Saturday, September 29, 2018

Piper PA-28-140 Cherokee, N40825: Accident occurred September 29, 2018 in Cheney, Spokane County, Washington

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Spokane, Washington

https://registry.faa.gov/N40825


NTSB Identification: GAA18CA575
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, September 29, 2018 in Cheney, WA
Aircraft: Piper PA28, registration: N40825

NTSB investigators will use data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator, and will not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Crashed under unknown circumstances.

Date: 29-SEP-18
Time: 17:01:00Z
Regis#: N40825
Aircraft Make: PIPER
Aircraft Model: PA 28 140
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: SERIOUS
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: SUBSTANTIAL
Activity: UNKNOWN
Flight Phase: UNKNOWN (UNK)
Operation: 91
City: CHENEY
State: WASHINGTON



SPOKANE COUNTY, Washington - Crews responded to a small plane crash Saturday morning near the Fowlers Airport in the Cheney area.

The single engine aircraft reportedly crashed into trees, and two males were extricated from the plane. The crash occurred in the south Spokane/east Cheney area near the Fowlers Airport off of S Short Rd.

KHQ has been told that the plane was attempting to land at the Fowlers Airport, but missed and attempted a go-around before crashing about 500 yards away from the airport. The flight had originated out of Felts Field in Spokane.

Both men were conscious after the crash and were taken to the hospital, where their condition is unknown.

A nearby witness says they responded to the crash and rendered aid to the victims.

Any information on the pilot or passenger is unknown at this time. 

A Federal Aviation Administration official is en route to the scene.

Original article can be found here ➤ http://www.khq.com










A small, single-engine plane crashed northeast of Cheney on Saturday morning.

Witnesses said the plane appeared to be attempting a landing on a nearby runway in the vicinity of the Homeport Airport. It crashed beyond the runway, hitting a stand of trees and coming to rest on its side.

Two passengers were reportedly inside the plane when it crashed. Witnesses say they were taken away by ambulance, apparently injured.

Spokane County Sheriff spokesperson Mark Gregory said the men did not appear to have life-threatening injuries when they were taken to the hospital.

A man who identified himself as a partial owner of the plane said that it was valued at around $35,000.

The Federal Aviation Administration is expected to arrive later in the day to investigate.

Original article can be found here ➤ http://www.spokesman.com

Piper Super Cub Replica, N1698K: Accident occurred September 29, 2018 in Saratoga Springs, Utah County, Utah

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Salt Lake City, Utah

https://registry.faa.gov/N1698K


NTSB Identification: GAA18CA576
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, September 29, 2018 in Saratoga Springs, UT
Aircraft: RAYMON A. KING SUPER CUB REPLICA, registration: N1698K

NTSB investigators will use data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator, and will not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.



SARATOGA SPRINGS — A pilot walked away from his plane with only minor injuries after landing upside down in shallow Utah Lake waters on Saturday.

The situation could have been worse, Utah County Sheriff’s Sgt. Spencer Cannon said.

“As crashes go, I think he’s fortunate in regards to what the circumstances are,” Cannon said.

The plane went down about 20 feet off shore, at about 12:45 p.m., near the Pelican Point area south of Saratoga Springs, on the west side of Utah Lake, Cannon said.

The pilot told authorities he was trying land the plane on the shoreline when a gust of wind came up and pushed the plane. A wheel touched the water, causing the plane to flip and crash, the pilot said.

The plane landed upside down in water about a foot deep, Cannon said. The pilot, who was the only person in the plane, walked to shore, he said.

Although the pilot called it a “hard landing," Saturday's landing could be reclassified as a crash, because there are no runways in the area and the plane landed upside down, Cannon added.

The man was treated for minor injuries at the scene but was not taken to a hospital, according to Cannon.

The Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board will be investigating the crash, Cannon said.

The name and age of the pilot were not released.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.ksl.com



Law enforcement responded to a plane crash on Utah Lake at around midday Saturday near Saratoga Springs. 

A plane with a single occupant went down in the water by Pelican Point, just south of Saratoga Springs, according to Sgt. Spencer Cannon with the Utah County Sheriff's Office. 

The pilot was attempting to make a landing on an exposed part of the Utah Lake shoreline, when a wind gust pushed the plane, Cannon later Tweeted. 

The wheel touched the water, and the pilot could not recover and crash landed, flipping the plane upside down. 

The pilot had minor injuries and walked to shore. 

Saratoga Springs medical personnel and sheriff's deputies initially responded, Cannon said. The Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board are involved. 

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.heraldextra.com





SARATOGA SPRINGS, Utah — A small plane crashed into a shallow part of Utah Lake Saturday in what the pilot told authorities was a “hard landing.”

Sgt. Spencer Cannon with the Utah County Sheriff’s Office said that the pilot, who was the sole occupant of the aircraft, crashed the plane into the west side of Utah Lake, at Pelican Point near Saratoga Springs.

The airplane flipped upside down during the crash, Cannon said.

Cannon said the pilot, who only suffered minor injuries, was able to walk 20 feet to the lakeshore.

The Federal Aviation Administration responded to the crash Saturday to investigate what caused the accident.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://fox13now.com

Beechcraft C90A King Air, PR-RFB: Fatal accident occurred September 15, 2018 in Ipumirim, Santa Catarina, Brazil

NTSB Identification: ERA18WA252
14 CFR Non-U.S., Non-Commercial
Accident occurred Saturday, September 15, 2018 in Ipumirim County, Brazil
Aircraft: BEECH C90, registration:
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

The foreign authority was the source of this information.

The government of Brazil has notified the NTSB of an accident involving a BEECH C90 airplane that occurred on September 15, 2018. The NTSB has appointed a U.S. Accredited Representative to assist the government of Brazil's investigation under the provisions of ICAO Annex 13.

All investigative information will be released by the government of Brazil.









Uma aeronave de pequeno porte de matrícula PR-RFB caiu e pegou fogo neste sábado (15) em uma comunidade de Linha Serra Alta, no interior de Ipumirim, no Oeste catarinense. Inicialmente, o Corpo de Bombeiros havia informado que duas pessoas foram encontradas carbonizadas, mas durante a tarde a corporação disse que há uma vítima.

Ainda não há informação definitiva sobre o número de vítimas. A empresa dona da aeronave disse à NSC TV que somente o piloto, Ailton dos Santos Filho, estava a bordo e que o avião estava alugado a uma companhia de táxi-aéreo de Xanxerê, também no Oeste.

Os bombeiros foram acionados por volta das 12h15. A área de mata é montanhosa e de difícil acesso. Inicialmente as equipes trabalharam para conter as chamas e depois fizeram buscas na região. As polícia Militar e Civil e os serviços de atendimento com ambulâncias prestaram apoio.

O avião tinha saído de Florianópolis com destino a Chapecó. Ainda não se sabe o que provocou a queda. Uma equipe do Instituto Geral de Perícias chegou ao local no fim da tarde. O local foi isolado e deve permanecer dessa maneira até pelo menos a manhã deste domingo (16).

A Aeronáutica informou que o Serviço Regional de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (Seripa V) vai apurar o acidente.

https://g1.globo.com

Piper PA-32RT-300T Turbo Lance II, N22267: Accident occurred February 20, 2015 at Lubbock Executive Airpark (F82), Lubbock County, Texas

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Lubbock, Texas

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

https://registry.faa.gov/N22267

Location: Lubbock, TX
Accident Number: CEN15LA149
Date & Time: 02/20/2015, 1017 CST
Registration: N22267
Aircraft: PIPER PA 32RT-300T
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Runway excursion
Injuries: 2 None
Flight Conducted Under:  Part 91: General Aviation - Business 

On February 20, 2015, about 1017 central standard time, a Piper PA-32RT-300T single-engine airplane, N22267, overran the end of the runway during an aborted takeoff at Lubbock Executive Airpark (F82), Lubbock, Texas. The private pilot and passenger were not injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a business flight with an instrument flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight that had the intended destination of Fort Worth Spinks Airport (FWS), Fort Worth, Texas.

The pilot reported that the accident occurred as he attempted a takeoff from runway 17 at F82. He reported using a short-field takeoff technique with 25° of wing flaps selected. The pilot stated that while they were taxiing toward runway 17 someone transmitted over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that the surface wind was from 220° at 4 knots, with 14 knot gusts. The pilot held the wheel brakes before starting the takeoff run until he had verified that the engine was developing takeoff power. The pilot stated that upon reaching 80 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) he applied aft yoke pressure to rotate for liftoff; however, the airplane did not respond to his aft stabilator control input. The pilot attempted to rotate a second time using both hands on the yoke, but the airplane still did not rotate and he aborted the takeoff as the airplane crossed midfield. The pilot reduced engine power to idle and applied wheel brakes; however, the airplane overran the end of the runway into a plowed field where the landing gear collapsed. The left wing sustained substantial damage after the landing gear collapsed.

The passenger, who was the pilot's spouse, reported that before arriving at F82 they had repositioned one of their cars at Lubbock International Airport (LBB) in case the surface winds increased or required the east/west runway later in the day. While at LBB, she noticed that the departing airplanes were taking off to the north. The passenger reported that after arriving at F82, the pilot performed the preflight while she loaded their baggage. The passenger stated that as they taxied toward runway 17, she asked the pilot about the current winds because she had previously observed airplanes departing to the north at LBB. The pilot replied that the windsock indicated the current surface winds were out of the southwest. Additionally, shortly before takeoff, she reported hearing someone transmit over the CTAF that the current winds were from 220° at 4 knots, with 14 knots gusts. The passenger reported that although she was seated in the right cockpit seat, she had monitored the airspeed indication during the takeoff. She noted that the pilot attempted to rotate the airplane at 80 KIAS, but the airplane did not respond to his aft pitch control input. She then observed the pilot grasp the yoke with two hands and pullback again with no effect on airplane pitch. The pilot announced that he was aborting the takeoff, reduced engine power to idle, and applied brakes. The passenger reported that although the airplane slowed considerably during the aborted takeoff, there was insufficient runway remaining for the airplane to come to a stop before the end of the runway. She stated that the landing gear collapsed after the airplane encountered soft soil located past the end of the runway. The passenger reported that the airplane came to rest on its lower fuselage, and that they were able to exit the airplane uninjured through the cabin door.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 59, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 08/15/2014
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 11/17/2013
Flight Time:   722 hours (Total, all aircraft), 37.5 hours (Total, this make and model), 672 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 58 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 19 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 59-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on August 15, 2014, with a limitation for corrective lenses.

The pilot reported having 722 total hours of flight experience, all of which were flown in single-engine airplanes. He had flown 672 hours as pilot-in-command, 111 hours at night, and 34 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions. He had flown 58 hours during the 90 days before the accident and 19 hours during 30 days before the accident. The pilot had not flown during the 24 hours before the accident. His most recent flight review, as required by 14 CFR 61.56, was completed on November 17, 2013, in a Piper PA-28-180 airplane.

The pilot reported having 37.5 hours of flight experience in Piper PA-32RT-300T airplanes, all of which were flown within the preceding 4 months. The pilot's only flight experience in T-tail equipped airplanes was in Piper PA-32RT-300T airplanes. He had logged 2.9 hours in another Piper PA-32RT-300T before his first flight in the accident airplane on November 21, 2014. The pilot reported that he had completed 22 flights and 43 takeoff and landings in the airplane before the accident.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: PIPER
Registration: N22267
Model/Series: PA 32RT-300T 300T
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1978
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 32R-7887252
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats: 6
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 09/01/2014, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3600 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 36 Hours
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 5044.83 Hours at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT: Installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: TIO-540-S1AD
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 300 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

The 1978-model-year airplane, serial number 32R-7887252, was a low-wing monoplane of aluminum semi-monocoque construction. The airplane was powered by a 300-horsepower, turbocharged, 6-cylinder, Lycoming TIO-540-S1AD reciprocating engine, serial number L-5794-61A. The engine provided thrust through a constant-speed, three-blade, Hartzell model HC-E3YR-1RF/F7673DR propeller, serial number FM1976B. The 6-seat airplane was equipped with a T-tail stabilator, wing flaps, and a retractable tricycle landing gear. The airplane had a useful load of 1,201 pounds and a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 3,600 pounds. According to FAA documentation and the corresponding bill-of-sale, the pilot purchased the airplane on November 29, 2014.

The last annual inspection was completed on September 1, 2014, at 5,008.74 hours total airframe time. The recording tachometer indicated 5,044.83 hours at the accident site, which was the airplane's total service time since new. The engine had accumulated 1,142.73 hours since its last overhaul. Review of the maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues. The airplane had two fuel tanks, one located in each wing, and a total fuel capacity of 98 gallons. The pilot estimated that the airplane had about 70 gallons of fuel before the flight. A postaccident weight-and-balance calculation indicated that the ramp weight before the flight was 3,359 pounds and within the normal category envelope limits with a center-of-gravity at 88.91 inches aft of the datum. 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: LBB, 3282 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 11 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 0953 CST
Direction from Accident Site: 358°
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Visibility: 10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling:  Broken / 26000 ft agl
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 9 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: None / None
Wind Direction: 290°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 29.79 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 13°C / -2°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Lubbock, TX (F82)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Fort Worth, TX (FWS)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1017 CST
Type of Airspace: Class G 

A postaccident review of available weather data was completed by a Senior Meteorologist with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to determine the surface wind direction, speed, and gust factor at the time of the accident. The wide-area synoptic weather conditions included trough of low pressure at the accident site and a high-pressure system located in southern Colorado. There was a 10-hPa pressure gradient across the region that resulted in westerly surface winds of 5 to 10 knots with gusts to 25 knots.

The nearest aviation weather station was at Lubbock International Airport (LBB) about 12 miles north of the accident site. At 0953, about 24 minutes before the accident, the LBB automated surface observing system reported: surface wind 290° at 9 knots, 10 miles surface visibility, broken cloud layers at 26,000 ft above ground level (agl) and 30,000 ft agl, temperature 13°C, dew point -2°C, and an altimeter setting 29.79 inches of mercury. At 1053, about 36 minutes after the accident, the LBB automated surface observing system reported: surface wind 280° at 17 knots with 23 knot gusts, 10 miles surface visibility, scattered clouds at 26,000 ft agl and 30,000 ft agl, temperature 20°C, dew point -4°C, and an altimeter setting 29.78 inches of mercury.

Postaccident wind calculations based on the 0953 weather report yielded a 8 knot crosswind and 4 knot tailwind for a takeoff on runway 17 at F82. A wind gust of 15 knots would have resulted in a 13 knot crosswind and 7 knot tailwind. The same wind calculations based on the 1053 weather report yielded a 16 knot crosswind and 6 knot tailwind; however, the weather report also included a 23 knot wind gust, which would have resulted in a 22 knot crosswind and 8 knot tailwind. 

Airport Information

Airport: Lubbock Executive Airpark (F82)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 3200 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 17
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 3500 ft / 70 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: None 

F82, a public airport located about 5 miles south of Lubbock, Texas, was owned and operated by Bre-Lene Logistics, LLC. The airport field elevation was 3,200 ft msl. The airport was served by an asphalted runway 17/35 (3,500 ft by 70 ft) and a turf runway 7/25 (1,500 ft by 110 ft). The airport was not equipped with an air traffic control tower. 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 33.485556, -101.812778 (est) 

A postaccident examination was conducted by FAA inspectors with the Lubbock Flight Standards District Office. The FAA inspectors reported there were continuous tire skid marks that began about 810 ft from the departure end of runway 17. The airplane subsequently came to rest about 20 ft past the end of the runway on a southwest heading. The airplane was found resting on its lower fuselage, with all three landing gear collapsed. An aft movement of the control yoke revealed a slight stiffness about halfway through its full aft travel; however, there was no binding or impediment that precluded full-aft yoke travel. The FAA inspectors reported that the control column bushings appeared to be new and that a small application of lubricant removed the slight stiffness that had been noted during their initial test. Measurements of the stabilator's range of travel established that it conformed to the manufacturer's design specifications. The cable tension for the upper and lower stabilator control cables measured 19 pounds and 21 pounds, respectively. According to the manufacturer's maintenance manual, when corrected for outside temperature, the stabilator control cable tension should have been 33 pounds. Although the measured cable tension was below the manufacturer's specification, the elevator control cable system functioned as designed. The cockpit pitch trim indicator was in a slightly nose-up setting, consistent with a takeoff trim configuration. Further examination and testing of the pitch trim system did not reveal any anomalies with the anti-servo tab, rigging, or its corresponding travel associated with stabilator movement. There were no anomalies identified with the aileron or rudder control systems.

The airplane's airspeed indicator was tested by an avionics technician under the supervision of the FAA inspectors. The airspeed indicator remained installed in the instrument panel with no modifications to the airplane's remaining pitot pressure system. The indicated airspeed was compared to the airspeed generated by technician's calibrated equipment. The testing revealed that the airplane's airspeed indicator consistently read 5 knots higher than the actual airspeed generated by the test equipment. 

Additional Information

The pilot reported that he had experienced two previous abnormal takeoffs since he purchased the airplane. On December 20, 2014, the airplane did not liftoff when he rotated at 70 KIAS during the takeoff run; however, the airplane subsequently became airborne when he made a second attempt to rotate at a higher airspeed and with increased aft elevator input. On December 26, 2014, the airplane did not liftoff when the pilot rotated at 80 KIAS during the takeoff run. The pilot immediately aborted the takeoff and brought the airplane to a stop on the remaining runway.

According to the Piper PA-32RT-300T Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), the normal takeoff procedure is to accelerate to 75 to 85 KIAS before applying back pressure to the control wheel to rotate into a climb attitude. A short-field takeoff procedure (with the wing flaps set to 25°) is to accelerate to 65 to 69 KIAS before applying back pressure to the control wheel to rotate airplane into a climb attitude and then after liftoff continue to accelerate to the desired climb airspeed.

Piaggio P180 Avanti, registered to Peregrine Falcon Inc and operated by Mountain Aviation Inc, N700FE: Accident occurred January 31, 2014 at Abraham Lincoln Capital Airport (KSPI), Springfield, Sangamon County

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Springfield, Illinois
Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV); Rome
Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB); Farnborough
Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A.; Finale Ligure
Mountain Aviation Inc; Broomfield, Colorado
Valve Research & Mfg Co; Deerfield Beach, Florida

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Investigation Docket  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms


https://registry.faa.gov/N700FE 


Location: Springfield, IL
Accident Number: CEN14LA127
Date & Time: 01/31/2014, 1312 CST
Registration: N700FE
Aircraft: PIAGGIO P180 - AVANTI II
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Landing gear collapse
Injuries: 5 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business 

The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident.

On January 31, 2014, at 1312 central standard time, a Piaggio P180 airplane, N700FE, was substantially damaged when the landing gear retracted during landing roll at Abraham Lincoln Capital Airport (SPI), Springfield, Illinois. The pilot, copilot, and 3 passengers were not injured. The airplane was registered to Peregrine Falcon, Inc. and operated by Mountain Aviation, Inc., under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country business flight that departed Dane County Regional Airport (MSN), Madison, Wisconsin, at 1156.

The pilot reported that he told the copilot to select landing gear down and to reposition the flaps as the airplane approached the outer marker for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 4 approach at SPI. The pilot stated that after repositioning the landing gear selector handle to gear-down the hydraulic system pressure indicated 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi), but he did not observe a safe landing gear indication. The pilot made a missed approach at the final approach fix to troubleshoot the landing gear system anomaly. The landing gear selector handle was cycled several times, each time without a safe gear-down indication. The copilot then declared an emergency with air traffic control. The pilot and copilot then completed the emergency landing gear extension checklist procedure; landing gear selector handle in the down position, hydraulic system off, emergency landing gear selector valve pulled, and then manually pump the landing gear down. The pilot reported that after completing the emergency landing gear extension they observed a safe gear-down indication. The copilot then advised the air traffic controller that they were ready to continue to the instrument approach and canceled their emergency.

The pilot reported that while they were being vectored back to the final approach course he and the copilot discussed if the hydraulic system could be turned back on to have power-assisted braking and nosewheel steering available upon landing on the snow-covered runway. The pilot stated that after the hydraulic system was turned on he observed a system pressure indication of 750 psi and did not observe an unsafe indication for the hydraulic system. Additionally, the safe gear-down indicators remained illuminated after the hydraulic system was turned back on.

The pilot reported that the flight was vectored for the ILS runway 4 approach at SPI and the airplane descended below clouds about 600 ft above ground level (agl) while on final approach. He stated that the touchdown was as slow and as soft as possible, and that he gradually applied wheel braking to slowly decelerate the airplane during the landing roll. He noted that the wheel brakes were less effective than normal and that the nosewheel steering was inoperative, but the airplane still decelerated to a walking speed as it approached the foxtrot taxiway turnoff. The pilot stated that he believed the diminished braking and lack of nosewheel steering was because the emergency landing gear selector valve was still in the extended position. The pilot reported that the landing gear collapsed as he "reached for" the emergency landing gear selector valve handle. The pilot further stipulated that he "did not make contact with the emergency selector" before the landing gear collapsed.

According to a transcript of the cockpit voice recorder, while inflight, at 1255:34, the copilot began pumping the landing gear down and 1 minute 3 seconds later the pilot stated "Okay, three green." At 1256:38, the copilot stated "ahhh, alright [exhaling]" and the sound of his pumping the emergency handle ceased. At 1259:43, the copilot asked the pilot "do you want the hydraulic pressure on for steering and braking?" The pilot replied "I was going to say. I think, ah, we should do that. Do you think that's acceptable?" At 1259:49, the pilot replied "okay… I do." At 1259:50, the pilot said "alright, I like that" and the sound of the hydraulic motor commences. At 1301:17, the pilot asked the copilot "there wasn't anything else in the checklist after pumping it down, correct?" The copilot replied, "it comes down, three green." At 1301:22, the pilot asked the copilot "okay, it didn't say go to any others?" The copilot replied "no." At 1301:35, the copilot told the pilot "checklist doesn't regard it… doesn't really have a checklist for… gear stuck." The copilot then said, "it has hydraulic failure, which would say pump the gear down." The copilot then told the pilot the remaining landing gear emergency checklists were for a gear-up landing, nose gear unlocked, and main gear unlocked.

According to the CVR transcript, while on final approach to the runway, at 1310:37, the copilot stated "We're set. We've got three green, no red. Hydraulic pressure is seven fifty and we've got zero diff." At 1311:25, the airplane touched down on the runway and the pilot told the copilot to bring the props full forward and set the engine power to ground idle. At 1312:05, the pilot stated, "I don't think I'm getting very good brakes… I don't have any pressure." At 1312:08, the copilot replied, "no pressure?" At 1312:09, the pilot stated, "no pressure." At 1312:10, the copilot stated, "try the steering." At 1312:12, pilot replied, "oh, you know we have the ah T-bar in." At 1312:15, the copilot stated, "okay." At 1312:17, the copilot stated, "pull it." Between 1312:17 and 1312:23, the landing gear warning horn was heard, the sound of the hydraulic system momentarily decreased before it increased back to normal, and there was the sound of rumbling and scraping consistent with the landing gear retracting and the airplane impacting the ground. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Flight Instructor
Age: 28, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 1 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 08/20/2013
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 12/13/2013
Flight Time:  5040 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1164 hours (Total, this make and model), 832 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 30 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 30 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft) 

Co-Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Flight Instructor
Age: 31, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 1 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 04/29/2013
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 09/27/2013
Flight Time:  5270 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1900 hours (Total, this make and model), 3388 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 52 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 19 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)

Pilot

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 28-year-old pilot held an air transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His airplane single-engine landing rating was limited to commercial privileges. He held a type rating for Bombardier Dash 8 100/300 airplanes. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on August 20, 2013, without any limitations.

The pilot reported having 5,040 total hours of flight experience, of which 4,685 hours were flown in multiengine airplanes. The pilot had flown 1,164 hours in Piaggio P180 airplanes. He had flown 832 hours as pilot-in-command, 1,240 hours at night, and 2,190 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions. His most recent flight review, as required by 14 CFR 61.56, was completed on December 13, 2013, in a P180 airplane. During the period December 16, 2013, through December 19, 2013, the pilot successfully completed ground and simulator training for the Piaggio P180 airplane at FlightSafety International, West Palm Beach, Florida.

Copilot

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the 31-year-old copilot held an air transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His airplane single-engine landing rating was limited to commercial privileges. He held a type rating for Fairchild Swearingen Metroliner airplanes. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on April 29, 2013, without any limitations.

The copilot reported having 5,270 total hours of flight experience, of which 3,893 hours were flown in multiengine airplanes. The copilot had flown 1,900 hours in Piaggio P180 airplanes. He had flown 3,388 hours as pilot-in-command, 685 hours at night, and 340 hours in actual instrument meteorological conditions. His most recent flight review, as required by 14 CFR 61.56, was completed on September 27, 2013, in a P180 airplane. During the period February 11, 2013, through February 14, 2013, the copilot successfully completed ground and simulator training for the Piaggio P180 airplane at FlightSafety International, West Palm Beach, Florida.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: PIAGGIO
Registration: N700FE
Model/Series: P180 - AVANTI II
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture:
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 1232
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats: 10
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 12/20/2013, Continuous Airworthiness
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 12100 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 2 Turbo Prop
Airframe Total Time: 45.5 Hours at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney Canada
ELT: C126 installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: PT6A-66B
Registered Owner: Peregrine Falcon, LLC
Rated Power: 850 hp
Operator: Mountain Aviation, Inc.
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

The 2013-model-year airplane, serial number 1232, was a twin-engine airplane of aluminum and composite construction. The airplane was powered by two 850 shaft-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-66B turbo-propeller engines, through 5-blade, counter-rotating, constant speed, full-feathering, Hartzell HC-E5N-3A propellers. The airplane was equipped with a retractable tricycle landing gear and a pressurized cabin that was configured to seat 10 individuals. The airplane was approved for operations in instrument meteorological conditions and known icing conditions. The airplane had a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 12,100 pounds. On November 22, 2013, the airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate and a registration number when it was imported into the United States after manufacture in Italy. The current airplane owner, Peregrine Falcon, LLC, purchased the airplane on December 20, 2013. According to the operator, the airplane had been maintained under the provisions of an approved manufacturer inspection program and had accumulated 45.5 total hours since new.

The airplane landing gear are extended and retracted by hydraulic fluid delivered to an actuator on each landing gear. Each actuating cylinder is provided with internal up and down locks. The locks are a normally closed type and can be only opened by applying positive pressure. Each lock directly actuates the switches controlling the landing gear position indicating lights on the instrument panel. An internal shuttle valve in each actuating cylinder allows landing gear extension on the main or on the emergency hydraulic lines.

The hydraulic system provides power for the actuation of the landing gear, nosewheel steering, and main wheel brake system. The modular hydraulic power package consists of a variable displacement pump driven by an electric motor, an integral hydraulic fluid reservoir, a solenoid-operated directional valve, a pressure transducer, and filter assembly. The hydraulic power package operates in three different modes (high duty, low duty, and non-operating mode). The high duty mode delivers hydraulic pressure in the nominal range from 1,800 to 3,100 psi for landing gear extension and retraction. The solenoid-operated directional valve directs hydraulic pressure to the landing gear actuators during normal extension and retraction. When the landing gear reaches a fully retracted position, the gear-up stop switch turns off the hydraulic system (non-operating mode). When the landing gear reaches a fully extended position, the gear-down stop switches signal the hydraulic power package to enter low duty mode (800 to 1,200 psi) to deliver hydraulic pressure for nosewheel steering and wheel brake actuation. Landing gear squat switches prevent the directional control valve from delivering hydraulic pressure to the retract lines if the landing gear control lever is inadvertently moved to the gear-up position while the airplane is on the ground.

The emergency landing gear extension system consists of an emergency selector valve and a hand pump. The emergency selector valve is installed on the left side of the center pedestal and the hand pump is on the right side of the pedestal. When the emergency selector valve handle is extended, the hand pump hydraulic line is connected to the emergency gear extend line at each landing gear actuator and the normal hydraulic return line is connected to the emergency return line. Operation of the hand pump operates shuttle valves in each landing gear actuator to provide hydraulic pressure to unlock and extend the landing gear. The hand pump, emergency selector valve, and associated hydraulic plumbing are designed to extend the landing gear only. The emergency extension procedure requires the hydraulic system to be turned off, the gear selector handle to be in the down position, and the emergency selector valve handle to be extended. About 60 hand pump strokes over about 90 seconds are required for a positive down lock of all landing gear.

The main wheel brakes are hydraulically actuated. When the airplane is on the ground, the hydraulic pump normally supplies flow to operate the brakes at a regulated pressure of 1,000 psi. When the rudder pedals are depressed, the brake valves allow fluid under pressure to flow the normal lines to the shuttle valves on each brake unit. If the system pressure drops below 500 psi due to a hydraulic power package failure or line breakage, an integral automatic diverter allows the brake valve to operate as a master cylinder, which converts brake pedal action to a fluid pressure directly applied to each brake unit through a separate emergency line that is controlled by the shuttle valve on each brake unit. Emergency brake operation requires about 50% more force on the brake pedals than normal.

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan


Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: SPI, 598 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1302 CST
Direction from Accident Site:
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Visibility:  2.5 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 1000 ft agl
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 3 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: Unknown / Unknown
Wind Direction: 10°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: Unknown / Unknown
Altimeter Setting: 30.14 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: -4°C / -8°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: Light - Snow; No Obscuration
Departure Point: Madison, WI (MSN)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Springfield, IL (SPI)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 1156 CST
Type of Airspace: Class C 

A postaccident review of available meteorological data established that day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. At 1302, about 10 minutes before the accident, the SPI automated surface observing system reported: wind 010° at 3 knots, 2.5 miles surface visibility with light snow, broken cloud ceiling at 1,000 ft agl, broken cloud ceiling at 5,000 ft agl, temperature -4°C, dew point -8°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.14 inches of mercury. 

Airport Information

Airport: Abraham Lincoln Capital (SPI)
Runway Surface Type: Concrete
Airport Elevation: 598 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Snow
Runway Used: 04
IFR Approach: ILS
Runway Length/Width: 8001 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop 

Abraham Lincoln Capital Airport (SPI), a public airport located about 3 miles northwest of Springfield, Illinois, was owned and operated by the Springfield Airport Authority. The airport field elevation was 598 ft msl. The airport was served by three runways, runway 4/22 (8,001 ft by 150 ft), runway 13/31 (7,400 ft by 150 ft), and runway 18/36 (5,300 ft by 150 ft). The airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower that was operational at the time of the accident. 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 3 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 5 None
Latitude, Longitude: 39.844167, -89.678056 (est) 

The airplane's landing gear was found retracted at the accident site. The aviation mechanic who coordinated the recovery of the airplane reported that he observed the landing gear selector handle in the gear-down position, the hydraulic system switch off, the electric master switch off, the emergency landing gear selector valve handle pulled out, and none of the circuit breakers were pulled or tripped. The airplane was suspended by a crane before the mechanic attempted to extend the landing gear. The mechanic pushed the emergency landing gear selector valve down, turned the hydraulics system switch on, and then turned on the electric master switch. When the electric master switch was turned on the landing gear did not extend, and the hydraulic system remained in the non-operating mode. The mechanic then turned the hydraulic system off, pulled the emergency landing gear selector valve handle, and extended the landing gear with the hand pump. The mechanic stated that he continued to actuate the emergency pump handle until he obtained a safe gear-down indication and was unable to move the emergency pump handle due to increased pressure. After successfully extending the landing gear, the electric master switch was turned off and the airplane lowered to the ground before being towed to a hangar. 

Flight Recorders

The airplane was equipped with an L-3/Fairchild model FA2100-1020 CVR, serial number 851267. The CVR recording contained about 2 hours 4 minutes of digital audio, which was stored in solid-state memory modules. The CVR was not damaged during the accident and the audio information was extracted from the recorder normally. The recording consisted of four channels of audio information, ranging from good to excellent quality. The first 5 minutes of the recording were from the previous flight. The accident flight recording began about 1119 when the airplane, operated as Foothills 70, received its instrument clearance from MSN clearance delivery. The flight departed MSN about 1156 and climbed to flight level 270. About 1222, the flight received automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information at SPI. After receiving the ATIS information, the flight crew briefed the ILS approach to runway 4 at SPI. By 1239, the flight began receiving air traffic control (ATC) radar vectors toward the final approach course for ILS runway 4 at SPI. At 1243, the airplane had descended to 2,300 ft msl. At 1247, the flight was cleared for the first ILS runway 4 approach to SPI. A full transcript was created for the flight from 1249:57 until 1313:39 as the passengers and flight crew members evacuated the airplane and electrical power was removed from the CVR. The transcript of the CVR audio information is included with the docket materials associated with the investigation. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be so equipped.

Tests And Research

A follow-up examination was completed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) maintenance inspectors with assistance from the airplane manufacturer, airplane operator, and maintenance personnel. The airplane was placed on jackstands to test the landing gear extension/retraction system. An electrical continuity test confirmed the correct operation of the landing gear selector handle (up/down) to the solenoid-operated directional control valve. Before testing continued, the landing gear selector handle was confirmed to be in the gear-down position, the emergency landing gear selector valve handle was confirmed to be extended, and the electric master switch was turned on. When the hydraulic system was momentarily powered on, the nose and right main landing gear immediately showed an unsafe condition and the right main landing gear retracted slightly. Hydraulic power was immediately turned off and the emergency landing gear extension valve handle was pushed down to return the system to a normal configuration. Although the landing gear selector handle remained in the gear-down position and the emergency landing gear extension valve was stowed, all three landing gear retracted when the hydraulic system was turned back on. The emergency extension procedures were then used to return the landing gear to a down-and-locked position. The electrical connection to the solenoid-operated directional control valve was removed to ensure the solenoid remained deenergized (gear down). The landing gear still retracted when hydraulic power was turned back on, despite the landing gear selector handle in the gear-down position, the solenoid deenergized, and the emergency landing gear extension valve stowed. Based on the testing, it was determined that the solenoid-operated directional control valve was stuck in the gear-up position. No mechanical anomalies were identified with the emergency landing gear extension valve during several pull-force tests. The hydraulic pump package, which included the solenoid-operated directional control valve, and the emergency landing gear extension valve were removed from the airplane for additional testing.

The hydraulic pump package, solenoid-operated directional control valve, and emergency landing gear selector valve underwent x-ray computed tomography (CT) scanning to document their internal conditions. The results of the CT scanning revealed a single particle located between one of the spool lands and the directional control valve housing. The position of the trapped particle prevented the spool from returning to the default (deenergized) position for normal landing gear extension. Further review established that trapped particle and jammed spool would allow hydraulic flow to the landing gear retraction lines. Additional CT scanning did not identify any anomalies with the remaining components of the hydraulic pump package or the emergency landing gear selector valve.

The solenoid-operated directional control valve was examined at the manufacturer to extract the trapped particle. Disassembly of the directional control valve confirmed the spool was jammed and required the spool to be forced out by hand. There was a minor impact mark on the edge of the spool where it had been in contact with the trapped particle. Metallurgical examinations of the trapped particle indicated that it measured about 2.9 mm long, 0.98 mm wide, and 0.5 mm thick. Energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy determined the composition of the trapped particle was about 94% iron, 3% nickel, 2% chromium, and 0.5% manganese (consistent with 9300 or 3300 series steel). A review of materials used in the directional control valve did not match the material composition of the trapped particle. Trace amounts of aluminum, magnesium, and silicon were also identified during testing, which were attributed to incidental contact with an aluminum component within the directional control valve.

A review of hydraulic system schematics indicated that the fluid returning to the hydraulic pump package flowed through the directional control valve; however, based on spool orientation and flow paths within the directional control valve, the trapped particle likely originated from the hydraulic pump package and not with the fluid returning from the aircraft systems. A teardown examination of the hydraulic pump package did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have resulted in a malfunction of the pump. However, during removal of the actuator sleeve the stainless-steel threaded insert pulled-out with the threaded section of the actuator sleeve. A visual examination established that the threaded insert had jumped a thread and was deformed. Additionally, there was damage to the actuator sleeve thread and corresponding female thread in the valve plate subassembly. The actuator sleeve was a machined steel component. Although the actuator sleeve had a similar material composition to the trapped particle that was recovered from the directional control valve, a further review did not provide a positive match between the particle and the materials used in the hydraulic pump package.

The airplane manufacturer performed testing on an exemplar airplane to determine if they could duplicate an uncommanded landing gear retraction with a simulated failure of the directional control valve in the gear-up position. Without the hydraulic system on, the landing gear was extended using the emergency landing gear extension procedure. The test results indicted the emergency line pressure was 1,800-2,700 psi after receiving a gear safe indication and significant force was required to actuate the emergency hand pump. The test results also indicated that there was a pressure decay in emergency system line of 50-100 psi per minute. The pressure in the gear retraction lines was 560-600 psi with the landing gear manually extended and the hydraulic pressure turned on with a simulated failure of the directional control valve in a gear-up position. The landing gear did not unlock (gear unsafe indication) and/or retract while the pressure in the emergency line was above 100 psi. Additionally, the emergency landing gear selector handle had to be moved more than 70% of its total stroke before the emergency line lost pressure and the landing gear retracted.

Additional Information

The emergency procedure to extend the landing gear in the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) and Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) did not specify if you could use the hydraulic system after an emergency gear extension. In the absence of any clear prohibition, the flight crew believed that the hydraulic system could be used for power-assisted braking and nosewheel steering. As result of the accident, the airplane manufacturer amended the emergency procedure to include a caution that the hydraulic pump should not be turned on following an emergency landing gear extension and that the emergency landing gear selector valve should remain extended. Additionally, the amended emergency procedure also notes that the normal ground roll will increase about 55% if reverse thrust is not used, brake action would be less effective than normal, and the emergency brake operation procedure should be used during landing. The amended emergency procedure also advises pilots that the nosewheel steering will be inoperative with the hydraulic pump turned off and that a maintenance check was required following an emergency landing gear extension.