Friday, May 27, 2022

Cessna 152, N4978B: Fatal accident occurred May 26, 2022 near Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (KMWC), Wauwatosa, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident. 

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Lycoming; Williamsport, Pennsylvania
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas

Spring City Aviation East LLC

Location: Wauwatosa, Wisconsin
Accident Number: CEN22FA214
Date and Time: May 26, 2022, 14:56 Local
Registration: N4978B
Aircraft: Cessna 152 
Injuries: 1 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On May 26, 2022, at 1456 central daylight time, a Cessna 152, N4978B, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident near Wauwatosa, Wisconsin. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Witnesses reported that the airplane touched down long on the runway surface, then took off again. When the airplane lifted off the ground, the flaps remained down, and the airplane appeared to be laboring. The airplane climbed just above tree height in a nose high attitude. Shortly thereafter, the wing dropped, and the airplane descended out of view.

ADS-B data indicated that the pilot took off from runway 22R and conducted a left traffic pattern. On initial climb, the airplane had a groundspeed between 55-60 mph. The airplane continued to climb on the crosswind and downwind legs, then started its descent about ¼ mile beyond the runway threshold. The airplane turned to base, then started to climb. It turned to final while about 825 ft above ground level (agl) and crossed the runway threshold about 50 ft agl at 61 mph. The airplane touched down and slowed to about 50 mph. Shortly thereafter, its speed increased, and the airplane started to gain altitude. About 100 ft agl, the groundspeed was about 42 mph, and it decreased to 29 mph at 175 ft agl. The airplane remained about 175 ft agl for 5 seconds during which the groundspeed slowly increased to 36 mph. The airplane suddenly entered a rapid descent to the ground.

After the pilot’s second takeoff, he reported to air traffic control that he had an engine failure. Shortly thereafter, he reported that he did not have his flaps up.

The airplane impacted the ground in a residential neighborhood about ¼ mile from the departure end of the runway. The airplane came to rest nose down with the engine in a deep impact crater. The cabin area extended upward, and the aft fuselage was fractured just aft of the baggage area. Both wings remained partially attached to the fuselage and their leading edges sustained aft crush damage. The airplane was recovered to a secure location for further examination.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Cessna 
Registration: N4978B
Model/Series: 152 
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built:
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Operator Designator Code:

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: VMC 
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: MWC,745 ft msl 
Observation Time: 15:03 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 23°C /15°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Scattered / 3100 ft AGL 
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 6 knots / , 180°
Lowest Ceiling: None
Altimeter Setting: 29.75 inches Hg 
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Wauwatosa, WI
Destination: Wauwatosa, WI

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal 
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries:
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 43.1025,-88.040278 (est)

Aircraft crashed under unknown circumstances into a residential neighborhood.  

Date: 26-MAY-22
Time: 19:55:00Z
Regis#: N4978B
Aircraft Make: CESSNA
Aircraft Model: 152
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: Fatal
Operation: 91
Aircraft Missing: No

Those who may have information that might be relevant to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation may contact them by email, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email You can also call the NTSB Response Operations Center at 844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290.

BROOKFIELD, Wisconsin -- A chess tournament has been set up in memory of Daniel Perelman, the student pilot who died in a plane crash in Wauwatosa back in May.

It will take place on October 15, at the Embassy Suites in Brookfield, with the first round set to start at 10:00 a.m.

Boards and pieces will be provided, but you're encouraged to bring a digital clock if you have one.

Proceeds will benefit Daniel's foundation, "Daniel Gives Back".

Daniel Andrew Perelman

MILWAUKEE - A Brookfield family is mourning the loss of a young man who died following a Wauwatosa plane crash Thursday, May 26. 

Daniel Perelman was 18. The Northwestern University student got his pilot's license last fall. Family said he'd only flown solo a couple of times.

On Thursday, the plane he was flying out of Timmerman Airport crashed in a nearby neighborhood.

Now in mourning, his family is asking for positivity in his memory.

Medical examiner reports say Perelman took off in a Cessna 152 Thursday afternoon, did a pass at Timmerman Airport and then a touch-and-go-landing. Then there was trouble. The report says he radioed in that he had engine problems and "didn't know what to do."

Perelman was the only one aboard the two-seater when it crashed in the backyard of a home just south of Timmerman. Perelman went to the hospital with multiple injuries and died Saturday.

Perelman was finishing up his freshman year at Northwestern University, studying physics. He was a member of the university's Aviation Club. The Brookfield Academy graduate received academic awards and got a perfect score on the ACT, but more importantly, is remembered as a kind and caring person.

With his passing, Chabad of Waukesha has set up a website, asking for you to take on a positive deed of goodness and kindness to commemorate Perelman's life and his positivity.

Perelman's father said even in his son's passing, he saved several lives as an organ donor. 

The FAA and NTSB are investigating what caused the crash.

Statement from Rabbi Levi and Mrs. Fraidy Brook, Chabad Jewish Center of Waukesha County

It is with many tears, and heavy hearts, that we inform you of the tragic passing of Daniel Andrew Perelman of Brookfield. 

Daniel was full of energy and curiosity, a gentle soul, and beloved by all who knew him. He leaves behind his parents, sister, grandparents, aunts uncles, classmates, friends and all those who knew him and loved him. 

In the Jewish tradition, remembering a loved one or friend is not a passive endeavor. 

Instead, to truly remember is to incorporate a behavior, a positive trait or action into our lives, thereby memorializing the life and contributions of the one we loved. 

In consultation with Daniel’s parents, Chabad of Waukesha has established the Deeds for Daniel Memorial Drive. Please join and take on a positive deed of goodness and kindness in commemoration of the life and positivity of Daniel. Visit to share what you have committed to do in his memory. 

Statement from Brookfield Academy

We were deeply saddened to hear the news of the passing of Daniel Perelman, an alumnus and valued member of the BA community, in a tragic airplane crash. 

Daniel attended Brookfield Academy from first grade through his graduation with the Class of 2021. 

Dr. Dan Davis, Head of the Upper School added, "Daniel Perelman was an insatiable student. He loved academic challenges and routinely took our most difficult courses and excelled. He was also well-liked, a true gentleman, courteous and caring in his interactions with others."




  1. I also have a fair number of hours in that plane. From the ATC audio and ADS-B data, it appears to be a touch-and-go, but flaps were down at takeoff. The pilot got nervous when the 152 didn't climb at a normal rate. After mistakenly reporting an engine malfunction, he saw flaps were down and immediately retracted them too quickly without gaining positive rate of climb. That caused the plane to sink at an already low altitude and airspeed. He pulled up reflexively in an attempt to maintain altitude, causing a stall. He's in critical condition now, so I hope he pulls through.

    1. I missed the part about full flaps on ATC. Makes sense. This would certainly cause drag and low airspeed in flight. Hope he pulls through.

    2. Same, I didn't catch it the first couple times I missed it, but he actually said "Sorry, I didn't have my flaps up". Then tower steps on him with his final transmission. So this seems like the most logical conclusion, raised the flaps too quick, lost lift. Also very sad to report that as of today, the pilot passed away.

    3. ATC Audio can be found here: Agreed, it sounds like raising the flaps too quickly without gaining enough airspeed. Every CFI should make their students practice go arounds with full flaps to see what it feels like so they will recognize their mistake and know how to correctly fix it.

    4. I thought the 152 can climb with 30 DEG flaps it was the 150s that would go to 40 deg flaps can't climb out in.

    5. It can, just very poorly. That's why the pilot thought he was having an engine failure. If it couldn't climb, he wouldn't have left ground effect.

    6. Curious how much troubleshooting is taught during sessions with flight instructors. Should pilot have known to retract flaps slowly and pulling up only after getting positive rate of climb?

    7. >It can, just very poorly.

      Yes, one needs to experience this, it is absolutely frightening, and if on a hot day or engine not leaned for altitude it might not climb at all.

      I wonder if they made the flaps retract slower pilots would do better when doing a panic retract, but if he was so green he couldn't recognize 40 deg flaps he might have stalled it anyway.

      Poor guy, that audio is harsh, he even says 'sorry' then crashes. R.I.P.

  2. It was a really humid day, wondering if there was also some carb ice on the 1st pattern? He would have had the throttle back to 1900/2000RPM in the pattern on the 1st circuit. Easy to forget in the excitement to pull out Carb Heat.... It would have melted of course by the time the Feds showed up.

    1. I trained in, and got my PPL in a Cessna 150M @ a 5,500 foot elevtion airport. The aircraft had an STC for the Lycoming 0-320 (150 HP). Looking back on those days with many go-arounds on sizzling summer days - with 30 degrees of flaps hanging out - had it not been for the 50 extra horses in that engine, I would have killed myself. There were other fkying situations where that extra HP saved my bacon.

      May our Heavenly Father have His hand on the lad. Prayers.

    2. @FAP333 - Yes, carb ice at glide power is indicated on the chart for 73F air temp and 59F dewpoint of the METAR at the time.

      Chart on Page 2 of:$FILE/CE-09-35.pdf

  3. Just never know, first or never to actual experience, thus prior to first solo, and continued practice of the go around and power off landing sequences, as the similar "touch and go" should be well versed. RIP.

  4. METARs:
    KMWC 262003Z 18006KT 10SM SCT031 23/15 A2975
    KMWC 261945Z 19009KT 10SM SCT031 23/14 A2976
    Track (zoomed to ending point):

  5. Rightly or wrongly I expect this will be difficult on the pilot's instructors. Beyond dealing with the loss, the FAA (and perhaps lawyers) will challenge the instructors' training and signing off on the pilot. The pilot's mistakes and then "didn't know what to do" are red flags.

    1. Will be interesting to learn whether the instructor is a time builder or someone of long experience who wasn't instructing as a stepping stone to make 1500.

      Time builders are not necessarily bad at instruction, but the likelihood of drawing a grey haired instructor of long experience who is thoroughly focused on each student instead of gazing frequently at a cell phone isn't what it used to be.

    2. The pilot got a student certificate in July 2021 and the pilot's father said his son only few solo a few time since then. I'm sure the CFI who signed off feels responsible, but the main issue is probably going to be pilot proficiency rather than the CFI's choice almost a year earlier.

    3. CFI would have had to sign a 90 day endorsement for him to fly (legally) or maybe he didn't have the endorsement.

  6. Most my time is in jets and other high performance aircraft and flaps during a go-around are still critical to get out of the full down position. Years ago, on a lark, I took a C-150 up with a non pilot to participate in a flour bombing contest at a local grass strip. Wanting to hit the min altitude as slow as possible, I selected full flaps. After the drop, I added full power and seemingly nothing happened performance wise. The plane was sinking with trees in front of us. I immediately knew it was the flaps and that I couldn't just bring them up. With all levers forward, my left hand on the yoke, my right on the flap switch, and the stall horn blaring, I milked the flaps up while maintaining altitude. With a slight bank we cleared some lower trees by less than 10 feet before gaining the speed to raise the flaps and make it around the pattern again. Never Again!

    1. The C150 had 40 degrees of flaps - and there were no 'notches' to stop at 10, 20, 30, or 40 ... up or down. I.e., with 40 degrees dialed in, upon hitting the flap retraction toggle the entire 40 degrees would come out in a matter of four (4) seconds.

      If one wanted to retract 40 degrees, then it was 1 second for each degree of flap ... i.e. 1 potato, 2 potato, 3 potato, 4 potato. Same thing inputing flaps. 1 potato on downwind, 2 potato on base, and 3 potato turning base to final. Never, never, never put in 40 degrees of flaps for final, as retracting 40 degrees on final could prove fatal.

      Cessna created the C152 with 30 degrees of flaps, and also provided a notch activated flap lever so as to aleviate the second countdown/count up method of the C150. They also increased the HP of the engine from 100 to 115/125 in order to provide an extra edge on a go-around.

      If going around in the C150 sounds complicated ... it was! The first and last time I ever dialed in 40 degrees in a C150 it nearly cost me my life on a go-around - from then on I never, never used 40 degrees of flaps.

    2. Cessna realized their mistake on the 150, and limited the flaps to 30 degrees on the 152.

    3. N4978B had the notch style flap switch. I wonder if upon realizing he forgot to retract the flaps, he slapped the switch all the way to the top (as he probably did many times while on a touch and go roll).

      The ADS-B track showed ground speeds of 35 to 41 knots on departure.

    4. Sounds as if your analysis is correct.

    5. To the poster who said it takes 1 second per 10° of flap retraction on a C150…. I beg to differ. I’m literally training in a C150/150hp currently (1967) with 40° of electric flaps and I can assure you, at least on the bird I’m flying, it takes 3 seconds per 10° lowering or raising. I was doing solo pattern work yesterday as a matter of fact.

      What a shame about this young aviator. Red flags that he had his PPL but ‘hadn’t flown solo much’ and other listed red flags. Makes me wonder about his instruction.

      I’m glad my CFI is a lifelong, old school, instructor.

      RIP flyer.

    6. No aircraft should be built that can cause an accident by making that kind of mistake. Humans make mistakes unless your following a checklist it will happen again.

    7. @Mike Smith - Keep in mind that when that aircraft was built in 1979, it was still customary for student pilots to thoroughly read and understand the AFM/POH. Instructors weren't expected to sign you off to solo if you weren't up to speed on how to operate the aircraft.

      It isn't harsh or cruel to point out that any student flying solo should have complete familiarity with all of the specific operating instructions for pulling off the flaps and the response of the aircraft to those manipulations.

    8. +1. THIS. I still re-read the POH about 1-2x a year for the aircraft I regularly fly and yes, I still learn things.

    9. Yeah no way flaps come up in 4 seconds, I think I timed mine back in the day and it was around 10 seconds. With a well-worn aircraft I'd guess probably typically around 8-12 seconds typically from 40 to zero.

  7. I was stationed at Fort Knox in the mid 1970s. The post had a flying club, of which I was a member. One day I was in a 172 doing touch-and-go landings to Rwy 18 at Godman AAF. On the go, to my surprise, the airplane almost jumped vertically into the air and that is when I noticed in my peripheral vision he forty degrees of flaps that I’d neglected to retract before takeoff. At that point I was getting a buyers view of St. Patrick’s Cemetery located on the hill just beyond the departure end of the runway. Well, I had a few more hours than the young man in the accident, so I milked the flaps up ever so gingerly thus living to fly another day. But, I don’t do touch-and-go landings anymore, and my 182 seldom sees the flaps more than twenty degrees. We lost a fine young man in this accident, and I’m sorry for his family. Fate is still the hunter.

    1. Those military flying clubs were a great extra GI benefit, most every notable post/base had one hear in the states, and overseas where we flew in skies with limited numbers of local aviators due airspace restrictions and cost of fuel. Plenty of 172/T-41s were on line @ very affordable rates, experienced CFIs, and fellow pilots to fly with in friendly skies.

    2. I did this ONCE with my CFI very early in my flight training (<4 hrs)... I chopped the throttle, settled back on the runway, corrected the flaps then went again. That hammered that home in my mind. I don't just reach for the flap lever, I visually check the flap position before adjusting the throttle

  8. This is sad beyond comprehension. I feel this kid was a kindred spirit. I had a few close calls during my early solo training (a near mid-air collision and forgetting to release the parking brakes prior to a take off - fortunately I got away with that one - I figured it out while taxiing). And I lived to talk about it. Before laying any blame let's await the results of the official investigation. Let the experts do their work. My sincere condolences to his family.

  9. Been there, done that.
    Yet even today I wonder why, in critical situations with no time to think, does one pilot make the correct decision and the other does not? The obvious answers are obvious, but is that all there is to it?

    1. With no time to think, conditioned response is key.

      An earlier comment noted that the pilot would have likely been trained to slap the flap switch all the way to the top during touch and go roll. If that becomes the conditioned action every time a pilot's mind is running the T&G subroutine, it is also the likely "woops, forgot - now correcting" action after it is skipped, even though the aircraft is now airborne.

      Maybe having student pilots develop a thoroughly conditioned response for this accident scenario by repetition using a desktop simulator would make a difference. Divide the T&G mental subroutine conditioning into two phases by adding practice time doing nursed raise after rotation for forgotten flaps.

    2. Any student that would "slap the flap switch" in air wasn't properly trained by their CFI to understand stall speeds and the effect of flaps.

    3. I agree with Anonymous above. The fact the student stated he didn't know what to do on the radio and made a mistake that should be basic training makes me think we should question the training performed by the organization providing the flight instruction.

  10. My original CFI during initial private pilot training put an explicit restriction on all of my solo endorsements: "NO TOUCH AND GO EXCEPT EMERGENCY." Later I wrote them out of my personal limits completely after I did my complex endorsement. I'd rather pay for a little extra cleanup time during back taxi than, as they say, "combine all the risks of a landing with all the risks of a takeoff in one maneuver."

    1. Have been a CFI since 1980...i never allow my students to do Touch and back always

    2. Agreed. Same here. CFI since 1990....

    3. Boy howdy, I hope your students never have a rejected landing.

    4. @Bryan, that's often a good go-to zinger, but it sounds like these guys are talking about solo students. It's one thing to practice a relatively risky maneuver with an instructor on board or when you've accumulated some experience; it's wholly another to do it when you're a student, alone, on your first or second or third solo.

    5. By the time a student is ready to solo he should be comfortable with all normal operating procedures for an aircraft. Go-arounds and their close siblings, touch-and-gos, should be a part of that.
      The student might touch down and realize he doesn't have good directional control (for whatever reason) and elect to get back in the air. Something might intrude on the runway. Whatever it is, a touch and go should not surprise him.

      Prohibiting (and usually not properly training) such maneuvers does more harm. There have been quite a few notable accidents lately relating to mis-handled go-arounds and touch-and-gos, and then you hear stories of CFIs handling the flaps (and sometimes carb heat and what else) for the student during such maneuvers.

      Miss Lake (the girl that crashed and died in the CAP plane a couple years ago) did so after (most likely) not handling a go-around properly. Can't remember if she touched down or not, end result was the same. It's called proper slow flight/stall awareness training. Not allowing/not training for that only kicks the can down the line. They might get lucky and not bend your precious flight school plane, but they'll get themselves killed later because of such poor and limiting training.

      Having flown the 150/152/172 and all flavors of PA-28s, a touch and go should never be on the list of feared maneuvers. You teach your students how to handle all the motions (power, carb heat, pitch, flaps, trim) until it becomes second nature. A short (or soft) field take-off or landing also has it's dangers. I suppose you don't teach those either? Students are limited to 5000 foot long /150 foot wide runways?

      So yes, practice tough-and-goes and go-arounds with your students. Ensure they're comfortable and proficient with them before you let them fly on your own. Their families will thank you later.

    6. It seemed like every time I was on speed and glide path for a really good landing, Murph would say, "Go Around!" I learned at KMWC also but in the 70's and in 150's.

    7. Perfect responses from people who are missed in aviation. Thank-you.

    8. Wow, that sucks. I did two touch and goes and a full stop on my first solo, and I probably did a couple hundred of them during my primary training. Also go arounds - flying at a busy Class D and dodging heavy jet traffic.........

  11. To this day, I remember the pre-solo touch-and-go drill in the 150: after touchdown: "flaps UP, carb heat OFF, full power".

    However, on my first go-around, I never retracted the flaps; my instructor brought them up one notch at a time and drilled that procedure into me BEFORE my first solo.

    WING FLAP SYSTEM. The wing flaps are of the single-slot type with a maximum deflection of 30° (see figure 7-3). They are extended or retracted by positioning the wing flap switch lever on the instrument panel to the desired flap deflection position. The switch lever is moved up or down in a slot in the instrument panel that provides mechanical stops at the 10° and 20° positions. For flap settings greater than 10°, move the switch lever to the right to clear the stop and position it as desired. A scale and pointer on the left side of the switch lever indicates flap travel in degrees. The wing flap system circuit is protected by a 15-ampere circuit breaker, labeled FLAP, on the right side of the instrument panel.
    Normal landing approaches can be made with power-on or power-off
    at speeds of 60 to 70 KIAS with flaps up, and 55 to 65 KIAS with flaps down. Surface winds and air turbulence are usually the primary factors in
    determining the most comfortable approach speeds. Actual touchdown should be made with power-off and on the main wheels first. The nose wheel should be lowered smoothly to the runway as speed is diminished.
    In a balked landing (go-around) climb, the wing flap setting should be
    reduced to 20° immediately after full power is applied. Upon reaching a
    safe airspeed, the flaps should be slowly retracted to the full up position.

    1. Not thoroughly reading the AFM/POH is a hazard of the modern culture. In times before cell phones and "TLDR" attitudes, an enthusiastic student was more likely to immerse attentively in reading and internalizing the written instruction details.

      The observation that "TLDR" attitude exists is based on personal experience of listening to junior engineering staff stating that they didn't read and act on written technical input they were given "because it was too long".

      Not saying that this accident pilot had "TLDR attitude", but immersion in the culture, peer attitudes and habits that include that attitude doesn't produce attention to details.

  13. read in airfactsjournal, for a touch&go, "the goal should be to hold the aircraft on the ground until flaps are no more than 10 degrees."

  14. Putting several comments above into context, when the NTSB publishes we will know the full details. Here's what this graybeard sees: 18 yo Student pilot issued 7/21, medical issued 9/21, likely soloed after that. No info on Oct to the accident date published. ATC comm indicates he was concerned about flaps and engine before the crash. One commenter speculates the pilot-cfi cord was cut. I beg to differ. The SP required a 90 day solo endorsement. I served on a flying club's board (7 a/c, 200+ flying members from transport to student, and half a dozen instructors). Our solo rules were iron clad: no student flew unless his instructor was physically present on the field, briefed the flight or a designated cfi familiar with the student and goals of the flight who approved the specific ops. Lesson: CFI's know your students well before you let them fly on their own. When in doubt, go along for the ride.

  15. Student pilot here, not young, recently, had landing made in a 152, wind gust, back in air, full throttle, carb heat in, not kidding looking into the sun couldn't see a thing on the panel, felt the airplane and gradually took flaps out while I stayed in ground effect, foreflight hazard warning going off. Need to teach people, students, how to feel the plane. What I described was 15 - 30 seconds. If there was an active airport and a lot going on as well as an active radio, he did go through the emergency procedures, he discovered the flaps were down. He simply made a mistake, something we are all capable of, and have all done. Thoughts and Prayers to the Family and those who cared about him.

  16. As in many fields of endeavor, in a crisis your training takes over because it is drilled into your brain. If one encounters a scenario for which one has never trained, luck and prayer come to the forefront, often with the results featured in this instance.

  17. Just throwing my two cents in, but assuming nothing else was wrong, even with full flaps down this this shouldn't have had a problem climbing. Was CFI'ing about a decade ago, was right seat with a student leaving an airport surrounded by trees. Can't remember if it was touch n gos or taxi backs, but regardless we picked the flaps up as part of the usual checklist to take off. Go to lift off, no immediate indication of anything wrong. Climbing out, its a 152 with two non-overweight males and maybe half tanks so its not being "pushed" by any means, but even so I don't expect stellar performance. Well, before we even get above trees (though still with plenty of positive rate to clear obstacles) I'm getting the sense like... we're pitched down lower than we should be, despite positive rate (I mean, it felt like someone was tipping my tail up). So, I look to my right (in order to compare this strange sense against how the sight picture over the cowling looks) and in my right peripheral, its awfully dark. Whys it so dark over th.... HOLY F THE FLAPS ARE STILL DOWN!?!? (Flaps make a heck of a sun shade). Of course my eyes dart to the flaps lever - in that split instant I expect to be perplexed by why the flaps are down when we read the checklist out loud and said 'flaps up' and I was certain I saw my student pick em up.... buuut, given theyre down, I half expected to find the lever down, but lo and behold... the lever is in the 0 position. The *indicator* on the other hand.... still full down. So I make my student aware of the situation, and since we have plenty of airspeed and positive rate, well... guess we just keep heading home (next airport over). We get up to 2500' (again, no real issue climbing other than the super strange feeling of the center of lift being unusually rearward) and yeah, moving the lever... nothing. Flap motor died on us. So we puttered all the way home on full flaps lol, and thats the day I a) learned a 152 will t/o and climb with two dudes and fuel with full flaps down, and b) to ***verify*** the flaps actually do what you mean them to when you move the lever.

  18. continued....

    Now, was my plane magical? Unlikely. So, I seriously doubt just the issue of flaps not retracted would do this young man in. But an engine acting strange is more than enough to distract you from picking up flaps in a timely manner, and without the full oomph of a healthy engine, flaps being full down is definitely more than enough to cause lack of positive rate. I'm not sure if he chose to do the "go" part of a touch and go with an engine acting strange, lets hope not. He said "I'm stalling" a couple times, and given his low time/new pilotness, in a panic, he could easily have been reverting to "stall" like an engine quitting, ala car/automobile. If he did have an ill engine after t/o AND forgot to pick the flaps up.... oof, thats a rough double-whammy for a student pilot. I have a hard time believing even a student would just t/o with flaps left down accidentally, but anything is possible I suppose. Either way, it sounds like, due either to genuine engine trouble or misconfiguration, flaps were a contributing compounding factor. One final thought... that 1st video thats posted, at 8:23 ( you can see the aileron be moved as they fiddle with the wreckage... to me, it looks like the flaps are retracted. Someone else mentioned a good point: picking the flaps up while slow would definitely cause aerodynamic stall, so if he did have an unhealthy engine struggling to keep airspeed and he just picked em all the way up... yeah, that could definitely have been a double-whammy of a different flavor with the same result.

    Also... to the folks saying my 90year old CFI says never let students do touch and gos... there are about 1 quadrillion (faa fact) successful T+Gs per oopsie. If a student can't do a touch and go (first solos and particularly short runways notwithstanding), theres a lot more issues that need solving before banning T+sGs. Granted, Timmerman's 22R at 3200' is not a length that would make me comfortable with letting pre-private students, especially freshly-solo'd ones, do solo T+Gs... but outright banning them is some serious plastic-covers-on-couches-tier overprotection. At a certain point, the safest thing to do is not fly planes.

    1. "serious plastic-covers-on-couches-tier overprotection".....beautiful. 20+ year professional pilot here: 135 instructor and check airman. I've done touch and goes in everything; single engine pistons, twin turbo props, and even jets. I've noticed over the years that sometimes pilots in training are too timid on the controls. If this young student slammed the flap lever full up, then he needed to ensure full power and push the nose down abruptly. Does anyone remember "pitch for airspeed, power for altitude"? A touch and go is not inherently dangerous, in fact a rejected landing is a required maneuver on any professional pilot check. I fear that in the interest of safety, we are actually creating less safe pilots.

    2. CFI here, since 1967. Soloed over 100 students out of a 2, 200' grass strip. Never lost one nor had an incident. It's all in the training !

    3. I'd fly with Turbocat. I fear that this generation of pilots has morphed from "everybody gets a trophy" now to "correcting me is harassment." I've tried to tell some pilots regarding dangerous habits (not 'get off my lawn' stuff, really DANGEROUS stuff) and they blow me off as a senile old man. One has crashed because of it.

      If a pilot is bad you need to be able to say he is bad and make him good. My CFIs corrected me until I got it right. Now, everybody is too sensitive.

  19. I cannot imagine the absolute grief of this boys family and friends. May God protect them and ease their pain as they go forward with this boys memory ever vibrant in their souls. Now a CFI must forever reflect upon what was. You are your brothers keeper as you teach and as you fly onwards. I am sad for all of the folks who we will never meet as they are forever young.

  20. I learned the hard way about dumping flaps at low altitude and airspeed, but fortunately my instructor was with me. Practicing slow flight down the runway, getting toward the end and you have to essentially perform a "go around" - full power, establish positive climb rate, then SLOWLY bring the flaps up. Well, dummy student me, on my second student lesson, way behind the power curve, just above stall speed, I went full power and began to accelerate (it was doing so very slowly - 150hp Cherokee and it was about 100F out), pitched up, and DUMPED all the flaps. Sank about 10 feet but we were about 20 feet above the runway! Thankfully I had picked up enough speed to avoid the stall. It was one of those moments that gets imprinted in your psyche. That instructor really liked to see you flying the plane behind the power curve. Now I'm grateful for that.

  21. preliminary information does not report known information about the PIC, why?

    1. There never is pilot information on NTSB Preliminary Reports.

    2. I made the same error early in my solo flying training. Took off with full flaps in a 172. Plane jumped off the runway and floated upward. I was momentarily in shock, but immediately realized the flaps must be down and handled it like a go around. Put the nose level, got above 60 with a positive rate of climb, and incrementally raised the flaps. I was fortunate in having done many go arounds with my instructor. May God Rest this young man's soul and comfort his family.

  22. So sorry. I found this page nearly a year later. I was at Timmerman that day cleaning all the winter's dirt from my plane N6125B a Cessna 152 with the exact paint job as 78B. I've since sold N6125B. At some point that afternoon I knew there was something going on and one of the airport's vehicles stopped and the driver told me that my look alike airplane had crashed.