Saturday, March 24, 2018

UPDATE: Mohave Valley firefighters urge residents not to eat Easter candy from Egg Drop

UPDATE ON MARCH 25: The Mohave Valley Fire Department released more information about the Mohave Valley Community Park Egg Drop that took place on Saturday.

According to a statement from the department, the Mohave County Department of Public Health (MCDPH) received complaints about the Egg Drop on Saturday, as the plane used to drop candy was reportedly also used for agricultural purposes.

Firefighters say that the plane was reportedly scrubbed multiple times before it was used for the event, and no illnesses were reported to the MCDPH as of this writing.

However, the fire department stands by their warning yesterday as a precaution, adding that the MCDPH recommends that visitors remove and wash their clothing to prevent any possible contact with herbicide.

Anyone who experiences nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, excessive sweating or urination should seek medical assistance immediately.

For questions or concerns, contact poison control at 800-222-1222. 


ORIGINAL STORY

MOHAVE VALLEY, Ariz. (KTNV) - The Mohave Valley Fire Department is warning residents not to eat the candy that was dropped from an airplane at Mohave Valley Community Park Saturday morning.

According to a post from the department's Facebook page, a crop duster was used to drop candy and eggs as part of an Easter celebration. They say that the items may be covered in herbicide, as it appears that the crop duster tank was not rinsed out before it was used for the Easter event.

The post said that the fire department did not run the event.

Residents should not eat anything dropped by the airplane. Those who attended the event are urged to wash their hands and throw away their candy and eggs.

Original article can be found here ➤  https://www.ktnv.com






Mohave Valley Fire Department

Mohave Valley Fire Department was contacted earlier today from Mohave County Department of Emergency Management regarding the egg drop. Our main concern is the safety and well-being of our residents. The purpose of this page is to only post information that is true and correct, to the best of our knowledge. In a situation such as this, we would rather err on the side of caution.

NEW RELEASE, March, 2018 
MOHAVE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH 

Patty Mead, RN, MS, Health Director

Mohave Valley Community Park Egg Drop, Public Health Notice:

Mohave County, AZ. The Mohave County Department of Public Health (MCDPH) received complaints concerning the candy distributed during the Mohave Valley Community Park Egg Drop. 

The plane used by the organizers to drop the candy at the event has reportedly been used for agricultural purposes. The plane was reportedly scrubbed multiple times prior to being used for the candy drop and at the time of this press release there have been no illnesses reported to MCDPH related to this event. 

While no illnesses have been reported associated with this event, as a precaution, you should not eat the candy. The eggs and candy should be disposed of properly in a trash container to avoid any further contact. Anyone who touched the eggs should wash their hands thoroughly and MCDPH also recommends that you remove and wash your clothing.

If you have come in contact with the eggs or candy and experience, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, excessive sweating or urination you should seek medical assistance immediately. 

If you have any questions or concerns please contact the poison control line at 800-222-1222

Wiscasset Airport (KIWI) budget concerns allayed: Newly designed jet becomes customer

Wiscasset Municipal Airport interim manager Rick Tetrev and airport advisory committee member Pam Brackett notice they are being photographed as he shows her the airport’s tie-down ropes for aircraft at the committee’s March 21 meeting.


Wiscasset Municipal Airport’s interim manager Rick Tetrev was relieved March 22 to learn the airport’s budget is intact. He and the Airport Advisory Committee wondered one day earlier if part of the budget for the fiscal year ending June 30 was going or had gone away due to cuts they understood had been planned. So they were also wondering how the department would pay fuel and other bills the last quarter of the fiscal year.

Members predicted that night, plane fuel the airport sells would run out in May if the airport could no longer buy it; and they said that could cost the airport customers if they couldn’t fuel up there. However, neither the fuel funding nor airport operations are in jeopardy, according to town officials Tetrev and the Wiscasset Newspaper followed up with the next day. Tetrev told the committee he would. His monthly budget reports from the town kept showing it was intact, so the panel and Tetrev hoped that was the case, and it was.


Interim airport manager Rick Tetrev said this jet recently started making stops at Wiscasset Municipal Airport and buying hundreds of gallons of fuel there.


Town Manager Marian Anderson said in a phone interview, she came up with a list of more than $400,000 in possible cuts at selectmen’s request months ago, but the board never adopted the list. So none of the departments saw those cuts, including the $20,000 the airport would have lost, she said. The airport’s budget is the same $254,697 voters passed last June; and selectmen have cut nothing from the airport’s proposed, flat budget for next year, Anderson added.

”Very relieved ... I’m happy,” Tetrev said in a phone interview after his check with the town.

The airport is nearly self-sustaining, with yearly revenues topping $200,000, Anderson said. Plus it brings in property taxes on the hangars and excise taxes on planes, she said.

Tetrev, a retired Naval commander, confirmed to the committee he expects Anderson will propose to selectmen soon to keep him on as manager and drop the interim from his title. Committee members praised his work since taking over after Frank Costa resigned last September. Tetrev served as airport supervisor beginning in 2015.

Rick Tetrev


Tetrev said a Pilatus PC-24 jet has been fueling up and flying out of Wiscasset to Boca Raton and elsewhere, buying hundreds of gallons of fuel. Pilatus Aircraft of Switzerland produced the new line of business jet that can land and take off in 2,600 feet, Tetrev said. “This was impressive.”

The committee and Tetrev continued drafting airport rules. They planned to see how other airports approach refusing customers due to concerns they are drunk or show other signs they shouldn’t be piloting then.

Chairman Steve Williams said Maine Aeronautics Association’s annual chili cook-off and pilot safety training had about 75 people, but not as much chili as usual so pizza was ordered. “People cleaned up the pizza and left the chili,” he said.

The committee meets next at 5 p.m. April 25 at the airport on Chewonki Neck Road.

Original article ➤  http://www.wiscassetnewspaper.com

Cessna 172N Skyhawk, N17SK: Fatal accident occurred August 25, 2016 near Sky King Airport (3I3), Terre Haute, Vigo County, Indiana

Dr. John Thomas Trump


The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Indianapolis FSDO; Plainfield, Indiana
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas
Lycoming Engines; Milliken, Colorado

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N17SK

Andrew T. Fox, Investigator In Charge 

National Transportation Safety Board - Aviation Accident Factual Report

Location: Terre Haute, IN
Accident Number: CEN16FA333
Date & Time: 08/25/2016, 1905 EDT
Registration: N17SK
Aircraft: CESSNA 172N
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Collision during takeoff/land
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal 

On August 25, 2016, about 1905 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172N single-engine airplane, N17SK, collided with trees and a house while on final approach to runway 26 at the Sky King Airport (3I3) located near Terre Haute, Indiana. The private pilot was fatally injured, and the pilot-rated passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to the pilot-rated passenger and operated by the private pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed for the local flight that departed 3I3 about 1817.

According to the pilot-rated passenger/airplane owner, the airplane was for sale, and the purpose of the flight was to demonstrate the airplane to the private pilot, who was a potential buyer. The owner reported that the flight began with him flying from the left pilot seat and the potential buyer seated in the right pilot seat. After departing runway 26 at 3I3, the flight proceeded direct to Edgar County Airport (PRG), Paris, Indiana, where the owner made an uneventful landing on runway 27. After a short back-taxi, he departed runway 27 for the return flight to 3I3. The owner made an uneventful full-stop landing on runway 26 at 3I3. After the landing, the potential buyer asked if he could fly the airplane in the traffic pattern. The owner agreed, and they switched seats to allow the potential buyer to fly the airplane from the left pilot seat.

The owner reported that the potential buyer made an uneventful takeoff and entered left traffic for runway 26. They flew an extended downwind, about 1 mile past the end of the runway, before turning onto the base leg. The owner noted that the airplane was about 100 ft lower than normal when they turned onto the base leg. Further, when the airplane turned onto the final approach, it was below a normal approach path to the runway and at a slower-than-normal airspeed. The owner's last memory of the flight was losing sight of the runway and telling the potential buyer to "add power and lower the nose for airspeed." The owner acknowledged having some memory loss because of the injuries he sustained during the accident, and, consequently, he did not recall that the potential buyer had performed a go-around and reentered the traffic pattern for another landing attempt.

A witness, who was a flight instructor providing ground instruction to a student at the airport, reported that the airplane approached from the north, entered the traffic pattern, and landed on runway 26. After landing, the airplane back-taxied on runway 26 before it departed again. The witness described the next landing approach as being "high and fast," and he observed the airplane go around before it crossed over the displaced threshold. The witness did not observe the subsequent approach or the crash.

Another flight instructor, who was on a training flight with a new student, reported that, as they approached the airport from the north, he heard the pilot of the accident airplane announce on the common traffic advisory frequency that they were departing runway 26 and would remain in the traffic pattern. The flight instructor stated that he entered the traffic pattern and followed the accident airplane on the downwind and base legs. The flight instructor observed the accident airplane perform a go-around after it turned onto final approach to runway 26. The flight instructor then made a full-stop landing on runway 26. While taxiing toward the ramp, the flight instructor observed the accident airplane on the downwind leg. The flight instructor did not see the crash.

Another witness, located near the accident site, reported hearing the airplane pass over his house and noted that it was significantly louder than normal. He then saw the airplane traveling at a low altitude and slow speed before he heard it collide with a tree. After hearing the collision with the tree, he heard an increase in engine speed before the airplane crashed into a house.

Another witness, who was in her backyard at the time of the accident, observed the airplane flying at a lower-than-normal altitude toward the airport. She stated that the airplane briefly climbed before colliding with a tree. She did not see the airplane's final descent into the house.

A postaccident review of radar track data confirmed the timeline of the flight and the number of approaches that the airplane made. About 1817, the airplane departed runway 26 at 3I3 and proceeded direct to PRG. About 1830, the airplane departed runway 27 at PRG and proceeded back to 3I3. The airplane approached 3I3 from the north and entered the traffic pattern for runway 26 on a left crosswind leg. The airplane then continued in left traffic and landed on runway 26 about 1845. There were no airplanes observed in the traffic pattern for about 10 minutes.

At 1855:09, the airplane departed runway 26 and entered a left traffic pattern. At the same time, another airplane was approaching the airport from the north that subsequently entered the traffic pattern for runway 26 behind the accident airplane. At 1859:09, the accident airplane descended below available radar coverage at 900 ft above mean sea level (msl) on a 1-mile final approach to runway 26. At the same time, the other airplane was in a left turn from the downwind leg to the base leg for runway 26.

At 1900:33, the accident airplane reappeared on radar at 900 ft msl about 1/2 mile from the departure end of runway 26. At 1900:47, the other airplane descended below available radar coverage at 800 ft msl on a 0.6-mile final approach to runway 26. The accident airplane continued in left traffic for runway 26, and, at 1904:24, it descended below available coverage at 900 ft msl while on a 1.4-mile final approach to runway 26. The final radar return was recorded about 1.1 miles east-northeast of the initial impact with the tree.


Todd T. Fox, Investigator In Charge - National Transportation Safety Board and Donald Shipman III and William Schneider of the Federal Aviation Administration. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 60, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 11/06/2014
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:  03/19/2012
Flight Time: 121.4 hours (Total, all aircraft), 12 hours (Total, this make and model), 86.5 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft) 

Pilot-Rated Passenger Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 63, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 05/16/2016
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 07/14/2015
Flight Time:  135.5 hours (Total, all aircraft), 135.5 hours (Total, this make and model), 48.6 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 2.4 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 1 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft) 

--- Pilot (Potential Buyer) ---

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 60-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating that was issued on March 19, 2012. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on November 6, 2014, with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.

The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was dated August 13, 2015, at which time he had 121.4 hours total flight time of which 118.9 hours were in single-engine land airplanes and 2.5 hours were in a glider. The pilot had logged 12 hours in Cessna 172 airplanes, which were flown between December 19, 2013, and January 3, 2014. He had logged 86.5 hours as pilot-in-command, 4.3 hours at night, and 32.8 hours in simulated instrument conditions. The logbook did not contain any recorded flights during the 12 months before the accident. A review of invoices for a rental airplane established that the pilot's last flight, which was 0.7 hours, occurred on September 22, 2015, in a Piper PA-28-181 single-engine airplane. Additionally, there was no record that the pilot had ever completed a flight review, as required by 14 CFR 61.56, after being issued his private pilot certificate on March 19, 2012.

--- Pilot-Rated Passenger (Airplane Owner) ---

According to FAA records, the 63-year-old pilot-rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land airplane rating that was issued on July 14, 2015. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on May 16, 2016, with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.

The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was dated July 31, 2016, at which time he had 135.5 hours total flight time, all in Cessna 172 single-engine airplanes. He had logged 48.6 hours as pilot-in-command, 3.4 hours at night, 5.0 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions, and 12.9 hours in simulated instrument conditions. He had flown 24.7 hours during the 12 months before the accident, 4.4 hours during the 6 months before the accident, 2.4 hours during the 90 days before the accident, and 1 hour during the month before the accident. The logbook did not contain any recorded flight time for the 24-hour period before the accident flight. The pilot's only flight review, as required by 14 CFR 61.56, was completed upon the issuance of his private pilot certificate dated July 14, 2015. 



Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: CESSNA
Registration: N17SK
Model/Series: 172N
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1980
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 17273809
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 12/09/2015, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 2300 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 48 Hours
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 15073 Hours at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT: C91A installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: O-320-H2AD
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 160 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held:  None 

The 1980-model-year airplane, serial number 17273809, was a high-wing monoplane of aluminum semi-monocoque construction. The airplane was powered by a 160-horsepower, 4-cylinder, Lycoming O-320-H2AD reciprocating engine, serial number L-495-76T. The engine provided thrust through a fixed-pitch, two-blade, McCauley 1C160/DTM7557 propeller, serial number 82011. The four-seat airplane was equipped with a fixed tricycle landing gear, wing flaps, and had a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 2,300 pounds. The FAA issued the airplane a standard airworthiness certificate on February 13, 1980. The pilot-rated passenger purchased the airplane on December 17, 2014.

According to maintenance documentation, the last annual inspection was completed on December 9, 2015, at 15,025.1 total airframe hours. The airplane's recording hour meter indicated 3,903.7 hours before the accident flight and 3,904.6 hours at the accident site. The airframe had accumulated a total service time of 15,073 hours. The engine had accumulated a total service time of 9,554.6 hours since new and had accumulated 378.6 hours since being overhauled on August 1, 2013. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane had two fuel tanks, one located in each wing, and a total fuel capacity of 42 gallons. A review of fueling records established that the airplane's fuel tanks were topped-off on July 31, 2016, and that the airplane had accumulated 1.8 hours since this refueling. 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: HUF, 589 ft msl
Observation Time: 1853 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 7 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 151°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: 31°C / 23°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 5 knots, 280°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting:  30.03 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Terre Haute, IN (3I3)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Terre Haute, IN (3I3)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1817 EDT
Type of Airspace: Class G 

A postaccident review of available meteorological data established that day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. The nearest aviation weather reporting station was located at Terre Haute International Airport (HUF) about 7 miles south-southeast of the accident site. At 1853, about 12 minutes before the accident, the HUF automated surface observing system reported: wind 280° at 5 knots, 10 miles surface visibility, a clear sky, temperature 31°C, dew point 23°C, and an altimeter setting 30.03 inches of mercury.

Airport Information

Airport: Sky King Airport (3I3)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 496 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 26
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 3557 ft / 50 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Traffic Pattern 

3I3, a public airport located about 5 miles north of Terre Haute, Indiana, was owned and operated by Sky King Airport, Inc. The airport field elevation was 496 ft msl. The airport was served by two asphalt runways, runway 8/26 (3,557 ft by 50 ft) and runway 18/36 (1,978 ft by 50 ft). Runway 26 had a displaced threshold that reduced the available runway landing length by 812 ft. The airport was not equipped with an air traffic control tower. 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 1 Serious
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Latitude, Longitude:  39.549444, -87.369167 

The initial impact point was the top of a large 50-ft-tall oak tree located about 190 ft east of the house where the main wreckage came to rest. The oak tree was located along the extended runway 26 centerline about 1,355 ft from the runway's displaced threshold. There were numerous small limbs and leaves distributed between the initial impact point and the house. The airplane's final resting position inside the house was consistent with a near vertical descent through the roof of the house.

A postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed flight control cable continuity from all flight control surfaces to their respective cockpit controls. The wing flaps were found extended to 10°. The throttle and mixture controls were full open and full rich, respectively. The magneto switch was found in the "BOTH" position. The carburetor heat control was found in the "ON" position. The altimeter's Kollsman window was centered on 30.04 inches of mercury. The fuel selector was positioned to draw fuel from both wing fuel tanks. No fuel was recovered from either wing tank; however, there was a significant odor of aviation fuel beneath the wreckage at the accident site. Additionally, a witness reported seeing fuel drain from the wreckage immediately following the accident. The airframe fuel strainer assembly contained a blue fluid consistent with 100-low-lead aviation fuel. The recovered fuel was not contaminated with water or particulates.

The engine remained attached to the firewall through its mounts. Mechanical continuity was confirmed from the engine components to their respective cockpit controls. Internal engine and valve train continuity were confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. The single-drive dual magneto provided spark on all leads as the engine crankshaft was rotated. A borescope inspection revealed no anomalies with the cylinders, pistons, valves, or valve seats. There were no obstructions between the air filter housing and the carburetor. The carburetor fuel bowl contained residual liquid that had the odor of 100 low-lead aviation fuel. The propeller separated from the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited S-shape bends, blade twisting, and chordwise burnishing.

The postaccident wreckage examination did not reveal evidence of any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane during the accident flight. 

Medical And Pathological Information

The pilot initially survived the accident; however, he subsequently died 9 days after the accident from the injuries that he sustained during the accident. The Office of the Associate Chief Medical Examiner, Frankfort, Kentucky, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was attributed to an anoxic brain injury due to multiple blunt-force injuries. No toxicological testing was performed due to the lack of available specimens taken on, or near, the date of the accident.






























NTSB Identification: CEN16FA333 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, August 25, 2016 in Terre Haute, IN
Aircraft: CESSNA 172N, registration: N17SK
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On August 25, 2016, about 1910 eastern daylight time, a Cessna model 172N single-engine airplane, N17SK, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and a house while on final approach to runway 26 at the Sky King Airport (3I3) located near Terre Haute, Indiana. There were two private pilots onboard. One pilot sustained fatal injuries and the other serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight that departed 3I3 about 1816.

A witness, who was a flight instructor providing ground instruction at the airport, reported that the accident airplane approached from the north and entered the traffic pattern for runway 26 (3,557 feet by 50 feet, asphalt). He then observed the airplane touchdown between the half-moon runway turnoff and the runway 18/36 intersection. After landing, the airplane was observed to back-taxi on runway 26 before it departed again. The witness described the next landing approach as being "high and fast" and that a go-around was performed before the airplane crossed over the displaced threshold. The witness did not observe the subsequent landing approach or the crash.

Another witness, located near the accident site, reported that he heard an airplane pass over his house and that it was much louder than typical. He then saw the airplane traveling at a low altitude and slow speed before he heard it collide with a tree. The witness reported that, following the collision with the tree, he heard the airplane increase engine power before it crashed into the house.

According to preliminary information, the current owner of the accident airplane was attempting to sell the airplane and that the accident flight was with a potential buyer. The pilot who survived the accident was unable to provide a written statement or to be interviewed before the release of this preliminary report. According to fire department personnel, following the accident, the potential buyer was recovered from the left cockpit seat and the current airplane owner was recovered from the right cockpit seat.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the current airplane owner, age 63, held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land airplane rating. His last aviation medical examination was completed on May 16, 2016, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings. His last flight review, as required by FAA regulation 61.56, was completed upon the issuance of his private pilot certificate dated July 14, 2015. The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using logbook documentation. His most recent pilot logbook entry was dated July 31, 2016, at which time he had accumulated 135.5 hours total flight time, of which 48.6 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. All of his flight time had been completed in a Cessna model 172N single-engine airplane. He had accumulated 5.0 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions, 12.9 hours in simulated instrument meteorological conditions, and 3.4 hours at night. He had flown 24.7 hours during the prior 12 months, 4.4 hours in the previous 6 months, 2.4 hours during prior 90 days, and 1 hour in the 30 day period before the accident flight. The pilot's logbook did not contain any recorded flight time for the 24 hour period before the accident flight.

According to FAA records, the potential buyer, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land airplane rating. His last aviation medical examination was completed on November 6, 2014, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings. A pilot logbook was not recovered during the on-scene investigation; however, on the application for his current medical certificate, he reported having accumulated 120 hours of flight experience.

The accident airplane was a 1980 Cessna model 172N, serial number 17273809. A 160-horsepower Lycoming model O-320-H2AD reciprocating engine, serial number L-495-76T, powered the airplane through a fixed-pitch, two blade, McCauley model 1C160/DTM7557 propeller, serial number 82011. The airplane had a fixed tricycle landing gear, was capable of seating four individuals, and had a certified maximum gross weight of 2,300 pounds. The airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on February 13, 1980. According to an airplane utilization logbook, the airplane's HOBBS hour meter indicated 3,903.7 hours before the accident flight. The airplane's HOBBS hour meter indicated 3,904.6 hours at the accident site. The airframe had accumulated a total service time of 15,073 hours. The engine had accumulated a total service time of 9,554.6 hours since new. The engine had accumulated 378.6 hours since being overhauled on August 1, 2013. The last annual inspection of the airplane was completed on December 9, 2015, at 15,025.1 total airframe hours. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane had a total fuel capacity of 42 gallons (40 gallons usable) distributed between two wing fuel tanks. A review of fueling records established that the airplane fuel tanks were topped-off on July 31, 2016. According to available information, the airplane had flown 1.8 hours since the last refueling.

The nearest aviation weather reporting station was located at Terre Haute International Airport (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana, about 7 miles south-southeast of the accident site. At 1853, the HUF automated surface observing system reported the following weather conditions: wind 280 degrees true at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 31 degrees Celsius, dew point 23 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting 30.03 inches of mercury.

The initial point-of-impact was the top of a large 50-foot tall oak tree located about 190 feet east of the house where the main wreckage came to rest. The oak tree was located along the extended runway 26 centerline about 1,355 feet from the runway displaced threshold. There were numerous small limbs and leaves distributed between the initial point-of-impact and the house. Based on the orientation of the wreckage in the house, the accident airplane descended through the roof of the house in a near vertical flight path. A postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed flight control cable continuity from all flight control surfaces to their respective cockpit controls. The wing flaps were found extended 10-degrees. The throttle and mixture controls were full open and full rich. The magneto switch was found in the BOTH position. The carburetor heat control was found ON. The fuel selector was positioned to draw fuel from both wing fuel tanks. No fuel was recovered from either wing tank; however, there was a significant odor of aviation fuel at the accident site beneath the wreckage. Additionally, a witness reported seeing fuel drain from the wreckage immediately following the accident. The airframe fuel strainer contained a blue fluid consistent with 100 low lead aviation fuel. The fuel recovered from the strainer did not contain any water or particulate contamination.

The engine remained attached to the firewall by its mounts. Mechanical continuity was confirmed from the engine components to their respective cockpit controls. Internal engine and valve train continuity was confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. The single-drive dual magneto provided spark on all leads as the engine crankshaft was rotated. A borescope inspection revealed no anomalies with the cylinders, valves, or pistons. There were no obstructions between the air filter housing and the carburetor. The carburetor fuel bowl contained residual liquid that had the odor of 100 low-lead aviation fuel. The propeller had separated from the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited S-shape bends, blade twisting, and chordwise burnishing.

WSK PZL-Mielec M-18A Dromader, N2283M, registered to and operated by Canam Aviators Inc: Fatal accident occurred June 10, 2016 in Winnabow, Brunswick County, North Carolina

Daniel Simard


The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Greensboro, North Carolina
State Commission Aircraft Accident Investigation; Warsaw, FN
PZL Mielec; Mielec, FN

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N2283M

National Transportation Safety Board - Aviation Accident Factual Report

Location: Brunswick, NC
Accident Number: ERA16LA209
Date & Time: 06/10/2016, 0900 EDT
Registration: N2283M
Aircraft: WSK PZL MIELEC M 18A
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-power)
Injuries: 1 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 137: Agricultural

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 10, 2016, about 0900 eastern daylight time, an experimental WSK PZL MIELEC M-18A, N2283M, was destroyed following an inflight separation of the right wing while maneuvering near Brunswick, North Carolina. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the aerial application flight, which was operated by Canam Aviators Inc., under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137. The flight originated from Bear Pen Airstrip (NC43), Supply, North Carolina, around 0845.

According to ground personnel, the airplane departed with a full load of fertilizer and 45 minutes of fuel with 30 minutes of reserve fuel. After 1 hour passed and the airplane did not return to the airport, ground personnel called 911 to report the airplane missing. The airplane was subsequently located in a wooded area.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, instrument airplane, and rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held an FAA second-class medical certificate, which was issued on May 13, 2016. At the time of the medical examination, the pilot reported 30,576 total hours of flight experience. The pilot's logbook was not recovered.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1994 and imported to the US, where it was issued a special airworthiness certificate in the restricted category. The accident operator purchased the airplane in 2003.

The most recent annual inspection was performed on January 15, 2016, at 8,567.9 hours total time in service. All of the inspection and maintenance entries from October 17, 2012, to the time of the accident were performed by the same company and mechanic. There were four annual inspections completed in this timeframe, and all entries specified that the inspections were conducted in accordance with the M-18 Service Manual. There was no specific information to indicate which of the published inspections from the manual were performed.

The airplane wing is composed of three sections; the center section and the right and left outboard sections. The outboard wing sections are connected to the center wing at three points each: two on the forward spar and one on the aft spar. The center section contains clevis fittings at the forward spar upper and lower spar caps and a clevis fitting at the aft spar. Corresponding lug fittings on the outboard wing sections fit into the center wing clevis fittings. The forward spar connections use an expansion mandrel installed through the bores of the center wing clevis and wing lug fittings. The aft spar connection uses a bolt installed through the bores of the center wing clevis and wing lug fittings.

An FAA inspector estimated that the takeoff weight was about 11,787 lbs, using an airplane empty weight of 5,975 lbs, chemical weight of 4,940 lbs (800 gallons), a fuel weight of 692 lbs (1.5 hours), and a pilot weight of 180 lbs.

AIRPLANE MODIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE HISTORY

The type certificate for the PZL M-18A was approved by the FAA in September 1987. The maximum weight was 9,260 lbs with a maximum hopper weight of 3,300 lbs regardless of the hopper capacity.

The original engine was removed from the accident airplane in April 1996 and replaced with a Honeywell TPE 331 turbine engine driving a Hartzell 3-blade, constant speed, reversing and feathering propeller in accordance with STC SA09039SC. Geared servo tabs were installed on the ailerons, elevators, and rudder in accordance with STC SA09063SC as part of the engine conversion. At the time of the modification, the airplane had accrued 997.0 hours total time in service. The airplane was again modified in January 2005, in accordance with STC SA09039SC, to install a different Honeywell TPE331 turbine engine driving a Hartzell 5-blade constant-speed reversing and feathering propeller. The airplane had accrued 5,153.7 hours total time in service at the time of this modification. The maximum weight approved as part of the STC was 9,260 lbs with the spray bar installed and 8,800 lbs with the spreader installed. A modified hopper was also installed at this time, which increased the hopper capacity to 800 gallons.

A logbook entry at an airframe time of 6,389.0 hours on June 21, 2006, indicated that the service life of the airplane was increased to 10,000 hours by incorporation of a manufacturer service bulletin. An entry on October 9, 2009, adjusted the total time in service of the airframe from 7,630 hours to 6,147 hours. The explanation provided in the entry indicated that the hour meter installed was recording incorrectly. On February 20, 2014, at an airframe time of 8,042.0 hours, a logbook entry documented the replacement of both left lower wing attach fittings and expanding mandrel in accordance with SB E/02.170/2000. On July 2, 2015, a logbook entry documented the replacement of the wing center section with a used serviceable unit with an estimated total time of 7,460 hours; the airframe time was 8,562.9 hours.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the wreckage by an FAA inspector revealed that the debris path was oriented from south to north. The wreckage area was compact except for the right wing and one propeller blade, which were located about 125 ft east of the main wreckage. The airplane impacted in a nose-down attitude of about 60°. The left wing was located on top of the engine and separated from the fuselage. The fuselage, cockpit, and hopper were found 10 ft north of the initial impact point. The remainder of the empennage was found 20 ft north of the cockpit. Small pieces of debris were found within a 50-ft radius of the initial impact point.

Further examination of the airplane by an NTSB investigator revealed that the right outboard wing forward spar lower fitting was fractured. Additionally, the right outboard aileron attach bracket was fractured, and visible cracks were evident on the right center and inboard aileron attach brackets. The fractured wing fitting, a fractured wing fitting attach bolt, and all three aileron attach brackets were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory Division in Washington, D.C. for analysis.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Metallurgical Examination

The right outboard wing forward spar lower fitting fractured through the upper and lower arms in the areas indicated by arrows in figure 1. Each arm contained six vertical bolt holes used to attach the fitting to the outboard wing forward spar. The fracture in the upper arm intersected the inboard vertical bolt hole, and the fracture in the lower arm intersected the second vertical bolt hole from the inboard end. Bench binocular microscope of the fractured arms revealed all the fracture faces contained fatigue cracks that emanated from the bore of the holes on diametrically opposite sides of each hole, in the areas indicated by brackets "O" in figure 1.


Figure 1. Right outboard wing forward spar, lower fitting.

Figure 2 shows a photograph of the lower arm fracture faces. The fatigue cracks in the lower arms initiated from multiple origins along the entire length of the bolt hole, in the areas indicated by brackets "O" in figure 2. Most of the fatigue crack origins were associated with corrosion pitting in the bore. Fatigue propagation on each side of the hole was through a 90% of the thickness and terminated in the areas indicated by dashed lines in figure 2.


Figure 2. Right outboard wing forward spar, Lower fitting, Lower arm.


Figure 3 shows a photograph of the upper arm fracture faces. The upper arm fractures contained similar fatigue cracks with the exception that the fatigue cracks initiated from multiple origins near the lower portion of the bolt hole. Most of the fatigue crack origins were associated with corrosion pitting in the bore. The fatigue cracks in the upper arms exhibited better defined fatigue fracture features than those on the lower arms.

Figure 3. Right outboard wing forward spar, lower fitting, upper arm.

The fractured bolt examined was installed through the third vertical bolt hole in the right outboard wing forward spar lower fitting. The fracture intersected the root thread portion of the bolt. The fracture face of the bolt contained fatigue cracks that emanated from multiple origins all around the root portion. Fatigue propagation was toward the center of the bolt and extended through about 95% of the bolt cross section.

Figure 4 shows a photograph of the right outboard aileron attach bracket, which contained a circumferential fracture in the main tube portion, near the location where the two upper arms were welded to the main tube. The fracture intersected the aft edges of the welds at the base of the two arms, indicated by arrows "X" in figures 4. Bench binocular microscope examination of the forward face of the main tube fracture revealed multiple fatigue cracks that emanated from the outer surface of the main tube at the aft edges of the welds. Fatigue propagation was through about 50% of the thickness and extended around about 30% of the tube circumference. Corrosion was noted on the outboard tube surface.


Figure 4. Right outboard aileron attach bracket.

The right center and inboard aileron attach brackets were intact, but both brackets contained visible cracks in the white paint layer where the two upper arms were welded to the main tube. The paint was removed with a commercial paint stripper from the weld areas of the intact brackets. Bench binocular microscope examination of both intact brackets after paint stripping revealed the presence of corrosion and intermittent cracks on the outer surface of the welds in the same respective location as the fracture on the outboard bracket. The cracks were not opened, but examination of the inner face of the main tube portion for both intact brackets revealed the intermittent cracks did not extend through the thickness.

Manufacturer Information

The PZL M18 Description and Service Manual provides procedures for maintaining and inspecting the airplane, including procedures for corrosion prevention and control; particular emphasis was placed on the cleaning of the airplane, with the statement that "regular and thorough cleaning of both the interior and exterior of the aircraft is a major part of corrosion control." The instructions for cleaning included the statement, "particular attention should be given to wing fittings." In addition, the manual provides instructions for non-destructive inspection of airframe structural fittings, with specific details for the wing fittings and anti-corrosion protection of the wing fittings. The manual also includes a maintenance schedule that contains procedures for verifying inspections every 3,000 flight hours, and periodic inspections at 50, 100 and 500 flight hours. The manual calls for a mandatory annual inspection within the scope of the 500-hour inspection and special verifying inspections each 3,000 hours of operation.

According to the PZL M18 Aircraft Repair Manual, the airframe has a service life of 10,000 flight hours. The left aft center-wing-to-fuselage attach fitting has a service life of 3,000 flight hours. The manual also defines an "Airframe Service Life in Overload Version." The original airframe service life was calculated for a takeoff weight of 10,340 lbs. There are procedures to increase the takeoff weight to 11,700 lbs, which, according to the manual, "causes higher fatigue wear and drop of service life by 1.35 times." For all operations performed above the standard weight of 10,340 lbs, the operator should multiply the flight hours by 1.35 to obtain the proper flight hours for calculating the service life of the airplane.

The manufacturer issued Service Bulletin (SB) E/02.159/97 in 1997 to provide instructions for corrosion protection of the outboard wing forward spar fittings as a result of findings on four airplanes that were operated in Greece. The bulletin provides instructions for inspection of the fitting arms where they attach to the forward spar, removal of any corrosion within limits, and protection of the fittings by application of a corrosion inhibiting compound. The bulletin also provides instructions for adding an inspection panel in the lower leading edge of the outboard wing to improve access to the outboard wing forward spar fittings. The accident airplane did not have the inspection panel specified by this SB.

The manufacturer issued SB E/02.170/2000 in August 2000 to provide instructions for inspection of the wing attach joints as a result of two accidents in the United States. The accidents were caused by corrosion in the lower wing attach fittings that resulted in fatigue cracking and failure of a fitting lug. The SB provides instructions for inspection of the wing fittings for corrosion in the lug bore and on the exterior surface of the fittings, repair of minor corrosion, inspection for ovalization of the lug holes, and magnetic particle inspection of the fitting lugs for cracks. The procedures do not require removal of the outboard wings but do require removal of the expansion mandrels. Procedures are also provided for replacement of the wing fittings, if necessary, with the recommendation that both left and right pairs of lower wing fittings should be replaced, even if only one pair has damage beyond limits. There are no specific procedures for inspection of the vertical holes where the fittings attach to the spar. The provisions of this SB were subsequently mandated by airworthiness directive (AD) 2000-18-12. The manufacturer issued Service Letter M18/034/2016 in February 2016 with instructions that only the magnetic particle inspection method is applicable for the SB and suggesting that the wings be removed from the airplane to better perform the inspection.

In January 2001, the manufacturer issued SB E/02.172/2001 to provide guidelines for increasing the service life of the airframe up to 10,000 flight hours for airplanes S/N 1Z001-01 through S/N 1Z028-01, which included the accident airplane. The SB instructed operators to perform the 3,000-hour special inspection in the Service Manual with particular attention paid to incorporation of all applicable mandatory bulletins on the airplane and corrosion, cracks and wear in the outboard wing-to-center wing attach fittings.

There are two published Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM) for the airplane: a European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)-approved version for those airplanes operating outside the United States, and an FAA-approved version. The EASA-approved AFM is used by other airworthiness authorities around the world, and provides for the operation of the airplane at increased gross weights up to 11,700 lbs, with the stipulation that a service life factor of 1.35 be applied for those flights above 10,340 lbs.

The FAA-approved AFM specifies that the airplane is certificated in the restricted category for agricultural operations and dispensing fire-fighting materials. The limitations specify a maximum takeoff and landing weight of 9,260 lbs, a maximum hopper load of 3,300 lbs, a never exceed speed of 151 knots, a maximum cruising speed of 124 knots, maneuvering load factors of +3.4g and -1.4g, and prohibits operational flights with a person in the mechanic's seat. The FAA AFM does not specify a service life factor since the airplane is certificated at a gross weight of 9,260 lbs.

FAA Information

In September 2000, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-18-12 to address corrosion and cracking of the wing attach fittings on all PZL M-18, M-18A, and M-18B airplanes as a result of two wing separation accidents. The AD required that operators inspect the center wing-to-outboard wing attach joints for cracks in the lugs, corrosion in the main holes, and ovalization of the main holes every 1 year or 500 hours time in service (whichever occurs first), repair corrosion and apply anti-corrosion protection, replace the wing attach joints as necessary, and eliminate any ovalization of the wing main joint holes. The AD specified that the inspection of the main holes must be done using magnetic particle methods and all other procedures were to be in accordance with manufacturer SB E/02.170/2000. The procedures published in the SB and AD were focused on the main attach lug and clevis on the wing fittings and did not specifically address the vertical bolt holes where the fittings attached to the wing or center section forward spar.

The AD was first complied with on the accident airplane on January 9, 2001, at an airframe total time of 4,195.7 hours. The records indicated that the left and right forward spar, lower wing attach fittings on the outboard wings, and the center section were replaced with new fittings as a result of the inspection, along with the wing straps and the left aft center-wing-to-fuselage attach fitting. The upper fittings were found to be serviceable. SB E/02.170/2000 was also complied with. The most recent AD inspection of the wing fittings was performed in January 2016, at an airframe total time of 8,567.9 hours, with no discrepancies noted.

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 23-13A provides guidance on the fatigue, fail-safe, and damage tolerance evaluation of metallic structure for normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes. Section 1-6 of the AC is applicable for alterations, modifications, or changes to the design and states, "Changes to the operational characteristics that may be important for fatigue include higher design airspeeds or higher average speed. They also include changes to the maximum allowable weight and center of gravity envelope, changes to the average weight and center of gravity location, and engine or propeller changes." Further, the section discusses a comparative fatigue analysis that should be performed when a modifier does not have access to the data from a manufacturer.

The manufacturer was not able to supply any information on the modification of the M-18A airplane by installation of a turbine engine, including any changes to the flight loads, fatigue spectrum, or reliability data. They were aware that there are STC provisions for the modification, but were not consulted for the modification by the STC holders.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau Investigation

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigated an accident involving a PZL Mielec M-18A airplane that suffered an in-flight failure of the left wing in October 2013. The details of the investigation can be found in ATSB Report AO-2013-187. The airplane was equipped with a TPE331 turbine engine. They determined that there was fatigue cracking that initiated due to corrosion pitting in the bore of the left outboard wing forward spar lower fitting attach lug. The fatigue cracking was only present on one leg of the lug and comprised about 19% of the total cross-sectional area of the fractured lug. The ATSB used 25 hours of recorded data from the accident airplane to develop a maneuver load spectrum for comparison with the manufacturer's design load spectrum and the FAA load spectrum for agricultural operations published in AC 23-13A. Analysis of the load spectrums showed that "the negative acceleration fraction spectrum correlated well with the other reference spectra, falling between the FAA and aircraft manufacturer's spectra" and "other than at low acceleration fractions, the positive acceleration fraction spectrum was significantly greater than both the FAA and aircraft manufacturer's spectra." The manufacturer calculated the effect of the derived spectrum, flight time, and operating speed on the airplane's fatigue life and found that the fatigue life could be reduced by a factor of as much as 3.85.

Additionally, the ATSB found that the airplane had been operated at higher speeds than assumed by the manufacturer and at weights above the certificated maximum gross weight, that the flight loads imposed on the airplane were more severe than assumed during design, and that the service life factors were not appropriately applied for these operations. This resulted in greater fatigue damage than anticipated by the manufacturer, rendering the service life limits and inspection intervals inadequate for the operation of the airplane.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Commercial
Age: 57, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Single
Other Aircraft Rating(s): Helicopter
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane; Helicopter
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 05/13/2016
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time:  (Estimated) 30576 hours (Total, all aircraft), 99999 hours (Total, this make and model)

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: WSK PZL MIELEC
Registration: N2283M
Model/Series: M 18A B
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1994
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Experimental
Serial Number: 1Z024-25
Landing Gear Type: Tailwheel
Seats: 1
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 01/15/2016, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 9260 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:  350 Hours
Engines: 1 Turbo Prop
Airframe Total Time: 8567.9 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Honeywell
ELT: Not installed
Engine Model/Series: TPE 331-11UA-
Registered Owner: CANAM AVIATORS INC
Rated Power: 940 hp
Operator: CANAM AVIATORS INC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: Agricultural Aircraft (137) 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KSUT, 25 ft msl
Observation Time: 0850 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 18 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 132°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Temperature/Dew Point: 26°C / 21°C
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 6 knots, 310°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting:  30.1 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Supply, NC (NC43)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Supply, NC (NC43)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 0845 EDT
Type of Airspace: Class E

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude:  34.127500, -78.339722

NTSB Identification: ERA16LA209
14 CFR Part 137: Agricultural
Accident occurred Friday, June 10, 2016 in Brunswick, NC
Aircraft: WSK PZL MIELEC M 18A, registration: N2283M
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On June 10, 2016, about 0900 eastern daylight time, an experimental WSK PZL MIELEC M-18A, N2283M, operated by Canam Aviators Inc., was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and the ground while maneuvering near Brunswick, North Carolina. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the aerial application flight operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137. The flight originated from Bear Pen Airstrip (NC43), Supply, North Carolina, around 0845.

According to the personnel that loaded the airplane with fertilizer, the pilot departed with a full load of fertilizer, and 45 minutes of fuel with 30 minutes of reserve fuel. After 1 hour passed and the pilot did not return to the airport, they called 911 to report the airplane missing. 

The airplane was subsequently located in a wooded area.

Examination of the wreckage by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector revealed that the airplane was traveling north when it impacted trees. The wreckage area was compact except for the right wing and one propeller blade located approximately 125 feet east of the main wreckage. The airplane impacted in a nose down attitude of approximately 60 degrees. The left wing was located on top of the engine and separated from the fuselage. The fuselage, cockpit, and hopper were found 10 feet north of the initial impact point. The remainder of the empennage was found 20 feet north of the cockpit. Small pieces of debris were found within a 50-foot radius of the initial impact point. The wreckage was retained for further examination.

According to FAA records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, instrument airplane, and rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held an FAA second-class medical certificate, which was issued on May 13, 2016. At the time of the medical examination the pilot reported 30,576 total hours of flight experience.