Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Inuvik, Northwest Territories, airport roof damaged in blizzard

 
 Parts of the Inuvik, N.W.T., airport seem to have been torn off during the high winds and snow in the region Tuesday. (Submitted photo)

 Parts of the roof at the Inuvik, N.W.T., airport were damaged in Tuesday’s blizzard.

 A large section of the roof peeled back like a sardine can. Airport manager Karen King said the damage is not causing the airport to shut down since it is just exterior damage.

"The airport's fully operational. It looks a lot worse, I think," said King.

Blizzard conditions wreaked havoc in the town, and winds reached up to 90 km/h in many parts of the Beaufort Delta.

The town's power flicked on and off. A metal tower on Inuvik's famous dome building snapped in half.

Tom Zubko, the owner of New North Networks which operates out of the dome, said that damage also looks worse than it is.

"It's one of those procrastination things — I have been meaning to take it off for a long time, and mother nature's done that for me now," said Zubko.

Donna-Lynn Baskin, who lives in Inuvik, said there was little to no visibility on the roads. She called the weather Inuvik’s worst blizzard in years.

She even narrowly missed colliding with something unusual which was in the middle of Mackenzie Road, the town’s main street – a hot tub.

“It was blowing down the street, when I came upon it I had to dodge and go down a side street to avoid it. It was just scuffling along, the wind was really pushing it, it was the whole hot tub unit…I was just glad not to hit it. It was white so it just sort of blended in, right now it's lodged in a snow bank in front of one of the local businesses,” she said.

Baskin said the winds were full of debris and that her home had been hit by flying shingles. She said there was so much snow blowing around that it was difficult to even see other cars on the road.

'I had to dodge and go down a side street to avoid it. It was just scuffling along, the wind was really pushing it, it was the whole hot tub unit.'—Donna-Lynn Baskin, Inuvik, N.W.T., resident

“The way the wind was gusting in some places - it was like someone had thrown white paint across the car windows,” she said.

Much of the same weather is expected today in the Beaufort Delta region. Schools and offices were closed, and health centres in many of the communities were open only for emergencies.

Gwich’in Tribal Council leader Richard Nerysoo is urging people in the region to be prepared to weather out the storm with enough fuel, water and food for several days.

Winds are expected to die down Wednesday afternoon.

Source:  http://www.cbc.ca

Smith Aerostar 601P, N700PS: Accident occurred January 16, 2012 in Philadelphia, Mississippi

NTSB Identification: ERA12FA146
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, January 16, 2012 in Philadelphia, MS
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/30/2013
Aircraft: Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P, registration: N700PS
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On the day of the accident, a mechanic taxied the airplane onto the runway and performed a full power check of both engines, exercised both propellers, and checked each magneto drop with no discrepancies reported. Following the engine run, the mechanic taxied the airplane to the fuel ramp where the fuselage fuel tank was filled; after fueling, the fuselage tank had 41.5 gallons of usable fuel. The mechanic then taxied the airplane to the ramp where the engines were secured and the fuel selector switches were placed to the off position. The mechanic reported that, at that time, the left fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons of fuel, while the right fuel tank had about 2 to 3 gallons of fuel; the unusable fuel amount for each wing tank is 3 gallons.

The pilot taxied the airplane to the approach end of runway 18 and was heard to apply takeoff power. A pilot-rated witness noted that, at the point of rotation, the airplane pitched up fairly quickly to about 20 degrees and rolled left to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The airplane continued rolling left to an inverted position and impacted the ground in a 40 degree nose-low attitude. A postcrash fire consumed most of the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and aft fuselage, including the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and fuselage fuel tank.

Postaccident inspection of the flight controls, which were extensively damaged by impact and fire, revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Although the flap actuators were noted to be asymmetrically extended and no witness marks were noted to confirm the flap position, a restrictor is located at each cylinder’s downline port by design to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition. Therefore, it is likely that the flap actuators changed positions following impact and loss of hydraulic system pressure and did not contribute to the left roll that preceded the accident.

Examination of the engines and propellers revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the fuselage fuel sump revealed the left fuel selector was in the crossfeed position, while the right fuel selector was likely positioned to the on position. (The as-found positions of the fuel selector knobs were unreliable due to postaccident damage.) The starting engines checklist indicates that the pilot is to move both fuel selectors from the on position to the crossfeed position, and back to the on position while listening for valve actuation/movement. The before takeoff checklist indicates that the pilot is to verify that the selectors are in the on position.

Although the left engine servo fuel injector did not meet flow tests during the postaccident investigation, this was attributed to postaccident heat damage. Calculations to determine engine rpm based on ground scars revealed that the left engine was operating just above idle, and the right engine was operating about 1,315 rpm, which is consistent with a left engine loss of power and the pilot reducing power on the right engine during the in-flight loss of control. Examination of both propellers determined that neither was feathered at impact.

Although the as-found position of the left fuel selector knob could be considered unreliable because of impact damage during the accident sequence, given that right wing fuel tank had no usable fuel, it is unlikely that the experienced pilot would have moved the left fuel selector to the crossfeed position in response to the engine power loss. It is more likely that the pilot failed to return the left fuel selector to the on position during the starting engines checklist and also failed to verify its position during the before takeoff checklist; thus, the left engine was being fed only from the right fuel tank, which had very little fuel. There was likely enough fuel in the right tank and lines for the pilot to taxi and takeoff before the left engine failed, causing the airplane to turn to the left, from which the pilot did not recover.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:

The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during takeoff following loss of power to the left engine due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the loss of control was the pilot’s failure to feather the left propeller following the loss of left engine power.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 16, 2012, about 1242 central standard time, an Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P, N700PS, registered to M & H Ventures LLC, experienced a loss of directional control during the initial takeoff and crashed in an open field near Philadelphia Municipal Airport (MPE), Philadelphia, Mississippi. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from MPE to Key Field Airport, Meridian, Mississippi. The airplane sustained substantial damage due to impact and a postcrash fire. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

A witness in an airplane waiting short of the runway for the accident pilot to depart watched the takeoff roll from runway 18 and reported the accident airplane became airborne just before the intersection of the ramp and runway. After becoming airborne, the witness noted the airplane immediately, “got squirrelly” and went to the left. The witness stated he taxied onto the runway and back taxied to the approach end of runway 18, where he initiated his takeoff roll; the wind at the time was from 160 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots. After becoming airborne, he noted the airplane had crashed and reported the event on the airport UNICOM frequency.

Another witness saw the airplane while it was airborne and noted it rolled left and “it looked like the wind caught the wing.” The witness reported the airplane rolled onto its left side and pitched nose down impacting the ground.

Still another witness who was located northeast of the accident site reported hearing the airplane begin the takeoff roll. The witness walked outside the building and noticed the airplane, “…veering to the left like it was turning out…” then noticed the airplane rolling onto its left side and pitching nose down impacting the ground.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 48, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating, and also a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating. At the airline transport level he was type rated in several transport category airplanes. He held a first class medical certificate with no limitations issued on July 27, 2011. On the application for his last medical certificate he listed having a total time of 6,200 hours.

In December 2011, the pilot undertook initial ground and flight training in the airplane. The training was conducted by a pilot who had 16,000 hours in Piper Aerostar airplanes.

The ground instruction consisted of 24 hours over the course of three full days, and the flight instruction consisted of 2.0 hours dual flight in the accident airplane, which occurred on December 15, 2011. The ground school consisted of systems instruction, while the flight training consisted of stalls, pitch and power demonstration, climbs, turns, flap demonstration, air velocity minimum control (VMCa), engine failures after takeoff, in the traffic pattern, and on final approach. Twelve takeoff’s and landings with and without flaps were performed, and go-arounds and aborted takeoff’s were also performed. The notes section of the flight review checklist indicates “Great Job-.”

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1977 by Ted Smith Aerostar Corporation, as model PA-60-601P, and was designated serial number 61P-0427-157. It was certificated in the normal category and originally equipped with two turbocharger equipped Lycoming IO-540-S1A5 engines rated at 290 brake horsepower at 2,575 rpm, automatic controlled turbochargers installed in accordance with (IAW) supplemental type certificate (STC) SE60WE, and Hartzell constant speed full manual feathering HC-C3YR-2UF propellers with FC8468-8R propeller blades.

In December 1996, the airplane was modified by supplemental type certificate (STC) SA1658NM which removed the original engines and installed 350 horsepower Lycoming TIO-540-U2A engines; the same make and model propellers remained installed. The airplane type certificate holder reported that as a result of the engine change, flight testing confirmed there was no change to the airplane’s original Vmca, which is 97 miles-per-hour indicated airspeed.

The airplane’s fuel supply system in each wing consists of integral wet wing tanks located outboard of the engine nacelle. Each tank has a total capacity of 65 gallons, of which 62 gallons are considered usable. The airplane also has a bladder-type fuselage fuel tank located between the rear cabin bulkhead and the forward bulkhead of the baggage compartment, which has a total capacity of 43.5 gallons, of which 41.5 gallons are considered usable. An annunciator light labeled “LOW FUEL” installed in a group in the annunciator panel in the glare shield by design illuminates continuously when 12 gallons fuel remain in the fuselage tank. The light will remain on as fuel is depleted from the fuselage tank until it is serviced above 12 gallons. The airplane was not equipped with a crossfeed annunciator light when the airplane was manufactured and the maintenance records do not reflect a crossfeed annunciator light was installed after manufacture in accordance with Kit 764-493.

A multiple sump assembly installed below the fuselage fuel tank has a “center sump” which is the low point for the fuselage tank, and two wing sumps which are the low points for each wing tank. Each sump can be drained by depressing its respective drain valve located on the lower aft side of the fuselage just aft of the wing. Fuel from the left and right wings are supplied via lines and hoses to each respective wing sump through a flapper check valve installed on each respective wing sump. Flapper check valves are also installed on each side of the fuselage fuel sump; the check valves prevent back-flow of fuel from one tank to another. Fuel from the fuselage tank flows through flapper check valves into each respective wing fuel sump, then to the each respective engine through valves, hoses, auxiliary fuel pumps, servo fuel injector, flow divider, injector lines, and fuel injector nozzles.

Four electrically operated valves are installed on the fuel sump assembly, and are controlled from two fuel selector switches (one for each engine) mounted on the instrument panel. Each valve on the fuel sump assembly has two positions (open or closed) and the switches have three detent positions (off, on, and crossfeed). The left switch is mounted on the pilot’s lower panel, while the right switch is mounted on the co-pilot’s lower panel. For example, when either fuel selector is in the on position, fuel is supplied from its respective wing tank if fuel is available and also from the fuselage tank. With either fuel selector positioned to the crossfeed position, fuel is supplied to the engine from only the opposite wing tank and not the fuselage tank. If both fuel selectors are positioned to crossfeed at the same time, no fuel will be consumed from the fuselage tank; the left engine will only be supplied fuel from the right wing and the right engine will only be supplied fuel from the left wing.

The FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual indicates that the crossfeed position is only to be used in level coordinated flight only, and double crossfeed is prohibited except in emergency when the “LOW FUEL” warning light on the annunciator panel is illuminated.

Review of the maintenance records that begin with an entry dated July 18, 1977, associated with an entry related to a production test flight, to the last entry dated January 16, 2012, revealed no entry indicating removal or replacement of either fuel selector switch, or fuel selector knob.

Further review of the maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with an annual inspection on December 27, 2011. The logbook entry indicates the airplane total time at that time was 2,856.9 hours. The mechanic who signed off the repairs and approved the airplane for return to service indicated that during the annual inspection, calibration of the fuel quantity system was performed. The airplane had accumulated approximately 22 hours since the inspection at the time of the accident. The maintenance records also reflect an entry on the day of the accident indicating in part that the left engine servo fuel injector was reinstalled after being sent for “bench check and repair.” The entry also indicates that after installation of the servo fuel injector, the mechanic rigged and leak checked it. Additionally, the mechanic also removed and cleaned the fuel injector nozzles, and adjusted the idle speed and idle mixture settings.

The mechanic who signed off the installation of the left servo fuel injector reported that he determined that a full power, high speed taxi should be performed to verify that the left engine would meet all full power parameters. On the day of the accident about 0905, or about 3 hours 37 minutes before the accident, he performed a walk-around inspection then started both engines using the airplane’s checklist. At the time, he reported that the left wing fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons fuel, the right tank had 2 to 3 gallons fuel, and the center tank had 18 gallons of fuel. He taxied the airplane to the turn-around for runway 18, then performed a preflight run-up. He cycled the propellers at 1,500 rpm, then performed a magneto check at 2,000 rpm noting a drop of 75 rpm when checking each magneto separately. He further reported that all engine parameters were in the “normal operating range.” He taxied into position, held the brakes and applied 30 inches manifold pressure, then released the brakes and smoothly increased power to 42 inches manifold pressure. He noted that the rpm was 2,500 and the fuel flow was 38 gallons-per-hour. He then reduced power and taxied to the ramp where he allowed the engines to cool for 4 minutes, then secured the engines. He then examined the engine nacelles for oil or fuel leaks, but did not report seeing any. Realizing the airplane needed fuel, he restarted the engines, taxied to the fuel pump, where a lineman filled the center fuel tank adding 22 gallons 100 low lead (100LL). He restarted the engines, taxied to his hangar, shut down the engines, and moved each fuel selector switch to the off position. He then towed the airplane inside the hangar.

The mechanic further stated that the accident pilot and another individual arrived at the airport about 1025, and then both departed the airport briefly. They returned to the airport, and he discussed the maintenance that was performed, and began installing a new mount on the pilot’s yoke for a Garmin 696 portable global positioning system (GPS) receiver. The mechanic towed the airplane to the ramp, and returned the tug to the hangar. He then went back to the airplane and met the pilot while he was performing his preflight inspection. The mechanic noted that the aileron trim was neutral, and he checked the fuel sump drains while being watched by the accident pilot. The mechanic left the airport before the accident flight departed and did not witness the accident.

The last entry in the airframe logbook was dated January 16, 2011; the sign off should have been January 16, 2012. The entry indicated that the airplane total time was approximately 2,879 hours.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A surface observation weather report taken at Philadelphia Municipal Airport at 1245, or approximately 3 minutes after the accident indicates the wind was from 180 degrees at 14 knots with gusts to 20 knots. The visibility was 10 miles, and scattered clouds existed at 2,400 feet and 6,500 feet, while a ceiling of broken clouds existed at 9,000 feet. The temperature was 19 degrees Celsius, but the dew point reading was missing, and the altimeter setting was 30.24 inches of Mercury.

COMMUNICATIONS

According to the pilot of an airplane waiting to depart after the accident pilot departed, the accident pilot announced his takeoff from runway 18 on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF); the accident pilot did not make any distress call on the CTAF after becoming airborne.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Philadelphia Municipal Airport is a publically-owned airport which has one asphalt runway designated 18/36. The runway is 5,001 feet in length and 75 feet in width.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) or flight data recorder (FDR). However, the airplane was equipped with components that are capable of recording and retaining non-volatile memory associated with flight, or fuel load. The components that have non-volatile memory, or are capable of retaining data consist of a Garmin GTN 750, Garmin 696 portable global positioning system (GPS) receiver, and a Shadin fuel flow indicator.

The Garmin GTN 750 records only data consisting of last frequencies, stored flight plans, and user settings, while the Garmin 696 GPS was downloaded but there was no track log recorded for the accident flight; it is a pilot/owner selectable option to enable or disable the recordings. The Shadin fuel flow gauge was downloaded indicated 41.4 gallons fuel remaining, 2.3 gallons of fuel used, and a full fuel load as being 165.5 gallons. Details of component analysis are available in the NTSB public docket for this accident.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The airplane crashed in an open field; the main wreckage was located at 32 degrees 47 minutes 38.2 seconds North latitude and 089 degrees 07 minutes 25.0 seconds West longitude, or approximately 930 feet east of runway 18/36 centerline and at a point abeam runway 18/36, about 523 feet from the departure end of runway 18.

Examination of the accident site revealed craters associated with the leading edge of the left wing, both engines, and the top portion of the fuselage. The ground scar attributed to the left wing was oriented on a magnetic heading of 154 degrees magnetic, while the ground scar attributed to the top portion of the fuselage was oriented on a magnetic heading of 128 degrees. An energy path of dirt and debris was oriented on a magnetic heading of 120 degrees. Windscreen pieces were noted in the ground scar crater attributed to the upper portion of the fuselage, while the ground scar attributed to be from the leading edge of the left wing that extended several inches below the surface was at an angle of 40 degrees from the surrounding surface terrain. The upper portion of the clam shell door was partially embedded in the ground on the right side of the ground scar from the upper fuselage with the word “Aerostar” visible and oriented upright but nearly 180 degrees from the energy path orientation. Two parallel oriented ground scars attributed to the left and right propeller blades were noted. The distance between the two attributed from the left propeller measured 37 inches, while the distance between the two attributed from the right propeller measured 21.5 inches.

The front fuselage and right wing came to rest on a magnetic heading of 160 degrees magnetic. Extensive postaccident fire damage was noted to the cockpit, cabin, both wings, and empennage. The grass south of the main wreckage was also burned. Both engines remained attached to the wings and the propellers remained attached to the engines. All components necessary to sustain flight remained attached or were found in close proximity to the main wreckage. Examination of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left flap actuator was extended approximately 3.375 inches while the right flap actuator was extended approximately 5.625 inches; both flap actuators were retained for further examination.

Examination of the cockpit revealed the left throttle, left propeller, and both mixture controls were full forward, while the right throttle was about ½ knob width less than full forward, and the right propeller control was about 1 knob width less than full forward. Both magneto switches were in the both position. The elevator trim indicator was off scale nose low, the rudder trim indicator was off scale nose left, and the flap indicator was off scale past full down. The flap selector was in the down position, while the landing gear selector handle was in the up position. The hour meter indicated 540.4. The 5 housings of the annunciator lights were separated from the attach point of the glare shield; the annunciator housings were retained for further examination. A Garmin 696 portable GPS receiver was tightly clamped to within 1 inch of the pilot’s yoke by a steel band clamp; the GPS receiver was retained for further examination. The left fuel pressure was off scale low, while the right fuel pressure was in the green arc near the upper red line limit. The cabin door pin of the lower door was near the green mark. Examination of the fuel pressure gauge revealed the left needle was indicating approximately 31 psi or just below the lower red line limit, while the right was indicating approximately 35 PSI or just above the lower red line limit.

Examination of the pilot’s instrument panel revealed the left fuel selector knob part number (P/N) MS91528-1K4B, was separated and was not located. The remaining portion of the aluminum knob which had a matching flat remained secured to the switch shaft key. The flat of the knob and switch shaft key remained aligned and were parallel to the “OFF” marking on the instrument panel. Further inspection of the back portion of the switch revealed several wires were separated from it, and the switch back was broken.

Examination of the co-pilot’s instrument panel revealed the right fuel selector knob P/N MS91528-1K4B was in the off position as first viewed. The portion of the knob in the area of the set screws was broken. Following removal of the knob, the remaining portion of the aluminum knob which had a matching flat remained secured to the switch shaft key. The flat of the knob and switch shaft key remained aligned and were parallel to the “OFF” marking on the instrument panel. The switch moved freely when the remaining portion of knob was moved by hand. Further examination of the right fuel selector knob revealed evidence of 2 holes associated with set screws. Proper placement of the knob correlated with the shaft and set screws revealed it was in the crossfeed position.

Examination of the fuel sump assembly revealed it exhibited extensive heat damage. The position indicator for the No. 1 valve was in the closed position, while the position indicators for the Nos. 3 and 4 valves were in the open positions. The No. 2 valve was destroyed by fire; therefore, the position could not be determined.

Examination of the left and right engines was performed by a representative of the engine manufacturer with Safety Board oversight. The examination of the left engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Suction and compression was noted in each cylinder during hand rotation of the crankshaft. The magnetos remained installed and noted to produce spark at all towers during rotation of each magneto using an electrical drill motor. Inspection of the air induction system revealed no obstructions. Inspection of the turbocharger components revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. Slight heat damage was noted to the lower aft area of the engine; the servo fuel injector cover exhibited evidence of light heat damage. The propeller, propeller governor, servo fuel injector, flow divider, and engine-driven fuel pump were retained for further examination.

Examination of the right engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. Suction and compression was noted in each cylinder during hand rotation of the crankshaft. The magnetos remained installed and noted to produce spark at all towers during rotation of each magneto using an electrical drill motor. Inspection of the air induction system revealed no obstructions. Inspection of the turbocharger components revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The propeller, propeller governor, servo fuel injector, flow divider, and engine-driven fuel pump were retained for further examination.

Examination of the left propeller revealed all blades were in the low pitch position. One propeller blade was loose in the propeller hub, which appeared to be intact with no evident impact damage. Cycling of the pitch change mechanism was not attempted and the air valve retained an air charge. The propeller faying flange, cylinder, piston, piston change rod, fork, spring and spring guides, feather stop, and start lock were unremarkable. The low pitch stop had an impression mark. None of the preload plates installed on the butt end of each propeller blade had impact marks; therefore, the position of the propeller blades at the moment of impact could not be determined. However, the propeller blades were not feathered at the moment of impact. Examination of the propeller blades revealed the No. 1 blade as marked was bent aft about 20 degrees at mid-blade; no blade twist or leading edge damage was noted. The No. 2 propeller blade was bent forward approximately 20 degrees at mid-blade; no blade twist or leading edge damage was noted, but rotational scoring was noted in the paint on the cambered side of the blade. The No. 3 propeller blade was bent aft approximately 20 degrees at mid-blade; no blade twist or leading edge damage was noted, but rotational scoring was noted in the paint on the cambered side of the blade. The pitch change knob of the No. 1 blade was fractured, while the pitch change knobs of the Nos. 2 and 3 blades were not fractured. No discrepancies were noted that would preclude normal operation; all damage noted was attributed to impact damage.

Examination of the right propeller revealed all blades were in the low pitch position. Cycling of the pitch change mechanism was not possible and the air valve was fractured and did not retain an air charge. The cylinder exhibited light gouges on the forward end due to contact by the spinner. The propeller faying flange, piston, spring, spring guides, feather stop, and start lock were unremarkable. The pitch change rod was bent, and the fork was cocked on the bent pitch change rod. The low pitch stop had an impression mark. The preload plate of the No. 1 propeller blade as marked exhibited an impact mark caused by fork contact at a low pitch position. The impact mark equated to a 2 degree blade angle. The No. 2 propeller blade had an impact mark on the preload plate at a low pitch position, while the No. 3 propeller blade had an impact mark on the preload plate of the caused by fork contact at a low pitch position. The impact mark equated to a 6 degree blade angle. Examination of the propeller blades revealed the No. 1 blade exhibited a 30 degree large radius aft bend at mid-blade, and the leading edge was twisted towards low pitch. Paint abrasion and rotational scoring was noted on the leading edge and cambered side of the blade; the pitch change knob was fractured. The No. 2 propeller blade exhibited a 20 degree large radius aft bend at mid-blade, and the leading edge was twisted towards low pitch. Paint abrasion and rotational scoring was noted on the leading edge and cambered side of the blade; the pitch change knob was fractured. The No. 3 propeller blade was bent mildly aft at mid-blade, and the pitch change knob was bent. No discrepancies were noted that would preclude normal operation; all damage noted was attributed to impact damage.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by the Mississippi State Medical Examiner’s Office, Jackson, Mississippi. The cause of death was listed as “multiple blunt traumatic injuries due to air craft crash, N700PS.”

Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens of the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated the specimens were unsuitable for carbon monoxide analysis, but the results were negative for cyanide, volatiles, and the drug screen.

TEST AND RESEARCH

As previously reported, the position indicators at the fuselage fuel sump were examined and the position indicator for the No. 1 valve was in the closed position, while the position indicators for the Nos. 3 and 4 shutoff valves were in the open positions. The No. 2 valve was destroyed by fire; therefore, the position could not be determined.

Per the airplane maintenance manual, the Nos. 1 and 3 valves are associated with the left engine, and the Nos. 2 and 4 valves are associated with the right engine. The as-found positions of the Nos. 1 and 3 valves at the fuel sump assembly equates to the left fuel selector being in the crossfeed position, or fuel to the left engine being supplied from the right fuel tank. Although the position of the No. 2 shutoff valve could not be determined, the maintenance manual also indicates that the only scenario in which the No. 4 shutoff valve would be in the open position (as viewed post accident), is when the right fuel selector is in the on position.

The airplane was fueled on the day of the accident at 0935. According to the individual who fueled the airplane, a total of 22.0 gallons of 100 low lead (100LL) fuel were added to the center fuel tank.

The pilot of an airplane (N252HM) fueled from the same source reported he did not notice any contamination in his fuel tanks as a result of the 10 gallons of 100LL fuel added to each wing fuel tank of his airplane. He also reported he did not experience any engine discrepancies related to fuel during his subsequent 1.0 hour flight after fueling.

Postaccident, a sample of fuel from the facility that fueled the airplane was submitted for analysis to Interek Caleb Brett, located in Romeoville, Illinois. The test results indicate that the submitted specimen meets the requirement of ASTM International (ASTM), ASTM D910 Aviation Gasoline specifications. A copy of the report is contained in the NTSB public docket for this case.

Bench testing of the left and right propeller governors was performed at a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certified repair station. Bench testing of the left and right propeller governors revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.

Bench testing and examination of both servo fuel injectors (servo) and flow dividers was performed at a FAA certified repair station. The left servo was placed on a test bench as received, and was noted to flow 160 pounds-per-hour (PPH) at test points 1, 3, and 4. Specification at test points 1, 3, and 4 are 52.0 to 84.0 PPH, 84.0 to 96.0, and 212.0 to 237.0 PPH, respectively. Following bench testing, the servo was disassembled which revealed the regulator seat was loose in the body and was not sitting correctly. The seat assembly was removed and noted to be deformed when compared with an exemplar seat. An exemplar seat was installed and the unit was re-assembled then placed on the test bench. At test point 1, the unit flowed 1.0 PPH higher than specification, at test point 3 the unit flowed 3.0 PPH greater than specification, and at test point 4 the unit flowed within specification. Testing of the automatic mixture control (AMC) was performed and it tested satisfactory. Bench testing of the right servo revealed it flowed within limits at test points 1 and 4, however, the unit flowed 11 PPH higher than specification at test point 4. Testing of the AMC was performed and it tested satisfactory. Bench testing of the left and right flow dividers revealed both tested satisfactory. Disassembly inspection of each flow divider after flow testing revealed no discrepancies with the diaphragm, or spring. Each flow divider had a 2.0 PSI spring installed.

A representative of the servo fuel injector manufacturer was contacted to review the findings of the left fuel servo test results (160 PPH at test points 1, 3, and 4), and also the finding of the distortion of the seat assembly. The representative reported in his experience he has seen distortion of the seat in cases where there was a postcrash fire. The representative also indicated that the material of the seat melts just above 300 degrees. He stated that the as-found flow result of 160 PPH at test point 1 would have resulted in an excessively rich mixture that most likely would not sustain combustion, and the reduced fuel flow at test point 4 would have resulted in a lean mixture when attempting to obtain full power.

Bench testing of the left and right engine-driven fuel pumps was performed at a FAA certified repair station. At 2,575 rpm and 38 PSI (test standard), the left and right engine-driven fuel pumps flowed 47.8 and 46.35 gallons-per-hour (GPH), respectively. The specified fuel flow at that rpm and PSI setting is a minimum of 42.0 GPH. The left engine-driven fuel pump passed the 600 RPM test, while the right engine-driven fuel pump did not pass the 600 RPM test. Disassembly of the right engine-driven fuel pump revealed the valve poppet had a worn spot, which is why it failed the 600 RPM test.

According to the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual, the starting engines checklist indicates that both fuel selectors are to be moved to the on, crossfeed, then back to the on positions, with wording indicating to listen for actuation/movement of valve actuation. The before takeoff checklist indicates to verify that the fuel selectors are in the on position, and the “LOW FUEL” warning light is out.

As previously reported, at the beginning of the flight, the fuselage fuel tank was full, and the left wing fuel tank had 4 to 5 gallons fuel, while the right wing fuel tank had 2 to 3 gallons of fuel. The airplane flight manual indicates that the unusable fuel amount for each wing fuel tank is 3 gallons.

Examination of the left and right flap actuators, and also the five annunciator housings was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory located in Washington, D.C. The flap actuators were submitted in an attempt to determine each actuator position prior to impact, while the annunciator housings were submitted for filament testing and examination in an effort to determine whether any of the bulbs were illuminated at impact. The examination of the flap actuators revealed both exhibited signs of exposure to fire and thermal damage. No witness marks were noted; therefore, the pre-fire flap actuator position could not be determined. Each of the five annunciators housed two annunciator lights that were made up of two bulbs each, for a total of four bulbs per fixture. The annunciator lights bulb filaments for REQ OXY (oxygen required per altitude switch, GEAR (throttle below 20 inches manifold pressure and gear in the up position), A/P INT (autopilot interrupt when using control wheel steering with autopilot on), LOW FUEL (when fuel quantity in the fuselage tank falls below 12 gallons), HTR FAIL (heater overheat circuit breaker is off), AUX HYD (auxiliary hydraulic pump is pumping, DE-ICE (when boots are inflating), R ALT and L ALT (alternators are off line). No bulb filament stretching was noted for both bulbs of the gear, low fuel, auxiliary hydraulic, de-ice, right alternator, or left alternator. Stretching was noted to both bulb filaments for regulator oxygen, while stretching was noted to one bulb filament of autopilot interrupt and heater fail.

Calculations to determine left and right engine rpm at impact were performed using the measured distance for the left and right propeller blades (37 inches and 21.5 inches), respectively. The calculations took into account the estimated groundspeed of 70 knots, which is the VMCa speed of 84 knots minus the headwind component of 14 knots. The formula is to multiply the groundspeed by 1212, and divide that amount by the distance in inches between the propeller slash marks multiplied by the number of propeller blades. Using that formula, the calculations revealed that the left engine rpm was approximately 764, while the right engine rpm was approximately 1,315.

A search of the FAA Service Difficulty Reports for the P/N of the fuel selector switch (980223-001) and P/N of the knob (MS91528-1K4B) revealed no records.

The flight manual supplement indicates that following engine failure during takeoff with insufficient runway remaining, the propellers and throttles are to be advanced to high rpm and to 42 inches manifold pressure, then place the landing gear up, and flaps up. The next step indicates to verify inoperative engine, followed by feathering of the propeller. The next step is to maintain 100 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS) for obstacle clearance, then after obstacle clearance establish best rate of climb speed of 117 knots CAS. The airplane is then to be trimmed, and the suspect engine secured.

The Aerostar Model 601P FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual indicates that with respect to the flaps, flow control valves are installed in the flap system to provide equal fluid flow to the left and right flap actuators thereby ensuring symmetrical flap extension and retraction. A restrictor is also located at each cylinder’s downline port to prevent a rapid asymmetric condition from occurring should the downline rupture when the flaps are extended.


 NTSB Identification: ERA12FA146 
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, January 16, 2012 in Philadelphia, MS
Aircraft: Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P, registration: N700PS
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On January 16, 2012, about 1242 central standard time, an Aerostar Aircraft Corporation PA-60-601P, N700PS, registered to M & H Ventures LLC, experienced a loss of directional control during the initial takeoff and crashed in an open field near Philadelphia Municipal Airport (MPE), Philadelphia, Mississippi. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from MPE to Key Field Airport, Meridian, Mississippi. The airplane sustained substantial damage due to impact and a postcrash fire. The certificated airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

A witness in an airplane waiting short of the runway for the accident pilot to depart watched the takeoff roll from runway 18 and reported the accident airplane became airborne just before the intersection of the ramp and runway. After becoming airborne, the witness noted the airplane immediately, “got squirrelly” and went to the left. The witness stated he taxied onto the runway and back taxied to the approach end of runway 18, where he initiated his takeoff roll; the wind at the time was from 160 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots. After becoming airborne, he noted the airplane had crashed and reported the event on the airport UNICOM frequency.

Another witness saw the airplane while it was airborne and noted it rolled left and “it looked like the wind caught the wing.” The witness reported the airplane rolled onto its left side and pitched nose down impacting the ground.

Still another witness who was located northeast of the accident site reported hearing the airplane begin the takeoff roll. The witness walked outside the building and noticed the airplane, “…veering to the left like it was turning out…” then noticed the airplane rolling onto its left side and pitching nose down impacting the ground.



Richard Howarth (pictured) the founder of HD Machines, LLC, in Meridian, Mississippi, was killed when his plane crashed just after take off Monday afternoon in Philadelphia, Mississippi. Howarth was 48.

Services for Richard Harper Howarth, Jr. will be held Saturday, January 21, 2012, at 2:00 p.m. at Saint Paul's Episcopal Church, with the Reverend Brian Ponder officiating.

Visitation will begin at noon in the church parish hall.

Burial will be at Magnolia Cemetery with Robert Barham Family Funeral Home in charge of the arrangements.

Mr. Howarth, 48, died Monday, January 16 in an airplane accident outside of Philadelphia, MS. He was an accomplished pilot, having served as a highly-decorated naval aviator during the Iraq War, and since 1995 as a pilot for Federal Express.

Following graduation in 1985 from Virginia Tech with a B.S. degree in Finance, Mr. Howarth worked in the commercial lending department at Chemical Bank in New York for one year. He then began a distinguished career in the U.S. Navy, receiving his wings at NAS Meridian, and later graduating from the Navy Fighter Weapons School (Top Gun). He graduated number one in officer commissioning class, received the Distinguished Naval Graduate Award and also graduated number one from Naval Air Training flight school.

Mr. Howarth flew an F-18 during Desert Storm, and led 44 combat missions during that conflict. He was awarded two Air Medals and two Navy Commendation medals with "V" for valor in combat. Upon retiring from active military duty, Mr. Howarth briefly flew commercially for ValuJet Airlines, and for Federal Express since 1995. While at FedEx, Mr. Howarth developed the MD-11 syllabus for training company pilots that is still in use today. He flew several aircraft for FedEx, and was selected to personally train the current cadre of pilot instructors for the company.

Mr. Howarth also founded a very successful vegetation management contract services company in 2004. As president of HD Machines, LLC in Meridian, he supervised all aspects of business operations covering thirteen states ranging from the Southeast to the Midwest.

Mr. Howarth is survived by his wife Cynthia Townsend Howarth; children Juliet Wells Howarth, Cythina Townsend Howarth, Jetson Dow Taylor and his wife Bryn, Brooke Taylor Kauerz, Jamison Clark Taylor and his wife Misty; father Richard Harper Howarth, Sr., mother-in-law Jane Temple Townsend; sisters Sara Howarth Marshall and her husband Tommy and Amelia Howarth Baker and her husband Clark; grandchildren Crosby Taylor, Jet Taylor, Evans Kauerz, Harper Kauerz, and Case Taylor; and nieces Ashley Marshall, Natalie Marshall and Emily Marshall.

The family request that memorials be made to Jacob's Well Recovery Center for Women, 45 Buford Lane, Poplarville, MS 39470 or The Richard H. Howarth, Jr. College Fund, 414 Highways 11 and 80, Meridian, MS 39301.

Aviat A-1C-180 Husky, Shell Aviation LLC, N62WY: Accident occurred December 03, 2011 in McKinney, Texas

http://registry.faa.gov/N62WY

NTSB Identification: CEN12LA125 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, December 03, 2011 in McKinney, TX
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/30/2013
Aircraft: AVIAT AIRCRAFT INC A-1C-180, registration: N62WY
Injuries: 1 Serious.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

After returning from a short night flight, the airplane was parked on a ramp in front of a hangar to deplane the passenger and take another person on a flight. The engine was at idle power and the propeller was turning. The pilot stated that he leaned across the airplane and opened the right door so the passenger could exit. When he saw that she was exiting toward the front of the airplane, he put his arm out and told her to walk toward the rear after exiting. Once the pilot saw that the passenger was clear of the wing strut and walking away, he lowered his arm. A witness who was walking from the hangar toward the airplane saw that the passenger was walking toward the front of the aircraft. He yelled for her to stop, and a second later she hit the propeller from the rear and fell to the ground. He noticed that the pilot immediately shut the engine down and then called emergency services. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-42D, "Hazards of Rotating Propeller and Helicopter Rotor Blade,” states that a propeller under power, even at slow idling speed, has sufficient force to inflict injuries. It cautions that the engine “should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers.” It further states that “when it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger’s route from the aircraft.”

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

The passenger's inadvertent contact with a rotating propeller after exiting the parked airplane. Contributing to the accident were the dark night conditions and the deplaning of the passenger while the propeller was turning.


On December 3, 2011, about 2050 central daylight time, a passenger of a parked Aviat Aircraft Inc., Husky A-1C, N62WY, came into its rotating propeller after exiting the airplane on the ramp of the Aero Country Airport (T31), McKinney, Texas. The airplane was registered to Shell Aviation, LLC, McKinney, Texas, and was being flown by a private pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Dark night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. The passenger was seriously injured and the pilot, who was the only other person remaining on board, was not injured. The flight had originated from T31 and had just returned from flying in the local area to view holiday lights.

A witness who was with the group of people who were at the airport to fly in the airplane that night reported that he and the pilot pushed the airplane out of the hanger approximately 2030 in preparation for the flight. He stated that the weather was VFR with ceilings around 3500 ft and good visibility. Several minutes after the pilot had started the airplane, he walked the first passenger to the aircraft, made specific mention to her of the propeller and to be careful, then helped her enter the aircraft and fasten her seat belts. Once she was situated in the rear seat he walked away from the aircraft and back into the hanger. The airplane then took off to view the holiday lights. After 10-15 minutes passed, he saw the airplane taxi back onto the ramp and park facing toward the north. After a brief discussion with another person in the hangar, he saw the shadow of the passenger exiting the airplane. He then began walking toward the aircraft and noticed that the passenger was walking toward the front of the aircraft. He yelled for her to "STOP", and a second later she hit the propeller from the rear and fell to the ground. He noticed that the pilot immediately shut the engine down and then called emergency services.

According to the pilot (as he recalled the event in a written statement), after landing from the planned 20-minute flight, he stopped the airplane on the ramp with the engine running in anticipation of taking another passenger to view the holiday lights. He opened the door on the right side of the airplane expecting a friend to come out and assist his passenger in deplaning. After he opened the door, the passenger started to get out of the airplane. Upon noticing that she was exiting in front of the strut, the pilot leaned out of his seat and placed his right hand and arm in front of her to divert her away from the front of the airplane and the propeller. He continued to keep his arm extended and told the passenger that she should walk behind the airplane. Once he saw that the passenger was at least beyond where the strut was attached to the wing, and walking away, he dropped his right arm and returned to his normal seat position. The pilot then looked to the left side of the airplane and opened his window to ask who was next to go for a ride. The pilot then heard someone yell, "STOP," and he immediately shut down the engine and saw the passenger lying in front of the airplane.

The NTSB did not travel to the scene of the accident, however, after notification of the event, an FAA inspector responded to the accident scene. He reported that when he arrived, the airplane was hangared, the scene cleaned up, and the injured passenger had been taken to the hospital. Local law enforcement and emergency medical personnel had processed the scene prior to the arrival of the FAA inspector. Both the FAA inspector's statement of his observations and the law enforcement report of the event are included in the supporting docket for this report.

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-42D "Hazards of Rotating Propeller and Helicopter Rotor Blade,” outlines safety considerations for pilots and passengers of aircraft with turning propellers or rotors. The AC is advisory in nature and not mandatory guidance. In part, the circular states that a propeller under power, even at slow idling speed, has sufficient force to inflict fatal injuries. On page 4 of the circular, it cautions that the engine “should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers”...”when it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger’s route from the aircraft.” The Advisory Circular is included in the supporting docket for this report.


NTSB Identification: CEN12LA125
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, December 03, 2011 in McKinney, TX
Aircraft: AVIAT AIRCRAFT INC A-1C-180, registration: N62WY
Injuries: 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On December 3, 2011, about 2050 central daylight time, a passenger of a parked Aviat Aircraft Inc., Husky A-1C, N2364G, contacted its rotating propeller after exiting the airplane on the ramp of the Aero Country Airport (T31), McKinney, Texas. The airplane was registered to Shell Aviation, LLC, McKinney, Texas, and was being flown by a private pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Dark night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The passenger was seriously injured and the pilot, who was the only other person remaining on board, was not injured. The flight had originated from T31 and had just returned from flying in the local area to view holiday lights from the air.

According to the pilot (as he recalls the event), after landing from the planned 20-minute flight, he stopped the airplane on the ramp with the engine running in anticipation of taking another passenger to view the holiday lights. He opened the door on the right side of the airplane expecting a friend to come out and assist his passenger in deplaning. After he opened the door, the passenger started to get out of the airplane. Upon noticing that she was exiting in front of the strut, the pilot leaned out of his seat and placed his right hand and arm in front of her to divert her away from the front of the airplane and the propeller. He continued to keep his arm extended and told the passenger that she should walk behind the airplane. Once he saw that the passenger was at least beyond where the strut was attached to the wing, and walking away, he dropped his right arm and returned to his normal seat position. The pilot then looked to the left side of the airplane and opened his window to ask who was next to go for a ride.

The pilot then heard someone yell, "STOP STOP," and he immediately shut down the engine and saw the passenger lying in front of the airplane.

 

Controller in Near Plane Crash Raises ‘Professionalism’ Concern

Jan. 18 (Bloomberg) -- An air-traffic controller who caused a near mid-air collision in June near Gulfport, Mississippi, had been repeatedly disciplined and was described by another controller as “unsafe,” according to a government report.

The tower also was not properly staffed, and the incident was not logged in after it occurred, as required by the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said in a report released today.

“The investigation revealed a number of deficiencies within the ATC facility that contributed to this incident,” the NTSB said.

The NTSB last May added “professionalism” of pilots and air-traffic controllers to its list of most-wanted safety enhancements. “There have been a disturbing number of individual incidents of non-compliant behavior, intentional misconduct or lack of commitment to essential tasks,” the safety board said on its website last year.

A JetLink Embraer SA ERJ 145 regional jet operated for United Continental Holdings Inc. came within about 300 feet of a privately owned Cessna 172 propeller plane shortly after they took off at almost the same time from different runways at Gulfport-Biloxi International Airport on June 19, the NTSB said. The two planes were carrying 55 people.

‘That Was Close’

“Wow, that was close,” the captain said he told the co- pilot afterward, according to the NTSB report.

The incident was caused by controller Robert Beck, who cleared both planes to take off at about the same time, according to NTSB documents released today.

Another controller told investigators that he saw the planes accelerating for takeoff and tried to warn Beck, who didn’t react, according to the report.

“We take reports like these very seriously,” Doug Church, a spokesman for the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, said in an e-mail. “We welcome the examination of this incident by federal officials and plan to work with the FAA to continue to improve the safety of our aviation system.”

An FAA manager at the airport tower, Ron Burrus, told investigators “it was a miracle that no one died,” according to the documents.

Beck “had a history of discipline problems that included absence without leave,” according to a manager cited in the report.

Controller Dennis Hilton, who also worked at the tower, said he rated Beck’s performance as a controller as “D-,” the NTSB said.

“Mr. Hilton stated that he considered Mr. Beck unsafe and that he avoided working with him when possible,” the NTSB documents said.

The NTSB is investigating cases in which air-traffic controllers fell asleep while on duty last year. The FAA last year reported it had discovered nine instances in which controllers fell asleep or didn’t respond to radio calls from pilots.

 You can read the NTSB incident report by clicking here.

Source: http://www.businessweek.com

NTSB: Near collision over Gulfport "operational error". Cessna 172, N54120 and Embraer ERJ145. Incident occurred June 19, 2011 in Gulfport, MS.

GULFPORT, MS (WLOX) -  The NTSB says "operational error" by an air traffic controller in Gulfport nearly led to a mid-air collision.

An incident report from the NTSB says the incident took place on June 19, 2011.  

The report describes how a small private plane and a 55 passenger regional jet heading to Houston got permission to take off within 16 seconds of each other.  

According to the NTSB findings, the Cessna 172 was on runway 18 and about to liftoff, when the air traffic controller told the 55 passenger regional jet it could roll down runway 14.  

So, how did two planes get take off clearance just 16 seconds apart?  The air traffic controller told investigators, "that from previous experience, he anticipated that the Cessna departing runway 18 would take 3 to 5 minutes to get airborne and the ERJ145 would depart well in advance of the Cessna."  

However, within seconds, the two aircraft were airborne.  And they reportedly passed in front of each other just 300 feet above the airfield.

The NTSB report says, "The Gulfport control tower local controller cleared two aircraft for takeoff from runways with intersecting departure flight paths without ensuring the first aircraft had passed the flight path intersection prior to clearing the second aircraft for takeoff."  

According to the NTSB, "The investigation revealed a number of deficiencies within the ATC facility that contributed to this incident."

Because of the near mid-air collision, managers in the Gulfport control tower will no longer let the air traffic controller work the local control position. 

You can read the NTSB incident report by clicking here.

Nobody on either plane was injured.

NTSB Identification: OPS11IA673A
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of EXPRESSJET AIRLINES INC
Incident occurred Sunday, June 19, 2011 in Gulfport, MS
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/18/2012
Aircraft: EMBRAER EMB-145EP, registration: N13929
Injuries: 55 Uninjured.

N54120, a Cessna 172, called ready for takeoff on runway 18. The tower local controller (LC) cleared the Cessna for takeoff on runway 18. Sixteen seconds later, (Jet Link) BTA2555/Embraer ERJ145 called ready for takeoff for runway 14. The LC cleared the ERJ145 for takeoff. The departure flight path of runway 18 intersects runway 14. The local controller was working the LC position combined with Ground Control (GC), Clearance Delivery (CD)/Flight Data (FD) and Controller-In-Charge (CIC) positions. The Cessna was airborne crossing taxiway Charlie when the ERJ145 passed through the intersecting flight paths airborne in front of the Cessna. Both aircraft were estimated to be at 300 feet. No traffic was issued to either aircraft by the LC. Closest proximity was estimated to be 0 feet vertically and 300 feet laterally. According to FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 3-9-8, Intersecting Runway Separation:

a. Issue traffic information to each aircraft operating on intersecting runways.
b. Separate departing aircraft from an aircraft using an intersecting runway, or runways when the flight paths intersect, by ensuring that the departure does not begin takeoff roll until one of the following exists:
1. The preceding aircraft has departed and passed the intersection, has crossed the departure runway, or is turning to avert any conflict.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
the Gulfport control tower local controller cleared two aircraft for takeoff from runways with intersecting departure flight paths without ensuring the first aircraft had passed the flight path intersection prior to clearing the second aircraft for takeoff.

Jacksonville, Florida: What's that Extra Plane Noise? Offshore Group Conducts Drills


JACKSONVILLE, Fla. -- With an international airport, two military bases and plenty of smaller airports, the skies over Jacksonville are accustomed to air traffic, but extra noise has been filling the skies lately.

The USS Enterprise and the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group are offshore conducting exercises in preparation for the final deployment of the world's first nuclear aircraft carrier, scheduled for later this year.

The drills will continue into the first week of February, according to Navy Public Affairs Officer LCDR Mike Kafka.

Chief Mass Communication Specialist Stephen M. White with USS Enterprise Public Affairs explained the carrier left its homeport in Norfolk, Virginia, on Jan. 11, to participate in a Composite Unit Training Exercise (COMPTUEX) and Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX).

COMPTUEX is designed to hone warfare skills and maintain unit proficiency.

"It's the final exercise to ensure Enterprise is combat ready," said Capt. William C. Hamilton, Jr., Enterprise commanding officer. "We're looking forward to working with the full strike group conducting combat exercises across the full spectrum of battle spaces."

That spectrum for the next few weeks includes Jacksonville's airspace, leading to unusual jet noises in the area from the more than 4,500 sailors and Marines involved.

JTFEX tests the group's ability to operate with coalition forces in a hostile environment.

"By the end of COMPTUEX and JTFEX, we will have a combat-ready strike group that will be ready to execute the Navy's mission anywhere in the world," said Rear Adm. Walter E. Carter, Jr., commander, Enterprise Carrier Strike Group.

The strike group consists of the USS Enterprise, Carrier Air Wing 1, Destroyer Squadron 2, guided missile cruiser USS Vicksburg, and three guided missile destroyers: USS Porter, USS James E. Williams and USS Nitze.

First Coast News

Red River, Wisconsin: Local, state and federal agencies practice for air disaster.




RED RIVER - Tens of people are dead and many more injured after a plane crashes onto the ice on the bay of Green Bay - sort of.

A simulated crash of a flight from Austin Straubel International Airport Wednesday is to test local, state and federal agencies' response.

"We want to make sure that we have an efficient response to any type of event that could occur, in our county," said Cullen Peltier, Emergency Management Director for Brown County.

Taking place at Red River County Park in the town of Red River in Kewaunee County, first responders are tasked with rescuing the simulated air crash victims from the water and ice, determine their conditions and communicate that information back to the Emergency Operations Center in Brown County.

FOX 11's Bill Miston is working on this story and will have more of FOX 11 News at Five.

Rescue Drill Prepares for Plane Crash on Green Bay


Local and federal agencies put their preparedness plans to the test Wednesday morning in a plane crash simulation on the bay of Green Bay.

The exercise simulated the crash landing of a commuter plane on ice-covered Green Bay, similar to the deadly Air Florida Flight 90 crash in the Potomac River in Washington, DC, in 1982.

The drill is designed to test the coordinated local, state, and federal response to a disaster situation.

It lets agencies evaluate their response plans, coordinate their rescue efforts, and test their communication skills.

"Everyone has problems with communications across the board, so having a plan in place and making sure everyone can talk on the right radio channel is extremely important. If you can't tell people where you need the help, it's not going to get there," Lieutenant Nick Craig, Green Bay Fire Department, said.

The U.S. Coast Guard, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, and Brown County Sheriff's Department were among the agencies participating.

Disaster drill simulates plane crash in icy Green Bay waters


A simulated airplane crash on Green Bay’s frigid bay allowed emergency crews Wednesday to test their ability to handle such a catastrophe.

At least 100 firefighters, paramedics and other emergency responders participated in the effort. They tried their hands at navigating the icy bay, rescuing victims and recovering bodies.

Officials said it was not only the first disaster drill on the frozen waterfront, it was also the first time Austin Straubel International Airport staffers participated in a simulated disaster away from the airport.

“We thought it would be an excellent exercise,” airport director Tom Miller said. “Not only does it test the people, it tests the resources.”

Miller and other officials gathered inside the Brown County Emergency Management center, while responders from area police departments and fire departments headed to the crash scene at Red River County Park along the bay north of Dyckesville.

Others huddled inside a De Pere church, where they attempted to console simulated family members of those killed or wounded in the airplane crash.

Participating agencies included the U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration, state Department of Natural Resources, the Brown County Sheriff’s Department, Kewaunee County Sheriff’s Department, Green Bay Fire Department and Sturgeon Bay Fire Department, among others.

Three Green Bay hospitals agreed to accept mock casualties from the crash scene.

Cullen Peltier, emergency management director for Brown County, said participants would reassemble later to assess their management of the catastrophe and identify areas for improvement. A report on the mock disaster should be ready by April.

“What we want to see is how we’re all going to work together,” Peltier said. “That’s really the main thing.”

Federal law requires Austin Straubel to conduct a major preparedness exercise every three years. When the Coast Guard separately expressed an interest in doing a disaster drill on the bay, coordinated plans began to come together.

From six to eight months of planning emerged a mock catastrophe orchestrated in vivid detail: an airplane headed to Austin Straubel instead slammed into the frozen bay and broke into pieces, killing several people and sending 21 others to the hospital.

“This is a very real simulation,” said Rear Adm. Michael Parks, district commander for the Coast Guard. “The response has been excellent by everybody involved.”

There was no actual airplane involved, but people posing as wounded passengers were treated and loaded onto a bus for transport to hospitals. Divers braved the icy waters to simulate rescuing survivors and recovering bodies.

Steve Winton, a volunteer firefighter from Wisconsin Rapids, portrayed a survivor and tried his best to give rescuers a realistic experience. Winton said it was important for those involved in the exercise to learn as much as possible.

“I’m going to hopefully give them good knowledge of treating real people,” he said. “Hopefully, what I put in today will help them in the future.”

Front nose gear did not lock properly: Stricken plane lands without incident at Arlington Municipal Airport (KGKY), Arlington, Texas

NBC 5
A small plane landed successfully at Arlington Municipal Airport after experiencing nose gear trouble.

Star-Telegram / Patrick Walker
A twin-engine aircraft coasts to a stop in the distance at Arlington Municipal Airport.

Star-Telegram / Patrick Walker
Emergency trucks await the arrival of a stricken twin-engine plane at Arlington Municipal Airport.


A Travel Air flight inbound to Arlington Municipal Airport landed safely after an issue with the nose gear caused an airport alert.

According to Karen VanWinkle, the assistant airport manager, the front nose landing gear on a Travel Air flight inbound to the airport was not locked down.

Emergency crews were on scene as a precaution in case the gear collapsed.

Chopper 5 was on the scene as the plane landed.

A twin-engine plane landed safely at Arlington Municipal Airport about 1:20 p.m. Wednesday after having problems with its front landing gear, Fire Department officials said.

Firefighters from Station 12 at the airport staged near the runway as the pilot flew around to burn off fuel.

The plane coasted to a stop after touching down without further incident.

Source:  http://www.nbcdfw.com

LPFM Fine Reduced in FAA Interference Case

January 18, 2012

A low-power FM station that interfered with FAA frequencies in Florida will have to pay a $1,500 fine for operating without an FCC-certified transmitter. But it convinced the commission to slash the penalty from the original $12,000.

Power Ministries is the licensee of WRLE(LP) in Dunnellon, Fla. Last September the Enforcement Bureau issued a notice of apparent liability, saying the station had operated with a non-certified transmitter for about three months the year before. The commission had responded to a complaint of interference from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Jacksonville Center to air traffic control frequency 133.75 MHz.

The proposed fine was $12,000 but the station appealed in a letter from Power Ministries owner Anthony Downes.

The FCC now has rejected his arguments that the fine should be waived on the grounds that he had acted promptly and had not been aware of interference. (Among other things, the FCC said, the station “deliberately disregarded” an agent’s request that it immediately turn off the transmitter to stop the threat to air traffic control, instead allowing the transmitter to operate unlawfully for another 30 minutes.)

But the commission has accepted the station’s documentation of inability to pay, and it cut the penalty to about 13% of the original amount. “If Power believes that the reduced forfeiture still poses a financial hardship, it may request full payment in installments,” it added.

In the original notice the FCC said the station had been using a PTEK amplifier model FM250E and CSI exciter model EX20F for the period in question. “After the station owner shut down the transmitter, the spurious emissions and interference to the FAA ceased,” the commission wrote.

Source:  http://www.radioworld.com

Los Angeles says Ontario International Airport (KONT) not for sale

LOS ANGELES -- The Los Angeles operator of Southern California's Ontario International Airport says Ontario city leaders are offering to buy the airport for $50 million but it's not for sale.

Los Angeles World Airports, which operates the Ontario and Los Angeles International airports, says in a statement Tuesday night that the $50 million doesn't come close to the value of the airport or Los Angeles' investment.

The Riverside Press-Enterprise says control of the airport has been an issue since passenger traffic began plunging in 2007. Ontario and other San Bernardino County officials have accused Los Angeles of neglecting Ontario in favor of Los Angeles International Airport.

Ontario International is about 40 miles east of downtown Los Angeles.

Source:  http://www.sacbee.com