Saturday, November 8, 2014

Composite FX Mosquito XET, N922RM: Accident occurred November 08, 2014 in Angleton, Texas

NTSB Identification: CEN15LA042
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, November 08, 2014 in Angleton, TX
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/09/2015
Aircraft: MOSIER ROBERT S MOSQUITO XET, registration: N922RM
Injuries: 1 Minor.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that he noticed the helicopter abruptly shudder during the crosswind turn. The pilot lowered the collective control, entered an autorotation, and turned back toward the airport. As he approached the runway area, the helicopter skids passed over a row of trees by about 5 or 10 ft. Immediately after the skids cleared the trees, the pilot began a cyclic flare, which resulted in the tail rotor striking a tree and a subsequent loss of directional control.

Examination of the helicopter revealed that the belt for the secondary drive reduction unit was loose, which allowed the belt to jump the drive cogs on the pulley. The belt was loose due to excessive wear of the pulley, which resulted in an abrupt in-flight shudder. The helicopter operating manual preflight inspection includes a check for proper belt tension.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate clearance from trees during a precautionary landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection during which he failed to detect a loose drive belt, which resulted in an in-flight shudder.

On November 8, 2014, about 1000 central standard time, a Composite FX Mosquito XET helicopter, N922RM, impacted trees during approach for landing at the Bailes Airport (7R9), Angleton, Texas. The pilot sustained minor injuries and the helicopter was substantially damaged. The helicopter was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which departed without a flight plan.

According to the pilot, he noticed the helicopter abruptly shudder during the crosswind turn at about 300 feet above ground level. The pilot lowered the collective control, entered an autorotation, and turned back toward the airport. As he approached the runway area, the helicopter skids passed over a row of trees by about 5 or 10 feet. Immediately after the skids cleared these trees, the pilot began a cyclic flare, which resulted in the tail rotor striking a tree. The helicopter began to spin violently and impacted the ground several times, damaging the main rotor and tail boom.

The helicopter was examined by Federal Aviation Administration and Composite FX personnel at the kit manufacturer's facility. The belt for the secondary drive reduction unit was observed to be loose, which allowed the teeth of the drive belt to "jump" the drive cogs on the pulley. The loose belt was due to excessive wear on the pulley.

The operating manual pre-flight inspection includes a check for tension of this belt, during which the operator should attempt to deflect the belt by about 3/16 of an inch, with an estimated five pounds of finger pressure in the middle of a long, unsupported span of the belt.


 NTSB Identification: CEN15LA042 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, November 08, 2014 in Angleton, TX
Aircraft: MOSIER ROBERT S MOSQUITO XET, registration: N922RM
Injuries: 1 Minor.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 8, 2014, about 1000 central standard time, a Composite FX Mosquito XET helicopter, N922RM, impacted trees during approach for landing at the Bailes Airport (7R9), Angleton, Texas. The pilot sustained minor injuries and the helicopter was substantially damaged. The helicopter was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which departed without a flight plan.

According to the pilot, he noticed the helicopter abruptly shudder during the crosswind turn at about 300 feet above ground level. The pilot lowered the collective control, entered an autorotation, and turned back toward the airport. As he approached the runway area, the helicopter skids passed over a row of trees by about 5 or 10 feet. Immediately after the skids cleared these trees, the pilot began a cyclic flare, which resulted in the tail rotor striking a tree. The helicopter began to spin violently and impacted the ground several times, damaging the main rotor and tail boom.

The helicopter was examined by Federal Aviation Administration and Composite FX personnel at the kit manufacturer's facility. The belt for the secondary drive reduction unit was observed to be loose, which allowed the teeth of the drive belt to "jump" the drive cogs on the pulley. The loose belt was due to excessive wear on the pulley.

The operating manual pre-flight inspection includes a check for tension of this belt, during which the operator should attempt to deflect the belt by about 3/16 of an inch, with an estimated five pounds of finger pressure in the middle of a long, unsupported span of the belt.


NTSB Identification: CEN15LA042  
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, November 08, 2014 in Angleton, TX
Aircraft: MOSIER ROBERT S MOSQUITO XET, registration: N922RM
Injuries: 1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 8, 2014, about 1000 central standard time, a Composite FX Mosquito XET helicopter, N922RM, impacted terrain during approach for landing at the Bailes Airport (7R9), Angleton, Texas. The pilot sustained minor injuries and the helicopter was substantially damaged. The helicopter was registered to and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight, which departed without a flight plan.

According to the pilot, he noticed the helicopter abruptly shuddered during the crosswind turn at about 300 feet above ground level. The pilot lowered collective control, entered an autorotation, and turned back toward the airport. As he approached the runway area, the helicopter skids passed over a row of trees by about 5 or 10 feet. Immediately after the skids cleared these trees, the pilot began a cyclic flare, which resulted in the tail rotor striking a tree. The helicopter began to spin violently and impacted the ground several times, damaging the main rotor and tail boom.


FAA Flight Standards District Office: FAA Houston FSDO-09

CHARLES E. BURGOON: http://registry.faa.gov/N922RM


BRAZORIA COUNTY, TX (KTRK) -- An experimental aircraft crashed Saturday morning in Brazoria County, sending the pilot to the hospital with back injuries. 

The 60-year-old pilot was take to Memorial Hermann Hospital by Life Flight. He was complaining of back pain and is listed in stable condition.

The FAA is investigating the crash.

ANGLETON, Texas - The Federal Aviation Administration is investigating a crash in Brazoria County. 

It happened around 10 a.m. Saturday in Angleton. 

Authorities say an experimental helicopter crashed under unknown circumstances at Bailes Field.

One person was on board.

Farmers see opportunity in drones

The next big thing for Georgia farmers could be drones.

State economic developers say Georgia’s agricultural industry could be one of the areas with the most promising potential for the launch of a commercial drone usage, and they’re intent on showing farmers why.

In the town of Moultrie nestled in a farm-rich region in the southern part of the state, aerospace firms flew their drones over fields of cotton to show off the technology to farmers attending the Sunbelt Ag Expo in early October.

Drones could offer farmers multi-spectral images of their crops to show which plants need more fertilizer, more water or more nitrogen — an advance in what’s known as “precision agriculture.” And that’s worth a lot, farmers say.

“You can see much more than you can with the naked eye,” said Joseph Driver, a farm manager.

While the Moultrie demonstration flights were done in the name of research, flying drones over farms for commercial purposes isn’t legal yet.

Two Georgia businesses hope to change that, and in recent months submitted applications for commercial drone operations. The Federal Aviation Administration in September approved the first six companies for commercial unmanned aircraft systems, all in movie and TV production. It’s yet to be seen which industries will be the focus for the next few rounds of approvals, but agriculture is seen as a logical choice since it could involve drones flown in rural locations away from populated areas.

The approvals of individual companies’ operations are an interim solution, as drone enthusiasts around the country await a blanket FAA rule to allow commercial operations of small unmanned aircraft. The process has been long delayed, but is expected to start by the end of 2014, followed by public comments, and take at least a year to complete.

The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International estimates the unmanned aircraft industry in Georgia could generate 2,880 jobs by 2025 and yield nearly $280 million in economic impact.

At Fenster Farms, which grows corn, soybeans, peanuts, cotton, wheat and pecans on about 2,000 acres, owner Lanny Fenster sees a big opportunity. He says drones can monitor crops better than “crop scouts” who walk the fields.

“You can find a spot with a disease” with the help of temperature sensory imagery and ultraviolet photography, he said. “We looked through the camera and we could tell exactly what was happening. … We went out to the exact spot. We couldn’t tell by looking.”

That is extremely valuable information, Fenster said.

“Disease — it starts someplace,” he said. “If you could just treat that area, you save on pesticides and make all the people in town happy.” And, he added, you get a better crop.

Fenster is thinking of buying a drone, or going in with two or three other farmers to buy one together.

“We grow over $4 billion worth of peanuts in Georgia every year,” said Steve Justice, director of the Georgia Center of Innovation for Aerospace. “If we can provide a tool that increases their yield 1 percent — 1 percent of $4 billion is big money, and that’s the real impact.

Other farmers may depend on crop consultants that could operate drones for them. The most sophisticated systems, with multiple sensors for a variety of UV and other imagery, may cost up to $100,000.

“I do think it’s the wave of the future as far as gathering more information,” said David Spaid, a crop consultant.

Meanwhile, one Georgia company, Phoenix Air, aims to start the first drone airline in Georgia. Phoenix Air — whose claim to fame is transporting Ebola patients in a souped-up, disease-containing Gulfstream jet — has created a division called Phoenix Air Unmanned and applied for federal approval for drone operations, including in agriculture.

And Vision Services Group, operating as VSG Unmanned, is also seeking federal approval for its own drone operations focused on agriculture and forestry.

The company says it is “positioned to refine and advance the technologies available to the agricultural industry.”

While the most familiar drones are quadrocopters (helicopters with four rotors), VSG Unmanned plans to launch winged aircraft by catapult that can rapidly soar over fields to capture images of 1,000 acres in one flight. The company demonstrated to interested farmers at the Sunbelt Ag Expo what its bright orange, aerodynamic unmanned plane could do.

“We’ve gone out on the field with farmers to see what their actual needs are,” said VSG’s Ben Worley, a former drone operator and mission commander for the Air Force. “We really just saw a need, a growing need, for better data.”

Guided Systems Technologies showed off its unmanned helicopter that can take multi-spectral images of fields to target problem areas. The firm is also developing a drone with a spray system for targeted pesticide treatment.

Sharing a booth with VSG Unmanned and Guided Systems at the expo was Atlanta-based unmanned service provider Flight Guardian, as well as the Georgia Tech Research Institute. Participation of the unmanned aircraft industry at the expo was coordinated by the state Center of Innovation for Aerospace and Center of Innovation for Agribusiness.

“We’ve identified agriculture early on as one of the potential early adopters of the technology,” said Justice. His center has invested some $350,000 in the development of unmanned aircraft systems over the past five years.

As progress toward commercial drone operations accelerates, state lawmakers are expected to take up the issue of privacy protections during next year’s legislative session.

“It’s timely at this point for the legislature to act so that operators in the state know what the rules of the road are,” Justice said.

All told, the Federal Aviation Administration has estimated as many as 8,000 commercial drones could be flying by 2020.

“The next 12 months is going to be a real turning point” for the commercial unmanned aircraft market, Justice said. “Next year, we’ll be talking about all the different commercial operations that have started to happen.”

- Source:  http://www.valdostadailytimes.com

Air Mobility Command Museum adds Soviet aircraft to exhibits: Dover Air Force Base (KDOV), Delaware

Restoration work has been completed on this Soviet-era Antonov-2 cargo aircraft, which now is on display at the Air Mobility Command Museum, Dover Air Force Base.
Submitted photo/Mark Mougel


 Dover Air Force Base, Del. --- The Air Mobility Command Museum  at Dover Air Force Base has unveiled a new, significant exhibit, said museum spokesman Mark Mougel.

Restoration has been completed on the museum’s Soviet cargo aircraft, the Antonov AN-2. This 1947 vintage aircraft is a single engine biplane, and can be compared to the American C-47 Skytrain in terms of its intended mission, although the C-47 is a more modern design with a greater load capability.

It is worth noting that the C-47 was designed almost 20 years earlier than the AN-2.

The AN-2 is on display outside the museum with many other historically significant cargo aircraft, Mougel said.

Admission and parking at the AMC Museum is free. Entrance to the museum is on Del. Route 9 just off exit 91 from Del. Route 1.

Normal museum hours are Tuesday through Sunday from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.

Military ID is not required to visit the museum.

Read more: http://www.doverpost.com

Sister's one-woman show to honor child pilot Vicki Van Meter


ST. GEORGE – A statue of acclaimed child pilot Vicki Van Meter stands tall at the St. George Municipal Airport, bringing joy to those who visit and fly in and out of southern Utah. 

 Her sister, Elizabeth, a documentary filmmaker and performer, established “The Purpose Project” after Vicki’s sudden death in 2008 to honor her.

At 7:30 p.m., today, for one night only, Elizabeth Van Meter will perform her one-woman show in the community where it originated.

The show will be at Eccles Fine Arts Center main stage theater at Dixie State University.

While visiting her parents, who live in St. George, she received a call from a New York producer asking her to create a full-length solo show based on her documentary film to be performed at the Cherry Lane Theater in New York City.

- Source:  http://www.thespectrum.com

Museum of Flight makes Dreamliner permanent exhibit after Boeing donation

Boeing will donate a 787 Dreamliner to the Museum of Flight on Saturday.

The occasion will be marked by a mid-morning ceremony featuring Doug King, president and CEO of The Museum of Flight and Boeing leaders and employees.

Boeing first announced the donation in September.

The Dreamliner will be available to the public from noon to 5 p.m. Saturday and all day Sunday. Visitors will be able to go inside the plane and see the inner workings of one of Boeing's most technically advanced designs.

The museum's 787 Dreamliner exhibit will be the first of its kind in the world.

After its weekend debut, the display will be closed to the public from Nov. 10 to Nov. 21 while it is being prepped for the permanent exhibit, according to a press release.

The ceremony and weekend exhibit will be free for all Boeing employees, retirees and suppliers, plus as many as six guests.

The donated Dreamliner was the third of its kind that Boeing built and was used to showcase the airplane around the world. This particular Dreamliner flew for the first time in March of 2010, and was flown to more than 20 countries around the world as part of the Dream Tour.

Boeing struggled with the earliest version of the Dreamliner after the lithium ion batteries short-circuited and caught fire. The planes were grounded in January 2013 after the incident and began flying again in May of that year after Boeing redesigned the battery and held no-passenger test flights.

Since then, though, sales of the Dreamliner have been good. Boeing has had 24 net orders for the 787 so far this year and 325 total since 2010.


- Source:  http://www.bizjournals.com

Hambantota Fuel Storage Facility Defects



The UNP parliamentarian Ravi Karunanayake raised the issue of the Hambantota Port SLPA Aviation Fuel Tank farm site in parliament last Friday subsequent to the visit to the site by a group of UNP members on July 10, 2014.

He revealed some of the observations on the prevailing condition of the facility, before taking over by the CPC. According to the report, continuous ground settlements in excess of more than 400 mm have been observed at locations where piling has not been done. The UNP team observed defects due to continuous ground settlement will continue to grow, until a permanent solution for the ground settling is identified through a consultant and implemented. They strongly emphasized that this Aviation fuel storage tank farm constructed by the SLPA is far below the acceptable industry standards and even by physical appearance.

It is a fact that any Aviation fuel storage and handling facility conform to the most stringent requirements of JIG, API, NFPA and other international standards due to the most critical nature of this industry, which has not been adopted in the design and construction of this facility.

Karunanayake said that a typical example of a dislocated pipe support at the Hambantota Aviation tank farm was seen on July 10, 2014 by them, due to continuous ground settlement. He said that temporary arrangements have been made by the SLPA/Contractor in the past on several occasions by increasing the height of the concrete support and using metal plates. However a small gap is still visible due to subsequent settlements. The team had also observed that the pipelines are hanging on to the tank nozzle and shell, over stressing the piping and tank shell, which will have severe consequences in the long run paving the way for  a catastrophic failure.

The team had also observed that after a detail assessment and evaluation, the total facility constructed by the SLPA is not in a suitable condition for the usage by CPC for the storage and handling for JetA1 without finding proper and permanent remedies to the continuous ground settlement and defects present at every location in the facility as clearly shown by photographic evidence taken by them during their visit to the facility. Karunanayake said that the CPC will never be able to obtain JIG approval and concurrence to operate this facility for Jet A1 as an intermediate storage terminal in the future, without proper rectification which is doubtful.

“However in the meeting it was mentioned that the SLPA will hand over this sub standard Jet A1 import and storage facility at the Hambantota port to the CPC in the near future in the same condition. We have been highly embarrassed as professional Engineers who have successfully completed the Aviation Refueling Terminal at the MRIA, to be a World class facility and a valuable asset for the CPC, by assigning the responsibility to make assessment and recommendations for a facility nowhere comparable to the CPC constructed facility,” he added.

Karunanayake further stated that it was mentioned in the meeting by SLPA, that as per the agreement with the contractor, all the defects will be rectified by the contractor before the 18th of July 2014 except for implementing a permanent solution to the ground settling problem. “However as per our observations it is not possible to rectify all the defects within such a short period and also without solving the ground settling issue which contributes for most of the defects.

There is no point in repairing it as it will only be a temporary solution. It was also mentioned in the meeting that the contractor has been given until the end of November 2014 to find and implement a permanent solution to the continuous ground settling problem. However the SLPA representative stated that an assurance cannot be given to the CPC that ground settling will not continue after that.”

He said that the CPC suggested to monitor the ground settlement until November 2014, weekly with 20 reference points to see the level of settlement. SLPA agreed to this and the  CPC agreed to inspect and get the readings with SLPA.

Meanwhile the CPC officials informed that the soil layer underneath the concrete may have been washed away as the man hole within the yard had sunk. Therefore the CPC suggested to perform a load test at the site, to which the SLPA agreed.

Since the Hambatota port has been constructed at a strategic location close to international shipping routes, to have a properly built and operated Jet A1 storage facility conforming to international standards is very advantages economically consistent with refueling operations at the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport.

“We sincerely believe that SLPA should take immediate action to find a permanent solutions to the prevailing conditions. We forwarded our observations with pictures as proof with our sincere engineering comments, for the consideration by the Management of the CPC when taking a decision for taking over of this facility by CPC for operation in the future,” said Karunanayake.

- Source:   http://www.thesundayleader.lk

Mellon leads Naples Airport Authority Noise Compatibility Committee for second year

The Naples Airport Authority Noise Compatibility Committee elected M. Richard Mellon for a second term as chair and voted Ernest Linneman vice chair during its October meeting. The committee also approved its 2013-14 annual report, which is available online at www.FlyNaples.com under Noise Abatement/Noise Committee.

The committee helps monitor the impact of aircraft noise and makes recommendations about noise-mitigation procedures for consideration by the City of Naples Airport Authority Board of Commissioners, which appoints members.

Mellon has been a licensed pilot for 50 years and is active in the Civil Air Patrol. He practiced law in Pittsburgh for 25 years and served as an arbitrator and judge in Pennsylvania. A resident of Wyndemere, he has lived in Naples for 20 years, has served as CEO and board chair of Mellon Philanthropic since 1998, and is a member of Pelican Bay Rotary.

A Naples resident since 1991, Linneman served as an airport commissioner from 2003 until October 2013 and was the board liaison to the Noise Compatibility Committee for five years. During his professional career, he was with Honeywell International for 19 years and served as senior vice president of planning and corporate development for Honeywell Aerospace. He also was vice president and general manager of ITT Service Industries, providing services to the three New York City airports.

The nine committee members serve as volunteer representatives of the Collier County Commission, Naples City Council, general aviation pilots and six geographic areas surrounding the airport. In addition to Mellon and Linneman, the committee includes City Councilman Doug Finlay, William E. Cox, Bob Erbstein, Bill Goddard, Bob Tweedie and Scottie Yeager. A committee vacancy, representing general aviation pilots, is expected to be filled in November. Airport Authority Commissioner Donna Messer serves as board liaison to the committee.

In 2012, the Airport Authority and the Noise Compatibility Committee launched the “Please Fly Safe Fly Quiet” campaign to encourage pilots and aircraft operators to do all they can to minimize aircraft noise. The campaign encourages pilots to observe the airport’s recommended 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. aircraft curfew, as well as to follow recommendations such as using the full runway length for takeoffs and landings; observing “keep-it-high” landing procedures and quieter departure techniques; adhering to preferred flight paths; and using idle reverse thrust.

Naples Municipal Airport, a certificated air-carrier airport, is home to flight schools, air charter operators, car rental agencies and corporate aviation and nonaviation businesses as well as fire/rescue services, mosquito control, the Collier County Sheriff’s Aviation Unit and other community services.

During the 2013-2014 fiscal year, the airport accommodated 95,120 takeoffs and landings.

All funds used for the airport’s operation, maintenance and improvements are generated from activities at the airport or from federal and state grants; the airport receives no property tax dollars. The Florida Department of Transportation values the airport’s economic impact to the community at $283.5 million annually.

For more information or to subscribe for email updates about the airport, visit www.FlyNaples.com.

- Source:  http://www.naplesnews.com

Opinion: Seacoast Helicopters are noisy and dangerous

Posted Nov. 8, 2014 @ 2:01 am

Nov. 7 — To the Editor:

The people of Portsmouth and neighboring towns are grappling with noise and safety concerns posed by the sightseeing flights of Seacoast Helicopters. I live under their primary route through the city and have children who attend the schools that these helicopters fly over.

On Oct. 23 in Frederick MD a Robinson R44 helicopter collided with a small plane causing a crash in which all three aboard the helicopter were killed. Not only is this the same model as one flown by Seacoast Helicopters, the issue took a sadly more personal tone when I learned that two of the passengers who died were cousins of mine, including the pilot Will Jenkins. Will was an experienced helicopter pilot and instructor — having flown as a bush pilot in Alaska for a number of years.

In thinking of these helicopters flying low over our schools and community many times a day, I am also reminded of a another very sad story from 1991 when Senator John Heinz and 6 others were killed when his airplane collided with a small helicopter near Philadelphia. In that instance wreckage fell on a school playground and killed two children at recess.

The public may not be aware that when Seacoast Helicopters is flying over Portsmouth they are not under control of the air traffic controllers at Pease. They are flying under visual flight rules, or VFR, which means they can fly wherever they want, as low as they want. The NH Gazette reported that on Oct 16th the cloud ceiling was at 700 feet and Seacoast Helicopters was observed flying below this cloud ceiling. How low is too low? The Pease Development Authority provided us with a copy of their “Voluntary Noise Mitigation Procedures” which include flying no lower than 2500’ above the City of Portsmouth. Other procedures include “Mix activity” – don’t fly repeatedly over the same areas – and “Fly neighborly. Do everything possible to minimize aircraft noise”. Clearly Seacoast Helicopters is not abiding by these voluntary procedures.

I for one do not feel safe. I also feel abused by the noise. Let your opinion be known to City Council, the Pease Development Authority, and to Bruce Cultrera at Seacoast Helicopters. Also look for the SSH page on Facebook!

Jason Jenkins

Portsmouth

- Opinion and Comments: http://www.seacoastonline.com

Indian Air Force Bison forced to drop three fuel tanks while flying near Gwalior

BHOPAL: An Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter plane dropped three fuel tanks on outskirts of Gwalior city in Madhya Pradesh on Saturday during an in-flight emergency.

The Gwalior air base 'Bison' was conducting a routine training mission when the incident took place.

The pilot was forced to jettison the fuel tanks. They were dropped about 5km from the runway of the base and landed in a field 500m away from a residential locality, said sources.

Emergency crews rushed to the area, and no injuries were reported.

The pilot followed proper procedures during the incident, although having the fuel tanks land in the farm was a coincidence, said an IAF officer on condition of anonymity.

"As part of the landing procedure the pilot had to eject the external tanks before attempting a landing which was safely made with the Bison returning to base," said the officer adding, "Dropping the tank reduces the aircraft's weight and drag and gives the pilot better control in the event of engine failure".

"We're really happy that no one was hurt and the pilot is ok," he said.

One tank landed ending up near a toll booth and was close to a field where a farmer was working. Fortunately the fuel on board both tanks did not catch fire.

All three drop tanks were recovered by the IAF officials and taken to the air base. The incident is under investigation.


- Source:  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com

Rude Arrows: Royal Air Force pilot denies leaving giant penis vapor trail in sky

When RAF pilots flew over this country village, they ‘accidentally’ left a vapor trail that upset a few locals.

Villagers in Moray, Scotland, complained that one top gun had created a giant penis in the sky with his flight path.

The trail was left over RAF Lossiemouth and a picture taken by a baffled local.

But the RAF denied the giant genitalia was intentional and said the trail was the result of a pilot flying in a specified holding pattern while waiting to land.

A spokesman told The Sun newspaper: ‘It’s not what it appears to be.

‘People sometimes look into the sky and see all sorts of things.’

- Source:  http://metro.co.uk

(Picture: Cascade)

Firebird 10: Hikers rescued from Piestewa Peak

PHOENIX (KSAZ) - It was a dramatic rescue; a pair of hikers who went off the trail at Piestewa Peak yesterday and fell.

Phoenix Fire Department crews called for a helicopter and a specially trained crew to rescue them.

But this one rescue looked different from the rest.

Phoenix Fire uses helicopters for some of the mountain rescues because it is more efficient and a speedier way to reach people who may need immediate medical attention.

And that's why yesterday with two hikers injured who fell, and one of them a 17-year-old girl who had an open fracture on her leg, they used a helicopter.

It could make you dizzy or even nauseous to watch the video.

A 17-year-old girl was strapped to a rescue device called a "baumann bag," spinning like a propeller as a helicopter flew her off Piestewa Peak and down to a waiting ambulance.

She was with an 18-year-old man, both were hiking when they went off trail and fell 10 feet.

He had shoulder injuries; she had hurt her leg.

Phoenix Fire has special units who train hard to handle these situations.

The rescue went off smoothly although there was that spinning, so why did the basket spin so much?

"The rotor wash from the canyon started hitting the basket, and once it started to move it gets a lot of movement, but once you get out of the canyon it stops the rotor wash and settles down," said Capt. Jeff Zientek.

Both hikers are now recovering from their injuries, a little about the helicopter it's called Firebird 10. The Fire and Police Department share the Italian made helicopter.

It has two engines so it can keep flying if one engine goes out; it's also the only one like it in the state.

A highly skilled Phoenix Fire crew trains continually just to pull off these tricky mountain rescues, and that training paid off yesterday.

REACT: Ambulance in the sky

Flight nurse Tony Rehberg, Kristi Lohmar, REACT supervisor and pilot Dan McDade stand in front of the REACT helicopter in Rockford. The helicopter fits all three personnel and a patient, and can fly to cities as far as Chicago and Milwaukee if needed.


Teams of three fly out from Rockford Memorial Hospital in the REACT helicopter with the hopes of providing fast care to patients in need. While the team pairings change, Kristi Lohmar, Tony Rehberg and pilot Dan McDade have worked together for the last several years.

Rehberg has been a flight nurse for REACT for the last 23 years just a couple years shy of when the program started in 1987. Lohmar, the medical-based supervisor and manager, has been with REACT for about 10 years, and McDade has been a pilot since 2008. In all, the REACT team has eight medical personnel, four pilots and two mechanics.

“(The program) first started in 1987 as a nurse and paramedic team, and evolved to a nurse and nurse team,” Lohmar said. “Now that we are affiliated with (Rockford Memorial Hospital) we have slowly gone back to a nurse and paramedic team.”

While the job is very demanding, none of them can imagine doing anything else. Lohmar described the job as “very humbling.”

“It humbles me to see people in their darkest hour, and we are there to bring some light and do what we can to bring them to a place to help them even more,” she said.

Being a flight nurse was a goal of Lohmar’s since she decided to go into nursing.

“It’s about being there for someone who is in a critical situation, and to be challenged with the unknown,” she said. “We help infants, children, toddlers, adults. The whole mix of it all is challenging.”

You always remember the first flights to serious injuries. McDade remembers his second flight to an 11-year-old girl who was run over by a truck about 18 years ago. He remembers because she was the same age as his son at the time of the accident.

“She was pretty bad,” he said. “I’m not a medical person, and I don’t pretend to be, but I know when it is bad. She ended up living. I saw her a year later and she came back and visited. It really affected me a lot because I saw how vulnerable life is, and how quick it can be taken away.”

Despite the challenges and difficulties of the job, part of the attraction is that no two days are the same, Rehberg said.

“I don’t think any of us would go back to the bedside being a nurse,” he said. “The level of autonomy that this job provides, and the care that we give is so much greater than other nurse positions. We are working for the doctor.”

Rehberg said they have to train on the helicopter due to limited space compared to an ambulance.

However, the advantage to such limited space is that everything is within arms reach.

“We’re a flying ambulance,” he said “We train to operate in the aircraft. All the treatments that we do we can do in that tight space. It’s a higher level of care than a paramedic ambulance. We all come with at least five years experience before we start flying. We have to have that background to be able to move into this position where we are functioning outside of a hospital and doing essentially the same thing we would do in a hospital, but without a doctor.”

The higher level of care is needed in order to get the patient to the necessary hospital for treatment. It takes about 10 minutes for the helicopter to get into the air after a call comes in, but the travel time is cut down by more than half compared to driving an ambulance.

“Madison is about 30 minutes away, Beloit is about 10 minutes, Freeport is about 12,” Rehberg said.

And the crew has a pretty wide radius on where they fly including Chicago, Galena, Ill. and Milwaukee. Where a patient is taken is obviously dependent on the location of the incident, and the severity of the injury.

“I think it’s important that you not only compress the time, but you’ve amplified the level of care,” McDade said. “By doing that, your chances of a successful outcome is higher.”

Patients are loaded into the back of the helicopter, and the two medical crews sit facing the back of the aircraft. The stretcher fits perfectly near the tail. Heart rate monitors, IVs and other medical supplies are all above the patient, attached securely to the walls of the aircraft.

About six months ago, REACT was approved to operate on Instrument Flight Rules through the Federal Aviation Administration. IFR is used by aircraft when visibility is low, and traffic is controlled from the ground.

“On cloudy days IFR allows aircraft to fly via instruments, and over highways in the sky,” Rehberg said. “It’s under direct control of the FAA and it allows us to fly directly to the airport.”

On sunny days, REACT can fly a patient directly to the hospital, but on days with low visibility IFR will direct them to an airport closest to the hospital.

“It provides a much higher level of safety to go directly to the airport because they are federally regulated approaches and you won’t hit a tower or anything,” Rehberg said. “So in that aspect it’s a safety mechanism. Hopefully in the future we will get a couple approaches into different hospitals that we frequent, which will allow us to go directly to those hospitals in less than favorable weather conditions.”

- Source:  http://www.beloitdailynews.com

Exhibit brings Vietnam War experience to life at Patriots Point

WCIV-TV | ABC News 4 - Charleston News, Sports, Weather 

MOUNT PLEASANT, S.C. (WCIV) -- Have you ever wondered what it was like during the Vietnam War? A new exhibit at Patriots Point brings the whole experience to life. 

The Vietnam Experience opens to the public Saturday. It's an interactive exhibit with various artifacts such as helicopters and a patrol boat in addition to videos and sound effects that really take you back to the Vietnam War.

It's a hero's welcome home, and an exhibit dedicated to those we proudly served the country during the Vietnam War.

“We are basically zeroing in on the period of the TET Offensive in 1968 with two different bases in Vietnam, one a Navy support base for patrol boats on the Mekong Delta and then a separate one which would be a piece of the Marine base at Khe Sanh with a Marine artillery fire base,” said Mac Burdette, Executive Director of Patriots Point.

And as soon as visitors walk in, they are taken back in time. Hearing the sound of helicopters brings back memories for Vietnam veteran Pat Deweese.

“That is a fighter coming across. Hopefully he is dropping some napalm or something,” said Deweese.

Deweese volunteered to serve after hearing a classmate was killed in action.

“This is what we had back in '68 and '69 when I was there. I was stationed just outside Da Nang, Vietnam but this is the Medevac helicopter -- plenty of room inside,” said Deweese. “Only one casualty in here right now but we could get six guys in here. I only did this for about three months until I was helping another guy back to the helicopter and then I got wounded so then I worked in the operating room from then on as a surgical technician.”

He says he comes to Patriots Point as often as he can, but this new addition really hits home.

“It just brings back so many memories. I love coming here," said Deweese. “Good and bad, I try to block the bad ones out. This is a sweet bird, saved a lot of lives.”

But there is more than the UH1 helicopter on display. Every video and sound effect on the site makes visitors feel like they were there. Some videos even take people into middle of the war zone.

It's an interactive experience that Deweese says is important so that we never forget the sacrifices of war.

“So no one forgets these guys right here, these guys on these stretchers, the guys that didn't come back," said Deweese. “The 58,479 guys that did not come back.”

Those at Patriots Point want this exhibit to educate and entertain those that visit, but most importantly to honor those that served.

“We feel like that Vietnam veterans did not get the recognition, the respect that they deserve when they came home from that long war,” said Burdette. “We want Patriots Point to be the place that Vietnam veterans think of as a place they can come to reflect with their families and their friends about their service in Vietnam and we kind of call it the homecoming they never got.”

This new exhibit is free to all Vietnam veterans Saturday, Nov. 8 and Sunday, Nov. 9. Then on Tuesday, Veteran's Day, all veterans will enjoy free admission.

-Story, Video and Photos:  http://www.abcnews4.com





Central Bureau of Investigation probes Air India's 68 Boeing aircraft order

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is probing Air India's purchase of 68 Boeing planes, the civil aviation ministry has said in a Right to Information (RTI) Act response.

Air India had placed an order for 68 aircraft, including Boeing 737s, 777s and 787s, all valued at $11 billion in December 2005.

While the then-civil aviation minister Praful Patel has denied any wrongdoing and said the decision to order 68 planes was approved by an empowered group of ministers and later by the Union Cabinet, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in its 2011 report faulted the purchase as it had a significant impact on the airline's financial health.

The CBI probe into the purchase of aircraft has come to light after Air India's former executive director Jitender Bhargava wrote to the civil aviation ministry seeking files on the aircraft order.

In a response to Bhargava's RTI request, the civil aviation ministry on October 31 replied that the case was under CBI investigation and the CBI had informed that the disclosure of information may impede the process of investigation.

Initially the Air India board had proposed the acquisition of 28 planes but the decision was revised and the order size increased. CAG had also questioned the hurry in placing the order for 68 planes.

In its report, CAG said Air India was advised to revisit its proposal by the ministry into expanding its requirement of aircraft. Whilst the earlier proposal for 28 aircraft had taken two years (January 2002 to January 2004) to prepare and submit, the revised long-term fleet for the 50-aircraft plan was completed in four months (from August to November 2004).

UNDER THE CBI SCANNER

  • Air India (AI) had placed an order for 68 aircraft, including Boeing 737s, 777s and 787s, all valued at $ 11 billion in December 2005
  • In a response to AI's former executive director Jitender Bhargava's RTI request, the civil aviation ministry on October 31 replied the case was under CBI investigation
- Source:  http://www.business-standard.com

Ohio football team gets visit from Nike helicopter

The Colerain football team received a welcome surprise at Thursday's practice.

The Cardinals were hard at work putting the finishing touches on their preparation for Saturday's first round playoff game at Hilliard Darby, when the chopping of a helicopter crept closer.

A black helicopter boasted the unmistakable white swoosh of Nike. It landed at Colerain's practice to deliver the Cardinals' personalized cold weather gear for the postseason.

The players were unaware this would be happening.

"Nike called us earlier in the week and set all this up," said Colerain athletic director Dan Bolden. "It's one of the great things Nike has done with us. It's a great thing for high school football. Our kids deserved this."

Nike is one of Colerain's corporate sponsors. Colerain's one of just 50 high schools in the country with a corporate sponsorship deal with Nike.

Story, Video and Photo Gallery:    http://www.cincinnati.com

Hampton: a war hero

Fred Hampton at his home in Zionsville. He flew 29 bombing missions in Europe during World War II. 
(Photo by Ward Degler)



Veterans Day honors all veterans of all American wars, those who returned home triumphant, and those who remained behind.

Fred Hampton, of Zionsville, is one of the former; a quiet, unassuming man who never considered himself a hero in spite of flying 29 dangerous bombing missions over Nazi-occupied Europe during the last desperate years of World War II.

Like thousands of other young men, Hampton’s plans for college and an engineering degree were cut short when he was drafted in the fall of 1943.

“I figured I’d wind up in the infantry,” he said. “Sleeping in muddy foxholes.” But a need for fresh bomber crews to relieve the battle weary pilots, gunners and navigators of the 8th Air Force in England found Hampton transferred to the Army Air Corps.

“I first trained to be a navigator,” he said. “And I even got some pilot training.”

Ultimately, Hampton wound up in gunnery school where he was assigned as a tail gunner.

“My height probably had something to do with that,” he said.

At 5-foot-2, Hampton was just small enough to squeeze into the cramped tail compartment of a B-17.

“I had to kneel during the entire mission,” he said. “Sometimes for nine to 10 hours.”

By the time Hampton and the rest of his crew got to England, the Air Corps had switched from B-24 Liberators to the older B-17s for most of the bombing missions.

“The B-17 could handle a lot more damage than the B-24,” he said. The planes were famous for limping home after being riddled with anti-aircraft flak and bullets from enemy fighters. The crew of one plane in Hampton’s outfit counted 365 bullet holes in their plane after a single mission.

The war became a reality for Hampton with his very first mission. “Up till then it was all training,” he said.

On Feb. 3, 1945, however, it all changed.

“That day we were part of the biggest raid of the war,” he says. “We were one of 1,500 planes loaded with bombs headed for Berlin.” Hampton recalls that the flak over the German capital was “terrible.”

“We lost a lot of planes that day,” Hampton remembers, “and we were all scared. We prayed a lot.”

Hampton and his crew flew 28 more combat missions during the last months of the war, bombing German factories, bridges, railroads and airfields in places like Hamburg, Bremen, Munich and Dresden.

“We got hit by German fighters over Dresden,” he said. “We lost one engine and the wing was shot up pretty badly.”

Despite being crippled, the plane finished its bombing run and limped back to England on three engines.

None of Hampton’s crew was injured in combat. But their most memorable mission was one they didn’t fly.

“Our crew was grounded and another crew was assigned to our B-17,” Hampton said. “That day our plane was shot down over Germany. We never learned what happened to the crew.”

Hampton came home in 1945 and picked up where he left off, went to college and got his degree in engineering. He married his wife Mary Lou in 1948 and settled down to the business of raising a family. In 1985 Hampton retired from Allison Transmission in Indianapolis where he had spent much of his career working on military contracts.

After retiring, Hampton returned to Europe for a visit. He toured a rebuilt Berlin and saw almost no evidence of the devastating raid he had been part of in 1945.

In England he drove out to the airfield where he had spent so many chilly mornings being briefed for missions. “It was eerily quiet,” he said, and the only reminder of what had happened there was a bronze plaque bearing the dates of the airfield’s existence.

Still healthy at 89, Hampton plans to observe Veterans Day 2014 as he has every year since his return. “With thanksgiving and respect for everyone who served.”

During World War II, B-17s dropped 640,000 tons of bombs on German targets. Four-thousand-six-hundred planes were shot down and 47,000 crew members died.

Veterans Day, enacted by Congress in 1954, grew out of Armistice Day, a day honoring those killed during World War I.

Story and photo gallery:  http://www.currentzionsville.com

Friday, November 7, 2014

Cirrus SR22, Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC, N811CD: Fatal accident occurred November 06, 2014 in Grover Hill, Paulding County, Ohio

Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf 

Location: Grover Hill, OH
Accident Number: CEN15FA040
Date & Time: 11/06/2014, 1800 EST
Registration: N811CD
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 3 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal

Analysis 

Before departing on the instrument flight rules cross-country flight, the private pilot obtained a weather briefing that forecast moderate icing conditions along the intended route. The pilot, a commercial pilot-rated passenger, and a second passenger then departed on the flight in the high-performance, single engine airplane, which was not certified for flight into known icing conditions. Both the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were heard communicating with air traffic controllers during the flight and it could not be determined who was flying the airplane at the time of the accident. About 1 hour, 45 minutes into the flight, the pilot requested a higher altitude and stated to a controller that the airplane was "picking up a little ice." The pilot was granted a higher altitude, which was above the clouds, thus, reducing the potential for icing. About 20 minutes later, the flight began its descent toward the destination airport. Radar contact was lost about 8 minutes later when the airplane was at an altitude of 3,600 ft mean sea level.

Based on an analysis of the weather conditions near the accident site at the time of the accident, the atmosphere was conducive to the formation of supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing. It is likely that, during the descent, the airplane encountered SLD icing, which rapidly accumulated on the airframe to the extent that the airplane could no longer sustain flight. The airplane then entered a steep, uncontrolled descent to ground contact. Due to the night conditions, it is possible that the pilots were not able to visually observe the amount of ice on the airframe or did not realize how quickly the ice was accreting. The airplane was equipped with a parachute system (CAPS) that could be deployed by the pilot in flight. The CAPS rocket motor was found expended; however, the parachute remained in its pack. The investigation could not determine whether the rocket was deployed before impact or as a result of impact forces. There were no observed airplane preimpact anomalies.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The airplane's encounter with supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing, which resulted in a loss of lift and a subsequent uncontrolled descent into terrain. Also causal was the pilot's preflight and in-flight decision to fly in known icing conditions in an airplane that was not certified to do so. 

Findings

Personnel issues
Weather planning - Pilot (Cause)
Decision making/judgment - Pilot (Cause)

Environmental issues
Freezing rain/sleet - Effect on operation (Cause)
Freezing rain/sleet - Effect on equipment (Cause)

Factual Information

History of Flight

Enroute-descent
Other weather encounter
Loss of control in flight (Defining event)

Uncontrolled descent
Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) 

On November 6, 2014, about 1800 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N811CD, impacted a farm field near Grover Hill, Ohio, and a post impact fire occurred. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and another passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. The flight operated on an activated IFR flight plan. The flight originated about 1545 from the Washington Municipal Airport (AWG), near Washington, Iowa, and was destined for the Findlay Airport (FDY), near Findlay, Ohio.

A fueling receipt from AWG showed that N811CD was serviced with 26.67 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline at 1519. The AWG airport manager indicated that he was at the airport at 1530 and he talked to three people who flew in N811CD. There were two men and a woman of the same age. He reported that they said they were flying east and would be back on Sunday as part of their return flight. Witnesses reported to the airport manager that they thought the woman was seated in the front right seat. The manager indicated that from 300 feet away, the airplane looked very clean. He was outside when they took off and the engine start-up sounded normal as did the engine run-up. The manager said that the takeoff appeared to be under full power and they climbed at a normal rate of climb.

According to records from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the accident airplane communicated with the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) located near Ft. Wayne, Indiana. About 1729, the pilot requested a climb to 10 or 11 thousand feet above mean seal level (MSL) because he was "picking up a little ice". The air traffic controller cleared the flight to 10,000 feet MSL, and asked for more details. The pilot reported that the windshield was picking up a little ice, and the outside air temperature was minus six degrees. About 1746, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were ragged between 9,500 and 10,300 feet MSL. About 1749, the pilot requested a lower altitude and the controller cleared the flight to 5,000 feet MSL. About 1751, the controller handed the flight off to Toledo TRACON.

About 1752, the pilot checked on with Toledo TRACON and indicated that he was on descent to 5,000 feet. The controller asked if the pilot had the current FDY weather. About 1754, the pilot reported that he had the current FDY weather and requested the RNAV [Area Navigation] Runway 25 approach to FDY. The controller advised the pilot to expect that RNAV approach. The last radio transmission from the airplane restated that the RNAV Runway 25 approach was requested and that transmission was received about 1754. The last transponder reply was about 1757, which indicated the airplane was at 3,600 feet MSL. That transponder reply showed the airplane was located to the south and east of the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137, near Grover Hill, Ohio.

A witness was driving in her car eastbound on Route 60 and was approaching Town Road 117. This intersection was about three miles west of the accident site. She indicated that she was driving about 45 to 50 mph. It was dark at the time and "spit" rain was coming down. She said that she could see through the car's windshield. She stated that above woods just south of Route 60, she saw a light coming down slowly. She described it as looking similar to a comet. The descent angle she physically gestured while being interviewed was about 35 to 45 degrees downward in the direction of the accident site. She said she saw the descending light for about two seconds. She subsequently saw an explosion, which was orange in color.

Another witness was in a house about a third of a mile northwest of the accident site. She indicated that a heavy wind or tornado sound is what got her attention. She also heard a sound she vocally described as "NEEEEER." She saw a reflection of light in a mirror. An explosion occurred when the NEEEEER sound stopped. She said that the conditions at that time were windy, dark, and rainy. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 59
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 3 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 10/15/2014
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 08/16/2014
Flight Time: (Estimated) 1000.3 hours (Total, all aircraft), 127.8 hours (Total, this make and model)

Pilot-Rated Passenger Information

Certificate: Flight Instructor; Commercial
Age: 65
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s):
Restraint Used: Unknown
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 04/21/2014
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 12/12/2013
Flight Time: 5016 hours (Total, all aircraft) 

The 59-year-old pilot held a FAA private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He had been issued a FAA third-class medical certificate on October 15, 2014, with a limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot reported on the application for that medical certificate that he had accumulated 987 hours of total flight time and 150 hours of flight time in the six months before that application.

The last entry in the pilot's logbook was dated November 5, 2014. The pilot recorded that he had accumulated 1,000.3 hours of total flight time, 151.5 hours of flight time during night conditions, 127.8 hours of flight time in SR22 airplanes, and 19.3 hours of flight time in actual instrument conditions. A certified flight instructor's endorsement in the pilot's logbook showed that the pilot received a flight review on August 16, 2014.

The 65-year-old pilot rated passenger held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a FAA flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. He had been issued a FAA second-class medical certificate on April 21, 2014. This medical certificate was issued to the pilot rated passenger as a Time-limited Special Issuance Second Class Medical Certificate with the following limitation(s): "Not Valid for Any Class After 04/30/2015" and "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." He reported on the application for that special issuance medical certificate that he had accumulated 5,016 hours of total flight time and 160 hours of flight time in the six months prior to that application. 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Manufacturer: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
Registration: N811CD
Model/Series: SR22 NO SERIES
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2001
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 0120
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 10/08/2014, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3400 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 1806.2 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: CONT MOTOR
ELT: Installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: IO-550-N7B
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 310 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None 

N811CD, a 2001 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0120, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, 310-horsepower, Continental Motors model IO-550-N7B engine, with serial number 686224, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on October 8, 2014. The airplane accumulated 1806.2 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection.

A FAA Inspector reported that the airplane was modified with a LoPresti Aviation BoomBeam landing light system in November of 2013. The installed 60-watt BoomBeam bulb emitted a 2,990 lumen output.

The airplane was fitted with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) designed to recover the airplane and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fiberglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation T-handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly which attached the parachute to the fuselage.

The accident airplane was not equipped nor certified for flight in icing conditions. 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions
Condition of Light: Night/Dark
Observation Facility, Elevation: KFDY, 812 ft msl
Observation Time: 1753 EST
Distance from Accident Site: 38 Nautical Miles
Direction from Accident Site: 93°
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Temperature/Dew Point: 7°C / 6°C
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 600 ft agl
Visibility: 3 Miles
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 10 knots, 260°
Visibility (RVR):
Altimeter Setting: 29.81 inches Hg
Visibility (RVV):
Precipitation and Obscuration: Mist; No Precipitation
Departure Point: WASHINGTON, IA (AWG)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: FINDLAY, OH (FDY)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 1545 EST
Type of Airspace: 

A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) senior meteorologist collected factual weather data in reference to the accident flight and produced a group chairman's factual weather report. The report showed that the accident pilot was provided weather information from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service through the ForeFlight.com website. He also filed an IFR flight plan for a direct flight from AWG to FDY. The pilot also requested a standard text weather briefing format. Standard weather information for the accident flight, to include the airmen's meteorological information (AIRMETs), area forecast (FA), meteorological terminal air reports (METARs), terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs), and pilot reports (PIREPs), was contained in the text weather briefing package. Meteorological Impact Statements (MIS) were not contained in the weather briefing information package. There is no record of any additional weather briefing information the accident pilot received.

A review of the 1900 surface analysis chart showed that it depicted a surface trough stretching from central New York westward across northern Pennsylvania, northern Ohio, and central Indiana. Constant pressure charts depicted a low-level trough over or just to the northwest of the accident site around the accident time with temperatures below freezing.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 38 miles and 93 degrees from the accident site at FDY was: Wind 260 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast clouds at 600 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 18 miles and 10 degrees from the accident site at the Defiance Memorial Airport, near Defiance, Ohio, (DFI) was: Wind 280 degrees at 8 knots: visibility 6 statute miles; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1853, the recorded weather at DFI was: Wind 320 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; present weather light rain; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,100 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.87 inches of mercury.

The 1900 Wilmington, Ohio, (KILN) upper air sounding was plotted. The plotted sounding depicted the lifted condensation level at 1,502 feet, a convective condensation level of 2,554 feet, and a level of free convection at 1,675 feet. The freezing level was located at 3,829 feet. The precipitable water value was 0.54 inches.

The sounding indicated a relatively moist vertical environment from the surface through 12,000 feet MSL with several layers of conditional instability. This environment would have been conducive of cloud formation from the surface to 12,000 feet and icing (clear, rime, and mixed) between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL. Additionally, the sounding was close to saturation between 0 degrees C and -11 degrees C (between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL) which, according to articles in professional meteorology journals, is considered a temperature range supportive of the growth of supercooled liquid water droplets (SLD).

Visible and infrared data from the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) was obtained and plotted. GOES-13 imagery at a wavelength of 0.65 microns (µm) and 10.7 µm depicted brightness temperatures for the scene and imagery surrounding the time of the accident, from 1400 through 2000 at approximately 15-minute intervals, were reviewed. The review revealed a general northwest to southeast movement of the clouds over the accident site about the accident time. Based on the brightness temperatures above the accident site and the vertical temperature profile provided by the 1900 KILN sounding, the approximate cloud-top heights over the accident site were 13,000 feet at 1800.

Fort Wayne, Indiana, (KIWX) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D), was located about 57 miles west-northwest of the accident site. Archive radar data was plotted with the airplane's radar track. Plotted base reflectivity values are located over and along the route of flight with the precipitation targets moving from north to south between 1755 and 1757. These reflectivity values correspond to very light precipitation targets. There were no lightning strikes near the accident site at the accident time.

KIWX WSR-88D dual-polarization (dual-pol) archived radar data was obtained and plotted. About 1750, radar data showed the accident flight began a descent from 10,000 feet and dual-pol depicted conditions near the aircraft location at the precipitation targets indicated small hydrometeor sizes, and/or a small amount of hydrometeors in the beam, hydrometeors that were much more horizontally shaped as they fell than spherical, and all the hydrometeors in the scan had very similar characteristics. These shape characteristics are similar to the freezing drizzle and supercooled liquid water characteristics described in articles in professional meteorology journals.

PIREPs, two hours before and after the accident and within 300 miles of the accident site, were reviewed. A portion of the PIREPS reported light or moderate icing conditions to include one report of severe clear icing at 4,000 feet MSL at 1900 about 180 degrees and 175 miles south of the accident site.

There was no issued significant meteorological information valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was no issued Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) advisory valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was a MIS issued at 1344 by the CWSU near Cleveland, Ohio, valid for the accident site at the accident time. The MIS discussed patchy light to moderate icing conditions with bases at 4,500 feet in the northern half of Cleveland's airspace, with the icing base at 7,500 feet across the southern half of Cleveland's airspace. The top of the icing was forecast to be at 16,000 feet with patchy instrument conditions in the precipitation.

AIRMET Zulu was issued at 1545 and was valid at the accident time. It was the only AIRMET valid for the accident site, at the accident time, and the accident flight level. AIRMET Zulu forecasted moderate icing conditions between the freezing level and flight level (FL)180 with the forecasted freezing level between 2,000 and 7,000 feet within the AIRMET airspace.

A corrected FA issued at 1540, valid at the accident time, forecasted an overcast ceiling from 1,500 to 2,500 feet MSL with tops to FL240, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, scattered light rain showers, and mist.

The Ft Wayne, Indiana, TAF, valid at the time of the accident, was issued at 1235 and was valid for a 24-hour period beginning at 1300. The TAF forecast for the time period surrounding the accident was for wind from 300 degrees at 16 knots with gusts to 26 knots, 6 miles visibility, light rain shower, and an overcast ceiling at 2,000 feet.

The current icing potential (CIP) supplements other icing advisories. The CIP icing probabilities, icing severity, and SLD potential, valid at 1700 and 1800 EST at 10,000, 9,000, 8,000, 7,000, and 6,000 feet MSL were reviewed. The CIP icing probabilities depicted 50 to above 85 percent probability of icing at every flight level between 10,000 and 6,000 feet around the accident site around the time of the accident. The highest probabilities for icing were located between 8,000 and 6,000 feet with the tongue of greater than 85 percent probability of icing stretching westward from the accident time into northern Indiana. In addition to the CIP indicating greater than 85 percent probability of icing, the CIP indicated that the icing severity around the accident site was between light and moderate. Below 8,000 feet, the icing severity around the accident site was depicted as mostly moderate icing at both 1700 and 1800. SLD potential was also calculated by CIP. Around the accident site at the accident time, where the SLD potential was calculated as "unknown", the SLD potential was between 40 and 70 percent with the highest probability of SLD between 9,000 and 6,000 feet. 

Airport Information

Airport: FINDLAY (FDY)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 813 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Unknown
Runway Used: 25
IFR Approach: RNAV
Runway Length/Width: 5883 ft / 100 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: None 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 2 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: On-Ground
Total Injuries: 3 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 41.045833, -84.496944 

The main sections of the airplane fuselage and empennage were found impacted and buried in soft terrain about 199 degrees and 907 feet from the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137. The airplane's resting heading was about 77 degrees. The airplane's airframe was found fragmented with its heavier components north of the main wreckage and its lighter components east of the main wreckage. The observed debris field of components extended about 124 feet north and about 187 feet east of the main wreckage.

Flight control cable and engine cable continuity was not established due to fragmentation and thermal damage. Airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. Both navigation light covers were found and green glass fragments were found under the navigation light cover on the south side of the main wreckage. The engine cowling was fragmented and it exhibited a crush line consistent with a right wing low impact. Both left and right ailerons and flaps were found resting on the ground in the debris field to the north of the main wreckage. The empennage, to include the lower section of the rudder, was found discolored and deformed consistent with thermal damage. A portion of the vertical stabilizer and the lower section of the rudder were found on top of and adjacent to charred sections of wing skin and wing spar at the southwest side of the main wreckage. The upper section of the rudder was found resting on the ground about 100 feet east of the main wreckage in a debris field mostly north of the wreckage. Separation surfaces on the upper and lower sections exhibited consistent sized and shaped tears and separations. The upper rudder section did not exhibit the same dark discoloration as the lower section did.

The rocket motor and parachute were found within subsurface empennage and fuselage fragments in the main wreckage area. The rocket motor along with its pick-up collar and attached lanyards were found situated together near the parachute. The rocket motor's propellant was found to be expended and the motor exhibited discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The parachute was found in a packed state. The snubbed rear harness and 3-point links remained in place consistent with an as-installed configuration. The parachute exhibited deformation and discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The CAPS activation handle along with a retained section of its activation cable were found about 100 feet to east/northeast in the debris field. The handle exhibited witness marks consistent with impact damage and its cable exhibited separation signatures consistent with overload. The CAPS activation handle holder/bracket was found about 100 feet east of the main wreckage in the debris field. The holder/bracket exhibited witness marks consistent with impact damage and the bracket was found bent about 180 degrees. The CAPS cover was not identified in the wreckage or recovered during the investigation.

The propeller and propeller flange separated from its engine crankshaft and was found buried about four feet below the field. The propeller blades exhibited S-shaped bending and leading edge gouges. The engine was found deformed and buried about eight feet below the field. The No. 5 and No. 6 cylinders separated from their crankcase. Disassembly of the fuel pump showed its shear shaft separated in overload and it shaft was bent. The pump's vanes were intact and the pump rotated by hand about a quarter turn. The pump's mixture arm also rotated when moved by hand. Both magnetos sustained impact damage. One magneto produced spark when its impulse coupling was rotated by hand. Removed sparkplugs exhibited normal combustion discoloring and a "worn out, normal condition" when compared to a Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Accessible cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope and no preimpact anomalies were detected during the borescope inspection. Disassembly of the oil pump revealed no debris or preimpact anomalies. Disassembly of the fuel manifold revealed that its seal surface facing its screen and valve exhibited deterioration and its seal surface facing its spring did not exhibit deterioration.

Disassembly of the attitude indicator revealed rotational scoring on its rotor and cage. 

Medical And Pathological Information

An autopsy was performed on the pilot and pilot-rated passenger by the Paulding County Coroner's Office. Both their causes of death were listed as blunt force trauma. Toxicological samples were not able to be taken on neither the pilot nor the pilot-rated passenger.

Fire

The main wreckage exhibited charring, deformation, and discoloration consistent with a ground fire. Separated airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. A witness reported the sound of an explosion consistent with a ground impact explosion. 

Tests And Research

An NTSB senior air traffic specialist obtained radar data from the FAA. He produced a table of the data and graphical images of the airplane's radar returns. The data was given to the weather group chairman and vehicle performance group chairman for use in their reports. The radar data and graphics are appended to the docket material associated with this case.

An NTSB senior aerospace engineer, who was the vehicle performance group chairman, used the radar data to produce a three dimensional graphic. The graphic does not depict the airplane's airspeed or descent rates. However, the graphic visually shows the slope of the accident airplane's descent near the accident site. The vehicle performance graphic is appended to the docket material associated with this case.

The vehicle performance group chairman produced a performance study that, in part, found that the accident flight encountered clouds and ice while in cruise at 9,000 feet just south of Tippecanoe, Indiana. A climb to 10,000 feet took the flight out of the clouds. However, when the airplane began its descent to the destination airport about 20 minutes later over Woodburn, Indiana, it again encountered clouds. During the descent, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet, the airplane pitched down over 70 degrees and entered a steep right turn. During the final 20 seconds of radar data, the airplane's bank angle exceeded 60 degrees as it descended at a rate of about 9,000 feet per minute. Impact occurred about seven and a half minutes after the start of the descent.

The published aerodynamic stall speed for the Cirrus SR22 is 70 knots, and estimates from radar data indicated that the airspeed was around 150 knots before the airplane pitched down abruptly. However, both bank angle and ice accretion would increase the stall speed. The vehicle performance study is appended to the docket material associated with this case.

The accident airplane's CAPS activation handle, activation handle holder, activation handle safety pin, and the rudder's upper and lower sections were shipped to the NTSB Materials Laboratory. An NTSB chemist indicated that the submitted rudder from this accident was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory to determine if rocket fuel residue from the parachute system was present on the exterior surface of the rudder skin. The entire surface was swabbed and the individual swabs were analyzed using a Fourier transform infrared spectrometer with a diamond attenuated total reflectance accessory in accordance to ASTM E1252-98 (American Society for Testing Materials E1252-98: Standard Practice for General Techniques for Obtaining Infrared Spectra for Qualitative Analysis). The spectra from all the samples were compared to a known spectra for the rocket fuel components. No spectral signatures matching the rocket fuel components were found in any of the swab samples.

An NTSB senior materials engineer also examined the airplane components and produced Materials Laboratory Factual Report No. 16-026. The report, in part, indicated that the plunger portion of the handle exhibited marks along the outer edge of the plunger end face and along the edge of an inner pass-through hole for its cable. The edge exhibited an arc-shaped segment where the red anodization layer had been removed and circumferential wear marks were observed, consistent with a sliding contact. On either end of the sliding contact region and at a few locations within, the edge exhibited linear impression marks consistent with the width of wires that makes up the cable. A deformed flat was observed on the side of the plunger next to the edge and additional linear impression marks were observed further up the plunger. The marks along the edge of the inner hole also exhibited linear features and the hole was deformed. The marks along the edge of the inner hole subtended a similar arc angle as the marks along the outer edge.

Visual examination of the cable revealed one of its wires was bent at a right angle at a location consistent with it having been bent over the outer edge of the plunger end face. A second wire was found fractured at the same location as the bend. Examination of the cable at the pass-through hole revealed three broken wires, wear, and material transfer on the outside of the cable.

The handle holder exhibited linear impression marks, similar to those observed on the plunger. The marks were concentrated along the edges of the chamfer where the barrel meets the end face of the holder. The width of one of the deeper impression marks was consistent with the width of wires that comprise the cable.

The handle holder mounting bracket was bent forming a U-shape. Relative to its as-installed orientation, the bend was consistent with the bracket bending down, aft, and to the right side of the airplane.

The safety pin was visually examined and no notable features were observed.

Examination of the rudder revealed it was fractured through the middle third separating it into a lower piece and an upper piece. The lower piece exhibited features consistent with exposure to elevated temperatures including soot on the skin, organic constituents volatilized from the paint, and incipient melting of the skin at the upper end. The upper piece was crushed and bent and it exhibited features consistent with scraping of the paint off of the right side.

At the forward end and bottom edge of the upper piece there was a riveted L-shaped bracket with a horizontal arm that was deformed downward and the rivets had pulled out of the bracket. The rudder skin fractures along the right and left sides of the rudder respectively, exhibited features consistent with tensile overstress fractures. At the aft end of the rudder, the skin exhibited a bend and tear in the skin. Together, the features were consistent with a tensile/bending overstress fracture starting at the forward end of the rudder and terminating at the aft end of the rudder.

The skin at the upper end of the lower piece exhibited sagging, surface oxide cracking, and waviness of the skin, consistent with incipient melting. The region of incipient melting was confined to the upper portion of the skin and the transition occurred along an approximately linear boundary. Toward the forward end on the left side, there was a split in the skin that had opened into two approximately parabolic shapes. The skin on the left hand side of the rudder was resting on the skin on the right hand side of the rudder at either end of the parabolic region and the left side skin was sagging in between. The materials laboratory report is appended to the docket material associated with this case.

Additional Information

Both the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were heard communicating on the air traffic control frequency during the flight. Additionally, the investigation could not determine which pilot-rated occupant was flying the airplane or where each pilot-rated occupant was seated due to the fragmentation of the airplane.

According to NTSB accident report CEN13FA096, on December 10, 2012, about 2016 central standard time, a Messerschmitt Bolkow-Blohm model BK 117-A3 helicopter, N911BK, impacted the ground near Compton, Illinois. The pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic were fatally injured, and the helicopter sustained substantial damage from impact forces. The emergency medical services (EMS) equipped helicopter was registered to Rockford Memorial Hospital, and operated by Air Methods Corporation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air-taxi flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on a company visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Rockford Memorial Hospital Heliport (LL83), Rockford, Illinois, about 1958 and was en route to the Mendota Community Hospital Heliport (14IL), Mendota, Illinois, where it was to pick up a patient for transport back to the Rockford Memorial Hospital.

Within the report, weather data and reports from first responders indicated that the flight likely encountered areas of snow, freezing drizzle, and supercooled liquid water.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference CEN13FA096 as follows: The inadvertent encounter with inclement weather, including snow, freezing rain, and reduced visibility conditions, which led to the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of aircraft control.

According to preliminary information supplied to the NTSB, on October 18, 2013, about 1017 central daylight time, N610ED, a Cessna 500, Citation, multi-engine turbofan airplane, was destroyed during impact with terrain near Derby, Kansas. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Dufresne, Inc.; Murrieta, California. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The airplane departed Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, about 1007 and was destined for New Braunfels Regional Airport (BAZ), New Braunfels, Texas.

Preliminary data from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control showed normal operations during climb before the pilot contacted the FAA Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center at 1014 and reported leveling at 15,000 feet. The controller cleared the pilot to proceed direct to Millsap, Texas and climb to 23,000 feet. Over the next minute, the aircraft made an abrupt right turn followed by an abrupt left turn. Radar data showed the airplane descended to 14,600 feet before resuming climb and reaching 15,200 feet at 1016:20. The aircraft then made an abrupt descending left turn and radar and radio contact was lost.

Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane below the clouds in a nose down vertical dive. One witness reported that after impact he saw a fireball about 500 feet high followed by a column of smoke. Evidence at the accident scene showed evidence of a postimpact fire with most of the wreckage located in or near a single impact crater. The outboard portion of the left wing and the left aileron was located about 3,000 feet west of the main wreckage.

At 1038, the closest official surface weather observation site at McConnell Air Force Base (IAB), Wichita, Kansas, reported a northeast wind at 12 knots, light rain, and a broken ceiling at 1,700 feet above ground level. Satellite imagery indicated abundant cloud cover with the cloud cover top near 21,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Pilot reports in the area indicated light to moderate icing conditions above 6,000 feet msl at the accident time. This accident investigation's report number is CEN14FA009

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-74B, "Pilot Guide: Flight In Icing Conditions," defined supercooled large droplets (SLD) as, "Water drops with a diameter greater than 50 micrometers that exist in a liquid form at air temperatures below 0 degrees C. SLD conditions include freezing drizzle drops and freezing raindrops." The AC stated that, "a significant reduction in CLmax (maximum coefficient of lift) and a reduction in the AOA (angle of attack) where stall occurs can result from a relatively small ice accretion. A reduction of CLmax by 30 percent is not unusual, and a large-horn ice accretion can result in reductions of 40 percent to 50 percent. Drag tends to increase steadily as ice accretes. An airfoil drag increase of 100 percent is not unusual, and, for large-horn ice accretions, the increase can be 200 percent or even higher."

The AC stated that a pilot may detect airframe icing as a loss of airspeed or an increase in the power required to maintain the same airspeed. "The longer the icing encounter, the greater the drag increase; even with increased power, it may not be possible to maintain airspeed. If the aircraft has relatively limited power (as is the case with many aircraft with no ice protection), it may soon approach stall speed and a dangerous situation."

According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2007-018, on February 5, 2007, a Cirrus SR22 aircraft, registered VH-HYY, with a pilot and one passenger on board, was being operated on a private flight from Canberra, ACT to Bankstown, NSW. As the aircraft approached the Cecil Park area, NSW, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the engine had lost power and he was attempting a forced landing. Soon after, the aircraft impacted terrain close to the M7 motorway and both occupants sustained serious injuries.

The ATSB report, in part, indicated that before impact, the pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), but the system malfunctioned and the parachute did not deploy correctly. According to the report, subsequent testing by the aircraft and CAPS manufacturers found that the pick-up collar could move prematurely from the top of the rocket launch tube during activation. Such movement was considered to have the potential to adversely affect the rocket's trajectory. However, the trajectory of the rocket that was evident in this accident, was not able to be replicated.

Subsequent to this ATSB report, the FAA issued airworthiness directive (AD) 2007-14-03 for Cirrus Design Corporation Models SR20 and SR22 Airplanes. The AD, in part, stated:

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Models SR20 and SR22 airplanes. This AD requires you to replace the pick-up collar support and nylon screws, of the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), with a new design pick-up collar support and custom tension screws. This AD results from a CDC report of an in-flight CAPS activation where the parachute failed to successfully deploy. We are issuing this AD to correct pick-up collar support fasteners of the CAPS, which could result in the premature separation of the collar. This condition, if not corrected, could result in the parachute failing to successfully deploy (CAPS failure).

Logbook entries revealed that AD 2007-14-03 had been complied with on N811CD before the accident.

According to NTSB incident report CEN13IA285, on May 16, 2013, about 1120 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp (CDC) SR22, N715CD, airplane ballistic parachute was activated by the pilot during flight near Dallas, Texas, following a loss of control in cruise flight. The parachute pack remained in its compartment, its rocket was deployed, and the rocket propellant was expended. The airplane received no damage. The private pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Jeramiah 2911 Inc and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Marginal visual flight rules conditions prevailed and the flight was operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) plan for the flight that originated from Addison Airport (ADS), Dallas, Texas, about 1055 and was destined for Independence Municipal Airport (IDP), Independence, Kansas. The flight returned to ADS and landed without further incident.

The report, in part, found that the CAPS rocket was on the ground behind the airplane and the D-Bag was in the enclosure compartment. The incremental bridal was found completely unzipped, which with D-Bag strap length, would allow the rocket motor to be positioned about 10 feet behind the rudder. The D-Bag was found extracted about half way out of the enclosure compartment. The 3-point links were found displaced from their as-installed configuration. The report further stated that the postincident examination of the parachute system did not reveal any system component failure. Postincident testing showed that off-axis deployment of the parachute could exceed the forces required for a successful deployment of the parachute. If the airplane has a large pitch or bank angle or angular rates (or a combination of these) as the parachute rocket leaves the airplane, the airplane will rotate and cause the rocket tether to pull at an angle other than that intended, and the parachute will fail to deploy. Radar data showed that the airplane was in a very dynamic flight pattern with extreme pitch and bank angles when the parachute system was activated. Thus, the parachute likely failed to deploy when activated due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference to CEN13IA285 as follows: The failure of the airplane's parachute to deploy when activated during a loss of control in cruise flight due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

The Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) safety representative was asked for operational safety comments that would assist future pilots when flight conditions are like the accident conditions. He, in part, indicated:

COPA recognizes that flights into significant weather conditions pose great risks, especially for icing and supercooled liquid droplet (SLD) conditions. COPA emphasizes that all non-FIKI aircraft are prohibited from flight into known icing conditions.

Consequently, COPA offers several weather knowledge courses designed to inform Cirrus pilots about the sources of information about weather conditions, ways to manage on-board weather sources, and planning options for dealing with inadvertent encounters with significant weather conditions. These courses attempt to provide practical guidance for pilots rather than meteorological analyses of weather.

For icing conditions, especially forecasted SLD conditions, COPA guidance focuses on understanding the tools now available and practical responses to those conditions. These informational tools include those published by the Aviation Weather Center of NOAA with forecast icing models highlighting SLD threats and probabilities of icing potential at various altitudes. Guidance for pre-flight planning in areas with forecast icing conditions seeks to a) avoid routes or altitudes above the freezing level(s) that would penetrate such conditions, b) escape actions to deal with inadvertent encounters, such as 180-turn, descend or climb, with emphasis on knowledge of the extent of the conditions, c) operation of no-hazard weeping wing (TKS) system to facilitate escape, and d) practical advice for pilots flying FIKI equipped Cirrus aircraft in such conditions, especially the potential to be overwhelmed by SLD conditions.

COPA also refers Cirrus pilots to the guidance on icing conditions provided by Cirrus Aircraft in their Flight Operations Manuals (FOM). The Cirrus FOM includes procedures for preflight and periodic checks of the TKS system that help ensure it will operate effectively when needed, as well as guidance to deal with inadvertent icing encounters.

In 2006, both COPA and Cirrus Aircraft issued safety letters concerning winter flying, partly in response to a cluster of icing-related accidents. Since then, with consistent emphasis on weather planning and avoidance procedures, no fatal icing-related accident in a Cirrus aircraft occurred until this event.

The published maximum demonstrated deployment speed of the CAPS is 133 knots. However, COPA advised of other events where the parachute deployed following an airplane's three turn spin, an inverted attitude with an airspeed near 40 knots, a bank angle of 86 degrees, and an airspeed of 187 knots.

The witness's observation of the descending light that illuminated for about two seconds, which was described as a comet, is similar to the visible time of a 1.2 second CAPS rocket burn. The airplane was modified with the BoomBeam landing light. Given the radar data, the airplane's landing light would have been visible below the clouds consistent with the witness's statement.

The rudder deformation near its separation was consistent with the size of the CAPS rocket motor. The approximate location of the separation/deformation was above the rudder trim tab, which is about the same height as the opening of the enclosure compartment. This height would place the separation in the red zone indicated in the extraction report in CEN13IA285. Although the rudder's deformation was consistent with the shape of the CAPS rocket motor, the investigation did not detect any propellant signatures or transfer marks that would be consistent with rocket contact with the rudder.

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Columbus, Ohio
Cirrus Design; Duluth, Minnesota
Continental Motors; Mobile, Alabama
COPA; San Diego, California 
Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc.; South St Paul, Minnesota 

Aviation Accident Factual Report -  National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfA

Investigation Docket -  National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N811CD

NTSB Identification: CEN15FA040
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 06, 2014 in Grover Hill, OH
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N811CD
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 6, 2014, about 1800 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N811CD, impacted a farm field near Grover Hill, Ohio, and a post impact fire occurred. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and another passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. The flight operated on an activated IFR flight plan. The flight originated about 1545 from the Washington Municipal Airport (AWG), near Washington, Iowa, and was destined for the Findlay Airport (FDY), near Findlay, Ohio.

A fueling receipt from AWG showed that N811CD was serviced with 26.67 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline at 1519. The AWG airport manager indicated that he was at the airport at 1530 and he talked to three people who flew in N811CD. There were two men and a woman of the same age. He reported that they said they were flying east and would be back on Sunday as part of their return flight. Witnesses reported to the airport manager that they thought the woman was seated in the front right seat. The manager indicated that from 300 feet away, the airplane looked very clean. He was outside when they took off and the engine start-up sounded normal as did the engine run-up. The manager said that the takeoff appeared to be under full power and they climbed at a normal rate of climb.

According to records from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the accident airplane communicated with the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) located near Ft. Wayne, Indiana. About 1729, the pilot requested a climb to 10 or 11 thousand feet above mean seal level (MSL) because he was "picking up a little ice". The air traffic controller cleared the flight to 10,000 feet MSL, and asked for more details. The pilot reported that the windshield was picking up a little ice, and the outside air temperature was minus six degrees. About 1746, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were ragged between 9,500 and 10,300 feet MSL. About 1749, the pilot requested a lower altitude and the controller cleared the flight to 5,000 feet MSL. About 1751, the controller handed the flight off to Toledo TRACON.

About 1752, the pilot checked on with Toledo TRACON and indicated that he was on descent to 5,000 feet. The controller asked if the pilot had the current FDY weather. About 1754, the pilot reported that he had the current FDY weather and requested the RNAV [Area Navigation] Runway 25 approach to FDY. The controller advised the pilot to expect that RNAV approach. The last radio transmission from the airplane restated that the RNAV Runway 25 approach was requested and that transmission was received about 1754. The last transponder reply was about 1757, which indicated the airplane was at 3,600 feet MSL. That transponder reply showed the airplane was located to the south and east of the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137, near Grover Hill, Ohio.

A witness was driving in her car eastbound on Route 60 and was approaching Town Road 117. This intersection was about three miles west of the accident site. She indicated that she was driving about 45 to 50 mph. It was dark at the time and "spit" rain was coming down. She said that she could see through the car's windshield. She stated that above woods just south of Route 60, she saw a light coming down slowly. She described it as looking similar to a comet. The descent angle she physically gestured while being interviewed was about 35 to 45 degrees downward in the direction of the accident site. She said she saw the descending light for about two seconds. She subsequently saw an explosion, which was orange in color.

Another witness was in a house about a third of a mile northwest of the accident site. She indicated that a heavy wind or tornado sound is what got her attention. She also heard a sound she vocally described as "NEEEEER." She saw a reflection of light in a mirror. An explosion occurred when the NEEEEER sound stopped. She said that the conditions at that time were windy, dark, and rainy.


PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The 59-year-old pilot held a FAA private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He had been issued a FAA third-class medical certificate on October 15, 2014, with a limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot reported on the application for that medical certificate that he had accumulated 987 hours of total flight time and 150 hours of flight time in the six months before that application.

The last entry in the pilot's logbook was dated November 5, 2014. The pilot recorded that he had accumulated 1,000.3 hours of total flight time, 151.5 hours of flight time during night conditions, 127.8 hours of flight time in SR22 airplanes, and 19.3 hours of flight time in actual instrument conditions. A certified flight instructor's endorsement in the pilot's logbook showed that the pilot received a flight review on August 16, 2014.

The 65-year-old pilot rated passenger held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a FAA flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. He had been issued a FAA second-class medical certificate on April 21, 2014. This medical certificate was issued to the pilot rated passenger as a Time-limited Special Issuance Second Class Medical Certificate with the following limitation(s): "Not Valid for Any Class After 04/30/2015" and "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." He reported on the application for that special issuance medical certificate that he had accumulated 5,016 hours of total flight time and 160 hours of flight time in the six months prior to that application.


AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

N811CD, a 2001 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0120, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, 310-horsepower, Continental Motors model IO-550-N7B engine, with serial number 686224, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on October 8, 2014. The airplane accumulated 1806.2 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection.

A FAA Inspector reported that the airplane was modified with a LoPresti Aviation BoomBeam landing light system in November of 2013. The installed 60-watt BoomBeam bulb emitted a 2,990 lumen output.

The airplane was fitted with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) designed to recover the airplane and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fiberglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation T-handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly which attached the parachute to the fuselage.

The accident airplane was not equipped nor certified for flight in icing conditions.


METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) senior meteorologist collected factual weather data in reference to the accident flight and produced a group chairman's factual weather report. The report showed that the accident pilot was provided weather information from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service through the ForeFlight.com website. He also filed an IFR flight plan for a direct flight from AWG to FDY. The pilot also requested a standard text weather briefing format. Standard weather information for the accident flight, to include the airmen's meteorological information (AIRMETs), area forecast (FA), meteorological terminal air reports (METARs), terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs), and pilot reports (PIREPs), was contained in the text weather briefing package. Meteorological Impact Statements (MIS) were not contained in the weather briefing information package. There is no record of any additional weather briefing information the accident pilot received.

A review of the 1900 surface analysis chart showed that it depicted a surface trough stretching from central New York westward across northern Pennsylvania, northern Ohio, and central Indiana. Constant pressure charts depicted a low-level trough over or just to the northwest of the accident site around the accident time with temperatures below freezing.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 38 miles and 93 degrees from the accident site at FDY was: Wind 260 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast clouds at 600 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1753, the recorded weather about 18 miles and 10 degrees from the accident site at the Defiance Memorial Airport, near Defiance, Ohio, (DFI) was: Wind 280 degrees at 8 knots: visibility 6 statute miles; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1853, the recorded weather at DFI was: Wind 320 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; present weather light rain; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,100 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.87 inches of mercury.

The 1900 Wilmington, Ohio, (KILN) upper air sounding was plotted. The plotted sounding depicted the lifted condensation level at 1,502 feet, a convective condensation level of 2,554 feet, and a level of free convection at 1,675 feet. The freezing level was located at 3,829 feet. The precipitable water value was 0.54 inches.

The sounding indicated a relatively moist vertical environment from the surface through 12,000 feet MSL with several layers of conditional instability. This environment would have been conducive of cloud formation from the surface to 12,000 feet and icing (clear, rime, and mixed) between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL. Additionally, the sounding was close to saturation between 0 degrees C and -11 degrees C (between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL) which, according to articles in professional meteorology journals, is considered a temperature range supportive of the growth of supercooled liquid water droplets (SLD).

Visible and infrared data from the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) was obtained and plotted. GOES-13 imagery at a wavelength of 0.65 microns (µm) and 10.7 µm depicted brightness temperatures for the scene and imagery surrounding the time of the accident, from 1400 through 2000 at approximately 15-minute intervals, were reviewed. The review revealed a general northwest to southeast movement of the clouds over the accident site about the accident time. Based on the brightness temperatures above the accident site and the vertical temperature profile provided by the 1900 KILN sounding, the approximate cloud-top heights over the accident site were 13,000 feet at 1800.

Fort Wayne, Indiana, (KIWX) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D), was located about 57 miles west-northwest of the accident site. Archive radar data was plotted with the airplane's radar track. Plotted base reflectivity values are located over and along the route of flight with the precipitation targets moving from north to south between 1755 and 1757. These reflectivity values correspond to very light precipitation targets. There were no lightning strikes near the accident site at the accident time.

KIWX WSR-88D dual-polarization (dual-pol) archived radar data was obtained and plotted. About 1750, radar data showed the accident flight began a descent from 10,000 feet and dual-pol depicted conditions near the aircraft location at the precipitation targets indicated small hydrometeor sizes, and/or a small amount of hydrometeors in the beam, hydrometeors that were much more horizontally shaped as they fell than spherical, and all the hydrometeors in the scan had very similar characteristics. These shape characteristics are similar to the freezing drizzle and supercooled liquid water characteristics described in articles in professional meteorology journals.

PIREPs, two hours before and after the accident and within 300 miles of the accident site, were reviewed. A portion of the PIREPS reported light or moderate icing conditions to include one report of severe clear icing at 4,000 feet MSL at 1900 about 180 degrees and 175 miles south of the accident site.

There was no issued significant meteorological information valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was no issued Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) advisory valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.

There was a MIS issued at 1344 by the CWSU near Cleveland, Ohio, valid for the accident site at the accident time. The MIS discussed patchy light to moderate icing conditions with bases at 4,500 feet in the northern half of Cleveland's airspace, with the icing base at 7,500 feet across the southern half of Cleveland's airspace. The top of the icing was forecast to be at 16,000 feet with patchy instrument conditions in the precipitation.

AIRMET Zulu was issued at 1545 and was valid at the accident time. It was the only AIRMET valid for the accident site, at the accident time, and the accident flight level. AIRMET Zulu forecasted moderate icing conditions between the freezing level and flight level (FL)180 with the forecasted freezing level between 2,000 and 7,000 feet within the AIRMET airspace.

A corrected FA issued at 1540, valid at the accident time, forecasted an overcast ceiling from 1,500 to 2,500 feet MSL with tops to FL240, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, scattered light rain showers, and mist.

The Ft Wayne, Indiana, TAF, valid at the time of the accident, was issued at 1235 and was valid for a 24-hour period beginning at 1300. The TAF forecast for the time period surrounding the accident was for wind from 300 degrees at 16 knots with gusts to 26 knots, 6 miles visibility, light rain shower, and an overcast ceiling at 2,000 feet.

The current icing potential (CIP) supplements other icing advisories. The CIP icing probabilities, icing severity, and SLD potential, valid at 1700 and 1800 EST at 10,000, 9,000, 8,000, 7,000, and 6,000 feet MSL were reviewed. The CIP icing probabilities depicted 50 to above 85 percent probability of icing at every flight level between 10,000 and 6,000 feet around the accident site around the time of the accident. The highest probabilities for icing were located between 8,000 and 6,000 feet with the tongue of greater than 85 percent probability of icing stretching westward from the accident time into northern Indiana. In addition to the CIP indicating greater than 85 percent probability of icing, the CIP indicated that the icing severity around the accident site was between light and moderate. Below 8,000 feet, the icing severity around the accident site was depicted as mostly moderate icing at both 1700 and 1800. SLD potential was also calculated by CIP. Around the accident site at the accident time, where the SLD potential was calculated as "unknown", the SLD potential was between 40 and 70 percent with the highest probability of SLD between 9,000 and 6,000 feet.


WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The main sections of the airplane fuselage and empennage were found impacted and buried in soft terrain about 199 degrees and 907 feet from the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137. The airplane's resting heading was about 77 degrees. The airplane's airframe was found fragmented with its heavier components north of the main wreckage and its lighter components east of the main wreckage. The observed debris field of components extended about 124 feet north and about 187 feet east of the main wreckage.

Flight control cable and engine cable continuity was not established due to fragmentation and thermal damage. Airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. Both navigation light covers were found and green glass fragments were found under the navigation light cover on the south side of the main wreckage. The engine cowling was fragmented and it exhibited a crush line consistent with a right wing low impact. Both left and right ailerons and flaps were found resting on the ground in the debris field to the north of the main wreckage. The empennage, to include the lower section of the rudder, was found discolored and deformed consistent with thermal damage. A portion of the vertical stabilizer and the lower section of the rudder were found on top of and adjacent to charred sections of wing skin and wing spar at the southwest side of the main wreckage. The upper section of the rudder was found resting on the ground about 100 feet east of the main wreckage in a debris field mostly north of the wreckage. Separation surfaces on the upper and lower sections exhibited consistent sized and shaped tears and separations. The upper rudder section did not exhibit the same dark discoloration as the lower section did.

The rocket motor and parachute were found within subsurface empennage and fuselage fragments in the main wreckage area. The rocket motor along with its pick-up collar and attached lanyards were found situated together near the parachute. The rocket motor's propellant was found to be expended and the motor exhibited discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The parachute was found in a packed state. The snubbed rear harness and 3-point links remained in place consistent with an as-installed configuration. The parachute exhibited deformation and discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The CAPS activation handle along with a retained section of its activation cable were found about 100 feet to east/northeast in the debris field. The handle exhibited witness marks consistent with impact damage and its cable exhibited separation signatures consistent with overload. The CAPS activation handle holder/bracket was found about 100 feet east of the main wreckage in the debris field. The holder/bracket exhibited witness marks consistent with impact damage and the bracket was found bent about 180 degrees. The CAPS cover was not identified in the wreckage or recovered during the investigation.

The propeller and propeller flange separated from its engine crankshaft and was found buried about four feet below the field. The propeller blades exhibited S-shaped bending and leading edge gouges. The engine was found deformed and buried about eight feet below the field. The No. 5 and No. 6 cylinders separated from their crankcase. Disassembly of the fuel pump showed its shear shaft separated in overload and it shaft was bent. The pump's vanes were intact and the pump rotated by hand about a quarter turn. The pump's mixture arm also rotated when moved by hand. Both magnetos sustained impact damage. One magneto produced spark when its impulse coupling was rotated by hand. Removed sparkplugs exhibited normal combustion discoloring and a "worn out, normal condition" when compared to a Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Accessible cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope and no preimpact anomalies were detected during the borescope inspection. Disassembly of the oil pump revealed no debris or preimpact anomalies. Disassembly of the fuel manifold revealed that its seal surface facing its screen and valve exhibited deterioration and its seal surface facing its spring did not exhibit deterioration.

Disassembly of the attitude indicator revealed rotational scoring on its rotor and cage.


MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot and pilot-rated passenger by the Paulding County Coroner's Office. Both their causes of death were listed as blunt force trauma. Toxicological samples were not able to be taken on neither the pilot nor the pilot-rated passenger.


FIRE

The main wreckage exhibited charring, deformation, and discoloration consistent with a ground fire. Separated airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. A witness reported the sound of an explosion consistent with a ground impact explosion.


TESTS AND RESEARCH

An NTSB senior air traffic specialist obtained radar data from the FAA. He produced a table of the data and graphical images of the airplane's radar returns. The data was given to the weather group chairman and vehicle performance group chairman for use in their reports. The radar data and graphics are appended to the docket material associated with this case.

An NTSB senior aerospace engineer, who was the vehicle performance group chairman, used the radar data to produce a three dimensional graphic. The graphic does not depict the airplane's airspeed or descent rates. However, the graphic visually shows the slope of the accident airplane's descent near the accident site. The vehicle performance graphic is appended to the docket material associated with this case.

The vehicle performance group chairman produced a performance study that, in part, found that the accident flight encountered clouds and ice while in cruise at 9,000 feet just south of Tippecanoe, Indiana. A climb to 10,000 feet took the flight out of the clouds. However, when the airplane began its descent to the destination airport about 20 minutes later over Woodburn, Indiana, it again encountered clouds. During the descent, at an altitude of about 6,000 feet, the airplane pitched down over 70 degrees and entered a steep right turn. During the final 20 seconds of radar data, the airplane's bank angle exceeded 60 degrees as it descended at a rate of about 9,000 feet per minute. Impact occurred about seven and a half minutes after the start of the descent.

The published aerodynamic stall speed for the Cirrus SR22 is 70 knots, and estimates from radar data indicated that the airspeed was around 150 knots before the airplane pitched down abruptly. However, both bank angle and ice accretion would increase the stall speed. The vehicle performance study is appended to the docket material associated with this case.

The accident airplane's CAPS activation handle, activation handle holder, activation handle safety pin, and the rudder's upper and lower sections were shipped to the NTSB Materials Laboratory. An NTSB chemist indicated that the submitted rudder from this accident was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory to determine if rocket fuel residue from the parachute system was present on the exterior surface of the rudder skin. The entire surface was swabbed and the individual swabs were analyzed using a Fourier transform infrared spectrometer with a diamond attenuated total reflectance accessory in accordance to ASTM E1252-98 (American Society for Testing Materials E1252-98: Standard Practice for General Techniques for Obtaining Infrared Spectra for Qualitative Analysis). The spectra from all the samples were compared to a known spectra for the rocket fuel components. No spectral signatures matching the rocket fuel components were found in any of the swab samples.

An NTSB senior materials engineer also examined the airplane components and produced Materials Laboratory Factual Report No. 16-026. The report, in part, indicated that the plunger portion of the handle exhibited marks along the outer edge of the plunger end face and along the edge of an inner pass-through hole for its cable. The edge exhibited an arc-shaped segment where the red anodization layer had been removed and circumferential wear marks were observed, consistent with a sliding contact. On either end of the sliding contact region and at a few locations within, the edge exhibited linear impression marks consistent with the width of wires that makes up the cable. A deformed flat was observed on the side of the plunger next to the edge and additional linear impression marks were observed further up the plunger. The marks along the edge of the inner hole also exhibited linear features and the hole was deformed. The marks along the edge of the inner hole subtended a similar arc angle as the marks along the outer edge.

Visual examination of the cable revealed one of its wires was bent at a right angle at a location consistent with it having been bent over the outer edge of the plunger end face. A second wire was found fractured at the same location as the bend. Examination of the cable at the pass-through hole revealed three broken wires, wear, and material transfer on the outside of the cable.

The handle holder exhibited linear impression marks, similar to those observed on the plunger. The marks were concentrated along the edges of the chamfer where the barrel meets the end face of the holder. The width of one of the deeper impression marks was consistent with the width of wires that comprise the cable.

The handle holder mounting bracket was bent forming a U-shape. Relative to its as-installed orientation, the bend was consistent with the bracket bending down, aft, and to the right side of the airplane.

The safety pin was visually examined and no notable features were observed.

Examination of the rudder revealed it was fractured through the middle third separating it into a lower piece and an upper piece. The lower piece exhibited features consistent with exposure to elevated temperatures including soot on the skin, organic constituents volatilized from the paint, and incipient melting of the skin at the upper end. The upper piece was crushed and bent and it exhibited features consistent with scraping of the paint off of the right side.

At the forward end and bottom edge of the upper piece there was a riveted L-shaped bracket with a horizontal arm that was deformed downward and the rivets had pulled out of the bracket. The rudder skin fractures along the right and left sides of the rudder respectively, exhibited features consistent with tensile overstress fractures. At the aft end of the rudder, the skin exhibited a bend and tear in the skin. Together, the features were consistent with a tensile/bending overstress fracture starting at the forward end of the rudder and terminating at the aft end of the rudder.

The skin at the upper end of the lower piece exhibited sagging, surface oxide cracking, and waviness of the skin, consistent with incipient melting. The region of incipient melting was confined to the upper portion of the skin and the transition occurred along an approximately linear boundary. Toward the forward end on the left side, there was a split in the skin that had opened into two approximately parabolic shapes. The skin on the left hand side of the rudder was resting on the skin on the right hand side of the rudder at either end of the parabolic region and the left side skin was sagging in between. The materials laboratory report is appended to the docket material associated with this case.


ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION

Both the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were heard communicating on the air traffic control frequency during the flight. Additionally, the investigation could not determine which pilot-rated occupant was flying the airplane or where each pilot-rated occupant was seated due to the fragmentation of the airplane.

According to NTSB accident report CEN13FA096, on December 10, 2012, about 2016 central standard time, a Messerschmitt Bolkow-Blohm model BK 117-A3 helicopter, N911BK, impacted the ground near Compton, Illinois. The pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic were fatally injured, and the helicopter sustained substantial damage from impact forces. The emergency medical services (EMS) equipped helicopter was registered to Rockford Memorial Hospital, and operated by Air Methods Corporation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air-taxi flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on a company visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Rockford Memorial Hospital Heliport (LL83), Rockford, Illinois, about 1958 and was en route to the Mendota Community Hospital Heliport (14IL), Mendota, Illinois, where it was to pick up a patient for transport back to the Rockford Memorial Hospital.

Within the report, weather data and reports from first responders indicated that the flight likely encountered areas of snow, freezing drizzle, and supercooled liquid water.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference CEN13FA096 as follows: The inadvertent encounter with inclement weather, including snow, freezing rain, and reduced visibility conditions, which led to the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of aircraft control.

According to preliminary information supplied to the NTSB, on October 18, 2013, about 1017 central daylight time, N610ED, a Cessna 500, Citation, multi-engine turbofan airplane, was destroyed during impact with terrain near Derby, Kansas. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Dufresne, Inc.; Murrieta, California. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The airplane departed Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, about 1007 and was destined for New Braunfels Regional Airport (BAZ), New Braunfels, Texas.

Preliminary data from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control showed normal operations during climb before the pilot contacted the FAA Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center at 1014 and reported leveling at 15,000 feet. The controller cleared the pilot to proceed direct to Millsap, Texas and climb to 23,000 feet. Over the next minute, the aircraft made an abrupt right turn followed by an abrupt left turn. Radar data showed the airplane descended to 14,600 feet before resuming climb and reaching 15,200 feet at 1016:20. The aircraft then made an abrupt descending left turn and radar and radio contact was lost.

Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane below the clouds in a nose down vertical dive. One witness reported that after impact he saw a fireball about 500 feet high followed by a column of smoke. Evidence at the accident scene showed evidence of a postimpact fire with most of the wreckage located in or near a single impact crater. The outboard portion of the left wing and the left aileron was located about 3,000 feet west of the main wreckage.

At 1038, the closest official surface weather observation site at McConnell Air Force Base (IAB), Wichita, Kansas, reported a northeast wind at 12 knots, light rain, and a broken ceiling at 1,700 feet above ground level. Satellite imagery indicated abundant cloud cover with the cloud cover top near 21,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Pilot reports in the area indicated light to moderate icing conditions above 6,000 feet msl at the accident time. This accident investigation's report number is CEN14FA009

FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 91-74B, "Pilot Guide: Flight In Icing Conditions," defined supercooled large droplets (SLD) as, "Water drops with a diameter greater than 50 micrometers that exist in a liquid form at air temperatures below 0 degrees C. SLD conditions include freezing drizzle drops and freezing raindrops." The AC stated that, "a significant reduction in CLmax (maximum coefficient of lift) and a reduction in the AOA (angle of attack) where stall occurs can result from a relatively small ice accretion. A reduction of CLmax by 30 percent is not unusual, and a large-horn ice accretion can result in reductions of 40 percent to 50 percent. Drag tends to increase steadily as ice accretes. An airfoil drag increase of 100 percent is not unusual, and, for large-horn ice accretions, the increase can be 200 percent or even higher."

The AC stated that a pilot may detect airframe icing as a loss of airspeed or an increase in the power required to maintain the same airspeed. "The longer the icing encounter, the greater the drag increase; even with increased power, it may not be possible to maintain airspeed. If the aircraft has relatively limited power (as is the case with many aircraft with no ice protection), it may soon approach stall speed and a dangerous situation."

According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2007-018, on February 5, 2007, a Cirrus SR22 aircraft, registered VH-HYY, with a pilot and one passenger on board, was being operated on a private flight from Canberra, ACT to Bankstown, NSW. As the aircraft approached the Cecil Park area, NSW, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the engine had lost power and he was attempting a forced landing. Soon after, the aircraft impacted terrain close to the M7 motorway and both occupants sustained serious injuries.

The ATSB report, in part, indicated that before impact, the pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), but the system malfunctioned and the parachute did not deploy correctly. According to the report, subsequent testing by the aircraft and CAPS manufacturers found that the pick-up collar could move prematurely from the top of the rocket launch tube during activation. Such movement was considered to have the potential to adversely affect the rocket's trajectory. However, the trajectory of the rocket that was evident in this accident, was not able to be replicated.

Subsequent to this ATSB report, the FAA issued airworthiness directive (AD) 2007-14-03 for Cirrus Design Corporation Models SR20 and SR22 Airplanes. The AD, in part, stated:

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Models SR20 and SR22 airplanes. This AD
requires you to replace the pick-up collar support and nylon screws, of the
Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), with a new design pick-up collar
support and custom tension screws. This AD results from a CDC report of an
in-flight CAPS activation where the parachute failed to successfully deploy.
We are issuing this AD to correct pick-up collar support fasteners of the CAPS,
which could result in the premature separation of the collar. This condition,
if not corrected, could result in the parachute failing to successfully deploy
(CAPS failure).

Logbook entries revealed that AD 2007-14-03 had been complied with on N811CD before the accident.

According to NTSB incident report CEN13IA285, on May 16, 2013, about 1120 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp (CDC) SR22, N715CD, airplane ballistic parachute was activated by the pilot during flight near Dallas, Texas, following a loss of control in cruise flight. The parachute pack remained in its compartment, its rocket was deployed, and the rocket propellant was expended. The airplane received no damage. The private pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Jeramiah 2911 Inc and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Marginal visual flight rules conditions prevailed and the flight was operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) plan for the flight that originated from Addison Airport (ADS), Dallas, Texas, about 1055 and was destined for Independence Municipal Airport (IDP), Independence, Kansas. The flight returned to ADS and landed without further incident.

The report, in part, found that the CAPS rocket was on the ground behind the airplane and the D-Bag was in the enclosure compartment. The incremental bridal was found completely unzipped, which with D-Bag strap length, would allow the rocket motor to be positioned about 10 feet behind the rudder. The D-Bag was found extracted about half way out of the enclosure compartment. The 3-point links were found displaced from their as-installed configuration. The report further stated that the postincident examination of the parachute system did not reveal any system component failure. Postincident testing showed that off-axis deployment of the parachute could exceed the forces required for a successful deployment of the parachute. If the airplane has a large pitch or bank angle or angular rates (or a combination of these) as the parachute rocket leaves the airplane, the airplane will rotate and cause the rocket tether to pull at an angle other than that intended, and the parachute will fail to deploy. Radar data showed that the airplane was in a very dynamic flight pattern with extreme pitch and bank angles when the parachute system was activated. Thus, the parachute likely failed to deploy when activated due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference to CEN13IA285 as follows: The failure of the airplane's parachute to deploy when activated during a loss of control in cruise flight due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

The Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) safety representative was asked for operational safety comments that would assist future pilots when flight conditions are like the accident conditions. He, in part, indicated:

COPA recognizes that flights into significant weather conditions pose great risks, especially for icing and supercooled liquid droplet (SLD) conditions. COPA emphasizes that all non-FIKI aircraft are prohibited from flight into known icing conditions.

Consequently, COPA offers several weather knowledge courses designed to inform Cirrus pilots about the sources of information about weather conditions, ways to manage on-board weather sources, and planning options for dealing with inadvertent encounters with significant weather conditions. These courses attempt to provide practical guidance for pilots rather than meteorological analyses of weather.

For icing conditions, especially forecasted SLD conditions, COPA guidance focuses on understanding the tools now available and practical responses to those conditions. These informational tools include those published by the Aviation Weather Center of NOAA with forecast icing models highlighting SLD threats and probabilities of icing potential at various altitudes. Guidance for pre-flight planning in areas with forecast icing conditions seeks to a) avoid routes or altitudes above the freezing level(s) that would penetrate such conditions, b) escape actions to deal with inadvertent encounters, such as 180-turn, descend or climb, with emphasis on knowledge of the extent of the conditions, c) operation of no-hazard weeping wing (TKS) system to facilitate escape, and d) practical advice for pilots flying FIKI equipped Cirrus aircraft in such conditions, especially the potential to be overwhelmed by SLD conditions.

COPA also refers Cirrus pilots to the guidance on icing conditions provided by Cirrus Aircraft in their Flight Operations Manuals (FOM). The Cirrus FOM includes procedures for preflight and periodic checks of the TKS system that help ensure it will operate effectively when needed, as well as guidance to deal with inadvertent icing encounters.

In 2006, both COPA and Cirrus Aircraft issued safety letters concerning winter flying, partly in response to a cluster of icing-related accidents.  Since then, with consistent emphasis on weather planning and avoidance procedures, no fatal icing-related accident in a Cirrus aircraft occurred until this event.

The published maximum demonstrated deployment speed of the CAPS is 133 knots. However, COPA advised of other events where the parachute deployed following an airplane's three turn spin, an inverted attitude with an airspeed near 40 knots, a bank angle of 86 degrees, and an airspeed of 187 knots.

The witness's observation of the descending light that illuminated for about two seconds, which was described as a comet, is similar to the visible time of a 1.2 second CAPS rocket burn. The airplane was modified with the BoomBeam landing light. Given the radar data, the airplane's landing light would have been visible below the clouds consistent with the witness's statement.

The rudder deformation near its separation was consistent with the size of the CAPS rocket motor. The approximate location of the separation/deformation was above the rudder trim tab, which is about the same height as the opening of the enclosure compartment. This height would place the separation in the red zone indicated in the extraction report in CEN13IA285. Although the rudder's deformation was consistent with the shape of the CAPS rocket motor, the investigation did not detect any propellant signatures or transfer marks that would be consistent with rocket contact with the rudder.

NTSB Identification: CEN15FA040 

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 06, 2014 in Grover Hill, OH
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N811CD
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


"The following is an INTERIM FACTUAL SUMMARY of this accident investigation. 


A final report that includes all pertinent facts, conditions, and circumstances of the accident will be issued upon completion, along with the Safety Board's analysis and probable cause of the accident:"


HISTORY OF FLIGHT


On November 6, 2014, about 1800 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N811CD, impacted a farm field near Grover Hill, Ohio, and a post impact fire occurred. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and another passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. The flight operated on an activated IFR flight plan. The flight originated about 1545 from the Washington Municipal Airport (AWG), near Washington, Iowa, and was destined for the Findlay Airport (FDY), near Findlay, Ohio.


A fueling receipt from AWG showed that N811CD was serviced with 26.67 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline at 1519. The AWG airport manager indicated that he was at the airport at 1530 and he talked to three people who flew in N811CD. There were two men and a woman of the same age. He reported that they said they were flying east and would be back on Sunday as part of their return flight. Witnesses reported to the airport manager that they thought the woman was seated in the front right seat. The manager indicated that from 300 feet away, the airplane looked very clean. He was outside when they took off and the engine start-up sounded normal as did the engine run-up. The manager said that the takeoff appeared to be under full power and they climbed at a normal rate of climb.


According to records from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the accident airplane communicated with the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) located near Ft. Wayne, Indiana. About 1729, the pilot requested a climb to 10 or 11 thousand feet above mean seal level (MSL) because he was "picking up a little ice". The air traffic controller cleared the flight to 10,000 feet MSL, and asked for more details. The pilot reported that the windshield was picking up a little ice, and the outside air temperature was minus six degrees. About 1746, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were ragged between 9,500 and 10,300 feet MSL. About 1749, the pilot requested a lower altitude and the controller cleared the flight to 5,000 feet MSL. About 1751, the controller handed the flight off to Toledo TRACON.


About 1752, the pilot checked on with Toledo TRACON and indicated that he was on descent to 5,000 feet. The controller asked if the pilot had the current FDY weather. About 1754, the pilot reported that he had the current FDY weather and requested the RNAV [Area Navigation] Runway 25 approach to FDY. The controller advised the pilot to expect that RNAV approach. The last radio transmission from the airplane restated that the RNAV Runway 25 approach was requested and that transmission was received about 1754. The last transponder reply was about 1757, which indicated the airplane was at 3,600 feet MSL. That transponder reply showed the airplane was located to the south and east of the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137, near Grover Hill, Ohio.


A witness was driving in her car eastbound on Route 60 and was approaching Town Road 117. This intersection was about three miles west of the accident site. She indicated that she was driving about 45 to 50 mph. It was dark at the time and "spit" rain was coming down. She said that she could see through the car's windshield. She stated that above woods just south of Route 60, she saw a light coming down slowly. She described it as looking similar to a comet. The descent angle she physically gestured while being interviewed was about 35 to 45 degrees downward in the direction of the accident site. She said she saw the descending light for about two seconds. She subsequently saw an explosion, which was orange in color.


Another witness was in a house about a third of a mile northwest of the accident site. She indicated that a heavy wind or tornado sound is what got her attention. She also heard a sound she vocally described as "NEEEEER." She saw a reflection of light in a mirror. An explosion occurred when the NEEEEER sound stopped. She said that the conditions at that time were windy, dark, and rainy.



PERSONNEL INFORMATION


The 59-year-old pilot held a FAA private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He had been issued a FAA third-class medical certificate on October 15, 2014, with a limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot reported on the application for that medical certificate that he had accumulated 987 hours of total flight time and 150 hours of flight time in the six months before that application.


The last entry in the pilot's logbook was dated November 5, 2014. The pilot recorded that he had accumulated 1,000.3 hours of total flight time, 151.5 hours of flight time during night conditions, 127.8 hours of flight time in SR22 airplanes, and 19.3 hours of flight time in actual instrument conditions. A certified flight instructor's endorsement in the pilot's logbook showed that the pilot received a flight review on August 16, 2014.


The 65-year-old pilot rated passenger held a FAA commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a FAA flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine and instrument airplane ratings. He had been issued a FAA second-class medical certificate on April 21, 2014. This medical certificate was issued to the pilot rated passenger as a Time-limited Special Issuance Second Class Medical Certificate with the following limitation(s): "Not Valid for Any Class After 04/30/2015" and "Must wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision." He reported on the application for that special issuance medical certificate that he had accumulated 5,016 hours of total flight time and 160 hours of flight time in the six months prior to that application.



AIRCRAFT INFORMATION


N811CD, a 2001 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0120, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, 310-horsepower, Continental Motors model IO-550-N7B engine, with serial number 686224, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller. According to airplane logbook entries, an annual inspection was completed on October 8, 2014. The airplane accumulated 1806.2 hours of total flight time at the time of that inspection.


The aircraft was fitted with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) designed to recover the aircraft and its occupants to the ground in the event of an in-flight emergency. The CAPS contains a parachute (within a deployment bag) located within a fiberglass CAPS enclosure compartment, a solid-propellant rocket contained within a launch tube to deploy the parachute, a pick-up collar assembly and attached Teflon-coated steel cable lanyard and incremental bridle, a rocket activation system that consisted of an activation T-handle, an activation cable, and a rocket igniter, and a harness assembly which attached the parachute to the fuselage.


The accident airplane was not certified for flight in icing conditions.



METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION


A National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) senior meteorologist collected factual weather data in reference to the accident flight and produced a group chairman's factual weather report. The report showed that the accident pilot was provided weather information from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service through the ForeFlight.com website. He also filed an IFR flight plan for a direct flight from AWG to FDY. The pilot also requested a standard text weather briefing format. Standard weather information for the accident flight, to include the airmen's meteorological information (AIRMETs), area forecast (FA), meteorological terminal air reports (METARs), terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAFs), and pilot reports (PIREPs), was contained in the text weather briefing package. Meteorological Impact Statements (MIS) were not contained in the weather briefing information package. There is no record of any additional weather briefing information the accident pilot received.


A review of the 1900 surface analysis chart showed that it depicted a surface trough stretching from central New York westward across northern Pennsylvania, northern Ohio, and central Indiana. Constant pressure charts depicted a low-level trough over or just to the northwest of the accident site around the accident time with temperatures below freezing.


At 1753, the recorded weather about 38 miles and 93 degrees from the accident site at FDY was: Wind 260 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast clouds at 600 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.


At 1753, the recorded weather about 18 miles and 10 degrees from the accident site at the Defiance Memorial Airport, near Defiance, Ohio, (DFI) was: Wind 280 degrees at 8 knots: visibility 6 statute miles; present weather light rain, mist; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.


At 1853, the recorded weather at DFI was: Wind 320 degrees at 15 knots with gusts to 20 knots; visibility 9 statute miles; present weather light rain; sky condition overcast ceiling at 1,100 feet; temperature 8 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.87 inches of mercury.


The 1900 Wilmington, Ohio, (KILN) upper air sounding was plotted. The plotted sounding depicted the lifted condensation level at 1,502 feet, a convective condensation level of 2,554 feet, and a level of free convection at 1,675 feet. The freezing level was located at 3,829 feet. The precipitable water value was 0.54 inches.


The sounding indicated a relatively moist vertical environment from the surface through 12,000 feet MSL with several layers of conditional instability. This environment would have been conducive of cloud formation from the surface to 12,000 feet and icing (clear, rime, and mixed) between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL. Additionally, the sounding was close to saturation between 0 degrees C and -11 degrees C (between 4,000 and 12,000 feet MSL) which, according to articles in professional meteorology journals, is considered a temperature range supportive of the growth of supercooled liquid water droplets (SLD).


Visible and infrared data from the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) was obtained and plotted. GOES-13 imagery at a wavelength of 0.65 microns (µm) and 10.7 µm depicted brightness temperatures for the scene and imagery surrounding the time of the accident, from 1400 through 2000 at approximately 15-minute intervals, were reviewed. The review revealed a general northwest to southeast movement of the clouds over the accident site about the accident time. Based on the brightness temperatures above the accident site and the vertical temperature profile provided by the 1900 KILN sounding, the approximate cloud-top heights over the accident site were 13,000 feet at 1800.


Fort Wayne, Indiana, (KIWX) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D), was located about 57 miles west-northwest of the accident site. Archive radar data was plotted with the airplane's radar track. Plotted base reflectivity values are located over and along the route of flight with the precipitation targets moving from north to south between 1755 and 1757. These reflectivity values correspond to very light precipitation targets. There were no lightning strikes near the accident site at the accident time.


KIWX WSR-88D dual-polarization (dual-pol) archived radar data was obtained and plotted. About 1750, radar data showed the accident flight began a descent from 10,000 feet and dual-pol depicted conditions near the aircraft location at the precipitation targets indicated small hydrometeor sizes, and/or a small amount of hydrometeors in the beam, hydrometeors that were much more horizontally shaped as they fell than spherical, and all the hydrometeors in the scan had very similar characteristics. These shape characteristics are similar to the freezing drizzle and supercooled liquid water characteristics described in articles in professional meteorology journals.


PIREPs, two hours before and after the accident and within 300 miles of the accident site, were reviewed. A portion of the PIREPS reported light or moderate icing conditions to include one report of severe clear icing at 4,000 feet MSL at 1900 about 180 degrees and 175 miles south of the accident site.


There was no issued significant meteorological information valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.


There was no issued Center Weather Service Unit (CWSU) advisory valid for the area of the accident site at the accident time.


There was a MIS issued at 1344 by the CWSU near Cleveland, Ohio, valid for the accident site at the accident time. The MIS discussed patchy light to moderate icing conditions with bases at 4,500 feet in the northern half of Cleveland's airspace, with the icing base at 7,500 feet across the southern half of Cleveland's airspace. The top of the icing was forecast to be at 16,000 feet with patchy instrument conditions in the precipitation.


AIRMET Zulu was issued at 1545 and was valid at the accident time. It was the only AIRMET valid for the accident site, at the accident time, and the accident flight level. AIRMET Zulu forecasted moderate icing conditions between the freezing level and flight level (FL)180 with the forecasted freezing level between 2,000 and 7,000 feet within the AIRMET airspace.


A corrected FA issued at 1540, valid at the accident time, forecasted an overcast ceiling from 1,500 to 2,500 feet MSL with tops to FL240, visibility between 3 and 5 miles, scattered light rain showers, and mist.


The Ft Wayne, Indiana, TAF, valid at the time of the accident, was issued at 1235 and was valid for a 24-hour period beginning at 1300. The TAF forecast for the time period surrounding the accident was for wind from 300 degrees at 16 knots with gusts to 26 knots, 6 miles visibility, light rain shower, and an overcast ceiling at 2,000 feet.


The current icing potential (CIP) supplements other icing advisories. The CIP icing probabilities, icing severity, and SLD potential, valid at 1700 and 1800 EST at 10,000, 9,000, 8,000, 7,000, and 6,000 feet MSL were reviewed. The CIP icing probabilities depicted 50 to above 85 percent probability of icing at every flight level between 10,000 and 6,000 feet around the accident site around the time of the accident. The highest probabilities for icing were located between 8,000 and 6,000 feet with the tongue of greater than 85 percent probability of icing stretching westward from the accident time into northern Indiana. In addition to the CIP indicating greater than 85 percent probability of icing, the CIP indicated that the icing severity around the accident site was between light and moderate. Below 8,000 feet, the icing severity around the accident site was depicted as mostly moderate icing at both 1700 and 1800. SLD potential was also calculated by CIP. Around the accident site at the accident time, where the SLD potential was calculated as "unknown", the SLD potential was between 40 and 70 percent with the highest probability of SLD between 9,000 and 6,000 feet.



WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION


The main sections of the airplane fuselage and empennage were found impacted and buried in soft terrain about 199 degrees and 907 feet from the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137. The airplane's resting heading was about 77 degrees. The airplane's airframe was found fragmented with its heavier components north of the main wreckage and its lighter components east of the main wreckage. The observed debris field of components extended about 124 feet north and about 187 feet east of the main wreckage.


Flight control cable and engine cable continuity was not established due to fragmentation and thermal damage. Airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. Both navigation light covers were found and green glass fragments were found under the navigation light cover on the south side of the main wreckage. The engine cowling was fragmented and it exhibited a crush line consistent with a right wing low impact. Both left and right ailerons and flaps were found resting on the ground in the debris field to the north of the main wreckage. The empennage, to include the lower section of the rudder, was found discolored and deformed consistent with thermal damage. The empennage was found under charred sections of the fuselage at the southwest side of the main wreckage. The upper section of the rudder was found resting on the ground in the debris to the north of the main wreckage. Separation surfaces on the upper and lower sections exhibited consistent sized and shaped tears and separations. The upper rudder section did not exhibit the same dark discoloration as the lower section did. The rudder sections were shipped to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination.


The rocket motor and parachute were found within subsurface empennage and fuselage fragments in the main wreckage area. The rocket motor was found with its propellant expended and it exhibited discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The parachute was found in a packed state and it exhibited deformation and discoloration consistent with thermal damage.


Disassembly of the attitude indicator revealed rotational scoring on its rotor and cage.


The propeller and propeller flange separated from its engine crankshaft and was found buried about four feet below the field. The propeller blades exhibited S-shaped bending and leading edge gouges. The engine was found deformed and buried about eight feet below the field. The no. five and no. six cylinders separated from their crankcase. Disassembly of the fuel pump showed its shear shaft separated in overload and it shaft was bent. The pump's vanes were intact and the pump rotated by hand freely about a quarter turn. The pump's mixture arm also rotated when moved by hand. Both magnetos sustained impact damage. One magneto produced spark when its impulse coupling was rotated by hand. Removed sparkplugs exhibited normal combustion discoloring and a "worn out, normal condition" when compared to a Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Accessible cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope and no preimpact anomalies were detected during the borescope inspection. Disassembly of the oil pump revealed no debris or preimpact anomalies. Disassembly of the fuel manifold revealed that its seal surface facing its screen and valve exhibited deterioration and its seal surface facing its spring did not exhibit deterioration.



MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION


An autopsy was performed on the pilot and pilot-rated passenger by the Paulding County Coroner's Office. Both their causes of death were listed as blunt force trauma. Toxicological samples were not able to be taken on neither the pilot nor the pilot-rated passenger.



FIRE


The main wreckage exhibited charring, deformation, and discoloration consistent with a ground fire. Separated airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. A witness reported the sound of an explosion consistent with a ground impact explosion.



TESTS AND RESEARCH


An NTSB senior air traffic specialist obtained radar data from the FAA. He produced a table of the data and graphical images of the airplane's radar returns. The data was given to the weather group chairman and vehicle performance group chairman for use in their reports. The radar data and graphics are appended to the docket material associated with this case.


An NTSB senior aerospace engineer, who was the vehicle performance group chairman, used the radar data to produce a three dimensional graphic. The graphic does not depict the airplane's airspeed or descent rates. However, the graphic visually shows the slope of the accident airplane's descent near the accident site. The vehicle performance graphic is appended to the docket material associated with this case.


An NTSB chemist indicated that the submitted rudder from this accident was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory to determine if rocket fuel residue from the parachute system was present on the exterior surface of the rudder skin. The entire surface was swabbed and the individual swabs were analyzed using a Fourier transform infrared spectrometer with a diamond attenuated total reflectance accessory in accordance to ASTM E1252-98 (American Society for Testing Materials E1252-98: Standard Practice for General Techniques for Obtaining Infrared Spectra for Qualitative Analysis). The spectra from all the samples were compared to a known spectra for the rocket fuel components. No spectral signatures matching the rocket fuel components were found in any of the swab samples.



ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION


Both the pilot and pilot-rated passenger were heard communicating on the air traffic control frequency during the flight. Additionally, the investigation could not determine which pilot-rated occupant was flying the airplane or where each pilot-rated occupant was seated due to the fragmentation of the airplane.


According to NTSB accident report CEN13FA096 , on December 10, 2012, about 2016 central standard time, a Messerschmitt Bolkow-Blohm model BK 117-A3 helicopter, N911BK, impacted the ground near Compton, Illinois. The pilot, flight nurse, and flight paramedic were fatally injured, and the helicopter sustained substantial damage from impact forces. The emergency medical services (EMS) equipped helicopter was registered to Rockford Memorial Hospital, and operated by Air Methods Corporation under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an on-demand air-taxi flight. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on a company visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated from the Rockford Memorial Hospital Heliport (LL83), Rockford, Illinois, about 1958 and was en route to the Mendota Community Hospital Heliport (14IL), Mendota, Illinois, where it was to pick up a patient for transport back to the Rockford Memorial Hospital.


Within the report, weather data and reports from first responders indicated that the flight likely encountered areas of snow, freezing drizzle, and supercooled liquid water.


The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference CEN13FA096 as follows: The inadvertent encounter with inclement weather, including snow, freezing rain, and reduced visibility conditions, which led to the pilot's spatial disorientation and loss of aircraft control.


According to preliminary information supplied to the NTSB, on October 18, 2013, about 1017 central daylight time, N610ED, a Cessna 500, Citation, multi-engine turbofan airplane, was destroyed during impact with terrain near Derby, Kansas. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Dufresne, Inc.; Murrieta, California. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight. The airplane departed Wichita Mid-Continent Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, about 1007 and was destined for New Braunfels Regional Airport (BAZ), New Braunfels, Texas.


Preliminary data from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control showed normal operations during climb before the pilot contacted the FAA Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Center at 1014 and reported leveling at 15,000 feet. The controller cleared the pilot to proceed direct to Millsap, Texas and climb to 23,000 feet. Over the next minute, the aircraft made an abrupt right turn followed by an abrupt left turn. Radar data showed the airplane descended to 14,600 feet before resuming climb and reaching 15,200 feet at 1016:20. The aircraft then made an abrupt descending left turn and radar and radio contact was lost.


Several witnesses reported seeing the airplane below the clouds in a nose down vertical dive. One witness reported that after impact he saw a fireball about 500 feet high followed by a column of smoke. Evidence at the accident scene showed evidence of a postimpact fire with most of the wreckage located in or near a single impact crater. The outboard portion of the left wing and the left aileron was located about 3,000 feet west of the main wreckage.


At 1038, the closest official surface weather observation site at McConnell Air Force Base (IAB), Wichita, Kansas, reported a northeast wind at 12 knots, light rain, and a broken ceiling at 1,700 feet above ground level. Satellite imagery indicated abundant cloud cover with the cloud cover top near 21,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Pilot reports in the area indicated light to moderate icing conditions above 6,000 feet msl at the accident time. This accident investigation's report number is CEN14FA009


According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Aviation Occurrence Investigation AO-2007-018, on February 5, 2007, a Cirrus SR22 aircraft, registered VH-HYY, with a pilot and one passenger on board, was being operated on a private flight from Canberra, ACT to Bankstown, NSW. As the aircraft approached the Cecil Park area, NSW, the pilot reported to air traffic control that the engine had lost power and he was attempting a forced landing. Soon after, the aircraft impacted terrain close to the M7 motorway and both occupants sustained serious injuries.


The ATSB report, in part, indicated that before impact, the pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), but the system malfunctioned and the parachute did not deploy correctly. According to the report, subsequent testing by the aircraft and CAPS manufacturers found that the pick-up collar could move prematurely from the top of the rocket launch tube during activation. Such movement was considered to have the potential to adversely affect the rocket's trajectory. However, the trajectory of the rocket that was evident in this accident, was not able to be replicated.


Subsequent to this ATSB report, the FAA issued airworthiness directive (AD) 2007-14-03 for Cirrus Design Corporation Models SR20 and SR22 Airplanes. The AD, in part, stated:


SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain

Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Models SR20 and SR22 airplanes. This AD
requires you to replace the pick-up collar support and nylon screws, of the
Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS), with a new design pick-up collar
support and custom tension screws. This AD results from a CDC report of an
in-flight CAPS activation where the parachute failed to successfully deploy.
We are issuing this AD to correct pick-up collar support fasteners of the CAPS,
which could result in the premature separation of the collar. This condition,
if not corrected, could result in the parachute failing to successfully deploy
(CAPS failure).

Logbook entries revealed that AD 2007-14-03 had been complied with on N811CD before the accident.


According to NTSB incident report CEN13IA285, on May 16, 2013, about 1120 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp (CDC) SR22, N715CD, airplane ballistic parachute was activated by the pilot during flight near Dallas, Texas, following a loss of control in cruise flight. The parachute pack remained in its compartment, its rocket was deployed, and the rocket propellant was expended. The airplane received no damage. The private pilot was uninjured. The airplane was registered to Jeramiah 2911 Inc and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Marginal visual flight rules conditions prevailed and the flight was operating on instrument flight rules (IFR) plan for the flight that originated from Addison Airport (ADS), Dallas, Texas, about 1055 and was destined for Independence Municipal Airport (IDP), Independence, Kansas. The flight returned to ADS and landed without further incident.


The report, in part, stated that the postincident examination of the parachute system did not reveal any system component failure. Postincident testing showed that off-axis deployment of the parachute could exceed the forces required for a successful deployment of the parachute. If the airplane has a large pitch or bank angle or angular rates (or a combination of these) as the parachute rocket leaves the airplane, the airplane will rotate and cause the rocket tether to pull at an angle other than that intended, and the parachute will fail to deploy. Radar data showed that the airplane was in a very dynamic flight pattern with extreme pitch and bank angles when the parachute system was activated. Thus, the parachute likely failed to deploy when activated due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.


The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause in reference to CEN13IA285 as follows: The failure of the airplane's parachute to deploy when activated during a loss of control in cruise flight due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.


NTSB Identification: CEN15FA040
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, November 06, 2014 in Grover Hill, OH
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N811CD
Injuries: 3 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


On November 6, 2014, about 1800 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22 airplane, N811CD, impacted a farm field near Grover Hill, Ohio, and a post impact fire occurred. The pilot, a pilot-rated passenger, and another passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by the impact and subsequent fire. The airplane was registered to and operated by Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Night instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions prevailed in the area of the accident. The flight operated on an activated IFR flight plan. The flight originated about 1545 from the Washington Municipal Airport (AWG), near Washington, Iowa, and was destined for the Findlay Airport (FDY), near Findlay, Ohio.


Preliminary flight service station information showed that the pilot requested a weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan for a direct flight from AWG to FDY.


A fueling receipt from AWG showed that N811CD was serviced with 26.67 gallons of 100 low lead aviation gasoline at 1519. The AWG airport manager indicated that he was at the airport at 1530 and he talked to three people who flew in N811CD. There were two men about 60 and a woman of the same age. He reported that they said they were flying east and would be back on Sunday as part of their return flight. Witnesses reported to the airport manager that they thought the woman was seated in the front right seat. The manager indicated that from 300 feet away, the airplane looked very clean. He was outside when they took off and the engine start-up sounded normal as did the engine run-up. The manager said that the takeoff was under full power and they climbed at a normal rate of climb.


According to preliminary information from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the accident airplane communicated with the Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) near Ft. Wayne, Indiana. About 1729, the pilot requested a climb to 10 or 11 thousand feet above mean seal level (MSL) because he was "picking up a little ice". The air traffic controller cleared him 10,000 feet MSL, and asked for more details. The pilot reported that windshield was picking up a little ice, and temperature was minus six degrees. About 1746, the pilot reported that the cloud tops were ragged between 9,500 and 10,300 feet MSL. About 1749, the pilot requested a lower altitude and the controller cleared him to 5,000 feet MSL. About 1751 pm the controller handed him off to Toledo TRACON.


About 1751, the pilot checks on with Toledo TRACON and indicated that he was on descent. The controller asked the pilot if he had current FDY weather. About 1725, the pilot reported that he has the current FDY weather and requested the RNAV [Area Navigation] Runway 25 approach to FDY. The controller advised the pilot to expect that RNAV approach. The last radio transmission from the airplane was received about 1754. The last transponder reply was at 1757, which indicated the airplane was at 5,100 feet MSL. That transponder reply showed the airplane was located to the south and east of the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137.


A witness was driving in her car eastbound on Route 60 and was approaching Town Road 117. This intersection was about three miles west of the accident site. She indicated that she was driving about 45 to 50 mph. It was dark at the time and "spit" rain was coming down. She said that she could see through the car's windshield. She stated that above woods just south of Route 60, she saw a light coming down slowly. She described it as a comet. The descent angle she physically gestured was about 35 to 45 degrees downward in the direction of the accident site. She said she saw the descending light for about two seconds. She subsequently saw an explosion, which was orange in color.


Another witness was in a house about a third of a mile northwest of the accident site. She indicated that a heavy wind or tornado sound is what got her attention. She also heard a sound she vocally described as "NEEEEER." She saw a reflection of light in a mirror. An explosion occurred when the NEEEEER sound stopped. She said that the conditions at that time were windy, dark, and rainy.


The 59-year-old pilot held a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He had been issued a FAA third-class medical certificate on October 15, 2014, with a limitation that he must have available glasses for near vision. The pilot reported on the application for that medical certificate that he had accumulated 987 hours of total flight time and 150 hours of flight time in the six months prior to that application.


The last entry in the pilot's logbook was dated November 5, 2014. The pilot recorded that he had accumulated 1,000.3 hours of total flight time, 151.5 hours of flight time during night conditions, 127.8 hours of flight time in SR22 airplanes, and 19.3 hours of flight time in actual instrument conditions. A certified flight instructor's endorsement in the pilot's logbook showed that the pilot received a flight review on August 16, 2014.


N811CD, a 2001 model Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, serial number 0120, was a four-place single engine low-wing airplane powered by a six-cylinder, 310-horsepower, Teledyne Continental Motors model IO-550-N7B engine, with serial number 686224, that drove a three-bladed Hartzell constant speed propeller.


At 1753, the recorded weather about 38 miles and 93 degrees from the accident site at FDY was: Wind 260 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 3 statute miles; present weather mist; sky condition overcast clouds at 600 feet; temperature 7 degrees C; dew point 6 degrees C; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.


The main sections of the airplane fuselage and empennage were found impacted and buried in soft terrain about 199 degrees and 907 feet from the intersection of Route 60 and Town Road 137. The airplane's resting heading was about 77 degrees. The airplane's airframe was found fragmented with its heavier components north of the main wreckage and its lighter components east of the main wreckage. The observed debris field of components extended about 124 feet north and about 187 feet east of the main wreckage. The propeller and propeller flange separated from its engine crankshaft and was found buried about four feet below the field. The propeller blades exhibited S-shaped bending and leading edge gouges. The engine was found deformed and buried about eight feet below the field. The no. five and no. six cylinders separated from their crankcase. Disassembly of the fuel pump showed its shear shaft separated in overload and it shaft was bent. The pump's vanes were intact and the pump rotated by hand freely about a quarter turn. The pump's mixture arm also rotated when moved by hand. Both magnetos sustained impact damage. One magneto produced spark when its impulse coupling was rotated by hand. Removed sparkplugs exhibited normal combustion discoloring and a "worn out, normal condition" when compared to a Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Accessible cylinders were inspected using a lighted borescope and no preimpact anomalies were detected during the borescope inspection. Disassembly of the oil pump revealed no debris or preimpact anomalies. Disassembly of the fuel manifold revealed that its seal surface facing its screen and valve exhibited deterioration and its seal surface facing its spring did not exhibit deterioration. Disassembly of the attitude indicator revealed rotational scoring on its rotor and cage. The rocket motor and parachute were found within subsurface empennage and fuselage fragments in the main wreckage area. The rocket motor was found with its propellant expended and it exhibited discoloration consistent with thermal damage. The parachute was found in a packed state and it exhibited deformation and discoloration consistent with thermal damage. Flight control cable and engine cable continuity was not established due to fragmentation and thermal damage. Airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. Both navigation light covers were found and green glass fragments were found under the navigation light cover on the south side of the main wreckage. The engine cowling was fragmented and it exhibited a crush line consistent with a right wing low impact. Both left and right ailerons and flaps were found resting on the ground in the debris field to the north of the main wreckage. The empennage to include the lower section of the rudder was found discolored and deformed consistent with thermal damage. The empennage was found under charred sections of the fuselage at the southwest side of the main wreckage. The upper section of the rudder was found resting on the ground in the debris to the north of the main wreckage. Separation surfaces on the upper and lower sections exhibited consistent sized and shaped tears and separations. The upper rudder section did not exhibit the same dark discoloration as the lower section did.


The Paulding County Coroner was asked to perform an autopsy on the pilots and take toxicological samples for testing at the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute.


The main wreckage exhibited charring, deformation, and discoloration consistent with a ground fire. Separated airframe components in the debris field exhibited localized discoloration and charring consistent with a post-impact ground fire. A witness reported the sound of an explosion consistent with a ground impact explosion.




OBITUARY: Michael L McCarty, MD 

Michael L. McCarty, 59, of Grand Island, NE died Thursday, Nov. 6, 2014, as the result of a fatal plane crash in Paulding County, Ohio.

Memorial services will be held Saturday, November 15, 2014 at 11:00 AM at St Mary’s Cathedral, Grand Island, NE with Reverend Richard Piontkowski officiating. Reception and dinner to follow at St. Mary’s Parish Center. There will be no visitation. Inurnment will be at a later date. Apfel Funeral Home is assisting the family. Dr. McCarty was born to John McCarty and Frieda Faye Neth on January 18, 1955 in Hastings, NE. Starting at age 7 Dr. McCarty started working to help contribute to his family which lead to the work ethic and success in life. 


Read more: http://www.apfelfuneralhome.com 

GRAND ISLAND, Neb. -- The investigation continues after Thursday's small plane crash in Ohio killed three Grand Island residents.  



The plane took off from the Central Nebraska Regional Airport in Grand Island.

Friends and family are remembering those lives that were lost.

Dr Michael McCarty as a very giving man, recalls his sister, "He was somebody that can't be replaced and he's had a huge impact on some many people's lives, my children, his children, other peoples children and just people in general," says Kim Gangwish.

Dr. McCarty was the pilot of the small single-engine plane that crashed last Thursday in Paulding county, Ohio. Wayne Weiss was the co-pilot that day. His wife Rosalee Weiss was also on board. All three were killed.

Airport officials aren't sure what happened and say it will take several months until they are able to determine what exactly caused the crash. But family members say both Dr. McCarty and Wayne had a lot of experience.

"He had the confidence to fly that day because he was with the most experienced pilot he knew between the two of them if there was a way that they could have saved that plane they would have," says Kim Gangwish, Dr. Michael McCarty's sister

Coworkers are struggling with the sudden loss.

"For me personally, I lost a friend. We're all in a state of shock and miss him greatly," says Tim Klemme the Central Nebraska Orthopedics Clinic administrator.

"Everybody in the office is just trying to adjust to not having him here with us," says Candi Price, Dr McCarty's nurse.

Dr. McCarty left an impact on many. Kim says that Grand Island lost some great people that day.

"We all learned from him, we all grew from him, we all have strength from him today, and he changed all of our lives in so many ways and we'll miss him a lot."

Officials say the cause of the crash could take months to determine. 


http://www.nbcneb.com


GROVER HILL, Ohio (WANE) The names of three victims in a Paulding County plane crash that happened Thursday night have been released by the county’s coroner.

According to a press release from the Paulding County Sheriff’s Department, the pilot of the aircraft is identified as Dr. Michael McCarty, 59, of Grand Island, Nebraska. The passengers on the plane are identified as Wayne Weiss, 65, and Rosalee Weiss, 62, both of Grand Island, Nebraska.

“The news is unfathomable at this time and we are deeply saddened and struck with this terrible loss,” Bryan Bydalek, a son-in-law of the Weiss couple, said in a statement issued to KGIN in Lincoln, Nebraska.  “Words cannot express the hurt we feel, but we do find some solace in knowing they passed together and that as a lifelong pilot, Wayne was doing something that he loved.  We would also like to send our condolences to the McCarty family as they deal with their loss as well.  We would also like to thank all our family and friends who have expressed their thoughts and prayers and support and we will continue to need support in the hard days to come.”

According to FAA records, they were on a section of the trip that would stop in Findlay, Ohio.

The three were traveling to New Jersey, family members told Paulding County Sheriff, Jason Landers. The plane crashed around 6 p.m. at the intersection on County Road 137 and County Road 60 in Latty Township.

McCarty was visiting a daughter and the Weisses were vacationing. Landers was told that both Michael and Wayne were longtime friends and experienced pilots. When the three failed to arrive in New Jersey at the scheduled time, the families began to search for them.

The aircraft was registered to Orthopedists Aviation Services. Investigators are continuing to clean up the scene on Saturday. They are hoping to wrap things up at the crash site so they can start the process of determining what actually happened.

- Source:  http://wane.com



Three people are dead after a plane that departed from Grand Island crashed in a western Ohio field. 

Family members say the pilot was Dr. Michael McCarty, 59, and on board were his friend and old flight instructor Wayne Weiss, 65, and Weiss' wife Rosalee, 62, all of Grand Island.
 

The three took off from the Central Nebraska Regional Airport around noon Thursday.  They refueled in Iowa, and planned to spend the night in Ohio before continuing on to visit family in New Jersey.  But around 6 pm, the Paulding County, Ohio sheriff says the four-seat single-engine plane went down there, with witnesses reporting it was on fire before impact.
 

McCarty was a well known orthopedic surgeon. His family tells NTV he was an experienced pilot and say the plane had just passed an annual inspection.

The Weiss family says Wayne was an experienced flight instructor, and had been flying since his military days. He had taught McCarty to fly some time ago.

"The news is unfathomable at this time and we are deeply saddened and struck with this terrible loss," the Weiss family said in a statement to NTV.  "Words cannot express the hurt we feel, but we do find some solace in knowing they passed together and that as a lifelong pilot, Wayne was doing something that he loved.  We would also like to send our condolences to the McCarty family as they deal with their loss as well.  We would also like to thank all our family and friends who have expressed their thoughts and prayers and support and we will continue to need support in the hard days to come."

The Paulding County sheriff said FAA and NTSB investigators were still on the scene as of Saturday morning.

According to WPTA-TV of Fort Wayne, Ind., witnesses told police they heard an explosion and saw the plane on fire before it crashed, . The flight began at Central Nebraska Regional Airport and left at 12:19 p.m. on Thursday. It flew for about two hours to Washington, Iowa, then took off about 40 minutes later for Findlay, Ohio. After making a short stop in Fort Wayne, Ind., it dropped off the radar in Paulding County, Ohio, at an altitude of about five thousand feet.

The aircraft is registered to Orthopedic Aviation Services out of Delaware.


- Source:  http://www.nebraska.tv

PAULDING COUNTY, Ohio (WANE) – A Thursday night plane crash that left three dead has brought federal investigators to an area in rural Paulding County.

 The crash happened near County Road 60 and County Road 137 around 6 p.m. on Thursday, and on Friday evening crews had arrived with heavy construction equipment to help them clear the scene of debris and remove the remains of those who perished in the crash.

The site is about two miles north of Grover Hill and several miles east of Wayne Trace High School.

Witnesses told police the small plane was on fire before it crashed into the field, which lies about two miles north of Grover Hill and several miles east of Wayne Trace High School. Paulding County Sheriff Jason Landers said a passing motorist and a hunter who was nearby would be interviewed Friday about what they saw and heard around the time of the crash.

“They heard an explosion and they actually saw the aircraft on fire in the air prior to the collision on the ground. One of them quite a distance away felt the concussion from the impact. It was a devastating incident that happened,” Landers said.

Debris is scattered in an area about 100 yards by 100 yards, according to Landers. The plane crashed in a field directly across the road from a house.

“The largest amount of material, if you will, is in the ground. We believe the way the aircraft descended into the ground and the speed at the time of the collision caused it to go into the ground, so we have to take our steps to go backwards and properly bring that back out,” Landers said.

According to flight tracking information, it appears the plane was traveling from a Washington, Iowa airport to Findlay, Ohio. Air traffic controllers in Toledo lost radar contact with the plane before it crashed due to still unknown circumstances.

According to information from the Federal Aviation Administration’s accident and incident notifications, there were three people on the plane when it crashed: the pilot and two passengers. All three died. The plane was registered to Orthopedic Aviation Services LLC out of Middletown, Delaware.

It’s unclear if the pilot made radio contact or a distress call before the crash. Landers said they hope media reports about the crash will help them identity details they have not been able to put together at the crash site. This is the first plane crash Landers has encountered as sheriff.

“I’m weighing heavily on people who know what they’re doing through federal agencies and the sheriff’s association. They have people who are trained to know how to investigate this. I’m not afraid to reach out for help,” he said.

The FAA arrived around 11 p.m. from Columbus. A representative fr
om the National Transportation Safety Board out of Chicago was traveling to the scene Friday morning. The Paulding County Sheriff’s Department and firefighters secured the site and assisted with the investigation.

The Grover Hill Fire Department, Paulding County Coroner’s Office, and an Aviation Crash Investigation team with the Buckeye State Sheriff’s Association are all involved with the investigation.


Story, comments, video and photo:  http://wane.com

Wayne and Rosalee Weiss, Dr. Michael McCarty