Monday, September 5, 2016

Bell 206: Fatal accident occurred September 05, 2016 in Fox Creek, Alberta

A woman was killed and two others injured when a helicopter crashed Monday south of Fox Creek, Alberta RCMP said.

The Bell 206 chopper crashed at around 4:20 p.m. about 25 kilometres south of Fox Creek, said RCMP spokeswoman Cpl. Laurel Scott.

She did not know if the 44-year-old woman who died was the pilot or a passenger. The two other people on board went to hospital — one via ground ambulance and one by helicopter, she said.

Emergency Medical Services took a woman in critical condition to an area hospital from the crash site, said Alberta Health Services spokesman Korey Cherneski.

The Transportation Safety Board was sending two investigators to the crash site, and should have more information to release Tuesday, said agency spokeswoman Julie Leroux.

Leroux did not know Monday who owned the helicopter. The Bell 206 is a twin-engine, dual-blade chopper with a capacity for six passengers, according to the manufacturer’s website.

Fox Creek is 265 km northwest of Edmonton.

Source:   http://edmontonjournal.com

Cessna 172N Skyhawk, N17SK: Fatal accident occurred August 25, 2016 near Sky King Airport (3I3), Terre Haute, Vigo County, Indiana

http://registry.faa.gov/N17SK

FAA Flight Standards District Office: FAA Indianapolis FSDO-11


NTSB Identification: CEN16FA333 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, August 25, 2016 in Terre Haute, IN
Aircraft: CESSNA 172N, registration: N17SK
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On August 25, 2016, about 1910 eastern daylight time, a Cessna model 172N single-engine airplane, N17SK, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and a house while on final approach to runway 26 at the Sky King Airport (3I3) located near Terre Haute, Indiana. There were two private pilots onboard. One pilot sustained fatal injuries and the other serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by a private individual under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight that departed 3I3 about 1816.

A witness, who was a flight instructor providing ground instruction at the airport, reported that the accident airplane approached from the north and entered the traffic pattern for runway 26 (3,557 feet by 50 feet, asphalt). He then observed the airplane touchdown between the half-moon runway turnoff and the runway 18/36 intersection. After landing, the airplane was observed to back-taxi on runway 26 before it departed again. The witness described the next landing approach as being "high and fast" and that a go-around was performed before the airplane crossed over the displaced threshold. The witness did not observe the subsequent landing approach or the crash.

Another witness, located near the accident site, reported that he heard an airplane pass over his house and that it was much louder than typical. He then saw the airplane traveling at a low altitude and slow speed before he heard it collide with a tree. The witness reported that, following the collision with the tree, he heard the airplane increase engine power before it crashed into the house.

According to preliminary information, the current owner of the accident airplane was attempting to sell the airplane and that the accident flight was with a potential buyer. The pilot who survived the accident was unable to provide a written statement or to be interviewed before the release of this preliminary report. According to fire department personnel, following the accident, the potential buyer was recovered from the left cockpit seat and the current airplane owner was recovered from the right cockpit seat.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the current airplane owner, age 63, held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land airplane rating. His last aviation medical examination was completed on May 16, 2016, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings. His last flight review, as required by FAA regulation 61.56, was completed upon the issuance of his private pilot certificate dated July 14, 2015. The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using logbook documentation. His most recent pilot logbook entry was dated July 31, 2016, at which time he had accumulated 135.5 hours total flight time, of which 48.6 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. All of his flight time had been completed in a Cessna model 172N single-engine airplane. He had accumulated 5.0 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions, 12.9 hours in simulated instrument meteorological conditions, and 3.4 hours at night. He had flown 24.7 hours during the prior 12 months, 4.4 hours in the previous 6 months, 2.4 hours during prior 90 days, and 1 hour in the 30 day period before the accident flight. The pilot's logbook did not contain any recorded flight time for the 24 hour period before the accident flight.

According to FAA records, the potential buyer, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with a single engine land airplane rating. His last aviation medical examination was completed on November 6, 2014, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings. A pilot logbook was not recovered during the on-scene investigation; however, on the application for his current medical certificate, he reported having accumulated 120 hours of flight experience.

The accident airplane was a 1980 Cessna model 172N, serial number 17273809. A 160-horsepower Lycoming model O-320-H2AD reciprocating engine, serial number L-495-76T, powered the airplane through a fixed-pitch, two blade, McCauley model 1C160/DTM7557 propeller, serial number 82011. The airplane had a fixed tricycle landing gear, was capable of seating four individuals, and had a certified maximum gross weight of 2,300 pounds. The airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on February 13, 1980. According to an airplane utilization logbook, the airplane's HOBBS hour meter indicated 3,903.7 hours before the accident flight. The airplane's HOBBS hour meter indicated 3,904.6 hours at the accident site. The airframe had accumulated a total service time of 15,073 hours. The engine had accumulated a total service time of 9,554.6 hours since new. The engine had accumulated 378.6 hours since being overhauled on August 1, 2013. The last annual inspection of the airplane was completed on December 9, 2015, at 15,025.1 total airframe hours. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane had a total fuel capacity of 42 gallons (40 gallons usable) distributed between two wing fuel tanks. A review of fueling records established that the airplane fuel tanks were topped-off on July 31, 2016. According to available information, the airplane had flown 1.8 hours since the last refueling.

The nearest aviation weather reporting station was located at Terre Haute International Airport (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana, about 7 miles south-southeast of the accident site. At 1853, the HUF automated surface observing system reported the following weather conditions: wind 280 degrees true at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 31 degrees Celsius, dew point 23 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting 30.03 inches of mercury.

The initial point-of-impact was the top of a large 50-foot tall oak tree located about 190 feet east of the house where the main wreckage came to rest. The oak tree was located along the extended runway 26 centerline about 1,355 feet from the runway displaced threshold. There were numerous small limbs and leaves distributed between the initial point-of-impact and the house. Based on the orientation of the wreckage in the house, the accident airplane descended through the roof of the house in a near vertical flight path. A postaccident examination of the airplane confirmed flight control cable continuity from all flight control surfaces to their respective cockpit controls. The wing flaps were found extended 10-degrees. The throttle and mixture controls were full open and full rich. The magneto switch was found in the BOTH position. The carburetor heat control was found ON. The fuel selector was positioned to draw fuel from both wing fuel tanks. No fuel was recovered from either wing tank; however, there was a significant odor of aviation fuel at the accident site beneath the wreckage. Additionally, a witness reported seeing fuel drain from the wreckage immediately following the accident. The airframe fuel strainer contained a blue fluid consistent with 100 low lead aviation fuel. The fuel recovered from the strainer did not contain any water or particulate contamination.


The engine remained attached to the firewall by its mounts. Mechanical continuity was confirmed from the engine components to their respective cockpit controls. Internal engine and valve train continuity was confirmed as the engine crankshaft was rotated. Compression and suction were noted on all cylinders in conjunction with crankshaft rotation. The spark plugs were removed and exhibited features consistent with normal engine operation. The single-drive dual magneto provided spark on all leads as the engine crankshaft was rotated. A borescope inspection revealed no anomalies with the cylinders, valves, or pistons. There were no obstructions between the air filter housing and the carburetor. The carburetor fuel bowl contained residual liquid that had the odor of 100 low-lead aviation fuel. The propeller had separated from the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited S-shape bends, blade twisting, and chordwise burnishing.

VIGO COUNTY, Ind. (WTHI) –  According to an obituary in the Lexington Herald-Leader, Dr. John Trump died on September 3 due to the injuries he received in the plane crash.

The plane crash happened on August 25 as the plane Trump and William Patrick O’Neill were in was assumed to be attempting to land at Sky King Airport.

According to the obituary, Trump is a resident of Lexington, Kentucky and is survived by his wife and children.

The last known condition of O’Neill was on August 26 when News 10 was told he was at Methodist Hospital in Indianapolis in stable condition.

Source:   http://wthitv.com

TRUMP Dr. John Thomas, 60, a resident of Lexington, beloved husband of Patty Gross Trump, died September 3, 2016, due to injuries suffered in a small plane crash in Terre Haute, IN. Born and raised in Michigan, he was the eldest son of the late John Walter Trump and Anabel Crow Trump, currently of Carlisle, OH. Dr. Trump was a graduate of Asbury College, the University of Michigan School of Dentistry and the University of Kentucky School of Medicine. He honorably served in the U.S. Air Force and the Kentucky Army National Guard, retiring as a colonel in 2004. A skilled anesthesiologist, Dr. Trump was known by colleagues and patients for his calm demeanor and soothing bedside manner. He had a generous nature and was always eager to lend a helping hand to family, friends and strangers alike. An avid runner since high school, he continued to participate in races and running events until his death. Other members of the Todd's Road Stumblers recall how he would slacken his pace to run alongside them. In addition to his wife, he will be greatly missed by his two children, Kevin Trump of Wilmore and Melinda (Blake) Johnson of Lexington; three stepchildren, Frederick "Chris" Augsburg of Lexington, Sandra (Paul) Jansen of Indianapolis, IN, and Jeffrey Davis of Lexington; a brother, Daniel (Meg) Trump of Miamisburg, OH; two sisters, Nina Trump of Dearborn Heights, MI, and Marjorie (Richard) Toepler of Cincinnati, OH; and three grandchildren, Raeanne and Brianna Augsburg, and Jeffrey "Wade" Davis. He was preceded in death by a brother, Joseph Trump. Dr. Trump will also be greatly missed by the Gross Family, who loved him dearly and of whom he has been a beloved family member for almost 14 years. Funeral services will be 1pm on Wednesday, Sept. 7, 2016 by Pastor Mark Sloss at Faith Lutheran Church, where Dr. Trump was a dedicated member. Burial will be in Lexington Cemetery. Visitation will be 4-8pm on Tuesday at Kerr Brothers Funeral Home-Harrodsburg Rd. and noon until the time of the service at the Church. Memorials are suggested to the American Diabetes Association and the Kentucky Organ Donor Affiliates.

- See more at: http://www.legacy.com


Todd Fox with the National Transportation Safety Board and Donald Shipman III and William Schneider of the Federal Aviation Administration. 

Todd Fox, National Transportation Safety Board





























Piper PA-28-181 Archer II, N8826C: Fatal accident occurred July 27, 2014 in Venice, Sarasota County, Florida

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident. 

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Tampa, Florida 
Piper Aircraft; Vero Beach, Florida 
Lycoming Engines; Williamsport, Pennsylvania 

Aviation Accident Factual Report  -  National Transportation Safety Board:   https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms


NTSB Identification: ERA14LA362 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, July 27, 2014 in Venice, FL
Aircraft: PIPER PA28, registration: N8826C
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 27, 2014, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-181, N8826C, was substantially damaged during a forced landing to a shoreline in Venice, Florida. The private pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were not injured; however, two people in shallow water near the shoreline were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the personal flight between Buchan Airport (X36), Englewood, Florida, and Venice Municipal Airport (VNC), Venice, Florida, conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

In an interview with the responding Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot stated that it was the first time the hangered airplane had flown in the preceding 3 1/2 months. The pilot later wrote that, after arriving at the hangar, he checked the fuel levels and noted "Right tank below tab. Left tank at tab." He also checked the oil level and added 3/4 quart of oil to the engine.

The pilot started the engine and made several magneto checks; the left magneto consistently ran "rough with 300 drop." He then shut down the engine and discussed the situation with an individual who had been working on another airplane in the hangar. The pilot subsequently started the engine again, and completed additional magneto operational checks with "all mags check[ing] out." The pilot then made a decision to go on a short flight and land at VNC for fuel, and he invited the other individual to go on the flight.

After taxiing to the run-up area, the pilot completed another engine run-up, with no anomalies noted.

The airplane subsequently took off from runway 30, with the climbout at best angle to 500 ft, and a slow turn south along the Intercoastal Waterway. The pilot subsequently climbed the airplane to 1,000 ft and cruised at 2,100 rpm. After maneuvering for a short while, the pilot headed the airplane north toward VNC with the engine rpm at 2,300 to 2,400 and the mixture remaining rich. The pilot decided to fly a 45-degree intercept to the VNC runway 23 downwind leg of the traffic pattern, passing over the beach at 900 to 1,000 ft.

En route, the engine started making a "missing, knocking, hitting sound. Rapid deterioration," according to the pilot. In a statement to county sheriff's office personnel and the FAA, the passenger recalled, that, in flight, the engine started running"…like there was a fouled plug or something…it started running rough a little bit…that was before it quit." The pilot subsequently adjusted the mixture and throttle to remove the knock, but the engine experienced a sudden total loss of power.

The pilot turned the fuel pump on and switched fuel tanks. The altitude was "dropping" and the pilot adjusted for best glide airspeed. He then looked toward VNC to land on runway 31 but decided the airplane would not reach the runway. He called VNC Unicom and declared an emergency, responding to questions about the airplane's location and registration.

The pilot then decided to target the Casperan Beach shoreline. He observed "only sparse population on sand" and a "group of people on high ground," which required him to keep the airplane over the water to remain clear of the grouping of people and noted that he could maneuver to shore, if able. The passenger also noted that, as the airplane approached the shoreline, he did not see people in the water. He further noted that, as the airplane was descending, the pilot "kept…pulling the nose up to try to extend the glide." The airplane subsequently touched down in shallow water on a northerly heading angled slightly toward the shore and came to a quick stop.

After the pilot and the passenger got out of the airplane, a lady shouted to them that she needed a cell phone. The pilot thought she wanted to call on their behalf, and it was only then that he learned that the airplane had hit two people in the water.
Neither the pilot nor the passenger indicated that the pilot applied carburetor heat during the flight.

According to an employee at VNC, about 1445, the pilot made an announcement on the common airport frequency, "to the effect of – emergency can't make the airport." The employee called 911 and asked the pilot of another airplane to provide the location; he responded that the airplane was on the beach about 1 mile south of VNC.

County sheriff's office personnel also provided transcripts from interviews with six witnesses. Witnesses were generally consistent as to what they saw and heard. The airplane was seen heading northward, over water, but angled in toward the north-south shoreline. It initially touched down in water but came to rest mostly on sand at the water's edge.

One witness stated that he was standing in waist-deep water about 10 to 15 ft from the shore and about 150 ft south of the two people struck. He saw the airplane descend and it passed directly over his head about 30 ft above him. There was no noise from the engine and the propeller was "kinda moving." He watched the airplane descend toward a group of people. It cleared half of the group, but apparently did not clear all of them. The witness further stated that he thought the airplane was "drifting in because I was far enough out in the water that if he had continued on a straight course he probably would have just hit the water."

Several other witnesses also noted that the engine was not running and that the propeller was turning; some noted the sound of a "thump" in conjunction with the landing. One witness stated that when the airplane hit the water, it "kind of kicked over to the right," then went up onto the beach.

The airplane struck a father and daughter. According to the wife/mother of the victims, the family, consisting of herself, her husband, three children, and his mother, arrived at the beach shortly before noon. About 1 hour later, another couple joined them. The group then moved farther up the beach to avoid new beachgoers, leaving the husband's mother at the original location.

At the time of the accident, the wife was near the shoreline, with her husband and daughter about 10 to 15 ft directly behind her in about 2 ½ feet of water. The two had been bending over to use strainers to collect shark teeth from the bottom. The wife first heard the airplane then saw it out of her peripheral vision to the left but had not seen it hit her family as it was out of her line of sight at the time. She then saw the airplane glide along the water and onto the sand. Her stepson, who was coming out of the water when the airplane passed by, told her that he had ducked when it went over his head, but did not indicate if he saw his father or his sister hit.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot, age 57, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating. The pilot reported 203 flight hours with 74 hours in make and model. His latest FAA third class medical certificate was obtained on February 11, 2013.

AIRPLANE INFORMATION

The airplane was powered by a Lycoming O-360-series engine driving a fixed-pitch, two-blade metal propeller. The latest annual inspection was completed on February 17, 2014, at airframe total time of 1,902 hours and engine time since overhaul of 836 hours.

There were no recording devices on the airplane.

According to the PA-28-181 Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the wing fuel tank capacity was 24 gallons usable. The tab mark was placarded at 17 gallons usable.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

While exact temperature/dew point conditions could not be determined over the water where the airplane was flying, VNC recorded, at 1455, an onshore-wind temperature of 32° C (90° F) and a dew point of 24° C (75° F). Under those conditions, the carburetor icing probability chart found in FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin CE-09-35 indicated a 60 percent relative humidity and a probability of carburetor ice at glide and cruise power.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

On-scene photographs showed the airplane upright and nose-down at the waterline, angled slightly towards the beach with the magnetic compass indicating 350 degrees magnetic. The nose landing gear was separated from the airframe, while both fixed main landing gear remained attached. The left wing, which was extended over the water, had about 4 feet of leading edge crushing on the outboard portion of the wing, and the wingtip was undamaged. The two-blade metal propeller exhibited no damage to one blade, while the other was bent aft about 60°, beginning mid-span.

Photographs of the cockpit showed the fuel was selected off, the magnetos were off, the mixture was rich, the throttle was forward and the carburetor heat was off. The pilot indicated to the FAA inspector that he had turned off the fuel and ignition after landing. The Hobbs meter indicated about 22 minutes of operating time, consistent with the pilot's recollection of 10 to 15 minutes of flight time.

The wing fuel tanks were subsequently defueled, the wings were removed, and the airplane was transported to a storage facility. There, NTSB, FAA, Piper Aircraft, and Lycoming Engine investigators further documented the airframe and engine.

The fuel supply line from each wing fuel tank to its disconnect point in the cockpit and each fuel tank vent line was checked via air flow and found to be unobstructed. Engine compression, magneto spark, fuel quality and engine crankshaft continuity checks were also accomplished with no anomalies noted.

The fuselage with engine still attached was then strapped down to a trailer and the original onboard fuel was supplied to the fuel selector valve via a portable external tank. The engine started on the second attempt; however, with the damaged propeller, it could only safely be operated to about 900 rpm. The propeller was then removed and partially straightened to the extent of available capability, then reattached. The engine was subsequently restarted and was able to be run throughout the throttle range up to 2,000 rpm safely. Magneto checks at that rpm yielded about a 100-rpm drop for both the left and the right magneto.

After the engine run-ups, the carburetor was removed, disassembled and examined, with nothing found that would have precluded normal operation.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Water in Fuel

Per FAA Advisory Circular 20-125, "Water can enter an aircraft…by condensation and precipitation (especially when an aircraft has partially filled tanks)." In addition, "The greatest single danger of water in fuel results from human error that allows fuel contaminated with water to enter an aircraft fuel system or permits an aircraft to be operated before its fuel system is properly checked for water."

The pilot provided a list of items performed before, during, and after the flight. However, the list did not mention sumping the fuel during the preflight inspection. The pilot was asked by email to "confirm preflight procedures in regards to checking fuel quality." The pilot responded with the original list and stated, in part, that the "fuel and oil quantities were verified and oil quantity was addressed." A subsequent email to the pilot specifically noted not wanting to miss any information about his sumping the fuel, but the pilot did not respond.

The passenger stated that he was not present for the preflight inspection.

Carburetor Icing

According to the POH, "Under certain moist atmospheric conditions at temperatures of -5 to 20 degrees C, it is possible for ice to form in the induction system, even in summer weather. This is due to the high air velocity through the carburetor venture and the absorption of heat from this air by vaporization of the fuel. To avoid this, carburetor preheat is provided to replace the heat lost by vaporization. Carburetor heat should be full on when carburetor ice is encountered. Adjust mixture for maximum smoothness."

In addition, "Carburetor ice can be detected by a drop in rpm in fixed pitch propeller airplanes and a drop in manifold pressure in constant speed propeller airplanes. In both types, usually there will be a roughness in engine operation."

Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) CE-14-23

On August 6, 2014, the FAA issued the SAIB, "information only, recommendations are not mandatory," to alert owners, operators and maintenance technicians of an airworthiness concern, "specifically structural deterioration and possible collapse of the air inlet hose. The air inlet hose may be between the air filter and the fuel injector, carburetor or carburetor heat box depending on the airplane model. A collapsed hose reduces airflow to the engine and could result in a rough running engine or a loss of power." Postaccident examination of the air inlet hose, revealed that it was not collapsed.

Ditching

The pilot indicated that he was concerned that if he landed in deeper water, the fixed landing gear airplane would flip over.

No substantive documentation could be located in FAA archives regarding the probability of successfully ditching an airplane. Thus, the NTSB requested that the FAA provide any policy that addressed protecting lives and property on the ground during a loss of engine power. The request was made not only in reference to this accident, but also to a similar accident that occurred in Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, on March 15, 2010 (NTSB #ERA10LA175). According to the FAA response:

"In the Pilot/Controller Glossary (P/CG), an aircraft emergency is described as 'a distress or urgency condition.' The P/CG further defines distress as 'a condition of being threatened by serious and or/imminent danger and requiring immediate assistance.' Urgency is defined as 'a condition of being concerned about safety and of requiring timely but not immediate assistance; a potential distress condition.'

Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations includes several requirements intended, in whole or in part, to protect lives and property other than the occupants of the aircraft. Section 91.119 describes minimum safe altitudes for operations under part 91; those regulations principally require all operations to be at an altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface. That regulation further specifies operational restrictions in congested areas. Section 91.13 prohibits any person from operating an aircraft in a way that endangers the life or property of another.

While not regulatory, Chapter 16 of the FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083- 3A) describes the human factors elements associated with pilots selecting between forced landing sites, including forced landings on water (ditching).

The accidents described in the NTSB's request appear to be the result of a PIC decision to
land on a hard surface rather than in the water. In these cases, the only available surfaces
may have been the body of water and the beach. Most pilots will instinctively look for the
largest available flat and open area for an emergency landing. While ditching an aircraft is not necessarily more unsafe than a beach landing, when other options exist, pilots may tend to avoid ditching an aircraft.

Ditching generally involves total loss of the aircraft, and the sudden deceleration, likelihood the aircraft overturning on touchdown, and subsequent cockpit egress difficulties can further influence this decision. A beach can also appear deceptively attractive to a pilot who is forced to make an instantaneous emergency landing decision. A beach surface is somewhat level, usually with no fixed obstacles, and can be assumed to be safe for the aircraft occupants and preservation of the aircraft. These conditions can cause a pilot to overlook the density of people on such a surface.

Because of the variety of possible emergency situations, it is impractical to apply a specific policy addressing risks involved between beach landings and ditching. The FAA relies on its requirements for pilot training on aeronautical decision making to compel pilots to pursue courses of action in an emergency which appear to be the safest and most appropriate under the circumstances."

NTSB Identification: ERA14LA362 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, July 27, 2014 in Venice, FL
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-181, registration: N8826C
Injuries: 2 Fatal,2 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On July 27, 2014, about 1445 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-181, N8826C, was substantially damaged during a forced landing to a shoreline in Venice, Florida. The private pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were not injured; however, a father and his daughter in shallow water near the shoreline were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the personal flight between Buchan Airport (X36), Englewood, Florida, and Venice Municipal Airport (VNC), Venice, Florida, conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

In an interview with the responding Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the pilot indicated that it was the first time the airplane had flown in the preceding 3 ½ months. The left fuel tank was ¾ full and the right fuel tank was ½ full. The engine started "right away;" however, when the pilot performed a magneto check, one of the magnetos had a 300-rpm drop. A second magneto check had the left magneto running roughly, but during a third magneto check, both magnetos were smooth and within limits. The carburetor heat check resulted in a smaller than usual drop of engine rpm.

The takeoff was "normal" and the airplane climbed to about 1,000 feet, then turned south toward Englewood. It subsequently turned north toward Venice, still at 1,000 feet, with the pilot listening on the local airport traffic frequency to enter the landing pattern. Approaching Venice, the engine began to run roughly, and the pilot checked different positions of the ignition switch and changed fuel tanks, but the engine lost power and propeller began windmilling. Total flight time was 10 to 15 minutes.

The pilot declared an emergency on the radio and began the forced landing descent. The airplane was over the water at the time, and the pilot was concerned that if he landed in deep water, the fixed landing gear airplane would flip over. The pilot saw groups of people along the beach, and attempted navigated around them. He then aimed for a spot where he thought there were no people, and landed in the water near the shoreline.

After the pilot and passenger got out of the airplane, a lady shouted to them that she needed a cell phone. The pilot thought she wanted to call on their behalf, and it was only then that he learned that the airplane had hit the father and his daughter.

According to an employee at VNC, about 1445, the pilot made an announcement on the common airport frequency, "to the effect of – emergency can't make the airport." After two requests, the pilot provided the registration number, but when asked about location, he did not respond. The witness called 911 and asked the pilot of another airplane departing the airport to provide the location, which he responded was on the beach about 1 mile south of VNC.

Venice Police provided transcripts from interviews with six witnesses. Witnesses were generally consistent as to what they saw and heard. One witness stated that he was standing in waist deep water about 10 to 15 feet from the shore and about 50 yards south of the family. He saw the airplane descend and it passed directly over his head about 30 feet above him. There was no noise from the engine and the propeller was "kinda moving." He watched the airplane descend toward a group of people. It cleared half of the group, but apparently did not clear all of them. The witness further stated that he thought the airplane was "drifting in because I was far enough out in the water that if he had continued on a straight course he probably would have just hit the water."

Several other witnesses also noted that the engine was not running and that the propeller was turning; some noted the sound of a "thump" in conjunction with the landing. One witness stated that when the airplane hit the water, it "kind of kicked over to the right," then went up onto the beach.

Several days after the accident, the family asked the FAA inspector to speak with them. During the visit, the wife indicated that the family, consisting of herself, her husband, his son and daughter from a previous marriage, and their daughter, arrived at the beach around mid-day. About ½ hour later, the husband's mother and another couple joined them. The family then moved farther up the beach to avoid new beach goers, leaving the husband's mother at the original location.

According to the wife, she was facing north, close to her stepdaughter, when she  saw the airplane in her peripheral vision pass by very low. She did not see her family struck. Her stepson, who was coming out of the water when the airplane passed by, told her that he had ducked when the airplane went over his head, but did not indicate if he saw either his father or his sister hit. The airplane came to a stop about 200 feet beyond the victims, who were in about 4 feet of water and very close to each other. The wife ran to pull her stepdaughter out of the water and a friend pulled her husband out of the water. Both victims were unresponsive and not breathing. A man arrived with knowledge of CPR and gave assistance to her husband while the wife administered to her stepdaughter.

On-scene photographs showed the airplane upright, nose-down at the waterline,  angled slightly towards the beach, with the magnetic compass indicating 350 degrees magnetic. The nose landing gear was separated from the airframe, while both fixed main landing gear remained attached. The left wing, which was extended over the water, had about 4 feet of leading edge crushing on the outboard portion of the wing, and the wingtip undamaged. The two-bladed propeller exhibited no damage to one blade, while the other was bent aft about 60 degrees, beginning mid-span, consistent with a lack of power at touchdown.

Photographs of the cockpit showed the fuel off, the magnetos off, the mixture rich, throttle forward and the carburetor heat off.

The wing fuel tanks were subsequently defueled, the wings were removed, and the airplane was transported to a storage facility. There, NTSB, FAA, Piper Aircraft and Lycoming Engine investigators further documented the airplane and engine.

Each wing fuel tank's fuel supply line from the tank to its disconnect point in the cockpit was checked via air flow to be clear, and each tank's vent system was also checked via air flow to be clear. Engine compression, magneto spark, fuel quality and engine crankshaft continuity checks were also accomplished with no anomalies noted.

The fuselage with engine still attached was then strapped down to a trailer and original onboard fuel was supplied to the fuel selector valve via a portable external tank. The engine started on the second attempt; however, with the bent propeller, it could only safely be operated to about 900 rpm. The propeller was then removed and partially straightened to available capability, then reattached. The engine was subsequently restarted and was able to be run throughout throttle range up to 2,000 rpm safely. Magneto checks at that rpm yielded about a 100-rpm drop for both the left and the right magneto.

After the engine run-ups, the carburetor was removed, disassembled and examined, with nothing found that would have precluded normal operation.

Research of engine electrical, air induction and fuel delivery systems continues.

============

PARRISH, Fla. – Rebecca Irizarry lost her husband Ommy and daughter Oceana in 2014 when the two were struck by a plane on a beach in Sarasota County.

But she reconnected with her daughter Saturday when she met 7-year-old Brandon McNaughton Jr., who was the organ transplant recipient of Oceana’s liver.

“I am so proud of my husband and daughter, this is their last gift to give and it’s an amazing gift,” Irizarry said.

McNaughton accepted Oceana’s liver two years ago and when the families of each child met, it ended months of curiosity on both ends. Brandon McNaughton’s mother Kelsey became emotional when Irizarry embraced her son.

“I feel like she is hugging her daughter and I hope it gives her everything she wants to feel,” Kelsey McNaughton said through tears.

Source:   http://www.winknews.com


 
Ommy and Oceana Irizarry
















  







Mooney M20J 201, N100NY: Incident occurred September 05, 2016 in Santa Margarita, San Luis Obispo County, California (and) Incident occurred September 12, 2013 at San Carlos Airport (KSQL), San Mateo County, California

http://registry.faa.gov/N100NY 

AIRCRAFT LOST POWER AND LANDED IN A FIELD. SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA.

Date: 05-SEP-16
Time: 18:44:00Z
Regis#: N100NY
Aircraft Make: MOONEY
Aircraft Model: M20
Event Type: Incident
Highest Injury: None
Damage: Unknown
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
City: SAN LUIS OBISPO
State: California



A plane experiencing engine trouble made an emergency landing in rural Santa Margarita late Monday morning.

The pilot of the Mooney M20J tells KSBY he took off from the San Luis Obispo airport at about 10:30 a.m., but began experiencing engine problems about 20 minutes later and was not able to get enough power to maintain altitude or return to the airport.

Another 20 minutes reportedly went by before he was able to crash land on a private dirt airstrip in the Pozo area.

The pilot and his passenger were unhurt.

The plane is said to have substantial damage and will likely remain in the area for several days until equipment can be brought in to remove it, according to the pilot. The left gear also collapsed.

The pilot says he has owned the plane for 18 years.

Source:  http://www.ksby.com


Incident occurred September 12, 2013 at San Carlos Airport (KSQL), San Mateo County, California:




SAN CARLOS (CBS SF) — A small plane was forced to make a “gear up” landing at the San Carlos Airport.

The incident happened around 11:20 a.m. The plane’s 56-year-old pilot was on a business trip from San Luis Obispo.

According to San Mateo County Sheriffs, he didn’t realize the landing gear was still up until the plane touched down on the runway.

Fortunately the pilot walked away uninjured.

Airport officials closed the airport until the plane could be moved from the runway.

Source:   http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com

Cessna TR182 Turbo Skylane RG, Unique Equipment Leasing LLC, N738GK: Accident occurred September 05, 2016 at Lake Tahoe Airport (KTVL), South Lake Tahoe, El Dorado County, California

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf 

Docket And Docket Items -    National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary -  National Transportation Safety Board:   https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

UNIQUE EQUIPMENT LEASING LLC:   http://registry.faa.gov/N738GK

NTSB Identification: GAA16CA465
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, September 05, 2016 in South Lake Tahoe, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/05/2016
Aircraft: CESSNA TR182, registration: N738GK
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that during landing the airplane floated half way down the runway, so she decided to perform a go-around. During the go-around, the pilot reported that airplane would not climb initially and one wheel touched down on the runway, which "threw the airplane off kilter." Subsequently, the airplane did start to climb, but the flight path was over the grass to the right of the runway, so she forced the airplane down in the grass ahead. During the touchdown, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane nosed over. 

During a postaccident interview with the National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that during the go-around, she retracted the flaps to 20 degrees, but she forgot to remove the carburetor heat because she normally flies fuel-injected airplanes. 

The fuselage, both wings, and vertical stabilizer sustained substantial damage. 

The pilot reported no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot's operating handbook for the accident airplane states in part: 

Balked Landing
1. Power – FULL THROTTLE and 2400 RPM [revolutions per minute].
2. Carburetor Heat – COLD.
3. Wing Flaps – RETRACT to 20 degrees.
4. Climb Speed – 75 KIAS [knots indicated airspeed].
5. Wing Flaps – RETRACT slowly after reach 75 KIAS.
6. Cowl Flaps – OPEN.

About the time of the accident, at the accident airport, an automated weather observing system reported the wind to be variable at 6 knots, a temperature of 66 degrees Fahrenheit(19 Celsius), and a dew point of 26 degrees Fahrenheit (-3 Celsius). The airport's elevation was 6,268 feet above mean sea level (MSL) and the density altitude was 8,108 feet above MSL.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during an aborted landing, which resulted in a runway excursion and a nose over. Contributing was the pilot's failure to remove the carburetor heat during the go-around in high density altitude conditions.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration Koch Chart, an airplane would have experienced a 66% decrease to the normal rate of climb. The high density altitude and the pilot's failure to remove the carburetor heat likely contributed to the airplane touching down momentarily on the runway during the go-around.


A pilot of a Cessna 180 was taken to Barton Memorial Hospital this afternoon after the plane flipped while landing at Lake Tahoe Airport.

The woman sustained neck injuries. Her male co-pilot was able to walk away. The names and hometowns of the couple have not been released. Officials said they were in a rental plane.

The incident occurred about 1:30pm Sept. 5. Friends of the couple were having lunch at the airport restaurant, but refused to talk to Lake Tahoe News.

Mountain West Aviation officials speculate there was a downdraft that caused the plane to flip. It is resting upside down on the far side of the runway near the Upper Truckee River.

The plane came in from the direction of the lake.

“The wind was behind them. They should have come in from the other way,” Kristin Utler told Lake Tahoe News.

She and her family were preparing to return home to Concord when the accident occurred.

Their plans, and those of others, were delayed at least two hours. The airport was closed immediately after the accident.

FAA officials are expected to arrive later Monday to take over the investigation.

Source:   http://www.laketahoenews.net








SOUTH LAKE TAHOE, Calif. (News 4 & Fox 11) — A small plane has crashed at the South Lake Tahoe Airport, according to the city's fire and rescue department.

The agency tweeted the news just before 2 p.m. Monday, Sept. 5, 2016. It later said two people were on board, with on person taken to a hospital. The extent of that person's injuries were not disclosed.

Photos from Fire and Rescue showed the plane lying upside down in a grass field.

A spokesman for the Federal Aviation Administration said in an email the plane is a Cessna 182, and that it crashed during landing under unknown circumstances.

The FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board would investigate, according to the spokesman.

Fatal Florida crashes show air traffic controllers lack proper training, report says

WASHINGTON, D.C. - Two fatal Florida plane crashes, along with several others, were cited in a major report released Monday by the National Transportation Safety Board.

Air traffic controllers’ lack of training and experience dealing with aircraft in distress were causes or contributing factors in the five fatal crashes covered by the report, the NTSB said.


“The NTSB concludes that, based on the accidents discussed above, the current training provided to air traffic controllers is not effective in preparing them to provide appropriate assistance to aircraft in distress,” the report said.


The report cited a Jan. 13, 2015, fatal crash in New Smyrna Beach as part of the NTSB investigation.


The crash involved a single-engine Cessna that went down after the pilot told air traffic control she was having difficulty flying by sight.


Instead of instructing the pilot to an airport with better visibility, air traffic controllers instructed her to turn to land at New Smyrna Beach Airport.


Conditions at New Smyrna Beach Airport at the time required pilots to maneuver mainly via their instrument panel, the report said.


Not providing the pilot with assistance flying by instruments was a contributing factor in the crash, the NTSB said.


The other fatal Florida crash cited in the report was a fiery crash on Jan. 4, 2013, when a pilot crashed into a home while trying to land at Flagler County Airport in Palm Coast.


The pilot had contacted air traffic controllers saying he was having engine trouble, but had in fact lost all power, the report said.


Although the plane was almost directly over the airport, the air traffic controller directed the plane away and it crashed a mile short of the runway, the report said.


The controllers were operating under the assumption that the plane had at least partial power, it said.


While the pilot did not say the plane had lost all power, the air traffic controllers should have recognized a potential emergency and obtained more specific information from the pilot, the NTSB said.


The pilot and two passengers died in the crash.


Other crashes cited in the report included an April 11, 2014, crash in Hugheston, West Virginia, that killed two; a Dec. 16, 2012, crash in Parkton, North Carolina, that killed the pilot; and an Aug. 11, 2012, crash in Effingham, South Carolina, that left the pilot and a passenger uninjured but seriously damaged their aircraft.


The report recommended two steps for the Federal Aviation Administration to take that would potentially remedy the training deficiencies of air traffic controllers.


The first was for the FAA to require ongoing national scenario-based training for air traffic controllers that would teach them how to identify and respond to emergency situations.


The second recommendation called for the FAA to revise required air traffic controller training with reference to “current and relevant” emergency scenarios from recent events.


The recommendations are not binding and it is up to the FAA to decide if they will be implemented completely or in part.


Source:    http://www.wftv.com




 
Tabata’s Facebook page contains a post from January  11, 2015  that appears to show a navigational map of New Smyrna Beach.


















NTSB Docket and Docket Items: http://dms.ntsb.gov

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA099
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, January 13, 2015 in New Smyrna Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/14/2016
Aircraft: CESSNA 152, registration: N757ZM
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


The commercial pilot was in the process of purchasing a block of flight time with the intent of building time toward an additional rating. According to the operator, the pilot did not complete the mandatory checkout. However, she possessed the keys to the airplane since she had flown the previous day with an instructor, but he did not approve her for solo flight because he believed she required additional practice landing the airplane with an instructor onboard. On the day of the accident, she flew an undetermined number of local, solo flights without the knowledge of the operator. The accident flight was initiated at night, presumably with the intent of operating in the local airport traffic pattern. About 7 minutes into the flight, the pilot likely encountered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and requested assistance from air traffic control. An air traffic controller attempted to provide the pilot with radar vectors to a nearby airport; however, the pilot was unable to visually acquire that airport. The controller then observed the airplane on radar at 600 ft and descending and directed the pilot to climb and turn. A short time later, radar and radio contact were lost; the airplane had crashed. The level of damage and fragmentation of the wreckage was consistent with ground impact at a high velocity. The flight was conducted on a dark, moonless night, under an overcast ceiling, and the final portion of the flight was over the ocean. These factors would have reduced the pilot’s ability to perceive the natural horizon and increased her risk of spatial disorientation.


Although the pilot held an instrument rating and had recently completed an instrument proficiency check, on the night of the accident, she did not demonstrate the skills necessary to control an airplane in IMC. She also did not display the ability to adequately communicate her situation to the controller, nor did she seem to understand or comply with the assistance offered to her. Review of autopsy results and postaccident toxicological testing showed no evidence of any physiologically induced incapacitation or other impairment. During the sequence of events leading up to the accident, the pilot communicated with two air traffic controllers. The pilot described that she was operating in conditions that limited her ability to navigate and potentially affected her ability to control the airplane under visual flight rules (VFR). 

Although the actions of the controllers did not directly contribute to the pilot’s loss of control while attempting to fly under VFR in IMC, the controllers did not act in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance that dictates how to assist pilots experiencing this type of emergency. Specifically, the controllers did not ascertain if the pilot was qualified and capable of IFR flight nor did they attempt to locate and direct the pilot toward the nearest areas reporting visual meteorological conditions. Further, a controller assisting the accident controller had the opportunity to solicit a pilot report from another pilot in a nearby airplane to ascertain if that airplane was operating above the reported IMC but did not do so. During postaccident interviews, the air traffic controllers indicated that they had not received FAA-required evidence-based simulation training on emergencies and described the computer-based emergency training that they received as poor quality.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while operating under visual flight rules (VFR) in night, instrument meteorological conditions, likely due to spatial disorientation. Contributing to the outcome was the radar controller's failure to follow published guidance for providing assistance to VFR pilots having difficulty flying in instrument conditions.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT


On January 13, 2015, about 2058 eastern standard time, a Cessna 152, N757ZM, collided with a public beach at New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The commercial pilot was fatally injured and the airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces. The airplane was registered to a private company and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed for the flight, and no flight plan was filed. The local flight originated from Massey Ranch Airpark (X50), Edgewater, Florida, about 2040.


Prior to the accident flight, the pilot, who was a Japanese citizen, contacted Flight Time Building LLC to purchase a block of flight time in a Cessna 152. According to the company's website, the company sold "blocks" of flight time to licensed pilots, with 50 hours being the minimum-sized block. The company normally dispatched an airplane to the pilot upon completion of a ground and flight "checkout." According to the owner of Flight Time Building, on the day prior to the accident, the pilot flew a local flight with an instructor, followed by a cross country flight with a safety pilot, who was an instructor-in-training. The owner reported that the pilot was not "signed off" for solo flight after the flights on January 12. The flight instructor stated that he needed to see "improved landings" before he could approve her for solo flight.


On the day of the accident, she flew an undetermined number of local, solo flights without the knowledge of Flight Time Building personnel. She possessed the keys to the accident airplane since she had flown it on the previous day with the safety pilot. She refueled the airplane at her own expense and initiated the accident flight, which was a local, night flight in the traffic pattern at X50.


At 2042:03, a radar target correlated to be the accident airplane was about 1 nautical mile (nm) south of X50. Radar data indicated the aircraft was in a left, 360-degree turn.


At 2047:22, the accident pilot pilot transmitted on the emergency frequency, 121.5 MHz, "hello," followed by two more transmissions of the her saying "hello." This coincided with radar data that depicted the accident aircraft emitting a transponder code of, or "squawking," 7700 (emergency) about 3.5 nm south of X50, or about 8.4 nm south of New Smyrna Beach airport (EVB).


At 2047:42, the pilot stated "uh I don't know where I am I want to land." At 2047:52, the Daytona Beach (DAB) Radar South controller transmitted, "The aircraft that doesn't know where they are at; are they at 1,700 feet squawking emergency and 1200?" At 2048:21, the pilot transmitted "I want to land."


The EVB local controller heard the pilot asking for assistance on 121.5 MHz. Because the aircraft was close to EVB, he was able to establish communications. Between 2048 and 2053, the EVB local controller provided assistance to the pilot. The pilot advised the EVB air traffic controller that she could see the ground but could not maintain visual flight conditions. When the EVB local controller turned the pilot toward EVB, the pilot reported that she could see the airport, but a short time later said she could no longer see it. The EVB local controller then attempted to transfer communications to DAB approach control on 125.35 MHz.


At 2053:52, the EVB local controller advised DAB ATC that the aircraft was proceeding towards DAB, and that EVB would have the lights set on high intensity if they needed the airport. The DAB Radar South controller replied, "thanks, we are going to try it." At 2054:35, the pilot of N757ZM transmitted "hello" on the emergency frequency 121.5, and at 2054:41 continued, "on 125.25 no ah contact." The pilot had been instructed by EVB to contact DAB on 125.35 MHz. The DAB Radar South controller responded on 121.5 by asking the pilot if she could hear DAB.


At 2054:49, the pilot again transmitted that she was unable to reach anybody on 125.25. The DAB air traffic controller replied "ok just stay on this frequency you are all right, maintain your present altitude." The EVB local controller informed the DAB air traffic controller that the pilot could not hear DAB on 125.35. DAB advised the EVB local controller that the pilot was on the wrong frequency, and that the DAB controller would assist the pilot on the emergency frequency.


At 2055:15, the pilot transmitted "hello." The DAB air traffic controller established communications with the pilot on 121.5 and asked the pilot if she could hear DAB; the pilot responded, "I can hear you."


At 2055:22, the DAB controller instructed the pilot to "remain calm and to maintain present altitude." The DAB controller told the pilot to continue the right turn northbound towards EVB, and that the airport would be off the right side. The DAB controller added that EVB would have all the runway lights turned on to high and instructed the pilot to advise when she saw the lights.


At 2055:40, the pilot transmitted on 121.5 that she was heading 100 degrees, and asked the DAB air traffic controller what heading she needed to fly. The DAB air traffic controller told the pilot that if she were able, to turn left heading 360 and that EVB would be at the pilot's 12 o'clock position and one and a half nautical miles. After an unintelligible transmission from the pilot, the DAB controller told the pilot she was not required to read back any further transmissions, and to make the turn. The DAB controller instructed the pilot to advise when she saw the lights at EVB. The pilot verified the heading and asked if she needed a left turn, heading 300. The DAB air traffic controller instructed the pilot to continue a left turn, heading 360 and reiterated the EVB position relative to the aircraft. The pilot acknowledged the turn.


At 2056:57, the DAB air traffic controller told the pilot to land any runway at EVB if she saw the runway lights. At 2057:06, the pilot stated she was at 600 feet and the DAB air traffic controller instructed the pilot to maintain her altitude until she saw the airport. The pilot replied that she was in the clouds. The DAB controller told the pilot, "okay don't worry, don't worry, don't worry, don't worry ma'am, just calm down, calm down; make a left turn." The DAB air traffic controller then instructed the pilot to make a left turn to climb because she had been in a descent. The DAB air traffic controller advised the pilot it was okay to be in the clouds but that she needed to climb.


At 2057:48, the DAB controller asked the pilot if she was climbing, and told her that she needed to maintain at least 1,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the climb to 1,000 feet, followed by an unintelligible transmission. The DAB air traffic controller reiterated the climb to 1,000 feet and for the pilot to advise DAB when she was comfortable. There were no further transmissions from the pilot.


A short time later, radar and radio contact was lost and the airplane crashed onto New Smyrna Beach, in shallow water. Radar data indicated a descending, right turn prior to impact. The altitude of the last observed radar target was 500 feet above mean sea level. Emergency responders arrived at the accident site shortly thereafter in an attempt to provide assistance.


PERSONNEL INFORMATION


The pilot, age 38, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. She was issued a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical certificate on August 18, 2014, with a restriction to wear corrective lenses.


Pilot records recovered from the wreckage indicated that the pilot had logged about 416 total hours of flight experience as of January 7, 2015. She had logged about 1.3 hours of night time and about 6.1 hours of actual instrument time prior to the accident flight. Logbook entries showed that she completed a 14 CFR Part 61.55 flight review and a 14 CFR 61.57(d) instrument proficiency check (IPC), in a Cessna 152, at Torrance, California on November 19, 2014. The flight review and IPC were performed with different flight instructors. Her pilot logbook indicated she flew about 2.4 hours on June 30, 2014, in a Beech BE-58 and did not log another flight prior to her flight review and IPC of November 19, 2014.


FAA inspectors interviewed the flight instructors who performed the flight review and IPC. Both flight instructors reported that the accident pilot showed no weaknesses, handled the radios during the flight, was familiar with the local area, and was a "good pilot."


AIRCRAFT INFORMATION


The airplane was a Cessna model 152 that was manufactured in 1977. The high-wing, fixed tricycle landing gear airplane was powered by a Lycoming O-235-L2C engine, rated at 110 horsepower at 2,550 rpm and was equipped with a Sensenich 72CK56-0-54 metal, fixed-pitch propeller.


According to the maintenance logbooks provided by the owner, the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engine was completed on October 27, 2014, at 502.1 hours tachometer time. The observed tachometer time at the time of the accident was 525.8 hours. The aircraft total time was not recorded in on the logbook entries, and the owner estimated that the total time of the airframe was about 12,000 hours.


METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION


The National Weather Service (NWS) Surface Analysis Charts for 1900 and 2200 on January 13, 2015 depicted a cold front moving across central into southern Florida with cold air stratus clouds behind the front. Numerous station models behind the front depicted visibilities restricted in mist or fog, with temperature-dew point spreads of less than 5° F, and in the vicinity of the accident site less than 3° F.


The NWS Weather Depiction Chart for 2000 depicted an extensive area of IMC extending from the accident site and across most of all of central and northern Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, portions of southern and eastern North Carolina, and portions of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. A second area of IMC was also identified over southern Florida ahead of the front in the vicinity of West Palm Beach with marginal visual meteorological conditions extending through most of central and into southern Florida. The closest visual meteorological conditions with ceilings above 3,000 feet and visibility greater than 5 miles were over southwestern Florida, and extreme south Florida. The chart indicated that fog and low ceilings were not a localized event over the New Smyrna Beach area, but extended over most of the area.


The National Center for Atmospheric Research regional radar mosaic for 2100 depicted no significant weather echoes associated with rain showers or thunderstorms in the vicinity of the accident site during the period.


The NWS 12-hour Low-Level Significant Weather Prognostic Chart valid for 0100 and available for briefing prior to the accident depicted the cold front moving across southern Florida with an extensive area of IMC expected over most of all of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and into sections of Mississippi, and Tennessee. The chart depicted no significant turbulence outside of convective activity was expected, and depicted the freezing level near 12,000 feet over the region.


No weather reporting capability was present at X50. A review of the observations surrounding the area indicated that at the time the accident airplane departed from X50, IMC were already being reported surrounding the area at EVB, DAB, and to the south at the NASA Shuttle Landing Facility (TTS), Titusville, Florida.


EVB was located approximately 5 nm north of the departure airport at an elevation of 10 feet, and less than 3 miles west of the accident site. The airport had an Automated Weather Observation System. The weather conditions reported at 2055, or about 3 minutes prior the accident, included wind from 350° at 8 knots, visibility 8 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 500 feet, temperature 17° Celsius (C), dew point 16° C, altimeter 30.14 inches of mercury (Hg).


The next closest weather reporting station was DAB, located approximately 14 nm northwest of the departure airport at an elevation of 34 feet. The airport had a control tower and a federally installed and maintained Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS). The weather conditions reported at 2053, or about 5 minutes prior the accident, included wind from 020° at 9 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 700 feet, temperature 18° C, dew point 16° C, and altimeter 30.14 inches of Hg.


The DAB special weather report at 2131 included wind from 360° at 11 knots gusting to 17 knots, visibility 1 statute mile, ceiling overcast at 400 feet, temperature 16° C, dew point 15° C, and altimeter 30.15 inches of Hg.


The DAB special weather report at 2146 included wind from 360° at 8 knots, visibility ½ statute mile in fog, ceiling overcast at 300 feet, temperature 16° C, dew point 15° C, and altimeter 30.15 inches of mercury. Remarks: automated observation system, tower visibility 1-mile, temperature 15.6° C, dew point 15.0° C.


Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB), Orlando, Florida, was located 20 nm southwest of the departure airport at an elevation of 55 feet, and was equipped with an ASOS. The weather conditions reported at SFB, at 2100, included wind from 360° at 9 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling broken at 1,000 feet, overcast at 3,900 feet, temperature 19° C, dew point 17° C, altimeter 30.14 inches of Hg.


On the day of the accident, sunset occurred about 1745 and evening civil twilight occurred about 1811. Moonrise occurred at 0029, and moonset occurred at 1212.


The DAB North Controller, who assisted the accident controller, solicited pilot reports (PIREPS) for the DAB local area earlier in her shift, but could not recall their specific content. During the accident sequence, she had been working a Cirrus SR22, whose pilot requested the RNAV runway 29 approach into EVB. The SR22 was at 3,000 feet holding at RISRE, about 10 NM east of EVB and near the accident aircraft, but she did not solicit a PIREP from the pilot or ask about cloud tops.


COMMUNICATIONS


Paragraphs 10-2-8 and 10-2-9 of FAA order 7110.65 address how air traffic controllers should provide radar assistance to aircraft operating under visual flight rules (VFR) in weather difficulty, including techniques that should be used to the extent possible when providing assistance. They state [in part]:


10-2-8. RADAR ASSISTANCE TO VFR AIRCRAFT IN WEATHER DIFFICULTY


a. If a VFR aircraft requests radar assistance when it encounters or is about to encounter IFR weather conditions, ask the pilot if he/she is qualified for and capable of conducting IFR flight.


b. If the pilot states he/she is qualified for and capable of IFR flight, request him/her to file an IFR flight plan and then issue clearance to destination airport, as appropriate.


c. If the pilot states he/she is not qualified for or not capable of conducting IFR flight, or if he/she refuses to file an IFR flight plan, take whichever of the following actions is appropriate:


1. Inform the pilot of airports where VFR conditions are reported, provide other available pertinent weather information, and ask if he/she will elect to conduct VFR flight to such an airport.


2. If the action in subparagraph 1 above is not feasible or the pilot declines to conduct VFR flight to another airport, provide radar assistance if the pilot:


(a) Declares an emergency.

(b) Refuses to declare an emergency and you have determined the exact nature of the radar services the pilot desires.

3. If the aircraft has already encountered IFR conditions, inform the pilot of the appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude. If the aircraft is below appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude and sufficiently accurate position information has been received or radar identification is established, furnish a heading or radial on which to climb to reach appropriate terrain/obstacle clearance minimum altitude.


10-2-9. RADAR ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUES


Use the following techniques to the extent possible when you provide radar assistance to a pilot not qualified to operate in IFR conditions:


a. Avoid radio frequency changes except when necessary to provide a clear communications channel.

b. Make turns while the aircraft is in VFR conditions so it will be in a position to fly a straight course while in IFR conditions.
c. Have pilot lower gear and slow aircraft to approach speed while in VFR conditions.
d. Avoid requiring a climb or descent while in a turn if in IFR conditions.
e. Avoid abrupt maneuvers.
f. Vector aircraft to VFR conditions.
g. The following must be accomplished on a Mode C equipped VFR aircraft which is in emergency but no longer requires the assignment of Code 7700:

1. TERMINAL. Assign a beacon code that will permit terminal minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) alarm processing.


WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION


The wreckage was located in shallow water at approximate coordinates 29 02 22.68N, 080 53 52.69W. The wreckage was pulled onto the beach by local authorities after coordination with the NTSB investigator-in-charge to prevent further damage and loss of parts.


The left and right wings separated from the fuselage during the impact sequence. The outboard 4 feet of the left wing was separated from the remainder of the wing. The right wing exhibited diagonal and aft crush deformation, beginning 2 feet from the wing root to the aft spar at the wing tip. Aileron control cable continuity was established through multiple recovery cuts and fractures consistent with overstress. A majority of the left aileron was not located. The wing flap actuator was found in the retracted (flaps up) position.


The fuselage was separated into multiple sections, including a section consisting of the engine firewall and instrument panel, the landing gear and cabin floor, and an 8-foot section of aft fuselage. The right main landing gear was not recovered. The nose landing gear was separated and located with the main wreckage.


The empennage separated aft of station 173. The horizontal and vertical stabilizers remained attached. The outboard half of the right horizontal stabilizer leading edge was crushed in an up and aft direction. Rudder and elevator control cable continuity was established through multiple recovery cuts and fractures consistent with overstress.


Both wing fuel tanks were breached during the impact sequence and no residual fuel of found. The fuel selector handle was found in the "on" position and the unit operated normally in the "on" and "off" positions when forced air was introduced into the selector valve. Sand was found in the fuel strainer bowl and screen. The odor of fuel was observed in the strainer bowl.


The propeller separated from the crankshaft flange and was found partially buried in sand at the location of the main wreckage. The blades exhibited twisting deformation, leading edge gouges, and surface polishing.


The engine was separated from the firewall. The carburetor, carburetor air box, and alternator were missing and were not located. All engine components were subjected to salt water and sand immersion. The carburetor flange was fractured from impact and was still attached to the oil sump. The carburetor data plate was lodged into the induction tube at the oil sump.


The valve covers, magnetos, vacuum pump, and exhaust were removed by investigators. Mechanical internal continuity was established by rotating the rear accessory gears at the vacuum pump drive with a mechanical device. All valve action was confirmed through 720 degrees of crankshaft rotation and thumb suction and compression was observed at all cylinders. A digital video boresope examination of the interior of the cylinders and the piston surfaces revealed normal operating signatures. The magnetos were turned with a hand drill and by hand rotation; no spark could be produced. The spark plug electrodes were normal in appearance except for salt water, oil, and sand contamination.


The inspection of the engine did not reveal any abnormalities that would have prevented normal operation or production of rated horsepower.


MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION


A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed at the offices of the District 7 Medical Examiner, Daytona Beach, Florida, on January 14, 2015. The autopsy report noted the cause of death as "Multiple Blunt Traumatic Injuries" and the manner of death was "Accident."


Forensic toxicology testing of the pilot was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory (CAMI), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The CAMI toxicology report indicated negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and drugs. Testing for cyanide was not performed.


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION


FAA Guidance to Pilots


In April 2003, the FAA published Advisory Circular 61-134, General Aviation Controlled Flight into Terrain Awareness. The circular stated in part:


"Operating in marginal VFR /IMC conditions is more commonly known as scud running. According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and FAA data, one of the leading causes of GA accidents is continued VFR flight into IMC. As defined in 14 CFR part 91, ceiling, cloud, or visibility conditions less than that specified for VFR or Special VFR is IMC and IFR [instrument flight rules] applies. However, some pilots, including some with instrument ratings, continue to fly VFR in conditions less than that specified for VFR. The result is often a CFIT [controlled flight into terrain] accident when the pilot tries to continue flying or maneuvering beneath a lowering ceiling and hits an obstacle or terrain or impacts water. The accident may or may not be a result of a loss of control before the aircraft impacts the obstacle or surface. The importance of complete weather information, understanding the significance of the weather information, and being able to correlate the pilot's skills and training, aircraft capabilities, and operating environment with an accurate forecast cannot be emphasized enough."


According to FAA Advisory Circular AC 60-4A, "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation," tests conducted with qualified instrument pilots indicated that it can take as long as 35 seconds to establish full control by instruments after a loss of visual reference of the earth's surface. AC 60-4A further states that surface references and the natural horizon may become obscured even though visibility may be above VFR minimums and that an inability to perceive the natural horizon or surface references is common during flights over water, at night, in sparsely populated areas, and in low-visibility conditions.


According to the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3), "Night flying is very different from day flying and demands more attention of the pilot. The most noticeable difference is the limited availability of outside visual references. Therefore, flight instruments should be used to a greater degree.… Generally, at night it is difficult to see clouds and restrictions to visibility, particularly on dark nights or under overcast. The pilot flying under VFR must exercise caution to avoid flying into clouds or a layer of fog." The handbook described some hazards associated with flying in airplanes under VFR when visual references, such as the ground or horizon, are obscured. "The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular tends to confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in the attitude of the airplane, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated; leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation."


Air Traffic Controller Training


As part of the investigation into this accident, air traffic controllers were asked about their preparedness to provide assistance to a pilot in an emergency situation. FAA air traffic controllers were required to undergo proficiency training that "maintains and upgrades the knowledge and skills necessary to apply air traffic procedures in a safe and efficient manner." This training included recurrent training and refresher training. Chapter 1 paragraph 5, (a) and (b), of FAA JO 3120.4N, Air Traffic Technical Training, addressed the requirements of recurrent and refresher training and stated [in part]:


JO 3120.4N Air Traffic Technical Training


a. Recurrent Training. Recurrent training is collaboratively-developed national safety training delivered via electronic means, instructor-led presentations, or any combination thereof. Recurrent training is intended to increase air traffic controller proficiency, enhance awareness of human factors affecting aviation, and promote behaviors essential for the identification, mitigation, and/or management of risk. Topics are derived from data collected through internal and external safety reporting systems and stakeholder input. Recurrent training is conducted via an 8-hour block of training, two rounds delivered yearly. Each round is comprised of approximately 4 hours of training selected from the topics listed below, and 4 hours of training on relevant and timely safety topics, such as but not limited to: Human Factors, Safety Culture, Threat and Error Management, Crew Resource Management, Event Recovery, and learning that promotes the maturity of the Safety Management System. Recurrent training requirements are identified annually NLT October 1st to be delivered the following calendar year. Recurrent training on the following items need not be duplicated in local refresher training:


(1) Safety alerts and traffic advisories, to include Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) procedures and the relationship between charted minimum altitudes and underlying topography.

(2) Weather and other conditions that affect flight (e.g., icing, thunderstorms, windshear, and VFR aircraft that encounter instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions).
(3) Bird activity information and dissemination.
(4) Wake turbulence information and application.
(5) Line up and wait (LUAW).
(6) Runway Safety.
(7) Recovery in ATC Operations.
(8) Fatigue awareness.

b. Refresher Training. Each facility must maintain, in writing, an annual (calendar year) refresher training plan. Annual refresher training contains two elements: nationally and/or facility-developed curriculum and simulation training. Facilities are encouraged to review their quality control data (e.g., Quality Control Monitoring, Service Reviews, and Compliance Verification and data available in the Partnership for Safety Portal) to identify additional topics for annual refresher training in order to meet each facility's changing needs. The following topics must be included unless designated by the TA as not applicable.


(1) Unusual situations, lost aircraft orientation, aviation security procedures (including interceptor procedures and communications), hijacking, and other topics identified by the TA. (Training on emergency situations should be based on real-life incidents and aircraft accidents, stressing a lessons-learned approach.)


(15) Facilities with simulation capabilities such as AT Coach, ETG, TTG, DYSIM, TSS,TTL, SIMFAST, O21 lab, etc., must complete locally identified, evidence-based simulation training on the topics identified in paragraph 5.b., Refresher Training, deemed appropriate by the TA, as follows:

(a) A minimum of one hour of evidence-based simulation training in calendar year 2014.
(b) A minimum of two hours of evidence-based simulation training in calendar year

Appendix (J) of the JO 3120.4N Air Traffic Technical Training identified the definitions and state [in part]:


Appendix J. Definitions


17. Evidence-based Training: Training based on an analysis of safety data.


All of the air traffic controllers indicated the recurrent training required by the FAA was lacking, and they couldn't remember any substance of the topics. All of the recurrent training they could remember was via computer-based instruction or by slide-based presentation. Both of the air traffic controllers on duty the night of the accident could not recall any refresher training utilizing the simulator as required, and the supervisor indicated most controllers viewed the training as an annoyance.



 
 Michael R. Anders, a 58-year-old Kentucky high school teacher, was killed when the plane he was piloting crashed into a Palm Coast home, killing two others.

 























 










 

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA105
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, January 04, 2013 in Palm Coast, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/08/2014
Aircraft: BEECH H35, registration: N375B
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The airplane departed under visual flight rules and was at an altitude of about 7,500 feet when the pilot reported vibrations and an “oil pressure problem.” Airports in the area were under instrument meteorological conditions with cloud ceilings of 900 to 1,000 feet above ground level (agl). An air traffic controller provided the pilot with radar vectors for an airport surveillance radar (ASR) approach to a nearby airport that did not have a published ASR procedure. The airplane was about 2.5 miles northwest of the airport, at an altitude of about 5,300 feet agl, when the pilot reported that the engine oil pressure was “zero” with “cool cylinders.” The controller did not obtain nor did the pilot provide any additional information about the engine’s power status. During the next approximately 7 minutes, the airplane continued past the airport to a point about 6.5 miles northeast before the controller vectored the airplane to the south and then west to the final approach course. The airplane subsequently struck trees and a residence about 3/4 mile from the approach end of the runway. A postcrash fire destroyed the airframe and engine. 

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the engine sustained a fractured No. 4 connecting rod due to oil starvation. The connecting rod punctured the crankcase, which resulted in a total loss of engine power. The crankshaft oil transfer passage at the No. 4 journal sustained mechanical damage during the accident sequence and contained displaced journal material. All other oil passages were unrestricted. The airplane’s maintenance logbooks were destroyed during the accident. Maintenance performed on the airplane about 1 month before the accident included the replacement of the Nos. 1 and 4 cylinders; however, it could not be determined if this maintenance played a role in the accident. The reason for the oil starvation could not be determined. 
Review of the air traffic control transcripts and interviews with the controllers revealed that they vectored the airplane such that it was unable to reach the airport. This was likely due to the weather conditions and the controllers’ incomplete understanding of the airplane’s mechanical condition (complete loss of power), which the pilot did not provide.

At the time of the accident, the pilot was using medication for hypertension and had well-controlled diabetes. It was unlikely that either condition significantly affected the pilot’s performance at the time of the accident. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
A total loss of engine power after the failure of the No. 4 connecting rod due to oil starvation, which resulted in a subsequent forced landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to clearly state that the aircraft had lost all power and the air traffic controllers’ incomplete understanding of the emergency, which resulted in the controllers vectoring the airplane too far from the airport to reach the runway.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 4, 2013, about 1419 eastern standard time, a Beechcraft H35, N375B, owned and operated by a private individual, experienced a loss of engine power while in cruise flight and was destroyed when it impacted a house, while on approach to the Flagler County Airport (XFL), Palm Coast, Florida. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an en route instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance was obtained for the flight, which departed Saint Lucie County International Airport (FPR), Fort Pierce, Florida, and was destined for Knoxville Downtown Island Airport (DKX), Knoxville, Tennessee. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The airplane arrived at FPR after flying from Stella Maris, Bahamas. The passengers cleared U.S. Customs about 1145. The airplane was subsequently refueled and departed for DKX under visual flight rules.

According to air traffic control information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot contacted Daytona Approach control about 1407, and reported vibrations and an "oil pressure problem." The controller advised the pilot that the airports in the area were IFR with cloud ceilings of 900 to 1,000 feet above ground level. The pilot received radar vectors for an airport surveillance radar approach to runway 29 at XFL, which was about 8 miles north of the airplane's position. At 1411:06, the pilot reported that the engine oil pressure was "zero" with "cool cylinders." At that time, the airplane was flying at an altitude of 5,300 feet mean seal level (msl), and was located about 2.5 miles from the approach end of runway 11, at XFL. The airplane continued to be vectored to a point about 6.5 miles northeast of the airport and was provided headings to the south and then west, to the final approach course for runway 29. The airplane was subsequently cleared to land about 1416. Radar contact with the airplane was lost when the airplane was about 2 miles from the runway, at an altitude of 200 feet msl. At 1418:27, the pilot transmitted "…we need help; we're coming in with smoke." There were no further communications from the airplane.

The XFL airport director observed the airplane as it approached runway 29. He described the weather conditions as instrument meteorological conditions with a low ceiling and mist. He observed the airplane "break out" of the cloud layer, very low, just above the tree line. The airplane's wings were level as it descended and disappeared in the tree line.

Another witness, who was an airline transport pilot and flight instructor, reported that the airplane looked "slow" as it exited clouds, was in a nose high attitude, and appeared to "stall" prior to descending below the tree line, which was followed by smoke about 10 seconds later.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. The pilot's logbooks were not recovered. His most recent FAA third class medical certificate was issued on December 31, 2012. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 1,300 hours, which included 30 hours during the previous 6 months. The pilot reported 1,100 hours of total flight experience, with 50 hours during the previous 6 months, on an FAA medical certificate application dated February 4, 2010.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The four-seat, all-metal, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane, serial number D-5121, was manufactured in 1957. It was powered by a Continental Motors IO-470-C1, 250-horsepower engine and equipped with a Beech 278 propeller assembly. According to Beechcraft, the airplane was originally manufactured with a Continental Motors O-470-G series engine, which could be modified post manufacturer with a fuel injected engine per Beech Kit 35-648, "Engine Conversion to Fuel Injection on the Beech Model H35 Bonanza." No documentation for the engine that was installed on the accident airplane was found.

The airplane was found to have been modified with the addition of 15-gallon fiberglass wingtip fuel tanks, which would have included a wingtip tank fuel transfer pump mounted in each respective wing's wheel-well, to allow fuel to be transferred from each wingtip fuel tank, to its respective wing. There was no record of a supplemental type certificate for the installation of wingtip fuel tanks found in the airplane's FAA airworthiness file.

According to FAA records, the pilot purchased the airplane on May 30, 2008. 

The airplane's maintenance records were not located. According to an FAA inspector, it was reported that the pilot traveled with his personal logbook and the airplane's maintenance records onboard the airplane. Additional information obtained by the FAA inspector revealed that the engine's No. 1 and No. 4 cylinders were replaced due to low compression during early December 2012; however, no work orders or other associated documentation could be located. 

A friend of the pilot reported that he believed that the airplane's last annual inspection was performed around September-October 2012. He stated that he was not aware of any previous engine issues with the airplane, except for a small oil leak.

In a written statement, the lineman who refueled the airplane at FPR reported that he noticed "visible oil leaks" on the airplane's nose gear strut. In addition, after he informed the pilot of a fuel imbalance prior to refueling, the pilot informed the lineman that the airplane's right fuel pump was not working. 

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The weather reported at XFL at 1350 was: wind 360 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, ceiling 900 feet broken, 1,400 feet overcast, temperature 15 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 13 degrees C, and altimeter 30.22 in/hg. 

COMMUNICATIONS

The following information, which contains excerpts of recorded communications, was obtained by an NTSB air traffic control specialist through interviews and review of communications and radar information obtained from the FAA: 

At 1349:34, the pilot contacted Daytona Beach approach control and reported that he was at 4,500 feet. Eight minutes later, the pilot requested a climb to 6,500 feet. The approach controller informed the pilot that they had received a pilot report (PIREP) reporting that the cloud tops were at 7,000 feet. The controller advised the pilot to maintain at or above 7,000 feet, and remain in VFR conditions. The pilot complied and climbed to 7,500 feet. 

At 1407:01, the pilot reported, "…we got a vibration in the prop, I need some help here." The approach controller informed the pilot that the closest airport was at his 12 to 1 o'clock position and 5 miles, and asked him if he was instrument flight rules (IFR) capable and equipped. The pilot stated, "I'm IFR, we're just getting a little vibration. We've got an oil pressure problem; we're going to have to drop quickly here." When asked to clarify the nature of the problem, the pilot stated, "…we got a propeller or something going, I'm backing it up here to see." 

According to the approach controller, Ormond Beach Airport, which was located approximately 6 miles to the southeast of the airplane's position, was considered briefly, however, because runway 8/26 was closed for construction and there had been a strong tailwind for runway 17, that airport was not an option. The approach controller subsequently cleared the flight to XFL, instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 2,000 feet.

About 1408, the approach controller instructed the pilot to continue his present heading, and informed him that he would get him as close as he could to the Flagler airport for a runway 29 approach. He advised the pilot that the weather ceiling at XFL was 900 feet, and that an instrument approach was necessary. The controller subsequently asked the pilot if he could accept an airport surveillance approach (ASR) into XFL and the pilot replied that he was "…lovely with that" (An ASR approach was a type of instrument approach wherein the air traffic controller issued instructions, for pilot compliance, based on an aircraft's position in relation to the final approach course, and the distance from the end of the runway as displayed on the controller's radar scope). 

Flagler County Airport did not have a published ASR approach. The controllers determined that to best handle the emergency it was necessary to offer the pilot an unpublished ASR approach to runway 29 at XFL using area navigation (RNAV) approach minimums. This determination was based on the information obtained from the pilot, and the need for the pilot to conduct an instrument approach into the airport due to the IFR weather conditions. 

At 1409, the pilot checked in with the arrival controller and reported he was at 7,000 feet descending to 2,000 feet. The arrival controller instructed the pilot to descend and maintain 3,000 feet, and to turn right to a heading of 060 degrees. According to the arrival controller, he assigned the airplane 3,000 feet because he wanted to ensure the airplane was high enough to remain clear of an antenna that was located northwest of XFL.

About 1410, the controller advised the pilot to expect an ASR approach to runway 29 at XFL.

At 1411:06, the pilot reported, "…we got zero oil pressure, but we've got cool cylinder head temperature." The controller acknowledged the pilot's transmission and instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading of 090 degrees and to descend and maintain 2,000 feet.

At 1411:47, the controller informed the pilot that he would provide guidance along the RNAV runway 29 approach and that the straight in minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 560 feet. 

At 1413:46, the controller instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading of 180 degrees and advised that the airplane was about 6 miles east-northeast of XFL on " a base leg for about a four and one-half to five mile final." The pilot acknowledged the turn and said "…we're starting to see some ground here." 

At 1414:27, the controller instructed the pilot to descend to 1,600 feet and to turn right, to a heading of 200 degrees.

At 1415:01, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane 5 miles southeast of XFL. About 35 seconds later, the controller provided the pilot turns to intercept the final approach course and informed the pilot that he was 4 miles straight in for runway 29, which the pilot acknowledged.

About 1416, the controller informed the pilot that the airplane was three miles from the runway, asked him to advise when he had the airport in sight, and cleared the airplane to land on runway 29.

At 1417:25, the controller told the pilot that the airplane was below radar coverage, instructed him to contact the XFL tower, and provided missed approach instructions, "if you don't have the airport in sight, climb straight ahead to 2,000 [feet]."

At 1417:59, the pilot transmitted, "…do you read me?" The controller immediately responded that he had him loud and clear and asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight at his 12 o'clock and a mile. The pilot did not respond.

At 1418:27, the pilot transmitted, "…we need help; we're coming in with smoke." The arrival controller informed the pilot that Flagler Tower was waiting for him, and that he was cleared to land.

At 1418:55, the XFL tower controller called the arrival controller and informed him that the airplane did not make it to the airport.

Federal Aviation Administration order 7110.65, "Air Traffic Control," provides guidance and instruction to air traffic controllers when an emergency situation exist or is imminent. Paragraphs 10-1-1, 10-1-2, and 10-2-5 stated in part:

10-1-1: Emergency Determinations...Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be prescribed. However, when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual.

10-1-2: Obtaining Information…Obtain enough information to handle the emergency intelligently. Base your decision as to what type of assistance is needed on information and requests received from the pilot because he/she is authorized by 14 CFR Part 91 to determine a course of action.

10-2-5: Emergency Situations…Consider that an aircraft emergency exists…when any of the following exist: 
a. An emergency is declared by either: 
1. The pilot.
2. Facility personnel. 
3. Officials responsible for the operation of the aircraft. 

[For additional information, please see the NTSB Air Traffic Control Group Factual Report located in the Public Docket.]

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The airplane impacted trees and a residence about 3/4 mile from the approach end of runway 29, slightly left of the extended centerline. The initial impact point (IIP) was identified as a pine tree that was about 60 feet tall and contained broken limbs about 30 to 35 feet above ground level. Various components of wreckage extended from the IIP, on a heading of 288 degrees magnetic for 50 feet. The remainder of the airplane impacted the roof of a detached single family home and a large fire ensued, which destroyed most of the airplane and dwelling.

The airplane's left outboard wing, with about one-half of the corresponding aileron attached, displayed evidence of a tree strike and was found at the base of a tree located about 60 feet from the back of the house. The inbound portion of the left aileron was observed near the right wing, which was inverted and located along the back of the house. The empennage came to rest inverted on the backside edge of the roof alongside of a section of the right wing inboard leading edge. Other remains of the fuselage and left wing were found inside the house. Examination of the airplane's flight control cables did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures. The right flap actuator remained intact and was observed in a flap retracted position. The landing gear actuator was not observed and the preaccident position of the landing gear could not be confirmed.

The engine was found inverted on the floor of the house. It sustained a significant amount of thermal and impact damage, which destroyed all accessories, with the exception of the propeller governor, which was intact, but fired damaged. A large hole was observed in the crankcase, which contained a portion of the No. 4 connecting rod. The engine was forwarded to Continental Motors Inc., Mobile, Alabama, for further examination.

The propeller remained attached to the crankshaft flange. The spinner was dented and did not display spiral dents. Both propeller blades displayed light chordwise scratches. The outboard section of one propeller blade was missing about 4 to 6 inches of its tip. The propeller blade was cut inboard of the missing section and forwarded to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, DC, for further examination. 

Subsequent teardown of the engine under the supervision of the NTSB investigator-in-charge revealed that the crankshaft exhibited lubrication distress, thermal damage, and mechanical damage at the No. 4 connecting rod journal. The crankshaft oil transfer passage at the No. 4 journal sustained mechanical damage and contained displaced journal material. The remaining crankshaft oil transfer passages were unrestricted. Only fragments of the No. 4 connection rod bearing were recovered and they displayed lubrication and thermal distress. In addition, the number No.4 connecting rod was fractured at the base of the I-beam and exhibited extreme thermal and mechanical damage consistent with a loss of lubrication. The oil galleys and passages in the left and right crankcase halves were intact, clear, and unrestricted. 

Subsequent examination of sectioned propeller blade by an NTSB metallurgist revealed that it exhibited extensive evidence of exposure to elevated temperatures that approached the melting point of the blade. This included complete removal of the paint, a thick oxide skin, and internal slumping of the blade material. The blade fracture surface exhibited characteristics consistent with separation while at elevated temperatures. The blade also showed a gradual deformation toward the camber side adjacent to the fracture. The deformation was accompanied by transverse cracking and stretching of the oxide layer on the flat side of the blade indicating deformation after or during high temperature exposure.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Office of the Medical Examiner, District 23, St. Augustine, Florida. The autopsy report noted the cause of death as "multiple blunt force injures." 

Toxicological testing performed on the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, was positive for the following:

"Atenolol detected in Liver
Atenolol detected in Blood (Heart)
1949 (mg/dl) Glucose detected in Urine
149 (mg/dl) Glucose detected in Vitreous
7 (%) Hemoglobin A1C detected in Blood"

Review of the pilot's most recent FAA medical examination application (dated December 31, 2012) revealed "No" was selected to the question "Do you currently use any medication (Prescription or Nonprescription)."