Flight Standards District Office - Federal Aviation Administration
Any witnesses should email witness@ntsb.gov, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email assistance@ntsb.gov.
IPSWICH- Mr. John Joseph Maliszewski, 62 of Ipswich, beloved husband of Sandra (Schall) Maliszewski, died Sunday September 21st, 2014 as the result of a helicopter accident in Great Falls, Montana.
Born in Lowell, he was the son of the late Thaddeus and Irene (Stets) Maliszewski. He was raised and educated in Tewksbury and was a graduate of Tewksbury High School. He earned his Graduate degree in Education from Fitchburg State University.
An entrepreneur, John began his professional career manufacturing fitness equipment under the name of Adonis. In 1991, he created and designed a vandal resistant mailbox called Pony Express which was sold through consumer catalogs. For the past 20 years, John was self employed in construction and in historical cast iron restoration. John was awarded many state contracts from MassPort in Boston. In 2008, he received Contractor of the Year Award for outstanding work after completing the Emergency Generator Stack Extension project. His cast iron projects, to name a few, included: the Cooke Cemetery, Brookline, MA, the Pingree House owned by the Peabody Essex Museum, and The Daniel Webster gravesite, Marshfield, MA.
He enjoyed flying airplanes and helicopters. John travelled extensively and visited many parts of the world, including Europe, Egypt, Kenya, Australia and the Fiji islands. He loved driving cross country, stopping to see every National Park. He had an avid interest in collecting and driving classic cars. John lived life to its fullest and was an inspiration to everyone whose lives he touched. He will be deeply missed by family and friends.
John is survived by his beloved wife, Sandra (Schall) Maliszewski of Ipswich, his brother Michael Maliszewski and Carmen Valla of Windham, N.H., his aunt Dorothy Kobylarz and her husband Frederick of Farmington, Connecticut, his in-laws, June and William Schall of Litchfield, N.H. and many cousins extended family and friends.
ARRANGEMENTS: His funeral service will be held in the All Saints Episcopal Church, Cherry St., Danvers, Monday at 11 AM. Relatives and friends invited. Burial in Walnut Grove Cemetery, Danvers. Visiting hours at the Peterson-O'Donnell Funeral Home, 167 Maple St., (Rte 62) Danvers Sunday from 2 to 4 P.M. In lieu of flowers, expressions of sympathy may be made in John's memory to the Wounded Warrior Project, P.O. Box 758517, Topeka, Kansas 66675 or to the Make-a -Wish Foundation 4742 N. 24th Street, Suite 400 Phoenix, AZ 85016-4862. To share a memory or offer a condolence, please visit www.odonnellfuneralservice.com
http://hosting-25014.tributes.com
An Ipswich man was killed on Sunday when the ultra-light helicopter he was piloting crashed in Montana, authorities said.
In an e-mail, Cascade County, Mont., Sheriff Bob Edwards identified the victim as 62-year-old John Joseph Maliszewski.
Edwards said Maliszewski “was involved in a helicopter crash in an area in Cascade County called the Dearborn. Mr. Maliszewski did die as a result of injuries sustained in the crash. ... Mr. Maliszewski’s family has been notified.”
Edwards added that the “helicopter is an ultra-light Mosquito single seat helicopter. The investigation is ongoing at this point. The Cascade County Sheriff’s Office, with assistance from the [Federal Aviation Administration] is conducting the investigation.”
The crash occurred at about 5 p.m. on Sunday, Edwards wrote. He added that Maliszewski was the owner of the helicopter, and that his level of experience as a pilot was not known as of Monday.
Edwards said he was unsure why Maliszewski was in Montana at the time of the crash.
Attempts to reach possible relatives of Maliszewski in Massachusetts and New Hampshire were unsuccessful on Monday.
Allen Kenitzer, an FAA spokesman, wrote in an e-mail that “according to local authorities, there was one person onboard the aircraft” at the time of the crash. He did not say how long the FAA investigation may take. Kenitzer said the aircraft crashed “under unknown circumstances.”
Peter Knudson, a spokesman for the National Transportation Safety Board, said the NTSB is not investigating the crash, since the helicopter is not required to have a registration number with the FAA. The NTSB is not required to open a review in such cases, Knudson said.
An entry in an NTSB accident database showed that the pilot of a similar helicopter, a Schulman Mosquito XEL, was killed in a crash in Halifax, Mass., in September 2010.
In that instance, the aircraft “was hovering just above the trees, [and] the tail section yawed left and right, followed by the main rotor blades tipping left and right. The helicopter then entered a spin and nosed over and impacted the trees,” the entry said.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of that crash was the pilot’s loss of control while hovering, and that a contributing factor was the pilot’s limited experience flying the helicopter.
Another pilot of an Innovator Technologies Mosquito XEL helicopter suffered serious injuries but survived a crash in September 2013 in Felda, Fla., during a landing attempt, according to the NTSB database.
http://www.bostonglobe.com
GREAT FALLS -- Cascade County Sheriff Bob Edwards has confirmed that a man died in a small helicopter crash near Dearborn Sunday afternoon.
Edwards also confirmed that the man was the only person on board the helicopter.
The crash happened just after 5:00 p.m. Sunday along Dearborn River Road near the Cascade County/Lewis & Clark County line.
The Dearborn Volunteer Fire Department, Cascade County Sheriff's Department, and Great Falls EMS responded to the scene.
The helicopter was reported to be a single-seat "mosquito" helicopter.
Investigators from the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board are en route and expected to arrive Monday morning.
The man's body is being taken to the state lab in Missoula for autopsy.
Authorities have not yet identified the victim and no information on the cause of the crash is available at this time.
Story and Comments: http://www.krtv.com
One person died Sunday when the small helicopter he was flying crashed into a hillside near Dearborn.
The crash was reported to emergency responders shortly after 5 p.m. near 84 Dearborn River Road. A man at the scene was initially reported to be unresponsive, and later confirmed as a fatality by responders from the Cascade County Sheriff's Office.
The helicopter was a one-person craft known as a Mosquito, Cascade County Sheriff Bob Edwards said.
Edwards said he did not have more information on the victim. He said National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration would be at the scene Monday. The pilot's body will be taken to Missoula for an autopsy.
No one else was injured in the crash and there was no fire caused by spilled fuel.
Dan Ryan, who lives across Dearborn River Road from the crash site, said he was on his front porch when he heard the helicopter pass overhead. It was flying up a canyon, he said, but started to spin out of control after turning back, falling into the hillside.
There was "no dust, no smoke" when it hit the ground, he said.
Dawn Allee, a Dearborn volunteer firefighter who also lives near the crash site, said she did not see the crash, but heard a "thump" when the helicopter hit the ground. She ran up to the crash site with some other people and surveyed the site for potential hazards as others attempted to provide medical aid to the pilot. Because some fuel had spilled, there were initially concerns about the possibility of a fire, she said.
Ryan said based on a license plate on a trailer pulled by a vehicle parked in a nearby parking lot, it appeared the pilot was an out-of-state resident.
Dearborn Volunteer Fire Department, the Cascade County Sheriff's Deparment and Montana Highway were among the responders.
According to the website, mosquito.net.nz, some models of the Mosquito helicopter are ultralights and no license is required to fly them in the United States. With other models, a license is required. Some models are factory assembled and the others are provided in kit form.
The website states that those models provided in kit form take 200 hours to assemble, depending on skill level.
- Source: http://www.greatfallstribune.com
Cascade County Sheriff’s Office personnel secure the scene of a fatal light helicopter crash near Dearborn on Sunday evening.
NTSB Identification: ERA13LA437
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, September 29, 2013 in Felda, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/19/2015
Aircraft: INNOVATOR TECHNOLOGIES MOSQUITO XEL, registration: None
Injuries: 1 Serious.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
After about a 10-minute flight, the pilot returned to the airport and attempted to land the helicopter. A witness reported that, when the helicopter was about 30 ft above the ground, it seemed to be “unstable” and began to oscillate from side to side. The pilot then aborted the landing, flew for a few minutes, and then returned for landing. The witness reported that during this landing attempt, when the helicopter was again about 30 ft above the ground, it began spinning to the left and then impacted the ground.
According to a friend of the pilot, about 2 months before the accident, the pilot had experienced a similar loss of control in the accident helicopter in which the helicopter rapidly spun to the left three times just before landing. The pilot then gained altitude, regained control, and flew away from the landing site. The pilot checked the controls and then came in and landed without incident. The pilot told his friend that, after the helicopter started spinning left, he shut off the automatic throttle governor and was able to recover. When the pilot was interviewed about 1.5 years after the accident, he reported that, during the previous flight when he lost helicopter control, he believed that he came in a little too fast and, since the governor did not work well and the helicopter did not have a lot of horsepower to correct or recover, that could have caused the spins. Regarding the accident, he stated that “I would like to think it was the helicopter, but it could have been me.” The majority of the helicopter, including the engine governor and engine management system, was consumed by a postcrash fire and could not be examined. Examination of the surviving components did not reveal any evidence of a preexisting failure or malfunction of the flight control system or engine. Although the loss of control was consistent with the pilot failing to maintain control during the landing approach and experiencing a loss of tail rotor effectiveness, the postcrash fire damage precluded determination of whether a mechanical failure played a role in the loss of control.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s loss of helicopter control while hovering for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination of the helicopter, which was limited due to postcrash fire damage.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 29, 2013, at 1109 eastern daylight time, an unregistered Mosquito XEL Helicopter was substantially damaged during landing at Lazy Springs Recreation Park, Felda, Florida. The non-certificated pilot was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight, which was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.
According to a witness, the pilot liked to fly the helicopter whenever he had a chance. On the day of the accident, the pilot had trailered the helicopter into the park to do some flying in the local area. The takeoff was uneventful, but instead of the pilot going out, and flying around the area for 30 to 45 minutes which was his usual habit, approximately 10 minutes later he returned and attempted to land. As the helicopter was approximately 30 feet from touchdown it seemed to be "unstable" and began to oscillate from side to side. The pilot then aborted the landing and flew off for a few minutes, and then returned. This time as the helicopter was once again about 30 feet from touchdown, it began spinning to the left and impacted the ground. A postcrash fire then ensued. The pilot was pulled out of the wreckage by the witness and another person, and was later airlifted to a hospital.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot did not hold any type of pilot certificate or rating for rotor wing aircraft. He had attended a basic helicopter orientation course which consisted of 24 hours of ground instruction and 10 hours of flight instruction in a Schweizer 300C which was designed to familiarize the course attendees with safety procedures, guidelines, aerodynamic forces, forces in flight, flight control systems, safety of flight, hazards of helicopter flight, basic navigation, aviation physiology, federal aviation regulations, aeronautical decision making, and pilot judgment.
Review of pilot records also revealed that he had received instruction prior to the course in a Robinson R22, and that he had received 14 CFR Part 61, Special Federal Aviation Regulation Number 73 (SFAR 73) required ground training which required that before a pilot could manipulate the flight controls of a Robinson R22 or R44 Helicopter, they must be trained in energy management, low rotor rpm which could lead to a low rotor rpm stall, and low or negative G, which could lead to mast bumping.
Further review of pilot records also indicated that he had received approximately 20 hours of dual instruction and at the time of the accident, he had accrued approximately 40 total hours of flight time.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The helicopter was of conventional composite and metal construction. The airframe was made of fiberglass in a vinylester matrix. It was powered by a 60 horsepower, two cycle, two cylinder engine, equipped with a 180-watt alternator which provided power to run the helicopters electrical system.
The drive train's primary reduction was bolted directly to the engine. A centrifugal clutch on the engine crankshaft permitted startup of the engine without a load from the rotor system. Power was transmitted from the clutch to the driven pulley of the reduction through a cogged belt. The driven pulley housed a sprag clutch which would permit the rotor to overspeed the engine during autorotation.
Review of the helicopter manufacturer's records revealed that the helicopter was manufactured in 2012 and had been equipped with floats. It weighed 314 pounds which would allow it to be operated under 14 CFR Part 103 ultralight regulations however, the pilot had changed the configuration of the helicopter by removing the floats, and adding an engine governor which rendered it ineligible for operation under Part 103 and placed it into the experimental category. This would have required the pilot to possess a private pilot certificate, the helicopter to be registered with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and an airworthiness inspection to be performed by an FAA designated airworthiness representative prior to the first flight, as described in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 20-27F, "Certification and Operation of Amateur Built Aircraft."
At the time of the accident the helicopter and engine had accrued approximately 20 hours of total operating time.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The recorded weather at Southwest Florida International Airport (RSW), located approximately 17 nautical miles west of the accident site, at 1053, included: winds from 070 degrees at 10 knots, 10 miles visibility, sky clear, temperature 28 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Examination of the accident site and wreckage revealed that the helicopter came to rest on a 15- degree embankment on the edge of a 27 acre lake, on a magnetic heading of 095 degrees. The majority of the helicopter including the cabin, seat, floor panel, and tail boom sections were consumed by the postcrash fire.
The rotor head showed marks consistent with mast bumping. The control mechanism was connected and moved freely. The swash plate was consumed by post-crash fire.
Rotor blade "A" was delaminated and thermal damaged from the blade root to 5 feet outboard. The rotor blade was still connected to the rotor hub. There was no chord or span wise scratching on the blade. The pitch change rod was connected and the pitch change horn was bent about 15- degrees upward. The spindle moved freely.
Rotor blade" B" was consumed by post-crash fire, delaminated, and was separated from the spar 13 inches outboard the blade root. There was no chord or span wise scratching. The blade root was still connected to the spindle, which moved freely. The pitch horn was bent about 45- degrees upward and the pitch rod connector was fractured in a manner consistent with tension overload.
The No. 3 sprocket was connected to the secondary drive system. The coupler connecting the lower shaft to the splitter gear box was consumed by post-crash fire. There was drive belt residue on the main rotor No. 3 and No.4 sprockets.
Engine continuity was not verified due to thermal damage to the engine accessories and the main engine casing. Three motor mounts were present, with the fourth motor mount retaining bolt having been sheared off. Two motor mount retaining bolts on the torque side of the engine were also bent. Both engine carburetors were consumed by the post-crash fire, and were unrecognizable. The muffler was attached to the engine and was unremarkable. The primary drive belt was attached to the No. 1 and No. 2 sprockets, and was thermal damaged.
Control continuity from the flight control pedals to the tail rotor pitch links was verified. Control continuity from the cyclic and collective control was not verified due to consumption of the mechanisms from the post-crash fire.
The tail rotor blades were connected to their respective pitch links, and were moved freely through their range of travel. The tail rotor gear box, pitch links, and control rods were thermal damaged. The tail rotor blades were free of chord or span wise scratching.
The splitter gear box was thermal damaged and the jaw couplers were unremarkable. The dampener in between the couplers was consumed by the post-crash fire. From the splitter gear box to six feet aft of the splitter gear box, the tail rotor drive shaft was either melted or thermal damaged. The three internal carrier bearings were present and thermal damaged. From the tail rotor gear box to a point located 22 ½ inches forward, a fracture of the tail rotor drive shaft, consistent with bending overload and thermal damage was present.
The right landing skid was thermal damaged, and otherwise unremarkable. The left landing skid was thermal damaged on the rear left side. The forward cross bow was thermal damaged but remained connected to the "T" fittings. The forward cross cable was thermal damaged and connected to the cross bow. The rear cross bow was thermal damaged and fractured 14 inches upward from the left side of the "T" fitting. The fracture was consistent with bending overload. The rear cross cable was connected to the left side and disconnected on the right side due to thermal damage. The left, right, front, and rear cables, were thermal damaged, and connected to the rear cross bow. Both cables were disconnected from their respective front mounts as a result of the post-crash fire.
SURVIVAL FACTORS INFORMATION
The occupant restraint system consisted of a lap belt only. Examination of the restraint system revealed that the lap belt was latched. No shoulder harness or anti-dive strap was installed. Review of the seat design also indicated that it was not of an energy absorbing design.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
During an interview with a friend of the pilot the friend advised that approximately 2 months prior to the accident flight, he observed the pilot have a loss of control with the helicopter similar to what happened on the accident flight when after lifting off and flying around for about 15 minutes he came back in to land. At approximately 30 feet above ground level, the helicopter rapidly spun three times to the left. The pilot then gained altitude, regained control, and flew away from the landing site for a few minutes. The pilot then checked the controls and then came in and landed without incident. When the pilot's friend asked him what happened, the pilot advised him that after the helicopter started spinning to the left, he shut off the automatic throttle governor and was able to recover.
Engine Governor and Engine Management System
Examination the engine governor and engine management system could not be accomplished as the majority of the system had been consumed by the postcrash fire.
Review of information provided by the manufacturer of the engine governor and engine management system revealed that it was composed of a servo module, a system control module, and a twist grip throttle module.
The servo module mounted on the airframe of the helicopter and the twist grip and control modules had been mounted on the collective control arm.
The servo module contained several sub-assemblies:
- A non-conformally coated circuit board with a micro controller, servo driver, magnetic clutch driver, servo limit switches, and a set of dual inline package (DIP) switches for setting operational characteristics.
- A servo motor.
- A linear screw drive.
- A magnetic clutch
During operation the micro controller would measure the engine rpm and compute an "Error" signal based on the difference between the actual engine rpm, and the "Set Point" rpm. The Error signal would be sent to the servo driver circuitry to drive the servo motor in the proper direction for pulling or releasing a Bowden cable connected to the twist grip throttle control.
When the system was first engaged by turning on the governor switch on the control module, the engine rpm and position of the magnetic clutch magnet are unknown. The microcontroller would then detect the rpm at which the engine was turning, and then would store that rpm in memory as the Set Point rpm. It would then drive the servo motor until the electromagnetic clutch magnet reached the outer end of the drive screw and contacted the clutch armature. The microcontroller then would turn on the clutch driver causing electrical current to flow through the windings of the electromagnet and engage the clutch. Once the clutch was engaged, the servo motor would retract the clutch and the throttle cable until a slight increase in rpm was detected. The increase in rpm would then "tell" the micro controller, that the servo module now had control of the throttle. As the load on the engine varied, the servo module would attempt to hold the rpm constant by changing the throttle setting to vary the engine power.
The system would work in conjunction with the helicopter's collective pitch correlator to hold the engine rpm constant as the pitch control was raised and lowered. Because of rotor blade and drive train inertia, the correlator would act before the fact and would increase or decrease the engine power before the engine actually "felt" the load change. The governor would act after the fact, depending on a change in engine rpm to sense load change. Both would work together to achieve rpm control.
The governor would work by retracting and releasing the Bowden cable connecting the servo module to the engine carburetors via the twist grip module. The servo module would pull on the throttle cable against the springs in the two carburetors. It could only release the cable. It could not push the throttles closed.
Normally, the pull against the carburetor springs needed to hold the throttles open was about 9 pounds. This was adequate to move the mechanisms in the throttle system, including the twist grip and servo modules provided the system moved smoothly and was free of any drag or snag points. If the mechanism did not move freely over the full range of travel, had points were drag increased, the system could allow the rpm to excessively exceed or significantly fall below the set point.
According to the manufacturer, for optimal performance of the engine speed governor it was imperative that:
- The engine was tuned to produce rated power in the operational environment where it was being used.
- The correlator was adjusted for maximum throttle change for collective control movement.
- The throttle mechanism was set up for smooth, drag and snag free operation.
DIP Switches
There were 4 groups of switches that needed to be set for the engine speed controller to function properly with the engine in the helicopter:
- Gain/Sensitivity switches.
- Engine Tachometer switches.
- Engine Responsiveness switches.
- Factory Setting switches.
The gain/sensitivity switches determined how sensitive the system was to errors between the actual engine rpm and the set point rpm. The engine speed controller would constantly compare that value to the real-time rpm to adjust the throttle appropriately. If the sensitivity was too high the system would constantly make throttle adjustments.
The engine tachometer switches were used to set the range of pulses per minute that would be received from the engine and used to establish the real-time engine rpm. The system would get this information by capturing the trigger pulses from the number one capacitor discharge ignition (CDI). The CDIs were triggered 2 times per crankshaft revolution. At 6,000 rpm this equated to 12,000 pulses per minute. The engine tachometer switches were set to use 13,000 pulses per minute as the high end of the expected operational range.
The engine responsiveness switches were used to set up the function that dampened out fluctuations in the error curve. This ensured that large error differences caused for example by a rapid pull up on the collective control would be responded to by a large, fast, throttle adjustment, whereas, small load increases, and adjustments to rpm as the engine approached the setpoint rpm would be smaller and less rapid.
Together, the gain/sensitivity switches, and the engine responsiveness switches were used to optimize, or tune, the system to minimize hunting, that is overshooting while trying to settle on the exact rpm while also minimizing undershooting (failing to adjust engine rpm close to the setpoint rpm).
All settings were based on 1/8th inch of slack in the Bowden cable. More slack would cause the system to surge or lose speed on set.
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness
Review of the accident flight and the flight two months earlier revealed that both flights also displayed evidence of a loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) which is a critical low-speed aerodynamic flight characteristic that is not related to a maintenance malfunction and is not necessarily the result of a control margin deficiency.
It is characterized by an uncommanded, rapid yaw towards the advancing blade which does not subside of its own accord. It can result in the loss of the helicopter if left unchecked. It is caused by an aerodynamic interaction between the main rotor and tail rotor. Some helicopter types are also more likely to encounter LTE due to insufficient thrust produced by having a tailrotor which is not always able to produce the thrust demanded by the pilot.
Pilot's Statement
During the accident the pilot had been seriously injured, suffered memory loss and for approximately a year and a half was unable to communicate with NTSB investigators.
On June 17, 2015, the pilot was finally able to be interviewed. During the interview he advised that he still did not remember the "crash itself" but was able to recall some of the events leading up to it. He remembered that it was sunny on the day of the accident and there was a mild headwind. He lifted off like he normally did, then flew out away from where he had lifted off and then circled around back to where he had lifted off from but something did not feel right. He then circled around again and this time everything seemed to be fine.
During his approach to land, when he was about 40 feet above ground level, the helicopter suddenly spun about two times, then nosed over, and struck the ground.
He did not think that it could have been the governor on the accident flight and he could not remember any reoccurring mechanical problems.
He also stated that he thought that the previous flight when it spun, that he believed he came in a little too fast and since the governor did not really work to well and the helicopter did not have a lot of horsepower to correct or recover that could have caused the spins.
When asked about what he thought caused the accident, he advised that "I would like to think it was the helicopter, but it could have been me."
NTSB Identification: ERA10LA488
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, September 19, 2010 in Halifax, MA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 12/27/2011
Aircraft: Schulman Mosquito XEL, registration: None
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The ultralight helicopter was observed flying low over a lake and then hovering over a swamp area with trees. When the helicopter was hovering just above the trees, the tail section yawed left and right, followed by the main rotor blades tipping left and right. The helicopter then entered a spin and nosed over and impacted the trees. A postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of failures of the helicopter or its components that would have prevented normal operations prior to impact. The pilot purchased the helicopter as a kit and constructed it at the manufacturer's facility with their assistance. Before it was completely built, the pilot departed the facility with the helicopter and declined to receive 10 hours of flight instruction offered by the kit manufacturer. The pilot had his Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate revoked 3 years prior to the accident and did not hold a helicopter rating. However, the pilot may have had experience in another type of helicopter and may have accumulated about 12 hours of flight time in the accident helicopter prior to the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's loss of control while hovering. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s limited experience operating the helicopter make and model.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 19, 2010, at about 1307 eastern daylight time, an unregistered, experimental, amateur-built, Schulman Mosquito XEL helicopter, owned and operated by a private individual, incurred substantial damage by post crash fire after colliding with trees in a heavily wooded area near East Monponsett Pond, Halifax, Massachusetts. The pilot died in a hospital 24 days after the accident. No flight plan was filed and visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, personal flight. The helicopter departed from Cranland Airport (28M), Hanson, Massachusetts, about half mile from the accident site, earlier that day.
Witnesses on a nearby lake observed the helicopter flying over and around the lake; flying low at times. The helicopter then maneuvered over a swamp area with trees and was seen hovering just above the trees. It was observed yawing its tail boom section left and right about 15 degrees each way; followed by the tipping of its main rotor blades left and right. The helicopter then went into a spin and nosed over impacting the trees.
A representative of the Mosquito aircraft manufacturer and training facility in Florida stated to the responding Federal Aviation Administration inspector that the pilot purchased the aircraft as a kit from them in 2009 and received a service offer to customers where the owner/builder can assemble the helicopter kit under the supervision of the kit manufacturer. The manufacturer also offered 10 hours of initial flight training in the helicopter, which the pilot declined stating he didn’t need it because he has experience flying a Robinson R-22 rotorcraft with a friend. The representative observed the pilot fly the helicopter when it was nearly completed. The pilot demonstrated that he did have some rotorcraft flying skills, but also demonstrated difficulty with power/flight control management and demonstrated rotorcraft flying skills typical of pilots flying rotorcraft with a governor, which an R-22 has and the Mosquito XEL does not. The pilot departed the facility with the helicopter before it had all the wiring completed. The pilot and the representative were in contact on a routine basis; the pilot seeking guidance on the completion of the wiring and accessory installation. The representative recalls the pilot mentioned that he had flown the helicopter about a total of 12 hours since departing the manufacturer’s facility.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a commercial pilot certification with single engine and multi-engine land, with instrument ratings. His medical certification was revoked on February 20, 2007, for medical reasons, which at that time he reported 4,000 hours total time. He did not hold a helicopter rating. A copy of the pilot’s flight logbook was not provided.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The Mosquito XEL, s/n 1097, an ultralight helicopter, was sold as an ultralight rotorcraft with floats on the skids. The helicopter must be operated with floats installed in order to be in compliance with the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 103 weight restrictions limit. When the helicopter is operated without the floats installed, it meets the experimental homebuilt category requiring registration and an airworthiness certification. The pilot must hold a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pilot certification for rotorcraft and a FAA medical certificate to operate the helicopter.
At the time of the accident the floats were not installed. The helicopter was not registered and had no airworthiness certification. A copy of the helicopter’s maintenance logbook was not provided.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The closest official weather observation was at the Plymouth Municipal Airport (PYM), Plymouth, Massachusetts, 8 miles southeast of the accident site. The JKL 1252 METAR, winds from 260 degree at 5 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; few clouds at 2700 feet above ground level; temperature 24 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 14 degrees C; altimeter 30.09 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The responding FAA inspector stated that the aircraft came to rest upside down with the top of the main rotor facing the ground in a heavily wooded swamp area. The majority of the helicopter’s fuselage, constructed of fiberglass, was consumed in a post crash fire. Both rubber serpentine drive belts were observed intact, with the main rotor belt melted to the pulley with the reinforcing cord drooping from the melted belt remnants. A section of the tail boom remained intact. Two feet of the tail boom, along with the tail rotor gearbox, was found 25 yards northwest from the main wreckage site. A 2 foot section of the tail rotor drive shaft was sheared off from the main section and found 5 feet from the main wreckage.
There were signatures of tree damage where the broken tail boom section and gear box were thrown away from the main wreckage site. One of the carbon fiber tail rotor blades was found adjacent to the remaining tail boom section at the main wreckage; the other tail rotor blade was found halfway between the main wreckage and where the tail rotor gearbox was found. Both carbon fiber tail rotor blades were broken at their root where they are bonded to the mounting pad. The tail rotor gearbox was damaged from impact and rotated freely. The main rotor blades, which were constructed from aluminum, remained intact with dents and bends to the top and bottom of the blades. No leading edge impact damage was observed on either main rotor blades.
A wreckage examination was conducted by the helicopter’s manufacturer representative with FAA oversight. There was no evidence or indications of failures of the helicopter and its components that would have prevented normal operations prior to tree impact.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/ DATA
The Mosquito helicopter’s operators manual makes refer to in order to fly the helicopter, potential pilots must receive proper training and it recommended that pilots be trained to private pilot status in a small training helicopter. Training to student pilot status is considered the minimum acceptable amount of training required. Operation of the helicopter by an inadequately trained pilot could result in severe injury or death. To maximize flight safety all helicopters must only be operated within certain areas of the Height-Velocity curve. If the Mosquito is above a level (approximately 10 feet), beyond which a hovering autorotation can be safely performed, it must be at a minimum of 250 feet before hovering is again permitted. In the event of an engine failure while hovering at altitudes between 10 and 250 feet, the rotor blades will not have sufficient inertia to maintain rpm and there will not be sufficient time for the helicopter to build adequate forward speed for a normal autorotation.
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