SOUTH BEND, Ind. -- Investigators are sifting through the remains of three homes on North Iowa Street for pieces of airplane that may have been left behind during the recovery of the plane wreckage. What happens to those homes now?
Kurt Gabrielson's company, Disaster Pro Services, deals with disaster restoration.
He says it's traumatic when your home is destroyed by a fire, tornado or in this case, a plane crash.
"It just leaves everybody in chaos; it's a very rough thing to go through,” said Gabrielson.
Gabrielson says there is no easy road to recovery.
"Everybody's insurance company is different, and your policy could be different, so until you know that, it's a long process,” said Gabrielson.
That process will be a little longer for these homeowners because the National Transportation Safety Board is combing through the rubble to make sure they have every piece of plane wreckage.
"With the plane being down and the federal government being involved with this now, everything is kind of on hold,” said Gabrielson.
But the NTSB isn't the only obstacle to a quick recovery for these residents.
"When you start getting into whether jet fuel's involved or anything else, then the EPA's involved too; so you have to have the right people,” said Gabrielson.
Gabrielson says the right people are in the area, but you have to seek them out.
"You want to find someone that you can work with that you can trust. If you don't have that feeling of trust towards the person that's what you need. And if you don't have that then, that's when you need to keep interviewing,” said Gabrielson.
Gabrielson says psychologically, it can be difficult not only for the owners of the damaged homes, but also the residents of the neighborhood.
The visible damage is a reminder of what happened so close to home.
Story and Video: http://www.abc57.com
Wednesday, March 20, 2013
JumpSeat offers seats on chartered planes - if you pass the interview
Imagine flying to Las Vegas on a private jet for a little more than $500.
It might be possible - provided you pass the interview stage.
A new service called JumpSeat seeks to pair spontaneous travelers with wealthier individuals and families who have already chartered a plane but want to lower their costs. The idea is to fill seats that otherwise would go empty without greatly changing the experience.
But you can't just buy a ticket and board the plane. For now, founder and chief executive Justin Sullivan or one of his colleagues interviews all prospective passengers. The goal: to ensure the extra travelers don't bother whoever paid $4,000 or $10,000 or $50,000 to charter the plane. Often, that means keeping conversation to a minimum.
"Ultimately, it is a social exercise," Sullivan said. "It is going to be a cultural phenomenon. But part of building community is instilling a sense of proper etiquette."
Massachusetts-based JumpSeat, which has been offering the service for about a month, is one of a handful of relatively new operations that seeks to open private jet travel to more people.
Most of the new entrants seek to remedy inefficiencies in the jet market, in which planes often fly either empty during repositioning flights or with many unfilled seats. Many of JumpSeat's competitors have generally focused on renting entire jets for cheaper-than-market prices, rather than individual seats. JumpSeat offers customers both options.
Sullivan, a seven-year veteran of the private jet industry, said it is wrong to assume charter customers have unlimited funds and don't worry about spending. Even many wealthier customers jump at the chance to save money, especially if they can do it by carrying a couple of passengers that they'll hardly see once on board.
"What we have found is that if they don't have to compromise anything else - they can still pick their equipment, they still don't have to deal with the TSA, they can still select their itinerary - they are willing to share empty seats on their aircraft if it offsets their costs," he said.
David Rosenblum, a Florida-based businessman, said he used JumpSeat recently to rent out two seats of an eight-seat Cessna Citation X for a flight between Miami and Van Nuys. JumpSeat took a cut of his take - that's how the company makes money - but he still made out well on the deal.
"Basically, I got $10,000 back," Rosenblum said. "They were a nice couple. They didn't really talk a whole lot. We sat in one area, and they sat in the other. For four people on an eight-passenger plane, there's plenty of room. "
At most airports, private jets passengers don't go through security, which means JumpSeat needs to be careful about whom it selects to fly. The company advertises that it does background checks on passengers and checks names against the federal government's current no-fly list.
Sullivan also wants to ensure his passengers are relatively well behaved. He does not, for example, want to sell a seat to a financial planner whose main goal is to pitch a product to a wealthy person who chartered the plane.
"This comes up all the time," Sullivan said. "People ask, 'How do I know my counter party is someone I want to share a plane with?' We want to get some basic level of comfort for people we are going to essentially vouch for. "
Sullivan likens his site to Airbnb, which allows people to rent out rooms, apartments and houses to travelers. Many of the prices on that wildly popular site, operational in 192 countries, go for less than the price of a hotel room.
Richard P. Rumelt, a professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, called JumpSeat's business model intriguing but expressed skepticism about how the company might attract regular customers.
"Typically, the value proposition of a private jet is the flexibility - I get to go where I want to go when I want," Rumelt said. "But if you schedule it like a commercial airline, I don't see what the value is - at least the value that might be repeated. I can see people doing it once. "
Take March 31, when two seats are available from Los Angeles International Airport to Eagle, Colo., near popular ski destinations, for $5,000. That's a great deal for a flight on an eight-seat Cessna Citation X, but the cost is far greater than the price of a first-class ticket. And since the plane will leave at some point between 9 and 11:30 a.m. and has no return leg, it's only appropriate for adventurous travelers with lots of disposable income.
For JumpSeat to become less of a social experiment and more of a money-making enterprise, it may need to build up its network between major cities. It could work well on routes where there is considerable private jet travel, such as between Van Nuys and Las Vegas. If Sullivan can sign up enough customers who have planes, he might be able to offer seats on several flights to Las Vegas in one day, giving fliers choices.
And with the flight to Las Vegas so short, the price would be considerably lower.
Sullivan said users might be able to find a last-minute seat to Las Vegas, perhaps on a four-seat light jet, for somewhere between $500 and $800.
"As the community builds to a critical mass," he said, "you'll be able to set your watch to the notion that you will be able to hop on a JumpSeat. "
Story and Reaction/Comments: http://www.dailybreeze.com
It might be possible - provided you pass the interview stage.
A new service called JumpSeat seeks to pair spontaneous travelers with wealthier individuals and families who have already chartered a plane but want to lower their costs. The idea is to fill seats that otherwise would go empty without greatly changing the experience.
But you can't just buy a ticket and board the plane. For now, founder and chief executive Justin Sullivan or one of his colleagues interviews all prospective passengers. The goal: to ensure the extra travelers don't bother whoever paid $4,000 or $10,000 or $50,000 to charter the plane. Often, that means keeping conversation to a minimum.
"Ultimately, it is a social exercise," Sullivan said. "It is going to be a cultural phenomenon. But part of building community is instilling a sense of proper etiquette."
Massachusetts-based JumpSeat, which has been offering the service for about a month, is one of a handful of relatively new operations that seeks to open private jet travel to more people.
Most of the new entrants seek to remedy inefficiencies in the jet market, in which planes often fly either empty during repositioning flights or with many unfilled seats. Many of JumpSeat's competitors have generally focused on renting entire jets for cheaper-than-market prices, rather than individual seats. JumpSeat offers customers both options.
Sullivan, a seven-year veteran of the private jet industry, said it is wrong to assume charter customers have unlimited funds and don't worry about spending. Even many wealthier customers jump at the chance to save money, especially if they can do it by carrying a couple of passengers that they'll hardly see once on board.
"What we have found is that if they don't have to compromise anything else - they can still pick their equipment, they still don't have to deal with the TSA, they can still select their itinerary - they are willing to share empty seats on their aircraft if it offsets their costs," he said.
David Rosenblum, a Florida-based businessman, said he used JumpSeat recently to rent out two seats of an eight-seat Cessna Citation X for a flight between Miami and Van Nuys. JumpSeat took a cut of his take - that's how the company makes money - but he still made out well on the deal.
"Basically, I got $10,000 back," Rosenblum said. "They were a nice couple. They didn't really talk a whole lot. We sat in one area, and they sat in the other. For four people on an eight-passenger plane, there's plenty of room. "
At most airports, private jets passengers don't go through security, which means JumpSeat needs to be careful about whom it selects to fly. The company advertises that it does background checks on passengers and checks names against the federal government's current no-fly list.
Sullivan also wants to ensure his passengers are relatively well behaved. He does not, for example, want to sell a seat to a financial planner whose main goal is to pitch a product to a wealthy person who chartered the plane.
"This comes up all the time," Sullivan said. "People ask, 'How do I know my counter party is someone I want to share a plane with?' We want to get some basic level of comfort for people we are going to essentially vouch for. "
Sullivan likens his site to Airbnb, which allows people to rent out rooms, apartments and houses to travelers. Many of the prices on that wildly popular site, operational in 192 countries, go for less than the price of a hotel room.
Richard P. Rumelt, a professor at the UCLA Anderson School of Management, called JumpSeat's business model intriguing but expressed skepticism about how the company might attract regular customers.
"Typically, the value proposition of a private jet is the flexibility - I get to go where I want to go when I want," Rumelt said. "But if you schedule it like a commercial airline, I don't see what the value is - at least the value that might be repeated. I can see people doing it once. "
Take March 31, when two seats are available from Los Angeles International Airport to Eagle, Colo., near popular ski destinations, for $5,000. That's a great deal for a flight on an eight-seat Cessna Citation X, but the cost is far greater than the price of a first-class ticket. And since the plane will leave at some point between 9 and 11:30 a.m. and has no return leg, it's only appropriate for adventurous travelers with lots of disposable income.
For JumpSeat to become less of a social experiment and more of a money-making enterprise, it may need to build up its network between major cities. It could work well on routes where there is considerable private jet travel, such as between Van Nuys and Las Vegas. If Sullivan can sign up enough customers who have planes, he might be able to offer seats on several flights to Las Vegas in one day, giving fliers choices.
And with the flight to Las Vegas so short, the price would be considerably lower.
Sullivan said users might be able to find a last-minute seat to Las Vegas, perhaps on a four-seat light jet, for somewhere between $500 and $800.
"As the community builds to a critical mass," he said, "you'll be able to set your watch to the notion that you will be able to hop on a JumpSeat. "
Story and Reaction/Comments: http://www.dailybreeze.com
Pheasants: When Your Hunting Truck is a Piper Super Cub -Field & Stream
March 20, 2013
By Phil Bourjaily, Field & Stream
Occasionally we have discussed hunting vehicles in this space. Photographer Dave Tunge sent me this picture of his “hunting truck,” a Piper Super Cub. “The Super Cub is a poor man’s helicopter,” he told me. “I can land almost anywhere with it.” He uses flotation tires inflated to just 6-8 psi (“like pillows”) he says, that allow him to roll over rocks the size of softballs and ruts in the fields without feeling them.
With birds scarce around Yankton, Tunge is able to reach farms in better pheasant areas 150 to 200 miles away in a short time. He lands right in the field, hunts, and flies home. His 15-month old Lab loves to fly as well.
Story, Photo, Reaction/Comments: http://www.fieldandstream.com
By Phil Bourjaily, Field & Stream
Occasionally we have discussed hunting vehicles in this space. Photographer Dave Tunge sent me this picture of his “hunting truck,” a Piper Super Cub. “The Super Cub is a poor man’s helicopter,” he told me. “I can land almost anywhere with it.” He uses flotation tires inflated to just 6-8 psi (“like pillows”) he says, that allow him to roll over rocks the size of softballs and ruts in the fields without feeling them.
With birds scarce around Yankton, Tunge is able to reach farms in better pheasant areas 150 to 200 miles away in a short time. He lands right in the field, hunts, and flies home. His 15-month old Lab loves to fly as well.
Story, Photo, Reaction/Comments: http://www.fieldandstream.com
Free Flight Friday: Win a Round Trip to Boston on Cape Air from the Augusta State Airport (KAUG), Augusta, Maine
‘Free Flight Friday’ is back on 92 Moose
Every Friday on the Moose Morning Show you can win round trip tickets to Boston from Cape Air and the Augusta Airport. Just listen to win.
You can also sign up to win a pair to be drawn every week!
Read more here: http://92moose.fm/free-flight-friday/
CK's, Tampa airport's rotating rooftop restaurant, closing in June
TAMPA -- Michael Koller remembers The View at CK's restaurant in its prime.
It had gleaming brass and mahogany finishes, romantic booths and elegant wine displays. A maitre d' greeted guests in the lounge and escorted them up to the dining room in a private elevator.
Koller, who worked as a bartender at the Tampa Airport Marriott's rotating rooftop restaurant in the early 1980s, called it the "happening" place to wine and dine back in the day.
That's why he was sorry to hear the restaurant will close for good this summer.
"It's a unique thing," said Koller, who now works as a contractor at the airport. "I've lived here for a very long time, and it's an icon."
The 40-year-old restaurant, which serves steak and seafood entrees, will cease its spinning on June 29, said Zach Curry, general manager of the Tampa Airport Marriott.
The hotel already serves breakfast and lunch in its Café Elise off the lobby, Curry said, so management decided to consolidate all the food options to one venue. CK's employees will move down to work in Café Elise, and the rotating restaurant will be converted to special event space.
"Having all the food and beverage in one place is really the ideal move for us," he said.
* * * * *
CK's, which has panoramic views of the city and the bay, is about as old as Tampa International Airport itself. Through the years it has remained a constant in an area that has developed and expanded.
But times change, said former Tampa mayor Dick Greco. There are new restaurants in the neighborhood, and people don't stop to eat at the airport as often as once did.
"You hate to see something that you're used to disappear, but it happens," he said.
Greco used to take out-of-town guests to CK's to get a taste of Tampa and see the views, he said. He remembers how women who put their purses on the floor beside them sometimes would have to get up and retrieve them from across the room after the floor spun beneath them.
"We used to go there just because it was different," said Greco, who plans to take his wife there for dinner one more time before the restaurant closes.
The Tampa Airport Marriott is asking anyone with photographs of CK's in its heyday to send them in. Staffers want to see photos of everything from proms to birthday dinners to anniversary parties, and keep them as mementos, Curry said. The photos will go up on a display board for all to see and, in exchange, CK's will give guests a free dessert.
For Koller, the closing means saying goodbye to a place where he made many memories and long-lasting friendships.
"I'll miss it," Koller said. "It's not going to be the same, for sure."
Story and Reaction/Comments: http://www2.tbo.com
It had gleaming brass and mahogany finishes, romantic booths and elegant wine displays. A maitre d' greeted guests in the lounge and escorted them up to the dining room in a private elevator.
Koller, who worked as a bartender at the Tampa Airport Marriott's rotating rooftop restaurant in the early 1980s, called it the "happening" place to wine and dine back in the day.
That's why he was sorry to hear the restaurant will close for good this summer.
"It's a unique thing," said Koller, who now works as a contractor at the airport. "I've lived here for a very long time, and it's an icon."
The 40-year-old restaurant, which serves steak and seafood entrees, will cease its spinning on June 29, said Zach Curry, general manager of the Tampa Airport Marriott.
The hotel already serves breakfast and lunch in its Café Elise off the lobby, Curry said, so management decided to consolidate all the food options to one venue. CK's employees will move down to work in Café Elise, and the rotating restaurant will be converted to special event space.
"Having all the food and beverage in one place is really the ideal move for us," he said.
* * * * *
CK's, which has panoramic views of the city and the bay, is about as old as Tampa International Airport itself. Through the years it has remained a constant in an area that has developed and expanded.
But times change, said former Tampa mayor Dick Greco. There are new restaurants in the neighborhood, and people don't stop to eat at the airport as often as once did.
"You hate to see something that you're used to disappear, but it happens," he said.
Greco used to take out-of-town guests to CK's to get a taste of Tampa and see the views, he said. He remembers how women who put their purses on the floor beside them sometimes would have to get up and retrieve them from across the room after the floor spun beneath them.
"We used to go there just because it was different," said Greco, who plans to take his wife there for dinner one more time before the restaurant closes.
The Tampa Airport Marriott is asking anyone with photographs of CK's in its heyday to send them in. Staffers want to see photos of everything from proms to birthday dinners to anniversary parties, and keep them as mementos, Curry said. The photos will go up on a display board for all to see and, in exchange, CK's will give guests a free dessert.
For Koller, the closing means saying goodbye to a place where he made many memories and long-lasting friendships.
"I'll miss it," Koller said. "It's not going to be the same, for sure."
Story and Reaction/Comments: http://www2.tbo.com
Hawker Beechcraft 390 Premier IA, Digicut Systems, N26DK: Accident occurred March 17, 2013 in South Bend, Indiana
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the passenger-rated-pilot "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is "RESET" by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary "RESET" toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Buss, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle was pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint erosion that was consistent with door being abraded in the closed position. Additionally, there was evidence that the left tire had pressed against the interior of the door when the exterior abrasion had occurred. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
===========
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal,3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures and terrain following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Regional Airport (KSBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger occupying the cockpit seats were fatally injured. An additional two passengers and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (KRVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1358 central daylight time.
According to preliminary air traffic control information, at 1610:31, the accident pilot established radio communications with South Bend Approach Control while at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE intersection and told the pilot to expect a visual approach to runway 9R. At 1611:44, the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:06, the flight was cleared to 3,000 feet msl. At 1615:00, the approach controller told the pilot to make a 5-degree left turn to align with runway 9R and asked the pilot to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:07, the pilot declared an emergency because of a lack of engine power, reporting that they were "dead stick" and without any power. About 23 seconds later, at 1615:30, the pilot transmitted "we've lost all power, and we have no hydraulics." When the controller asked if the airplane remained controllable, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller advised that all runways at KSBN were available for landing and issued the current winds, which were 130-degrees at 10 knots. At 1615:22, the pilot transmitted that the airplane’s navigational systems were inoperative and requested a radar vector toward the airport. The controller replied that the airport was 9 miles directly ahead of the airplane’s current position. At 1616:12, the controller told the pilot to turn 10-degrees left to intersect runway 9R. At 1616:15, the pilot replied "26DK, turning left." No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:58, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to runway 9R with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low descent into a nearby residential community.
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SOUTH BEND – Clean up on North Iowa Street is already in progress, and we could soon see crews haul away contaminated ground soil and debris.
The Indiana Department of Environmental Management got its first look at the damage Wednesday but initially had to look from outside the orange fencing, because the National Transportation Safety Board still had control of the scene and hadn't released it to the city yet.
However, South Bend mayor's Chief of Staff Mike Schmuhl said the NTSB released the scene to city officials during the afternoon, meaning demolition can start and insurance adjusters can assess the damage.
Most of the damage caused by the plane’s jet fuel and fumes damaged the houses it hit and the ground soil around them, said IDEM spokeswoman Amy Hartsock. The agency will work with a clean-up contractor to haul the contaminated material from the site.
According to Hartsock and NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway, payment for the clean-up process generally falls on the source that caused the contamination. Since the damage came from that private jet, its owner and/or insurance company would be responsible. Insurance representatives for the owner of the plane were on scene Wednesday, Hartsock added, saying IDEM is on site to work with those companies and give the clean-up contractor guidance.
Just before noon, an excavator rolled back down Iowa Street as the NTSB, firefighters and others went back into what used to be a house to search for remaining pieces and parts of the Hawker Beechcraft Premier jet that crashed there Sunday.
The city shut down Iowa for about 90 minutes while crews searched the scene, primarily focusing on the home that sustained the most damage.
Investigators are putting the jet back together inside a secure hangar at South Bend Regional Airport and searching for any clues that might help them figure out what caused the plane to go down.
WSBT made several calls to officials at South Bend’s police, fire and public works departments Wednesday to try and get an idea of how many overtime hours crews have worked since the plane crashed and how much it will cost.
The chief of finance at the South Bend Fire Department told WSBT it’s his understanding the city will pay for that overtime initially but can later turn it in to insurance companies and likely be reimbursed for the costs.
Mayor Buttigieg’s chief of staff told WSBT the city is trying to get the neighborhood back together before it compiles and releases details about the financial impact of the crash.
WSBT also learned why it’s been a challenge to identify which of the two deceased men was flying the plane.
According to St. Joseph County Coroner Michael O’Connell, M.D., both the owner of the plane, Wes Caves, and another man in the plane, former Oklahoma University football star Steve Davis, were ejected from their seats and were found in one of the houses, making it impossible to tell who was piloting and who was co-piloting the aircraft.
Source: http://www.wsbt.com
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORPORATION 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 3 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger, who were occupying the cockpit seats, were fatally injured. An additional two passengers, who were seated in the cabin area, and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed the Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (RVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1356 central daylight time.
According to air traffic control (ATC) information, after departing RVS, the accident flight proceeded toward the intended destination while receiving normal ATC services. The flight was eventually cleared to a final cruise altitude of 41,000 feet (FL410). The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) contained about 31 minutes of cockpit conversation/audio and radio communications. At 1545:31, the beginning of the CVR recording, the pilot was discussing the airplane's fuel status and how much fuel would be required for the return flight. The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate various flight management system functions to the pilot-rated-passenger. At 1546:08, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked "a lot of stuff to learn." The pilot continued to explain and demonstrate the features of the flight management system, the use of his mobile tablet as an electronic flight bag, and the airplane's various weight limitations.
At 1552:17, the pilot established contact with Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and reported being level at FL410. The controller subsequently cleared the flight to descend to 24,000 feet (FL240). After receiving the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger discussed how to initiate a descent using the autopilot's vertical speed mode. The pilot explained how to use airplane pitch and engine power and to maintain a desired airspeed during the descent. At 1555:22, the pilot stated "we're up more speed, so we got to get our power back. gettin' ready to start beeping at us. got to bring it back." At 1555:27, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning for 13.5 seconds. At 1555:31, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot, "just pull it way back?" The pilot replied, "well, just get it out of the line. and we got to get it so, that it trends -- there you go -- there you go -- now give it -- it ends, there you go." The pilot continued to explain how to maintain a desired airspeed. At 1555:55, the pilot-rated-passenger remarked, "I just hate chasin' the darn thing." The pilot replied, "huh, how many hours you got flying this jet?" The pilot-rated-passenger stated, "well, I know, but I'm just saying it's just, you know, uncomfortable. Creates alarm in the back -- throttle up, throttle down."
The pilot then explained how to setup a descent while maintaining a specified airspeed. At 1557:29, the pilot-rated passenger stated, "so, pull back?" The pilot replied, "little bit. little bit. keep working it back 'cause that tells you where you're gonna be in six seconds. so, right now, you're going to be at the line in six seconds, so you want to continue to trend back. so yeah. so, just take two seventy or something like that." At 1557:53, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to "just keep us out the red."
At 1558:08, the controller cleared the flight direct to South Bend. After acknowledging the direct clearance, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger how to program the flight management system to proceed direct to the destination airport. The pilot then discussed the airplane's indicated airspeed, ground speed, and how to cross-check the airplane's flight attitude with the backup cockpit instrumentation. At 1559:24, the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) recording is audible over the radio channel. At 1559:42, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot if they needed to engage engine heat. The pilot replied that they would wait until they get an ice indication light. At 1600:34, the pilot-rated-passenger asked the pilot "okay. pull back on the power?"
At 1601:35, the controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 20,000 feet (FL200). At 1602:13, the pilot discussed the current weather conditions that he had obtained from the ATIS recording, the expected wind correction during the approach and landing, the minimum descent altitude during the instrument approach, and the landing reference speed. At 1603:22, the controller asked the pilot to expedite a descent to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). At 1603:51, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "watch your speed" and "very good, very good. great speed management."
At 1605:08, a sound similar to the altitude alert was heard, the pilot announced "thousand away" and told the passenger-rated-pilot "okay, now we can come nose back up." At 1605:29, the pilot stated "let's go to the stop... to the click (detent)... MCT (maximum continuous thrust)." At 1606:14, the CVR recorded a sound similar to the airspeed overspeed warning that lasted for 11.4 seconds. At 1606:20, the pilot stated "that's what a check pilot will do, is he'll give you three things to do... when he knows you're trending in the wrong direction." At 1606:32, the pilot said "your throttles."
At 1606:49, the controller cleared the flight to expedite a descent to maintain 11,000 feet msl. After acknowledging the descent clearance, the pilot and pilot-rated passenger continued to discuss how to maintain airspeed during a cruise descent. At 1607:23, the controller asked the pilot for a ride report. The pilot replied that the weather conditions had been "smooth all the way." At 1607:52, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger to maintain 290 knots. The pilot-rated-passenger replied "okay, where is it?" The pilot responded "two ninety would be more power." At 1608:44, the controller issued a heading change for traffic sequencing. The pilot then explained how to promote a waypoint using the flight management system and how to plan for a descent to the selected waypoint. At 1610:11, the controller cleared the flight direct the destination airport and to contact South Bend Approach Control.
At 1610:32, the pilot established communications with South Bend Approach Control and reported being level at 11,000 feet msl. The approach controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE, the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 9R instrument approach, but to expect a visual approach to the airport. The pilot then explained how to promote KNUTE as the next active waypoint within the flight management system, and how to plan for the descent to the waypoint. At 1611:45, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:07, the approach controller cleared the flight to descend and maintain 3,000 feet msl.
After receiving the descent clearance to 3,000 feet msl, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "let's power back. let's bring it back to uh -- let's trend toward uh two twenty, two ten." The pilot-rated-passenger acknowledged and the pilot replied "and we'll have to come way out of it to do that." At 1613:30, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. The pilot then verbalized a descent checklist and turned on the seatbelt cabin chime. At 1614:14, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "we gotta get -- just pull -- just pull the power out." At 1614:18, the pilot-rated-passenger asked, "just pull it on down?" The pilot replied, "yeah, let's -- let's get back to two hundred (knots)." At 1614:21, the cockpit area microphone recorded another sound consistent with a decrease in engine speed. At 1614:26, the cockpit area microphone recorded the sound of two clicks. At 1614:27, there was a brief interruption in electrical power, an autopilot disconnect chime, and two unidentified tones. According to ATC radar track data, at 1614:28, the final radar return with an accompanying mode-C altitude return was recorded at 6,700 feet msl. At that time, the flight was located about 18 miles southwest of the destination airport. At 1614:29, the pilot said "uh-oh" and the pilot-rated-passenger replied "what?" At 1614:33, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 3.5 seconds. At 1614:35, the pilot told the pilot-rated-passenger "you went back behind the stops and we lost power." (The airplane throttle quadrant had a mechanical stop at the flight idle power position, which required lifting finger levers, or pull-up locks, to further retard the throttles into the fuel cut-off position.)
At 1614:43, the pilot said "okay let's see here... boost pumps are on... okay we are dead stick." At 1614:56, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was heard for 10.9 seconds. At 1615:01, the approach controller told the pilot to turn five degrees left for runway 9R and to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:02, the cockpit area microphone recorded a sound similar to an engine starter/generator spooling up; however, according to a sound spectrum study, engine power was not restored during the attempted restart. At 1615:08, the pilot told the approach controller, "uh... South Bend, we have an emergency, two six delta kilo. dead engines, dead stick, no power." The controller asked if he needed assistance and the pilot replied "affirm." Between 1615:19 and 1615:27, there was a sustained electrical power interruption to the CVR. At 1615:30, the controller asked for the pilot's intentions and the pilot replied "uh, we've lost all power and we have no hydraulics." At 1615:32, there was the sound similar to an altitude alert.
At 1615:38, the controller stated that the airport would have emergency equipment standing-by and asked if the airplane was controllable. At 1615:42, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller told the pilot that all of the runways were available for landing and issued the current wind condition. At 1615:53, the pilot told the controller "uh, we have no navigation. if you could give us a vector please... we have no heading either. which -- you're gonna have to tell us which way to fly." The controller replied that the airplane was about 9 miles from the airport, which was at the 12-o'clock position. At 1616:09, the pilot-rated-passenger stated "there's the airport" and the pilot responded "Where? -- Okay." At 1616:12, the sound similar to the landing gear warning horn was audible until the end of the CVR recording. At 1616:13, the approach controller told the pilot to turn left 10 degrees. At 1616:16, the pilot replied "two six delta, turning left." At 1616:32, the CVR stopped recording while the airplane was still airborne with both engines still inoperative.
No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:59, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to the runway with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low, rolling descent into a nearby residential community.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
--- Pilot ---
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. He was type-rated for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet. His last aviation medical examination was completed on January 22, 2013, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate. The medical certificate had a limitation that it was not valid for any certificate classification after January 31, 2014. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
The pilot's flight history was reconstructed using a partially completed pilot logbook, a spreadsheet flight log, several applications for his FAA pilot certificates and ratings, and a spreadsheet history of the flights that had been completed in the accident airplane. The pilot began his primary flight instruction on January 21, 2011. On April 29, 2011, when he applied for his private pilot certificate, he reported having 71 hours total time. On February 5, 2012, when he applied for his instrument rating, the pilot reported having 314 hours total time. On February 26, 2012, when he applied for his multi-engine rating, the pilot reported having 330 hours total time. On May 4, 2012, when he applied for his type-rating in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390, the pilot reported having 450 hours total time. According to additional flight documentation, after he had received his type-rating, the pilot accumulated an additional 163.7 hours in the accident airplane. The pilot's total flight experience was estimated to be about 613.7 hours, of which at least 171.5 hours were completed in the same make/model as the accident airplane.
According to training records, from April 29, 2012, through May 4, 2012, the pilot attended initial type-rating training for the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane at The Jetstream Group, located in Chino, California. The course consisted of 41 hours of ground training, 8 hours of flight briefing/debriefing, and 7.8 hours of flight training in the Hawker Beechcraft model 390 airplane. On May 4, 2012, the pilot obtained his type-rating following a 2.1-hour oral examination and a 2.0 hour checkride with a FAA designated pilot examiner.
--- Pilot-Rated-Passenger ---
According to FAA records, the pilot-rated-passenger, age 60, held a private pilot certificate with single and multi-engine land airplane and instrument airplane ratings. His last aviation medical examination was completed on August 3, 2005, when he was issued a third-class medical certificate with the limitation for corrective lenses. A search of FAA records showed no previous accidents, incidents, or enforcement proceedings.
A review of available logbook information indicated that the last recorded flight was completed on September 28, 2008. At that time, the pilot-rated-passenger had accumulated 1,877.2 hours total flight experience, of which 1,705.3 hours were listed as pilot-in-command. He had accumulated 1,576.2 hours in multi-engine airplanes and 301 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 92.4 hours in actual instrument conditions and 517.6 hours at night. His last recorded flight review and instrument proficiency check was completed on September 19, 2006, in a Beech model 60 twin-engine airplane. A review of available information did not reveal any logged flight experience in turbine-powered business jets.
According to an affidavit provided by the pilot's son following the accident, the pilot-rated-passenger was not an employee of the operator, nor was he employed as a pilot for the accident flight. He was reportedly a friend of the pilot who shared a common interest in aviation. He reportedly did not have an official role on the accident flight, and as such, was considered a pilot-rated-passenger.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a 2008 Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, serial number RB-226. Two Williams International model FJ44-2A turbofan engines, each capable of producing 2,300 pounds of thrust at takeoff, powered the airplane. The airplane had a maximum takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds. The airplane was equipped for operation under instrument flight rules and in known icing conditions.
The accident airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate on March 13, 2008. According to FAA documentation, 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC, purchased the airplane on April 18, 2012. The current FAA registration certificate was issued on May 1, 2012. The airplane was maintained under the provisions of a FAA-approved manufacturer inspection program. The last inspection of the airplane was completed on November 4, 2012, at 419 hours total airframe time. As of the last inspection, both engines also had accumulated 419 hours since new. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on July 7, 2011. A postaccident review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane hour meter indicated 457.5 hours at the accident site.
The primary flight control systems, except the spoilers, were manually operated through control cables, push/pull tubes, and mechanical linkages. The spoilers were electronically controlled and hydraulically actuated. The pitch trim system, roll trim system, and yaw trim system were electrically operated. The speed brake was controlled electrically and operated hydraulically. The flaps were electronically controlled and electrically actuated.
Pitch attitude of the airplane was controlled by the elevators and the variable incidence horizontal stabilizer. The elevator control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control columns. Roll attitude was controlled through the ailerons, spoilers and roll trim. The aileron control system was operated manually by movement of the cockpit control wheels. The spoiler control system was electrically controlled by movement of the cockpit control wheels and hydraulically actuated. Yaw control was accomplished by the rudder and rudder trim tab. The rudder control system was operated manually by moving the cockpit rudder pedals.
The cockpit engine thrust levers were connected to control cables that extended aft through the fuselage to the power control arm located on the bottom of each hydromechanical fuel control unit (HMU). In addition to the mechanical throttle linkages to the HMUs, each engine had an electronic control unit (ECU) that interfaced with its respective HMU to provide automatic fuel control throughout the normal engine operating envelope. The ECUs were part of the Standby Bus electrical system. Finger levers, or pull-up locks, were installed to prevent the inadvertent movement of the thrust levers from flight idle into the fuel cutoff position.
During normal operation, the Standby Bus is powered by the Essential Bus. The Essential Bus receives electrical power from the main battery and generators (when online). During engine prestart and engine start, the ECUs are powered by the main battery until a generator is brought online. The generators are used as starter motors during normal engine starts and starter-assisted air starts. As such, following an engine start, a generator is "RESET" by selecting the associated toggle switch that is located on the electrical control sub-panel. The momentary "RESET" toggle switch position reestablishes electrical power from the generator to the Essential Bus system. During normal engine operation, the ECUs are powered by the generators through the Essential Bus; however, the ECUs could also be powered by the standby battery, through the Standby Buss, if the standby battery is selected following the depletion of the main battery.
In the event of a loss of engine power during flight, an engine can be restarted in the air by one of two methods: either a windmilling start or a starter-assisted air start. A windmilling start uses residual engine speed, air movement against the fan blades, and engine igniters to restart the engine and regain power. A starter-assisted air start uses electrical power, routed through the generator/starter motor, to increase the N2 shaft to a speed where the igniters can restart the engine. Generally, the flight envelope to accomplish an engine air start is between 130 and 300 knots indicated airspeed and from sea level to 25,000 feet. At lower airspeeds, a starter-assisted air start is recommended and uses the normal engine start switch. At higher airspeeds a windmilling start is recommended and does not use the normal engine start switch. In contrast to the normal ground start procedure, the air start procedure requires that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start.
The airplane was equipped with an electrically controlled, hydraulically actuated, retractable landing gear. If hydraulic or electric power is unavailable, an alternate procedure is used to extend the landing gear. When the alternate landing gear extension handle was pulled outward from the stowed position, the landing gear and door up-lock hooks are released, which allows the landing gear to free-fall into the down-and-locked position. The use of the alternate landing gear handle also opens a mechanically actuated recirculation valve that connects the main landing gear retraction and extension hydraulic lines to allow a more positive free-fall of the gear. The landing gear release is sequenced so that the nose gear is released first, followed by the main landing gear inboard doors, and finally the main landing gear. According to the airframe manufacturer, the nose landing gear is released from the up-locks when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The main landing gear inboard doors are released when the alternate extension handle is extended to 2-3/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). Finally, the main landing gear are released from their respective up-locks when the alternate extension handle is pulled to 3-1/4 inches (+/- 0.25 inch). The full stroke length of the alternate extension handle, following a full deployment of the landing gear, is specified to be a minimum of 4 inches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1620, the SBN automated surface observing system reported: wind 120 degrees at 13 knots, gusting 17 knots; a clear sky; 10 mile surface visibility; temperature 2 degrees Celsius; dew point -8 degrees Celsius; and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury.
COMMUNICATIONS
The accident flight was on an activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. A review of available ATC information indicated that the accident flight had received normal air traffic control services and handling. A transcript of the voice communications recorded between the accident flight and South Bend Approach Control are included with the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The South Bend Airport (SBN), a public airport located approximately 3 miles northwest of South Bend, Indiana, was owned and operated by the St. Joseph County Airport Authority. The airport was a certificated airport under 14 CFR Part 139 and had on-airport fire and rescue services. The airport field elevation was 799 feet msl. The airport had three runways: runway 9R/27L (8,414 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); runway 18/36 (7,100 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/grooved); and runway 9L/27R (4,300 feet by 75 feet, asphalt).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
Although not required, the airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1010 CVR, serial number 446023. The CVR recording contained about 31 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The recording began at 1545:31 with the airplane established in cruise flight at 41,000 feet (FL410), and the recording stopped about 1616:32 while the airplane was maneuvering toward the destination airport with both engines inoperative. A transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane collided with three residential structures during the final impact sequence. A majority of the wreckage was found within one of the structures. There was a noticeable odor of Jet-A fuel at the accident site and the South Bend Fire Department reported that fuel had pooled in the basement of the house. The airplane wreckage was recovered from the house and transported to the South Bend Airport to facilitate a more detailed examination. A postaccident examination of the runway 9R revealed areas of abrasion damage to the grooved asphalt surface. The observed damage was consistent with the accident airplane coming in contact with the runway surface during the accident flight.
--- Fuselage ---
The radome had separated from the radome bulkhead, which had separated from the fuselage. The nose baggage and avionics sections had separated forward of the forward pressure bulkhead and the nose wheel well structure had buckled. The cabin area exhibited impact damage; however, portions remained intact from the forward pressure bulkhead to the aft pressure bulkhead. A section of the right cabin sidewall, from the emergency escape hatch opening forward to approximately the right side galley area, had been cut open by first responders to extract the occupants. The aft fuselage had separated from the cabin portion at the aft pressure bulkhead, but remained attached by flight control cables and other conduits. Both engines remained attached to the aft fuselage. The main entry door remained attached at both hinge locations and was found open with the latches in the closed position. The main entry door latching mechanism was actuated and operated as designed. Examination of the fuselage revealed no evidence of an in-flight or post-impact fire. The VHF communications No. 1 antenna had separated from the lower fuselage, and exhibited gouges and scoring of the lower leading edge that were consistent with contact with the runway surface.
--- Wings ---
The wing assembly had separated from the airframe at all mounting points. The left wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces, but remained intact with all flight control surfaces attached. The right wing exhibited deformation consistent with impact forces and had separated in several locations. The inboard portion of the right wing exhibited minor damage when compared to the outboard wing. The outboard portion of the right wing, outboard of the inboard flap, exhibited impact damage, deformation, and had separated into several pieces. The outboard portion of the right wing, from the aileron outboard, had separated as one piece, with the exception of the composite wing tip assembly. The composite wing tip assembly had separated from the outboard end of the wing and was found amongst the main wreckage. The lower skin of the outboard portion of right wing and the lower skin of the composite wing tip exhibited gouging/scoring that was consistent with contact with the runway surface. The marks made by the gouging/scoring were approximately parallel with the chord of the wing and were aligned with the longitudinal axis of the fuselage. Additional abrasion damage was observed on the lower aft portion of all right wing flap tracks and the aft portion of the wing center keel structure. The trailing edge of the right aileron also exhibited abrasion damage. The wing flaps were observed in the retracted position and the measurement of the individual flap actuators corresponded with fully retracted flap positions. The aileron flight control system displayed multiple separations throughout the circuit; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Stabilizers ---
The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the rear fuselage and revealed limited impact damage. The elevators remained attached to the horizontal stabilizer at all hinges. The outboard portion of the right elevator, including the balance weight, had separated from the remaining right elevator. The right and left elevator trim tab surfaces remained attached to their respective elevators at their hinges. The rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer and the hinges exhibited no apparent damage. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder at the hinges and did not appear to be damaged. The rudder trim tab surface was visually aligned (faired) with the trailing edge of the rudder. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder displayed multiple separations; however, all observed separations exhibited features consistent with an overstress failure.
--- Landing Gear ---
The nose landing gear had separated from the airframe trunnion. The nose landing gear drag brace had separated from the nose landing gear assembly and the airframe supporting structure. The down lock actuator and down lock "pawl" assembly had separated from the drag brace assembly. The nose wheel and tire remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly. The nose wheel exhibited signs of impact damage to a portion of the bead area. The nose landing gear doors had separated from the airframe and were found amongst the main wreckage. The nose landing gear actuator had separated from the airframe in two pieces. The piston portion of the actuator remained attached to the nose landing gear assembly.
The left main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the left wing trunnion. The gear was found in the wheel well; however, the uplock was not engaged to the main landing gear uplock roller. The left main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and to the wing supporting structure. The actuator was found in the retracted position; however, multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by the measurement of the landing gear actuator. The left outboard gear door remained attached to the wing structure and the left main landing gear assembly. The left inboard gear door had separated from the wing and was found in several pieces amongst the main wreckage. The left inboard gear door actuator remained attached to the wing. About 90-percent of the inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The paint on the exterior portions of the door appeared to be eroded, consistent with contact with the runway surface while in the closed position.
The right main landing gear assembly remained intact and attached to the wing structure. The right wing had separated between the main landing gear trunnion fitting and the main landing gear actuator wing attach fitting. The main landing gear actuator remained attached to the main landing gear assembly and the wing attach fitting. The right main landing gear actuator was partially extended; the actuator was in neither the fully retracted nor the down-and-locked position. Multiple separations of hydraulic lines and impact damage prevented a determination of the landing gear position by measurement of the landing gear actuator. The right main landing gear outboard door had separated from the wing and was not recovered during the investigation. About 60-percent of the right inboard gear door was recovered and reconstructed. The reconstructed portion of the door exhibited exterior paint erosion that was consistent with door being abraded in the closed position. Additionally, there was evidence that the left tire had pressed against the interior of the door when the exterior abrasion had occurred. The inboard gear door actuator remained attached the wing.
--- Cockpit Switch and Lever Positions ---
Both engine power levers were in the normal takeoff position. Both levers were bent right and forward approximately 45-degrees. The power levers moved smoothly from the normal takeoff position to the flight idle detent. There was a positive indication at the normal takeoff and flight idle stops. The finger levers, which allow the power levers to be moved aft of the flight idle detent into fuel cut-off, could not be activated/pulled because of damage to both the power levers and the finger levers.
The flap handle was in the 20-degree detent position. Although the flap handle was bent, it could be moved between each flap position detent. A positive detent was noted at each flap position.
The lift dump switch was in the "Unlock" position. The lift dump handle was in the retracted position.
The speed brake was in the "RETRACT" position.
The landing gear position handle located in the cockpit was observed in the "UP" position. The cockpit landing gear circuit breaker was in the closed (not pulled) position. The landing gear alternate extension handle was found partially extended about 1-1/2 inches and was bent toward the instrument panel.
The battery toggle switch was in the "Standby" position.
Both generator toggle switches were in the "ON" position.
Both avionics switches were in the "ON" position.
The left fuel boost switch was in the "ON" position.
The position of the right fuel boost switch could not be determined due to impact damage.
The fuel transfer switch was in the "OFF" position.
Both engine ECU switches were in the "ON" position.
Both engine ignition switches were in the "ARM" position.
Engine synchronization was in the "OFF" position.
--- Engines ---
A postaccident examination of the left engine, serial number 105363, revealed evidence of leading edge foreign object damage to the N1 (Spool) Fan, consistent with the ingestion of debris during the impact sequence. Although damaged, the N1 Fan could still be rotated by hand. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm located at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The Low Pressure (LP) Trip Lever cable exhibited no visible damage, and the fuel cutoff mechanism had not been activated. All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination revealed evidence that the left engine was operating at the time of impact.
A postaccident examination of the right engine, serial number 105364, revealed evidence of attic insulation, pieces of home roofing shingles, pieces of wood, and other unidentified debris within the engine cowling and bypass duct. However, the N1 fan did not reveal visible evidence of leading edge foreign object damage that would be expected from the ingestion of debris in conjunction with engine operation. Thrust lever cable continuity from the center pedestal to the engine could not be verified due to the severity of the airframe damage. However, on the engine, the power control cables were continuous from the engine pylon to the power control arm at the base of the HMU. The fuel control throttle lever was observed in the maximum power position. The LP Trip Lever cable was found bent and damaged, and the LP Trip Lever fuel cutoff mechanism had been activated. (The LP Shaft Trip Sensor is activated when the LP turbine is forced in the aft direction against the trip lever. Typical scenarios of when a trip sensor would be activated include a LP Shaft separation or when the engine is exposed to significant impact loading.) All three engine magnetic chip collectors were inspected and were free of metallic chips and/or debris. The powerplant examination did not reveal any evidence that the right engine was operating at the time of impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
On March 18, 2013, autopsies were performed on the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center, located in Mishawka, Indiana. The cause of death for both individuals was attributed to blunt-force injuries sustained during the accident. The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on samples obtained during each autopsy.
The pilot's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Losartan, an FAA-accepted high blood pressure medication, was detected in urine and blood samples. The pilot had reported the use of this medication on his most recent FAA medical certificate application.
The pilot-rated-passenger's toxicological test results were negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol, and all drugs and medications.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
--- Sound Spectrum Study ---
A study was performed to evaluate the sound spectrum of audio recorded by the cockpit area microphone after the loss of engine power at 1614:27. The CVR audio was compared with audio recorded during ground testing of an exemplar Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA). The sound spectrum study indicated that, at 1615:02, the pilot engaged a starter motor in attempt to restart one of the engines. The study further established that the electrical noise from the engine igniters was not present at any point during the CVR recording, including the attempted engine air start. (The air start procedure required that the igniter switches be switched to the "ON" position before attempting any engine air start) A review of the remaining CVR audio did not reveal any evidence of another attempt to restart an engine.
--- Surveillance Video Study ---
There were several surveillance videos of the accident airplane during the two landing attempts, and the final descent and impact. A study of airport surveillance footage was completed to determine an average ground speed of the airplane during the second landing attempt. The study determined that the airplane's average ground speed was 127 knots (+/- 4 knots) during the 3.75 seconds of camera footage of the second landing attempt. Additional information concerning the surveillance videos can be found with the docket materials associated with this investigation.
--- Mobile Device Examinations ---
Several mobile devices were recovered from the wreckage and sent to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination.
The pilot's tablet mobile device contained several aviation related applications; however, none of the applications contained flight track data for the accident flight. One application, ForeFlight, depicted the planned route-of-flight for the accident flight. Additionally, the ForeFlight application also contained 160 file-and-brief entries for previous flights. Another application, LogTen Pro, contained a partial flight history log.
The pilot's mobile phone was reviewed and no information pertinent to the investigation was recovered.
The pilot-rated-passenger's mobile phone contained a text message, dated March 13, 2013, concerning a previous flight that he had in the accident airplane with the pilot. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
Another passenger's mobile phone contained multiple out-going text messages with timestamps between 13:45 and 13:53 central daylight time. These text messages noted that the accident flight was about to takeoff and provided the expected time en route to South Bend. At 1505 eastern daylight time, a multi-media text message was sent with a photograph from inside the airplane cabin looking toward the cockpit. At 1612, another photo was taken from inside the cabin looking outside through a cabin window. No additional information was recovered that was pertinent to the investigation.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
One of the surviving passengers was interviewed by two NTSB Human Performance and Survival Factors investigators. The passenger reported that he loaded his luggage and computer gear on the airplane between 1330 and 1345 central daylight time. After loading, he and the other passenger boarded the airplane and waited for the pilots. Around 1350, the pilot and pilot-rated-passenger boarded the airplane. The passengers were not provided a safety briefing. He stated that the takeoff and cruise portion of the flight appeared to be normal; however, while the airplane was on approach to the runway he noticed instrument panel was not illuminated like it had been earlier in the flight. Specifically, he recalled that the cockpit instrument panel appeared to be unpowered. He saw that the pilot was manually flying the airplane. The pilot-rated-passenger turned around and announced that they should prepare for landing. The passenger stated that he became concerned when the airplane flew past the terminal and control tower and had not touched down. He noted that he felt like the airplane was "coming in hot." The airplane then banked right and climbed away from the runway. The passenger heard the pilot tell the pilot-rated-passenger that they were "down to one engine." The airplane continued in the traffic pattern back to the runway. The passenger stated that the cockpit instrument panel still appeared to be unpowered during the second landing attempt; however, he did recall seeing flashing red and yellow cockpit lights. The passenger believed that during the second landing attempt the airplane had a slower groundspeed when compared to the first landing attempt. He noted that the airplane bounced off the runway several times before it entered a nose-high attitude and rolled to the right. He remembered seeing rooftops of homes before he blacked-out. His next memory was after the accident, as first responders attempted to gain access to the cabin.
===========
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA196
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, March 17, 2013 in South Bend, IN
Aircraft: Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 390, registration: N26DK
Injuries: 2 Fatal,3 Serious.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On March 17, 2013, at 1623 eastern daylight time, a Hawker Beechcraft model 390 (Premier IA) business jet, N26DK, serial number RB-226, collided with three residential structures and terrain following an aborted landing attempt on runway 9R located at the South Bend Regional Airport (KSBN), South Bend, Indiana. The private pilot and pilot-rated-passenger occupying the cockpit seats were fatally injured. An additional two passengers and one individual on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to 7700 Enterprises of Montana, LLC and operated by Digicut Systems of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the business flight that departed Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport (KRVS), Tulsa, Oklahoma, at 1358 central daylight time.
According to preliminary air traffic control information, at 1610:31, the accident pilot established radio communications with South Bend Approach Control while at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The air traffic controller cleared the flight direct to KNUTE intersection and told the pilot to expect a visual approach to runway 9R. At 1611:44, the flight was cleared to descend to 10,000 feet msl. At 1613:06, the flight was cleared to 3,000 feet msl. At 1615:00, the approach controller told the pilot to make a 5-degree left turn to align with runway 9R and asked the pilot to report when he had the airport in sight. At 1615:07, the pilot declared an emergency because of a lack of engine power, reporting that they were "dead stick" and without any power. About 23 seconds later, at 1615:30, the pilot transmitted "we've lost all power, and we have no hydraulics." When the controller asked if the airplane remained controllable, the pilot replied "ah, barely controllable." The controller advised that all runways at KSBN were available for landing and issued the current winds, which were 130-degrees at 10 knots. At 1615:22, the pilot transmitted that the airplane’s navigational systems were inoperative and requested a radar vector toward the airport. The controller replied that the airport was 9 miles directly ahead of the airplane’s current position. At 1616:12, the controller told the pilot to turn 10-degrees left to intersect runway 9R. At 1616:15, the pilot replied "26DK, turning left." No additional voice communications were received from the accident airplane. The approach controller continued to transmit radar vectors toward runway 9R without any response from the accident pilot. At 1618:58, the approach controller told the accident airplane to go-around because the main landing gear was not extended. (The tower controller had informed the approach controller that only the nose landing gear was extended) The accident airplane was then observed to climb and enter a right traffic pattern for runway 9R. The airplane made another landing approach to runway 9R with only the nose landing gear extended. Several witnesses observed the airplane bounce several times on the runway before it ultimately entered a climbing right turn. The airplane was then observed to enter a nose low descent into a nearby residential community.
============
SOUTH BEND – Clean up on North Iowa Street is already in progress, and we could soon see crews haul away contaminated ground soil and debris.
The Indiana Department of Environmental Management got its first look at the damage Wednesday but initially had to look from outside the orange fencing, because the National Transportation Safety Board still had control of the scene and hadn't released it to the city yet.
However, South Bend mayor's Chief of Staff Mike Schmuhl said the NTSB released the scene to city officials during the afternoon, meaning demolition can start and insurance adjusters can assess the damage.
Most of the damage caused by the plane’s jet fuel and fumes damaged the houses it hit and the ground soil around them, said IDEM spokeswoman Amy Hartsock. The agency will work with a clean-up contractor to haul the contaminated material from the site.
According to Hartsock and NTSB spokesman Keith Holloway, payment for the clean-up process generally falls on the source that caused the contamination. Since the damage came from that private jet, its owner and/or insurance company would be responsible. Insurance representatives for the owner of the plane were on scene Wednesday, Hartsock added, saying IDEM is on site to work with those companies and give the clean-up contractor guidance.
Just before noon, an excavator rolled back down Iowa Street as the NTSB, firefighters and others went back into what used to be a house to search for remaining pieces and parts of the Hawker Beechcraft Premier jet that crashed there Sunday.
The city shut down Iowa for about 90 minutes while crews searched the scene, primarily focusing on the home that sustained the most damage.
Investigators are putting the jet back together inside a secure hangar at South Bend Regional Airport and searching for any clues that might help them figure out what caused the plane to go down.
WSBT made several calls to officials at South Bend’s police, fire and public works departments Wednesday to try and get an idea of how many overtime hours crews have worked since the plane crashed and how much it will cost.
The chief of finance at the South Bend Fire Department told WSBT it’s his understanding the city will pay for that overtime initially but can later turn it in to insurance companies and likely be reimbursed for the costs.
Mayor Buttigieg’s chief of staff told WSBT the city is trying to get the neighborhood back together before it compiles and releases details about the financial impact of the crash.
WSBT also learned why it’s been a challenge to identify which of the two deceased men was flying the plane.
According to St. Joseph County Coroner Michael O’Connell, M.D., both the owner of the plane, Wes Caves, and another man in the plane, former Oklahoma University football star Steve Davis, were ejected from their seats and were found in one of the houses, making it impossible to tell who was piloting and who was co-piloting the aircraft.
Source: http://www.wsbt.com
Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, Air Tindi, C-GATV: Accident occurred October 04, 2011 on Great Slave Lake, Northwest Territories, Canada
 |
| Matt Bromley |
EDMONTON - The investigation into a deadly northern plane crash has found it was caused by a combination of marginal weather and the pilot's marijuana use.
The pilot and one passenger were killed when the Air Tindi plane went down near a community on the east arm of Great Slave Lake in October 2011.
A Transportation Safety Board investigation found the weather that day was rainy and overcast with poor visibility.
"The aircraft was flown at low altitude into an area of low forward visibility, which prevented the pilot from seeing and avoiding terrain," the investigation concludes. "Weather during the accident flight was marginal for (visual flight rules) flight."
The Cessna 208B Caravan did not have electronic aids such as a terrain awareness and warning system or terrain-warning GPS. But it was fully equipped for instrument flying and the pilot and the company were qualified in such navigation.
"Flying under (instrument flight rules) would have provided a margin of safety given the weather conditions," the board wrote. "It could not be determined why the pilot chose to fly under (visual flight rules)."
The report also found the pilot was flying over Great Slave Lake beyond the gliding distance of his airplane.
There was another issue as well.
"Toxicology testing revealed that concentrations of cannabinoids found in the pilot's bloodstream were sufficient to have impaired pilot performance and decision-making during the flight."
Those concentrations were "considerably greater" than levels that impaired pilot performance in flight simulator tests, the report says.
"The quantity of psychoactive components in the pilot's system is considered to have been sufficient to have resulted in impairment of cognitive processes."
The flight did not have a co-pilot.
The board says Air Tindi has since instituted random drug tests for all employees in safety-sensitive jobs.
In a prepared statement, Air Tindi said: "The (board) report indicates that this accident was a function of various factors, including poor weather conditions and some of the decisions made by the pilot. The accident was a tragedy by any measure and we remain deeply saddened by the tragic consequences of that accident."
The statement also says that Air Tindi has "always had ... stringent monitoring for all team members who work in safety-sensitive positions."
"We would like to again express our condolences to the friends and family affected," said Air Tindi president Sean Loutitt.
The company did not answer questions about the board's report.
Since 1991, the Transportation Safety Board has found four air, marine or rail accidents in which operators either tested positive for marijuana or were known to have used it while responsible for their vehicles.
Mandatory drug testing for employees in federally regulated transportation industries does not exist in Canada, although it does in the U.S.
The regularly scheduled flight went down about 25 kilometres from the community of Lutsel K'e, narrowly missing a massive cliff but crashing onto a narrow peninsula. Rescuers responded immediately.
A privately owned Twin Otter landed on Great Slave Lake near the crash site and rescuers beat their way through the bush to the site.
A helicopter owned by Great Slave Helicopters also flew in, as did a Royal Canadian Air Force Hercules search-and-rescue aircraft. RCMP also choppered to the site.
Two of the four passengers, both from Lutsel K'e, were injured. Rescuers were unable to save the pilot, Matthew Bromely, 28, and passenger Timothy Harris, 54.
Since the accident, the board has required all planes with more than six passenger seats to have terrain awareness and warning systems installed by July 2014.
http://www.globalnews.ca
http://tsb.gc.ca
EDMONTON, AB, March 20, 2013 /CNW/ - The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) today released its investigation report (A11W0151) into the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident on 4 October 2011 that involved a Cessna 208B Caravan operated by Air Tindi Ltd. near Lutsel K'e, Northwest Territories.
The Cessna Caravan was operating under visual flight rules (VFR), under which the pilot must maintain constant visual reference to the ground. The flight departed during daylight hours from Yellowknife to Lutsel K'e, Northwest Territories, with one pilot and three passengers aboard. When it did not arrive on time, a search was launched, and the aircraft was found 26 nautical miles west of Lutsel K'e on high terrain near the crest of Pehtei Peninsula. The pilot and one passenger were fatally injured, and the two other passengers were seriously injured. Although no emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal had been received, it was found to be operational when the search team found the aircraft.
The flight and the nature of the crash were characteristic of a CFIT accident, identified on the TSB's Watchlist as one of the safety issues posing the greatest risk to Canadians.
The aircraft was flown at low altitude into an area of low forward visibility, which prevented the pilot from seeing and avoiding terrain. Weather during the accident flight was marginal for VFR flight, and the aircraft did not have a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) or terrain-warning features on its GPS. The pilot, aircraft and company were all qualified to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR), under which pilots fly using cockpit instruments rather than visual references. Flying under IFR would have provided a margin of safety given the weather conditions. It could not be determined why the pilot chose to fly under VFR.
Toxicology testing revealed that concentrations of cannabinoids found in the pilot's bloodstream were sufficient to have impaired pilot performance and decision-making during the flight.
Since the accident, Air Tindi has taken measures to improve safety, such as dispatching all scheduled flights under IFR; installing cockpit imaging and flight data monitoring devices in its Cessna 208B fleet; and introducing random drug and alcohol tests for employees in safety-sensitive positions.
The ELT manufacturer made changes to its ELT designs to improve signal detection, and it also revised the instructions on how to secure ELT installations properly in aircraft. Canadian, U.S., and European regulators have taken steps to raise awareness of the need for adequate instructions to ensure that hook and loop (Velcro) fasteners securing ELTs are sufficiently tightened, and the FAA for its part has changed the design criteria for all new ELTs to exclude hook and loop fastener mounting systems.
Transport Canada enacted regulations requiring TAWS to be installed in all turbine-powered aircraft with 6 or more passenger seats by July 2014.
Collisions with land and water are a TSB Watchlist issue.
http://www.newswire.ca
Replica Spitfire Mk XXVI, VH-VSF: Accident occurred March 17, 2013 near Parafield Airport, South Australia
Video taken by witnesses as a replica Spitfire plunged into the ground, killing the pilot, could hold the key to finding the cause of the crash.
Roger Stokes, 73, died on Sunday when the plane he built from a kit nosedived into a factory carpark in Adelaide's northern suburbs as he took part in a local air show.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigators were on the scene on Monday but said it could take some time to determine what went wrong.
Lead investigator Richard Davies said they would rely on physical evidence and statements from witnesses, including video footage of the crash.
The ATSB has called for anyone with video to come forward.
Investigators will also examine the wreckage and the accident site, collect maintenance and pilot records and examine air traffic control radio and radar data.
Witnesses to Sunday's crash told the Adelaide Advertiser the Spitfire went into an uncontrolled nosedive close to a soccer oval.
One said the plane appeared to do a barrel roll when a wing gave way.
"It was twirling, turning on its back and going nose first," he said.
The organizers of the air show said they would cooperate fully with the investigation into the crash.
Bob and Margaret Jarrett said Mr Stokes was a passionate aviator who offered their event great support.
"His loss will be felt across the amateur aviation community," they said in a statement.
Fellow Spitfire enthusiast Langdon Badger said he could not believe the crash was the result of pilot error, describing Mr Stokes as an outstanding engineer and pilot.
"It is a tragic loss," Mr Badger told ABC radio.
"He was a lovely fellow and a brilliant engineer and an excellent pilot."
Mr Stokes had spent four years and $250,000 building the three-quarter-scale Spitfire.
In an interview in 2010 he said he had always been impressed with the shape, finding it funny that something so beautiful was produced to fight a war.
"It's a dream to fly," he said.
"I get as much enjoyment out of other people's enjoyment because everybody loves it."
http://www.couriermail.com.au
Collision with terrain involving amateur built scale replica Spitfire Mk XXVI, VH-VSF near Parafield Airport, South Australia, 17 March 2013
Roger Stokes, 73, died on Sunday when the plane he built from a kit nosedived into a factory carpark in Adelaide's northern suburbs as he took part in a local air show.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigators were on the scene on Monday but said it could take some time to determine what went wrong.
Lead investigator Richard Davies said they would rely on physical evidence and statements from witnesses, including video footage of the crash.
The ATSB has called for anyone with video to come forward.
Investigators will also examine the wreckage and the accident site, collect maintenance and pilot records and examine air traffic control radio and radar data.
Witnesses to Sunday's crash told the Adelaide Advertiser the Spitfire went into an uncontrolled nosedive close to a soccer oval.
One said the plane appeared to do a barrel roll when a wing gave way.
"It was twirling, turning on its back and going nose first," he said.
The organizers of the air show said they would cooperate fully with the investigation into the crash.
Bob and Margaret Jarrett said Mr Stokes was a passionate aviator who offered their event great support.
"His loss will be felt across the amateur aviation community," they said in a statement.
Fellow Spitfire enthusiast Langdon Badger said he could not believe the crash was the result of pilot error, describing Mr Stokes as an outstanding engineer and pilot.
"It is a tragic loss," Mr Badger told ABC radio.
"He was a lovely fellow and a brilliant engineer and an excellent pilot."
Mr Stokes had spent four years and $250,000 building the three-quarter-scale Spitfire.
In an interview in 2010 he said he had always been impressed with the shape, finding it funny that something so beautiful was produced to fight a war.
"It's a dream to fly," he said.
"I get as much enjoyment out of other people's enjoyment because everybody loves it."
http://www.couriermail.com.au
Collision with terrain involving amateur built scale replica Spitfire Mk XXVI, VH-VSF near Parafield Airport, South Australia, 17 March 2013
Air Canada flight forced to make emergency landing in Toronto after engine shuts down mid-flight
An Air Canada flight with 24 passengers on board was forced to circle
in the air for over an hour after one of its engines failed en route to
Billy Bishop Airport in Toronto.
Rescue crews faced a tense scene shortly after 4 p.m. as the plane coasted safely onto the Toronto runway with only one propeller spinning.
“It appears that the plane has landed safely, that the emergency procedures that we had put into place were not needed, and that everything went as planned,” Peel police spokesman Thomas Ruttan told CP24.
Everyone on board was safe, Ruttan said.
The plane had apparently suffered hydraulic issues, which appear to be related to the engine malfunction.
The Air Canada Express flight reportedly left from Moncton earlier on Wednesday.
UPDATED: A plane is safely on the ground after engine problems forced it to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
A plane is safely on the ground after engine problems forced it to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
“It appears that the flight has landed safely and everybody on board is absolutely fine,” said Peel Regional Police Const. Thomas Ruttan.
There were 24 people aboard the plane, Ruttan said. Emergency crews rushed to the runway at Pearson just before 4 p.m. Wednesday to await the landing.
One of the plane’s engines had hydraulic issues and was “unserviceable,” a police spokesperson said.
Around 4:20 p.m., the plane landed safely without incident on a runway parallel to the highway.
The plane is a Dash-8, a medium-sized twin engine plane.
Source: http://www.thestar.com
Emergency crews are in position on the runway at Pearson to await the landing. The Dash-8 has an engine problem, police say.
A plane with engine problems is being forced to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
There are an estimated 24 people on board the plane, Peel Regional Police spokesman Const. Thomas Ruttan said. Emergency crews were called to the runway at Pearson just before 4 p.m. Wednesday to await the landing.
“With one of the engines being out there are going to be issues with that plane as it comes in, but at this point we need to be cautious about how we respond,” Ruttan said.
He said there are other issues with the plane’s “operations” but would not be specific.
“I can’t be specific in what’s going on, I know there are issues with the plane with some of the operations,” Ruttan said.
The plane is a Dash-8, a medium-sized twin engine plane. It is unclear what airline the plane is flying for or where it was headed.
Source: http://www.thestar.com
Rescue crews faced a tense scene shortly after 4 p.m. as the plane coasted safely onto the Toronto runway with only one propeller spinning.
“It appears that the plane has landed safely, that the emergency procedures that we had put into place were not needed, and that everything went as planned,” Peel police spokesman Thomas Ruttan told CP24.
Everyone on board was safe, Ruttan said.
The plane had apparently suffered hydraulic issues, which appear to be related to the engine malfunction.
The Air Canada Express flight reportedly left from Moncton earlier on Wednesday.
UPDATED: A plane is safely on the ground after engine problems forced it to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
A plane is safely on the ground after engine problems forced it to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
“It appears that the flight has landed safely and everybody on board is absolutely fine,” said Peel Regional Police Const. Thomas Ruttan.
There were 24 people aboard the plane, Ruttan said. Emergency crews rushed to the runway at Pearson just before 4 p.m. Wednesday to await the landing.
One of the plane’s engines had hydraulic issues and was “unserviceable,” a police spokesperson said.
Around 4:20 p.m., the plane landed safely without incident on a runway parallel to the highway.
The plane is a Dash-8, a medium-sized twin engine plane.
Source: http://www.thestar.com
Emergency crews are in position on the runway at Pearson to await the landing. The Dash-8 has an engine problem, police say.
A plane with engine problems is being forced to make an emergency landing at Pearson International Airport.
There are an estimated 24 people on board the plane, Peel Regional Police spokesman Const. Thomas Ruttan said. Emergency crews were called to the runway at Pearson just before 4 p.m. Wednesday to await the landing.
“With one of the engines being out there are going to be issues with that plane as it comes in, but at this point we need to be cautious about how we respond,” Ruttan said.
He said there are other issues with the plane’s “operations” but would not be specific.
“I can’t be specific in what’s going on, I know there are issues with the plane with some of the operations,” Ruttan said.
The plane is a Dash-8, a medium-sized twin engine plane. It is unclear what airline the plane is flying for or where it was headed.
Source: http://www.thestar.com
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