Tuesday, May 19, 2015

Piper PA-28-181 Archer III, N597JG, Knoxville Flyers: Accident occurred May 19, 2015 near Knoxville Downtown Island Airport (KDKX), Knox County, Tennessee

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA217
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 19, 2015 in Corryton, TN
Probable Cause Approval Date: 03/06/2017
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-181, registration: N597JG
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

During a training flight, the student and flight instructor heard a "loud bang" from the engine area, accompanied by engine roughness and reduced power. The flight instructor performed a forced landing to a field, resulting in substantial damage to the engine firewall. An examination of the engine revealed the No. 4 cylinder head was fractured outboard of the barrel thread. Further examination revealed that the cylinder fractured due to fatigue that initiated at the interior of the head near the intake valve. The serial number for the cylinder was outside the range of those affected by an airworthiness directive requiring inspection and/or replacement of certain cylinders.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The failure of the No. 4 engine cylinder due to fatigue, resulting in a catastrophic failure of the engine.






The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Knoxville Flyers Incorporated: http://registry.faa.gov/N597JG

FAA Flight Standards District Office: FAA Nashville FSDO-19

Aviation Accident Factual Report -  National Transportation Safety Board:   https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Docket And Docket Items -   National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA217 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 19, 2015 in Corryton, TN
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-181, registration: N597JG
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On May 19, 2015, about 1650 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-181, N597JG, was substantially damaged during a forced landing near Corryton, Tennessee. The student pilot and certificated flight instructor (CFI) were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Knoxville Flyers Incorporated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the instructional flight, which departed Knoxville Downtown Island Airport (DKX), Knoxville, Tennessee, at 1430.

According to the CFI, his student was performing flight maneuvers when he heard a loud "bang" from the area of the engine. This was accompanied by engine roughness and a reduced rpm. The CFI took control of the airplane and the student pilot completed the engine restart checklist in an attempt to resolve the engine roughness. The engine continued to lose power and the airplane began losing altitude. The CFI declared an emergency and informed air traffic control that he would be conducting an off-airport landing. He then performed a forced landing in a field, and during the landing sequence the firewall was damaged.

A detailed postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the nose gear mount attachment and firewall was buckled. No further damage was noted on the airframe. An examination of the engine revealed the No. 4 cylinder head was fractured circumferentially on the head at the outboard barrel thread. The cylinder was removed and sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination. Detailed examination of the cylinder's fracture surfaces revealed that portion of the fracture surface had relatively smooth fracture features with curving crack arrest lines, features consistent with fatigue.

Examination of the cylinder revealed that there were markings cast on the cylinder near the exhaust port opening that read ECI and AEL85099 IR. A stamp near the intake port opening read 51932-14. A review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine was overhauled on February 7, 2008. On May 1, 2014, the engine had a time of 1,012.5 hours since overhaul. No anomalies were reported following a compression check performed during the annual inspection. The last engine service (oil change) prior to the accident was entered May 13, 2015, with a recorded time of 1509.7 hours since overhaul.

A review of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-26-12, effective February 4, 2010 required repetitive inspections or inspection and early replacement of cylinders with certain ECI part number AEL85099 heads installed on Lycoming 320, 360, and 540 series engines including the Lycoming O-360-A4M engine installed on the accident airplane. The serial number for the cylinder head in this accident was outside the range of serial numbers listed in AD 2009-26-12, and therefore was not subject to the inspection and replacement requirements.   
The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Knoxville Flyers Incorporated: http://registry.faa.gov/N597JG

FAA Flight Standards District Office: FAA Nashville FSDO-19

Aviation Accident Factual Report -  National Transportation Safety Board:   https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Docket And Docket Items -   National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

NTSB Identification: ERA15LA217 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, May 19, 2015 in Corryton, TN
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28-181, registration: N597JG
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On May 19, 2015, about 1650 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28-181, N597JG, was substantially damaged during a forced landing near Corryton, Tennessee. The student pilot and certificated flight instructor (CFI) were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Knoxville Flyers Incorporated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the instructional flight, which departed Knoxville Downtown Island Airport (DKX), Knoxville, Tennessee, at 1430.

According to the CFI, his student was performing flight maneuvers when he heard a loud "bang" from the area of the engine. This was accompanied by engine roughness and a reduced rpm. The CFI took control of the airplane and the student pilot completed the engine restart checklist in an attempt to resolve the engine roughness. The engine continued to lose power and the airplane began losing altitude. The CFI declared an emergency and informed air traffic control that he would be conducting an off-airport landing. He then performed a forced landing in a field, and during the landing sequence the firewall was damaged.

A detailed postaccident examination of the airplane revealed the nose gear mount attachment and firewall was buckled. No further damage was noted on the airframe. An examination of the engine revealed the No. 4 cylinder head was fractured circumferentially on the head at the outboard barrel thread. The cylinder was removed and sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination. Detailed examination of the cylinder's fracture surfaces revealed that portion of the fracture surface had relatively smooth fracture features with curving crack arrest lines, features consistent with fatigue.

Examination of the cylinder revealed that there were markings cast on the cylinder near the exhaust port opening that read ECI and AEL85099 IR. A stamp near the intake port opening read 51932-14. A review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the engine was overhauled on February 7, 2008. On May 1, 2014, the engine had a time of 1,012.5 hours since overhaul. No anomalies were reported following a compression check performed during the annual inspection. The last engine service (oil change) prior to the accident was entered May 13, 2015, with a recorded time of 1509.7 hours since overhaul.

A review of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-26-12, effective February 4, 2010 required repetitive inspections or inspection and early replacement of cylinders with certain ECI part number AEL85099 heads installed on Lycoming 320, 360, and 540 series engines including the Lycoming O-360-A4M engine installed on the accident airplane. The serial number for the cylinder head in this accident was outside the range of serial numbers listed in AD 2009-26-12, and therefore was not subject to the inspection and replacement requirements.   




KNOXVILLE (WATE) – A small plane was forced to make an emergency landing in Knox County Tuesday afternoon. 


The plane landed in the 7900 block of Washington Pike in Corryton around 4:45 p.m.

Rural/Metro officials say the plane, carrying a flight instructor and pilot in training, had just taken off from Downtown Island Home Airport. Neither were injured.

Pilot Bobby Gintz says they were flying at about 4,000 feet and practicing maneuvers when they had an engine failure. They had only five minutes to find a place to land.

The Piper PA-28 aircraft is registered to Knoxville Flyers, Inc, according to the FAA. Officials say the plane will need some work, but will fly again.

Philadelphia law firm unsuccessful in keeping National Transportation Safety Board from posting plane crash findings, loses wrongful death suit: Grumman American AA-5, N6511L, fatal accident occurred March 13, 2005 in Chesapeake, Ohio

PHILADELPHIA – A Philadelphia law firm seeking injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order against the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has had its requests denied by a Philadelphia federal judge.

The Wolk Law Firm filed the complaint on May 4 on behalf of its clients Rebecca Hetzer Young, Anise Gothard Nash and Elizabeth Lampe, who are currently involved in a pending and separate wrongful death case in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio, Young v. Elano Corp.

Young, Nash and Lampe represent the surviving family members of three individuals killed in a Grumman AA-5 aircraft crash at Ohio’s Lawrence County Air Park on March 3, 2005.

The crash claimed the lives of the plane’s pilot Michael Young, plus passengers Ginny Young and Charles Lampe, and is the event serving as the basis for the Young v. Elano Corp. litigation.

The complaint brought by The Wolk Law Firm sought a 30-day enjoinment towards the NTSB from publishing its “Probable Cause Determination” regarding the 2005 crash on its website, www.ntsb.gov beginning May 4, feeling it would be “irreparably harmful” to the plaintiffs and the case of Young, Nash and Lampe, effectively denying them their right to a fair trial.

The 30-day enjoinment time limit, the plaintiffs said, would last for the duration of their clients’ wrongful death trial in Ohio.

According to the lawsuit, the plaintiffs contacted the NTSB to remove the “Probable Cause Determination” when it was first published on April 7, and allegedly received a refusal to remove the information from the government agency one week later.

The plaintiff allege the NTSB’s “brief” investigation into the 2005 crash was unsatisfactory and arrived at incorrect conclusions with respect to the reasons for the crash by allegedly inviting the engine manufacturer to participate in the investigation, ignoring physical evidence and eyewitness accounts of engine malfunction and inferring toxicology conclusions without referring to proper evidence.

Court records indicate the motion for a temporary restraining order was thrown out by Eastern District Court Judge Lawrence F. Stengel on May 6 following a telephone conference with all parties involved. As a result of the temporary restraining order motion being denied, the plaintiffs dismissed their litigation five days later.

Meanwhile, the wrongful death trial in the crash that claimed the lives of Michael Young, Ginny Young and Charles Lampe has concluded.

The trial resulted in a defense verdict. Jurors found the defendants were not negligent, did not negligently design a muffler and did not negligently fail to warn about dangers associated with the muffler.

The plaintiff was represented by John Joseph Gagliano of The Wolk Law Firm in Philadelphia.

The defendant was represented by Thomas F. Johnson of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, also in Philadelphia.

U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania case 2:15-cv-02459

Source:  http://pennrecord.com

http://registry.faa.gov/N6511L 


NTSB Identification: NYC05FA058
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
Accident occurred Sunday, March 13, 2005 in Chesapeake, OH
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/25/2006
Aircraft: Grumman American AA-5, registration: N6511L
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Witnesses observed the airplane approach to the runway; however, it appeared to be high, and as it passed over the runway, it executed a go-around. The airplane continued around the traffic pattern, and returned to land a second time. The second landing attempt appeared to be fast, and the intended touchdown point was "far down the runway." The pilot then applied power, and the airplane became airborne, with a nose high attitude. The airplane continued in a nose high attitude, and cleared the 30-foot high trees located at the end of the runway. The tail of the airplane then began to wobble, the right wing dropped, and the airplane descended to the ground about 1/4 mile from the airport. A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the main wreckage. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any abnormalities with the airframe or engine.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed during the aborted landing, which resulted in an inadvertent stall.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 13, 2005, at 1506 eastern standard time, a Grumman American AA-5, 6511L was destroyed when it impacted terrain, shortly after takeoff from the Lawrence County Airpark (HTW), Chesapeake, Ohio. The certificated private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

A witness, who was at the airport, stated that he observed the accident airplane approach runway 26. The airplane appeared to be high, and as it passed over the runway, it executed a go-around. The airplane continued around the pattern, and returned to approach runway 26 a second time. The second landing attempt appeared to be fast, and the intended touchdown point was "far down the runway." The witness looked away from the airplane, and seconds later, he heard the engine power being applied. The witness then observed the airplane become airborne, with a nose high attitude, and clear the trees located at the end of the runway. The airplane continued in a nose high attitude and the tail began to wobble, followed by the right wing dropping. The airplane then descended behind the tree line out of the witnesses view. 

A second witness, who was monitoring the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency at HTW with a handheld radio, also observed the accident airplane approach runway 26. The airplane appeared to be fast, and as it passed the mid-point of the runway, it was still 25-30 feet above the ground. The airplane passed out of the witness's sight; however, the witness then heard the pilot in the accident airplane transmit, "…Guys we're going to crash…" 

A third witness heard an airplane rev its engine, and looked up to observe the accident airplane in a steep climb. The airplane then made a right hand bank, before stalling, and subsequently descending nose first to the ground.

The accident occurred during the hours of darkness, at 38 degrees, 25.11 minutes north longitude, 82 degrees, 30.17 minutes west latitude, at an elevation of 561 feet. 

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate for single-engine land airplanes. His most recent application for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) third-class medical certificate was issued on January 11, 2004. The pilot reported that he had accumulated about 250 hours of total flight experience on the medical application.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The weather reported at an airport 4 miles south of HTW, at 1451, included calm winds, clear skies, and 10 statute miles of visibility. The temperature was 37 degrees Fahrenheit, and the dew point 27 degrees Fahrenheit.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

Approximately 30-foot tall trees were located about 200 feet from the departure end of runway 26.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The wreckage site was located in a field, consisting of soft terrain, about 1/4 statute mile from HTW, on an approximate magnetic heading of 280 degrees. The accident site was disturbed prior to the arrival of Safety Board personnel on March 14, 2004, due to emergency rescue procedures. In addition, the area had been doused with water and firefighting agents to contain the postcrash fire.

Next to the impact crater was a section of the right wing, the right flap, and the right wing tip.

The main fuselage was located about 65 feet from the impact crater, oriented on about a 260-degree magnetic heading, and was consumed by the postcrash fire. All crew and passenger seats were destroyed and separated from their attachment points. 

All major control surfaces of the airplane were accounted for at the accident scene.

The engine was separated from the main fuselage. The propeller remained attached to the engine. Both propeller blades were twisted, and exhibited chord-wise scratches and leading edge nicks.

The left wing remained attached to the main fuselage and was consumed by the postcrash fire. 

The postcrash fire also consumed the empennage.

Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit area to all of the flight control surface locations. The rudder and stabilator control stops were examined, and did not reveal any abnormalities.

The overhead canopy and right wing aileron were located about 20 feet beyond the main wreckage. 

The engine was recovered from the accident site and examined. The crankshaft was rotated via the propeller. Compression and valve train continuity was confirmed to all cylinders. The top and bottom spark plugs were removed and examined. Their electrodes were intact. The number 1 and 3 cylinder top and bottom sparkplugs were light gray in color, while the number 2 and 4 cylinder top and bottom sparkplugs were oil soaked. Both the left and right magnetos could not be tested due to impact and fire damage.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma conducted toxicological testing on the pilot. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Wreckage Release

The airplane wreckage was released on March 17, 2005 to a representative of the owners insurance company.

Beech 55 Baron, N5816S: Accident occurred May 18, 2015 in Saltville, Virginia

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA215 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, May 18, 2015 in Saltville, VA
Aircraft: BEECH 95 B55 (T42A), registration: N5816S
Injuries: 2 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On May 18, 2015, at 1238 eastern daylight time, a Beech 95-B55 (T42A), N5816S, was destroyed during collision with terrain near Saltville, Virginia. The commercial pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane departed Spruce Creek Airport (7FL6), Daytona Beach, Florida, about 0920, and was destined for Mansfield Lahm Regional Airport (MFD), Mansfield, Ohio. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight, which was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

Preliminary radar and air traffic control information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that at 1214:05, the airplane was in cruise flight at an altitude about 9,000 feet when the pilot contacted Tri-Cities Approach Control. The air traffic controller acknowledged the pilot and issued the altimeter setting. At 1220:02, the controller asked the pilot his on-course heading; the pilot responded 356 degrees. The controller advised the pilot of scattered areas of unspecified weather of unknown intensity about 40 miles directly ahead of the airplane. The pilot stated he would like to deviate east if possible. The TRI air traffic controller approved deviations left and right as necessary, and instructed the pilot to maintain 9,000 feet. At 1232:16, the air traffic controller switched the pilot to the Indianapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZID) and the pilot acknowledged the communications transfer. There were no further communications between the accident airplane and air traffic control.

Radar data depicted an easterly deviation off course, along with a gradual descent, before radar contact was lost.

A search was initiated, and the airplane wreckage was discovered in heavily wooded, mountainous terrain on May 19, 2015.

At 1235, the weather recorded at Tazewell County Airport, 8 miles north of the site, included scattered layers at 2,900 feet, 3,600 feet, and a broken ceiling at 8,000 feet with 10 miles visibility. The wind was from 210 degrees at 5 knots. The temperature was 24 degrees C, and the dewpoint was 18 degrees C. The altimeter setting was 30.26 inches of mercury. A Center Weather Advisory issued at 1204, valid west of the airplane's flight track, forecasted areas of heavy to extreme precipitation in isolated thunderstorms.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued July 2, 2013. A review of the pilot's logbook revealed he had accumulated 2,852.3 total hours of flight experience, 167 hours of which were in the accident airplane make and model.

According to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1965, and was equipped with two Continental Motors Inc IO-470, 260 hp reciprocating engines. The airplane's maintenance records were not recovered; however, a maintenance invoice revealed that its most recent annual inspection was completed August 15, 2014, at 4094.9 total aircraft hours.

The wreckage was examined at the accident site and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The initial impact points were an approximate 50-foot-tall tree and a deep ground scar collocated near the peak of a mountain, at an elevation of about 4,400 feet. . The airplane fragmented outside the crater, and was contained in an arc that reached about 50 feet beyond the crater on an approximate 192 degree magnetic heading, and widened to about 60 feet at its widest point.

Control continuity could not be established due to extensive impact damage, however; parts associated with both wings, left and right wing flaps, and left and right ailerons were identified. Sheet metal and cabling associated with the horizontal and vertical stablizers, as well as the elevators, were also identified.

The propellers were separated from their respective engines, and all propeller blades exhibited similar twisting, bending, leading edge gouging, and chordwise scratching. One tree trunk displayed deep, angular cuts with paint transfers consistent with propeller contact.

The wreckage and some personal electronic devices were recovered for examination at a later date.




The investigation of the plane crash that killed two people on Monday in a remote area near Saltville may take some time as the debris field is described as substantial and only being cleared during daylight hours.

According to Corinne Geller, public relations director with the Virginia State Police, the crash scene has been turned over to the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board, which began removing the wreckage on Thursday.

“They were going to have to remove by helicopter due to the terrain,” said Geller. “Cause remains under investigation.”

Geller said investigators are still waiting on positive identification of the victims whose bodies were taken to the Office of the Medical Examiner in Roanoke, but an Ohio newspaper identified the people on board the Beech BE55 as George and Pamela Ihrig Fonseca of Mansfield, Ohio. The couple was reported to have been flying from their winter home near Daytona Beach, Fla., back to Ohio.

The plane left Florida Monday morning and was reported missing at 2:20 p.m. The wreckage was discovered early Tuesday afternoon where the plane had crashed into Flat Top Mountain east of Saltville.

The Saltville Rescue Squad building served as a staging area for searchers and local people assisted in locating the crash scene once it was spotted from the air. On board the Virginia State Police helicopter conducting the spotting was a member of the Black Diamond Search and Rescue Council and a Virginia State Police lieutenant, stated a news release from the Virginia State Police.

The terrain is difficult, rocky with dense foliage, so recovery of the wreckage is taking place only during daylight hours, reported a spokesman with the NTSB.

The Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries (VDGIF) Conservation Police assisted with the ground search using ATVs.

Weather conditions at the time of the crash are being studied as part of the investigation, stated Lt. Ed Murphy with the Virginia State Police as the pilot of the aircraft may have been trying to avoid isolated storms in the flight path. A preliminary report may be released in the next couple of weeks.



George and  Pam Ihrig Fonseca
The husband and wife aboard a six-seat plane that crashed into the side of a mountain in Virginia were both aviation enthusiasts and pilots, a family member said.

George Fonseca and his wife, Pam Ihrig Fonseca, were on their way back home to Mansfield, Ohio, aboard their Beech BE-55 plane early Monday, said niece Kayla Ihrig of Pennsylvania. The Fonsecas encountered bad weather over the rugged and remote mountains of southwest Virginia, just east of Saltville, according to the Virginia State Patrol.

The plane crashed into the side of a mountain called Flat Top, which is quite steep, Virginia State Police Lt. Ed Murphy said. A search helicopter spotted the wreckage about 12:35 p.m. the next day.

“They were aviation enthusiasts,” Ihrig said in a telephone interview Wednesday. “They took flying very seriously. It was a huge shock to everyone.”

The couple had left the Spruce Creek Fly-In near Port Orange — where they have a home with a hangar on Lazy Eight Drive that backs up to a taxiway — just before 9 a.m. Monday and were expected back in Mansfield about five hours later, according to the flight plan they had filed with the Federal Aviation Administration. They were supposed to land at the Mansfield Lahm Regional Airport, FAA officials said.

The FAA had put out a statement saying that the pilot lost contact with air traffic controllers at Tri-Cities Airport in Tennessee at 12:40 p.m. Monday. The aircraft was flying about 7 miles northeast of Tazewell County Airport, Richland, Virginia, when contact was lost.

“The crash site is located on the western side of Flat Top Mountain towards the top elevation,” Corinne Geller, a spokeswoman with the Virginia State Patrol, wrote in an email. She described the debris field of wreckage as “extensive.”

Ihrig said her aunt Pam also had her pilot’s license, but she’s not certain whether Pam or George Fonseca was flying the plane Monday. She said the couple had four planes and enjoyed restoring Word War II-era aircraft. They flew back and forth between their residences in Mansfield and the Fly-In.

Ihrig also said the Fonsecas “traveled more than anyone else I ever met.” The couple owned a staffing company in Mansfield and when the couple failed to show up at their office, people became concerned and someone called Fonseca’s son, Ihrig said.

“Once we heard they were missing, family members drove (to the site) from Missouri and Pennsylvania,” Ihrig said.

Geller of the Virginia State Patrol said officials with the National Transportation Safety Board and the FAA were at the scene investigating on Wednesday.

Source:  http://www.news-journalonline.com


George Fonseca
































Monday, May 18, 2015

Beechcraft 1900C, YV1674, Aeropanamericano: Fatal accident occurred February 11, 2015 near Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA129
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 11, 2015 in Miami, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/27/2016
Aircraft: BEECH 1900, registration: YV1674
Injuries: 4 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The accident flight was a repositioning flight being operated by two airline transport pilots, and it was the multiengine turboprop airplane's first flight after an aviation maintenance technician (AMT) had replaced the left engine propeller with an overhauled propeller. The AMT subsequently performed an engine run, which included verifying correct power settings and corresponding blade angles.

A review of flight data recorder (FDR) data revealed that, about 2 seconds after rotation, the left engine propeller rpm decreased to 60 percent, and the left engine torque increased off-scale (beyond 5,000 ft-lbs), which is consistent with the left propeller traveling to the feathered position and the engine torque increasing in an attempt to maintain propeller rpm. About 30 seconds later, the flight crew shut down the left engine and attempted to return to the departure airport. Postaccident examination of the rudder trim actuator revealed that the rudder trim was at its full-right limit, which would have occurred to counteract the left engine drag before its shutdown. Based on this evidence, it is likely that the flight crew did not readjust the trim when the drag was alleviated, which resulted in the airplane being operated in a cross-controlled attitude for about 50 seconds with a left bank and full-right rudder trim. Although the airplane should have been able to climb about 500 ft per minute with one engine operating, it slowed and descended from 300 ft in the cross-controlled attitude until it stalled, as indicated by a stall warning recorded by the cockpit voice recorder, and subsequently impacted terrain.

Examination of the wreckage, including teardown examination of the left engine and propeller, did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. Review of the airplane maintenance manual revealed instructions to check the propeller reversing linkage on the front end of the engine, which controlled the beta valve, for proper rigging during propeller installation. The manual also contained a warning that misadjustment of the beta valve can cause unplanned feathering of the propeller and result in a possible hazard to airplane operation and overtorque damage to the engine; however, the beta valve rigging could not be verified postaccident due to impact damage. Additionally, the ground/flight idle solenoid energizes when weight becomes off wheels and further opens the beta valve, which could exacerbate an existing misrigged condition as soon as the airplane becomes airborne, which is when the airplane experienced the uncommanded propeller feathering.

The FDR data were consistent with the flight crew not performing the Before Takeoff (Runup) checklist. One of the items on that checklist was a low-pitch solenoid test, which would have energized the solenoid and possibly driven the left propeller uncommanded to feather during ground operations rather than in flight. A similar test during the postmaintenance engine-run would have had the same results.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The left engine propeller's uncommanded travel to the feathered position during takeoff for reasons that could not be determined due to impact damage. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to establish a coordinated climb once the left engine was shut down and the left propeller was in the feathered position. 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 11, 2015, at 1439 eastern standard time, a Beech 1900C, Venezuelan registration YV1674, registered to and operated by Aeropanamericano, C.A., was destroyed during collision with terrain and a postcrash fire, following a loss of propeller thrust during takeoff from Miami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida. The two foreign certificated pilots and two passengers were fatally injured. The repositioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Providenciales International Airport (MBPV), Providenciales, Turks and Caicos.

Review of radar and communication data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in addition to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), revealed that the flightcrew started the engines at 1427:35 and began to taxi to runway 27L at 1432. At 1434:23, the air traffic controller asked the flightcrew if they were going to do a run-up. The flightcrew responded affirmative; however, subsequent recorded conversation between the flightcrew did not reveal any intelligible reference to a checklist and at 1436:08, a flightcrew member stated "prepare for takeoff now." The flight was cleared for takeoff at 1436:44 and then engine power increased at 1437:22. The flightcrew conversation included "(airspeed) alive" at 1437:38, "V-1" at 1437:51, and "rotate" at 1437:52. About 2 seconds later, at 1437:54, a sound was recorded consistent with a decrease in propeller rpm followed by "engine is lost" at 1437:56. The CVR also captured the sound of the landing gear retracting at 1438:03.

At 1438:13, the flightcrew reported an engine failure to air traffic control. The controller asked the flightcrew if they would like to return to the airport and they replied affirmative. The controller then offered a 180-degree turn to runway 9R and the flightcrew requested a traffic pattern to runway 27L, which the controller approved with left turns in the pattern. At 1438:56, the flightcrew reported that they needed to turn left downwind and the controller cleared them to land on runway 9R. An enhanced ground proximity warning sound was recorded at 1438:58, followed by a terrain warning at 1439:01 and a stall warning horn at 1439:04. No further communications were received from the accident flight and the CVR recording ended at 1439:20.

Review of radar data revealed that six targets were recorded during the accident flight. The first target was recorded at 1438:18, at an altitude of 200 feet mean sea level (msl) about 1,000 feet beyond the departure end of runway 27L. The next three targets indicated a slight left turn at 300 feet msl. The fifth target indicated a continued slight left turn at 200 feet msl. The last target was recorded at 1439:19, at 100 feet msl, next to a utility pole that was struck. Witnesses observed the airplane flying low, with the left wing down and the left propeller turning slower than the right propeller, before the airplane impacted the utility pole.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot held a Venezuelan pilot and medical certificate. According to logbook excerpts and information from the operator, the pilot had accumulated a total flight experience of approximately 19,053 hours; of which, 17,860 hours were in multiengine airplanes. The operator added that of the total hours, the pilot had accumulated 1,476 hours in Beech 1900s with the company since 2006. The operator further reported that the pilot had accumulated additional Beech 1900 experience prior to employment, but they did not have information as to the number of hours.

The co-pilot held a Venezuelan pilot and medical certificate. He also held an FAA airline transport pilot certificate and first-class medical certificate, dated November 14, 2014. According to logbook excerpts and information from the operator, the co-pilot had accumulated a total flight experience of approximately 9,529 hours; of which 5,184 hours were in multiengine airplanes. The operator added that of the total hours, the co-pilot had accumulated 152 hours in Beech 1900s with the company since 2012. The operator further reported that the co-pilot had accumulated additional Beech 1900 experience prior to employment, but they did not have information as to the number of hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The 21-seat, twin-engine, low-wing, retractable gear airplane, serial number UC-47, was manufactured in 1988. It was powered by two Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-65B, 1,100 horsepower engines, equipped with four-blade, controllable-pitch, Hartzell HC-B4MP-3A propellers. The airplane was maintained under a manufacturer's approved inspection program. Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane's most recent inspection was completed on February 2, 2015. At that time, the airframe had accumulated 35,373 total hours of operation. The left engine had been operated for 2,305 hours since overhaul and the right engine had been operated for 3,449 hours since overhaul.

On February 9, 2015, the left engine propeller was removed for overhaul and replaced with another overhauled propeller. The accident flight was the first flight after the overhauled propeller was installed on the left engine.

During an interview, the aviation maintenance technician (AMT) that removed and replaced the left engine propeller stated that the pilots reported problems with the left engine propeller on February 7, 2015. Specifically, the pilots reported that the propeller was not achieving the correct power setting or pitch angle. The AMT further stated that he completed the propeller removal and replacement in about 6 hours, which was normal. He followed the airplane maintenance manual and only needed to disconnect the beta arm to perform the work. The AMT subsequently checked his own work and concluded with an operational check of power and performance, which included verifying correct power settings and corresponding blade angles.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather at KTMB, at 1453, was: wind from 030 degrees at 5 knots; sky clear; visibility 10 miles; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point 10 degrees C, altimeter 29.96 inches of mercury.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Cockpit Voice Recorder

The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild model A-100S CVR. The CVR recorded a minimum of 30 minutes of digital audio stored on solid state memory modules. Four channels were recorded: one channel for each flightcrew, one channel for a cockpit observer, and one channel for the cockpit area microphone. The channel for a cockpit observer did not record any audio, nor was it required to. The other three channels recorded audio of poor quality; however, a CVR Group convened at the NTSB Vehicle Records Laboratory, Washington, DC, on April 28, 2015 and was able to prepare a transcript of the recording. The transcript included 12 minutes, 26 seconds of the audio recording, which began as the flightcrew was preparing to start the engines and ended after impact (for more information, and a copy of the transcript, see CVR Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation in the NTSB public docket).

Flight Data Recorder

The airplane was equipped with a Loral/Fairchild Model F1000 flight data recorder (FDR). Data were successfully downloaded at the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC. The following parameters were recorded and plotted: autopilot engage; engine No. 1 propeller reverse; engine No. 1 propeller speed; engine No. 1 torque; engine No. 2 propeller reverse; engine No. 2 propeller speed; engine No. 2 torque; indicated airspeed; longitudinal acceleration; magnetic heading; microphone No. 1 keying; pressure altitude; and vertical acceleration.

Review of the plotted data revealed that engine torque and propeller rpm increased slightly about 10 seconds after the flight was cleared for takeoff, consistent with the airplane taxiing onto the runway for takeoff. At 1437:20, the engine torque increased to approximately 3,000 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) and the propeller rpm increased to 90 percent, consistent with takeoff power. At 1437:54, which was 2 seconds after one of the pilots stated "rotate," the left engine propeller rpm decreased to 60 percent while the left engine torque increased off-scale (beyond 5,000 ft-lbs), consistent with the left propeller travelling to the feathered position and the engine torque increasing in an attempt to maintain propeller rpm. The left engine propeller rpm and torque decreased to 0 at 1438:28 and 1438:34, respectively, consistent with the engine being shut down. At that time, the right engine propeller rpm remained at 90 percent and right engine torque remained between 3,000 to 5,000 ft-lbs until the end of the data, which was approximately 50 seconds later. During that time, the indicated airspeed decayed from about 110 knots to 100 knots and the magnetic heading indicated a 40-degree left turn (for more information, see FDR Specialist's Factual Report of Investigation in the NTSB public docket).

Additionally, FDR data recorded between the end of the previous flight and the accident flight were consistent with an approximate 12-minute postmaintenance engine run; however, there was no evidence of a torque check, overspeed governor test, low pitch solenoid test, primary governor check or autofeather check.

WRECKAGE INFORMATION

The airplane came to rest upright in a field against several trees, oriented about a magnetic heading of 110 degrees. The beginning of a debris path was observed near a severed utility pole and scrape marks across the adjacent road were consistent with left wingtip contact. Additionally, sections of the left propeller blades were located near the utility pole and along the debris path, consistent with the left propeller impacting the utility pole as the left wingtip was scraping the ground. The debris path extended about 240 feet, on a magnetic heading of 240 degrees, to the main wreckage.

A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the cockpit and cabin. The horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer, elevator, and rudder remained intact and were charred. The left and right outboard sections of the horizontal stabilizer and elevator were separated consistent with impact damage. The left wing mid-section had been consumed by fire. The left wing inboard flap was retracted and partially consumed by fire. The left wing outboard flap was charred and partially separated. The left aileron separated from the left wing and the left main landing gear was retracted.

The right wing was also partially consumed by fire and the right main landing gear was retracted. The right inboard flap, right outboard flap and right aileron were consumed by fire. The nosegear was also retracted. The elevator trim actuator measured 2 inches, which equated to greater than 15 degrees (off scale) trim tab down. The rudder trim actuator measured 3 inches, which equated to approximately 15 degrees trim tab left (full right rudder). The aileron trim actuator measured 1.93 inches, which corresponded to an approximate neutral setting.

Control continuity was confirmed from the ailerons to the bellcrank at the left wing root. That bellcrank had partially melted and one of the two cables leading to the cockpit had released where the bellcrank melted. The other cable remained attached. Rudder control continuity was confirmed from the rudder pedals, to the wing root area where the cables were cut by recovery personnel, to the rudder. Elevator continuity was confirmed from the control column, to the wing root area where the cables were cut by recovery personnel, to the elevator. Rudder and elevator trim cable continuity was confirmed from their respective trim tabs to the cockpit area.

The right propeller remained attached to the right engine and all four composite propeller blades separated at the hub. The right engine exhaust duct exhibited torsional bending and compression. The right engine was partially disassembled. The power section was separated from the gas generator case. Rotational scoring was observed between the compressor turbine disc and the first stage power turbine stator and baffle. Rotational scoring was also observed on the first stage power turbine blades and shroud. Continuity was confirmed from the compressor turbine disc to the accessory gearbox.

Teardown examination of the right propeller did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions and the propeller blades were found to be within the normal operating range at the time of impact.

The left propeller remained attached to the left engine and two of the four composite propeller blades had separated at the hub. One blade separated about 1 foot from the hub and the fourth blade remained attached and twisted. The propeller governor was in place, but the propeller speed control lever was separated and missing. The propeller governor reversing lever (beta arm) was found above the guide pin and the beta carbon block was separated and missing. The propeller governor cable rigging was attached; however, the sleeve nut that connects to the clevis was fractured, adjacent to the cambox. The cambox was fractured and the connecting rod between the fuel control and the cambox was bent. The pressure sensing line from the propeller governor to the fuel control was intact. The propeller overspeed governor was in place, but its cannon plug was severed.

The left engine exhaust duct exhibited some compression. Teardown examination of the left engine revealed that the compressor turbine (CT) was intact and all blades on the CT disk were complete and did not exhibit thermal damage or deformation. The CT disk had rub marks over a 90-degree section on the blade tips and blade attachments. A 360-degree rub was also present on the CT disk center bore and a coincident rub on the turbine baffle center dome between the 12 and 6 o'clock positons (for more information, see Powerplant Group Chairman's Factual Report in the NTSB public docket).

Teardown examination of the left propeller did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies. Impact (witness) marks on the piston dome corresponded to the blades being in the feathered position at the time of impact. One propeller blade appeared to have been rotated 180 degrees from the normal operating range, consistent with impact forces. Although the beta arm was found above the guide pin, rather than below it, subsequent metallurgical examination of the guide pin revealed scrapes and bending consistent with the beta arm being forced above the guide pin by impact forces, propeller removal or wreckage recovery (for more information, see Materials Laboratory Factual Report in the NTSB public docket).

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Autopsies were performed on the pilot and copilot by the Miami-Dade County Medical Examiner Department, Miami Florida, on February 12, 2015.

Toxicological testing of the pilot and copilot was performed on the pilot by the FAA Bioaeronautical Science Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Review of the pilot's toxicological report revealed:

"Chlorpheniramine detected in Urine
Chlorpheniramine detected in Blood
Pseudoephedrine detected in Urine
Pseudoephedrine detected in Blood
Telmisartan detected in Blood
Telmisartan detected in Urine"

Chlopheniramine was a sedating antihistamine; however, the levels detected were below reportable quantitative levels, consistent with levels that would not result in impairment. The detected Pseudoephedrine and Telmisartan were a decongestant and blood pressure medication, respectively. Both had an acceptable side effect profile consistent with no degradation in the pilot's performance during the accident flight.

Review of the copilot's toxicological report revealed:

"Diphenhydramine detected in Urine
0.061 (ug/ml, ug/g) Diphenhydramine detected in Blood (Cavity)
Losartan detected in Blood (Cavity)
Losartan detected in Urine"

Diphenhydramine was also a sedating antihistamine and the level detected was within the therapeutic range; however, a determination could not be made regarding impairment of the copilot due to the testing source being from cavity blood. Losartan was also a blood pressure medication with an acceptable side effect profile.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Checklists

The "Before Takeoff (Runup)" checklist included:

"…7. Cockpit Voice Recorder (if installed)..……….Check
a. Headset………………………………..……..Check
b. CVR Test Button…………………..Press And Hold
Observe meter needle in green band.
Listen for test tone in headset…
…16…c. Power Levers………......Increase Until Props Are
Stabilized at 1520 To 1610 RPM…
…17. Low Pitch Solenoid…………….………………TEST
a. Power Levers………………...Idle (Note Prop RPM)
b. Prop Test Switch……………..…Hold To Low Pitch
c. Prop RPM……………Stabilized Approx 200 RPM
Below Value in Step a….
…20. Autofeather………..…………………………..Check
a. Power Levers...Set Approximately 700 FT-LBS Torque
b. Autofeather Switch…………………...…...Hold In Test
(Both Autofeather Annunciators – Illuminated)
c. Power Levers……………………....Retard Individually
1) At approximately 550 ft-lbs-
Opposite Annunciator……………....Extinguished
2) At Approximately 320 ft-lbs-
Both Annunciators………………….Extinguished…"

Data consistent with execution of these checklist items were not captured on the CVR or FDR.

Performance

Review of the Beech 1900C Airliner Emergency Procedures revealed:

"Engine Failure During Takeoff (At or Above V1) – Takeoff Continued

1. V1 Speed……………………………………………………………….Rotate
2. Landing Gear (when positive climb established)………………………….Up
3. Airspeed…………………………………….…Maintain V2 to 400 Feet AGL
4. Propeller (inoperative engine)………………………………Verify Feathered
5. Airspeed (at 400 feet AGL minimum)……………Increase To Flaps Up Vyse
6. Flaps………………………………………………………………………..Up
7. Climb to 1000 feet AGL and Accomplish the Following Cleanup Procedures:…"

The airplane's maximum gross weight was 17,610 pounds. A weight and balance could not be computed due to the destruction of baggage/cargo; however, there was no evidence to indicate the airplane was at or over gross weight. The airplane's published takeoff safety speed (V2) was 120 knots (at 16,600 pounds and flaps up) and the single-engine best rate of climb speed (Vyse) was 125 knots. The published single-engine rate of climb under the given conditions was approximately 500 feet per minute.

Propeller

Review of the Beech 1900C airliner maintenance manual, chapter 61, Propeller Maintenance Practices, C. Installation, revealed, "…(13) Check the propeller reversing linkage on the front end of the engine for proper rigging…"

Ground Fine Stop System

The airplane's ground fine stop system was designed to prevent the propeller from operating at too fine (flat) a pitch during flight, whereas such a pitch might be utilized during ground operations. It used an electrical solenoid mounted on the front of the reversing push/pull cable to limit the propeller blade angle to 0 to 7 degrees. The solenoid was connected to the propeller reversing lever by means of a slotted clevis, which allowed the reversing lever to be pulled aft, resetting the beta valve. The electrical solenoid could be energized by two ground paths. One was through the right landing gear squat (weight on wheels) switch. The other occurred by pulling the power levers to the ground idle fine switch. The solenoid in each case energizes and pulls the reverse lever of the beta valve aft to reset the blade angle.

Review of the Beech 1900C airliner maintenance manual, chapter 76, Controls – Maintenance Practices, 8 Propeller Ground-Fine Solenoid, A. Rigging revealed:

"(1) Install the solenoid in the supporting bracket with the aft surface of the solenoid flush with the aft portion of the support bracket.
(2) Connect the solenoid arm to the propeller reversing lever
(3) Position the solenoid bracket on the beta cable housing so that the distance between the forward surface of the solenoid and the center of the clevis pin through the end of the solenoid plunger is 0.5-inch.
(4) Assure that all hardware is tight and that the safety wired are installed at the beta cable end as appropriate."

The section also contained a warning, "Warning: Misadjustment of the beta valve can cause unplanned feathering of the propeller. Resulting in a possible hazard to airplane operation and overtorque damage to the engine"

The rigging on the accident airplane could not be verified due to impact damage.




MIAMI - The widows of two of four Venezuelan men killed when a small airplane crashed in Kendall in February have filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the company that owned the Beech 1900C aircraft.

The lawsuits seek damages in excess of $15,000 from Aeropanamericano, C.A., for the deaths of Juan Carlos Ventencourt De Lima, 57, and Francisco DiMarco Vegas, 36.

Authorities identified the other victims killed as Raul Chirivella, who was the pilot, and Roberto Cavaniel.

Authorities said the men were in town on business to pick up plane parts and were returning to Venezuela.

Aviation officials said the plane left Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport and was trying to return after an engine apparently failed.

According to the complaint, "Reasonably skilled pilots of multi-engine aircraft are expected and required to be able to safely handle situations in which one of the two engines fails by flying the aircraft to the nearest available airfield or, in this instance, by returning to the airfield from which the aircraft had taken off."

The complaint also alleges that, "The subject aircraft was designed to be able to fly with only one engine functioning and was designed such that a reasonably skilled pilot can continue to fly the plane safely with only one engine functioning in order to land at the nearest available airfield or return to an airfield from which it has taken off."

The four men were on the twin engine Beechcraft 1900 headed for the Turks and Caicos, which is a common pit stop for planes heading to Venezuela.

Aviation officials said the plane hit a utility pole before crashing to the ground and catching fire.

It's unclear what caused the plane's engine to fail.

Source:  http://www.local10.com

NTSB Identification: ERA15FA129
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, February 11, 2015 in Miami, FL
Aircraft: BEECH 1900C, registration: YV1674
Injuries: 4 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On February 11, 2015, at 1439 eastern standard time, a Beech 1900C, Venezuelan registration VY1674, registered to and operated by Aeropanamericano, C.A., was destroyed during collision with terrain, following a loss of engine thrust during initial climb from Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida. The two foreign certificated pilots and two passengers were fatally injured. The repositioning flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the planned flight to Providenciales International Airport (MBPV), Providenciales, Turks and Caicos.

The twenty-one-seat airplane, serial number UC-47, was manufactured in 1988. It was powered by two Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-65B, 1,100 horsepower engines, equipped with four-blade, controllable-pitch, Hartzell HC-B4MP-3C propellers. Review of maintenance records revealed that the left engine propeller had been due for overhaul. It was removed and replaced with an overhauled propeller prior to the accident flight and the accident flight was the first flight after the overhauled propeller was installed on the left engine. 

Review of radar and communication data from the Federal Aviation Administration revealed that the flight was cleared for takeoff at 1436:45. At 1438:15, one of the pilots reported an "engine failure" to air traffic control. The controller asked the pilot if he would like to return to the airport and the pilot replied affirmative. The controller then offered a 180-degree turn to runway 9R and the pilot requested a left traffic pattern to runway 27L, which the controller approved; however, the airplane subsequently impacted a utility pole and terrain about 2 miles west of the runway. Review of radar data revealed that six targets were recorded during the accident flight. The first target was recorded at 1438:18, at an altitude of 200 feet mean sea level (msl) about 1,000 feet beyond the departure end of runway 27L. The next three targets indicated a slight left turn at 300 feet msl. The fifth target indicated a continued slight left turn at 200 feet msl. The last target was recorded at 1439:19, indicating 100 feet msl, next to the utility pole that was struck. Witnesses observed the airplane flying low, with the left wing down and the left propeller turning slower than the right propeller, before the airplane impacted the utility pole. 

The airplane came to rest upright in a field against several trees, oriented about a magnetic heading of 110 degrees. The beginning of a debris path was observed near a severed utility pole where scrape marks across the adjacent road were consistent with left wingtip contact. Additionally, sections of left propeller blades were located near the utility pole and along the debris path, consistent with the left propeller impacting the utility pole as the left wingtip was scraping the ground. The debris path extended about 240 feet, on a magnetic heading of 240 degrees, to the main wreckage. 

A postcrash fire consumed a majority of the cockpit and cabin. The horizontal stabilizer, vertical stabilizer, elevator, and rudder remained intact and were charred. The left and right wing mid-sections had been consumed by fire. The wing flaps and landing gear were in the retracted position. The right propeller remained attached to the right engine and all four composite propeller blades separated at the hub. The right engine exhaust duct exhibited torsional bending and compression. The left propeller remained attached to the left engine and two of the four composite propeller blades had separated at the hub. The other two blades separated about 1 foot from the hub. The left engine exhaust duct exhibited some compression. Both engines and propellers were retained for further examination. The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, which were forwarded to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for readout. 

The recorded weather at KTMB, at 1453, was: wind from 030 degrees at 5 knots; sky clear; visibility 10 miles; temperature 23 degrees C; dew point 10 degrees C, altimeter 29.96 inches of mercury.