Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Bahamas Press: What could have been on that aircraft that would cause nothing to be said?

Plane crash on Stella Maris, Long Island went unreported by local officials  

Plane lands on its belly, and no one was injured – YET – Bahamian authorities made no mention of the incident to the press almost two weeks ago…

Stella Maris, Long Island – More news went unreported in the Bahamas and only BP will bring it to you! A plane crash-lands on Long Island a day after Valentines Day (Feb 15th, 2014)…

This breaking story confirmed to BP following TSB Report#A14F0027 was issued by the Canadian Transport Department.

The report confirmed in the communication that a Cessna Citation 501SP, registration C-GKPC, was on a flight from KFXE Fort Lauderdale Executive, Florida to MYNA Stella Maris Airport, Bahamas.

It confirmed that on the downswing leg for landing runway 31, the checklist was interrupted, and the aircraft landed with the gear retracted.

BP can confirm that, according to the official report, during that flight the aircraft sustained “substantial damage” to the underside and the flaps. No one was injured.

Interestingly, it appears that
BP agents in the aviation department of the Bahamas are still in the dark on the issue up to press time and, simply, no one knows what in the hell happened in Long Island. What in the hell is this? It appears that everyone in this town – INCLUDING THE WUTLESS MEDIA – are sleeping!

BP investigations – without the help of the Aviation Department here in the capital – says the plane is owned by Kelly Panteluk Construction Ltd which is located in the Canadian city of Estevan in the Province of Saskatchewan

We believe the plane was piloted Kelly Panteluk, but we aren’t sure. We know three passengers were on-board. Our concern here is simple. What was on the plane that causes officials in the Bahamas to not report this incident to the public, and think a major news gathering source like Bahamas Press will not find out?

This is the second unreported air incident in the country, which occurred almost two weeks ago.

Just yesterday Bahamas Press reported how on Sunday a plane crashed into a police vehicle at the Treasure Cay Airport. The plane had illegal nationals onboard and had no landing clearance in the Bahamas. That incident was never reported to the media until BP made public the incident.

What else is happening in the Bahamas yinner don’t know? Major news is breaking and only VAT is sucking up all the national pages.

We report yinner decide!

Story and Photo:   http://bahamaspress.com

Pontotoc County Airport (22M), Mississippi: Aiming to receive larger grants



 
PONTOTOC COUNTY, Miss. (WTVA) — With more than 20 tenant aircraft, all is quiet at the Pontotoc County Airport, but if plans come to fruition, there may soon be more planes there.

It's seeking more money to pay for enhancements that would boost the number of arrivals and departures.

"More aircraft based here, the better your chances are of receiving grants from the government and the higher the grants can be," said Ted McVay, secretary/treasuer of the airport board.

Through larger grants, old hangars could be replaced with state of art hangars.

Not only would the airport benefit. So would the county with more business.

A key asset that board members of the Pontotoc County Airport feel that they have in their favor is a new fueling system.

Pilots of piston engine aircraft can come in and fuel up the plane and take off, and that time is around 30 minutes as opposed to going to a larger airport where commercial aviation pilots may encounter delays after refueling their plane.

"Here, there is no wait for fuel unless there is somebody in line ahead of you," said Michael Tallant, airport board member. "Basically, just pull up, swipe your credit card and do the transaction and get your fuel."

The airport also features a maintenance facility on the field that services and repairs aircraft, which would be appealing to some pilots.

"There are a lot of private pilots that don't like to go in the higher traffic area airports with towers that they're just not comfortable with," said Tallant. "So we hope to get some of that traffic in here."

The airport recently got a grant that paid for the new fueling system, overlay work at each end of the runway and a new security gate around sections of the airport.

Story, photo and video:   http://www.wtva.com

Gulf’s private jet operators throttle up for expansion

Private charter operators in the region are looking to expand their fleet as they aim to cash in on the rebounding economy. Niche players such as Falcon Aviation Services, Rotana Jet, Royal Jet and Qatar Executive, the Qatar Airways subsidiary, are exploring aircraft orders that could potentially be more than US$1.5 billion.

The Abu Dhabi-based Falcon also said yesterday that it would order two CSeries 300 aircraft from Bombardier worth $150m, giving a much needed boost to the Canadian manufacturer’s narrow-body jet.

“We are signing a firm order for two CSeries 300 corporate jets with Bombardier. This is going to be the first corporate CSeries 300 in the Middle East,” said Mahmoud Ismael, the Falcon chief executive, at the Abu Dhabi Air Expo yesterday. “They represent a $150 million deal. This is a very big thing for us because we are changing slightly the beat by going with this aircraft rather than the traditional Airbus [or] Boeing.”

Earlier this month, Falcon ordered two Q400 NextGen turboprop aircraft from Bombardier worth $61m, which are expected to be delivered as early as November. 

In addition, Falcon is waiting for two helicopters that will be delivered in the first quarter of next year, which will take their overall fleet size to 28.

Royal Jet, also based in the capital, is set to place a $750m order to replace its existing fleet by 2020. 

Shane O’Hare, the president and chief executive, said a decision should come by the second quarter. The potential replacements could include the Bombardier CSeries, the Boeing Business Jet line or the Airbus Corporate Jet. The first planes are expected to arrive in 2016, the company said. 

“The current fleet is still young, but we need to work in advance as the interior is custom-built. We are also looking at various funding options,” Mr O’Hare said.
Another regional heavyweight, Qatar Executive, is also looking to bulk up its fleet. 

“Qatar Executive is a very important part of our business,” said Akbar Al Baker, the chief executive of Qatar Airways, on the sidelines of the expo. “We are growing this business steadily. We started with just one aircraft a few years ago and now we have eight.” The carrier had ordered a Global 5000 jet from Bombardier and was considering additional purchases from the company, as well as from Gulfstream, he added. 

It was not just the airlines that were upbeat about business prospects. The French manufacturer Dassault Aviation expects to grow its business in the Arabian Gulf as demand picks up for business jets. 

The company last year sold nine of its Falcon business jets, including four of the long-range Falcon 7X, in the Middle East. The first of these orders will be delivered this year. 

“The Dassault Falcon aircraft sales [this year] are expected to grow the overall Dassault Falcon regional fleet by a further 10 per cent, with the Falcon 7X and new Falcon 5X accounting for most of these new sales orders,” said Renaud Cloatre, the company’s sales director for the Middle East. “With the gradual recovery of the worldwide economy, [the Middle East] is once again showing signs of sustained growth.”

The number of business jets operating in the region will double by the end of the decade, according to the Dubai-based Middle East Business Aviation Association (Mebaa). 

In the past five years, Dassault has delivered 30 Falcon aircraft in the region, Mr Cloatre said. 

The Middle East and Africa region has a relatively small share in global business aviation market, accounting for 3 per cent to 4 per cent of the global total, with the average age of the business jets at 15 years, according to Mebaa. The market has grown by about 7 per cent each year over the past five years.

The Middle East is expected to contribute 4 per cent of the global demand for business jets over next five years, the group said.

Ex-Foothills Regional Airport (KMRN) manager Nelson sentenced to 3 years

ASHEVILLE — Former Foothills Regional Airport Manager Alex Nelson will spend three years in jail for conspiracy, embezzlement and money laundering.

But he walked out of the federal courthouse in Asheville on Tuesday. He will be able to self-report to prison.

Kurt Meyers, the federal prosecutor in the case, said when someone is allowed to self-report to prison it generally happens within two to three months of sentencing. He said Nelson will get a letter from the Federal Bureau of Prisons about reporting to prison.

Nelson is one of three airport officials who have pleaded guilty in wrongdoing at the airport. Brad Adkins, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy and embezzlement on the same day — Sept. 24, 2012 — as Nelson was scheduled to be sentenced Tuesday. However, a sealed motion to continue his sentencing was granted on Monday, according to federal court records. So far, a rescheduled date for Adkins’ sentencing has not been set.

Nelson was facing a maximum sentence of 35 years in prison. In addition to three years and one month — 37 months — in prison, Nelson will have three years of supervised release after he gets out, U.S. District Court Judge Martin Reidinger decided. Nelson also will pay $179,781.51 in restitution, with $129,781.51 going to the airport and $50,000 going to the N.C. League of Municipalities, Reidinger said.

Reidinger said a sentence should be deterrence from criminal conduct, not just for the defendant but for others as well. He said the taxpayers’ trust was abused and a substantial part of it was done knowingly.

Nelsons’s attorney Jack Stewart told the judge the case has taken a terrible toll on Nelson. He said Nelson got in way over his head and that corruption was happening at the airport before he took the job there and he thought that was the way business was done.

“I think Alex Nelson is a good man and I think he’s contrite,” Stewart said.

Stewart said Nelson is not a sophisticated businessman.

Meyers said there is no evidence the wrongdoing was going on at the airport before Nelson started working there. He called Nelson’s theft a really high degree of deception.

Meyers said the theft wasn’t just a one-way scheme or just one loophole.

A federal affidavit said Nelson and Adkins used side business accounts to deposit airport checks made out to a bogus company. One example in the affidavit is from June 2009 to September 2011, around 21 checks were deposited into Adkins’ business accounts at Community One Bank or converted into cash.

Of the checks totaling $49,000 deposited into the “Foothills Maintenance” account, $26,000 was withdrawn as cash and $22,000 was made payable to a conspirator, the affidavit says. The affidavit doesn’t name the conspirator.

The affidavit also said Nelson and Adkins used other conspirators to defraud the airport authority by awarding numerous contracts to conspirators at grossly inflated prices for work completed or for no work at all. Federal documents said Nelson also used the airport credit card for personal use.

Meyers told the judge the theft that was going on at the airport is very difficult to catch.

“In this country, we take corruption very seriously,” Meyers said.

Nelson was allowed to speak during the hearing and said he was said he lacked experience and technical expertise to do the job when he was hired. He said he told former airport board Chair Randy Hullette that he had no background in finance when Hullette asked him to take the job. Nelson has said he did not receive financial reports like he was supposed to, saying the bookkeeper never got them to him.

Nelson said he was sorry and he accepted responsibility for what happened on his watch.

Reidinger said, however, that Nelson was treading awfully close to denying his part in the crimes that occurred at the airport.

Reidinger said theft has to be punished effectively.

“Theft of this nature cannot be tolerated,” Reidinger said.

Nelson has the right to appeal his sentence within 14 days, Reidinger told him.

The federal government revoked the bond of Brad Adkins and he has been held at the McDowell County jail. Adkins faces a maximum sentence of 15 years in prison.


Source:   http://www.morganton.com

Outagamie County will wait a year before airport gets Appleton moniker

APPLETON — It’ll take a year or more before Outagamie County Regional Airport receives its new name, but when it does, Appleton will take the top billing.

The Outagamie County Board on Tuesday overwhelmingly approved a resolution to change the airport’s name to either Appleton Airport or Appleton International Airport. The change will happen after county officials learn whether the airport is granted U.S. Customs service, thereby obtaining international status. Officials expect to learn whether Customs will set up in Outagamie County in early to mid-2015.

County Executive Thomas Nelson said the transition period will afford the county time to determine how to meet the projected $140,000 to $200,000 expense that would include signage changes. He praised the board for a decision that allows the airport to better market itself and extend its already strong value toward economic development.

“It’s a small change, but it could be a big deal,” he said.

The county organized a committee last year to determine the feasibility of a name change and whether a switch made sense. They determined current name of the Greenville-based airport doesn’t resonate with those outside the region.

Members determined a name change could aid in drawing customers who are currently flying into Green Bay or Milwaukee for the purpose of conducting business in the Fox Valley. Business travelers make up 80 percent of the airport’s commercial traffic. The airport relies on commercial flights for more than half of its revenue.

Pam Seidl, executive director of the Fox Cities Convention & Visitors Bureau, supported the change and noted its similar experience when reaching out beyond the region. People don’t recognize the Fox Valley or the Fox Cities. They see the region in terms of its biggest city.

The bureau has since included “Greater Appleton Wisconsin” in its marketing efforts.

“We had to put the pin in the map for them,” Seidl said.

The committee noted a nationwide trend in tying airport names to the key destinations bringing in its travelers. Illinois’ Rockford Airport, for instance, was renamed Chicago-Rockford Airport.

Supervisor Tanya Rabec, who led the name change committee, said there’s tight competition with other airports and it makes good business sense to better reach out to those ultimately destined for the Fox Valley.

“They’ll be renting our cars, using our gas stations, staying at our hotels,” Rabec said.

The county board passed the measure by a 25-6 vote after only brief discussion.

Supervisor Jim Duncan said he made 600 phone calls to gauge the community’s opinion on making the change. He said 70 percent of those he spoke with were in favor of a switch to Appleton.

The change has been long in the works.

The county board in 1983 defeated a proposal to change the name to Fox Cities Metro Airport. Another three name change efforts failed between 2003 and 2011.

Char Stankowski, general manager for Little Chute’s Country Inn & Suites, relayed her career experience through several Fox Valley hotels in support for the change. As far as guests are concerned, they’re not staying in Little Chute or Grand Chute.

“They come to the Appleton area,” she said.

Source:  http://www.postcrescent.com

At Nordic Airports, Defying the Snow is Good Sport: In Nordic Countries, Skill at Keeping Airports Open Through Blizzards Is a Point of Pride

The Wall Street Journal
By  Daniel Michaels
Updated Feb. 25, 2014 10:35 p.m. ET
 

Airports in much of the world get occasional snow, and North America has taken a beating this season. But in Nordic countries, where winter can last six months and airplane deicing starts in August, skill at operating through sleet, snow and frost is vital for business and is a point of pride.

Stockholm's Arlanda Airport sets a goal of never succumbing to winter. "That's also the sport of it," says Arlanda operations head Lena Rökaas.

Her team spends months conducting off-season drills. But when her squad's big day came in December, the Swedish manager worried she and her colleagues wouldn't be able to handle what was coming at them.

Undaunted, her crew headed out in tight formation as if "getting ready for battle," Ms. Rökaas says. They plowed relentlessly ahead and protected a perfect 50-year record: Arlanda stayed open despite getting socked by more than a foot of snow.

Swedish crews wax nostalgic about a 1968 blizzard when Arlanda was the only Western European airport operating and arriving planes parked on one of its two runways. "It's a lovely story," says Arlanda spokeswoman Susanne Rundström.

Nordics call it "snowhow," a mix of massive machines, finely honed plowing patterns and constant practice.

"We consider ourselves almost world champions," says Heini Noronen-Juhola, vice president for aviation and safety at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport. Helsinki has developed more than 20 clearing routines, each linked to specific weather conditions. Ms. Noronen-Juhola considers the playbook "our big secret."

As at other Nordic airports, Helsinki's 120 maintenance people spend summers choreographing equipment. They usually clean tarmacs with diagonal rows of vehicles, sometimes referred to as a conga line. Each machine shoves snow to the vehicle behind it and ultimately off the edge of the runway. Drivers follow their maneuvers precisely so air controllers, who also know the routines, can time arriving and departing flights down to the minute.

"It's like dancing," says Ms. Noronen-Juhola.

In winter, her crews work round-the-clock shifts, like firefighters, and hustle at the first sight of snow. Helsinki airport last closed in 2003, for 30 minutes, because of snow and air-traffic-control problems. Like other Nordic airports, it frequently cuts capacity and cancels some flights.

Another Nordic secret: pushing producers for absurdly powerful equipment. Oslo Airport runs two of the world's largest self-propelled snowblowers, built by Norwegian airport-equipment maker Øveraasen AS. Only two other of the TV2000 units operate at airports; they, too, are in Norway.

The 2,000-horsepower machines can shoot 10,000 tons of snow an hour more than 150 feet from the tarmac. "It's like throwing a car every second," says Henning Bråtebæk, operations director at Oslo Airport.

Helsinki Airport pushed Finnish snow specialist Vammas in the 1990s to develop some of the first machines able to plow, sweep and blow snow simultaneously. Several of these machines can clear a runway in about 10 minutes, a job that a generation ago took half an hour.

Back then, runway clearing required many different machines. Opening scenes of the 1970 disaster film "Airport" show assorted tractor-size vehicles tackling a blizzard, including some that spit fire to melt ice.

Today, all-in-one cleaners are about as long as a locomotive. Most have two mighty engines, one for motion and the other to sweep and blow. They can run for hours without stopping—and Nordics keep going.

"They don't go for breaks—there's big pride in that," says Ms. Rökaas in Stockholm of her drivers, who mainly use Swiss snow equipment from Aebi Schmidt Holding AG. "Someone goes out and gives them coffee."

The machines can run for so long that producers have to worry about drivers' comfort. Vammas boasts that its cabs are so cozy, with their heated seats, frost-resistant windows, stereo speakers and vibration-free suspension, that operators are comfortable in T-shirts.

Over the past decade, combination machines have caught on at airports across Canada and the U.S. After a crippling winter storm in 2011, frequently sweltering Dallas-Fort Worth Airport bought 10 Vammas machines for about $1 million each. Vammas was acquired by Fortbrand Services Inc. of Plainview, N.Y., in 2010. It manufactures Vammas machines in Finland and in the U.S.

"They look very cool," says airport spokesman David Magaña.

When snow was forecast in December, the airport prepared to unleash its yellow monsters. Unfortunately, what arrived was sleet that landed and froze, creating "a hockey rink from here to Tennessee," says Mr. Magaña. With snowplows offering little help against ice, nearly 90% of flights were canceled for a day.

Still, versatile Nordic machines have been so popular that other big vehicle makers have jumped in. American truck maker Oshkosh Corp , based in wintry Wisconsin, touts its new multifunction machine as "a rolling 81,000-pound Swiss Army Knife." Product manager Les Crook boasts that its joystick control, covered in buttons for each function, "is just like a Game Boy."

Not to be outdone, Øveraasen last year unveiled a new product line with the curvy lines of a sports car and cabs that rise like a cherry-picker to give drivers greater visibility. "The futuristic design is a real eye-catcher," says an Øveraasen brochure. Bård Eker, whose industrial-design firm Øveraasen hired for the new line, says his company refrained from making the look too futuristic for fear of scaring off customers.

While big equipment helps get the job done, veterans say quality snow time is critical. Oslo Airport, for example, gets hit on average 60 days each winter. "We get a lot of practice," says Mr. Bråtebæk.

But this year, as the U.S. has experienced a Nordic winter, Northern Europe has been unusually warm. That worries Ms. Rökaas in Stockholm. "The worst thing for these people is when there is no snow," she says of drivers, who she fears might get bored and quit.

As for the future, officials are counting on snow and dreaming up new ways to prepare.

"We would love to have a roof on the airport," says Ms. Noronen-Juhola in Helsinki. "It's a great idea."

Source:  http://online.wsj.com

Cloud-seeding captain aims to ‘make this desert green’

Although dwarfed by the other planes, the eight-seater Beechcraft King Air C90 commands a central role in the weather patterns of the UAE.

“When it rained two or three weeks ago we made it rain even more,” said Capt Brendon Allen, 38, who pilots one of the six cloud-seeding Beechcraft operated by the National Centre of Meteorology and Seismology.

The eight-seater propeller plane had been modified by the centre to shoot rain-inducing flares into clouds on the edge of releasing their moisture, and it was on show at the opening day of the Abu Dhabi Air Expo.

The airport opened its gates and landing strips to the public on Tuesday as it hosted the third annual expo.

The three-day outdoor aviation exhibition features 175 aviation manufacturers displaying the latest trends and innovations in aircraft manufacturing.

Leading private aviation companies, including Boeing, Airbus and Gulfstream, displayed over 100 planes on the airport’s tarmac.

Flying out of Al Ain and Al Bateen airports the modified aircraft used for cloud-seeding are sent into rough weather at a moment’s notice.

“We just give the clouds a nudge,” said Capt Allen, a former South African air force pilot who began flying in the UAE more than six years ago.

Capt Allen, who worked for more than five years as a flight instructor in Al Ain, said the weather airlines usually avoid were the conditions he and his fellow pilots flew toward.

“People who fly into hurricanes, they’re crazy.

“As we fly straight into thunderstorms, we’re just a bit disturbed.”

He added that the design of the sturdy design Beechcraft was ideal for flying into turbulent weather.

“When you fly into clouds that are 50,000 feet high that contain billions of gallons of water, you learn to respect weather.”

In the UAE’s arid climate, cloud-seeding is essential to increase the water table and provide farmers with much-needed water.

“Sometimes people ask me if I can make it rain on their farm or house,” said Capt Allen, adding that weather patterns where too unpredictable to control the areas it rained over.

But he said projects such as cloud-seeding provided valuable data which were the building blocks for controlling weather in the future.

“There are places it rains too much and people die, and there are places where it doesn’t rain at all and people starve,” said Capt Allen, who believes the long-term goal should be to move weather where it wasn’t wanted to where it was.

“I believe one day we’ll be able to make this desert green.”

While displaying the aircraft Capt Allen was asked by 10 year-old visitor Sammy Zain whether creating more rain would prove to be a problem on the roads of the UAE.

“I don’t think for one moment I’m endangering anybody. We don’t control the weather, and the benefit to the country as a whole far outweighs the tiny bit of risk.”

The other aircraft on display featured ultralight business jets to weightier planes, such as Gulfstream’s G650. Priced at more than $US64.5 million (Dh237 million), it will take you from Abu Dhabi to the company’s headquarters in Savannah, Georgia in 14 hours in fine style.

On the larger end of the business jet spectrum came the Boeing corporate jet, a modified 737 seating between 25 and 50 passengers with the original design seating up to 215, and the largest narrow body corporate jet, the Airbus ACJ231.

Visitors were also treated to an aeronautical display by the UAE’s Al Fursan Aerobatic team and Emirates Sky Diving team while having the opportunity to view the “Paper Planes” Art Exhibition by Sheikha Al Yazia bint Nahyan Al Nahyan at the Gulf Centre for Aviation Studies.

“The private aviation market is witnessing tremendous growth in Abu Dhabi and the wider region,” said Ali Majed Al Mansoori, chairman of Abu Dhabi Airports.

“Abu Dhabi is fast becoming a regional leader in the aviation industry, and we are very pleased to once again host a first-class general aviation exhibition in the capital.”
Story and photo: http://www.thenational.ae

Sacramento International Airport (KSMF), California: Planes rerouted, roads closed during afternoon bomb scare in Yolo County

 Sacramento International Airport rerouted planes to alternate runways and some rural Yolo County roads were closed as a precaution Tuesday afternoon after sheriff’s deputies discovered a possible explosive device in a pickup truck.

Deputies responded about 12:30 p.m. to a medical aid call in the area of County Road 124, north of County Road 126 in the rural unincorporated area of Yolo County, west of West Sacramento. West Sacramento fire crews found a man lying in the roadway. While they were trying to treat him, he became combative and they requested an emergency response from deputies, according to a Yolo County Sheriff’s Office news release.

A deputy arriving at the scene spotted a black pickup truck on County Road 124 with one end of an electrical cord sticking into the fuel tank and the other end leading into the bed of the truck.

After the firefighters and the deputy got the man calmed down, the deputy took a closer look at the truck and found that the wiring protruding from the fuel tank was connected to a homemade device in the bed of the truck. Believing it might be an explosive device, authorities set up a quarter-mile perimeter around the vehicle, and the Yolo County Bomb Squad was requested.

The man was taken by ambulance to an area hospital, where he continued to be uncooperative with investigators, sheriff’s officials said.

While waiting for the bomb squad, investigators made contact with a woman who said she had been with the man a short time before the medical aid call. She told investigators that the man had been acting strangely for the past three days, and for some reason on Tuesday he became incoherent and enraged while the two were in the truck on County Road 124.

The woman said the man began shooting a handgun into and out of the vehicle. He also reportedly made statements about explosives.

The woman said she went to Old River Road, where she got a ride to her home in West Sacramento.

As a precaution, authorities advised the Sacramento International Airport control tower of the situation and airport officials chose to reroute flights to another runway. Deputies also checked area residences, looking for anyone who witnessed the shooting incident or was hurt by the gunfire. No injuries were reported.

About 3 p.m., the bomb squad determined that the device in the pickup was not an explosive. Roadways were reopened to traffic and the airport resumed normal operations.

Sheriff’s officials said they are continuing to investigate the incident.

Source: http://www.sacbee.com

U.S. Navy Orders More of Boeing's Poseidon Jets: Additional Order Marks Move to Full-Rate Production

The Wall Street Journal
By  Doug Cameron
Feb. 25, 2014 9:21 p.m. ET

The U.S.Navy agreed to buy 16 more Boeing Co. P-8A Poseidon jets as part of a $2.1 billion deal that marks a move to full-rate production for the surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft.

The deal announced by the Pentagon Tuesday increases the Navy's order to 53 jets as it exercised options as part of a broader agreement that would see the service take up to 117 of the aircraft, a heavily-modified version of its best-selling 737-800 passenger plane.

Boeing's development of military versions of its commercial aircraft has proved successful at stimulating sales at a time when orders for its specialized fighters are drying up. In addition to the P-8A, the company won a multibillion-dollar contract to make the new KC-46 aerial refueling tankers—recently renamed the Pegasus—for the U.S. Air Force, based on its 767 twin-aisle jet.

The switch in U.S. military strategy toward the Pacific from central Asia has fueled demand for the Poseidon and other equipment that has offered the Navy with more protection from budget cuts than other branches of the military. The latest P-8 buy comes from the Navy's fiscal 2014 budget.

The move to full-rate output marks a milestone for the P-8 program after four sets of initial production that has seen 13 planes delivered so far to the Navy, though their capabilities have attracted criticism from the Pentagon's chief weapons tester, notably over its ability to provide surveillance over large areas

The defense department's acquisition chief countered a report last month from the tester, and said the P-8 was meant to develop in stages, with its full capabilities emerging in later models.

Boeing has also won orders from Australia and India for the P-8.


Source:   http://online.wsj.com

Internal review of Collier airports reveals tenant lease violations, unpaid rent and inadequate insurance

Collier County airport tenants have been regularly violating the terms of their leases, falling short on rent and failing to provide adequate insurance documentation for years, an internal review released Tuesday shows.

The new overseers of the three county airports found that 54 of the 97 tenants were either in violation of their contracts or operating on expired ones. In addition to the lease violations, a circuit clerk audit found that the county could be liable to pay back up to $500,000 in federal grant money that two tenants received, but didn’t live up to funding requirements. In both cases, the county didn’t keep proper track of how the grant money was being used, the audit found.

The shortcomings, canceled projects and missing documents likely are the result of high turnover at the airports, which have cycled through seven executive and interim executive directors since 2000, said Commissioner Fred Coyle.

“These problems are no surprise to me,” Coyle said. “Seven directors over 14 years is ridiculous.”

The violations could prove costly.

The county might be on the hook for $250,000 in U.S. Department of Commerce grant money to build a campground that closed in less than a year.

The project was approved under the promise the campsite would have a useful life of 20 years, said Megan Gaillard, an auditor for Collier County Clerk Dwight Brock’s office.

It will ultimately be up to the commerce department if it wants the county to reimburse the funds, Gaillard said.

“We suggest the county work with the department to resolve the issue,” she said.

Another tenant, Global Manufacturing Technology, received a $250,000 grant from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to build a powder coating system. Much of the heavy machinery and equipment was bought and installed, but the system never was completed, Gaillard said. Some of the equipment couldn’t be found by auditors and the county hasn’t kept the proper records to show how the money was spent.

The county needs to notify the USDA that the project never was completed and work with them to refund the money, Gaillard said.

The tenants’ lease violations varied in severity.

One tenant owed $70,000 in rent, having not paid since the most recent airport executive director was let go five months ago, the review found.

Another built several structures outside a go-kart-track and raceway without building permits including a two-story operations center. The tenant, Immokalee Regional Raceway, didn’t have insurance for the go-kart-track, operated a concession stand without notifying the health department and allowed RVs to camp overnight without a permit, the review found.

The raceway also didn’t get permission from the county to build part of the go-kart-track, which crosses into an area that’s specifically zoned for flight. A $96,000 restroom, built by the now defunct campground and funded with the federal grant money, was lifted and hauled across the airport without a permit and is now located just outside the dragway, according to the report.

The violations show why commissioners want to run the airports through the county manager rather than an executive director, Commissioner Georgia Hiller said.

“We have to take whatever remedial action we can to straighten all this up,” Hiller said.

County commissioners narrowly ousted Chris Curry, their former airport director, in September. They then turned control of the airports to Collier’s growth management division — a department that deals in a wide swath of county services and ultimately reports to Leo Ochs, county manager. Curry sued the county in January, saying commissioners breached his contract by terminating him early. He has since been hired to run the Tallahassee Regional Airport.

When Curry started at the airports in 2010, the compliance issues were significant, he said. Not just among tenants, but the runways themselves were dangerously close to being unusable.

“When you come into a new environment you try to fix the most serious problems first,” he said.

More than half of the lease violations the county uncovered in its review 37 of the 54 were solely because the tenant’s insurance documentation wasn’t on file. But that doesn’t mean they don’t have adequate insurance, Curry said.

“Most of the tenants did have their insurance documents,” he said. “The question is whether the airport had the hard copy on file, because the requirements were just to provide an annual copy to the airport.”

County inspectors won’t shut any businesses down over the violations, said Nick Casalanguida, administrator of the growth management division.

“Every tenant that didn’t have insurance documentation has been contacted and that will be wrapped up in a month,” he said. “Situations where tenants are significantly delinquent in rent, we’re coming up with a reasonable payment plan. We’re taking the approach to work with these folks to get it resolved, instead of just laying the hammer down.”

Many have already gotten back on track, Casalanguida said.

Salazar Machine and Steel, which is the furthest behind in rent, will have paid $54,000 of the $70,000 it owes by Friday, he said. The company’s owners are trying to work with the county to lessen or forgive the other $16,000 it owes in late fees. 


Story and photos:    http://www.naplesnews.com

Stinson Municipal Airport (KSSF), San Antonio, Texas: Lone Restaurant At Stinson Closing

The lone restaurant at Stinson Airport is shutting its doors.

It opened just one year ago with the goal of making Stinson a destination airport for business travel.

Now, the restaurant's owner announced he's relocating to Pica Pica Plaza.

Bernard McGraw will open his new location on Fat Tuesday for Mardi Gras.

He says Stinson was a great location, but he didn't have control over his pricing and hours which cost him thousands of dollars.

"It really came down to the numbers," said McGraw.

He fell behind on his state taxes and rent.

When the state came in, the Katrina evacuee decided it was best for his Creole kitchen to move.

"We needed to have more control of our daily operation and be able to make decisions in real time versus getting approval and waiting for things to come through," he said.

This is the 2nd restaurant in recent years to close it's doors at the airport that's trying to expand.

Last year, we reported the city spent close to $10 million dollars developing the property, expanding the runway and terminals to handle more traffic.

However, Mcgraw says the city didn't do enough to promote San Antonio's smaller, lesser known airport.

"If you go down Loop 410 and Southwest Military, there's no signage, there's nothing that says Stinson is back here," said Mcgraw.

"I was pretty disappointed when I heard his kitchen was closed," said Rebecca Viagran, District 3 City Council.

Viagran says Stinson is in her district and something she's making a priority.

"I've asked the city manager to take a look at the contract that is there with whatever restaurant goes into that take a look at it to see what we can do better," she said.

"We wish Stinson the best, that's why I've been in talks with the council-member giving my story about my experience here, what can the city do to make it work for the next vendor that comes in," said McGraw.     

The city says it does want to bring another restaurant in and they are taking proposals.

Meanwhile, Bernard's will host its grand opening at Pica Pica at 11 a.m. next Tuesday.


Source:   http://www.foxsanantonio.com

Cities’ call for firefighting aircraft may be answered by Russian air tanker

A company with access to three Russian-made amphibious air tankers has responded to a call put out by cities in Los Angeles County concerned about inadequate air support for fighting frequent wildfires.

Santa Maria-based International Emergency Services has sent a proposal to a local city council member offering to lease a twin-engine turbo-jet plane that holds nearly twice as much water as the Canadian-made Super Scooper, the CL-415.

The Russian BE-200 similarly scoops water out of a reservoir or the ocean without landing but can release water all at once or in four to eight bursts. In particular, it works in tandem with other water- and retardant-dropping aircraft and therefore increases drop volumes, company officials said.

“This is the future of fire fighting,” said Adrian Butash, marketing director for IES, which holds the exclusive rights to import the BE-200. The plane was made by Beriev Aircraft Co., a manufacturer based in Taganrog, a city located on the Black Sea about 600 kilometers from Sochi, the host of the recent 2014 Winter Olympics.

The plane, originally built for the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, was flight-tested by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a recent demonstration in Russia. The water-scooping planes were used to battle forest fires in Russia, Portugal, Greece, Spain, Indonesia and Israel but not yet in the United States.

The company is in the process of getting clearance to fly the planes in the United States from the Federal Aviation Administration, company officials said. One official said it may be only a few weeks away from getting FAA clearance.

IES officials have contacted Azusa City Councilman Angel Carrillo, who is leading the effort along with the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments and Los Angeles County Fire Department to supplement the air attack used to fight wildfires.

Carrillo has said the Super Scoopers’ performance in the Colby Fire, which blackened nearly 2,000 acres and destroyed five homes in Glendora in January, was instrumental in containing the damage. But he said they are only leased from September through November and were here on a fluke.

“We can provide our aircraft to an entity like the San Gabriel Valley COG or Los Angeles County at a very affordable price,” said James Bagnard, IES program manager.

The cost of leasing one plane for a year would be about $16 million, he said. Leasing it for a 180-day fire season would be $8 million. Exact figures were not included in the proposal IES sent Carrillo. Bagnard had not heard back from the Azusa councilman.

However, at the San Gabriel Valley COG meeting Thursday, Carrillo said the cost of saving lives and preventing millions of dollars in property loss would be worth it. “If we can have an additional tool, why wouldn’t we want to have it?” he said.

Deputy Fire Chief John Tripp told the COG members the fire department can extend the lease of the Super Scoopers when red flag conditions persist. In fact, the Super Scooper lease had already been extended through the end of February.

On Tuesday, county Supervisor Mike Antonovich announced the lease will be extended until March 15.

“Although Los Angeles County is expected to receive some significant rainfall later this week, our region is still in a drought and fire danger remains high,” Antonovich said in a prepared statement.

Carrillo had asked the county to look into keeping a Super Scooper-type plane in Southern California 12 months a year. He said the state, the federal government and other Southern California counties could share the cost.

Bagnard, who grew up in Pasadena, said he has seen the San Gabriel Mountains on fire and believes his company’s plane can save lives and property. He said his company has many options to house the plane because the region has many airports.

It’s perfect for California since it can scoop 3,167 gallons of water in 18 seconds without landing, putting “more water on a fire per hour,” he said.

IES is talking with the state Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, known as CalFire, and the U.S. Forest Service, as well as the counties of San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara about leasing a BE-200.

“The BE-200 has worked well with the CL-415s in Greece. They make a good team,” Bagnard said.

Using water-dropping aircraft in combination — especially at the beginning of the fire — could make a huge difference, according to the Wildfire Research Network in Tujunga.

The county used two Canadian 415 Super Scoopers on the Colby Fire, each dropping 1,600 gallons. In recent wildfires in Europe, planes are used in greater numbers at once. For example, Italy teamed up four in tandem to get a 6,400-gallon drop, according to the group’s 2011 report delivered to a conference in Washington, D.C.

Multiple aircraft tactics is just one of the improvements suggested by the group. The group also suggested pre-designating an incident commander for each geographic area before a fire breaks out. Another idea — night-flying helicopters — was added to the Forest Service fleet for the first time this year after a bill by Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Burbank, required the extra service. Los Angeles County Fire and L.A. City Fire have flown helicopters at night for many years.

Large, fixed-wing aircraft, such as the 415s, BE-200 or the C-130s, a military plane, can’t fly after what firefighters call “pumpkin time,” when the sun begins to set and turn orange, fire officials said.

Tripp told the COG the Super Scooper planes were not the key to containing the Colby Fire, but rather, it was a combination of air attacks and firefighters on the ground, plus good preparation from hillside homeowners who cleared brush and removed leaves from their roofs and gutters ahead of time.


Story and photos:   http://www.presstelegram.com

Debris from January plane crash recovered off Oceano coast: Morrisey 2150, N5102V

Wreckage believed to be that of the airplane that crashed off the coast of Oceano on Jan. 14, was located Monday by divers with the San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Underwater Search and Recovery Team.

Working off the dive boat “Magic,” divers used information gathered from witnesses, radar, sonar and depth finders to locate the debris field near the area they had been searching since the plane crashed, according to a release from the SLO Sheriff’s Office today.

Divers found what appears to be the wing, fuselage and other parts of the 2150 Morrisey.

Los Angeles resident Alan George Gaynor, 52, a pilot for SkyWest Airlines, and David Brian Casey, 63, of Friday Harbor, Wash., were killed in the crash after taking off from the Santa Maria Public Airport.

Two small pieces recovered Monday are believed to be from the plane, including a carburetor and part of the manifold, as well as a metal tube.

No human remains were found.

The Sheriff’s Office is now working with the National Transportation Safety Board to recover the wreckage, according to the release.

The search for any remains is continuing with the recovery effort.


Story and photo:   http://www.lompocrecord.com


http://registry.faa.gov/N5102V

NTSB Identification: WPR14FA096
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, January 14, 2014 in Pismo Beach, CA
Aircraft: MORRISEY 2150, registration: N5102V
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On January 14, 2014 at 1352 Pacific standard time, a Morrisey 2150, N5102V, was destroyed after it impacted the Pacific Ocean near Pismo Beach, California. The airline transport pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. The pilot/owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which had originated from the Santa Maria Public Airport, Santa Maria, California, approximately 20 minutes before the accident. A flight plan had not been filed.

Witnesses said they saw a "white streak" descending towards the ocean, which was followed by a "loud boom" noise.

Radar data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration tracked the airplane's flight path from takeoff at Santa Maria to the accident site.

Problems Linger For Boeing's Flagship 787 Airliner


Despite more than a decade to work out problems and an estimated $20 billion to build it, Boeing's 787 aircraft is still plagued by issues.

The high-tech, fuel-efficient airplane was supposed to be a game changer in the aviation industry — and it still may be — but it keeps making headlines for all the wrong reasons.

Ever since 787s finally began flying in 2011, there have been technical and mechanical problems, from software bugs and engine defects to faulty wiring, trouble with hydraulics and fuel tank leaks.

"The lingering problems run the gamut from insignificant to highly significant. And it's a roll of the dice at this point what the next one's going to be," says aviation writer Christine Negroni, who has covered the issues on her blog, Flying Lessons.

The biggest problem was with the planes' lithium ion batteries, which caught fire on two of the aircraft a year ago, leading regulators to ground the entire 787 fleet worldwide for more than three months.

Made largely from carbon fiber and other composites, the 787 is lighter, more fuel-efficient and has a greater range than aluminum planes. It also has a new engine design and gives passengers larger windows and more comfort. The 787 fills a void for many airlines, giving them a long-haul, wide-body airplane with a lower operating cost, Negroni says. 

The 787's problems date to the concept's introduction more than a decade ago. Design flaws, kinks in the supply chain and manufacturing troubles delayed its production by years.

"People defend the airplane by saying it's just teething problems," Negroni says. "I don't know of another airplane that was grounded for 3 1/2 months because they were concerned about fire in flight."

The plane went back into service even though critics say Boeing never fixed the problem. Instead, it just built a box around the battery to better contain any fire, added a system to ventilate smoke and fumes, and spaced the battery cells farther apart.

And sure enough, last month, another battery overheated, sending smoke outside the plane.

In addition to the chronic reliability problems, Negroni says some of the airlines flying the plane, including LOT in Poland, are finding the 787, known as the Dreamliner, to be a publicity nightmare.

"The CEO of LOT said to me, 'Flying the Dreamliner is like dating Paris Hilton. Everything you do makes news,' " Negroni says. "Even if it's a minor issue on the Dreamliner, it's a headline."

In an emailed statement, a Boeing spokesman acknowledges problems but says that improving dependability of the 787 "is at the top of our priorities and we're making good progress at reducing those reliability issues."

The aerospace giant says that after years of delays, the company is "on track to meet all delivery commitments in 2014," now producing 787s at a record rate of 10 per month.

But the ramped-up production pace apparently comes with a cost.

Union machinists on the 787 assembly line in Everett, Wash., say they're getting incomplete fuselage sections of the plane from Boeing's new nonunion plant in South Carolina. Some of the plane sections have bad wiring or poorly installed hydraulics lines, they say.

"There's no question that Boeing management underestimated the difficulty of this approach to building the 787," says Richard Aboulafia, vice president of analysis at the Teal Group.

Aboulafia says Boeing made a mistake when it fired hundreds of experienced contract employees last year to cut costs. Now, the company is hiring some of them back and adding new contract workers to address the production problems in South Carolina.

A handful of airlines, including Air India and Norwegian Air, want compensation from Boeing for problems. Still, at a list price of over $200 million each, orders are still strong, Aboulafia says.

"You've still got over 800 planes on order. That's pretty impressive," he says.

Among the happy customers is United Airlines, which has nine of the airplanes in service and has ordered dozens more.

"It is by far the most popular aircraft in our fleet for both customers and employees," says United spokeswoman Christen David. The airplane allows United to add new direct routes to China, Australia and Nigeria, David says.

So how's this for confidence in the plane? After signing a $155 million contract to play for the Yankees a few weeks ago, Japanese baseball star Masahiro Tanaka spent nearly $200,000 to charter a 787 to New York.


Story, photo, audio and comments/reaction:   http://www.npr.org

DeLand, Florida, son helps mother 'slip the surly bonds of Earth' on final flight

Finding just the right way to pay final tribute to a beloved parent isn't always easy. In the case of Grace McElvy Whitecar of DeLand, who died in 2011 at the age of 87, just the right tribute came nearly three years after her death. 

 Her son, Michael Boyd of DeLand, took Whitecar's cremains for a Valentine's Day flight Feb. 14, and scattered her ashes over the Atlantic Ocean.

Boyd qualified as an aircraft-carrier pilot 50 years ago, flying over the Gulf of Mexico from the USS Lexington. Whitecar, who loved adventure, shared his love of the skies, and became a licensed pilot. She was also an avid boater who loved the water, so scattering her ashes at 1,300 feet above the ocean off the coast of Canaveral National Seashore combined both of her passions.

Boyd had planned a Jan. 30 "Ultimate Barnstormer" flight in History Flight's North American AT-6, a two-seat trainer, to mark the 50th anniversary of his carrier qualification. When bad weather postponed that flight, Boyd's wife, Jeannie, suggested the Valentine’s Day tribute to Boyd’s mother.

For nearly three years, they had been undecided about where to scatter Whitecar's remains. 


The Valentine Day's flight was the perfect solution, Boyd said. The flight "grew into something more noteworthy and much more poignant" than he had anticipated, he said.

Boyd met History Flight pilot John Makinson at the DeLand Municipal Airport, and they took to the skies.

Makinson had arranged a surprise for Boyd: a two-plane honor escort for Whitecar's final flight — another Texan and a T-34.

The planes flew over Brandywine twice so Jeannie could see them, and then they headed for the coast south of New Smyrna Beach.

The escort planes broke off, and Boyd and Makinson went through some rolls and loops in the high-performance trainer. Boyd performed some of them himself, a strangely familiar feeling after more than 50 years since his Navy flying days, Boyd said.

Boyd piloted the craft back to DeLand, after a 1.2-hour flight. Makinson wrote in Whitecar’s flight log: "Left up in the sky @ 1300' soaring with the angels."

Whitecar lived at Good Samaritan Florida Lutheran for the last seven years or so of her life. She had also lived in Leesburg, Tampa and Arcadia.

In addition to Boyd and his wife, Jeannie Boyd, she is survived by daughter Julia Jennings of Tampa, husband David F. Desmond of DeLand, and four grandchildren.

See more photos and a video of the Valentine's Day flight at Michael Boyd's blog, Confessions of a Canine Couch Potato, which Boyd helps his dog, Buddy, write.

Read Buddy's story, "A DeLand dog goes from life on the lam to the lap of luxury" online at here at The Beacon.

NOTE: Beacon staff writer Pat Hatfield Andrews also went on a barnstorming flight in a vintage Texan with History Flight pilot John Makinson in April 2008. Watch the video of that flight at here at The Beacon

Story and photo gallery:   http://beacononlinenews.com

'I thought I was going to die': Grandfather John Lord suffered a heart attack while flying near Wickhambrook

A grandfather has told how he cheated death when he suffered a heart attack - 1,500ft in the air in his microlight aircraft.

John Lord, 64, who had always been in perfect health, was 20 minutes into a solo flight on Saturday afternoon when he was gripped by crippling chest pains.

He immediately turned round and struggled the ten miles back to his friend’s field near Wickhambrook where he had taken off.

Despite being in agony, grandfather John - a microlight pilot for 24 years - managed a “text book landing” before getting his friend to call an ambulance.

Within minutes of touching down he announced “I think I’m going to die” before he collapsed.

Paramedics frantically performed CPR and managed to revive him before rushing him to West Suffolk Hospital.

John, a dad-of-one, was due to be transferred to the specialist heart unit at Papworth Hospital yesterday.

Speaking from his hospital bed yesterday he said: “It was a beautiful day and the wind was in the right direction so I thought I would go for a fly.

“The chest pains started to get more intense but I didn’t think it was anything serious.

“I thought they were down to being extremely hot so I was being optimistic at one point but then I thought to myself ‘I must get back on the ground’.

“I knew when I was sitting in the car on the ground that something was seriously wrong.

“I said ‘I think I’m going to die’ and the next thing I know the paramedic was doing CPR on me.

“It is fortunate I didn’t carry on flying and that I decided to come back when I did because if I hadn’t done that it could have been a very different story.”

He added: “That’s my flying days over. I’ve flown for over 23 years and it was a very close call. I wouldn’t want to put the stress on my wife.

“Somebody was looking after me on Saturday, that’s for sure.”

John, of Bury St Edmunds, is due to retire from his post as a technical consultant at mobile phone giants EE.

He first got his pilot’s license in 1989 and immediately got hooked on the buzz of being alone in the sky and planned to spend much of his retirement flying.

But since his near-miss he has also been forced to cancel his first retirement plan of a holiday to Florida next month as he faces up to eight weeks rehabilitation.

Instead of flying he plans to pursue his other hobby of photography from the safety of the ground - but he admits nothing will beat the thrill of getting into a cockpit.

John, who is married to wife Angela, 61, added: “I’ve never been in hospital in my life before this. I’ve never broken anything.

“I am so thankful to the ambulance service or everything that was done on Saturday. Without them it would have been so very different.”

Paramedic Dale Boulston, who saved John’s life, said: “While we were assessing the patient he went into cardiac arrest.

“We worked to resuscitate him and were fortunately able to get a return of spontaneous circulation which means his heart started beating normally again.

“We took him to West Suffolk General for further treatment and I was able to visit him in hospital on Sunday.”

An ambulance service spokesman said: “We’re really pleased to hear that Mr Lord is doing so well following his incident just a few days ago.

“It’s lucky for everyone involved that John was able to land the plane safely and fortunately our hard working crew was then on hand to give immediate lifesaving treatment.

“People who suffer a cardiac arrest outside of hospital have less than a 20 per cent chance of survival: the sooner they receive CPR and access to a defibrillator the better, and in this case our crews were able to carry out chest compressions and give a shock from the defibrillator as soon as John went into cardiac arrest.

“This undoubtedly made a real difference to John surviving and making such a good recovery.

“We wish him all the best with the recovery process and hope he has a happy and healthy future ahead of him.”

Story and photo gallery:  http://www.cambridge-news.co.uk

Legislator tries again to get special deal for Evergreen International Aviation nonprofits, which owe $1 million in taxes

A backer of legislation to expand property-tax exemptions for Evergreen International Aviation Inc.’s nonprofits is trying for a third time to bail out the McMinnville organizations, which are behind on more than $1 million in taxes and interest.

In the latest attempt, Oregon State Sen. Larry George, R-Sherwood, circulated a proposed amendment Monday custom-tailored to exempt portions of the Evergreen Aviation & Space Museum and other entities.

But lawmakers remained skeptical of the special-interest bid, which might have died already if not for the possibility that George could use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations over other legislation.

One problem is that the amendment is so broadly written that it could exempt the Wings & Waves Waterpark and any other Evergreen facilities from property taxes, according to John Phillips, an Oregon Revenue Department legislative liaison.

“The language … is so broad that there would appear to be no property that they could build or use on that site that would not qualify for this exemption,” Phillips wrote in a memo to legislators. “This issue is being litigated,” he added. “Now is not the time to preempt the court’s ruling on the current law.”

The Legislature usually avoids legislation tailored to specific companies, although recent counter examples include Nike and Intel, which received tax deals in exchange for promises of major expansions. The proposed Evergreen exemptions are more complicated in several respects.

For one thing, Evergreen’s commercial companies, once located across Oregon 18 from the museums, water park and theater, have filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. For another, an Oregon Justice Department investigation continues into allegations of commingled funds between the for-profit and nonprofit entities.

And as Phillips noted, legal challenges continue as Evergreen nonprofits appeal tax-exemption denials issued by Yamhill County assessors.

Sen. George did not respond to calls for comment Monday. But his mother, Yamhill County Commissioner Kathy George, wrote a letter with Allen Springer, a fellow commissioner, urging legislators to find a solution to the aviation museum’s tax impasse.

“This incredible, nationally and internationally acclaimed facility is in imminent danger of closing forever, and we are asking for your immediate help in averting this potential tragedy,” the commissioners wrote Thursday to Sen. Ginny Burdick, D-Portland, chairwoman of the Senate Finance and Revenue Committee, and Rep. Phil Barnhart, D-Eugene, chairman of the House Revenue Committee.

Legislative backers initially presented an Evergreen tax-exemption bill to the House Revenue Committee. After a cold reception there, they filed an amendment to House Bill 4003, which concerns federal tax law. The latest attempt would amend House Bill 4005, which would increase enterprise zones for electronic commerce.

– Richard Read

Story, photo and comments/reaction:   http://www.oregonlive.com

Airbus faces tough battles over A330 longevity plan

(Reuters) - As Airbus races through flight testing of its newest plane, the next-generation A350, Europe's planemaker faces growing battles to secure a future for the A330, until now its only truly lucrative wide-body jet.

Twenty years after it entered service, the 250 to 300-seat jet has repeatedly been pronounced dead by rival Boeing but refuses to lie down, outliving its A340 sibling and surviving for now the arrival of lighter new jets like Boeing's 787 and the A350.

But analysts say time is finally ticking on Airbus's most profitable wide-body jet, despite a steady series of changes aimed at prolonging the end of its production cycle and with over 1,000 still in service.

Without a fresh burst of sales or a slowdown from current record production levels, they say, Airbus faces a sharp drop in deliveries from 2016 onwards, with the visible backlog of undelivered aircraft now worth just 26 months of production.

"The A330 had an amazing past five years, not only because of its merits, but because Boeing's 787 was delayed," said industry analyst Richard Aboulafia at Teal Group.

"But with the 787 hitting (its targeted) production of 10 aircraft per month, that is going to crowd the A330 out of the market space pretty quickly," he added.

That leaves Airbus with a two-fold challenge. It must decide

how best to maintain a foothold in the 200 to 300-seat market, where it first developed jets more than 40 years ago and which Boeing later targeted in part with its 787 family.

The version of the A350 that Airbus originally hoped would defend that spot, the 270-seat A350-800, has sold poorly and is likely to remain sidelined compared to the 314-seat A350-900.

And with the A350 only gradually building up output until 2018, experts say Airbus faces a hole in revenue and cash flow as a gap opens between peak output of the A330 and that of the A350 -just as it also wrestles with a complex transition between versions of its other main cash cow, the A320.

Even though orders may not be as bleak as they appear, with some countries still to approve deals, Airbus has already started looking at ways of heading off any output gaps.

Last year it broke from a pattern of beefing up the A330 to fly further with more payload and announced a leaner Regional version to compete in the key Chinese domestic market.

Ostensibly the aircraft is the same, but its performance will be artificially capped to help save airlines save on maintenance and statutory bills like landing fees.

Such an aircraft would be a niche product aimed at countries with congested domestic markets like China and India.

Morphing the plane in a different direction, Airbus is also looking at the possibility of new engines to boost performance in its core activity of flying medium- and long-haul routes.

It has given itself until the end of the year to make a decision but could make a move at Farnborough Airshow in July.

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

 
But industry sources say Airbus has already raised the stakes by offering to increase its industrial presence in China with an A330 cabin center. It already assembles small jets there.

"We have always been open to additional industrial co-operation when the market supports it," Chief Executive Fabrice Bregier said at the recent Singapore Airshow, asked about the first report of such a proposal in Aviation Week.

In response, market watchers say Boeing has launched a counter-offensive to halt the A330's latest assault on China.

Officials with the U.S. firm acknowledge that Airbus's A330 Regional would save just over 10 percent in operating costs.

But they argue this would not compensate for the extra fuel needed for a heavy aircraft like the A330 when it is operating on short routes instead of the long ones it was designed for.

Adapting the industry playbook, they say it would be more profitable to fly two smaller Boeing 737s instead, because the Airbus would burn 12 percent more fuel than both combined.

Airbus officials argue that China's crowded skies and airport congestion rule out adding flights, so the only option is to boost capacity. About 80 percent of China's airspace is under military control, leaving scarce room for traffic development.

That could be changing as China seeks to boost the low-cost airline sector but there is no clear-cut rule on whether more flights are the right marketing tool, said Ascend analyst Rob Morris.

STRATEGIC MARKET, TACTICAL TOOLS

 
But critics of Airbus's plans have a fallback argument.

Boeing, they say, is likely to try to persuade Chinese airlines that even if they want to put A330s on domestic routes to ease congestion it would be better for their balance sheets and more practical to redeploy them from international ones, rather than buy even more A330s with declining resale values.

Airbus officials counter that it would cost millions of dollars to reconfigure jets in that way.

China is one of the most strategic markets for both companies but analysts say they are also behaving tactically.

Both have gambled on lighter weight carbon-fiber technology but are unable to deliver as quickly as airlines would like, and are meanwhile carving out sales pitches playing up their existing products.

The battle looks set to revive tensions between the two dominant planemakers in the $100 billion annual jetliner market that last erupted in an advertising war in 2012.

Taking aim at Airbus's flexibility over pricing of the A330, whose development was paid for long ago, a Boeing executive said it would be a "losing proposition" against the smaller 737 in China, even if Airbus gave up any gap in price.

An Airbus official retorted curtly, saying Boeing's own data was "veracity-challenged".


Source:  http://www.reuters.com

Pilot Used Plane As A Weapon Against Police To Allow Escape

A pilot intentionally rammed his plane into a police vehicle to avoid capture as he attempted to smuggle a group of immigrants into Abaco on Sunday night.

Superintendent Noel Curry, officer in Charge of the Abaco District, said the officers were lucky to be alive after the head-on collision with the nine-seater plane around 6:45pm. A wanted notice was last night issued for 30-year-old Owen George Johnson as part of the investigation.

According to information received by this newspaper, when the wing of the plane hit the police vehicle, the plane spun, angling the propeller toward the officers who were at that time pinned in the jeep as the propeller chopped its way through the vehicle towards them.

Taking advantage of that moment, the pilot got out of the aircraft and escaped into nearby bushes. However, the seven illegal migrants onboard the nine-seater aircraft were taken into custody.

Supt Curry: “Acting on information police in Abaco went to the Sandy Point Airport where they observed an aircraft attempting to land. Officers went on the runway to quickly apprehend the passengers, in the twin engine nine-seater plane, however the pilot turned the plane in the direction of the officers. The plane’s wing as well as the propeller hit the police vehicle shattering the windshield, the back glass and causing extensive front end damage,” he said.

“The pilot jumped from the plane before it came to a complete stop and ran into nearby bushes. The passengers, seven illegal immigrants, were taken into custody. They include two female Haitians, one male Haitian, and four male Dominicans. There was also a two-year-old toddler on the plane.”

Supt Curry said two of the three officers were injured during the collision, and were treated and discharged at a nearby clinic. The illegals are expected to be flown to the capital and turned over to immigration officers.

Police in Abaco are hunting for Owen George Johnson, who is 30, born in New Providence and a pilot by profession. He is 6ft 6in, has a low haircut, is heavy built and with a light brown complexion. Police warn not to approach him if he is seen, as he is considered dangerous.

Anyone with information is asked to contact police in Grand Bahama at 350-3107/8, in Abaco at 367-3437 or 911 or 919.


Source:   http://www.tribune242.com

Air Canada sex act case heard in Dartmouth court: Jason George Chase pleads guilty, Alicia Elizabeth Lander's trial starts after 2014 arrest in Halifax

One of two people accused of committing a sex act on an Air Canada plane that landed at the Halifax airport has pleaded guilty to committing an indecent act. 

The trial for the other began with some graphic testimony.

Court records say Jason George Chase, 39, and Alicia Elizabeth Lander, 25, are alleged to have participated in an indecent act in a public place on Jan. 24, 2014.

Last year, both pleaded not guilty.

However, on Wednesday, Chase changed his plea to guilty. He's scheduled to appear back in court on March 27 for sentencing and is asking for a conditional discharge.

Lander's lawyer, Laura McCarthy, said the guilty plea will not affect her client's ability to get a fair hearing. She admits the case is unusual.

"The circumstances are unique. I would say the charge isn't necessarily unique," she said. "People are charged with forms of indecent exposure not necessarily regularly but often enough. So I wouldn't say it's a completely unique charge in that people aren't charged with it, the circumstances are unique."

The trial for Lander went ahead, with court hearing from two Mounties and three Air Canada employees.

The first witness was an Air Canada employee who identified Lander and testified she was belligerent the night of the incident as police tried to question her at Halifax Stanfield International Airport once the flight from Toronto arrived.

The employee said Lander's cursing was vulgar and made people in the arrival area uncomfortable.

RCMP Const. James Curran testified he was one of the responding Mounties on Jan. 24 and could smell liquor on Lander's breath.

He said he warned Lander to keep her voice down or she would be charged with creating a disturbance.
Kicked holes in wall

Curran said that as Mounties were escorting her through the airport, Lander kicked a sliding glass door and knocked it off its track. The kicking continued, according to Curran. He said Lander started mule kicking and hit an officer.

After being dragged into an interview room at the airport, Curran said Lander kicked holes in the wall.

Also testifying was Air Canada flight service director John Dunn, who said the woman asked if she could sit next to her friend at the start of the flight.

Dunn said another passenger warned flight attendants to watch them because they wanted to become members of the "mile high club."

Dunn said he went to the seat and found the woman with her pants pulled down and the man's hand in her lap. He said the man was penetrating her. Dunn said he told the woman it was inappropriate and ordered her to get dressed.

He said he could see her thong and told the woman to put her breasts back in her bra.

It was at that time Dunn said he separated the pair and the woman slept the rest of the flight.

The incident was reported to the captain, who arranged to have police meet the plane.

Dunn said his concern was for some children who were a few rows back from where Lander was sitting. His testimony ended by saying it appeared Lander was fondling Chase under a coat on his lap, but he couldn't be sure.

After a short recess, Lander's lawyer, Laura McCarthy, said her client wanted to testify, but there was no time on Wednesday.

"She's just going to give her version of events from what she recalls. That's all I can really say about her evidence. I have to let her have her opportunity to give it first," she said.

The case will conclude March 3.

Story and comments:  http://www.cbc.ca

 Two people accused of committing a sexual act on an Air Canada plane in January are scheduled to go to trial next year after pleading not guilty to committing an indecent act.

Court records say Jason George Chase, 39, and Alicia Elizabeth Lander, 25, are alleged to have participated in an indecent act in a public place on Jan. 24.

They were arrested by police after arriving at the Halifax Stanfield International Airport on a flight from Toronto.

The accused were not in Dartmouth provincial court on Tuesday but their defence lawyers entered the pleas on their behalf.

The trial has been set for Jan. 21, 2015.

In addition to the indecent act charge, Lander is also charged with causing a disturbance, assaulting a police officer and mischief. Police told CBC News that after Lander was arrested, she was verbally abusive and kicked officers.

Lyle Howe, Lander's lawyer, said his client decided to plead not guilty to those charges as well after receiving disclosure from the Crown.

"We've reviewed the paperwork and we've decided that that's what we were going to enter as our plea," he told reporters.

"Any time somebody is alleged to have committed a criminal offence is a difficult ordeal."


http://www.cbc.ca

The two people accused of committing a sexual act on an Air Canada plane did not show up for their scheduled court appearance in Dartmouth on Tuesday.

Jason Chase, 38, and Alicia Lander, 24, are both facing a charge of committing an indecent act.

The sexual act allegedly happened during a January flight. They were stopped by officers after arriving at the Halifax Stanfield International Airport.

In addition, Lander is facing charges of causing a disturbance, assaulting a police officer and mischief. The RCMP told CBC that after Lander was arrested, she was verbally abusive and kicked officers.

They're scheduled to be back in court for a plea on April 1.


Source:    http://www.cbc.ca


Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA, The Vein Guys, N777VG: Accident occurred February 20, 2013 in Thomson, Georgia

NTSB Identification: ERA13MA139
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 20, 2013 in Thomson, GA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/21/2014
Aircraft: BEECH 390, registration: N777VG
Injuries: 5 Fatal,2 Serious.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The purpose of the flight was to return employees of a vein care practice to their home base at Thomson-McDuffie County Airport (HQU), Thomson, Georgia. The pilot was the pilot flying, and the copilot was the pilot not flying. (The National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] notes that although the copilot is referred to as such in this report, his role in the cockpit is not required by federal regulations.) The departure from John C. Tune Airport, Nashville, Tennessee, and en route portions of the flight were uneventful. During the flight, the copilot reminded the pilot about a speed restriction and also reminded the pilot to adjust his altimeter. The pilot responded to the altimeter reminder by stating, "say, I'm kinda out of the loop or something. I don't know what happened to me there but I appreciate you lookin' after me there." About 4 minutes later, on approach to HQU, the pilot lowered the landing gear, and the ANTI SKID FAIL message illuminated in the cockpit; the copilot commented on the illumination. The pilot continued the approach; he did not respond to the copilot and did not refer to the Abnormal Procedures section of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-approved Abbreviated Pilot Checklist to address the antiskid system failure message. The airplane touched down on runway 10 about 2005, and about 7 seconds later, the pilot initiated a go-around. (In postaccident interviews, neither the pilot nor the copilot recalled the reason for the go-around.) The airplane lifted off near the departure end of the 5,503 ft-long runway. According to enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) data, when the airplane was about 63 ft above ground level, the left wing struck a utility pole, which was 72 ft high and about 1,835 ft from the runway threshold, severing the outboard portion of the wing. The airplane continued another 925 ft before crashing in a wooded area.

Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions of the engines or flight controls. The reason for the antiskid system malfunction could not be determined due to the general destruction of the wreckage.

For an antiskid inoperative condition, the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist only provides landing distance values for flaps up and flaps 10 degrees. The pilot should have selected one of those two flap settings for landing and determined the landing distance required. The first data recorded by the EGPWS showed that the airplane was configured at flaps 30. The flaps were transitioning through flaps 15 at the time of impact.

When the antiskid system fails, the landing distance required for full stop increases greatly: according to the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist, the landing distance would increase about 130 percent with flaps up and 89 percent with flaps 10. Thus, the required landing distance for the weather conditions that prevailed at HQU at the time of the accident with flaps up was 7,066 ft, and the required landing distance with flaps 10 was 5,806 ft. HQU runway 10's available runway length for landing was 5,208 ft, which did not meet the flaps up or flaps 10 performance penalty requirements with an antiskid system failure, thus requiring a diversion to a longer runway. It is likely that after touchdown, the pilot recognized that the airplane was not slowing as he expected and might not stop before the end of the runway. Rather than risk a high-speed overrun, he elected to conduct a go-around.

The NTSB determined that at the time the airplane struck the utility pole, the landing gear was extended, the flaps were in transit (retracting) toward the 10-degree position, and the lift dump system was deployed. Lift dump is a critical system to assist in stopping the Beechcraft 390 Premier (Premier 1A) during landing. Section 3A of the airplane flight manual (AFM) (Abnormal Procedures) included the following warning: "Extending lift dump in flight could result in loss of airplane control leading to airplane damage and injury to personnel. Continued safe flight with lift dump extended has not been demonstrated." The wreckage examination as well as drag estimates based on recovered EGPWS data indicate that the lift dump remained extended during the airplane's go-around attempt. The airplane drag associated with lift dump, flaps, and landing gear likely resulted in only marginal climb performance. While Beechcraft does not publish a procedure for a go-around after touchdown, aerodynamic data for the 390 Premier (Premier IA) suggest that if the airplane were configured with lift dump retracted and flaps 10 degrees or less, it would have been capable of a significantly higher climb rate after the failed landing attempt.

The pilot displayed a lack of systems knowledge of the accident airplane. First, the pilot demonstrated a lack of understanding of the antiskid system. Although the pilot had received antiskid system failure training during his recurrent simulator training on January 4, 2013, he stated in postaccident interviews that he did not think they needed the antiskid system for the landing at HQU and that the performance penalty would only apply if you were "trying to make your numbers." Because of this faulty belief, when the antiskid failure illumination occurred, the pilot did not take action. Second, the pilot selected a flap position (flaps 30) that was prohibited by the antiskid failure procedures in the AFM. Third, he performed a go-around with the lift dump extended. Both the AFM and a placard in the cockpit warned against extending the lift dump in flight. When the pilot decided to go around, he should have immediately retracted the lift dump per the AFM restriction for lift dump extension in flight.

The utility pole (Pole 48) that was struck was erected, along with several others, in 1989 by Georgia Power. The FAA was not notified before the construction of the utility poles in 1989; accordingly, no obstruction evaluation was done, and no depictions or mention of possible obstructions in the area were included on associated aeronautical charts. After the accident, Georgia Power submitted FAA Forms 7460-1 for four utility poles east of the airport, including Pole 48. The FAA conducted aeronautical studies on the poles and, on May 31, 2013, determined in its initial findings that Pole 48 did not comply with FAA obstruction standards and was "presumed to be a hazard to air navigation." The study also stated that if the pole were lowered to a height of 46 ft or less, it would comply with obstruction standards. After the FAA issued the preliminary obstruction determinations, Georgia Power requested that the FAA conduct further study on the four obstructions to determine if a favorable determination could be achieved. On August 12, 2013, the FAA published public notices announcing the four aeronautical studies and invited interested parties to submit relevant comments before September 18, 2013. According to an FAA official, the final determinations for the four obstructions were not completed at the time of this report. Since the initial aeronautical studies were conducted, the FAA Flight Data Center issued several notices to airmen to alert pilots about obstructions and also to amend the approach and departure procedures at HQU accordingly. In addition, the FAA increased the glideslope angle for the runway 28 precision approach path indicator from 3.00 to 3.50 degrees. Although the FAA has deemed the pole a presumed hazard, the pilot's attempted flight with the extended lift dump made airplane control and continued safe flight unlikely.

In evaluating the pilot's performance, the NTSB considered that the pilot experienced a sleep restriction, a circadian disruption the night before the accident, and long duty hours and extended wakefulness. The pilot normally slept about 8 hours per night; however, he only slept 5 hours the night before the accident (February 19). Further, the pilot awoke about 0200 on the morning of the accident, which was significantly earlier than his normal waking time of about 0600. On the day of the accident, he reported that upon arrival in Nashville, he slept for about 4 hours in a chair in the pilot lounge. However, his cell phone activity indicated outgoing calls during that time, suggesting interruptions to his sleep, which would have fragmented any sleep the pilot did obtain and degrade its restorative quality. Additionally, the accident took place about 2006, indicating an extended period of wakefulness based on the early awakening. Based on the available evidence, the pilot was likely suffering from fatigue at the time of the accident. Research indicates that fatigue associated with sleep loss, circadian disruption, and long duty hours can lead to increased difficulty in sustaining and directing attention, memory errors, and resultant lapses in performance. An NTSB safety study found that flight crewmembers who were awake for more than 12 hours made more procedural errors, tactical decision errors, and errors of omission than those awake less than 12 hours (NTSB. 1994. A Review of Flightcrew-Involved Major Accidents of U.S. Air Carriers, 1978 through 1990. SS-94/01. Washington, DC). Twice during the accident flight, the copilot gave the pilot reminders (one about the speed restriction and one about the altimeter). The pilot responded by indicating that he was "out of the loop." Further, the pilot did not refer to the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist for the antiskid system failure (for which the copilot commented on the illuminated light) or retract the lift dump when he elected to go around. Had the pilot not been fatigued, he likely would have paid closer attention to the flight and not had lapses in performance.

Both pilots survived, with serious injuries, and all five passengers, who were seated in the back, died. Postaccident examination showed that the seat buckles in the back were not fastened and the shoulder harnesses were not attached or pulled out. According to the copilot, the "fasten seatbelt" sign was on (the seatbelt chime was recorded by the cockpit voice recorder), but he did not remember giving a briefing on seatbelts. The pilot indicated that he did not remember seeing if the passengers had their seatbelts on. All six of the passenger seats had been forcibly detached from the airplane fuselage, and three were consumed by fire. All of the passengers sustained multiple traumatic injuries. Although proper use of restraint systems in survivable accidents can dramatically lessen or prevent serious injuries to occupants, due to the high impact forces and fragmentation of the cabin in this accident, it is unknown whether the use of restraints would have affected the survivability of the passengers.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to follow airplane flight manual procedures for an antiskid failure in flight and his failure to immediately retract the lift dump after he elected to attempt a go-around on the runway. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's lack of systems knowledge and his fatigue due to acute sleep loss and his ineffective use of time between flights to obtain sleep.

Member Sumwalt filed a concurring statement that can be found in the public docket for this accident. Member Weener joined the statement.


***This report was modified on August 25, 2014, and October 21, 2014. Please see the docket for this accident to view the original report.***

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 20, 2013, about 2006 eastern standard time (EST), a Beechcraft Corporation 390 Premier (Premier IA), N777VG, collided with a utility pole, trees, and terrain following a go around at Thomson-McDuffie County Airport (HQU), Thomson, Georgia. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were seriously injured, and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Pavilion Group, LLC, and was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated at John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 1827 central standard time (1927 EST).

On the morning of the accident, the pilot and copilot left their respective homes in South Carolina about 0230 for the 1-hour drive to HQU (where the airplane was based) to fly five passengers, who were employees of Vein Guys®, to JWN. (The National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] notes that while the copilot is referred to as such in this report, his role in the cockpit is not required by federal regulations.) The airplane departed HQU about 0406 and arrived at JWN about 0459. (Although JWN is located in the central time zone, all subsequent times in this report are in EST unless otherwise noted.) Both pilots stated in postaccident interviews that the flight to JWN was uneventful and the weather was good. They reported that at the JWN terminal, they slept in the crew break room, completed paperwork, and worked on the computer. They left for a late lunch about 1500 and returned to the airport about 1630.

According to security camera footage from the JWN terminal, both pilots were observed walking toward the airplane about 1913, and about 1918, the five passengers were seen walking toward the airplane while one crewmember performed an external walk-around inspection. About 1923, the airplane taxied from the parking area and departed JWN at 1927. The pilot was the pilot flying and was in the left cockpit seat.

About 1927, the flight crew contacted departure control while climbing through 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and requested an IFR clearance to HQU. About 1930, the flight crew contacted the Memphis air route traffic control center (ARTCC) while climbing through 14,000 ft msl, and about 1933, the flight was cleared to climb and maintain a cruising altitude of flight level (FL) 270. According to flight crew interviews, the en route weather was good, and a tailwind in excess of 70 knots was observed.

About 1948, the flight crew contacted the Atlanta ARTCC and was cleared to descend to FL240. About 1953, the flight crew was given a further descent clearance to 11,000 ft msl along with the Athens, Georgia, altimeter setting. About the same time, the copilot tuned in the HQU automated weather observation system (AWOS) to receive the most current weather at the destination airport. The AWOS at 1935 reported calm wind, temperature 10 degrees C, 10 statute miles visibility or greater, scattered clouds at 12,000 ft, and an altimeter setting of 30.13 inches of mercury. The pilot then set up the flight management guidance system for a visual approach to runway 10 at HQU with a 3.4-degree descent to the runway from a 5-mile final approach. The copilot tuned the instrument landing system for runway 10 as a backup.

About 1956, the flight crew advised the Atlanta ARTCC that they were descending through 18,500 ft, and 2 minutes later, they cancelled their IFR flight plan. About 1958, the copilot stated to the pilot, "ten thousand comin' up captain and you blowin' through." About 1959, the copilot told the pilot to adjust his altimeter. The pilot responded, "say, I'm kinda out of the loop or something. I don't know what happened to me there but I appreciate you lookin' after me there." The flight crew was then directed to contact Augusta approach control, and about 2000, the flight crew contacted Augusta approach control and advised that they were descending out of 8,400 ft and had HQU in sight. About 2002, the flight crew advised Augusta approach control that they would switch to the local HQU advisory frequency.

Concurrently, the pilot began to perform an "S" turn along the final approach path to the runway. About 1 minute later, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) aural alert announced that the airplane was 1,000 ft above the ground, and the pilot lowered the landing gear. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the landing gear was lowered, about 2004, the copilot noted that the "ANTI SKID FAIL" annunciator light illuminated. The pilot continued the approach, and, about 2005, the airplane touched down on runway 10. Witnesses reported that after the airplane touched down, they heard or saw it go around. According to the CVR, the takeoff warning horn sounded about 0.3 seconds before the pilot stated that he was performing a go-around. The airplane lifted off near the departure end of the runway. The copilot directed the pilot to increase pitch. According to EGPWS data, as the airplane climbed to an altitude of about 63 ft above the ground, about 9 seconds after liftoff, the left wing struck a utility pole located about 0.25 miles east of the departure end of the runway. The airplane continued about 925 ft before colliding with trees and terrain. It was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.

During a postaccident interview, when asked about the approach, landing, and go-around at HQU, the pilot recalled checking the airplane's landing light switches to prepare for the landing. The next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital on February 24, 2013. He did not recall any additional details about the approach, landing, or go-around or any airplane system anomalies, including any antiskid problems, during the flight.

In postaccident interviews, the copilot did not recall anything unusual about the glidepath and recalled being about 1 or 2 knots above reference speed. The copilot thought that the airplane touched down on runway 10 within 200 ft of the 1,000-ft runway marker. As he began to reference the after landing checklist, he heard the pilot announce a go-around, but the copilot did not know the reason for the go-around. He stated that he began to monitor the airspeed indicator, saw that they were at 105 knots approaching the end of the runway, and thought "it was going to be close." The engines sounded like they always did on a normal takeoff. He thought something hit the airplane on his side and recalled seeing trees in the windshield. The next thing he remembered was seeing someone with a flashlight at the accident scene. He did not recall any alarm or aural caution before the go-around and indicated that everything looked normal.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The Pilot

The pilot, age 56, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with a single pilot type rating on the Premier IA. (The 390 Premier is the same as the Premier I/IA series.) He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane privileges. He was the director of operations for Sky's the Limit, doing business as Executive Shuttle, a 14 CFR Part 135 operator based in Greenwood, South Carolina. He was hired by the Pavilion Group to provide private pilot services for their Premier IA under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported 13,319 hours total flying time, including 12,609 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC). He reported 198 hours, all as PIC, in the Premier IA. The pilot held a second-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate, issued October 29, 2012, with a limitation to possess glasses for near/intermediate vision.

According to interviews and training records, the pilot attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) initial training course at the FlightSafety Wichita Learning Center, Wichita, Kansas, from June 7, 2012, through June 22, 2012. The ground instruction consisted of 58 hours of ground training and 11.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The pilot also attended flight simulator training, which consisted of 15 hours of simulator training. He was type rated on the Premier IA on June 22, 2012, following a 2.2-hour simulator session and a 2.5-hour oral/written examination.

The pilot also attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) recurrent PIC course at the FlightSafety Greater Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center, Wilmington, Delaware, from January 3, 2013, through January 5, 2013. The ground instruction consisted of 12 hours of training and 4.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The simulator portion of the training consisted of 7 hours of simulator time.

A copilot who previously flew with the pilot stated that the pilot was experienced, professional, and possessed good flying skills. Both copilots who flew with the pilot, including the accident copilot, stated that they did not have a specific role on the flights they flew with him in the Premier IA.

On February 15, the pilot flew the owner of Vein Guys® and his family to Orlando, Florida, and remained in Orlando until Monday, February 18. He did not use a copilot for the Orlando trip. On February 18, he flew the family to HQU and then drove to his residence, going to bed about 2100. On February 19, he awoke about 0500 for a 0930 flight to Olive Branch, Mississippi, with the accident copilot and Vein Guys® staff. The return flight landed at HQU about 1700 that evening. He arrived at his residence about 1820 and went to bed about 2100.

On the day of the accident, the pilot awoke about 0200 and arrived at HQU about 0330 for the 0400 flight to JWN. He described February 20 as a "tough, tough day" because of the early departure time. After arriving at JWN, he slept for about 4 hours in a chair in the pilot lounge. He did not sleep again that day. A review of the pilot's cell phone records revealed three outgoing calls were made during his 4-hour sleep break. The pilot indicated that he normally slept about 8 hours per night and that he typically awoke about 0600.

The Copilot

The copilot, age 40, held an ATP certificate. He possessed no type ratings. He was employed by and flew charters for Executive Shuttle, which was owned by the accident pilot. He accompanied the accident pilot on the Premier IA flights at the pilot's request and estimated that he had about 45 flight hours in the Premier IA. He reported 2,932 hours total time, including 2,613 hours as PIC. The copilot held a second-class FAA medical certificate, issued February 12, 2013, with no limitations.

The copilot received no simulator training in the Premier IA before the accident and did not complete formal training courses in the Premier IA. He received a 14 CFR 61.55 logbook endorsement on October 10, 2012, from the accident pilot, stating that he demonstrated the skill and knowledge required for safe operation of the Premier IA as second-in-command.

On Monday, February 18, the copilot was at home and awoke between 0600 and 0630 and went to bed about 2200. On Tuesday, February 19, he awoke between about 0530 and 0600 and flew with the captain to Olive Branch. After returning to HQU, the copilot made the 1-hour drive to his home but was not certain what time he went to bed or fell asleep. The last cell phone activity that day occurred about 2148. On Wednesday, February 20, the copilot awoke between about 0200 and 0215 and drove with the accident captain to HQU for the flight to JWN. The copilot told investigators he was able to sleep for about 4 to 5 hours in the pilot lounge (awakening about 1000 central time).

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Premier IA was a carbon fiber composite fuselage, metal low-wing airplane powered by two Williams FJ44-2A turbofan engines mounted on the aft fuselage each rated at 2,300 lbs of thrust.

The Premier IA was not equipped with reverse thrust, and wheel braking was the primary means of stopping the airplane after landing. (The lift dump assists in putting weight on the wheels, which makes braking more effective.) The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled antiskid system. According to the manufacturer, the system offered protection from skids and could provide consistently shorter landing rolls for all runway conditions. The ANTI SKID FAIL annunciator would illuminate if a malfunction existed in the system when the ANTI SKID switch was in the NORM (normal) position.

Activation of the lift dump switch extended the three spoiler panels on each wing and overrode normal spoiler operation. A placard was located on the cockpit pedestal immediately aft of the lift dump switch that read, "WARNING DO NOT EXTEND IN FLIGHT." In addition, the Hawker Beechcraft Premier I/IA Model 390 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 3A—Abnormal Procedures, page A-25, states, "Do not extend lift dump in flight." Section 3A of the AFM (Abnormal Procedures) included the following warning: "Extending lift dump in flight could result in loss of airplane control leading to airplane damage and injury to personnel. Continued safe flight with lift dump extended has not been demonstrated."

The airframe and engine maintenance logbooks were not located after the accident. Pavilion Group used CAMP Systems as their maintenance management provider, and the Hawker Beechcraft Service Center, Atlanta, Georgia, also provided maintenance services.

The most recent record of maintenance performed on the airplane occurred on January 29, 2013, at Aeronautical Services, Greenwood, South Carolina. The maintenance included replacement of the left and right main tires, touching up exterior paint, and a battery capacity check. The total time on the airplane was not recorded at that time.

The most recent maintenance record indicating aircraft total time was on January 4, 2013, when the airframe total time was 635.4 hours. The most recent comprehensive airframe and engine inspection was recorded on June 15, 2012. The 600-hour Schedule A inspection was accomplished at 503.3 hours total time and 565 total airframe cycles.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The National Weather Service (NWS) reported no significant weather and no precipitation over the region. The area forecast applicable for HQU expected light wind and scattered to broken high cirrus clouds, with visibility unrestricted. The NWS also issued an airmen's meteorological information that was current at the time of the accident for moderate turbulence below 8,000 ft over the area.

HQU was equipped with an AWOS that issued observations every 20 minutes. The HQU 1955 observation reported calm wind, visibility 10 miles or greater, sky clear, temperature 9 degrees C, dew point -4 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.12 inches of mercury. The HQU 2015 observation reported wind from 240 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken ceiling at 12,000 ft above ground level (agl), temperature 11 degrees C, dew point -3 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.15 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

HQU was a general aviation airport with one asphalt runway (runway 10-28) measuring 5,503 ft long and 100 ft wide, with precision instrument markings on both ends. The runway had high-intensity runway edge lights that changed from white to amber for the last 2,000 ft in both directions. Both ends had red threshold lights and green approach lights. Adjacent to the touchdown zone for both ends of the runway was a two-unit precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system set at 3 degrees. (As later discussed, following an aeronautical study after the accident, the FAA changed the glidepath angle for the runway 28 PAPI to 3.5 degrees.) Postaccident tests and inspections of the airport lighting systems indicated that the lighting system was operating normally at the time of the tests.

The runway and taxiway lights were pilot-adjustable to low, medium, and high settings and would remain on for 15 minutes after activation. The PAPIs would not activate when the runway lights were set to the low setting. A City of Thomson administrator managed the airport with the help of an on-site airport manager who also managed a local fixed base operation (Spirit Aviation). The airport manager did not prepare or keep any logs about airport self-inspections, regular maintenance, wildlife strikes, lighting activation, or periodic inspection/calibration of the PAPI units. According to the airport manager, a local electrical contractor accomplished all preventative and repair work on the airport's lights and navigational aids on an as needed basis. After the accident, the airport began keeping weekly logs of lighting outages, maintenance, and general field conditions.

The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) inspected HQU biennially to ensure compliance with the requirements set out in GDOT's Rules and Regulations for Licensing of Certain Open-to-the-Public Airports. The GDOT inspections also included an airport inspection for the FAA's Airport Safety Data Program. The two most recent inspection reports from 2010 and 2012 determined that HQU met the minimum state licensing requirements but failed to meet federal requirements for precision and visual approaches. Specifically, runway 10 failed to meet FAA Part 77 reporting requirements for a 50:1 obstruction-free, precision instrument approach to 200 ft from the runway end. Similarly, runway 28 failed to meet the FAA Part 77 reporting requirements for a 34:1 obstruction-free, nonprecision instrument approach to 200 ft from the runway end. The obstructions listed for both approaches were trees, left and right of centerline. The 2012 inspection report for the runway 28 approach included an obstruction characterized as a power line, 66 ft high, and 2,200 ft from the displaced threshold, extending from the centerline to 400 ft right of centerline, which provided a 27:1 approach to 200 ft from the runway end and a 33:1 approach to the displaced threshold.

The Thomson city administrator stated that before 2012, no GDOT inspection report had identified the power line east of the airport as a potential obstruction. To determine whether the power line was an obstruction and to provide data in support of an official airport layout plan, the city administrator authorized a formal survey of the airport. The survey had not been completed at the time of the accident or at the time of this report.

Airport Obstructions

During the accident sequence, the airplane struck a concrete electrical utility pole (Pole 48) that was about 1,835 ft east of the runway 28 threshold and 50 ft left of the extended runway centerline. Pole 48 was 72 ft high, and the airplane struck the pole about 58 ft agl. The pole was not equipped with lights, but orange visibility balls were on the adjacent wires.

The pole was owned and maintained by Georgia Power, a regional utility that supplied electric power to local businesses and residents. Pole 48 was erected in 1989, along with similar poles and electrical utility lines, to provide electrical power to the Milliken and Company textile plant adjacent to HQU. Thomson McDuffie County entered into an "aviation easement" agreement with Deering Milliken, the owner of the Milliken Kingsley textile factory adjacent to HQU, in September 1973. The provisions of the easement were designed to protect the approach surface east of the airport. The text of the easement stated that Deering Milliken "…will not hereafter erect or permit the erection or growth of any structure, trees, or other object within or upon said parcel, which lies within the approach area of the 9-27 [now 10-28] runway to a height above the approach surface. Said approach surface being an inclined plane with a slope of 34:1, i.e. one ft of elevation for each 34 ft of horizontal distance, located directly over the center of said parcel." Milliken and Company entered into easement agreements with Georgia Power in May 1977 and again in August 1989 to grant the right to construct, erect, install, operate, and maintain "poles, wires, transformers, service pedestals, and other necessary apparatus" to supply electrical power to the Milliken Kingsley textile plant.

Title 14 CFR Part 77 establishes standards for approach surfaces to runways of various types and requires notice to the FAA of any proposed construction or alteration of existing structures that may affect the national airspace system. FAA Advisory Circular 70-7460-1K, "Obstruction Marking and Lighting," provides guidance on compliance with 14 CFR Part 77 and procedures for notifying the FAA of proposed construction or alteration. Specifically, a Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration Form (FAA Form 7460-1) is required for notification. Upon receipt of Form 7460-1, the FAA will conduct an aeronautical study to determine the effects of the construction or alteration on navigable airspace. Then, the FAA will determine if the construction or alteration constitutes a hazard to air navigation.

Georgia Power did not notify the FAA before constructing the utility poles in 1989; therefore, the FAA had no knowledge of the poles as potential obstructions. Accordingly, there were no depictions or mention of possible obstructions on associated aeronautical charts.

After the accident, Georgia Power submitted FAA Forms 7460-1 for four utility poles east of the airport, including Pole 48. The FAA conducted aeronautical studies on the poles and, on May 31, 2013, issued initial findings from the studies. Regarding Pole 48, the FAA determined in its initial findings that "…the structure as described exceeds obstruction standards and/or would have an adverse physical or electromagnetic interference effect upon navigable airspace or air navigation facilities. Pending resolution of the issues described below, the structure is presumed to be a hazard to air navigation." The study also stated that if the pole were lowered to a height of 46 ft or less it would not exceed obstruction standards, and a favorable determination could subsequently be issued. The FAA reported similar findings on the other three structures. The FAA stated in its findings that to pursue a favorable determination at the originally submitted height, further study would be necessary, and a formal request would be required within 60 days.

After the FAA issued the preliminary obstruction determinations, Georgia Power requested that the FAA conduct further study on the four obstructions to determine if a favorable determination could be achieved. On August 12, 2013, the FAA published public notices announcing the four aeronautical studies and invited interested parties to submit relevant comments before September 18, 2013. According to an FAA official, the final determinations for the four obstructions were not completed at the time of this report. Since the aeronautical studies were conducted, the FAA Flight Data Center issued several notices to airmen to alert pilots about obstructions and also to amend the approach and departure procedures at HQU accordingly. In addition, the FAA increased the glideslope angle for the runway 28 PAPI from 3.00 to 3.50 degrees.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild FA2100-1010 CVR. The CVR recording contained the last 30 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR sustained significant heat and structural damage as a result of the accident. Despite the damage to the unit, three channels of recorded audio were available, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1935:13 as the flight was at FL240, and the recording stopped about 2006 during the crash sequence. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane struck Pole 48, and sections of the pole and attached power lines were found along the wreckage debris path, which was oriented from west to east on an approximate magnetic heading of 085 degrees. The left wing was completely severed about 13 ft inboard from the wing tip and exhibited no fire damage. The severed wing was located about 320 ft east of Pole 48.

Various fragments of the airplane structure were found along the debris path leading to the main wreckage site, which was located about 925 ft east of Pole 48. Multiple trees, up to 2 ft in diameter, were severed or toppled in the main wreckage impact zone. The main wreckage consisted of the center wing section, a portion of the right wing, the main landing gear, the baggage compartment, the emergency locator transmitter rack, and the empennage. The main wreckage was damaged by a postcrash fire and contained melted aluminum and burnt composite material. The forward fuselage was about 60 ft east of the main wreckage and was damaged by a postcrash fire.

The right engine was separated from the fuselage and was on the south side of the debris path between the main wreckage and the forward fuselage shell. The left engine was severed into two main sections with the compressor and the turbine and exhaust section located in a shallow pond on the north side of the debris path. A large portion of the ground in the vicinity of the accident site was charred and burned by a postcrash fire.

All three landing gear assemblies were located on scene. The left and right main landing gear actuators separated from the landing gear but remained attached to the wing structure. Measurements of the actuator positions, as found, corresponded to the "gear extended" or "down" position.

An examination of the nose landing gear actuator piston revealed that its extension was at an intermediate position. The nose landing gear had an external downlock mechanism to secure the gear in the down-and-locked position. The mating side of the external downlock mechanism was not observed and therefore precluded determination of the position of the nose landing gear. Fire and impact damage to the antiskid system components (antiskid control unit, power brake/antiskid control valve, and wheel speed transducers) prevented their functional testing.

The wreckage was transported to a storage facility where additional examinations of the wreckage were performed. The landing gear switch, which was cockpit-mounted, was found with the instrument subpanel attached to electrical wire. The switch exhibited heat and thermal damage consistent with a postcrash fire. The metal part of the switch handle was found in the down (extended) detent, and the J-hook was engaged on the handle. The lift dump switch assembly, which was mounted on the cockpit center console, was not located.

The electrically controlled and operated wing flap system was examined. The four flap positions available to the pilot were UP (0 degrees), 10, 20, and DN (30 degrees/full down). While the flap handle was found in the 10-degree detent, measurements of the flap actuator positions revealed that the flaps were at approximately the 15-degree position (a nonselectable, in-transit position) at the time of impact.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Both the pilot and copilot sustained serious injuries. Drug and alcohol testing on the pilot and copilot was conducted by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute after the accident. Toxicology results were negative for both pilots on a wide range of drugs, including major drugs of abuse.

The Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Science listed the cause of death for all passengers as blunt force injuries.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The pilot's seat was found with the seatback and seat pan cushions attached to the frame, which was severely damaged with broken tubes in the seatback and seat bottom. The upper shoulder area of the seat was crushed forward and to the right. The seat, which was located near the remains of the cockpit, appeared to be forcefully detached from the cockpit floor track rails with small floor track pieces attached to the seat post. First responders removed the pilot from his 4-point restraint by cutting the belt webbing.

The copilot's seat was found attached to the floor structure in the remains of the cockpit. The seatback, seat pan cushions, and the 4-point restraint were consumed by the postcrash fire. The seat frame was severely damaged with broken tubes in the seatback and seat bottom. First responders found the copilot out of his seat and walking along an access road near the main wreckage area.

All six passenger seats were found scattered among the wreckage and were detached from the airplane floor structure. The seat backs and bottoms of all seats exhibited severe damage, including breakage of the structural tubing framework. The restraint systems on the passenger seats were attached to their respective seat frames, and all six buckles were unlatched. The belt webbing was intact on three of the seats, and the remaining three passenger seat restraints were consumed by fire. One of the six shoulder harnesses was found attached to the lap portion of the female buckle. The other five shoulder harnesses were found retracted in the seatback frame. None of the six passenger seat belt buckles or associated fittings were damaged.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell Mark V EGPWS. The nonvolatile memory (NVM) was downloaded, and, by design, the EGPWS recorded airplane performance data based on a parameter exceedance, which was, in this event, an excessive bank angle, most likely the result of the separation of the left wing after impact with Pole 48. The unit captured the data during the 20 seconds before the exceedance. The unit was designed to record for 10 seconds after the exceedance; however, only 2 seconds were recorded because electrical power to the unit ceased during the crash sequence.

The data indicated that during the go-around attempt, the airplane lifted off near the departure end of runway 10 (consistent with the copilot's statement). Per the EGPWS data, the landing gear remained in the down position until impact. The calibrated airspeed was about 125 knots when the airplane lifted off. The airplane continued straight ahead and slowly accelerated and gradually climbed, until a rapid pitch up was recorded, from 10.5 to 27.4 degrees within 1 second. One second later, the roll increased from 2.1 degrees left to 71.7 degrees left.

The first data recorded by the EGPWS showed that the airplane was configured at flaps 30. The flaps were transitioning through flaps 15 at the time of impact.

Engines

During postaccident examination, the No. 1 (left) engine exhibited extensive impact deformation and was split at the interstage case flange, aft of the axial low pressure compressor (LPC). The fan blades exhibited tip bending opposite the direction of rotation, and the low pressure turbine (LPT) shaft was twisted consistent with a sudden stoppage due to impact.

The No. 2 (right) engine was intact; however, some components, including the LPC, high pressure compressor, high pressure turbine, and LPT all exhibited blade tip rubs with corresponding case rubs. The accessory gearbox tower shaft was sheared, and damage consistent with impact was noted to the fuel pump, oil lube, and scavenge pump.

Wing Spoiler System Actuators

Examination and disassembly of the lift dump actuators revealed that one unit was 0.457 inch from full extension (panel extended), and the other unit was 0.221 inch from full extension. A determination of left or right could not be made due to fire and impact damage.

Examination and disassembly of the left blow-down actuator revealed that the unit was seized at the fully extended position. Damage to the clevis at the end of the actuator was consistent with the roll/speedbrake/spoiler panel in the fully extended position at impact. The right blow-down actuator had minimal damage and was fully functional when tested. Its position at impact could not be determined.

Examination and disassembly of the left roll control actuator revealed that the unit was 0.022 inch from the fully extended position. The right roll control actuator had minimal damage and was found to be fully functional when tested. Its position at impact was 0.201 inch from the fully extended position.

Spoiler Control Unit

The spoiler control unit (SCU) interfaced with the hydraulics and controlled hydraulic actuation of the six spoiler panels across the wings. The SCU was responsible for providing surface position commands and monitoring hydraulic components for malfunction detection and protection.

Exterior examination of the SCU revealed major fire and impact damage to the unit's housing. The bit and diagnostic card was also fire damaged. The data on the NVM chip were downloaded but were inconclusive; therefore, a determination of the actuation of the spoilers before and during the accident could not be made based on SCU data.

Flight Management Computer (FMC-3000)

The airplane was equipped with a Rockwell Collins FMC-3000 flight management computer. The unit was tested and operated normally on a test bench. NVM analysis indicated that no internal faults occurred on the FMC-3000 near the time of accident.

Air Data Computers (ADC-3000)

The airplane was equipped with two Rockwell Collins ADC-3000 air data computers (ADC). Examination revealed that the mounts on both ADCs were damaged from impact, indicative of forces during impact in excess of 20g. Both units operated normally on a test bench. The first unit showed a final power cycle with weight coming off wheels at 4 minutes after power on and weight on wheels again at 44 minutes after power on. Following the weight on wheels, within the 44th minute after power on, 3 faults were indicated in the NVM. In order, they were for a faulty Ps (static pressure) counter, a faulty Qc (impact pressure) counter, and an unexpected interruption. According to Rockwell Collins, these faults were most likely due to extreme acceleration causing electrical connections between the circuit cards within the ADC to fail. The second unit showed a final power cycle with weight coming off wheels at 4 minutes after power on and a return to weight on wheels at 44 minutes after power on. No faults were observed in the NVM.

Airplane Performance Study

The NTSB produced an airplane performance study of the landing and go-around phases of the accident flight largely based on information from the CVR and the EGPWS, as well as the physical evidence documented at the accident site. To attain the unfactored landing distance performance numbers contained in the AFM, the following conditions had to be met: thrust as required to maintain a 3-degree approach angle, retarding thrust to idle at 50 ft agl; approach speed at VREF; flaps down; antiskid normal; maximum braking; and lift dump extended after touchdown.

Beechcraft calculated stopping performance for several scenarios related to the accident flight. Beechcraft indicated that with the estimated stopping distance for the accident airplane with no antiskid system operative and the lowest braking action recorded during the flight test, the airplane would require about 1,560 ft to stop from the first speed recorded by the EGPWS (83 kts). This estimate decreases to 1,350 ft when moderate braking is applied. Based on EGPWS data, after touching down, the pilot did not stop the airplane within the first 2,900 ft beyond the runway 10 threshold and initiated a go-around with more than 2,400 ft of hard surface remaining; the first speed was recorded at this point. (The actual touchdown point was not recorded and could not be determined.) The wreckage examination, as well as drag estimates based on recovered EGPWS data, indicated that the lift dump remained extended during the go-around attempt. The airplane drag associated with the lift dump, flaps, and landing gear extended resulted in only marginal climb performance.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

According to its website, Vein Guys® was a group of four physicians that operated several vein care centers in the southeastern United States, with offices in Augusta, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Nashville, Tennessee; and Raleigh, North Carolina. According to interviews, the Pavilion Group was a subsidiary established by the owners of Vein Guys® to handle all business activities associated with the ownership and operation of its private airplane, which it used to shuttle physicians and staff between their offices in Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina and also for private flights to vacation destinations.

Before owning the accident airplane, the Pavilion Group owned a King Air 300 (N401BL) and used the pilot services of Executive Shuttle (owned by the accident pilot). The Pavilion Group sold the King Air and, in June 2012, purchased the accident airplane and continued to use the pilot services of Executive Shuttle. The Pavilion Group's airplanes were operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. According to the accident pilot, the Pavilion Group paid for the pilot's initial and recurrent Premier IA ground and simulator training at FlightSafety. Although Executive Shuttle operated as Sky's the Limit, a 14 CFR Part 135 certificate holder, the pilot stated in interviews that there was no signed contract between Executive Shuttle and the Pavilion Group (or Vein Guys®) for pilot services on the Pavilion Group's airplane, and all Premier IA flights Executive Shuttle operated for the Pavilion Group were conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Takeoff Warning System

The airplane was equipped with a takeoff configuration warning system that provided an automatic aural warning to the flight crew during the initial portion of takeoff if the airplane was in a configuration that would not allow for a safe takeoff. The aural warning would continue until the airplane's configuration was changed to allow for safe takeoff, until action was taken by the pilot to abandon the takeoff roll, or until weight was off of the wheels. If either lift dump surface was not retracted, the speed brake/lift dump lever sensors were in the extended range, either flap position was greater than 22 degrees, or the pitch trim was outside of a predetermined range for takeoff, the aural warning would activate in the cockpit.

Antiskid System Failure and Pilot's Corrective Action

Pilots receiving training at FlightSafety on the Premier IA were taught to use the FAA approved Abbreviated Pilot Checklist to handle system malfunctions. A failure of the antiskid system was included in the Abnormal Procedures section of the checklist. According to the checklist, the pilot should move the antiskid switch to OFF and plan for a flaps 10 or flaps up landing. The antiskid failure procedure also provided a note stating that landing distance would increase about 130 percent with flaps up and 89 percent with flaps 10.

According to the Antiskid Failure Checklist (which is within the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist), the pilot was required to account for the loss of the antiskid system by applying a performance penalty to the normal landing distance, depending on the flap setting selected (flaps 10 or flaps up). Using weather conditions that prevailed at HQU at the time of the accident, the required landing distance with flaps up was 7,066 ft, and the required landing distance with flaps 10 was 5,806 ft. HQU runway 10's available runway length for landing was 5,208 ft, which did not meet the flaps up or flaps 10 performance penalty requirements, and a diversion to a longer runway would have been required. The Premier IA AFM Antiskid Fail procedure included a note that stated, "Use of flaps 20 or DN (30) for landing, with anti-skid failed, is prohibited."

The simulator instructor who provided the pilot's initial training stated in a postaccident interview that he would expect the pilot to use the written checklist for a systems failure, determine the proper flap setting for landing, and then apply the performance penalty for the landing, adding that the Antiskid Failure Checklist emphasized that the landing must be made with only flaps 10 or UP. According to the pilot's FlightSafety training records, he received antiskid system failure training during his recurrent simulator training on January 4, 2013.

On June 17, 2013, both pilots listened to the CVR recording for the accident flight, and according to subsequent interviews, neither pilot recalled seeing the ANTI SKID FAIL annunciator light illuminated on the approach. According to interviews with both pilots and a review of the CVR recording, the ANTI SKID FAIL abnormal checklist as outlined in the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist for the Premier IA was not conducted by the accident crew before landing at HQU. Further, the pilot stated that he did not think they needed the antiskid system on the landing at HQU and said the performance penalty would only apply if you were "trying to make your numbers" in the book made by the test pilots by applying maximum braking.

Balked Landing/Go-Around

According to recorded data and witness statements, the flight crew attempted a go-around after landing at HQU. The pilot did not recall the event during interviews, while the copilot stated that they conducted a go-around after the airplane touched down. Procedures for the Premier IA (AFM and Pilot Checklist) referred to the discontinuation of a landing approach as a "balked landing."

According to the FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083, page G-2), a balked landing was synonymous with a go-around. Per the FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary, a go around was a situation when a pilot abandons his/her approach to land. The Airplane Flying Handbook (chapter 8), "Approaches and Landings," states the following: "The go around is not strictly an emergency procedure. It is a normal maneuver that may at times be used in an emergency situation.…Although the need to discontinue a landing may arise at any point in the landing process, the most critical go-around will be one started when very close to the ground. Therefore, the earlier a condition that warrants a go-around is recognized, the safer the go around/rejected landing will be."

According to the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual (page PCG T-4), a touchdown was the point at which an aircraft first made contact with the landing surfaces. The Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A, page 8-7) explained that the landing process was not over until the airplane decelerated to a normal taxi speed or came to a complete stop. The FAA indicated in its May 14, 2013, response to NTSB Information Request 13-267 that a pilot may execute a balked landing/go-around if he/she determined that, after first contact with the landing surface, positive control had not been maintained or if continuing the landing process may expose the aircraft to unsafe conditions such as an unexpected appearance of hazards on the runway.

FlightSafety Premier IA instructors and evaluators in Wichita, Kansas, and Wilmington, Delaware, stated during postaccident interviews that a balked landing was an airborne maneuver typically taught to be performed at an altitude of 50 ft on the approach, and Premier pilots were not taught to execute a balked landing in the Premier IA following touchdown on the runway. The FlightSafety instructors and evaluators also stated that they discouraged students from executing a balked landing after touchdown. Beechcraft Premier IA manuals and FlightSafety training guidance for the Premier IA do not contain language prohibiting a balked landing procedure after touchdown.

The pilot told investigators that he did not recall if anyone at FlightSafety told him not to conduct a go-around or balked landing after touching down during his training. The pilot also stated that the only balked landings he conducted in training were while airborne. When asked by investigators if he recalled anyone at FlightSafety telling him not to conduct a go-around or balked landing after touching down, the pilot said "no." The pilot further stated that a balked landing was something that occurred in the air, and on the ground it was called a "touch and go." The pilot did not remember ever doing a touch and-go in the simulator and had never done one in a Premier.

On March 29, 2011, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-11-18, asking the FAA to "require manufacturers of newly certificated and in-service turbine-powered aircraft to incorporate in their Aircraft Flight Manuals a committed-to-stop point in the landing sequence (for example, in the case of the Hawker Beechcraft 125-800A airplane, once lift dump is deployed) beyond which a go-around should not be attempted." On June 10, 2013, the FAA indicated that it was impractical to fully implement the recommendation but that it would address the NTSB's concerns by issuing an Information for Operators (InFO). Pending the issuance of the InFO and the NTSB's review of an acceptable plan of action to ensure that all operators incorporate the guidance, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-11-18 "Open—Acceptable Alternate Response."



 NTSB Identification: ERA13MA139
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 20, 2013 in Thomson, GA
Aircraft: BEECH 390, registration: N777VG
Injuries: 5 Fatal,2 Serious.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 20, 2013, about 2006 eastern standard time (EST), a Beechcraft Corporation 390 Premier (Premier IA), N777VG, collided with a utility pole, trees, and terrain following a go around at Thomson-McDuffie County Airport (HQU), Thomson, Georgia. The airline transport-rated pilot and copilot were seriously injured, and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Pavilion Group, LLC, and was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated at John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 1827 central standard time (1927 EST).


On the morning of the accident, the pilot and copilot left their respective homes in South Carolina about 0230 for the 1-hour drive to HQU (where the airplane was based) to fly five passengers, who were employees of Vein Guys®, to JWN. (The National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] notes that while the copilot is referred to as such in this report, his role in the cockpit is not required by federal regulations.) The airplane departed HQU about 0406 and arrived at JWN about 0459. (Although JWN is located in the central time zone, all subsequent times in this report are in EST unless otherwise noted.) Both pilots stated in postaccident interviews that the flight to JWN was uneventful and the weather was good. They reported that at the JWN terminal, they slept in the crew break room, completed paperwork, and worked on the computer. They left for a late lunch about 1500 and returned to the airport about 1630.

According to security camera footage from the JWN terminal, both pilots were observed walking toward the airplane about 1913, and about 1918, the five passengers were seen walking toward the airplane while one crewmember performed an external walk-around inspection. About 1923, the airplane taxied from the parking area and departed JWN at 1927. The pilot was the pilot flying and was in the left cockpit seat.

About 1927, the flight crew contacted departure control while climbing through 3,500 ft mean sea level (msl) and requested an IFR clearance to HQU. About 1930, the flight crew contacted the Memphis air route traffic control center (ARTCC) while climbing through 14,000 ft msl, and about 1933, the flight was cleared to climb and maintain a cruising altitude of flight level (FL) 270. According to flight crew interviews, the en route weather was good, and a tailwind in excess of 70 knots was observed.

About 1948, the flight crew contacted the Atlanta ARTCC and was cleared to descend to FL240. About 1953, the flight crew was given a further descent clearance to 11,000 ft msl along with the Athens, Georgia, altimeter setting. About the same time, the copilot tuned in the HQU automated weather observation system (AWOS) to receive the most current weather at the destination airport. The AWOS at 1935 reported calm wind, temperature 10 degrees C, 10 statute miles visibility or greater, scattered clouds at 12,000 ft, and an altimeter setting of 30.13 inches of mercury. The pilot then set up the flight management guidance system for a visual approach to runway 10 at HQU with a 3.4-degree descent to the runway from a 5-mile final approach. The copilot tuned the instrument landing system for runway 10 as a backup.

About 1956, the flight crew advised the Atlanta ARTCC that they were descending through 18,500 ft, and 2 minutes later, they cancelled their IFR flight plan. About 1958, the copilot stated to the pilot, "ten thousand comin' up captain and you blowin' through." About 1959, the copilot told the pilot to adjust his altimeter. The pilot responded, "say, I'm kinda out of the loop or something. I don't know what happened to me there but I appreciate you lookin' after me there." The flight crew was then directed to contact Augusta approach control, and about 2000, the flight crew contacted Augusta approach control and advised that they were descending out of 8,400 ft and had HQU in sight. About 2002, the flight crew advised Augusta approach control that they would switch to the local HQU advisory frequency.

Concurrently, the pilot began to perform an "S" turn along the final approach path to the runway. About 1 minute later, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) aural alert announced that the airplane was 1,000 ft above the ground, and the pilot lowered the landing gear. According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), after the landing gear was lowered, about 2004, the copilot noted that the "ANTI SKID FAIL" annunciator light illuminated. The pilot continued the approach, and, about 2005, the airplane touched down on runway 10. Witnesses reported that after the airplane touched down, they heard or saw it go around. According to the CVR, the takeoff warning horn sounded about 0.3 seconds before the pilot stated that he was performing a go-around. The airplane lifted off near the departure end of the runway. The copilot directed the pilot to increase pitch. According to EGPWS data, as the airplane climbed to an altitude of about 63 ft above the ground, about 9 seconds after liftoff, the left wing struck a utility pole located about 0.25 miles east of the departure end of the runway. The airplane continued about 925 ft before colliding with trees and terrain. It was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire.

During a postaccident interview, when asked about the approach, landing, and go-around at HQU, the pilot recalled checking the airplane's landing light switches to prepare for the landing. The next thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital on February 24, 2013. He did not recall any additional details about the approach, landing, or go-around or any airplane system anomalies, including any antiskid problems, during the flight.

In postaccident interviews, the copilot did not recall anything unusual about the glidepath and recalled being about 1 or 2 knots above reference speed. The copilot thought that the airplane touched down on runway 10 within 200 ft of the 1,000-ft runway marker. As he began to reference the after landing checklist, he heard the pilot announce a go-around, but the copilot did not know the reason for the go-around. He stated that he began to monitor the airspeed indicator, saw that they were at 105 knots approaching the end of the runway, and thought "it was going to be close." The engines sounded like they always did on a normal takeoff. He thought something hit the airplane on his side and recalled seeing trees in the windshield. The next thing he remembered was seeing someone with a flashlight at the accident scene. He did not recall any alarm or aural caution before the go-around and indicated that everything looked normal.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The Pilot

The pilot, age 56, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate with a single pilot type rating on the Premier IA. (The 390 Premier is the same as the Premier I/IA series.) He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane privileges. He was the director of operations for Sky's the Limit, doing business as Executive Shuttle, a 14 CFR Part 135 operator based in Greenwood, South Carolina. He was hired by the Pavilion Group to provide private pilot services for their Premier IA under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The pilot reported 13,319 hours total flying time, including 12,609 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC). He reported 198 hours, all as PIC, in the Premier IA. The pilot held a second-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate, issued October 29, 2012, with a limitation to possess glasses for near/intermediate vision.

According to interviews and training records, the pilot attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) initial training course at the FlightSafety Wichita Learning Center, Wichita, Kansas, from June 7, 2012, through June 22, 2012. The ground instruction consisted of 58 hours of ground training and 11.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The pilot also attended flight simulator training, which consisted of 15 hours of simulator training. He was type rated on the Premier IA on June 22, 2012, following a 2.2-hour simulator session and a 2.5-hour oral/written examination.

The pilot also attended the FlightSafety Premier I Series (RA-390) recurrent PIC course at the FlightSafety Greater Philadelphia/Wilmington Learning Center, Wilmington, Delaware, from January 3, 2013, through January 5, 2013. The ground instruction consisted of 12 hours of training and 4.5 hours of briefing/debriefing. The simulator portion of the training consisted of 7 hours of simulator time.

A copilot who previously flew with the pilot stated that the pilot was experienced, professional, and possessed good flying skills. Both copilots who flew with the pilot, including the accident copilot, stated that they did not have a specific role on the flights they flew with him in the Premier IA.

On February 15, the pilot flew the owner of Vein Guys® and his family to Orlando, Florida, and remained in Orlando until Monday, February 18. He did not use a copilot for the Orlando trip. On February 18, he flew the family to HQU and then drove to his residence, going to bed about 2100. On February 19, he awoke about 0500 for a 0930 flight to Olive Branch, Mississippi, with the accident copilot and Vein Guys® staff. The return flight landed at HQU about 1700 that evening. He arrived at his residence about 1820 and went to bed about 2100.

On the day of the accident, the pilot awoke about 0200 and arrived at HQU about 0330 for the 0400 flight to JWN. He described February 20 as a "tough, tough day" because of the early departure time. After arriving at JWN, he slept for about 4 hours in the pilot lounge. He did not sleep again that day. A review of the pilot's cell phone records revealed three outgoing calls were made during his 4-hour sleep break. The pilot indicated that he normally slept about 8 hours per night and that he typically awoke about 0600.

The Copilot

The copilot, age 40, held an ATP certificate. He possessed no type ratings. He was employed by and flew charters for Executive Shuttle, which was owned by the accident pilot. He accompanied the accident pilot on the Premier IA flights at the pilot's request and estimated that he had about 45 flight hours in the Premier IA. He reported 2,932 hours total time, including 2,613 hours as PIC. The copilot held a second-class FAA medical certificate, issued February 12, 2013, with no limitations.

The copilot received no simulator training in the Premier IA before the accident and did not complete formal training courses in the Premier IA. He received a 14 CFR 61.55 logbook endorsement on October 10, 2012, from the accident pilot, stating that he demonstrated the skill and knowledge required for safe operation of the Premier IA as second-in-command.

On Monday, February 18, the copilot was at home and awoke between 0600 and 0630 and went to bed about 2200. On Tuesday, February 19, he awoke between about 0530 and 0600 and flew with the captain to Olive Branch. After returning to HQU, the copilot made the 1-hour drive to his home but was not certain what time he went to bed or fell asleep. The last cell phone activity that day occurred about 2148. On Wednesday, February 20, the copilot awoke between about 0200 and 0215 and drove with the accident captain to HQU for the flight to JWN. The copilot told investigators he was able to sleep for about 4 to 5 hours in the pilot lounge (awakening about 1000 central time).

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Premier IA was a carbon fiber composite fuselage, metal low-wing airplane powered by two Williams FJ44-2A turbofan engines mounted on the aft fuselage each rated at 2,300 lbs of thrust.

The Premier IA was not equipped with reverse thrust, and wheel braking was the primary means of stopping the airplane after landing. (The lift dump assists in putting weight on the wheels, which makes braking more effective.) The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled antiskid system. According to the manufacturer, the system offered protection from skids and could provide consistently shorter landing rolls for all runway conditions. The ANTI SKID FAIL annunciator would illuminate if a malfunction existed in the system when the ANTI SKID switch was in the NORM (normal) position.

Activation of the lift dump switch extended the three spoiler panels on each wing and overrode normal spoiler operation. A placard was located on the cockpit pedestal immediately aft of the lift dump switch that read, "WARNING DO NOT EXTEND IN FLIGHT." In addition, the Hawker Beechcraft Premier I/IA Model 390 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 3A—Abnormal Procedures, page A-25, states, "Do not extend lift dump in flight." Section 3A of the AFM (Abnormal Procedures) included the following warning: "Extending lift dump in flight could result in loss of airplane control leading to airplane damage and injury to personnel. Continued safe flight with lift dump extended has not been demonstrated."

The airframe and engine maintenance logbooks were not located after the accident. Pavilion Group used CAMP Systems as their maintenance management provider, and the Hawker Beechcraft Service Center, Atlanta, Georgia, also provided maintenance services.

The most recent record of maintenance performed on the airplane occurred on January 29, 2013, at Aeronautical Services, Greenwood, South Carolina. The maintenance included replacement of the left and right main tires, touching up exterior paint, and a battery capacity check. The total time on the airplane was not recorded at that time.

The most recent maintenance record indicating aircraft total time was on January 4, 2013, when the airframe total time was 635.4 hours. The most recent comprehensive airframe and engine inspection was recorded on June 15, 2012. The 600-hour Schedule A inspection was accomplished at 503.3 hours total time and 565 total airframe cycles.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The National Weather Service (NWS) reported no significant weather and no precipitation over the region. The area forecast applicable for HQU expected light wind and scattered to broken high cirrus clouds, with visibility unrestricted. The NWS also issued an airmen's meteorological information that was current at the time of the accident for moderate turbulence below 8,000 ft over the area.

HQU was equipped with an AWOS that issued observations every 20 minutes. The HQU 1955 observation reported calm wind, visibility 10 miles or greater, sky clear, temperature 9 degrees C, dew point -4 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.12 inches of mercury. The HQU 2015 observation reported wind from 240 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken ceiling at 12,000 ft above ground level (agl), temperature 11 degrees C, dew point -3 degrees C, and altimeter setting 30.15 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

General

HQU was a general aviation airport with one asphalt runway (runway 10-28) measuring 5,503 ft long and 100 ft wide, with precision instrument markings on both ends. The runway had high-intensity runway edge lights that changed from white to amber for the last 2,000 ft in both directions. Both ends had red threshold lights and green approach lights. Adjacent to the touchdown zone for both ends of the runway was a two-unit precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system set at 3 degrees. (As later discussed, following an aeronautical study after the accident, the FAA changed the glidepath angle for the runway 28 PAPI to 3.5 degrees.) Postaccident tests and inspections of the airport lighting systems indicated that the lighting system was operating normally at the time of the tests.

The runway and taxiway lights were pilot-adjustable to low, medium, and high settings and would remain on for 15 minutes after activation. The PAPIs would not activate when the runway lights were set to the low setting. A City of Thomson administrator managed the airport with the help of an on-site airport manager who also managed a local fixed base operation (Spirit Aviation). The airport manager did not prepare or keep any logs about airport self-inspections, regular maintenance, wildlife strikes, lighting activation, or periodic inspection/calibration of the PAPI units. According to the airport manager, a local electrical contractor accomplished all preventative and repair work on the airport's lights and navigational aids on an as needed basis. After the accident, the airport began keeping weekly logs of lighting outages, maintenance, and general field conditions.

The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) inspected HQU biennially to ensure compliance with the requirements set out in GDOT's Rules and Regulations for Licensing of Certain Open-to-the-Public Airports. The GDOT inspections also included an airport inspection for the FAA's Airport Safety Data Program. The two most recent inspection reports from 2010 and 2012 determined that HQU met the minimum state licensing requirements but failed to meet federal requirements for precision and visual approaches. Specifically, runway 10 failed to meet FAA Part 77 reporting requirements for a 50:1 obstruction-free, precision instrument approach to 200 ft from the runway end. Similarly, runway 28 failed to meet the FAA Part 77 reporting requirements for a 34:1 obstruction-free, nonprecision instrument approach to 200 ft from the runway end. The obstructions listed for both approaches were trees, left and right of centerline. The 2012 inspection report for the runway 28 approach included an obstruction characterized as a power line, 66 ft high, and 2,200 ft from the displaced threshold, extending from the centerline to 400 ft right of centerline, which provided a 27:1 approach to 200 ft from the runway end and a 33:1 approach to the displaced threshold.

The Thomson city administrator stated that before 2012, no GDOT inspection report had identified the power line east of the airport as a potential obstruction. To determine whether the power line was an obstruction and to provide data in support of an official airport layout plan, the city administrator authorized a formal survey of the airport. The survey had not been completed at the time of the accident or at the time of this report.

Airport Obstructions

During the accident sequence, the airplane struck a concrete electrical utility pole (Pole 48) that was about 1,835 ft east of the runway 28 threshold and 50 ft left of the extended runway centerline. Pole 48 was 72 ft high, and the airplane struck the pole about 58 ft agl. The pole was not equipped with lights, but orange visibility balls were on the adjacent wires.

The pole was owned and maintained by Georgia Power, a regional utility that supplied electric power to local businesses and residents. Pole 48 was erected in 1989, along with similar poles and electrical utility lines, to provide electrical power to the Milliken and Company textile plant adjacent to HQU. Thomson McDuffie County entered into an "aviation easement" agreement with Deering Milliken, the owner of the Milliken Kingsley textile factory adjacent to HQU, in September 1973. The provisions of the easement were designed to protect the approach surface east of the airport. The text of the easement stated that Deering Milliken "…will not hereafter erect or permit the erection or growth of any structure, trees, or other object within or upon said parcel, which lies within the approach area of the 9-27 [now 10-28] runway to a height above the approach surface. Said approach surface being an inclined plane with a slope of 34:1, i.e. one ft of elevation for each 34 ft of horizontal distance, located directly over the center of said parcel." Milliken and Company entered into easement agreements with Georgia Power in May 1977 and again in August 1989 to grant the right to construct, erect, install, operate, and maintain "poles, wires, transformers, service pedestals, and other necessary apparatus" to supply electrical power to the Milliken Kingsley textile plant.

Title 14 CFR Part 77 establishes standards for approach surfaces to runways of various types and requires notice to the FAA of any proposed construction or alteration of existing structures that may affect the national airspace system. FAA Advisory Circular 70-7460-1K, "Obstruction Marking and Lighting," provides guidance on compliance with 14 CFR Part 77 and procedures for notifying the FAA of proposed construction or alteration. Specifically, a Notice of Proposed Construction or Alteration Form (FAA Form 7460-1) is required for notification. Upon receipt of Form 7460-1, the FAA will conduct an aeronautical study to determine the effects of the construction or alteration on navigable airspace. Then, the FAA will determine if the construction or alteration constitutes a hazard to air navigation.

Georgia Power did not notify the FAA before constructing the utility poles in 1989; therefore, the FAA had no knowledge of the poles as potential obstructions. Accordingly, there were no depictions or mention of possible obstructions on associated aeronautical charts.

After the accident, Georgia Power submitted FAA Forms 7460-1 for four utility poles east of the airport, including Pole 48. The FAA conducted aeronautical studies on the poles and, on May 31, 2013, issued initial findings from the studies. Regarding Pole 48, the FAA determined in its initial findings that "…the structure as described exceeds obstruction standards and/or would have an adverse physical or electromagnetic interference effect upon navigable airspace or air navigation facilities. Pending resolution of the issues described below, the structure is presumed to be a hazard to air navigation." The study also stated that if the pole were lowered to a height of 46 ft or less it would not exceed obstruction standards, and a favorable determination could subsequently be issued. The FAA reported similar findings on the other three structures. The FAA stated in its findings that to pursue a favorable determination at the originally submitted height, further study would be necessary, and a formal request would be required within 60 days.

After the FAA issued the preliminary obstruction determinations, Georgia Power requested that the FAA conduct further study on the four obstructions to determine if a favorable determination could be achieved. On August 12, 2013, the FAA published public notices announcing the four aeronautical studies and invited interested parties to submit relevant comments before September 18, 2013. According to an FAA official, the final determinations for the four obstructions were not completed at the time of this report. Since the aeronautical studies were conducted, the FAA Flight Data Center issued several notices to airmen to alert pilots about obstructions and also to amend the approach and departure procedures at HQU accordingly. In addition, the FAA increased the glideslope angle for the runway 28 PAPI from 3.00 to 3.50 degrees.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild FA2100-1010 CVR. The CVR recording contained the last 30 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR sustained significant heat and structural damage as a result of the accident. Despite the damage to the unit, three channels of recorded audio were available, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1935:13 as the flight was at FL240, and the recording stopped about 2006 during the crash sequence. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane struck Pole 48, and sections of the pole and attached power lines were found along the wreckage debris path, which was oriented from west to east on an approximate magnetic heading of 085 degrees. The left wing was completely severed about 13 ft inboard from the wing tip and exhibited no fire damage. The severed wing was located about 320 ft east of Pole 48.

Various fragments of the airplane structure were found along the debris path leading to the main wreckage site, which was located about 925 ft east of Pole 48. Multiple trees, up to 2 ft in diameter, were severed or toppled in the main wreckage impact zone. The main wreckage consisted of the center wing section, a portion of the right wing, the main landing gear, the baggage compartment, the emergency locator transmitter rack, and the empennage. The main wreckage was damaged by a postcrash fire and contained melted aluminum and burnt composite material. The forward fuselage was about 60 ft east of the main wreckage and was damaged by a postcrash fire.

The right engine was separated from the fuselage and was on the south side of the debris path between the main wreckage and the forward fuselage shell. The left engine was severed into two main sections with the compressor and the turbine and exhaust section located in a shallow pond on the north side of the debris path. A large portion of the ground in the vicinity of the accident site was charred and burned by a postcrash fire.

All three landing gear assemblies were located on scene. The left and right main landing gear actuators separated from the landing gear but remained attached to the wing structure. Measurements of the actuator positions, as found, corresponded to the "gear extended" or "down" position.

An examination of the nose landing gear actuator piston revealed that its extension was at an intermediate position. The nose landing gear had an external downlock mechanism to secure the gear in the down-and-locked position. The mating side of the external downlock mechanism was not observed and therefore precluded determination of the position of the nose landing gear. Fire and impact damage to the antiskid system components (antiskid control unit, power brake/antiskid control valve, and wheel speed transducers) prevented their functional testing.

The wreckage was transported to a storage facility where additional examinations of the wreckage were performed. The landing gear switch, which was cockpit-mounted, was found with the instrument subpanel attached to electrical wire. The switch exhibited heat and thermal damage consistent with a postcrash fire. The metal part of the switch handle was found in the down (extended) detent, and the J-hook was engaged on the handle. The lift dump switch assembly, which was mounted on the cockpit center console, was not located.

The electrically controlled and operated wing flap system was examined. The four flap positions available to the pilot were UP (0 degrees), 10, 20, and DN (30 degrees/full down). While the flap handle was found in the 10-degree detent, measurements of the flap actuator positions revealed that the flaps were at approximately the 15-degree position (a nonselectable, in-transit position) at the time of impact.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Both the pilot and copilot sustained serious injuries. Drug and alcohol testing on the pilot and copilot was conducted by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute after the accident. Toxicology results were negative for both pilots on a wide range of drugs, including major drugs of abuse.

The Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Science listed the cause of death for all passengers as blunt force injuries.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The pilot's seat was found with the seatback and seat pan cushions attached to the frame, which was severely damaged with broken tubes in the seatback and seat bottom. The upper shoulder area of the seat was crushed forward and to the right. The seat, which was located near the remains of the cockpit, appeared to be forcefully detached from the cockpit floor track rails with small floor track pieces attached to the seat post. First responders removed the pilot from his 4-point restraint by cutting the belt webbing.

The copilot's seat was found attached to the floor structure in the remains of the cockpit. The seatback, seat pan cushions, and the 4-point restraint were consumed by the postcrash fire. The seat frame was severely damaged with broken tubes in the seatback and seat bottom. First responders found the copilot out of his seat and walking along an access road near the main wreckage area.

All six passenger seats were found scattered among the wreckage and were detached from the airplane floor structure. The seat backs and bottoms of all seats exhibited severe damage, including breakage of the structural tubing framework. The restraint systems on the passenger seats were attached to their respective seat frames, and all six buckles were unlatched. The belt webbing was intact on three of the seats, and the remaining three passenger seat restraints were consumed by fire. One of the six shoulder harnesses was found attached to the lap portion of the female buckle. The other five shoulder harnesses were found retracted in the seatback frame. None of the six passenger seat belt buckles or associated fittings were damaged.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell Mark V EGPWS. The nonvolatile memory (NVM) was downloaded, and, by design, the EGPWS recorded airplane performance data based on a parameter exceedance, which was, in this event, an excessive bank angle, most likely the result of the separation of the left wing after impact with Pole 48. The unit captured the data during the 20 seconds before the exceedance. The unit was designed to record for 10 seconds after the exceedance; however, only 2 seconds were recorded because electrical power to the unit ceased during the crash sequence.

The data indicated that during the go-around attempt, the airplane lifted off near the departure end of runway 10 (consistent with the copilot's statement). Per the EGPWS data, the landing gear remained in the down position until impact. The calibrated airspeed was about 125 knots when the airplane lifted off. The airplane continued straight ahead and slowly accelerated and gradually climbed, until a rapid pitch up was recorded, from 10.5 to 27.4 degrees within 1 second. One second later, the roll increased from 2.1 degrees left to 71.7 degrees left.

Engines

During postaccident examination, the No. 1 (left) engine exhibited extensive impact deformation and was split at the interstage case flange, aft of the axial low pressure compressor (LPC). The fan blades exhibited tip bending opposite the direction of rotation, and the low pressure turbine (LPT) shaft was twisted consistent with a sudden stoppage due to impact.

The No. 2 (right) engine was intact; however, some components, including the LPC, high pressure compressor, high pressure turbine, and LPT all exhibited blade tip rubs with corresponding case rubs. The accessory gearbox tower shaft was sheared, and damage consistent with impact was noted to the fuel pump, oil lube, and scavenge pump.

Wing Spoiler System Actuators

Examination and disassembly of the lift dump actuators revealed that one unit was 0.457 inch from full extension (panel extended), and the other unit was 0.221 inch from full extension. A determination of left or right could not be made due to fire and impact damage.

Examination and disassembly of the left blow-down actuator revealed that the unit was seized at the fully extended position. Damage to the clevis at the end of the actuator was consistent with the roll/speedbrake/spoiler panel in the fully extended position at impact. The right blow-down actuator had minimal damage and was fully functional when tested. Its position at impact could not be determined.

Examination and disassembly of the left roll control actuator revealed that the unit was 0.022 inch from the fully extended position. The right roll control actuator had minimal damage and was found to be fully functional when tested. Its position at impact was 0.201 inch from the fully extended position.

Spoiler Control Unit

The spoiler control unit (SCU) interfaced with the hydraulics and controlled hydraulic actuation of the six spoiler panels across the wings. The SCU was responsible for providing surface position commands and monitoring hydraulic components for malfunction detection and protection.

Exterior examination of the SCU revealed major fire and impact damage to the unit's housing. The bit and diagnostic card was also fire damaged. The data on the NVM chip were downloaded but were inconclusive; therefore, a determination of the actuation of the spoilers before and during the accident could not be made based on SCU data.

Flight Management Computer (FMC-3000)

The airplane was equipped with a Rockwell Collins FMC-3000 flight management computer. The unit was tested and operated normally on a test bench. NVM analysis indicated that no internal faults occurred on the FMC-3000 near the time of accident.

Air Data Computers (ADC-3000)

The airplane was equipped with two Rockwell Collins ADC-3000 air data computers (ADC). Examination revealed that the mounts on both ADCs were damaged from impact, indicative of forces during impact in excess of 20g. Both units operated normally on a test bench. The first unit showed a final power cycle with weight coming off wheels at 4 minutes after power on and weight on wheels again at 44 minutes after power on. Following the weight on wheels, within the 44th minute after power on, 3 faults were indicated in the NVM. In order, they were for a faulty Ps (static pressure) counter, a faulty Qc (impact pressure) counter, and an unexpected interruption. According to Rockwell Collins, these faults were most likely due to extreme acceleration causing electrical connections between the circuit cards within the ADC to fail. The second unit showed a final power cycle with weight coming off wheels at 4 minutes after power on and a return to weight on wheels at 44 minutes after power on. No faults were observed in the NVM.

Airplane Performance Study

The NTSB produced an airplane performance study of the landing and go-around phases of the accident flight largely based on information from the CVR and the EGPWS, as well as the physical evidence documented at the accident site. To attain the unfactored landing distance performance numbers contained in the AFM, the following conditions had to be met: thrust as required to maintain a 3-degree approach angle, retarding thrust to idle at 50 ft agl; approach speed at VREF; flaps down; antiskid normal; maximum braking; and lift dump extended after touchdown.

Beechcraft calculated stopping performance for several scenarios related to the accident flight. Beechcraft indicated that with the estimated stopping distance for the accident airplane with no antiskid system operative and the lowest braking action recorded during the flight test, the airplane would require about 1,560 ft to stop from the first speed recorded by the EGPWS (83 kts). This estimate decreases to 1,350 ft when moderate braking is applied. Based on EGPWS data, after touching down, the pilot did not stop the airplane within the first 2,900 ft beyond the runway 10 threshold and initiated a go-around with more than 2,400 ft of hard surface remaining; the first speed was recorded at this point. (The actual touchdown point was not recorded and could not be determined.) The wreckage examination, as well as drag estimates based on recovered EGPWS data, indicated that the lift dump remained extended during the go-around attempt. The airplane drag associated with the lift dump, flaps, and landing gear extended resulted in only marginal climb performance.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

According to its website, Vein Guys® was a group of four physicians that operated several vein care centers in the southeastern United States, with offices in Augusta, Georgia; Atlanta, Georgia; Nashville, Tennessee; and Raleigh, North Carolina. According to interviews, the Pavilion Group was a subsidiary established by the owners of Vein Guys® to handle all business activities associated with the ownership and operation of its private airplane, which it used to shuttle physicians and staff between their offices in Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina and also for private flights to vacation destinations.

Before owning the accident airplane, the Pavilion Group owned a King Air 300 (N401BL) and used the pilot services of Executive Shuttle (owned by the accident pilot). The Pavilion Group sold the King Air and, in June 2012, purchased the accident airplane and continued to use the pilot services of Executive Shuttle. The Pavilion Group's airplanes were operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. According to the accident pilot, the Pavilion Group paid for the pilot's initial and recurrent Premier IA ground and simulator training at FlightSafety. Although Executive Shuttle operated as Sky's the Limit, a 14 CFR Part 135 certificate holder, the pilot stated in interviews that there was no signed contract between Executive Shuttle and the Pavilion Group (or Vein Guys®) for pilot services on the Pavilion Group's airplane, and all Premier IA flights Executive Shuttle operated for the Pavilion Group were conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Takeoff Warning System

The airplane was equipped with a takeoff configuration warning system that provided an automatic aural warning to the flight crew during the initial portion of takeoff if the airplane was in a configuration that would not allow for a safe takeoff. The aural warning would continue until the airplane's configuration was changed to allow for safe takeoff, until action was taken by the pilot to abandon the takeoff roll, or until weight was off of the wheels. If either lift dump surface was not retracted, the speed brake/lift dump lever sensors were in the extended range, either flap position was greater than 22 degrees, or the pitch trim was outside of a predetermined range for takeoff, the aural warning would activate in the cockpit.

Antiskid System Failure and Pilot's Corrective Action

Pilots receiving training at FlightSafety on the Premier IA were taught to use the FAA approved Abbreviated Pilot Checklist to handle system malfunctions. A failure of the antiskid system was included in the Abnormal Procedures section of the checklist. According to the checklist, the pilot should move the antiskid switch to OFF and plan for a flaps 10 or flaps up landing. The antiskid failure procedure also provided a note stating that landing distance would increase about 130 percent with flaps up and 89 percent with flaps 10.

According to the Antiskid Failure Checklist (which is within the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist), the pilot was required to account for the loss of the antiskid system by applying a performance penalty to the normal landing distance, depending on the flap setting selected (flaps 10 or flaps up). Using weather conditions that prevailed at HQU at the time of the accident, the required landing distance with flaps up was 7,066 ft, and the required landing distance with flaps 10 was 5,806 ft. HQU runway 10's available runway length for landing was 5,208 ft, which did not meet the flaps up or flaps 10 performance penalty requirements, and a diversion to a longer runway would have been required. The Premier IA AFM Antiskid Fail procedure included a note that stated, "Use of flaps 20 or DN (30) for landing, with anti-skid failed, is prohibited."

The simulator instructor who provided the pilot's initial training stated in a postaccident interview that he would expect the pilot to use the written checklist for a systems failure, determine the proper flap setting for landing, and then apply the performance penalty for the landing, adding that the Antiskid Failure Checklist emphasized that the landing must be made with only flaps 10 or UP. According to the pilot's FlightSafety training records, he received antiskid system failure training during his recurrent simulator training on January 4, 2013.

On June 17, 2013, both pilots listened to the CVR recording for the accident flight, and according to subsequent interviews, neither pilot recalled seeing the ANTI SKID FAIL annunciator light illuminated on the approach. According to interviews with both pilots and a review of the CVR recording, the ANTI SKID FAIL abnormal checklist as outlined in the Abbreviated Pilot Checklist for the Premier IA was not conducted by the accident crew before landing at HQU. Further, the pilot stated that he did not think they needed the antiskid system on the landing at HQU and said the performance penalty would only apply if you were "trying to make your numbers" in the book made by the test pilots by applying maximum braking.

Balked Landing/Go-Around

According to recorded data and witness statements, the flight crew attempted a go-around after landing at HQU. The pilot did not recall the event during interviews, while the copilot stated that they conducted a go-around after the airplane touched down. Procedures for the Premier IA (AFM and Pilot Checklist) referred to the discontinuation of a landing approach as a "balked landing."

According to the FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083, page G-2), a balked landing was synonymous with a go-around. Per the FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary, a go around was a situation when a pilot abandons his/her approach to land. The Airplane Flying Handbook (chapter 8), "Approaches and Landings," states the following: "The go around is not strictly an emergency procedure. It is a normal maneuver that may at times be used in an emergency situation.…Although the need to discontinue a landing may arise at any point in the landing process, the most critical go-around will be one started when very close to the ground. Therefore, the earlier a condition that warrants a go-around is recognized, the safer the go around/rejected landing will be."

According to the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual (page PCG T-4), a touchdown was the point at which an aircraft first made contact with the landing surfaces. The Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A, page 8-7) explained that the landing process was not over until the airplane decelerated to a normal taxi speed or came to a complete stop. The FAA indicated in its May 14, 2013, response to NTSB Information Request 13-267 that a pilot may execute a balked landing/go-around if he/she determined that, after first contact with the landing surface, positive control had not been maintained or if continuing the landing process may expose the aircraft to unsafe conditions such as an unexpected appearance of hazards on the runway.

FlightSafety Premier IA instructors and evaluators in Wichita, Kansas, and Wilmington, Delaware, stated during postaccident interviews that a balked landing was an airborne maneuver typically taught to be performed at an altitude of 50 ft on the approach, and Premier pilots were not taught to execute a balked landing in the Premier IA following touchdown on the runway. The FlightSafety instructors and evaluators also stated that they discouraged students from executing a balked landing after touchdown. Beechcraft Premier IA manuals and FlightSafety training guidance for the Premier IA do not contain language prohibiting a balked landing procedure after touchdown.

The pilot told investigators that he did not recall if anyone at FlightSafety told him not to conduct a go-around or balked landing after touching down during his training. The pilot also stated that the only balked landings he conducted in training were while airborne. When asked by investigators if he recalled anyone at FlightSafety telling him not to conduct a go-around or balked landing after touching down, the pilot said "no." The pilot further stated that a balked landing was something that occurred in the air, and on the ground it was called a "touch and go." The pilot did not remember ever doing a touch and-go in the simulator and had never done one in a Premier.

On March 29, 2011, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-11-18, asking the FAA to "require manufacturers of newly certificated and in-service turbine-powered aircraft to incorporate in their Aircraft Flight Manuals a committed-to-stop point in the landing sequence (for example, in the case of the Hawker Beechcraft 125-800A airplane, once lift dump is deployed) beyond which a go-around should not be attempted." On June 10, 2013, the FAA indicated that it was impractical to fully implement the recommendation but that it would address the NTSB's concerns by issuing an Information for Operators (InFO). Pending the issuance of the InFO and the NTSB's review of an acceptable plan of action to ensure that all operators incorporate the guidance, the NTSB classified Safety Recommendation A-11-18 "Open—Acceptable Alternate Response."


ATLANTA — Lawsuits stemming from a fatal plane crash in Thomson spurred a House subcommittee Monday to approve legislation giving cities the same protection from lawsuits as counties.

The panel also OK’d a bill to exempt payroll documents of government contractors from the state’s open records law.

The February 2013 crash of a Beechcraft airplane at the Thomson-McDuffie Regional Airport while returning from a routine flight from Nashville took the lives of five staffers of The Vein Guys medical clinic. Their families are suing as is one of the two pilots who survived the crash. Those seven suits against the city and county are still pending and might not come to trial for years.

Thomson Mayor Ken Usry said that if any settlements or jury awards exceed the $5 million insurance coverage the city has, the results could be financially devastating for him and the city. That’s because a 20-year-old law grants the county immunity but not the city.

“The county can walk, and the balance of the lawsuit will fall on me and the city,” he said. “It can bankrupt me.”

State Rep. Barry Fleming, who sponsored House Bill 1010, led the subcommittee considering it and serves as the city attorney for several small cities. He said he wanted to make things equal for the two types of local governments. Otherwise, the Harlem Republican said, cities will be unwilling to enter into joint projects with counties if they aren’t facing equal liability.

Usry can’t benefit from HB 1010, but he said failure to pass it would indeed stop him from cooperating with the county.

“This has gotten my attention,” he said. “If I’m going to go into ventures with the county, I need a balanced playing field.”

Attorneys who represent clients suing governments told the panel that the best way to make things equal would be to remove the protections that counties enjoy.

“Public policy ought to be able to hold our cities and counties accountable for the harm they do,” said Jason Rooks, a lobbyist for the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association.

The subcommittee sent the bill to the full House Judiciary Committee, along with House Bill 796, to make confidential the personnel records of government contractors.

Normally, private companies doing business with the government would not be subject to the state’s Sunshine Law, but when federal funding is involved, the Truman-era labor-protection Davis-Bacon Act requires contractors to submit payroll documents to prove they are paying workers the prevailing wage for the area.

HB 796 would shield those workers from identity theft, said its sponsor, Rep. John Carson, R-Marietta. Plus, it will prevent competitors from poaching.

“If a competitor finds out what I’m paying my guy, he can pay him more and steal my guy,” said Mark Woodall, a lobbyist for Associated General Contractors.

A Trial Lawyers Association lobbyist objected to HB 796 as hindering the public from knowing exactly who is doing the work on government contracts, but the committee unanimously approved the bill.



Story, photo and comments/reaction:  http://chronicle.augusta.com


http://registry.faa.gov/N777VG

NTSB Identification: ERA13MA139
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 20, 2013 in Thomson, GA
Aircraft: BEECH 390, registration: N777VG
Injuries: 5 Fatal,2 Serious.


This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On February 20, 2013, at 2006 eastern standard time, a Beechcraft 390 Premier 1A, N777VG, was destroyed following a collision with a utility pole, trees, and terrain following a go-around at Thomson-McDuffie Regional Airport (HQU), Thomson, Georgia. The airline transport-rated pilot and co-pilot were seriously injured, and five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to the Pavilion Group LLC and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight originated at John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee, about 1828 central standard time (1928 eastern standard time).

The purpose of the flight was to transport staff members of a vascular surgery practice from Nashville to Thomson, where the airplane was based. According to initial air traffic control information, the pilot checked in with Augusta approach control and reported HQU in sight. About 2003, the pilot cancelled visual flight rules flight-following services and continued toward HQU. The last recorded radar return was observed about 2005, when the airplane was at an indicated altitude of 700 feet above mean sea level and 1/2 mile from the airport. There were no distress calls received from the crew prior to the accident.

Witnesses reported that the airplane appeared to be in position to land when the pilot discontinued the approach and commenced a go-around. The witnesses observed the airplane continue down the runway at a low altitude.

The airplane struck a poured-concrete utility pole and braided wires about 59 feet above ground level. The pole was located about 1/4 mile east the departure end of runway 10. The utility pole was not lighted. During the initial impact with the utility pole, the outboard section of the left wing was severed. The airplane continued another 1/4 mile east before colliding with trees and terrain. A postcrash fire ensued and consumed a majority of the airframe. The engines separated from the fuselage during the impact sequence. On-scene examination of the wreckage revealed that all primary airframe structural components were accounted for at the accident site. The landing gear were found in the down (extended) position, and the flap handle was found in the 10-degree (go-around) position.

An initial inspection of the airport revealed that the pilot-controlled runway lights were operational. An examination of conditions recorded on an airport security camera showed that the runway lights were on the low intensity setting at the time of the accident. The airport did not have a control tower. An inspection of the runway surface did not reveal any unusual tire marks or debris.
Weather conditions at HQU near the time of the accident included calm wind and clear skies.


 Roth



 Davidson



 McCorkle




 Porter



 Volpitto