Wednesday, July 28, 2021

Bombardier CL-600-2B16 Challenger 605, N605TR: Fatal accident occurred July 26, 2021 near Truckee Tahoe Airport (KTRK), Nevada County, California

 Montero De Collado De La Rosa


 Thomas Bret Ebaugh

Ryan and Christine Thomas

John Kenneth Dunn

Kevin Kvarnlov
















































































This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Stein, Stephen

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Reno, Nevada  
Bombardier Inc; Dorval, Quebec
General Electric

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:

Tarco Aircraft Funding LLC


Location: Truckee, CA 
Accident Number: WPR21FA286
Date & Time: July 26, 2021, 13:18 Local 
Registration: N605TR
Aircraft: BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2B16
Injuries: 6 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On July 26, 2021, about 1318 Pacific daylight time, a Bombardier Inc., CL-600-2B16 airplane, N605TR, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Truckee, California. The pilot, copilot and 4 passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data and preliminary air traffic control (ATC) audio from the Federal Aviation Administration, the airplane departed Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, about 1145 (see Figure 1) and made a left turn to the south. The flight crew was in contact with ATC throughout the duration of the flight. As the airplane was passing over northwestern Nevada, ATC began issuing descent instructions for the airplane’s approach into Truckee-Tahoe Airport (TRK). Once the airplane descended below 26,000 ft, ATC advised the flight crew to expect the RNAV (GPS) Runway 20 approach at TRK. The flight crew accepted the approach but requested to circle to runway 11 for the longer runway and the controller told them to expect the circling approach. After coordinating with the TRK tower, the controller informed the flight crew that they would be number two for TRK and could expect some delays. ATC then cleared the airplane to hold north of the ALVAA waypoint, the initial approach fix to the RNAV runway 20 approach. After one turn in holding (see Figure 2), ATC cleared the airplane for the RNAV runway 20 approach, cancelled radar services, and instructed the pilot to contact the TRK tower. The flight crew established communication with the TRK tower controller when they were near the LUMMO waypoint, located about 9.6 nm north of the approach end of runway 20. The tower controller offered the flight crew the option of crossing over the field and enter the left downwind leg for runway 29 or to enter downwind leg for runway 11. Once the flight crew announced they were making a right turn (see Figure 3) and reported runway 11 in sight, the controller then cleared them to land on runway 11 and informed them that the airplane was not in sight. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance, which was their final radio communication. 





Multiple eyewitnesses observed the airplane before the crash. Some reported that the airplane caught their attention because of its low altitude and abnormal flight path into runway 11. According to witnesses, the airplane was in a nose down attitude and steep left turn during its last few seconds of flight. A witness located about 50 ft from the accident site reported that he observed the airplane come from the northwest about 20 ft above the trees. The airplane then entered a steep left turn and banked erratically just before it impacted trees and then the ground. The witnesses close to the accident site stated that the airplane appeared intact when they first observed it.

Three surveillance videos captured the accident flight’s final movements and were all consistent with the witness’ recounts.

The accident site was located on a hillside between a golf course fairway and a residential street. The airplane was consumed by postcrash fire. A debris path, which measured about 225 ft long and 85 ft wide was marked by several broken trees and was oriented on an easterly heading. (see Figure 4). The initial point of impact was identified by a severed tree that stood about 70 ft tall, located about 120 ft west of the main wreckage. Portions of the right and left wings and control surfaces were found fragmented along the debris path. Additional airframe fragments were collocated with the main wreckage, which was comprised of both engines, the empennage, and fuselage remnants.

According to FAA regulations, the airplane was required to have, at a minimum, a 30-minute Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and an 18 parameter Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The airplane was equipped with recorders that exceeded these requirements. The FDR and CVR were recovered and were successfully read out by the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Lab, and the data is being analyzed. 



Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: BOMBARDIER INC
Registration: N605TR
Model/Series: CL-600-2B16
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator:
Operating Certificate(s) Held: On-demand air taxi (135)
Operator Designator Code: RHAA

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: VMC
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KTRK,5900 ft msl
Observation Time: 13:50 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 33°C /8°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: 
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 11 knots / 16 knots, 280°
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 2300 ft AGL 
Visibility: 4 miles
Altimeter Setting: 30.13 inches Hg 
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Departure Point: Coeur d'Alene, ID (COE)
Destination: Truckee, CA

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 4 Fatal 
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries: 
Aircraft Explosion: Unknown
Total Injuries: 6 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 39.325433,-120.16291

Those who may have information that might be relevant to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation may contact them by email witness@ntsb.gov, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email assistance@ntsb.gov. You can also call the NTSB Response Operations Center at 844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290.


Sheriff’s officials have formally identified the six people killed when a jet crashed near Truckee-Tahoe Airport last week.

Two of the victims were from California, two were from Minnesota, one was from Texas and one was from Mexico, Nevada County Sheriff’s officials confirmed Wednesday.

Family members had previously, unofficially identified Thomas Bret Ebaugh, 56, as one of the pilots in the crash. Colleagues also said Ryan Thomas, 38, and Christine Thomas, 33, founders of real estate agency Hideaway Properties in La Quinta, died in the crash, along with 34-year-old Kevin Kvarnlov, a Hideaway associate.

Nevada County Sheriff’s Office spokesperson Andrew Trygg confirmed those four identities as well as both remaining victims: 43-year-old Alberto Montero De Collado De La Rosa of Mexico, and 62-year-old John Dunn of Dallas. Authorities gave Ebaugh’s residence as Lakeville, Minnesota, and Kvarnlov’s as Mendota Heights, Minnesota.

Trygg added that both Ebaugh and Montero De Collado De La Rosa were the pilots.

Officials had said previously that the identification process would take a few months due to the fire that sparked after the crash. Trygg said the process happened much faster than expected because the Sheriff’s Office was able to acquire DNA evidence from a family member and officials had obtained surveillance footage from Coeur D’Alene Airport, the jet’s departure location.

The incident involved a Bombardier CL-600-2B16 Challenger 605 that was attempting to land at Truckee-Tahoe Airport, when it crashed and started a quarter-acre fire near Ponderosa Golf Course, according to local law enforcement and the Federal Aviation Administration.

The Federal Aviation Administration reported the flight, which had been scheduled to travel from Coeur D’Alene in Idaho before continuing to Thermal in Riverside County and finally to Van Nuys Airport in Los Angeles, had four passengers and two crew members on board.



John Kenneth (Ken) Dunn, 62, died unexpectedly in a tragic plane crash on Monday, July 26, 2021, while traveling with friends to one of his favorite places on earth, Truckee, California. Ken was born on September 15, 1958 in Bellefonte, PA to Peter and Sonya Dunn. Ken received a Bachelor of Business Administration from Louisiana State University and an MBA from the University of Arkansas. While working in the real estate industry, Ken met the love of his life, Christie Manos and they married on December 21, 1996. 

Together Ken and Christie raised four beautiful children, Katie, Chris, Peter, and Nicki. Ken took great pride in the closeness of family and watching his family grow with the birth of his grandchildren. After an industrious career in banking and real estate, Ken co-founded Rainier Capital in 2003. With his keen instinct for real estate investment, Ken and his partners turned Rainier Capital into a leading commercial real estate investment firm. He had a passion for mentoring people starting out in the business, always eager to offer advice, wisdom, and guidance. Alongside his passion for family and business, Ken was well known for his active life and sense of adventure. Not only did Ken love fast cars and motorcycles, he loved traveling with his father and sons pursuing high adventure sports from skiing, dirt-biking, helicopter trips in Nepal to water sports and boating.

Ken was happiest at their lake house with family, golfing at Northwood with friends, or at their house in Truckee, California cycling or playing on another beautiful golf course. His friends describe him as an excellent golfer in "flip flops". With his engaging personality and incredible conversational skills, Ken never met a stranger and had countless friends. He endeared himself to all people, and his sincerity was felt by all. However, his friends and family members agree that there was never a "Ken" encounter without a little sarcasm. Ken lived a beautiful life full of family, success, and adventure. Those who knew him well, saw how his faith in Jesus touched his life and guided him to the realization that of all of his blessings, his family was the dearest to him. 

Ken is survived by his loving wife, Christie, his son Peter Dunn (24), his daughter Nicki Dunn (21), his stepdaughter Katie Schulze (married to John Paul) and his stepson Chris Booras. Ken had three beautiful grandchildren: Libby (9), Ellie (7), and JP (5). His mother Sonya Snow, his brother Peter Dunn (married to Renee), and his sister, Debbie Adams (married to Jimmy) and predeceased by his father, Peter Dunn, as well as a large, loving extended family. A service will be held at Northwood Club on Sunday, August 1, 2021, at 5:00 pm.   A PRIVATE reception will follow.


Hideaway Properties, a real estate agency in La Quinta, announced that its associate Kevin Kvarnlov along with Hideaway members and owners Ryan and Christine Thomas were killed in the crash.


Kvarnlov was originally born and raised in St. Paul, Minnesota but as Hideaway Properties put it, "he grew up knowing he always wanted to get out of the cold and find warmer weather."

He moved to the Coachella Valley in 2011 to pursue a career as a golf professional, the business wrote in an email to members. He spent 9 years on the professional staff at The Palms Golf Club and The Plantation Golf Club, before moving to real estate.

In 2019, Kvarnlov joined the Hideaway Properties Team in 2019 as a Real Estate and Membership Associate.

"The Hideaway Properties Team is struggling to deal with the loss of our beloved coworker and friend, Kevin Kvarnlov, and appreciate your understanding during this difficult time," Robert Ravis, the director of real estate for Hideaway, wrote in an email.

157 comments:

  1. Coachella Valley residents among the 6 people killed in a plane crash near Lake Tahoe

    https://kesq.com/news/2021/07/28/coachella-valley-residents-among-the-6-people-killed-in-a-plane-crash-near-lake-tahoe/

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  2. A sad tragedy. The plane had an 10kt+ tailwind when doing the circle. Seems like they overshot final...

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    1. Classic "overshoot, tighten the turn, pull up to arrest the sink rate accelerated stall" in a turbojet?

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    2. My type rating limitation says circling day VFR only. If the airlines won't do it.....

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    3. Stall, then nose down, too close to the ground, and making a steep turn at the same time is a recipe for disaster.

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  3. School bus driver heard the jet coming, stopped 50 feet short of crash, just in time to prevent being hit. Doorbell video shows the bus go by, fire ball in woods:

    https://twitter.com/StephanieLinTV/status/1420101311333224450

    Bus driver gives his account:
    https://youtu.be/0vJbCZ3Z1aE

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    1. The crash location is on undeveloped lots 10328/10346 of Reynolds Way in the otherwise developed street, a remarkable outcome similar to the sparing of the school bus.

      Crash location pinned on map image:
      http://maps.google.com/maps?t=k&q=loc:39.32542+-120.162770

      Location is verifiable by matching grey house on left (10294 Reynold Way) and green mailbox concreted in the bucket on right in this street view image perspective to the Reynolds Way view shown at 2:00 thru 2:04 time at the end of the KCRA video linked below:

      Street View Image:
      https://goo.gl/maps/tHVrRdKRFaEkU5qHA
      KCRA video:
      https://www.kcra.com/article/death-toll-6-truckee-plane-crash/37159638

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  4. Condolences to all.
    The pilot, Thomas "Bret" Eaugh semed very experienced.
    I wonder if higer-altitude, valley airports like KTRK were part of his experience?
    The high terrain, circling approach, tailwinds, and purportedly virtual IMC (according to another aircraft) all seem like adverse factors. --d4a

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    1. Correcting my own errors:
      (1) "semed" should be "seemed"
      (2) "Eaugh" should be "Ebaugh"
      --d4a

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  5. Challenger is Cad D for circling... so N/A in KTRK. What were they thinking? Breaking off IFR and going "visual" won't make it any better. Especially with thick smoke from the fires as reported.

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    1. exactly, it looks like they stalled it, they way to low to recover obviously.. it almost sounds like the engines spooled up at the last second like they tried to apply power but it was way too late.

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    2. I’m not a pilot but am researching as I saw from a distance the plane go down. I believe the pilot “spooled “ engines up in order to minimize collateral damage. He put it into the only vacant lot and saved lives on the ground. So very sad for the victims.

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    3. Anon, that isn’t a plausible theory. Once the aircraft entered a stall/spin, the flight crew became passengers and were merely along for the ride.

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    4. I am a pilot and the PIC did nothing heroic.

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    5. There's a reason my type-rating in this aircraft -- CL-65 -- says "circling minimums not authorized". Even for airline pilots who fly this jet 20 hours a week, the FAA recognizes the danger. Unfortunately, Part 91 allows this.

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    6. So would this approach/circling maneuver have been illegal if the flight was performed under Part 135?

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    7. yes... probably the OPSPECs provided for circle to land, usually do. That is easy to determine.

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  6. Blows through the extended center line at 300 feet above the terrain and less than a mile from the threshold, and then banks in an attempt to recapture short final with a decent rate of 1,125 FPM. Just when did he plan on executing a missed? Oh, he wasn't. Unbelievable for a pilot of this experience level.

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    1. Accident rates for pilots have a dual peak:

      Low-timers get into trouble due to inexperience.

      High-timers get into trouble due to complacency.

      ...ironically, complacency is DUE TO EXPERIENCE.

      I define "complacency" as:

      Historic LUCK x Invisibility of RISK

      Ie: "I've done this before without a problem" x "what I don't look for will kill me"

      A "highly experienced" pilot who has pulled off approaches like this before, and doesn't recognize the thin safety margins, is actually MORE DANGEROUS.

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    2. Well stated. This reminds me of Kobe Bryant’s pilot. I wonder though how a passenger in GA plane or jet is supposed to identify these pilots?

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    3. Normalization of deviance.

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    4. Sounds like Bret was on the radios and the other pilot was PF. I am only speaking off of experience, but the PF was a Mexican national, and far, FAR more of the Latin American pilots I have flown with have been reckless sky gods who have put the airplane into questionable situations. Again, not making generalizations, just speaking from experience. This guy could have been a straight shooter, but the smoking hole seems to speak otherwise.

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    5. Who was "PIC" (regardless of who was a the controls)? That pilot is responsible.

      Did the operator have a safety management system (SMS) in place to ensure that crews know and follow airline-level safety practices?

      SMS provides structure for:

      - decision-making (ie: unstabilized below 500 AGL requires a mandatory go-around)

      - management awareness of operational practices, trends, and attitudes

      - balancing risk controls with other high-priority goals, such as customer satisfaction and finance.

      Salvaging a botched circling maneuver is a no-no that should have layers of controls to prevent its attempt.

      In the absence of these systems, the operator accepts the risk.

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    6. The most dangerous pilot are the ones with 300 hours, and 3000.
      It's common to for the 300 hour pilot to have just received their CFI.
      The 3000 hour pilot just transitioned to jets.
      Both think they are Chuck Yeager. The smart ones realize they are actually at the bottom of the knowledge curve, similar to the new Private pilot that realizes they have just be given a "license to learn"

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  7. What I don’t get, at all, is why the GPS Rwy 11 approach wasn’t flown. It’s a simple approach, I’ve used it into Truckee dozens of times while Pic in a Falcon 900 during IFR conditions. During the thick smoke of the Camp fire, we got into Truckee using the GPS 11 two times that I recall.
    The approach actually flown makes no sense to me, and I understand that it’s a circling approach as the pilot declared. His airspeed was high, at least that’s what I extract from flightaware. 170 is well above stall for the C600. Looking at the doorbell video, his angle of descent into the crash was steep and very fast. A lesson to all, making the missed decision saves lives.
    With the deepest respect for the pilot and co pilot, and sympathy for all six that lost their lives.

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    1. If you listen to the tower tapes - they were referring all flights to the RNAV for 20...

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    2. 170kts is roughly a football field per second if my math is correct.

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    3. Yep. 6076ft per nm × 170 nm/hr ÷ 3600 sec/hr = 287 ft/second.

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    4. The heading for the last portion of the flight was 200 degrees set up perfectly for straight into the IAF for RR 20

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    5. Should he have made his request for runaway 11 sooner? I think it was an 11 knot tail wind in the mountains at 1;18 in the afternoon on a July day that can be gusty with lots of updrafts. I think there's a glider port nearby. The idea of a tailwind landing makes me queasy and the steepness of the final turn as though he was cowboying it practically making a hairpin out of it when he could have started it earlier, gone further out and made a wider turn. Did he make a late decision switch off his recommended approach to runway 11.

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    6. DA was 9,200ft. 170kts over the ground (no wind) is about a 140kt TAS. Landing config stall is 113kts IAS in level flight. If he's at a 45deg bank (level), then it increases to 136kt. There are a few other factors to consider (W&B, config is unknown, VSI, etc.), but his safety margin is close to nil here.
      Wind is 280@11G16 which is almost directly behind him as he completes the turn. He goes from 11kt headwind to tailwind while likely decreasing power.
      I'm not a jet driver, but it appears there is no margin of error. I'm guilty of cheating with inside rudder when I'm overshooting, but only when airspeed allows. Sadly, he didn't have it.

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  8. I have the feeling this will be texbook like the Learjet 35A Teterboro Approach Crash... normalization of deviance all around.

    "You can always go around"...

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  9. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dE6LROPK58

    Reminder to coporate pilots as public announcement: It is a bad idea to do impromptu last second acrobatics in a high performance jet a few hundred ft AGL to get to a runway you have overshot.

    Better simply. Go. Around.

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    1. The sad result of experience leading to overconfidence and perceived invincibility

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    2. Yep Marc.....aerobatics in the pattern are a bad idea....even in a Cirrus. https://www.bing.com/videos/search?q=cirrus+sr22+stall+spin+crash&docid=608056206899633933&mid=80BE5AA1B3F1B0D015C580BE5AA1B3F1B0D015C5&view=detail&FORM=VIRE

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  10. Truckee has a straight-in approach (RNAV RWY 11) to the runway that the pilot wanted with cat C minimums only 20 feet higher than circling mins for the RNAV RWY 20 approach that the pilot chose. RNAV RWY 11 would have been the safest approach since it would get you down just as low and would not require a dangerous circling maneuver. Not sure why the pilot would have picked RNAV 20 circle to 11, unless he wanted to pick a little more direct approach and/or had successfully used it in the past.

    It is wise to remember the words of the FAA's IPH page 4-8
    “Circling approaches are one of the most challenging flight maneuvers conducted in the NAS, *especially for pilots of CAT C and CAT D turbine-powered, transport category airplanes*. These maneuvers are conducted at low altitude, day and night, and often with precipitation present affecting visibility, depth perception, and the ability to adequately assess the descent profile to the landing runway.“

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    1. Why the pilot would initially choose 20 is beyond me. It’s barely long enough, especially if your above Vref and high DA coming in, of which he was. Our vref for the Falcon 900 was 124 as we headed down Truckee’s extended centerline. The RNAV GPS 11 approach has a slight turn to align to 11 but in no case should bank angles get high.
      This was a best case for a missed and back out to the initial fix.

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    2. The heading for the last portion of the flight was 200 degrees set up perfectly for straight into the IAF for RR 20

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    3. Soo... pilots should accept whatever approach involves the least amount of turning instead of requesting whatever approach is safest? Sounds like *brilliant* ADM right there...

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  11. I’ve synced the apparent ground track/heading/speed/alt with the ATC audio. It seems the aircraft was at FL200, ground speed of 370kts, just a few miles north of KTRK when given a hold clearance north of a fix (ALVVA) orthogonal to him. 90 seconds later, at the same alt and speed, they executed a turn toward ALVVA , however, they did not enter the hold north of ALVVA as instructed and instead began a right turn toward AWEGA, the IF. A proper hold entry would have been a teardrop or parallel entry in the protected space north and west of ALVVA versus a descending right turn to the east. They then potentially mis-reported “established in hold” when inbound to AWEGA, and received clearance direct AWEGA and for the approach less than a minute before actually crossing AWEGA, still high and fast.

    I think this one has a little confusion regarding the hold, resultant task saturation, and a slam dunk approach that was never really stabilized. Add that to a circling approach, for which a Challenger (at CAT D circling speeds) is not authorized, a very close-in base turn, overshooting final, and stall/spin.

    So tragic. My heart is close to Truckee and really sank with this one.

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    Replies
    1. ALVVA and AWEGA are both nonsense fix names that start and end with the letter A. It was a really BAD idea for approach designers to choose these two names for two fixes that are right next to each other on the same plate. That's just a recipe for confusion. Plus, AWEGA appears on the approach plate with the hold for the missed approach depicted and ALVVA has no hold depicted, so it's not entirely surprising that the pilot mistakenly picked the wrong one to hold at.

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    2. Yes, it definitely seems like he was behind the airplane. He was told to hold at ALVVA at around 20:02:45Z, but continued south well away from both ALVVA and AWEGA for another 4 minutes until he was almost over the airport before finally starting a right turn north towards ALVVA at 20:06:38Z. He was told to descend to 14,000 at 20:07:28Z but stayed at 20,000 feet (selected on the FMS per ADS-B returns) for another 2 minutes until finally starting a descent at 20:09:56Z after he was cleared to descend for the approach. He was actually close or at ALVVA when he reported established in the hold at 20:09:09Z, but was given clearance for the approach shortly afterwards, so it's unclear if he would have done a parallel entry to correctly hold north of ALVVA on bearing 340, or if he was mistakenly holding south of ALVVA on the reciprocal bearing. In his defense, he was told to expect to hold for longer, so he may have not felt the urgency to descend right away. Also, single pilot IFR in a fast jet is quite demanding and very easy to get task saturated.

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    3. The CL-65 is not approved for single-pilot operations.

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    4. I thought so and only wondered because the last sentence in the longer comment from Aug 4 insinuates that this was a single pilot flight.

      Also several comments here refer to "the pilot" and "he" as if there was only a sole pilot and no crew who made all the radio calls, flying and decisions. I thought a go around could be called for (and flown) by any crew member (at the controls).

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  12. Also, another aircraft had shot the RNAV 11 less than 15 minutes prior. ZOA’s sector was pretty saturated and KTRK itself had three inbound IFR aircraft (which is why the hold was directed - 605TR was to be #3). One aircraft (presumably #2) cancelled IFR in order to help 605TR not have to spend time in the hold. This may have contributed to the controller granting the approach clearance (and resultant compressed timing) despite 605TR not being in the hold at the correct fix.

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  13. Tower was referring all traffic to RNAV GPS 20.. on the tapes.

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    Replies
    1. All that means is RNAV GPS 20 was the default approach the tower happened to be offering (probably because it is an LP approach with the lowest minimums). However, it is complete normal to request a different approach than the first one the tower offers. The tower has no idea what the landing distance of your A/C is, nor what your company policy might require. Since the tower approved the pilot's request to circle to 11, it is extremely unlikely they would have refused a request for a straight-in approach to 11 via the RNAV GPS 11 procedure.

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    2. Um, no. The "tower" doesn't "refer traffic to approaches". Oakland center is the agency that gives aircraft their expected and assigned approach clearances. By the time they talk to tower, they are already on the approach. And "refer" is not the appropriate term. Pilots are told to "expect" an approach, which gives them the opportunity to request a different approach if they prefer. And as someone else mentioned, not "all" traffic got RNAV GPS 20. At least one A/C got RNAV GPS 11.

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  14. If they were pushing for RNAV 20 the pilot was ultimately the PIC and would have clarified a landing isn't possible on 20 due to length and a circling approach was not authorized and simply said "unable" at which they would have given him 11.
    It's a simple stall/spin base to final due to an extremely tight turn and really no excuses to have accepted this approach to begin with.
    Assuming they made it somehow he would still have been potentially cited for a deviation since CAT D is not authorized.
    You have to know better when you fly a sophisticated and expensive piece of machinery like that.

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    Replies
    1. He wasn’t told to expect the RNAV 20 until about a minute before he crossed AWEGA the first time at FL200/370kts (note: he crossed AWEGA again later after the non-hold).

      Mark my words, the late instruction (for that speed/alt/position) and confused hold will play into the outcome of the improper circle-to-land, short base, overshot final, and stall/spin.

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    2. Well even assuming improper ATC directions the PIC is the ultimate authority. The buck stops at them... he could have calmly said "unable" and "resequence me with the RNAV 11 for runway length". 2 simple sentences that would have made everyone alive and well today and this landing a non event.
      As I mention when you fly a high performance sophisticated jet a little more is assumed of you. Especially assertiveness.
      Most controllers are not pilots and rarely are aware of the intricacies of CAT C or D differences.

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    3. You’re absolutely correct. I’m just pointing out what likely happened, rather than what should have happened.

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    4. Oh he was calm.....and jolly....happy chat with ATC during an instrument approach ? Doesn't sterile cockpit also apply to unnecessary ATC communications ? If not, it should.

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  15. At the very beginning of the ZOA sector 44 tape from the LiveATC archive at 2000Z, a different aircraft is cleared for the RNAV 11 at KTRK.

    605TR hit the ground less than 18 minutes later.

    https://archive.liveatc.net/ktrk/KTRK-ZOA44-Jul-26-2021-2000Z.mp3

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  16. No matter the type of aircraft, the type of approach… if you are left seat you and only you are PIC. As commented above, the simple phrase, “ unable, need to resequence for the xxxx approach” over rides any and all instructions given from the controller. Know as “missed”, “go around” “unable” .. in the end it’ll have zero impact on your pride but add years to your life.

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    1. PIC does NOT have to occupy the left seat in order to be PIC.

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    2. I dont think Leo meant this literally. Helis are typically flown with PIC in the right seat, fixed wing from the left.

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    3. Helicopters with clockwise rotating main rotors are usually flown PIC in the right seat. Euro machines with counterclockwise rotating main rotors are flown with PIC in the left seat.

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    4. I think you got that backwards. When viewed from overhead, American helicopter rotors almost universally spin in a counter-clockwise direction. Many European helicopter rotors, on the other hand, tend to spin in a clockwise direction.

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  17. "One of the airplane's wheels smashed through the garage of a nearby home, Caroline Bechdolt, a manager of Ponderosa Golf Course, told The SF Chronicle."

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  18. Here are some quick specs and info on the Challenger 605 CL-600-2B16(like N605TR)

    http://jetav.com/bombardier-challenger-605-performance-specs/

    The Challenger 605 is certified as a Cat C (APC) aircraft and would be "legal" for a circle to land at TRK airport as long as the max IAS of 140 of Knots is not exceeded. The criterion taken into consideration for the assignment of an aircraft to a specific category is the indicated airspeed at the runway threshold (VAT) whilst in the normal landing configuration at the maximum certified landing mass.

    https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Approach_Speed_Categorisation

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  19. For clarity, yes the Challenger is a D category for circles, as is the Falcon 900 I fly (which I regularly fly into TRK during ski season) but it is accepted sop for such a jet to accept and fly such an approach as long as the weather at the time indicates you will break out during the Intermediate Approach leg at the latest, and be able to continue in VMC conditions, with normal maneuvering and descent rates to landing. Basically this becomes a visual approach once VMC PRIOR to the final approach fix.
    This is how business jets mostly get into Aspen/Pitkin County as well.

    This will likely prove to be an airmanship failure equally shared by the pilot flying, and the pilot monitoring.
    Total shame for all involved.
    My condolences to the surviving family members.

    ReplyDelete
  20. FAR Part 91 privately owned and registered in Fort Lauderdale Florida, N605TR's flight log @ flightaware recorded 9 flights / 24 hours since 10 June.

    ReplyDelete
  21. "For clarity, yes the Challenger is a D category for circles, as is the Falcon 900"

    I think you meant to say category "C" for circles.

    Category C is based on Max certified landing weight of no more than 58,500 lbs. and, a V-REF no higher than 140 kts IAS

    Category A: Speed 90 knots or less.
    Category B: Between 91 and 120 knots.
    Category C: Between 121 and 140 knots.
    Category D: Between 141 knots and 165 knots.
    Category E: Speed 166 knots or more.

    Aircraft approach category means a grouping of aircraft based on a speed of VREF
    and the maximum certificated landing weight.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Let me restate my thoughts......
      The Falcon 900 is an Approach Category C airplane, except for circles, where is is explicitly stated to be a Category D.
      With slats, and assuming all else is equal, I believe the Falcon 900 will virtually always post lower approach speeds than the Challenger, due to the slats/flaps configuration. Otherwise, the Challenger has virtually the exact same performance profile as the Falcon, outside of the the maximum certified altitude. That being said I believe the Challenger will never have a Vref lower than the Falcon. The Falcon will ALWAYS be categorized as D. Not sure how the Challenger could EVER be categorized in the slower C.
      I don't fly the Challenger, so yep, I could be wrong.

      Delete
    2. I have never flown the Falcon or the Challenger. Honest question (I am learning here): Would you advise where it is explicitly stated that the 900 is Cat D for circling?

      Delete
    3. when I flew 600/601's circling 'min' speed was 150 kts/flap 30 config

      Delete
    4. For...."I've never flown the Falcon"..above

      It may take me a while but I'll go dig it out for you.
      Thanks

      Delete
    5. I'm a sim instructor for the CL605/50 and the standard configuration for a circling approach is 150 Knots and flaps 30. Cat D circling minimums.

      Delete
    6. Based on what’s written above, if the issue is legal/technical, there’s a misconception about what determines airplane category for minimums. While it’s legal and prudent to elect higher minimums especially when circling at a higher speed, 97.3 and TERPS specify that the category is determined by Vref, (or by 1.3 times Vso at Max Gross if no Vref). So, while you can elect to fly the 605 to Cat D mins, it is always a Cat C airplane.

      Delete
    7. Sim instructors need to stop teaching 150 knots (flaps 30) for circling. The correct speed for circling flaps 30 is Vref+17, which at this elevation could be higher than 150 knots, depending on weight. If they were tankering fuel and landing near max weight, they would need to be at 154-155 knots circling.
      This was drilled into me by a check pilot during one of my many 135 checkrides in the Challenger. I thought I was being conservative by always rounding up to 150, since most of our training airports in the sim are at lower elevations, and the speeds always come out to 145-148. Well he pulled out the landing performance chart for 6000' and proved me wrong that day.

      Delete
    8. What's LEGAL and what's SAFE are totally different things.

      What JFK Jr did was LEGAL.

      'nuf said...

      Delete
  22. cat mins are based on speed in the circle for circle approach. So it’s the speed in the circle which gives you your protected area else there would not be circle cat mins. So cat d as you can’t circle at approach speed do to lift vectors changing. You can’t circle cat d here. Obviously

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  23. What were the winds? I thought they were 280, 11 gusting 16, which would favor runway 29, not 11. Was he trying to enter left downwind for 28? There was an eye witness who reported something falling from the 605, at first described as a parachute. Regardless, lots of questions.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Tower said winds calm. Not sure if they briefed something else or airport environment prior to departure.

      Delete
  24. Challenger wing is notorious for poor slow speed performance and a sharp "break" into the full stall. Challenger pilots do not like to fly at "Vref", generally add speed for handling quality and comfort, and that is just for "straight in" conditions. Maneuvering as in a centerline overshoot would really compound the problems. There are numerous Challenger stall accidents and incidents documented, from high altitude coffin corner to wingtip drag and scrapes on takeoff.

    ReplyDelete
  25. "Challenger pilots do not like to fly at "Vref", generally add speed for handling quality and comfort, and that is just for "straight in" conditions."

    That is a crock...I've flown with pilots like you. Vref is 30% above stall which in itself is a huge margin above stall, and to add ten or twenty knots above that "for safety" is silly. In many situations, extra speed is not desireable. Look at the charts and fly the airplane. Adding speed to make up for lack of flying skills is not wise.

    So many pilots flying today know little about aerodynamics and don't understand what their wing is doing at high altitude or when making tight, low, and too-slow turns. But to add speed above Vref in a Challenger... don't come to our company looking for work. The extra cost of brakes and tires alone are more than your salary would be.

    A & P Mechanic
    3700-hr PIC in Challenger

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    Replies
    1. I agree with you about the tendency to fly "ref+". I flew with an old timer in Lears who use to fly ref -10 into short fields. But I can also agree that some airplanes fly better at ref +. I currently fly an MD 87, and I can say that on the approach, ref + 10 or 15 makes the approach much more comfortable. Bleed the speed on short final, and it's a much easier approach. Vref at five miles out is great in the sim; not practical in the business I'm in.

      Delete
    2. The Challenger has an exceedingly low pitch attitude on landing to start with. Flying, and then landing, at anything above Vref exacerbates that so really its a Vref plus very little type of aircraft.

      Delete
    3. we always 'approached' at Vref +10 but crossed the fence at Vref; but don't forget to add on the POH 'corrections' if you were down a hydraulic system, plus gusts etc...

      Delete
    4. Vref is 1.23Vs in a Challenger, not 1.3Vs.

      Delete
  26. Another lesson to learn from. 1100fpm descending steep bank turn at 300 agl, 1100fpm steep bank.. hard pull up to avoid crashing... hard pull up in an 1100fpm descending steep turn, accelerated stall. Why? The ATC tapes sound strange the see yaaaa to approach control.. the chat with tower, where was the focus?


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I believe you can maintain focus while expressing light-hearted ATC communication. But complacency comes to mind, especially while executing a circling approach with limited visibility. Unless you’re right on top of flying the airplane, things can and will go to s very quickly.

      Delete
    2. Barking that strange "see yaaa" on frequency is apparently all the rage these days. I've even heard LA Center controllers say it to pilots first.

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    3. In my experience the people who are unprofessional on the radio (e.g., exclaiming “see YAAA” on the radio are unprofessional in other ways. There are seems to be a correlation with the big-watch and black leather jacket crowd.

      Delete
    4. In regards to the “see yaaa”, that was Bret’s personality and not any indication of his ability.

      RIP Bret!

      Delete
    5. Totally agree with you. That was Bret everyday. Known and flown with him for 15 years. Class act and a great pilot. Unfortunately I have ready the transcripts and Bret was dealing with a guy in my opinion in the left seat that was incapable.

      Delete
  27. The Vref discussion is an important one here esp. the "SOP" of carrying arbitrary personal margins, but the causal chain and acceptance of risk happened back at the hold execution or lack thereof, approach clearance acceptance and proceeding with an apparently unfamiliar circling maneuver. I agree with the Challenger drivers that CAT D is a prudent opspec for 605s, even having a visual TRK picture early in the initial segment was not conducive to stabilizing descent, configuring the airplane, and maintaining speed targets while circling in sketchy viz.
    Like others here I've circled a Falcon 50ex (CAT C) in low-viz with similar terrain and it is not routine. It requires extreme diligence along with crew skill and proficiency.
    Very avoidable accident, very sad for families.

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    Replies
    1. I concur completely with the above. I have executed the circle many times at TRK in Falcon 50/900 aircraft. Unless you do it regularly it requires the upmost respect and crew diligence. Very sad, condolences to the families.

      Delete
    2. If you have "legally circled" at TRK in a Falcon 900 then, the 900 is NOT a Cat D aircraft

      Delete
    3. ^^^^^^^^^^ "If you have..."
      OK, you clearly don't get it.
      There is not nearly enough info in the statement your addressing to justify your comment and you obviously havent read the rest of the comments above so here is a more comprehensive description for you.
      It is perfectly legal to fly an approach only authorized for circle cat C, even if your in a plane designated a circle cat D, if you can expect to breakout VMC prior to the FAF, then continue to fly the procedure as a Visual Approach to the runway, including tracking the published approach course as if you were still IMC, short of unnecessarily descending to circling MDA due to VMC/VFR conditions existing. The normal sop would be to report the airport in sight to ATC, then be cleared for the visual.
      We all do this, it's OK.

      Delete
    4. Just the same why not fly the 11 approach? You can ask for a visual from that too. Why fly an approach which ATC selected over 5 kts of wind just to call a visual and maneuver if able (due to what the sim instructor typed). Any circle can become a visual to the circle runway but it’s not the intent of the procedure. The intent was the best runway for winds at the time for little airplanes.

      Delete
    5. Oh for the smoke they wanted the 20 mins for a look see or something?

      Delete
  28. A tragedy. :(

    I used to fly Hawker 125’s. Now I fly 747-400’s. The category is, at times, variable with larger aircraft. You just don’t see it with smaller GA aircraft whose weights don’t vary much.

    Some good points were brought up. I think it’s unfair though to question the captains motives as to why he did not choose a different approach since making requests that go against ATC coordination tend to add delays.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. As one of the challenger pilots states “unable” isn’t a big deal to state. Not the busiest airport so can’t imagine a huge delay anyway.

      Delete
  29. Ok just putting this out there.... One comment above mentions a witness said they saw something falling from the a/c... drone?

    ReplyDelete
  30. They weren’t aligned with final approach so a drone as cause of accident would be less likely than a control issue like a stall.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Yes fair call, but even morons flying drones around airports to get footage of a/c coming and going usually aren't stupid enough to fly them on direct approach routes. Just putting it out there because stalling a/c usually don't have bits falling of them while still airborne. Of course the witness could have just thought they saw something. Like all other comments know one knows what happened at this point. Sad for all whatever it was.

      Delete
    2. I doubt something fell off the plane. It would have happened in cruise if so at a higher airspeed. The witness probably saw a shadow or something.

      Delete
    3. That's probably the same witness who said "the plane was really low before it hit the ground"

      Delete
  31. I can't find Alberto Montero De Collado De La Rosa on the FAA's Airmen Inquiry Search Page

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. https://mx.linkedin.com/in/alberto-montero-del-collado-8142471b6

      Delete
    2. There is an archived version of his linkedin that does not require a sign-in at: https://archive.is/TCHBs

      Delete
  32. So for anyone who has never flown into that airport... it is a jarring picture. Basically the bottom of a bowl surrounded by a lot of mountainous terrain. The ODP itself only points to a single direction where to takeoff and hold until reaching the needed altitude and speaks volumes.
    I landed on 29 and the terrain was always pretty close below. I can imagine things got bad pretty quickly onboard and on top of it a missed from 11 was straight into climbing terrain to the East. Assuming they didn't stall and continued onward with full flaps and gear down it would have also been a pretty bad situation. All around bad ADM.

    ReplyDelete
  33. recommended web site with arrival/departure procedures w/ videos for each rwy @ 2021 Truckee Tahoe Airport District. All Rights Reserved. https://truckeetahoeairport.com/aviation/procedures

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. EXCELLENT web site, thank you. Great videos.

      Delete
    2. That Runway 29 Arrival animated graphic is clearly an IFR arrival - I Follow Roads.

      Delete
  34. anyone know how fast it was going on impact? and the orientation of the plane? someone mentioned a crater where it struck

    ReplyDelete
  35. That circling turn with the Challenger 605 led to the stall ... it is tragic and may not have happened without the high altitude of the Truckee Tahoe Airport and smoke from the fires in California. It's a tough airport.

    ReplyDelete
  36. I'm guessing loss of visual horizon and/or runway due to smoke and continued flight when there should have been a go around.

    ReplyDelete
  37. NTSB published the Preliminary report yesterday, 8/13/21. I still do not understand them trying to land on runway 11 with winds favoring 29.

    The NTSB points out the winds: 11 knots / 16 knots, 280°

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Timing of wind data used is misleading. NTSB report says crash was "about 1318 Pacific daylight time", which is 2018 UTC.

      The 28011G16KT was 32 minutes after the crash:
      KTRK 262050Z AUTO 28011G16KT 04SM BKN023 33/08 A3013 FU RMK VIS 3 1/2/V5 FU BKN023 ACFT MSHP

      The previous AWOS wind reading was 33 minutes before the crash:
      KTRK 261945Z AUTO 09005KT 04SM BKN023 32/06 A3014

      Tower told the pilot "wind calm". Between the stale AWOS wind data and the tower "calm", there was no reason to go RW29 as they approached.

      Here is the AWOS archive dump for the whole day and you can see the infrequent AWOS readings in the system that were available to the person writing the preliminary:

      https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/cgi-bin/request/asos.py?station=TRK&data=all&year1=2021&month1=7&day1=26&year2=2021&month2=7&day2=27&tz=Etc%2FUTC&format=onlycomma&latlon=no&elev=no&missing=M&trace=T&direct=no&report_type=1&report_type=2

      Delete
    2. Primarily, runway length decision. 11 affords 7000 feet versus 4600, 25 additional feet in width. Matters not with a Cessna, matters huge with a 35,000 jet at Vref +. Under perfect conditions the Challenger requires 4100 feet to land, not much room for error on a 4600 foot runway.

      Delete
    3. Leo: "Matters not with a Cessna"

      Um it sure does matter with my 35,000 lb Cessna Citation!

      Delete
  38. The FAA just published a safety publication on the danger of visual approaches and the importance to stick to the published IFR ones...

    https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2021/SAFO21005.pdf

    ReplyDelete
  39. "Communicating “UNABLE” to ATC when, in the judgment of the pilot-in-command (PIC),
    compliance with a specific instruction, request, or clearance may reduce safety. For example,
    in considering an ATC clearance/instruction, if the judgment of the PIC is that there is
    inadequate time to recalculate the aircraft’s landing performance, reconfigure avionics, brief
    the new approach procedure, brief the new runway exiting and taxi plan, or otherwise stabilize
    the approach, then state “UNABLE” and request the desired instrument approach."

    ReplyDelete
  40. Accelerated stalls in that bird are not going for a good outcome!

    ReplyDelete
  41. This plane had a CVR and a data recorder just like the big boys... hopefully the docket will reveal the state of mind of the pilots. Either way I can confidently call it an unstabilized approach that ended in an aerodynamic stall following the airflow exceeding the critical angle of attack of the wings, without the 2 year delay the NTSB generally has. I doubt the CRV will provide much clues unless some gross incompetence is noted like violations of sterile cockpit rule, lack of approach briefing etc... but you never know.

    ReplyDelete
  42. Just stumbled across this on YT, keep an eye on the windshield of the SUV on the right. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6v16Wk1t9UA

    ReplyDelete
  43. The NTSB report says "ATC cleared plane to hold north of ALVVA the IAF" and then refers to Fig 2 which shows the plane holding west of AWEGA.
    They were at FL200 when crossing AWEGA the first time at 01.04.08 and at 14,800 when crossing it (close) the second time at 01.12.42 when they could, should, have been descending to 9,500 at LUMMO the IAF. LUMMO is 5.2 nm from the circling altitude fix of RWY 20 which they ere no longer using. At LUMMO, which they did cross they were at 9,950' descending at 1856 ft/min and doing 288 knots. That is not a stable approach and trouble started long before AWEGA the first time.

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  44. Two things about the pilot that stand out to me: One is that he was originally from Palm Springs, a graduate of Palm Springs High School and 3 of the 4 pax were from and worked in the Palm Springs area. Was there a need to impress on the pilots part? Secondly, his final remark to the KTRK tower controller "Look forward to seeing you guys". Even the controller seemed a little taken aback. Was he planning on visiting the tower cab after arrival or subconsciously hoping there was going to be a happy ending to this flight? The remark just seemed strange, in fact the pilots demeanor seemed unusually upbeat considering the pressure he must have felt, the dangerous circling approach and how far he was behind the plane. Just my thoughts.

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  45. "The factors that contribute to a base-to-final crash include:

    The pilot carrying too much speed, thus requiring a tighter turn so as not to overshoot the runway centerline;
    A tail wind requiring a tighter turn so as not to overshoot the runway centerline;
    The aircraft being low in the turn, leading the pilot to compensate by pulling the nose up;
    High density altitude conditions which result in an indicated airspeed yielding a higher groundspeed than normal;
    High density altitude conditions which results in decreased aircraft performance."

    => This is textbook base to final stall/spin. Not much to really look into it. Just like Teterboro or other similar crashes of fast slick jets that shoulda coulda woulda go around but didn't.
    The NTSB's final will have the usual: "Exceeded critical angle of attack resulting in an aerodynamic stall" in the probable cause verbiage.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Agree.

      I'm typed in the CL65. The stall onset is crisp, with a minimum 1,000 ft to recover. And the engine spool-up seems to take forever.

      My impression is these guys were flying by visual ground reference and didn't detect the airspeed decay in a tight turn until it was too late.

      Delete
  46. Flew with/around the pilot for 20 years as regional airline Captain. He thought he was an expert aerobatic pilot. He had done an aileron roll in the airliner, reportedly on a crew-only ferry flight, and it was described as done incorrectly. He was a pretender, but everybody was impressed by his talk. With full flaps and no leading edge slats the break in the CL65 family is sudden and abrupt. Perfect stall-spin setup.

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  47. FDR and CVR indicate flight spoilers were deployed during the base to final turn and remained that way until impact! Another weird almost 135 situation. We almost have it on our certificate but the owner wants to fly but we are sort of almost exercising operational control even though we can’t. What an all around mess

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  48. Once an approach is botched it's unstable and you go around. This one was never stable and could never be stable given the conditions.

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  49. Reading the CVR transcript was both frightening and puzzling. The left seater had no idea where they were on the turn to downwind for the visual approach. The PM was trying to coach him around the turn, and he had deployed the flight spoilers to help slow them down. He stated "Give me the airplane" several times right before the stall, I fly a 605 and you can bet this was an eye opener. Lots of chances to abort, none taken....very sad...

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    Replies
    1. Can you please share where you found the CVR transcript?
      I could not find it in the docket.
      Thanks

      Delete
    2. #31 GROUP CHAIRMAN’S FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
      Cockpit Voice Recorder
      64-pages

      The reader of this report is cautioned that the transcript of a cockpit voice recorder audio recording is not a precise science but is the best product possible from an NTSB group investigative effort. The transcript or parts thereof, if taken out of context, could be misleading. The transcript should be viewed as an accident investigation tool to be used in conjunction with other evidence gathered during the investigation. Conclusions or interpretations should not be made using the transcript as the sole source of information.

      Delete
    3. 8000+ density altitude when they listened to the AWOS. That says it all.

      Delete
    4. Transcript from cockpit: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14037454&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR21FA286%20CVR_Release-Rel.pdf

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    5. Yep, 8900 density altitude on transcript. I get 9133-9163 using met data above and two different calculators. Some calculators may vary, based on station or altimeter pressure. Either way, density about 75-76% sea level. Airspeed minimums need to be at least 15% higher. How could they not be aware of that deciding to hot dog tight final turns, with spoilers deployed even? Safe, lazy 16-mile RNAV approach to 11 so boring, I suppose. Flying is fun; take your time. Wide turns, gentle altitude changes. Relax, watch the instruments do their thing. This isn't supposed to be a roller coaster ride to flaming hell.

      Delete
  50. Wanna bet Bombardier is gonna get sued for not making the stall "IDIOT PROOF" enough? As always ridiculous since the root cause is the decision to continue an unstabilized approach but per legal rent-seeking lobbying the "strict" liability doctrine means a manufacturer has to account for every single damn permutation i.e O(N!) of possibilities of their products being misused. Hence the laughing stock of the rest of the world warnings on products in America like "Do not put baby in the washing machine" or "Do not put head in furnace" etc...

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    Replies
    1. When you put a plane in a dive then attempt a pull out, no stall protection can help. It got flown into the ground

      Delete
    2. Agreed but the US legal tort system doesn't think in terms of common sense but rather rent-seeking for $$$
      https://www.rapp.org/archives/2015/11/tragic/

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  51. So after reading the extensive NTSB docket everything becomes clear:
    1) The CL605 needs to use "artificial means" of stall warning in order to be certified as Part 25 transport airplane, given its wing profile results in an abrupt and rolling stall. It is all legal and per certification process.
    2) The stall warnings were activated as intended and the stock pusher was even triggered to stabilize the situation.
    3) Alas the crew overrode the stick pusher because they got themselves low and slow and close to the ground on an unstabilized approach with a steep turn. Something even a normal stall buffer and warning on a docile C172 wouldn't have helped anyways.
    4) As a result they got treated to the natural raw stall characteristics of the plane... swift turn and immediate and brutal turbulence created above the dropped wing. Something ATP's they were shoulda have known would happen as this is where ATP certificated and type rated pilots earn their money: Knowing intimately the behavior and characteristics of the plane they are flying and never straying where they shouldn't with those characteristics.
    I think the probable cause will be obvious but beyond that the recurring issue of supposedly qualified pilots getting themselves in trouble for stuff they shoulda have known, according to their type rating.

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  52. Cockpit transcript Um, Um. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=14037454&FileExtension=pdf&FileName=WPR21FA286%20CVR_Release-Rel.pdf

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  53. A lot of non standard chatter in the cockpit, no SOP evidently and a lot of confusion !

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    Replies
    1. PIC never listened to the SIC and you know the rest. IMO he's why they are in the ground.

      Delete
  54. Certainly a wake up call for an SMS that is tighter. Here it was a Part 91 so they didn't need to have anything at all but one can see the cone of possibilities narrowing the second they decided to switch to the longer runway in VFR. It's like going into the event horizon of a black hole... you cross it and don't feel a thing but that's it, no return. Frankly if they needed to abandon an IFR approach in sketchy weather better to divert to Lake Tahoe with a longer runway instead, and it would have been the end of it. Therein lies the root cause of this mess. A simple decision like that.
    Hindsight is 202/20 but for any corporate or 135 operators reading this: Refuse to ever cancel an IFR for a VFR. No exceptions. No maybes. And if the IFR runway is too short go somewhere else.

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  55. Reading the CVR it looks like one of the pilots turned off the autothrottles... resulting in a speed decay at the worst possible moment. The other seems to have realized it too late and attempted to correct but at this point even a go around might have been doomed with the latency in spooling up.

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    Replies
    1. Autothrottles don't cancel without an audible signal. Nobody was flying the airplane. "After you, Alphonse..." "No, after you, Gaston...."

      Delete
  56. Just read the entire CVR transcript. These two pilots had no business sitting up front with passengers in the back. Unprofessional doesn't come close to describing the complete lack of discipline and SA these two displayed. Just WOW. What scares me is that I am out there flying around with 230 folks sitting behind me and there are more than likely dangerous dolts like these in the same airspace. Sad.

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    Replies
    1. i got the impression these guys are the type who did not get "airspeed and the ball are the most important things on landing in the turn" lesson from anyone and were staring at the numbers in those last moments before that stick pusher went off. Glider pilots dont seem to have this issue of airspeed mismanagement, maybe we start a dialog that all new pilots get glider training first before airplane training. Good enough for the USAF, should be good enough for the rest.

      Delete
    2. Bedford, MA, that killed 7, and Teterboro, that killed 2... both also due to lack of professionalism and basic respect for things that student pilots learn in their first few hours i.e checklists and professionalism.

      Delete
    3. Kobe also thought he had a professional up front. This is why Part 91 (or poorly-managed '135) is so dangerous: the CEO decides what is safe.

      Delete
    4. This Captain was a 20 year airline professional doing this flight as a side job. He carried himself like the world's greatest aerobatic pilot, did harebrained stuff all the time, had a pugnacious attitude toward anyone who questioned him. I knew him, was senior to him and he never affected me, but he was a horror story with a cover story that satisfied most people.

      Delete
  57. After reading the CVR transcript, contrary to some of the previous comments I think the PF (Eduardo) was being more calculated and standard than the PM. It seems to me that the PF had some reservations about the 20 approach and was definitely behind because of the change, and the PM was pushy throughout. PF should have put on the brakes and said I’m not comfortable so let’s go somewhere safe and get our bearings here, so that’s on him, but I do think he felt pressured by the more experienced PM and let himself get put into a difficult position. PM kept sort-of taking control, with no clear assumption of command, and it sounds like neither was sure what the other was doing in the final seconds. I have learned from other reports like this, and used it to get myself out of similar situations. This kind of pressure creeps up in small increments, like the frog in slowly heating pot of water story. Also, canceling IFR would complicate things if they did have to abort the approach in marginal weather, so they kind of screwed themselves there and added the pressure of not having a plan for it.

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  58. Who speaks for the passengers? How could they possibly know that they were being served by such an over-rated talentless hack in the cockpit? No, I won't apologize. I read all the technical rationalizations above. This isn't hindsight. This is business. How about some respect for the cargo? I get no hint that they had any concern for that. Since there really is no way to know who is trying to get you killed up there, better to fly a major commercial airline, perhaps. At the very least, be proactive and pick safer airports nearby if you can't know the pilot. One million percent pilot error is inexcusable, inexplicable. I won't delete this comment -- this clown act deleted their passengers.

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    Replies
    1. This Captain WAS a regional airline Captain with a MAJOR attitude.

      Delete