. The airplane rotated about 500 feet prior to the end of the runway, and began a shallow climb, while mostly maintaining a high pitch angle. Shortly thereafter, he observed the airplane "stall" and enter a descending left spin, before it disappeared behind a tree line. He did not hear any communications from the accident airplane over the airport common traffic advisory frequency after the takeoff.

A witness, who was in a car that was parked outside the front entrance of a supermarket, reported that she heard two "sputtering" engine sounds. She then looked up and observed the airplane in a climb attitude, very low in the sky. The airplane turned left and immediately descended straight down, nose first.

The airplane descended into the roof of a supermarket, located about 1 mile from the departure end of the runway. The airplane penetrated the roof, and impacted shelving before coming to rest upright, on a heading of about 260 degrees.

A postcrash fire destroyed the cockpit and consumed a majority of the airframe, which was constructed of composite materials. The airplane was equipped with a tail-mounted Lycoming IO-540 series, 300-horsepower engine, with a three-bladed Hartzell constant-speed propeller assembly. One propeller blade was melted about 24-inches from the hub. A second blade was fractured about 17-inches from the hub, with its outboard section located in the debris. A third blade was intact. Two of the propeller blades had curled tips; however, all of the propeller blades were relatively straight, with no twisting damage. The engine, including all accessories sustained fire damage. Initial external examination of the engine did not reveal any catastrophic failures; however, the engine was retained for further examination.

=============

The engine in an experimental plane that crashed into a DeLand Publix supermarket last year, killing the pilot and injuring four others, was involved in a fatal crash nearly 20 years earlier, according to a federal report. 

The Seawind 3000 nose-dived into the roof of the Publix shortly after take-off from DeLand Municipal Airport on April 2, 2012, injuring three shoppers in the store. The pilot later died from burns while the passenger in the plane was seriously injured.

Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said the plane's 300-horsepower 1978 engine was involved in a fatal accident in Big Bear City, Calif., in 1993, in another aircraft. It experienced a “partial loss of engine power during takeoff,” leaving two dead, including the pilot, and four injured, the NTSB reported.

The report, issued Oct. 23, didn't pinpoint the cause of the crash into the Publix at 299 E. International Speedway Blvd. That will come in the next phase of the NTSB investigation.

“It's just a factual report. It's not a probable cause (report),” said Keith Holloway, a public affairs officer with the NTSB. “That information will be analyzed and a probable cause will be determined,” which usually takes at least six months.

After taking off under clear skies, the Seawind went into a downward left spin and crashed into the building, about a mile from the end the runway. One witness, parked in a car in front of Publix, reported hearing “sputtering” engine sounds before the crash, the report said.

Kim Presbrey, an Illinois attorney and private pilot, died nearly two months after the crash due to complications from third-degree burns. His friend and passenger, Thomas Rhoades of Illinois, a commercial pilot, was seriously injured.

Rhoades told investigators “there were no problems with the airplane's takeoff roll and initial climb. As the pilot turned crosswind, the engine suddenly quit. His next recollection was rolling on the floor of a supermarket,” according to the NTSB report.

Presbrey and Rhoades left Aurora, Ill., on April 1, heading to Altamonte Springs for seaplane training. They stopped to refuel in Tennessee and attempted to continue on to Orlando Sanford International Airport. When the plane's transponder — a device which reports a plane's location to air-traffic controllers — malfunctioned, they landed in DeLand.

The fatal crash occurred the next day, when the pair took off for Daytona Beach International Airport in order to have the transponder replaced at a maintenance facility.

During a conversation with an employee at the maintenance facility, Presbrey said he was “new to the airplane, which he had purchased about six weeks earlier, after it had not been flown for about three years,” the report states.

Presbrey had about 500 hours of total flying time and 20 hours flying the Seawind, the report say.

Rhoades told investigators he flew with Presbrey in the plane for about an hour, one week prior to the accident. He believed Presbrey got “some initial training” from the person who brokered the plane's sale.

That broker also was killed in a Seawind 3000 accident in Sarasota on Jan. 12, the report said.

After the crash, Publix was closed for several months for repairs and renovations. In July 2012, Publix sued Presbrey's estate, claiming the crash caused nearly $1 million in damage to the store. The suit, which is pending in circuit court, claims Presbrey was inadequately trained.

The crash sparked an inferno that destroyed the plane's cockpit and damaged the engine. Investigators sent the engine to its manufacturer, Lycoming Engines, for examination, which “did not reveal any preimpact malfunctions,” the report states. However, two of the six cylinders in the engine were not approved for installation on that model of engine by the manufacturer, the report notes.

http://www.news-journalonline.com


 
 
Kim E. Presbrey 


Kim Presbrey, a prominent attorney, died May 26  at Loyola University Medical Center.   The crash that claimed his life gave him serious burns he fought to recover from for months.  Presbrey was a nature enthusiast, a hunter, a fisherman, an attorney, a lobbyist, a labor advocate, a sports fan, a master shopper, a pilot, and above all, a family man.


About 100 people were inside a local Publix on a Monday evening in April when an airplane — or rather a "big ball of fire" to witnesses — came through the ceiling near the meat department.

By the end of the night, thousands more eyes were on the DeLand grocery store as black smoke lifted out of the hole in the roof with media crews on the ground and in the air capturing the chaotic scene.

For online readers of the Daytona Beach News-Journal, that astonishing plane crash was the top local news story of 2012...

Source:  http://www.news-journalonline.com