Monday, August 26, 2019

Beechcraft 58TC Baron, N2VV and Cirrus SR22T, N828DZ: Incident occurred August 24, 2019 at San Carlos Airport (KSQL), San Mateo County, California

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; San Jose

Aircraft struck wing tip of N828DZ.

EPD Tech LLC

https://registry.faa.gov/N2VV

Date: 24-AUG-19
Time: 21:35:00Z
Regis#: N2VV
Aircraft Make: BEECH
Aircraft Model: 58
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: UNKNOWN
Activity: PERSONAL
Flight Phase: UNKNOWN (UNK)
Operation: 91
City: SAN CARLOS
State: CALIFORNIA

Aircraft was struck by N2VV.

Zadi Aviation LLC

https://registry.faa.gov/N828DZ

Date: 24-AUG-19
Time: 21:35:00Z
Regis#: N828DZ
Aircraft Make: CIRRUS
Aircraft Model: SR22
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: MINOR
Activity: PERSONAL
Flight Phase: UNKNOWN (UNK)
Operation: 91
City: SAN CARLOS
State: CALIFORNIA

Mooney M20C Ranger, N78988: Accident occurred August 26, 2019 near Reno Stead Airport (KRTS), Washoe County, Nevada

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Reno, Nevada

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/N78988

Location: Reno, NV
Accident Number: WPR19LA243
Date & Time: 08/26/2019, 1644 PDT
Registration: N78988
Aircraft: Mooney M20C
Injuries: 2 Serious, 1 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal 

On August 26, 2019, about 1644 Pacific daylight time, a Mooney M20C airplane, N78988, was substantially damaged during a forced landing at Reno/Stead Airport (RTS), Reno, Nevada. The private pilot was not injured and the two passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the cross-country flight, which departed Black Rock City Airport (88NV), Gerlach, Nevada about 1600.

According to the pilot, he departed 88NV for RTS to collect a friend who was attending an event in the Black Rock Desert. Prior to his departure, the pilot sumped the fuel tanks, added oil and subsequently departed on the accident flight with the fuel tanks about half full. The soft field takeoff from 88NV, climbout, and cruise segments of the accident flight were uneventful. The pilot departed with the right fuel tank selected and then immediately switched to his left fuel tank after he reached about 8,500 ft mean sea level. He then configured the airplane for cruise flight by reducing his throttle setting and leaning the mixture. As he approached RTS, he descended below the airport's traffic pattern altitude, engaged the fuel pump and switched to the right fuel tank just before he entered the right base leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 26. The pilot stated that he verified positive fuel pressure while he switched the fuel tanks. Immediately after the pilot disengaged the fuel pump and while he was turning onto the final approach leg of the airport traffic pattern, the engine sputtered and then quit. The pilot made one unsuccessful attempt to restart the engine after he switched the fuel selector back to the left tank and engaged the fuel pump. He then pitched the airplane for the published best glide speed, 100 mph, and configured the airplane for a forced landing. The pilot stated that he was focused on the airspeed indicator during the landing attempt and was not looking outside the airplane when the airplane impacted a fence and then the ground.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Mooney
Registration: N78988
Model/Series: M20C No Series
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site:
Condition of Light:
Observation Facility, Elevation: , 5050 ft msl
Observation Time: 1635 PDT
Distance from Accident Site:
Temperature/Dew Point: 32°C / 1°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility:  10 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 30.12 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Departure Point: Gerlach, NV (88NV)
Destination: Reno, NV (RTS)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries:1 Minor 
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 2 Serious
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 2 Serious, 1 Minor
Latitude, Longitude: 39.656944, -119.857500






STEAD, Nevada (KOLO) - A plane making a landing at the Reno Stead Airport crashed short of the runway, outside of the airport property.


Reno Fire says the plane did not catch on fire. Officials with the Reno-Tahoe International Airport tell KOLO 8 that sources are telling them the plane was coming east from The Playa.


Three people were on board and they have all been transported to a Reno hospital. Two reportedly suffered minor injuries and one person is hospitalized with critical injuries.


The Federal Aviation Administration is due on scene to begin their investigation. Bravo Avenue will be limited to one lane for the next day while the crash is being investigated.


The Mooney M20C Ranger is registered out of Woodland Park, Colorado.


Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.kolotv.com

Loss of Control in Flight: Beech A36TC Bonanza, N60WB; fatal accident occurred July 26, 2017 near Ogden-Hinckley Airport (KOGD), Weber County, Utah

Diana and Layne Clarke

Perry and Sarah Huffaker

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Salt Lake City, Utah
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas
Continental Motors; Mobile, Alabama
Hartzell Propellers; Piqua, Ohio

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N60WB

Location: Ogden, UT
Accident Number: WPR17FA166
Date & Time: 07/26/2017, 1240 MDT
Registration: N60WB
Aircraft: BEECH A36TC
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 4 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal 

On July 26, 2017, about 1240 mountain daylight time, a Beech A36TC airplane, N60WB, sustained substantial damage during a forced landing shortly after takeoff from Ogden-Hinckley Airport (OGD), Ogden, Utah. The private pilot, and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Peak 2 Peak, LLC, and was being operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions were reported in the area about the time of the accident. A flight plan was not filed for the flight, which was destined for Yellowstone Airport (WYS), West Yellowstone, Montana.

According to the tower controller at OGD, the accident pilot contacted the tower and requested a northwest departure from runway 17. The controller instructed the pilot to enter the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern after departure due to a possible conflict with an inbound helicopter. The controller cleared the airplane for takeoff and it subsequently departed runway 17. When the airplane was about 1/4 mile from the departure end of the runway, the controller cleared the pilot to turn right to the northwest. Less than 1 minute later, the pilot stated, "Hey, I'm going down, zero-whiskey-bravo." The controller cleared the pilot to land, then watched the airplane as it descended and impacted terrain about 1/2 mile from the departure end of runway 17. Another pilot in the area reported seeing the airplane impact the highway.

Two mechanics at OGD heard the accident airplane take off. They stated that the sound was unusual, which made them look up to see what it was. When the airplane first came into view, they stated that it was about 100 ft above the ground and that it should have been about 500 ft or higher at that location, which was about 3,700 ft down runway 17. As the airplane passed by, they noticed that the engine sounded underpowered and that the tail of the airplane was moving up and down as if the pilot was struggling to keep the airplane airborne.

Dashcam video from a car on a southwest-bound street captured the accident airplane in flight. The airplane was first seen flying in a wings-level attitude from the right side of the video frame. As it approached the center of the video frame, it entered a right turn and flew away, paralleling the street. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a steep, right, descending turn until out of view. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 48, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed:Yes 
Medical Certification: Class 3 None
Last FAA Medical Exam: 10/22/2015
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time:  396.3 hours (Total, all aircraft), 169 hours (Total, this make and model)

The pilot, age 48, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane rating. His most recent FAA third-class airman medical certificate was issued on October 22, 2015, with no limitations. The pilot reported no flight experience on the medical application. The pilot's logbook revealed a total of 396 hours of flight experience, which included 196 hours in the accident airplane. In the last 6 months, he had about 28 hours of flight experience, of which about 26 were in the accident airplane. 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: BEECH
Registration: N60WB
Model/Series: A36TC
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1981
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: EA-173
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats:6 
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 05/16/2017, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3651 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 3612 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Continental
ELT: Installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: TSIO-520NBcUB
Registered Owner: PEAK 2 PEAK LLC
Rated Power: 300 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

The airplane was manufactured in 1981 and was equipped with a Continental TSIO-520-NBcUB series engine. The pilot purchased the airplane in May 2014.

A review of maintenance records indicated that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on May 16, 2017, at a tachometer and airframe total time of 3,612.5 hours.

The engine logbook indicated that the engine was overhauled in February 2009. The most recent engine logbook entry was dated May 16, 2016, which indicated that the engine had accrued 493.18 hours since overhaul.

The airplane was equipped with a three-bladed Hartzell PHC-C3YF-1RF propeller. The propeller was installed in February 2005, and the governor was overhauled in February 2009.

Fueling records obtained from OGD revealed that the airplane was serviced with 23.3 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel the morning of the accident flight.

The airplane's co-owner stated that he and the accident pilot bought the airplane 3 years before the accident and that they had no problems with it other than some minor avionics issues. They always refueled with the main fuel tanks to the tabs (60 gallons total, 54 gallons useable) and the wing tip tanks half full (20 gallons total). His reason for the half full tip tanks was to keep the tanks wet, and for managing aircraft weight. He further stated that they had flown the airplane four to six times since the last annual inspection.

The co-owner further reported that their customary procedure was to lean the mixture by four turns of the knob during taxi. During engine runup, they would lean further, and for takeoff, they would adjust the mixture to the full rich position. They always performed takeoffs with the wing flaps retracted. He added that he and the accident pilot sometimes flew together and, during takeoff from runway 17 at OGD, they would use the intersection with runway 3/21 as a visual cue for aborting the takeoff, if the takeoff roll was too long.

Airplane Weight and Balance

The most recent weight and balance record for the airplane was dated April 10, 2015, and indicated that the airplane's maximum gross weight was 3,650 lbs. The airplane was equipped with a wing tip tank supplemental type certificate (STC), which increased the maximum gross weight to 3,833 lbs.

Despite postimpact fire damage, there was no evidence of any large suitcases, bags or cargo items in the airplane at the time of the accident. Based on the weights of the pilot, passengers, and fuel, and allowing for 40 lbs of baggage, the calculated gross weight of the airplane at the time of the accident was about 3,853 lbs. The actual loading of the airplane at the time of the accident, including baggage weight and location and position of the rear passengers, could not be accurately determined. When the weight data was added to a center of gravity moment worksheet, the airplane's center of gravity was outside the worksheet's envelope.

Airplane Takeoff Performance

Takeoff performance distance data for the airplane were presented in graph form in the pilot's operating handbook (POH). The performance chart values were predicated on the following conditions:

- Gross weight: 3,650 lbs
- Power: "Take-off Power Set Before Brake Release"
- Flaps: 0ยบ
- Landing gear retracted after lift-off
- Runway: paved, level, dry surface
- Takeoff speeds: lift off, 74 kts; 50 ft height, 80 kts

POH-derived takeoff distances calculated using the ambient conditions, level runway, 3,650 lb weight, and no wind component were a ground roll distance of 1,900 ft and a distance to clear a 50-ft obstacle of 3,100 ft.

The tip tank STC specified increasing the 3,650-lb takeoff distance values by 11%, which resulted in a ground roll distance of 2,190 ft and distance to clear a 50-ft obstacle of 3,441 ft.

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KOGD, 4439 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1753 UTC
Direction from Accident Site: 16°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility:  10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: Calm /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:
Wind Direction:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:
Altimeter Setting: 30.22 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 25°C / 14°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Ogden, UT (OGD)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: W. YELLOWSTONE, MT (WYS)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1235 MDT
Type of Airspace:

The 1153 weather observation at OGD included calm wind, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 25°C, dew point 14°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.22 inches of mercury. At 1253, wind was from 270° at 5 knots with 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 26°C, dew point 14°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.21 inches of mercury. The density altitude about the time of the accident was about 5,514 ft.

Airport Information

Airport: OGDEN-HINCKLEY (OGD)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 4472 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 17
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 5195 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: None

OGD was equipped with two paved runways, designated 3/21 and 17/35. Runway 17/35 measured 5,195 ft long by 100 ft wide. The airport elevation was 4,472 ft above mean sea level.

Runway 17 had a constant uphill slope of 0.04%. The threshold of runway 17 was at an elevation of about 4,436 ft, and the departure end was at an elevation of about 4,457 ft.

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 3 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: On-Ground
Total Injuries: 4 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 41.174722, -112.018889 

The initial impact point was located on the ground near the outer edge of the northbound side of the freeway about 1 mile south of the departure end of runway 17. The airplane came to rest in the median along the center guardrail. The debris field was about 150 ft long with debris in both north- and southbound lanes. (See Figure 1). The main wreckage remained intact and displayed extensive postcrash fire damage. The wing tip tanks and the leading edges of the wings were crushed, consistent with vertical impact damage. All flight controls were accounted for and flight control continuity was confirmed. The propeller assembly separated from the engine during the accident sequence and was subsequently relocated about 200 ft from the debris field after being struck by a passing tractor-trailer. No other vehicles were involved in the accident sequence.


Figure 1-Aerial View of the Accident Site

Airframe

The wreckage was relocated to a hangar at OGD for further examination. The rudder and elevator trim tab actuator measurements were unreliable due to impact damage. The left flap actuator indicated about 2° of extension, and the right flap actuator position could not be determined. The fuel system was compromised due to impact and thermal damage. The fuel selector valve was found in the right main tank position. The fuel strainer was disassembled and was free of debris. The tip tanks displayed hydraulic deformation consistent with fuel being present in the tank during impact. No fuel was found during the examination. The landing gear was found in the retracted position. All cabin seats separated from their attach points and were loose in the wreckage.

Engine

The engine was shipped to the Continental Motors facility in Mobile, Alabama, for a teardown examination. The examination did not reveal any preaccident anomalies with any of the internal engine components. Disassembly of the fuel pump did not reveal any preaccident anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The fuel pump drive coupling was fractured consistent with impact damage. The propeller governor separated from the engine during the impact sequence and exhibited impact and thermal damage. The internal gears separated from the housing and were undamaged. The propeller governor was disassembled, and the internal flyweights remained intact and capable of normal movement. The turbocharger separated from the engine and exhibited impact and thermal damage. The turbocharger driveshaft was seized and could only be rotated slightly with the use of a wrench. The turbocharger was partially disassembled, and the internal surfaces of the scrolls were not visibly damaged. The turbocharger controller, wastegate, and overboost valve displayed thermal and impact damage. The turbocharger was shipped to Hartzell Engine Technologies, Montgomery, Alabama, for further examination. The examination revealed no anomalies.

Propeller

The propeller assembly did not exhibit any evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies. All damage was consistent with high impact forces and the blade damage was indicative of rotation with engine power at the time of impact. 

Medical And Pathological Information

The Utah Department of Health, Office of the Medical Examiner in Taylorsville, Utah, performed an autopsy of the pilot. The cause of death was reported as multiple blunt and thermal injuries.

Toxicology testing performed by the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory was negative for drugs, carbon monoxide, and volatiles.

Additional Information

High Density Altitude

The hazards associated with high density altitude operations are outlined in FAA Pamphlet FAA-P-8740-2, Density Altitude. The publication states,

Whether due to high altitude, high temperature, or both, reduced air density (reported in terms of density altitude) adversely affects aerodynamic performance and decreases the engine's horsepower output. Takeoff distance, power available (in normally aspirated engines), and climb rate are all adversely affected.

At power settings of less than 75 percent, or at density altitude above 5,000 feet, it is also essential to lean normally-aspirated engines for maximum power on takeoff (unless the aircraft is equipped with an automatic altitude mixture control). Otherwise, the excessively rich mixture is another detriment to overall performance.

According to the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3B), "under conditions of high-density altitude, the airplane may be able to become airborne at an insufficient airspeed, but unable to climb out of ground effect. Consequently, the airplane may not be able to clear obstructions."

The FAA Pilot's Operating Handbook (FAA-H-8083-25A) states that,

due to the reduced drag in ground effect, the aircraft may seem capable of takeoff well below the recommended speed. As the aircraft rises out of ground effect with a deficiency of speed, the greater induced drag may result in marginal initial climb performance. In extreme conditions, such as…high density altitude…a deficiency of airspeed during takeoff may permit the aircraft to become airborne but be incapable of sustaining flight out of ground effect.

Weight and Balance

According to the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25B), compliance with the weight and balance limits of any aircraft is critical to flight safety. Operating above the maximum weight limitation compromises the structural integrity of an aircraft and adversely affects its performance. Operation with the CG outside approved limits will result in control difficulty.

Balance refers to the location of the CG of an aircraft and is important to stability and safety in flight. The CG is a point at which the aircraft would balance if it were suspended at that point.

The primary concern in balancing an aircraft is the fore and aft location of the CG along the longitudinal axis. The CG is not necessarily a fixed point; its location depends on the distribution of weight in the aircraft. As variable load items are shifted or expended, there is a resultant shift in CG location. The distance between the forward and back limits for the position of the center for gravity or CG range is certified for an aircraft by the manufacturer. The pilot should realize that if the CG is displaced too far forward on the longitudinal axis, a nose-heavy condition will result.

Loading in a nose-heavy condition causes problems in controlling and raising the nose, especially during takeoff and landing. The pilot's natural correction for longitudinal unbalance is a change of trim to remove the excessive control pressure. Excessive trim, however, has the effect of reducing not only aerodynamic efficiency but also primary control travel distance in the direction the trim is applied.

Limits for the location of the CG are established by the manufacturer. These are the fore and aft limits beyond which the CG should not be located for flight. These limits are published for each aircraft in the Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS), or aircraft specification and the AFM or POH. If the CG is not within the allowable limits after loading, it will be necessary to relocate some items before flight is attempted. The forward CG limit is often established at a location that is determined by the landing characteristics of an aircraft. During landing, one of the most critical phases of flight, exceeding the forward CG limit may result in excessive loads on the nosewheel, a tendency to nose over on tailwheel type airplanes, decreased performance, higher stalling speeds, and higher control forces.

In extreme cases, a CG location that is beyond the forward limit may result in nose heaviness, making it difficult or impossible to flare for landing.

The publication also cautioned that it is possible to load some aircraft in such a manner that they will be out of CG limits even though the useful load has not been exceeded. Because of the effects of an out-of-balance or overweight condition, a pilot should always be sure that an aircraft is properly loaded.

Regulatory Guidance

14 CFR Part 23 requires establishment of the ranges of weights and CGs within which an aircraft may be operated safely. The manufacturer provides this information, which is included in the AFM, type certificate data sheets, or aircraft specifications.


While there are no specified requirements for a pilot operating under 14 CFR Part 91 to conduct weight and balance calculations prior to each flight, 14 CFR Part 91, requires the pilot in command to comply with the operating limits in the approved AFM. These limits include the weight and balance of the aircraft. To enable pilots to make weight and balance computations, charts and graphs are provided in the approved AFM.



NTSB Identification: WPR17FA166
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, July 26, 2017 in Ogden, UT
Aircraft: BEECH A36TC, registration: N60WB
Injuries: 4 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On July 26, 2017, about 1240 mountain daylight time, a Beech A36TC airplane, N60WB, was substantially damaged when it collided with the freeway shortly after departing from Ogden-Hinckley Airport (OGD), Ogden, Utah. The private pilot, and three passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Peak 2 Peak, LLC., and operated by the pilot as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was destined for Yellowstone Airport (WYS), West Yellowstone, Montana. 

According to an air traffic control recording from the OGD tower, shortly after departing the runway, the pilot reported "hey, I'm going down, zero-whiskey-bravo." The controller cleared the pilot for landing and four seconds later, another pilot flying in the area reported seeing the airplane impact the highway.

Witnesses who were also general aviation mechanics, located between hangar rows adjacent to the runway at OGD, heard the airplane during its departure. They stated that the sound was unusual which made them look up to see what it was. When the airplane first came into view they stated it was about 100 ft above the ground, and that it should be about 500 feet or higher at that location [which was about 3,700 ft down runway 17]. As the airplane passed by, they noticed the engine sound was underpowered and the tail of the airplane going up and down, as if the pilot was struggling to keep the airplane at altitude.

Dash Cam video from a car on a southwest-bound street, captured the accident airplane in flight. The airplane was first observed flying wings level from the right side of the video frame. As it approached the center of the video frame, it entered a right turn and flew away, paralleling the street. Shortly after, the airplane entered a descending right banking turn until out of view. 

The accident site revealed that the first identified point of contact (FIPC) was the outer edge of the northbound freeway, and came to rest in the median, along the guardrail. The debris field was about 150 feet long with debris in both north and southbound lanes. The main wreckage remained intact with post-crash fire damage. The wing tip tanks and the leading edge of the wings were crushed, consistent with vertical impact damage. All flight controls were accounted for and flight control continuity was attained. The propeller assembly separated from the engine during the accident sequence and was subsequently relocated about 200 feet further up the freeway from the debris field, after being impacted by a passing tractor trailer. No other vehicles were involved in the accident sequence. 

The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination.


August 26, 2019: Family of 2017 Riverdale plane crash victims sues maker of aircraft fuel cells

OGDEN, Utah — The children and parents of a West Haven couple killed in a Riverdale plane crash have filed two lawsuits alleging negligence in the aircraft’s manufacture, maintenance and operation.

Perry and Sarah Huffaker were passengers on a Beech A36TC Bonanza piloted July 26, 2017, by their friend Layne Clarke that crashed onto Interstate 15 near Riverdale Road shortly after takeoff from Ogden-Hinckley Airport.

Clarke’s wife, Diana, also was aboard and all four were killed. The four were en route to vacation in West Yellowstone, Montana.

An attorney representing the Huffakers’ four children and the couple’s parents recently filed suit in 2nd District Court against Eagle Fuel Cells of Eagle River, Wisconsin.

The complaint alleges product liability, negligence and wrongful death due to the alleged faulty manufacture and operation of a fuel bladder in the Beech.

On Tuesday, the family’s attorney filed a separate, amended suit against 12 businesses that allegedly were responsible for maintenance of the plane.

That suit originally was filed in 2017, naming 11 other companies, many of them manufacturers of major components of the Beech. Those defendants have been dismissed from the suit, leading to the filing of the amended complaint naming new defendants.

The 2017 suit makes similar allegations to those in the case against Eagle Fuel Cells, including product liability, negligence and wrongful death. It also names as a defendant the estate of Layne Clarke, asserting that the pilot was negligent as well.

The Clarke estate’s attorney responded in court filings that the Clarkes fulfilled their duty of complying with Federal Aviation Administration regulations and that any deficiencies in the plane may have been the fault of the aircraft’s manufacturers and maintainers.

A National Transportation Safety Board preliminary investigation report made no conclusions about the cause of the crash, but it quoted Ogden airport mechanics as saying they looked up during the takeoff because the sound was unusual.

“As the airplane passed by, they noticed the engine sound was underpowered and the tail of the airplane (was) going up and down, as if the pilot was struggling to keep the airplane at altitude,” the report said.

The NTSB has not yet filed a final report of the crash.

Efforts to contact Eric Olson, of Salt Lake City, the Huffaker family’s attorney, were not immediately successful.

Eagle Fuel Cells’ attorney, Scott Sweeney of Denver, declined to comment Thursday.

That suit was transferred to U.S. District Court this week at Eagle Fuel Cells’ request.

Original article can be found here ➤  https://www.standard.net




October 21st, 2017: Wrongful death lawsuit filed by family of couple who died in Weber County plane crash 

OGDEN — The family of a couple who died in a plane crash in Weber County in July filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Weber County District Court.

West Haven residents Perry and Sarah Huffaker, ages 45 and 42, and Taylor residents Layne and Diana Clarke, ages 48 and 46, died July 26 when the Beech A36 Bonanza plane they were in crashed on I-15 in Riverdale. The plane had taken off from Ogden-Hinckley Airport just before 1 p.m. on July 26 and crashed about half a mile away from the airport.

It could take more than a year for officials from the National Transportation Safety Board to determine exactly what caused the crash.

A complaint filed Friday in Weber County District Court says Layne and Diana Clarke were owners of the plane and were operating it at the time of the crash.

The complaint was filed on behalf of Perry and Sarah Huffaker’s surviving family members, including their children and parents. The lawsuit is filed against Donette Crayton, who represents the estates of Layne and Diana Clarke.

The complaint alleges that the Clarkes failed to “use reasonable care” in the operation of the airplane, which led to the wrongful deaths of Perry and Sarah Huffaker.

The Huffakers are seeking a jury trial to determine damages to pay for medical and other expenses, other financial losses and to provide relief for emotional suffering the family experienced as a result of the crash, as well as court and attorney fees, according to the complaint.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.ksl.com

Cirrus SR22, N915TD; incident occurred August 24, 2019 at Show Low Regional Airport (KSOW), Navajo County, Arizona -and- incident occurred August 27, 2015 at Scottsdale Airport (KSDL), Maricopa County, Arizona

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Scottsdale

August 24, 2019: Aircraft landed and nose wheel collapsed.

https://registry.faa.gov/N915TD

Date: 24-AUG-19
Time: 21:38:00Z
Regis#: N915TD
Aircraft Make: CIRRUS
Aircraft Model: SR22
Event Type: INCIDENT
Highest Injury: NONE
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: UNKNOWN
Activity: PERSONAL
Flight Phase: LANDING (LDG)
Operation: 91
City: SHOW LOW
State: ARIZONA

August 27, 2015: Landing gear collapsed.

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this incident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Scottsdale, Arizona
Cirrus Aircraft Design Corp; Duluth, Minnesota

Aviation Incident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

Investigation Docket  - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Incident Data Summary - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

http://registry.faa.gov/N915TD

Location: Scottsdale, AZ
Incident Number: WPR15IA252
Date & Time: 08/27/2015, 1405 MST
Registration: N915TD
Aircraft: CIRRUS SR22
Aircraft Damage: Minor
Defining Event: Landing gear collapse
Injuries: 3 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Instructional

Analysis

***This report was modified on August 1, 2018. Please see the docket for this incident to view the original report.***

While the pilot receiving instruction was landing the airplane, the main landing gear touched down first; as he was slowly lowering the nose landing gear (NLG) to the runway, he felt a "shimmy" in the NLG. Despite applying back pressure to lift the weight off the NLG, the airplane's nose slowly started falling forward, and the nosewheel collapsed.

Postincident examination of the airplane revealed that the NLG was fractured through the strut tube adjacent to the forward edge of the gusset tube attachment welds. Metallurgical testing revealed that the failure was the result of high-stress fatigue cracking due to sideways bending from one side. No mechanical or metallurgical anomalies were noted with the NLG.

After the incident, the airplane manufacturer conducted structural testing of the NLG, which revealed that shimmy events or nonstandard towing could result in cracks and the eventual separation of the NLG. As a result, the airplane manufacturer issued two service advisory letters, which outlined appropriate towing and inspection procedures. The airplane manufacturer also issued a series of service bulletins, which, in part, recommended that all NLG on the affected airplanes be inspected for cracks in the welds between the strut tube and the gusset tubes and that postshimmy inspections also be conducted to look for cracks in this area. Additionally, the airplane manufacturer updated the design of the NLG to increase the strength of the strut tube.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident to be:
The failure of the nose landing gear due to unanticipated fatigue loads.

Findings

Aircraft
Nose/tail landing gear - Fatigue/wear/corrosion (Cause)
Nose/tail landing gear - Capability exceeded (Cause)
Nose/tail landing gear - Failure (Cause)

Factual Information 

On August 27, 2015, about 1405 mountain standard time, a Cirrus SR22, N915TD, experienced a nose landing gear collapse during landing roll at Scottsdale Airport (SDL), Scottsdale, Arizona. The certified flight instructor (CFI), the pilot receiving instruction, and one passenger were not injured. The airplane received minor damage. The airplane was registered to ESPBC LLC of Scottsdale, and operated by Scottsdale Executive Flight Training as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional cross-country flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight originated from Flagstaff, Arizona about 1300, and was destined for SDL.

According to the CFI, the pilot receiving instruction made the landing. The main landing gear touched down first, and slowly the nose gear was lowered onto the runway's surface. The CFI reported that at this time they felt a shimmy in the nose gear, during which the pilot receiving instruction applied back pressure on the stick to lift the weight off the nose gear. As the nose gear came down a second time, it appeared that the shimmy had stopped, and that they were level on all three wheels. However, after a few seconds the nose slowly started falling forward until it had completely collapsed.

The nose landing gear consists of a main strut tube and two gusset tubes near the top portion of the main strut tube. The landing gear was observed fractured through the strut tube adjacent to the forward edge of the gusset tube attachment welds.

The National Transportation Safety Board Materials Laboratory examined the nose landing gear strut and determined that the failure of the landing gear was the result of high stress fatigue cracking due to sideways bending from one side. No mechanical or metallurgical anomalies were noted with the landing gear.

On March 7, 2016, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Advisory Letter SA 16-03, entitled "Nose Landing Gear Strut Assembly Inspection, which denoted the following:

Cracks have been discovered on the nose landing gear strut assembly at the welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes.

A visual inspection of the welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes for cracks must be performed every time the engine cowling is removed.

If cracks are found, the aircraft is prohibited from flight until the nose landing gear strut assembly is replaced. (Refer to AMM-32-20)

On April 12, 2016, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Advisory Letter SA 16-05, entitled "Aircraft Towing Guidance." The SA was based on the potential for damage to the nose landing gear due to loading from non-standard and abusive tug operation. 

The SA was released offering aircraft towing guidance. This guidance included the following;

When towing aircraft, do not stop/start abruptly, especially when the tow bar is at an angle greater than 45° either side of center.

When positioning the aircraft with a towing vehicle, the angle of the tow bar must be less than 45° either side of center for both pulling and pushing. Hand towing must be used if angles greater than 45° either side of center are needed for positioning.

Do not tow aircraft at speeds higher than 15 mph.

Additionally, Cirrus Design Corporation performed structural testing of the nose landing gear.

Based on the data provided by the NTSB metallurgy lab, and a video of an incident in Japan where an airplane experienced a nose landing gear shimmy, Cirrus explored two different methods of producing side loads in the nose landing gear. The first was through taxi and towing, the second through shimmy. Flight testing showed that significant side loads on the nose landing gear would develop during a shimmy event.

As a result of the testing, Cirrus did the following:

On April 12, 2016, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22, entitled "NOSE GEAR – Nose Landing Gear Strut Assembly Inspection," was issued. The bulletin, which Cirrus considers mandatory, was issued with instructions to inspect all nose landing gear in the field for cracks in the welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes. In addition to the one-time inspection required by the Service Bulletin, Cirrus added a post-shimmy inspection to Chapter 5-50 Unscheduled Maintenance Checks of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). Similar to the hard/overweight landing inspection, this post-shimmy inspection would look specifically for cracks at the gusset welds exactly as noted in the Service Bulletin. (For additional information, refer to the Service Bulletin, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22R1 was issued. The bulletin, which Cirrus considers mandatory, was revised to update Compliance, Effectivity, Purpose, Manpower Requirements, and Accomplishment instructions. The bulletin specifically states, "Operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this service bulletin, dated April 12, 2016, must complete Revision 1 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety, and must continue to perform this Service Bulletin every 50 hours thereafter until termination action occurs. (For additional information, refer to the revised Service Bulletin, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-22R2 was issued. The bulletin, which Cirrus considers mandatory, was revised to update Compliance and Effectivity. The bulletin specifically states, "Operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this service bulletin, dated April 12, 2016, must complete Revision 2 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety, and must continue to perform this Service Bulletin every 50 hours thereafter until termination action occurs. (For additional information, refer to the revised Service Bulletin, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation Service Bulletin SB2X-32-23, which Cirrus considered to be mandatory, entitled "NOSE GEAR – Nose Wheel Shimmy Reduction," was issued. The bulletin noted that on affected airplanes, nose wheel shimmy may exist on aircraft equipped with Beringer wheels. The bulletin states that a nose tire vibration due to imbalance or tire damage can be mistaken for NLG shimmy. However, it is advisable that both conditions be examined closely and considered tandem during aircraft inspection. The bulletin contains instructions for the adjustment of the nose tire pressure and force required to rotate the nose wheel fork. (For additional information, refer to the Service Bulletin, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation issued revised Service Bulletin SB2X-32-23R1. The bulletin, which is considered mandatory, was revised to update Effectivity, Purpose, and Accomplishment Instructions. The bulletin states that operators who have successfully complied with the original release of this Service Bulletin, dated July 14, 2017, must complete Revision 1 of this Service Bulletin in its entirety. The Service Bulletin contains instructions for the adjustment of the nose tire pressure and the verification of the force required to rotate the nose wheel fork. (For additional information, refer to the revised Service Bulletin, which in appended to the docket for this report.)

On July 14, 2017, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Cirrus Service Advisory (SA) SA17-08, entitled "Possible Cracking at Nose Land Gear Fillet Welds." The SA revealed that cracks had been discovered on some nose landing gear (NLG) strut assemblies at the fillet welds between the strut tube and the LH and RH gusset tubes. These cracks had led to the collapse of the NLG assemblies. The SA further revealed that each of the aircraft involved had a history of excessive nose wheel shimmy following touchdown of the nose landing gear. The SA defined "nose wheel shimmy" as "a lateral oscillation or wobble of the NLG resulting in a shaking feeling throughout the cabin of the aircraft that can vary in intensity." This is normally encountered during the landing roll-out and will subside as speed is reduced. Cirrus noted in the "Actions" section of the SA that nose wheel shimmy can be reduced or eliminated by lowering the tire pressure. Prior to the next flight, adjust the tire pressure on the nose landing gear to 40 – 50 psi (276 – 344 kPa). (For additional information, refer to the Service Advisory, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

On January 5, 2018, Cirrus Design Corporation issued revised Service Advisory SA17-08R1 (revision 1). The Advisory was issued to update Effectivity and the NLG tire pressure as outlined in SA17-08, dated July 14, 2017. Cirrus noted in the "Actions" section of the SA that nose wheel shimmy can be reduced or eliminated by lowering the tire pressure. Prior to the next flight, adjust the tire pressure on the nose landing gear to 30 – 35 psi (207 – 241 kPa). (For additional information, refer to the Service Advisory, which is appended to the docket for this report.)

Cirrus Aircraft also incorporated specific emphasis and recommendations on how to further discourage shimmying on landing and actions to be taken if the situation occurs on landing in their pilot training program. These incorporations are included in the Landing Standardization Course. Maintenance guidance is also available to mechanics following a shimmy event.

To increase the strength of the weld in the critical area on the nose landing gear, the thickness of the main strut tube was analyzed with an increased wall thickness from 0.125-inch to the full thickness of 0.156-inch. The result of the analysis was an increase (3-5%) in the local stress levels in the static analysis. This design change has been made for all new and replacement gear. 

History of Flight

Landing-landing roll
Landing gear collapse (Defining event)
Miscellaneous/other
Attempted remediation/recovery 

Flight Instructor Information

Certificate: Flight Instructor; Commercial
Age: 29, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Multi-engine; Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 06/11/2014
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 01/20/2015
Flight Time:  783 hours (Total, all aircraft), 60 hours (Total, this make and model), 699 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 326 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 88 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)

Student Pilot Information

Certificate: None
Age: 52, Male
Airplane Rating(s): None
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s):None 
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: None
Last FAA Medical Exam: 06/11/2014
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 01/20/2015
Flight Time:  500 hours (Total, all aircraft), 365 hours (Total, this make and model), 17 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 9 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft) 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: CIRRUS
Registration: N915TD
Model/Series: SR22
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2014
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 4098
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 05/27/2015, 100 Hour
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3600 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 93 Hours
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 391.4 Hours at time of accident
Engine Manufacturer: Continental Motors
ELT: C126 installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: IO-550
Registered Owner: ESPBC LLC
Rated Power: 310 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: SDL, 1510 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site:
Observation Time: 1353 MST
Direction from Accident Site:
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility:  10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 3 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: / None
Wind Direction: 70°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:
Altimeter Setting: 29.93 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 40°C / 14°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Flagstaff, AZ (FLG)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Scottsdale, AZ (SDL)
Type of Clearance: VFR Flight Following
Departure Time: 1300 MST
Type of Airspace: Class D

Airport Information

Airport: Scottsdale (SDL)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 1510 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 210
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 8249 ft / 100 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Traffic Pattern

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 None
Aircraft Damage: Minor
Passenger Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 3 None
Latitude, Longitude: 33.622778, -111.910556 (est)