Friday, October 10, 2014

Marsh S-2F3AT Turbo Tracker, California Dept of Forestry and Fire Protection, N449DF: Fatal accident occurred October 08, 2014 in El Portal, California

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: WPR15GA005
14 CFR Public Aircraft
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 07, 2014 in El Portal, CA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/31/2017
Aircraft: MARSH AVIATION S 2F3AT, registration: N449DF
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

: NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this public aircraft accident report.

The airline transport pilot was conducting a visual flight rules, public firefighting retardant drop flight on an active fire. The airplane, call sign "Tanker 81," was supported by two other aircraft: an orbiting Air Tactical aircraft (ATGS) that coordinated the aerial operations with ground units and an Aerial Supervision Module (ASM) that flew ahead of the tanker to define the route and the drop initiation point. After successfully conducting one drop, Tanker 81 was reloaded with fire retardant, and it then returned to the fire area. The accident pilot coordinated his next drop with the ATGS and then followed the ASM to the drop.

According to the ASM pilot, he flew the proposed drop route and initiated smoke to show the Tanker 81 pilot the desired drop location. The route included a slight left turn to final and a right turn on exit over descending terrain. The ASM had descended to 4,000 ft msl during the run, and described a predominate tree off to the right of the flightpath as a hazard, and instructed the accident pilot to stay to the left of it. The ASM pilot also described "very clear, smooth air over the drop area." He asked the Tanker 81 pilot if he had seen the smoke and if the route looked OK to him? The Tanker 81 pilot responded that "it looked OK." The ASM then climbed to 5,100 ft msl to lead the drop run. The ASM joined the pattern on the downwind and then told the Tanker 81 pilot that he could descend to 5,100 ft msl. He continued to describe the drop and flightpath to the tanker pilot and told him that there was some thin top smoke on final but that he could see through it and that they would break out of the smoke before reaching the drop area. He added that the last response he received from the tanker pilot was when he said, "OK." 

Witnesses reported seeing the accident, and one of them provided a video that was taken from a vantage point along a mountain trail that was above Tanker 81's flightpath. The video revealed that while on approach, Tanker 81 struck trees with its left wing. Following the impact with the trees, the airplane entered a descending left roll, and it then impacted on the top of an approximate 800-ft-tall rock cliff. A fire erupted during the impact, the airplane fragmented, and the main wreckage was projected over the cliff and scattered over a wide river valley below the cliff face. 

An examination of the wreckage site confirmed that the airplane's left wing had struck trees, and the outboard section of the left wing had separated from the airplane. Examination of the two engines revealed impact signatures consistent with their producing power at the time of impact. The pilot was in radio communications with either the fire base, the ATGS, or the ASM throughout the accident flight, and he did not report any concerns about the flight or mechanical issues.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from trees while maneuvering at a low altitude.


 Geoffrey Craig Hunt 



Additional Participating Entity: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Fresno, California

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N449DF

NTSB Identification: WPR15GA005
14 CFR Public Aircraft
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 07, 2014 in El Portal, CA
Aircraft: MARSH AVIATION S 2F3AT, registration: N449DF
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this public aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 7, 2014, about 1623 Pacific daylight time, a Marsh Aviation S-2F3AT airplane, N449DF, call sign "Tanker 81," impacted terrain while maneuvering in Yosemite National Park near El Portal, California. The airline transport pilot sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to the United States Department of Agriculture and operated by CAL FIRE. On this fire, it was under the operational control of US National Park Service (NPS), as a public firefighting flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site about the time of the accident. The airplane had departed Columbia Airport (O22), Columbia, California, at 1608. 

According to a CAL FIRE representative, Tanker 81 was stationed at the Hollister, California, air base and had been dispatched to the Dog Rock fire in Yosemite National Park. The airplane successfully made one fire retardant drop and then proceeded to O22 to reload. Tanker 81 was supported by two other aircraft: an orbiting Air Tactical aircraft (ATGS) that coordinated the aerial operations with ground units and an Aerial Supervision Module (ASM) that flew ahead of the tanker to define the route and the drop initiation point. 

Upon returning to the fire area, the accident pilot coordinated his next drop with the orbiting ATGS aircraft and then followed the ASM airplane. According to the ASM pilot, the ASM flew the proposed drop route and initiated smoke to show the Tanker 81 pilot the desired drop location. The route included a slight left turn to final and a right turn to exit over descending terrain. The ASM descended to 4,000 ft msl during the run, and described a predominate tree off to the right of the flightpath as a hazard, and instructed the accident pilot to stay to the left of it. The ASM pilot also described "very clear, smooth air over the drop area." The ASM pilot asked the Tanker 81 pilot if he had seen the smoke and if the route looked OK to him? The Tanker 81 pilot responded that "it looked OK." The ASM then climbed to 5,100 ft msl to lead the drop run. The ASM pilot joined the pattern on the downwind and then told the Tanker 81 pilot that he could descend to 5,100 ft msl. He continued to describe the drop and flightpath to the tanker pilot and told him that there was some thin top smoke on final but that he could see through it and that they would break out of the smoke before reaching the drop area. He added that the last response he received from the pilot was when he said, "OK," on the downwind and that this was not unusual. 

The crew of the ATGS airplane reported that, while Tanker 81 was on final approach for the drop, it appeared to strike trees with its left wing. Both aircrews reported that there was smoke in the area but that visibility along the approach to the drop was good.

Witnesses reported seeing the accident, and one of them provided a video that was taken from a vantage point along a mountain trail that was above Tanker 81's flightpath. The video revealed that, while on approach to the drop site, Tanker 81 struck trees with its left wing. Following the impact with the trees, the airplane entered a descending left roll, and it then impacted on the top of an approximate 800-ft-tall rock cliff. A fire erupted during the impact, the airplane fragmented, and the main wreckage was projected over the cliff and scattered over a wide river valley area below the cliff face. 

Tanker 81 was equipped with telemetry, which showed the airplane on a course heading of 253º at 4,810 ft msl and 148 knots at 1623. The flight telemetry log is included in the public docket for this report.



In this file photo, Yosemite National Park Rangers transfer the body of  Cal Fire pilot, Geoffrey "Craig" Hunt, who was killed in an airplane crash in Yosemite National Park, California.


PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held an airline transport certificate with airplane multiengine land, airplane single-engine land, and instrument ratings. The pilot was issued a Federal Aviation Administration second-class medical certificate on February 12, 2014, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses. The pilot's flight records showed that he had 6,567 total flight hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was originally a Grumman S-2 manufactured in 1966, but it was remanufactured as a Marsh Aviation S-2F3AT in 2004. It was equipped with two Honeywell (Allied Signal) TPE331-14GR turbine engines. Total airframe time since new was 5,819.5 hours as of October 2, 2014. The airplane was operated in the restricted category and maintained under annual and 100-hour inspections. The latest 100-hour inspection was completed on August 23, 2014. A review of maintenance logs showed no evidence of any airplane mechanical/maintenance anomalies. 

COMMUNICATIONS

The pilot of Tanker 81 was in radio communication with either the fire base, the ATGS, or ASM throughout the accident flight. The pilot did not express any concerns about the flight or report any mechanical issues.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1600, the closest official weather reporting station, about 7 miles northwest of the accident site, reported sky condition clear, temperature 75°F, dew point 32ºF, altimeter setting 29.90 inches of mercury, wind from 225º at 10 to 15 knots, and visibility greater than 10 miles.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane impacted trees and terrain on a steep, heavily vegetated area within the active fire zone. All the wreckage sustained impact and fire damage. The top of a tree had been severed and lay on the ground, and the outboard section of the left wing was found separated from the airplane. The inboard end of the separated wing section leading edge showed impact marks perpendicular to the wingspan. The inboard end of the wing section was torn chordwise from leading edge to trailing edge. Along the chordwise tear, the sheet-metal tears were jagged, and the internal structure was pulled apart. The tear was outboard of the locking mechanism that locked the folding wing in place. The aileron and flap were in place. 

The main fuselage, right wing, and both engines and their associated propellers were found in the river valley area below the cliff face. The wing-fold locking mechanism for the left wing's outboard section and the locking mechanism's locking devices, which were found in the "locked" position, were also located in the valley. The left-wing outboard section had separated outboard of the locking mechanism. 

Examination of both engines revealed impact signatures consistent with their producing power at the time of impact. All the propeller blades exhibited S-bending and torsional twisting. Portions of the blades were fragmented and exhibited leading edge gouging and chordwise scratching. 

Following the onsite examination, the wreckage was recovered to a secure facility and reexamined. No anomalies were noted with the airplane or engines.

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

A review of the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide (ASG), document PMS 505, NFES 002544, dated January 2014, Chapter 9, Tactical Aircraft Operations, outlines operational procedures for air tanker aircraft. Section 1, Low Level Operations, part b, item i defines a "show me" profile as a low-level pass made over the target using the physical location of the aircraft to demonstrate the line and start point of the retardant drop. The Show-Me Profile is normally used for the first airtanker on a specific run or when an incoming airtanker has not had the opportunity to observe the previous drop. A Show-Me can be used alone or before other profiles. The pilot [of the lead plane] begins the run when the airtanker crew can visually identify the aircraft, hazards, line, start and exit point of the drop. 

An NTSB Operations Group was formed, and the Operations Group Chairman's report is available in the public docket for this report. 

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Mariposa County, Coroner, Modesto, California conducted an autopsy on the pilot. The pilot's cause of death was attributed to "multiple blunt force injuries." 

The FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted toxicological testing on specimens from the pilot. No toxicological anomalies were found.





LOS ANGELES (AP) — The 2014 fatal crash of an air tanker fighting a forest fire in Yosemite National Park came just after the pilot was warned to avoid a tree to the right but then struck trees to the left, according to a National Transportation Safety Board report.

Soon after the plane went down investigators came to believe its left wing probably struck a tree. The report released Wednesday provides new details on what led up to the crash, which killed pilot Geoffrey "Craig" Hunt, 62, but does conclude what caused it.

The board is expected to determine the probable cause within about 45 days, said Janet Upton, spokeswoman for the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, which was operating the aircraft under control of the National Park Service when the crash occurred on Oct. 7, 2014.

The twin-engine S-2F3AT was working with a tactical aircraft over the fire and another airplane that flies ahead of retardant-laden air tankers to guide them to drop points. Both support planes reported good visibility.

According to the report, the guide plane flew a proposed route and released smoke to show Hunt where to drop retardant. The approach included a slight left turn and then a right turn to exit the area.

The guide pilot "described a predominate tree off to the right of the flightpath as a hazard, and instructed the accident pilot to stay to the left of it," the report said.

The guide pilot asked the Hunt if he had seen the smoke and if the route looked OK, and he agreed, the report said.

The guide pilot then began leading the tanker on the actual retardant run, describing the drop and flightpath and saying there would be a thin layer of wildfire smoke but he would see through it and break clear of it before reaching the drop, the report said.

Hunt said "OK" in his last communication with the guide plane.

The crew of the tactical aircraft overhead reported the tanker appeared to strike trees with its left wing while on final approach for the drop. The tanker crashed into the top of 800-foot-tall rock cliff and wreckage fragmented into a river valley below.

Examination of wreckage showed the outer end of the tanker's left wing had been sheared off and a severed treetop was lying on the ground. Both engines were still producing power at the time of impact, evidence showed.

The report said Hunt was in radio communication with his base and the other two aircraft throughout the mission and did not express any concerns about the flight or report any mechanical problems. His cause of death was determined to be multiple blunt-force injuries and there were no toxicological anomalies.

The tanker was originally built as a Navy anti-submarine warfare plane in 1966 and was remanufactured as a tanker in 2004.


Original article can be found here: http://www.whig.com


NTSB Identification: WPR15GA005
14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 07, 2014 in El Portal, CA
Aircraft: MARSH AVIATION S 2F3AT, registration: N449DF
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. : NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this public aircraft accident report.

On October 7, 2014, about 1630 Pacific daylight time, a Marsh Aviation S-2F3AT airplane, N449DF, call sign tanker 81, was destroyed by impact with terrain and a postcrash fire while maneuvering in the Yosemite National Park, near El Portal, California. The airplane was registered to and operated by Cal Fire under contract to the National Parks Service, as a visual flight rules (VFR), public use aerial firefighting tanker. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight that departed Columbia Airport (O22), Columbia, California.

According to a Forest Service spokesman, the airplane was stationed at the airbase at Hollister, California, and had been dispatched to the Dog Rock fire. The airplane arrived on scene, and made one drop on the fire, then proceeded to the Columbia Airport to be reloaded with fire retardant.

During the aerial firefighting operations, in addition to the aerial tanker, 2 other aircraft were used; an orbiting aerial controller that coordinated aerial operations with ground units; and a "lead plane" that tracked ahead of the tanker to define the route and the drop initiation point.

Upon returning to the fire scene, the accident airplane had coordinated its next drop with the orbiting aerial coordinator, and was following the lead airplane. The crew of the lead airplane did not see the accident. The crew of the controller airplane reported that the accident airplane may have struck a tree with its wing, which separated from the airplane. Both aircrews reported that there was smoke in the area, but visibility was good.

On October 9, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge and an additional NTSB investigator arrived on scene. Also on scene were representatives (investigators) of the U.S.D.A Office of Aviation Safety (OAS), National Parks Service (NPS), U.S Forest Service (USFS), and CAL FIRE.



The air tanker that went down while fighting a wildfire near Yosemite National Park this week, killing the pilot, did not appear to have mechanical issues, officials announced Friday.

The finding by National Transportation Safety Board investigators prompted state fire officials to lift an order that had grounded California's fleet of S-2T air tankers.

"We are comfortable to say that we don’t see anything that leads us to any mechanical issues," Josh Cawthra, an NTSB investigator, told reporters.

He added that his agency had concluded its on-scene investigation into the crash that killed veteran pilot Geoffrey "Craig" Hunt, but will have to wait until the Dog Rock fire is extinguished before the wreckage can be removed from the area.

The blaze has burned 245 acres at the edge of the park and is 10% contained, park officials said.

"It’s a very complex investigation. We essentially leave no stone unturned," Cawthra said.

The plane, an S-2T tanker that carries 1,200 gallons of fire retardant, crashed near El Portal inside Yosemite on Tuesday afternoon.

Hunt, a 13-year veteran, was alone in the plane and was making his second drop for the day when the crash occurred.

"This accident is extremely tragic," he said. "These pilots put their lives out there on the line."

Despite the delay in moving the plane, investigators can continue with other elements of the probe, including reviewing digital recordings associated with the flight. Investigators are expected to interview witnesses, examine radio communications, radar data and any video of the flight that may be out there, said NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway.

Because the plane was not a commercial airliner, it doesn’t have a black box, Holloway said, adding that nine of out 10 flight crashes the NTSB investigates don’t involve black boxes.

A preliminary report on the crash could be issued in the next five business days, officials said, with the final report taking as long as 18 months.

Meanwhile, Ken Pimlott, chief of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, said normal flight operations, as well as routine inspections, would be allowed to resume immediately.

Most pilots were eager to start flying again after the fleet was grounded right after the crash, but he said all had been urged to take whatever precautions they felt necessary before returning to the skies.

"We just want to make sure they are comfortable and they are ready," Pimlott said.


Story and Photo Gallery:  http://www.latimes.com

Cessna T310R, N654DE: Incident occurred October 09, 2014 at South Jersey Regional Airport (KVAY), Lumberton, New Jersey


Aircraft landed gear up.

https://www.schemedesigners.com

http://registry.faa.gov/N654DE


http://6abc.com

FAA Flight Standards District Office:  FAA Teterboro FSDO-25

Robinson R66, Robinson Helicopter Co., N646AG: Fatal accident occurred July 27, 2013 in Noxen, Pennsylvania

http://registry.faa.gov/N646AG

NTSB Identification: ERA13FA336
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, July 27, 2013 in Noxen, PA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 10/06/2014
Aircraft: ROBINSON R66, registration: N646AG
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The flight departed under visual flight rules (VFR) and then obtained VFR flight following before proceeding in a southeasterly direction. About 28 minutes after takeoff, while flying about 3,000 feet mean sea level over a sparsely populated and heavily wooded area with few ground reference lights, the flight likely encountered light rain. The pilot flew south of a wind turbine, initiated an approximate 180-degree left turn with 300 feet altitude loss, then began following a dirt road associated with the wind turbines. After completion of the turn he advised the controller, "...we're inadvertent IMC [instrument meteorological conditions], reversing..." and asked for a heading to the nearest airport. The controller asked the pilot if he wanted a vector to the nearest airport and also if the flight was in IMC, but there was no reply. The controller provided a heading for a vector to a nearby airport but the pilot did not respond. The flight continued in the same orientation following the course reversal, flying past another wind turbine before turning right; the controller again advised the pilot of the direction to the nearest airport. The pilot immediately responded that he was, "...having trouble maintaining control here." The controller informed the pilot that the nearest airport was heading 068 degrees and 8 miles away, and the recorded radar data indicates the pilot flew a north-northeasterly heading with changes in altitude noted. The comments from the pilot followed by the maneuvering (changes in altitude and heading) were consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Radio and radar contact were lost; the helicopter descended on an east-northeasterly heading into trees and terrain in a heavily wooded area away from any nearby wind turbines. 

Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed extensive impact damage, although there was no evidence of a preimpact failure with the flight controls, drive line, or structure. The engine was found to operate normally and data downloaded from the engine monitoring unit indicates no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. 

While there was no record of an official preflight weather briefing before departure, a text message from the non-instrument rated pilot to his brother approximately 1 hour before departure stating, "...Waiting out weather to fly back to [Ocean City, MD] tonight" indicates that to some extent he was aware of the weather. Had the pilot obtained an official preflight weather briefing for the intended VFR flight, the briefing specialist likely would have advised him against VFR flight due to IMC (ceiling less than 1,000 feet and visibility less than 3 miles) and mountain obscuration that were forecast to exist in the accident area.

Although the left seat occupant was a student pilot, it is unlikely the pilot-in-command was giving him instruction during the accident flight. While operation of a helicopter with decreased ceiling and visibility can be safely performed, the environmental conditions in the accident site area consisting of a sparsely populated heavily wooded area with few ground reference lights and no illumination from the moon were indicators that VFR flight should not have continued.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's decision to continue VFR flight into night instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of control.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT


On July 27, 2013, about 2220 eastern daylight time, a Robinson Helicopter Company R66 helicopter N646AG, operated by a private individual, collided with trees and terrain near Noxen, Pennsylvania. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Tri-Cities Airport (CZG), Endicott, New York, to Jake Arner Memorial Airport (22N), Lehighton, Pennsylvania. The helicopter was destroyed and the commercial-rated pilot and 4 passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated from CZG about 2151.

The flight departed VFR, and at 2153, the non-instrument rated pilot contacted Binghamton Approach Control and advised the controller that the flight had just departed CZG, and was requesting visual flight rules (VFR) flight following. The controller provided the altimeter setting (30.00 inches of Mercury) and asked the pilot the destination and requested altitude, to which he replied 22N, and 3,000 feet msl.

A discrete transponder code was assigned (4606), and the flight was radar identified 3 miles southwest of CZG. The flight proceeded in a southwesterly direction flying about 3,000 feet until about 2157, then turned to a south-southeasterly heading while flying between 2,600 and 3,000 feet msl. 

At 2204, air traffic control communications were transferred to Wilkes-Barre Approach Control; the pilot established contact with that facility advising the controller that the flight was level at 3,000 feet msl. The Wilkes-Barre Approach controller acknowledged the transmission, and issued an altimeter setting of 30.00 inches of Mercury. While in contact with that facility the flight proceeded in a southeasterly direction with altitude and slight heading changes until about 2219, at which time recorded radar reflects a left turn to a northwesterly direction. Correlation of the radar targets from recordings of the Wilkes-Barre airport surveillance radar with locations of wind turbines in the area revealed that between 2218:55, and 2219:00, the helicopter flew west of the B-26 wind turbine, and continued in a southeasterly direction, then when turning to a northwesterly direction about 2219:19, the pilot flew just south of the B-21 wind turbine. The radar targets depict the flight path above and adjacent to a road associated with the wind turbines while turning to a northwesterly direction; no determination could be made whether the pilot had visual contact with the road. At 2219:40, while just east of the B-16 wind turbine, the pilot advised the controller, "we're inadvertent IMC, reversing ah, can you give us a heading to the nearest airport, please."

The controller asked the pilot if he wanted a heading to the nearest airport and if the flight was in IFR conditions but the pilot did not respond to that transmission. The radar data reflects that the helicopter continued in a northwesterly direction until 2219:53. About 6 seconds later, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 068 degrees for vectors to an airport, to which he replied 5 seconds later "6 alpha golf having trouble maintaining control here." The helicopter at that time was located about 1,105 feet east-southeast of the previous radar target 10 seconds earlier, and had descended from 2,800 to 2,600 feet msl.

The radar data from Wilkes-Barre Approach reflects that between 2220:03 and 2220:17, the flight proceeded in a northeasterly heading with some altitude deviation noted. The controller then asked the pilot, "helicopter 6AG ah you having trouble maintaining altitude sir", to which the pilot immediately replied, "Affirmative 6AG." The radar data reflected that between 2220:17, and 2220:27, the helicopter descended from 2,600 to 2,300 feet, though the coordinates remained unchanged. Radio and radar contact were lost. The pilot of a nearby airline flight attempted to communicate with the pilot at 2221, but there was no reply.


The helicopter crashed on privately owned wooded land leased to an energy company; there were no known witnesses to the accident that occurred during a dark night.

A 406 MHz emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was received at the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (AFRCC) at 2224, and the Pennsylvania State Police and State Emergency Operations Center were notified. A search was initiated, but adverse weather (heavy fog) caused the search to be called off in the early morning hours. The search resumed several hours later when the weather conditions improved; the wreckage was located on July 28, 2013, about 1350.



PERSONNEL INFORMATION


The pilot seated in the right seat, age 30, held a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft helicopter rating issued January 19, 2012. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate with rotorcraft helicopter rating issued February 25, 2012. He was issued a first class medical certificate with no limitations on April 30, 2012. On the application for his last medical certificate he listed a total time of 350 hours.


His 2nd pilot logbook contained entries from the first dated February 12, 2013, to the last dated July 21, 2013. He carried forward a total flight time of 952 hours, 14.5 hours simulated instrument time, and 6.0 hours turbine powered rotorcraft helicopter, though the make and model helicopter was not specified. Including his carry forward time he logged a total time of approximately 1,328 hours, of which 1,274 hours were as pilot-in-command. He did not log any simulated or actual instrument flight time in the 2nd pilot logbook. Excluding the unlogged flights after July 21, 2013, he logged a total of approximately 92 hours night flight time, of which approximately 5 hours were in the previous 90 days, and 0.3 hour, or 18 minutes was logged in the previous 30 days. The last logged night flight occurred on July 16, 2013, and was flown in a Robinson R22.


Further review of his 2nd logbook revealed an entry dated July 19, 2013 indicating his attendance of a R66 helicopter pilot safety course at the manufacturer's facility. A total of approximately 1 hour was logged in the R66 helicopter.


Documents provided by Robinson Helicopter Company associated with the pilot/flight instructor safety course revealed that on the application dated June 28, 2013, he listed in part having accrued 1,306 hours total helicopter hours, and 6 hours in R66 helicopters. Ground training was conducted July 15 through July 18, 2013, and on July 19, 2013, an approximately 1.0 hour flight was conducted in an R66 helicopter. On the "Instructor/Pilot Evaluation" form for training conducted in the R66, the instructor indicated his proficiency was above average in "Knowledge" with a comment indicating, "Well studied on systems." He was marked average for the remainder of the maneuvers, and a comment in the General Comments section indicated, "Flew well – no problems noted. Taking delivery of R-66 today." In addition, he was approved to transition other pilot's in Robinson R66 helicopters.


Following completion of the pilot/flight instructor safety course at the manufacturer's facility, he and another pilot flew the helicopter during the course of several flights over a 3 day period from California to Hampton Roads Executive Airport (PVG), Norfolk, Virginia. While the pilot logged the time (approximately 19.6 hours) as dual received and pilot-in-command, the other individual who flew with him and who is a certified flight instructor reported flying the helicopter 7.4 hours. He also indicated he did not give the accident pilot any flight instruction during any of the flights, and further, he did not sign his pilot logbook indicating he had given him flight instruction. The individual who flew with the accident pilot reported there were no discrepancies with the helicopter, and all systems worked OK with no squawks noted. After an uneventful arrival in Virginia at PVG, the other pilot departed, and the accident pilot flew the helicopter to Ocean City Municipal Airport (OXB), Ocean City, Maryland; the flight duration was logged to be approximately 1 hour, and there were no further logged flights in the accident helicopter.

Data downloaded from the Engine Monitoring Unit (EMU) correlated with unlogged flights in the pilot's pilot logbook revealed he accrued approximately 7 hours, bringing his total time to 1,335 hours. On the accident date including the accident flight, the helicopter was operated on 6 flights totaling approximately 6 hours.

The occupant seated in the left front seat was issued a student pilot medical certificate on February 19, 2013, with a restriction to wear corrective lenses. On the application for the medical certificate he listed 10 hours flight time.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2013, under a production certificate issued on October 25, 2010, and designated serial number 0409. It was equipped with a Rolls-Royce 250-C300/A1 engine rated for 270 horsepower for takeoff limited to 5 minutes or 224 horsepower continuous. The helicopter was equipped with 5 seats.

The helicopter was approved for VFR operations day and night. VFR operation at night is permitted only when landing, navigation, instrument, and anti-collision lights are operational. Section 2 of the Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual indicates that in "Kinds of Operating Limitations" that orientation during night flight must be maintained by visual reference to ground objects illuminated solely by lights on the ground or adequate celestial illumination.

Review of the airframe and engine logbooks revealed no entries other than those associated with production of the airframe or engine.

According to the hour meter, the elapsed time since manufacture at the time of the accident was 33.08 hours, while the engine monitoring unit indicates a total engine run time of approximately 28 hours, and 18 engine starts.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

There was no record with Lockheed Martin AFSS, or either DUAT vendor (CSC or DTC) that the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing before departure.

Airmet Sierra Update 6, for IFR conditions issued by National Weather Service (NWS) at 1645, and valid until 2300, bordered the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The Airmet indicated that between 2000 and 2300, and continuing beyond 2300 to 0500 the next day, ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibilities below 3 miles with precipitation and mist were forecast. The Airmet for mountain obscuration, which extended over the route and the accident site, indicated that between 1700 and 2000, and continuing beyond 2300 to 0500 the next day, clouds, precipitation, and mist were forecast.

The NWS Weather Depiction Chart for 1800 EDT depicted an area of instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions over eastern Pennsylvania by a shaded contour line due to visibility 2 miles in thunderstorms and moderate rain, which was surrounding by an area of marginal visual flight rule (MVFR) conditions by an unshaded contour line. Multiple stations across western Pennsylvania and New York reported rain and thunderstorms with MVFR conditions.

A surface observation taken from Binghamton Regional Airport (BGM), Binghamton, NY, at 2142, or approximately 9 minutes before the flight departed indicates the wind was from 190 degrees at 8 knots, the visibility was 2.5 miles with moderate rain and mist, broken clouds existed at 600 feet and 1,400 feet, and overcast clouds existed at 7,000 feet. The temperature and dew point were 19 and 18 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.99 inches of Mercury (inHg).

At 2045, or approximately 1 hour 6 minutes before the flight departed, the Area Forecast (FA) issued by the National Weather Service Aviation Weather Center indicated that for eastern Pennsylvania, expected broken clouds at 3,500 feet layered to 25,000 feet, with widely scattered thunderstorms and light rain, with cumulonimbus tops to 38,000 feet.

At 2054, or approximately 1 hour before the flight departed, the pilot sent a text message to his brother indicating, "…Waiting out weather to fly back to [Ocean City, MD] tonight." At the same time, a surface observation from the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), Scranton, PA, located approximately 18 miles east-southeast of the accident site reported wind from 220 degrees at 4 knots, 10 miles visibility with light rain, scattered clouds at 7,000 feet, broken clouds at 8,000 feet, and overcast clouds at 10,000 feet. The temperature and dew point were 22 and 18 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.00 in Hg. 


At 2100, or approximately 51 minutes before the flight departed, the Weather Depiction Chart depicted a larger area of MVFR conditions extending over across western and central New York and northern Pennsylvania along and ahead of the approaching frontal system. The accident site was located in the area of MVFR conditions. Visual flight rule (VFR) conditions were depicted across southern Pennsylvania into Maryland, with the station models depicted overcast sky coverage.

The GOES-13 infrared satellite imagery for 2202 and 2232 EDT respectively with a standard MB temperature enhance curve applied to highlight the higher and colder cloud tops typically associated with convective activity. The images depict an extensive area of low clouds over the region with a north-to-south band of enhanced clouds moving over the route of flight at the time of the accident, with the radiative cloud top temperatures corresponding to cloud tops between 29,000 and 33,500 feet.

The closest Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) to the accident site was from the NWS Binghamton (KBGM) located approximately 46 miles north of the accident site, at an elevation of 1,606 feet. Based on the radar height calculations, the 0.5 degree elevation scan depicted the conditions encompassing the altitude between 3,230 and 7,860 feet over the accident site, with the floor just above the helicopters altitude. The KBGM 0.5 degree base reflectivity image at 2220 EDT depicts the accident site area with light reflectivity values of 15 to 20 dBZ, and several high reflectivity echoes on the range of 50 dBZ east of the general route of flight associated with embedded thunderstorms with one of the cells immediately north of Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP), which was reporting IFR conditions in heavy rain at the time.

A remote automated weather station RAWS located about 24 miles northwest of the accident site reported at 2201, or approximately 19 minutes before the accident, that the wind was calm, the temperature and dew point were 67 and 66 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively, and the relative humidity was 95 percent.

A surface observation taken from AVP at 2221, or approximately 1 minute after the accident indicates the wind was variable at 4 knots, the visibility was 1.25 miles with heavy rain and mist, runway 04 visual range (RVR) 4,000 variable 6,000 feet, a few clouds at 600 feet, broken clouds at 1200 feet, and overcast clouds at 4,900 feet. The temperature and dew point were 19 and 18 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.00 inHg.

A RAWS located approximately 15 miles north-northeast of the accident site reported at 2229, or approximately 9 minutes after the accident, that the wind was calm, the temperature and dew point were 66 and 62 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively, the relative humidity was 88 percent, and rain was being recorded at the time of the observation.

Based on the approximate location of the accident, sunset occurred at 2025, and the end of civil twilight occurred at 2056. The Sun and the Moon were more than 15 degrees below the horizon and provided no illumination.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The helicopter was equipped with an Engine Monitoring Unit (EMU) that is a digital recording device mounted behind the right rear seatback panel. The EMU records and retains data consisting of total engine run time, an engine start counter (whenever N1 exceeds 30 percent and Measured Gas Temperature (MGT) is at least 343 degrees Celsius), and exceedances for N1, N1 run limit, N2 transient, N2 run limit, Torque Meter Oil Pressure (TMOP) transient, TMOP exceedance, TMOP run limit, MGT transient start- up mode, MGT start-up mode, MGT run limit start up, MGT transient run mode, MGT run mode, MGT run limit run mode, and torque. The EMU also records and retains data consisting of flight history (date, engine start time and duration), and in 1 second increments N1 and N2 speeds in percent, TMOP psi, and MGT in Fahrenheit.

Data downloaded from the revealed that the accident flight and 17 previous flights were recorded; 1 entry totaling 4 seconds on July 19, 2013 was noted but was not attributed to a flight. There were no recorded exceedances for any of the flights. Data associated with the accident flight totaled approximately 37 minutes 35 seconds; an approximate 14 second gap of data was noted between 0222:32 and 0222:46 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), or between 2222:32 and 2222:46 local EMU time.

Review of the recorded data associated with the accident flight revealed that slight variation to N2 below 100 percent was noted for about 6 minutes 49 seconds after the first recorded data point, or until 0152:00.500 (2152:00.500 local), at which time the N2 (equivalent to main rotor speed), and TMOP were recorded to be consistently above 100 percent and 50 psi, respectively. The recorded N2 readings were nearly constant with slight changes for the next 29 minutes 17 seconds, or until 0221:17.312 (2221:17.312), while the TMOP readings were nearly constant with slight changes notes between 0152:00.500 (2152:00.500 local) and 0220:40.312 (2220:40.312), at which time the TMOP began to decrease. Changes to recorded TMOP occurred from then until 0222:46.937 (2222:46.937 hours local), which was the last recorded data point. A copy of the recorded data associated with the accident flight downloaded from the EMU is contained in the NTSB public docket.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The helicopter crashed in a heavy wooded area owned by several family members, who leased the land to an energy company which installed 88 wind turbines. According to the site manager, on the date and time of the accident, the wind turbines were down for maintenance and Notice to Airman # 07/025 was disseminated indicating the wind turbines were not illuminated. The site manager also advised that there was no damage to any of the wind turbines, and they do not have any cameras or recording equipment on them.

Examination of the accident site revealed damage to trees at decreasing heights and debris along an energy path oriented on a magnetic heading of 074 degrees. Major parts of the helicopter consisting of the main rotor assembly, mast, transmission, tail rotor assembly, and horizontal and vertical stabilizers were separated from the helicopter and located along the energy path southwest of the resting portion of the main wreckage. Numerous cockpit and cabin furnishings as well as cockpit and cabin doors, landing gear pieces, and personal effects were also located along the energy path. There was no smell of fuel at the accident site, and no evidence of fire. The accident site was not located near any wind turbines.

Further inspection of the accident site revealed the farthest identified impacted trees were located at 41.4546 degrees North latitude and 076.0926 degrees West longitude. The trees were nearly aligned and perpendicular to the energy path and were about 16 feet apart. When viewed from that location towards the resting point of the main wreckage, the tree to the left was damaged at an estimated height of 55 feet above ground level (agl), while the tree to the right was damaged 45.12 feet agl (measured using Theodolite App). A distance of 59.05 feet existed between the estimated impact point in the creek bed and the tree that was fractured 45.12 feet agl, while the calculated angle between the two points was 27.5 degrees.

The main portion of the wreckage consisting of the fuselage was inverted near the base of 2 trees adjacent to a creek; the wreckage was located at 41.4547 degrees North latitude and 076.0923 degrees West longitude. It came to rest on a magnetic heading of 040 degrees magnetic. The fuel tank was drained following recovery of the wreckage and found to contain 54 gallons of jet fuel; no contaminants were noted. A small amount of a liquid with the appearance and odor of Jet A fuel was drained from the fuel line to the fuel pump when the line was detached from the fuel pump. No breaches of the fuel system were noted, and there was no evidence of fuel spillage on the ground.

The airframe was almost completely destroyed. The main rotor and gearbox were detached from the airframe, with the mast fairing remaining attached to the mast tube. The mast fairing exhibited a large dent on the trailing edge, which corresponded to the bent mast tube and main rotor mast. The rear fuselage was intact and the rear cowling was attached. The tailcone was bent and wrapped around the left side of the airframe. The tailcone was separated in the approximate center of the 5th bay. The remaining 2 ½ bays were intact, but detached from the empennage. There was a large dent on the upper surface of the aft 2 bays. The empennage was intact. The lower vertical stabilizer was bent approximately 90 degrees rearward, and there was a circular shaped dent at the intersection between the lower vertical and horizontal stabilizers. The dent contained wood debris and bark scrapings. The tail rotor visual guard was fractured at the front of the lower vertical stabilizer. The forward end remained attached to the tailcone and the aft portion was attached to the lower vertical stabilizer.

Inspection of the flight controls revealed numerous fractures; however, there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Inspection of the driveline revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

Examination of the firewall revealed it was deformed in several places and rotational scoring from the engine output shaft at the firewall penetration point was noted. The fuel cut-off valve was in a forward, or off position, and the control cable was detached from the control arm. The control cable sheath was secure in the retention clamps. The cable end was not visible protruding from the end of the sheath, and the sheath exhibited stretching and separation of the coils between the engine and the control in the cabin.

The cockpit was fragmented, and flight and engine instruments were located along the energy path. Additionally, the instrument panel was separated. All of the removable controls were installed. The collective was in a full up position, and the friction slider was straight and was fractured at the lower end. The pilot's throttle twist grip was in the "on" or "flight position."

Inspection of the separated instrument panel revealed it contained the airspeed indicator, faceplate of the turn coordinator, and directional gyro. The housing of the turn coordinator was separated from the panel, and was accounted for at the accident site. The annunciator panel contains LED type lights; therefore, no determination could be made as to whether there were any annunciations at the time of the accident.

Inspection of the engine and engine compartment revealed the throttle valve on the engine right side was in a rearward, or 'flight' position, and the control cable was detached from the control arm. The control cable sheath was secure in the retention clamps. The cable end was not visible protruding from the end of the sheath, and the sheath exhibited stretching and separation of the coils between the engine and the control in the cabin. The power turbine governor (PTG) needle was in a position between 30 and 40, and the control cable and linkage was intact and secure. The PTG 'beep' control actuator when tested by hand. The F642-1 shaft was separated at the flex couplings at both ends. At the engine end, 1 flexplate ear was torn and one F906-1 yoke arm was torn. At the main rotor gearbox (MRGB) end, assembly was intact and in place. The sprag clutch unit locked and free-wheeled normally the flexplate arms were torn on opposite sides, and one MRGB input yoke arm was separated from both the flexplate and the input "shaft".

Main rotor blade SN 0950 exhibited a fractured spar was broken at approximately 6 feet from the coning bolt, and the tip of the blade was detached, but accounted for at the accident site. The blade skin/honeycomb was damaged at tip. There was a gentle upward bend over the inboard 6 feet of the blade, and again for the outboard 4 feet of blade. Wood was embedded in the spar of the blade at the tip. Some minor dents and one tear were visible on the lower skin. 2 small pieces of the removable tip cap were located. The spindle tusk was intact.

Main rotor blade SN 0954 "exhibited a 90 degree downward bend approximately 90 inches from coning bolt, with a partial spar fracture, and spar separated at 160 inches from coning bolt. Skin/honeycomb portion detached from spar at separation, and was not located. The outboard approximate 36 inches of main rotor blade was later accounted for; the spindle tusk was intact. A report concerning the separated outboard section of main rotor blade is contained in the NTSB public docket.

Examination of the engine revealed it exhibited little visible damage. The output shaft/sprag clutch assembly exhibited significant damage. The engine which was secure in its mount points was removed, and sent to the manufacturer's facility, where with FAA oversight, it was placed in a test cell and found to operate normally. The report from the manufacturer and statement from the FAA inspector that witnessed the engine run are contained in the NTSB public docket.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Postmortem examinations of the pilot and left seat occupant were performed by Forensic Associates of NEPA, Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania. The cause of death for both was listed as multiple traumatic injuries.

External examinations only were performed on the remaining occupants. The cause of death for all was listed as multiple traumatic injuries.

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot and left seat occupant by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report for the pilot stated the results were negative for carbon monoxide, volatiles, and tested drugs, while testing for cyanide was not performed.

The toxicology report for the left seat occupant stated the results were negative for volatiles and tested drugs, while the specimens were unsuitable for carbon monoxide testing; testing for cyanide was not performed.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The first uncorrelated radar target at 2151:34, was located at 42 degrees 04 seconds 23.88 seconds North latitude and 076 degrees 06 minutes 23.40 seconds West longitude, or about 0.42 nautical miles from the center of a ramp at the departure airport. Review of the EMU recorded data revealed the estimated takeoff was at EMU time 0152:00.500 (2152:00.500). No determination could be made as to how the helicopter proceeded between the EMU time estimated at takeoff and the first uncorrelated radar target.

Correlation of the EMU data with the transmissions from the pilot and the radar data indicates that the changes to the TMOP from the near steady state condition after takeoff occurred about 4 seconds after the pilot advised the controller that the flight was inadvertent IMC, which also was at a point when changes in heading and altitude were noted.

ADDITIONAL DATA AND INFORMATION

Weight and Balance Data

At the time of manufacture, the basic empty weight was 1,346.2 pounds and the empty weight moment was 146392. No modifications were recorded in the maintenance records between the time of manufacture and the accident flight.

Baggage and personal effects that were found either in bags in the baggage compartment, on the ground adjacent to the main wreckage, or loose at the accident site were recovered and secured at a facility of the Pennsylvania State Police. The items that were wet were air dried, and the weight of all items was determined to be 159.5 pounds.

Weight and balance calculations were performed using the empty weight of the helicopter (1,346.2 pounds), the weight of the pilot and left front seat occupant per the Coroner (140 and 170 pounds), respectively. The weights of the rear seat occupants from left to right also reported by the coroner were 127, 33, and 190 pounds, respectively. Additionally, the calculations included the weight of the luggage (159.5 pounds), and full usable fuel amount of 493.1 pounds. The calculations determined that at the moment of engine start, the gross weight was 2,658.8 pounds.

According to the helicopter type certificate data sheet, the design gross weight is 2,700 pounds.

Spatial Disorientation

According to Advisory Circular (AC) 60-4A titled, "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation," surface references and the natural horizon may become obscured even though visibility may be above VFR minimums and that an inability to perceive the natural horizon or surface references is common during flights over water, at night, in sparsely populated areas, and in low-visibility conditions.


From the editorial page 
4:55 p.m. EDT October 10, 2014


Most Tier motorists know enough to stay off the roads when a sheet of ice coats the highway. Even the most macho truck driver knows to pull over at the nearest rest stop when weather makes it too dangerous to navigate treacherous road conditions.

Drivers aren't forced off the road by state or federal law. Common sense warns them of the real potential for catastrophe if they dare to continue driving at normal speeds and fail to slow down when faced with less than ideal road conditions.

Evidently, some novice airplane and helicopter pilots are either too proud or too self-assured to observe the same caution as most motorists. They hope to "beat" the weather, or they believe their piloting skills are more advanced than they actually are. Some pilots are overconfident; others underestimate the weather conditions on takeoff and still others run into an unexpected turn in the weather while in flight. The results are often fatal for themselves and their passengers.

A recent analysis of National Transportation Safety Board data by reporter Steve Reilly revealed that at least 533 general aviation accidents between 1983 and 2013 were the result of pilots who lacked the proper credentials to fly in less than ideal weather conditions. Those accidents resulted in 955 deaths.

No one — air traffic controllers or any regulations from the Federal Aviation Administration — can stop these less experienced pilots from taking off when weather conditions worsen. Although federal regulations mandate non-instrument-rated pilots stay grounded in inclement weather, experts and officials say it is virtually impossible to keep pilots from violating them.

The unqualified flights cost uncounted millions of dollars in property damage and expenses for emergency responses and investigations.

When non-instrument-rated David Jenny took flight in a helicopter from Endicott's Tri-Cities Airport on the night of July 27, 2013, he apparently failed to obtain pre-flight weather briefings prior to takeoff. When he encountered bad weather about a half-hour into his flight that required skills beyond his level, he made a desperate call to air traffic controllers, looking for a safe landing spot. It was too late. Moments later, the helicopter went down in a wooded section of Pennsylvania's Wyoming County. The resulting crash took the lives the pilot and his four passengers, including a 3-year-old boy.

Though pilot training stresses the dangers of flying in instrument conditions, many still ignore the advice, thinking they can get by on their wits and their limited skills. Too often, they are wrong. The results, as they were in this case, are tragic.

Most pilots exercise sound judgment. Those who do not put their own lives, and often the lives of others, in danger.

The Federal Aviation Administration needs to develop a system to protect these unqualified pilots from themselves. Give amateur pilots an identifying code that would show air control if a pilot had sufficient qualifications for instrument flying. If adverse weather conditions exist, they can refuse to provide further flight information. Or, the FAA could develop another procedure that would protect passengers and those on the ground from amateur pilots who fail to exercise good judgment.

What's next

The Federal Aviation Administration should have tighter rein on pilots not capable of flying in adverse weather conditions.


- Source:  http://www.pressconnects.com


Pilot David Jenny posted a photo to his Facebook page on Saturday, July 27, 2013 shortly before the group left for the flight with the caption: 'Raiding the kitchen before we head out.' From left are: Pilot David Ernest Jenny Jr., 31, of Towson, Md.; Noah Robert McKain Woodland, 3, of Leesburg, Va.; Woodland's father, Carl Robert Woodland, 29, of Lovettsville, Va.; Leanna Mee Kelly, 27, of Savage, Md.; and her father, Bernard Michael Kelly, 58, of Ellicott City, Md. 

General Electric Unit is in Talks to Buy Milestone Aviation Group: GE Capital-Milestone Deal Could Value Helicopter Lessor at Over $2.5 Billion

The Wall Street Journal
By Dana Cimilluca, Ted Mann and Dana Mattioli


Updated Oct. 10, 2014 5:50 p.m. ET


General Electric Co.’s finance arm is negotiating a deal to buy Milestone Aviation Group Ltd., according to people familiar with the matter, as the industrial giant seeks to expand its aircraft-leasing operation into helicopters.

Milestone, co-founded by NetJets Inc. founder Richard Santulli, has announced plans for an initial public offering of stock. It’s not uncommon for a company exploring an IPO to simultaneously explore a full sale. The purchase price for Milestone could be more than $2.5 billion, according to some of the people.

Milestone, founded in 2010, is the world’s largest helicopter-leasing company by fleet value. Private-equity owned Milestone has acquired a $2.2 billion fleet of helicopters and placed orders for around $3 billion more. The company leases helicopters for uses including flying workers and supplies to and from oil platforms, search and rescue and emergency medical services.

GE Capital Aviation Services, or Gecas, as the unit is called, maintains a fleet of more than 1,600 aircraft it leases to airlines, cargo businesses and other customers. Acquiring Milestone would broaden Gecas’s portfolio beyond the competitive plane-leasing business, as it currently owns no helicopters.

Profits in the GE unit fell in 2013 to $896 million from $1.2 billion, on relatively flat sales of $5.3 billion. The aviation-leasing unit reported assets of $45.9 billion, out of $517 billion across GE Capital’s five businesses.

The company is in the midst of an effort to shrink the overall size of GE Capital, which generates significant profits for the parent company but ran into trouble during the financial crisis. GE management has stepped up its efforts to reshape the finance arm in recent years, including through the IPO this year of its consumer-finance business, which backs store-branded credit cards.

That business, rebranded as Synchrony Financial Inc., is to be fully split off from GE in a tax-free transaction next year, which will substantially reduce the company’s exposure to the consumer credit risks that have irked some investors since the crisis.

GE Chief Executive Jeff Immelt and others close to the company remain bullish on other aspects of GE Capital, which remains a critical portion of the parent’s earnings and is on track to contribute $3 billion in dividends to it this year.

The unit intends to continue shedding consumer-related assets while focusing on its “commercial core,” GE Chief Financial Officer Jeffrey Bornstein told investors in July.

The Milestone deal, should it come to fruition, would be the latest sale of an aircraft-leasing operation and could presage more such activity. American International Group Inc. last year agreed to sell control of its big aircraft-leasing business to AerCap Holdings NV for $5.4 billion.

Surging demand for big helicopters from the Sikorsky Aircraft unit of United Technologies Corp. and others has prompted a number of new private equity-backed entrants into the business of renting rotorcraft.

These include Waypoint Leasing, backed by funds linked to the family office of Michael Dell and Soros Fund Management LLC, and Lobo Leasing Ltd., which is backed by Blackstone Group LP.

Analysts have pointed to Waypoint, No. 2 in the helicopter-leasing business after Milestone, as another potential sale or IPO candidate.

—Doug Cameron contributed to this article.

- Source:  http://online.wsj.com

Beach Flight Aviation's 'trike' makes an impression at National Shrimp Festival, flights available over the beach

 

GULF SHORES, Alabama -- It may look like a scooter attached to a hang-glider, but Beach Flight Aviation's sport plane, called the "trike," is a real, working aircraft that is drawing a lot of attention in the Outdoor Village vendor area at the 43rd Annual National Shrimp Festival in Gulf Shores. 

Dozens of people at a time are stopping by to check out the three-wheeled, open-cockpit aircraft, with some sitting in the cockpit and posing for photos. It's one of the more popular attractions in the Outdoor Village, which is saying something, two tents down from the Tacky Jacks' chainsaw carving demonstrations (more on those later). 

Beach Flight Aviation began setting up operations out of Jack Edwards Airport in Gulf Shores a few months ago, offering passengers the chance to ride in the trike with a pilot or learn to fly it themselves. Packages start at $95 for a 20-minute flight and progress up to $295 for a 90-minute experience that could go as far as Dauphin Island, weather permitting. 

Beach Flight co-owner Tony Castillo was with one trike on the festival grounds while his partner Gary Berdeaux took flights over the beach in the other. 

Castillo said their most popular routes were from Jack Edwards along Ala. 59 to the beach during the 20-minute flights, or east over Orange Beach for longer trips. But, he said there were possibilities of flying over other destinations. 

"Most people want to see the beach, but flying over the bay is beautiful too," Castillo said. 

The trikes are officially light sport aircraft, subject to FAA regulations like any other plane. Both Castillo and Berdeaux are long-time trike flyers who moved from Kentucky and Atlanta to the Alabama Coast, choosing to set up their new business in Gulf Shores. 
 
"There's nothing like it in this area," Castillo said. "They have it in California, Florida, Colorado, Hawaii, so we said 'why not here?'"

The sample aircraft is on the festival grounds this weekend at the 43rd National Shrimp Festival, which runs through 10 p.m. Friday and Saturday and until 5 p.m. Sunday. For more information on the trikes, see the Beach Flight Aviation web site, and keep checking AL.com/beaches for full coverage of the National Shrimp Festival. 

- Story and Photo Gallery:   http://www.al.com

Kenton County leader: Airport is ours, let us keep control • State auditor calls for change to airport board

FLORENCE —Kenton County's judge-executive says there doesn't need to be changes in the composition of the board that oversees the region's largest airport.

Steve Arlinghaus sent a letter to the Northern Kentucky Legislative Caucus this week, asking lawmakers to resist a call by the state's auditor to change the airport's board to 11 members, only three of which would be appointed by Kenton County.

In the letter, Arlinghaus said that Auditor Adam Edelen says that the county doesn't claim the airport among its assets, which Arlinghaus says isn't true.


Read: Arlinghaus' letter 


He points to an "oversight" by a previous administration that left the airport off the county's list and notes that the majority of the airport's land is owned by the county or the airport board and has been for decades.

Arlinghaus also takes issue with Edelen's claim that no other single agency appoints all the members of the airport board, noting that Lexington's mayor appoints all 10 members of Lexington's board, and that Louisville's board members are appointed by only two people.

The judge-executive also states that anger over travel, food and drink used by members was caused by an "overzealous" reporter who failed to state that taxpayer dollars weren't being spent on those items.

The letter also refers to the "tremendous anger of Cincinnatians from the very beginning days of Kentucky getting the airport instead of Ohio."

Arlinghaus states that Kenton County gets no money from owning CVG, as opposed to the $1.5 million that Boone County gets annually in payroll taxes, "yet they provide little to no services." He states that he offered to sell a stake in the airport to Boone County and Hamilton County, but was rebuffed.

"Should you decide to follow the misguided recommendation of the State Auditor  and pressure from outside jurisdictions or others who agree with him, purely for political reasons, you will be doing a grave injustice to the taxpayer's (sic) of Kenton County; the rightful and only owners of CVG," Arlinghaus concluded.

Read more: http://www.wlwt.com


http://www.wlwt.com/Airport-letter.pdf