Tuesday, October 08, 2019

Socata TBM700C2, N700AQ: Fatal accident occurred October 03, 2019 near Capital Region International Airport (KLAN) Lansing, Michigan

This was the picture Neil Alan Sego (right) posted from the plane just before they took off for Michigan. -Scott Sego (son)

Joel Stewart Beavins

Timothy Joe Clark

John Thomas Lowe

Zechariah "Zech" Eugene Bennett

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Grand Rapids, Michigan
Daher; Pompano Beach, Florida
Pratt & Whitney Canada; Longueuil, Quebec, Canada
Hartzell Propeller; Piqua, Ohio
Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses; Le Bourget, FN
Transportation Safety Board of Canada; Gatineau, Quebec, Canada

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Location: Lansing, MI
Accident Number: CEN20FA001
Date & Time: 10/03/2019, 0858 EDT
Registration: N700AQ
Aircraft: Socata TBM 700
Injuries: 5 Fatal, 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Business 

On October 3, 2019, about 0858 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700 airplane, N700AQ, collided with terrain while on an instrument approach to Capital Region International Airport (LAN), Lansing, Michigan. The commercial pilot, pilot-rated passenger, and 3 passengers were fatally injured. The remaining passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was owned by N700AQ LLC and operated under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. The cross-country business flight departed Indy South Greenwood Airport (HFY), Greenwood, Indiana, at 0800.

According to automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data that was transmitted from the airplane to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC), the flight departed runway 19 at HFY and turned northeast toward MAREO intersection where it turned north toward LAN. The airplane subsequently climbed to flight level 190 (19,000 ft pressure altitude). At 0834:24, the flight entered a cruise descent from flight level 190 and was progressively cleared down to 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl). According to ATC communications, the pilot was provided radar vectors to join the localizer for the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 10R approach at LAN. At 0853:03, the approach controller stated, "TBM zero alpha quebec, five miles from FAMLI, turn right, ah, right heading zero seven zero, maintain three thousand until established on the localizer, cleared the ILS one zero right." The pilot responded, "Zero seven zero, ah, we're cleared for the ILS ten right into, ah, Lansing." The ADS-B data indicated the airplane entered a right turn and joined the localizer inbound.

At 0854:27, the approach controller stated, "TBM zero alpha quebec, contact Lansing tower one one niner point niner, good day." The pilot responded, "One nineteen ninety, seven hundred alpha quebec." At 0855:29, the airplane crossed over the outer marker (FAMLI) at 2,302 ft msl and continued to descend on the glideslope while established inbound on the localizer toward runway 10R. The airplane had a calculated true airspeed of 168 knots when it crossed over the outer marker. Between 0855:29 and 0857:45, the airplane continued to decelerate from 168 knots to 64 knots.

Figure 1. Chart of Altitude and Airspeed During Instrument Approach

At 0854:36, the pilot established contact with the Lansing tower controller and reported being established on the ILS Runway 10R instrument approach. At 0854:39, the tower controller stated, "Seven zero zero alpha quebec, Lansing, ah, tower, the winds are calm, one zero right cleared to land." The pilot responded, "Cleared to land, ah, ten right, seven hundred alpha quebec." There were no additional communications received from the pilot. At 0858:13, the tower controller attempted to contact the pilot over the tower frequency without success.

The ADS-B data indicated that at 0857:06 the airplane was about 1.3 miles from the runway threshold at 1,250 ft msl (about 400 ft above the runway elevation) and established on the localizer inbound to the runway. At 0857:37, the airplane was 0.5 mile from the runway threshold at 1,041 ft msl (about 180 ft above the runway elevation) when it entered a shallow climb and a left turn away from the runway heading. When the left turn began, the airplane had decelerated to 72 knots. Between 0857:37 and 0857:45, the airplane continued to decelerate to 64 knots while it climbed to 1,059 ft. At 0857:45, the final ADS-B datapoint was located about 300 ft north of the localizer centerline and 0.36 miles from the runway 10R threshold. The final ADS-B datapoint was about 480 ft southwest of the initial impact point with terrain.

Figure 2. Chart of Altitude and Airspeed During Final Approach

Figure 3. Plot of ADS-B Position Data During Final Approach

According to FAA records, the 48-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 4, 2019, with no restrictions or limitations. On the application for his current medical certificate, the pilot reported having accumulated 1,325 total hours of flight experience and 125 hours within the previous 6 months.

The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was dated September 30, 2019, at which time he had accumulated 1,403.8 hours total flight time. The pilot had 1,404.8 hours total flight experience including the 1 hour accident flight. The pilot had flown 1,375 hours in single-engine airplanes and 29.8 hours multi-engine airplanes. He had logged 1,365 hours as pilot-in-command, all of which were flown in single-engine airplanes. He had flown 250.6 hours, 125.9 hours, 88.2 hours, and 35.5 hours during the year, 6 months, 90 days, and month before the accident, respectively. Based on available information, the 1 hour accident flight was his only flight time during the previous 24 hours.

The pilot's most recent flight review, as required by Title 14 CFR 61.56, was completed upon the issuance of his commercial pilot certificate dated May 8, 2019. His last instrument proficiency check was completed in a Redbird SR22 simulator on September 12, 2019. He completed the SIMCOM TBM 700 Initial Course on September 30, 2018. According to the pilot's logbook, he had flown 76.4 hours and 9.8 hours in Socata TBM 700 and TBM 850 airplanes, respectively. The pilot had logged all of his Socata TBM 700 flight time during the 12 months before the accident.

According to FAA records, the 67-year-old pilot-rated passenger held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. He also held a flight instructor certificate for single-engine land and instrument. The pilot did not possess a valid FAA medical certificate; his previous third-class medical certificate expired on August 31, 2017. The pilot obtained the required comprehensive medical examination for BasicMed from his physician on September 25, 2017, and completed the required medical education course on February 19, 2018. A pilot logbook was not located during the onsite investigation.

The airplane, a Socata TBM 700 C2, serial number 252, was manufactured in 2003. The low-wing airplane was of conventional aluminum construction and was equipped with a retractable tricycle landing gear and a pressurized cabin that was configured to seat six individuals. The airplane was powered by a 700 shaft-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-64 turbo-propeller engine, serial number PCE-PM-0140, through a 4-blade, constant speed, full-feathering, Hartzell HC-E4N-3/E9083SK propeller assembly, serial number HH1456. The airplane was approved for operations in instrument meteorological conditions and in known icing conditions. The airplane had a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 7,394 pounds. On May 12, 2003, the airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate and a registration number when it was imported into the United States after manufacture in France. The current airplane owner purchased the airplane on July 31, 2018.

According to maintenance records, the airplane had been maintained under the provisions of an approved manufacturer inspection program. The most recent annual inspection was completed on June 1, 2019, at 3,512.3 hours total airframe time. At the time of the accident, the airframe, engine, and propeller had accumulated 3,550.6 hours since new. The engine had accumulated 1,184.8 hours since its last hot section inspection. The propeller had accumulated 1,089.4 hours since its last overhaul. The static system, altimeter system, automatic pressure altitude reporting system, and transponder were last tested on April 10, 2018. A postaccident review of the available maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues.

The airplane had two fuel tanks, one located in each wing, and a total fuel capacity of 290.6 gallons (281.6 gallons usable). The airplane had been fueled with 100 gallons of fuel before the flight, and according to available fueling documentation and airplane use logs, the airplane had about 176 gallons onboard before the flight.

According to the current weight-and-balance record, dated May 24, 2017, the airplane had an empty weight of 4,674.28 lbs and a useful load of 2,719.92 lbs. The empty weight center-of-gravity (CG) was 187.17 inches aft of the datum. At maximum takeoff weight, 7,394 lbs, the forward and aft CG limits were 187 inches and 193.65 inches, respectively.

The airplane's weight and balance at takeoff were calculated using the reported weights and seat positions for the pilot and the 5 passengers, fueling receipts/invoices, and recent flight tracking data. Based on the available data, the takeoff weight and CG location were estimated to be 7,626.28 lbs and 196.18 inches, respectively. At takeoff, the airplane was about 232 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight and about 2.53 inches past the aft CG limit. The engine burned about 70 gallons (476 lbs) of fuel during the flight. The estimated airplane weight and CG location at the time of impact were 7,150.28 lbs and 196.60 inches, respectively. At impact, the airplane was about 126 lbs over the maximum allowable landing weight and 2.95 inches past the aft CG limit.

According to the Socata TBM 700 C2 Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Supplement No. 41, the aerodynamic stall speed at maximum takeoff weight with the landing gear and flaps extended for landing is 65 knots. The aerodynamic stall speed at maximum takeoff weight with the landing gear and flaps extended for takeoff is 77 knots. The aerodynamic stall speed at maximum takeoff weight with the landing gear and flaps retracted is 83 knots. The approach speed with flaps in the landing position is 85 knots.

A postaccident review of available meteorological data established that day instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident site. At 0853, about 5 minutes before the accident, the LAN automated surface observing system reported a calm wind, 1.25 miles surface visibility, light rain with mist, 400 ft above ground level (agl) overcast ceiling, temperature 12°C, dew point 11°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury. At 0906, about 8 minutes after the accident, the LAN automated surface observing system reported a calm wind, 1 mile surface visibility, light rain with mist, a vertical visibility of 500 ft agl, temperature 12°C, dew point 12°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.94 inches of mercury.

Capital Region International Airport, a public airport located about 3 miles northwest of Lansing, Michigan, was owned and operated by Capital Region Airport Authority. The airport field elevation was 861 ft msl. The airport was served by three asphalt runways, runway 10R/28L (8,506 ft by 150 ft), runway 6/24 (5,003 ft by 120 ft), and runway 10R/28L (8,506 ft by 150 ft), runway 10L/28R (3,601 ft by 75 ft). The airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower that was operational at the time of the accident.

During an ILS approach, the localizer provides lateral guidance for the final approach course, and the glideslope provides vertical guidance as the aircraft descends toward the runway. For a precision approach, such as an ILS approach, the missed approach point is where the aircraft reaches the decision altitude while on the glideslope.

The published inbound course for the ILS runway 10R approach at LAN was 096° magnetic, the crossing altitude for the final approach fix (FAMLI) was 2,367 ft msl, and the distance between FAMLI and the runway 10R threshold was 4.5 nm. The touchdown zone elevation was 861 ft msl. The decision altitude was 1,061 ft msl (200 ft agl) and required 2,400 ft runway visibility range (RVR). The missed approach procedure was to climb on runway heading to 2,000 ft msl, then make a left turn to a 070° magnetic heading and climb to 2,700 ft msl, then join the 257° radial from the Flint vortac, and hold at ERRYS intersection.

The initial impact was in an open grass field located about 0.3 miles west-northwest of the runway 10R threshold. The initial impact was identified by a large area of grass that had been pushed down and preceded a 135 ft long ground scar that was oriented on a 060° bearing. The initial impact point measured 42 ft wide and was consistent with the wingspan of the airplane. The lower VHF antenna, the left main landing gear door, and several flap track fairings had separated from the airplane and were located along the wreckage debris path.

Figure 4. Overview Photo of the Initial Impact Point and Ground Scar

The main wreckage consisted of the entire airplane. Both wings and the empennage remained attached to the fuselage. All flight control surfaces remained attached to their respective hinges. Flight control continuity for the elevator, rudder, and right aileron were confirmed from the forward cabin to each flight control surface. Flight control continuity to the left aileron could not be established due to impact damage; however, the observed cable separations near the left wing root were consistent with overstress. Both spoilers were retracted and remained connected to their respective ailerons. The wing flap actuator jack screws were found halfway between the takeoff and landing positions. The left main landing gear and nose gear were fully retracted and on their respective actuator up-locks. The right main landing gear had retracted into its wheel well; however, the right gear was not secured by its respective actuator up-lock. Both the rudder and elevator trim surfaces were found in a neutral position. The throttle was found in the flight idle position, the propeller lever was full forward, and the condition lever was full forward. The fuel manual override was closed and gated. The flap selector was found in the "UP" and locked position. The landing gear selector switch was found in the "UP" position. The fuel system switch was found on "AUTO" and the engine was using fuel from the left fuel tank at impact. Both fuel tanks had ruptured during impact and there was a strong odor of Jet-A aviation fuel at the accident site.

Figure 5. Overview Photo of Main Wreckage at Accident Site

The engine remained attached to its respective engine mounts. There was a complete fracture of the propeller shaft and reduction gearbox housing forward of the 2nd stage reduction gears. Engine oil was found on the outside of the engine cowling, windscreen, and extending 20 ft in front of the engine on the ground. Much of the engine oil had been pumped out of the engine after impact. There was compressive impact damage to the exhaust case at the 6 o'clock position. Engine control continuity was established from the cockpit to the fuel control unit. The propeller speed setting lever and reset cables had separated from the propeller governor; however, free movement of the cables were observed when the cockpit levers were moved by hand. The compressor rotor was free to turn with no anomalies and continuity was established with the accessory gearbox. Fuel discharged from hoses when the fuel pump was rotated. The fuel filter bowl was about ½ full of fuel, which appeared clear with no significant debris or phase separation. Both magnetic chip detectors were free of any metallic particles. There was some minor foreign object debris found on the leading edge of several 1st stage compressor blades, and there was vegetation debris found in the inlet screen. The compressor turbine (CT) and power turbine (PT) were intact with all blades present. There were rotational contact signatures observed on the CT blades downstream platforms from contact with the inner shroud of the upstream side of the 1st stage PT vane ring. The 1st stage PT blade tips displayed rubbing, and corresponding rubbing was observed on the shroud at the 6 and 12 o'clock positions. Some of the upstream blade platforms displayed rubbing with the inner shroud of the downstream side of the 1st stage PT vane ring.

Figure 6. Overview Photo of the Engine and Propeller at Accident Site

The propeller assembly remained attached to the engine propeller shaft that fractured from the engine reduction gear box during impact. One propeller blade was bent in the forward/thrust direction. The remaining three propeller blades were bent in the aft direction. All four propeller blades exhibited chordwise/rotational scoring on the camber side with paint discoloration from the tip to the outboard end of the deice boot. Three blades exhibited chordwise/rotational scoring on the face side. The spinner dome was dented adjacent to one propeller blade with a counterweight impression area with the center/average angle of about 44°. The pitch change rod was in the feathered position. Three propeller blades could be rotated by hand force due to fractured pitch change mechanisms. One propeller blade had been forcefully rotated beyond the reverse stop position, two blades were in an approximate low pitch position, and one blade was in an approximate feathered position. The beta ring appeared intact and undamaged with the carbon block and beta arm in position. The beta arm and valve moved freely.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Socata
Registration: N700AQ
Model/Series: TBM 700 C2
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator: N700AQ LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: LAN, 861 ft msl
Observation Time: 0853 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 12°C / 11°C
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 400 ft agl
Visibility:  1.25 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.93 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Departure Point: Greenwood, IN (HFY)
Destination: Lansing, MI (LAN)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 3 Fatal, 1 Serious
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 5 Fatal, 1 Serious
Latitude, Longitude: 42.780278, -84.606111

Those who may have information that might be relevant to the National Transportation Safety Board investigation may contact them by email eyewitnessreport@ntsb.gov, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email assistance@ntsb.gov. 

Joel Beavins, beloved husband of Jill (Rader) Beavins and father of Emma and Ellie Beavins, passed away suddenly on Sunday, October 6, 2019 at age 48. Joel was born on April 20, 1971 to Joel Beavins Sr. and Dana (Richardson) Leas in Greenville, Ohio. He married Jill Rader in 1995 in Carmel, IN, she survives. He and his family are active members at Grace United Methodist Church in Franklin, IN.

Joel graduated from Richmond High School in 1990 and continued his education at Ball State University and Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis where he attained a degree in biology. He worked as a sales executive for over 20 years for medical and scientific research products. Joel’s greatest source of pride was his family, especially his two daughters. He was the biggest fan and constant supporter of Emma and Ellie’s careers in high school athletics, as well as all of their endeavors. Joel’s second passion was flying. He obtained his pilot’s license in 1999 and actively flew multiple aircraft over the years, with increasing ratings and licenses. He was a member of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

Joel was the first to volunteer to help a friend, to mentor, or to serve. He went on multiple mission trips through his church, and was active in the Grizzly Golf Foundation.  He likewise enjoyed golfing with his daughter Ellie and watching her play at Franklin Community High School. Joel was a life-long learner and a constant example of how doing what you love should be the focus of one’s life.

Survivors include his wife Jill (Rader) Beavins of Franklin, IN; his children Emma Beavins and Ellie Beavins; his mother Dana (Richardson) Leas of Richmond, IN; his sisters Karen (Todd) Meinsen of Fountain City, IN and Christina Beavins of Greenville, NC; his maternal grandmother Norma Richardson of Greenville, OH; 6 nieces and nephews and countless relatives and friends.

He was preceded in death by his maternal grandfather Eugene Richardson of Greenville, OH; his paternal grandparents Beau and Dorothy Beavins of Greenville, OH; his niece Morgan Judd of Cincinnati, OH; and his father.

A service in honor of Joel’s life will be held Friday, October 11, 2019 at 6PM at Grace United Methodist Church, 1300 East Adams Drive, Franklin, IN, 46131.

The family would like to extend a special thank you to the staff at Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, MI whose incredible care allowed for Joel’s gift of organ donation that will save many lives. In lieu of flowers, memorials may be made to Grace United Methodist Church in honor of Joel Beavins, addressed to 1300 East Adams Drive Franklin, IN, 46131.  Swartz Family Community Mortuary and Memorial Center in Franklin, IN. is assisting with arrangements.  Online condolences may be sent to the family at www.swartzmortuary.com.  Information 317-738-0202.

Neil Alan Sego, 46, of Trafalgar, was born on June 17, 1973, to Joseph and Karen Sego in Indianapolis, IN. He passed away on October 3, 2019, in Lansing, MI.

Neil married the love of his life (apart from hunting), Nicole, on May 9, 1998. He was an amazing father to sons, Jacob, Ethan, and Owen.

Neil was involved in the community and affected many lives along the way. He was a wrestling coach for 14 years, coaching elementary, middle, and high school kids having a lasting effect on them. He was also a football coach for his sons' teams. Neil was active in many different groups that include, the Center Grove Optimist Club, Valkyrie Riders Club, and Take Five News Group. Neil was also an avid hunter.

Neil was not only a husband and father, but he was also a son, brother, uncle, coach, and friend. He didn't know a stranger and would help and mentor many throughout his life. He will be greatly missed by many.

Neil is survived by his wife, Nicole Mathes Sego; sons, Jacob Caudill, Ethan Sego, and Owen Sego; mother, Karen Sego; siblings, Scott (Stephanie) Sego, Andy (Holly) Sego, Brad (Lina) Sego, Debbie Sego, Tammy (Chris) Schmitt, and Joe Maxey; an abundance of nieces, nephews, great-nieces, and great-nephews. He was preceded in death by his father, Joseph Sego; grandparents Roscoe and Mary Spencer and Thurman (Ed) and Elsie Sego.

Visitation will be Sunday, October 13, 2019, from 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. at G.H. Herrmann Funeral Home, 1605 S State Road 135, Greenwood, IN and Monday, October 14, from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. at Indian Creek High School, 803 W. Indian Creek Dr., Trafalgar, IN.

Services will be held Monday, October 14, 2019, at 11:00 a.m. at Indian Creek High School, 803 W. Indian Creek Dr, Trafalgar, IN.

In Lieu of Flowers, the family would request donations be sent for support of Neil's sons, Ethan and Owen, to First Merchants Bank, c/o Nicole Sego, 110 N SR 135, Trafalgar, IN 46181.


John T. Lowe, 51, of Greenwood, passed away on October 3, 2019. He was born on August 28,1968 in Altoona, Pennsylvania to the late Glenn M. and Susan J. Lowe.

He is survived by his wife, Lori DeLuca Lowe; son, Benjamin Lowe; siblings, Cynthia (F. Tibertus “TY”) Lenz, Cathleen (Mark) Sargent; and sister-in-law, Cynthia Lowe; nephews, Joshua, Cory, Jim, and Jason; and nieces, Maribeth and Julie. He was preceded in death by his brothers, George Charles “Chuck” Lowe and Stephen Lowe.

John was a 1986 graduate of Center Grove High School where he participated in multiple sports including football, baseball, track and band. He was #77 on the football team and Ben wears the #77 jersey now.

He was a veteran of the United States Navy stationed at Submarine Base Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He was a true patriot that loved his country.

John was co-owner of The Engineering Collaborative, an Indianapolis based consulting and design firm.

He was an avid outdoorsman; he was a Crossfit enthusiast; mentor and supporter of young athletes through the Center Grove Community particularly football, wrestling, and baseball. He was a life coach to many.

Visitation will be from 12:00 PM - 2:00 PM Saturday, October 12, 2019 at Stones Crossing Church, 7000 W. Stones Crossing Road, Greenwood, Indiana with a service beginning at 2:00 PM.


Timothy Joe Clark, 67 of Franklin, IN passed away on October 3, 2019. He was born April 13, 1952 in Seymour, IN to Joe Richard and Beulah May Snyder Clark. He graduated from Seymour High School in 1970. He married Kathryn McKinney on August 11, 1973 at Central Christian Church in Seymour. He was a very loving husband, father and grandfather who was dedicated to his family. Tim graduated from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business with honors in 1974. He became a licensed CPA in 1975. 

After graduating from IU, he began working with Arthur Young and Company for 10 years before going to RCA Thomson Consumer Electronics where he spent 20 years before retiring. Tim was very active in the community, volunteering for food pantries, schools, neighborhood associations, churches and Lifeline Pilots. He was an avid sports fan, enjoying golfing, marathon running and scuba diving. He became a fixer of things at a young age. He loved to overcome challenges and enjoyed farming. His greatest love was his family. He always made it to events where his grandkids were involved.

Tim is preceded in death by his parents. Surviving to cherish his memory are his wife, Kathryn (Kath), son, Jeremy, daughter, Courtney (Andrew) Groves, grandchildren, Lillian, Lucas, Sydney and Callie. He is also survived by brother Ted (Robin) Clark, sister, Jill (Don) Scifres and brother, Jay Clark.

Friends may visit with Tim’s family from 5-7 PM Tuesday, October 8, 2019 at Burkholder Chapel of Thorne-George Family Funeral Homes, 419 N. Chestnut Street, Seymour, IN and one hour prior to the service at the church. Funeral services will be held at 11:30 AM Wednesday, October 9, 2019 at Immanuel Lutheran Church with Rev. Ralph Blomenberg, Rev. Philip Bloch and Rev. James Rodriquez officiating. Interment will follow at Immanuel Lutheran Cemetery in Seymour.  Memorials may be given in Tim’s memory to Lutheran Child and Family Services at Burkholder Chapel.  Please share memories and condolences at www.burkholderfuneralchapel.com.

Zechariah "Zech" Eugene Bennett, age 27, formerly of Terre Haute, IN, passed away Friday, October 4th, 2019, from injuries sustained in a plane crash in Lansing, MI. Zech was born June 13th, 1992, to Larry G. and Cheryl Bennett.

He was a 2011 graduate of Riverton Parke High School, where he excelled in football. Zech graduated from Indiana State University in 2016 with a bachelor's in construction management.

Zech married his high school sweetheart, Shelby Lynn Bennett, on May 15th, 2015, on a beach in Fort Myers, FL. They were like peanut butter and jelly, never apart. They could finish each other's sentences and their thoughts were always the same. They were perfect for each other.

After graduating college, Zech worked as a manager for the Kroger Company. After two years, Zech decided to switch his career path and began working as an assistant project manager for Patterson-Horth Inc.- General Contractor. Zech was eager to learn and take on new challenges. He was on assignment for his company when the small plane went down. The owner of Patterson and Horth expressed that, "in 2 short years Zech had touched the lives of everyone at the company. His infectious smile and can-do attitude gained him respect among his peers."

Zech never met a stranger and he was always willing to help whoever he could. Zech had many friends that he grew up with, but as he got older his tight circle of friends became more evident. He cherished spending time with them, going to ball games and escape rooms, playing video games, riding the Harleys, and celebrating Taco Tuesday.
Zech lived a life full of adventures with the love of his life. They loved to travel, but they did not care about the destination as long as they were together.
Zech placed his trust in the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. On September 13th, 2018, Zech and his wife were baptized at their home church, New Life Fellowship. Because of Zech's decision, he is living with the Lord and waiting for the rest of his family to join.

Zech's ultimate sacrifice was being an organ donor. Because of his unselfish choice to give, 6 lives have been changed by his donations.

Zech is preceded in death by his grandmother, Darlene K. Bennett (GMa) and grandmother, Mildred E. Flora. Zech is survived by his parents, Larry and Cheryl Bennett; his beautiful wife, Shelby Lynn Bennett (Young) and their beautiful unborn child; father in-law, John Young and wife Amber Young; mother in-law, Kim Clements and husband Brad Clements; sisters-in-law, Megan Guard, Carley Young, Leilani Young, and Rebekah Young; brother-in-law, Ian Young and Jacob Guard; and several aunts, uncles, and cousins.

Services will be at 12:00 p.m. noon on Saturday, October 12th, 2019, at New Life Fellowship, 7849 Wabash Ave., Terre Haute, IN 47803. Visitation will be at New Life Fellowship on Friday, October 11th, 2019, from 5:00 until 7:00 p.m., and from 11:00 a.m. until service time on Saturday. Pastor Jeffrey Harpole will be officiating. Greiner Funeral Home, 2005 North 13th Street, Terre Haute, IN 47804, were entrusted with arrangements. Online condolences may be made at: www.greinerfuneralhome.com

WATERTOWN TOWNSHIP, Michigan (WILX) - The office of the Clinton County Sheriff has released the names of those involved in Thursday's plane crash.

As of Friday, the families have all been notified.

The injured on the plane were:
Joel Stewart Beavins, age 48 of Franklin, Indiana, he is in critical condition at Sparrow Hospital.

Aaron Levi Blackford, age 42 of Frankton, Indiana, he is in critical condition at Sparrow Hospital.

Zechariah Eugene Bennett, age 27 of Plainfield, Indiana, he is in critical condition at Sparrow Hospital.

And the three people who died were:
Neil Alan Sego, age 46 of Trafalgar, Indiana, John Thomas Lowe, age 51 of Greenwood, Indiana, and Timothy Joe Clark, age 67 of Franklin, Indiana.

Two of the men on the plane, Clark and Beavins, have commercial pilot licenses.

It happened around 9 a.m. on October 3, near Capital Region International Airport in DeWitt Township.

The passengers were traveling from Indianapolis to mid-Michigan to work on a construction project for the Lansing Board of Water and Light.

"This tragic event - you know we have a lot of folks that are traveling to our plant and we always hope for safe arrival you know they get home safe too. Safety is paramount to us and we never take for granted getting to the job can have unfortunate ramifications," Dick Peffley, BWL general manager, said.

Federal investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board began work Friday trying to figure out why the plane went down. They say it could be several days if not longer before they can tell the families what went wrong.

At this time, they have separated the engine from the propeller and are hoping to get things cleaned up and moved by Saturday.

Airport police are standing by to protect the area and make sure that no one approves the plane.

Also, on Friday afternoon, Airport Road between State Road and Port Lansing Road, that were closed due to fatal plane crash, are now open.

Authorities say the single-engine, 6 passenger, non-commercial aircraft crashed near Airport and State roads.

In a press conference, Clinton County Sheriff Larry Jerue said the plane had a pilot, co-pilot, and four passengers on board.

Spencer Flynn, airport spokesperson, said that the pilot was trying to land when it crashed west of Airport Road.

Emergency personnel were on the scene, including Clinton County and Lansing Fire for mutual aid.

Flynn said that they don't yet know the cause of the crash.

“No details on that. I know that it was coming in on the approach and that’s when something went wrong.”

It crashed 125 yards off Airport Road, which is technically not airport property, officials said in the press conference held after the crash.

"Aircraft accidents are very complex and will involve many agencies to conclude the investigation," Capital Region International Airport said in a statement.

They added, "we ask for your patience as we continue to navigate this crisis, attend to those injured, accommodate and inform families and protect the public."

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.wilx.com

WATERTOWN TWP. — Four of the six men killed or critically injured in a single-engine plane crash near Lansing Thursday were coming to town as contractors for the Lansing Board of Water & Light's Delta Energy Park. The crash killed three of the six men on board, including two of the contractors.

Clinton County Sheriff's Office this morning identified the dead as Timothy Clark, 67, of Franklin, Indiana; John Lowe, 51, of Greenwood, Indiana; and Neil Sego, 46, of Trafalgar, Indiana. 

The three critically injured in the crash are Joel Beavins, 48, of Franklin, Indiana; Aaron Blackford, 42, of Frankton, Indiana; and Zechariah Bennett, 27, of Plainfield, Indiana. They remain in critical condition at Sparrow Hospital. 

Beavins and Clark both hold commercial pilot licenses through the Federal Aviation Administration, although sheriff's officials have not confirmed who the pilot and copilot were. 

Clinton County Sheriff Larry Jerue said the plane, which appeared to be a leased TBM 700, originated in the Indianapolis, Indiana, area and was en route to the Capital Region International Airport when it crashed at about 9 a.m. in Watertown Township, just north of Lansing and west of the Capital Region International Airport. 

The four passengers on the plane were flying to Lansing to meet the Lansing Board of Water & Light in their role as contractors for the new Delta Energy Park. 

“On behalf of the entire workforce at the Lansing Board of Water & Light, I extend my most sincere condolences to the victims and families of those involved in Thursday’s plane crash," BWL Dick Peffley said in a statement released by spokesperson Amy Adamy. "I know this is a difficult time for those BWL employees who worked with their team, and grief services are being made available.”

Tim Horth, co-founder of Patterson-Horth, said Bennett worked for him at the Indianapolis-based construction company. 

"Zech Bennett is a valued employee and always has a positive attitude and smile on his face," Horth said in an email. "This news has devastated all the employees of Patterson-Horth.  We pray for his recovery and those others impacted by this accident."

Three of the victims, Sego, Blackford and Lowe, worked at The Engineering Collaborative in Indianapolis, said Principal Samuel Hurt. He identified Lowe as a business partner and Sego and Blackford as employees.

Police have not yet determined what caused the plane to crash. Jerue said it was misty and cloudy at the time of the crash, but would not confirm if weather was a factor. 

The Lansing airport received an emergency alert from the aircraft just before 9 a.m., said Eric Patrick, chief of public safety and operations for the airport. He said he isn't sure if the alert came in before or after the crash. 

The plane was likely on final approach, as it was largely intact at the crash scene, Patrick said Thursday. There was no fire on board when crews arrived. 

Thursday’s crash is the deadliest on record in Lansing. Only two of the 28 plane crashes investigated by the National Transportation Safety Bureau in Lansing were fatal, according to data the federal government began tracking in 1962.

In October 1982, the pilot of a Beechcraft airplane died after crashing in a field off Pratt Road in Clinton County north of Lansing.

In September 1993, both the pilot and a passenger died after a plane leaving Capital Region International Airport crashed behind a residential neighborhood near Waverly Road and Hunters Ridge Drive south of the Grand River in Lansing.

Original article ➤ https://www.lansingstatejournal.com


  1. A rather comprehensive preliminary report in less than 10 days.

    RIP guys


  2. RIP

    They let the speed decay to stall. Being overweight doesn't help either. This shows a level of complacency not compatible with a commercial pilot ticket. Especially in a high performance turboprop that will try to kill you every chance it gets.

  3. RIP to all.

    I don't understand why the gear was up. The throttle position was not consistent with a go-around/missed approach. Anyone think that this would have been survivable if the gear was down?

  4. They may have realized how low the speed was and tried to push it hard but it was too late for a 7000+ lb bird.

    Either way the neglect in monitoring airspeed was deadly.

  5. Problem here is the CG was three inches aft of the limit. Well outside the envelope. Plane may have had an uncontrolled pitch up. Very dangerous situation to put an airplane into. Attempting a go around would be the correct recovery. Very unfortunate.

  6. Let's get rid of anonymous comments, then this will be a website of value. Fake names don't count either. I am Michael Gaff. PPl in September 1971 (airline pilot, commercial pilot, corporate flunky, aircraft owner).

    Who the heck flies an instrument approach, inside the outer marker, with the gear up. Slow the airplane (some flaps and definitely gear down helps), run your checklists until only a few items remain, monitor one's airspeed (monitor one's airspeed) (then, monitor one's airspeed), look for the runway at DH, then land if it is in sight ( if not, go-around).

    This is not rocket surgery.

    These clowns killed themselves with incredibly inadequate flying, taking others with them.

    In the end, we all die, but these deaths were ridiculously avoidable until a later time.

  7. Did I read this correctly -no gear or flaps less than a mile from the runway threshold, therefore no stabilized approach?

  8. Well Gaffster I think you got your wish granted today.

  9. Ok, hold on everyone, piece the puzzle together. My theory is this: Once he crossed the final approach fix (the outer marker for ILS 10R LAN), the approach was flown under normal operating configuration for that aircraft - gear down, flaps down, condition lever forward, prop lever forward, power as required, all should have been completed and set for a turbine aircraft upon crossing the outer marker. Final approach speed should have been around 85-95 knots for that weight (even though they were STILL above max landing weight), until crossing the runway threshold. His airspeed varied and ultimately decayed without his realizing it (inexperience for total flight time and in that aircraft in IMC), and then at the last possible, most critical moment, his speed bled down to 64 knots, below stall speed in the landing config. He was heavy, aft CG, and too slow. That is a recipe for a dramatic pitch up stall. He tried to go around, only gained 20 ft of altitude. In the process of going around, he tries to retract the flaps and gear, as those handles were found in the upright position, thinking that will help, but he has no positive rate of climb yet, so that should not have been attempted. But, 2 of the 3 gear were tucked away and locked, the flaps only made it halfway up, hence the jackscrews being at 50%. This maneuver only increased his pitch and stall speed, not to mention his probable angle of attack, the airplane enters a severe nose down, wing down stall, he pulls the power to flight idle to hopefully save the airplane from accelerating into the trees, pulls back on the controls which accelerates the stall, and it impacts terrain in a flat position with flap handle up, gear handle up, power lever at flight idle. That is what I think happened.

    I am a very experienced ATP, CFII with 8500 flight hours in turbine aircraft.

  10. I also drove by the crash nite the following morning. It was very surreal

  11. It's a very well thought out analysis from the back seat. Good job.

  12. 8500, what evidence does it take in NTSBs investigation to validate "That is what I think happened" ?

  13. Meh, We're all entitled to an opinion. I think 8500 has it down to a tee. sue me later for agreeing with him. It's the most technical explanation on this thread to date.

  14. Probably a classic example of the pilot looking for the runway without sufficient visual references. This led to a breakdown in his instrument crosscheck and likely the reason he lost the bubble on his airspeed on short final. Wx was at 400 AGL, but vis was only 1.25 miles. ILS looked normal prior to that point. Probably spent too much time looking out once he got himself below the cloud (and started to see the ground) and realized it too late to safely go-around. Also probably explains the slight left turn since he might have been straining to see the runway. W/B didn't help on the go.

  15. I would agree with 8500, except that accident pilot blew through the final approach fix 70knots too fast, and was in no position crossing the outer marker to lower flaps or gear. Way behind the airplane. I spent some time in accident airplane with accident pilot, and have reviewed all his prior flights in the previous 2 weeks, whereas he crosses the FAF at 105kts plus or minus 5kts. The airplane was way ahead of him this day. I have been grieving the loss of a friend and hoped to get some closure with the initial report, however, the NTSB report poised more questions than answers. Every time I was with accident pilot, he had gear down and one notch of flaps at 105kts crossing FAF. Certainly not clean at 178 kts. Such a shame.

    1. Cirrus Skies, can you tell me if you and the pilot practiced missed approaches during your time in the TBM?, and in which airplane, cirrus or tbm, did the pilot achieved his commercial rating? Thank You.

  16. Yes, CirrusSkies is correct for approach flaps, gear, and 105 knots speed at the OM. Crossing the OM at 168-178 knots is 70 knots too fast for the TBM series. CirrusSkies, I am sorry for the loss of your friend.

    And for the record, the opinions in my posts are mine alone and should not be taken to represent the actual final events of the accident flight.

  17. I think 8500 is spot on in his analysis. Even so, how does one think that retracting flaps and gear in an otherwise flyable condition is safe? Go out somewhere, establish a sink rate mimicking a glide slope with gear and flaps in a suitable configuration, then suddenly clean up the airplane. I used to be a maintenance/test pilot for Beech. I absolutely love the PT-6 series of engines (I couldn't stand the Garrett stuff), but they definitely had a little bit of a spool-up time from flight idle. These guys were trying to make a somewhat recovered approach out of a s**t sandwich. I have never made any mistakes, so what do I know?
    By the way, to prove 8500's hypothesis, when you do try to go around from a flight idle condition to a climb, you will lose a few hundred feet.

  18. Thanks 8500. I believe your hypothesis is spot on. Such an unfortunate tragedy.

  19. what are your thoughts on the plane pulling left at approximately the decision point? I’ve been looking into this aircraft and here's what I've found- the French Government, the BEA, did a study on this aircraft and its tendency to pull left at a low speed when thrust is increased rapidly. They recommend that all pilots receive extra training to correct the issue. Is this a training issue or a design flaw? From what I can find online, and these numbers may not be correct, they produced approximately 324 of the 700 series built in various configurations. And including this crash there are 63 fatalities associated with the 700 series. And a total of 45 crashes. There have been 2 crashes 11 days apart. How do these numbers sound to you? 13.5% of all TBM 700’s that have been produces have crashed.

  20. This crash was more than that... it was a surreal hard impact. So many people died from internal trauma. So sad.

    Deer Hunter, there have been a lot of these crashes caused by too much money, and not enough experience! The most recent I can find (besides this one) have been due to spatial disorientation, wx, etc.

  21. undated from https://www.slackdavis.com/crashes-by-model/airplanes/socata-tbm700-850-pratt-whitney-pt6-engine/
    "When you need legal help after a catastrophic injury, turn to us."

    "There have been a total of 30 recorded incidences with the SOCATA TBM700, according to the Aviation Safety Network. A number of accidents involving the TBM700/850 occurred towards the end of the flight when the aircraft was about to land. Witnesses have reported that that the aircraft can potentially turn or roll towards the left and lose control. Experts warn purchasers of used aircraft to carefully inspect the engines and landing gear of the TBMs. This is because a previous pilot may have operated the aircraft beyond its recommended capabilities, engaging in “hard landings” or putting too much strain on the engine."

  22. Say what you want about the airplane but this was Pilot error. The plane got in front of him and he couldn't handle it. descent rate at 1,375ft was 844 fpm at 95 kts. There is no way this should happen with a co-pilot on board.

  23. Why doesn't the crash scene indicate any fatalities? No fire...intact, upright airframe? What happened to kill these poor folks?............rd

  24. Blunt trauma to the head, neck and torso, contusion, traumatic brain injury, forces of sudden deceleration = almost immediate death.

  25. Power up, fine. Gear up, fine. Flaps up, not until you have positive rate.

  26. From what the manufacturer has listed, this aircraft did not come standard with a cockpit voice recorder. Does anyone know how to find out if this plane had a cockpit voice recorder installed? And if it did have one installed how can someone go about getting that recording or transcript?

  27. Questions from above (Monday, October 21, 2019 at 7:16:00 PM EDT):
    Q1. "Does anyone know how to find out if this plane had a cockpit voice recorder installed?"
    Q2. "And if it did have one installed how can someone go about getting that recording or transcript?"


    A1. I don't know; maybe somebody else does. I looked for a for-sale specs to no avail. Perhaps the FAA, NTSB, the plane's mechanics, and/or the LLC's registered agent know.
    A2. If there is a CVR, the NTSB has it and I doubt that they would release its complete contents at this point--if ever. I could be wrong.

    LiveATC has recordings of ATC communications (which do not include intra-aircraft communications).
    E.g., KLAN-Oct-03-2019-1230Z.mp3 has N700AQ-related communications starting with:

    [08:40:19] N700AQ: [Ap-]proach, [unclear] with you, 11-thousand.
    [08:40:35] GREAT LAKES APP: Last calling Approach, say again.
    [08:40:37] N700AQ: Uh, November-7-hundred-Alpha-Quebec with you, 11-thousand.

    and ending with N700AQ's final communications:

    [08:54:25] KLAN-TWR: T-B-M-7-0-0-Alpha-Quebec, Lansing Tower. The wind's calm. 1-0-Right, cleared to land.
    [08:54:30] N700AQ: Cleared to land, uh, 10-Right. [Unclear phrase.]

    and followed by ATC's attempts to get a response from N700AQ and related communications with other aircraft and ground vehicles.

    I have a draft transcript of the previously mentioned file and could clean it up and post it here if there is interest.
    I intend to inspect and transcribe earlier files--e.g., those that include N700AQ's communications with Indy Approach, etc.

  28. CirrusSkies, I take it from your previous comments that your answer on the CVR is from personal experience in that aircraft with that pilot, and not just the standard answer from the TBM700 manual, correct? It sounds like you’re trying to make sense of the tragedy that took your friend. I do not mean any disrespect to you or your friend at all, it appears that you were surprised at the possible errors that your friend could have made. And that those potential errors aren’t indicative of him as a pilot. It sounds like your search for info is for some explanation or evidence that something else was wrong or that something had changed. For everyone else, we don’t know what kind of pilot he was, or anything about him. So everyone else’s opinion of him as a pilot is based on the data and pictures provided. But it sounds like you knew a different pilot, not one that would not have made the suspected errors that are going around that could end up being the cause, waiting on the factual report for cause, is that a fair statement?

    1. Yes Deer Hunter. He was clearly behind the airplane. He’s always been solid on the radio. The first time I’ve ever heard “uh” was in the atc tapes on the accident flight. He blew through the OM arguably 80kts too fast at least. That should have been a go-around point, but clearly wasn’t. Last approach calls he mistakingly says “Uh clear one-two right” and in the next call acknowledges “clear ten right.” Compounding distractions trying to catch up to the circumstances and I can hear the stress in the calls. This unfolds like every other accident report where friends of accident pilot are unexpectedly shocked by pilot error. A series of bad decisions to reconcile a poor setup, as the approach was unstable because of high airspeed initially, resulted in getting so far behind the plane it became disorienting to the pilot, and eventually led to an unrecoverable loss of airspeed at a low altitude. This was a senseless and tragic accident.

  29. Jimbo, bro... Power up, pitch up, flaps approach, positive rate .... then gear up. You might not attain positive rate with landing flaps Sir.

    1. This is most certainly the correct order. The TBM has plenty of power to climb in the full landing configuration.

  30. N500AQ had a Garmin GTN750 with remote audio panel and clearance recorder. The clearance recorder records and maintains all cockpit and radio communications. The audio can be retrieved the next time the audio panel is turned on. The information is not lost until it is overwritten by new messages.
    The pilot in command will always be blamed as long as the aircraft, engine and propeller manufacturer “support” the aircraft accident investigation.

  31. The clearance recorder only records incoming TX, not cockpit communications when the mic-key isn’t triggered. I have played back many clearances with the audio playback function on the gtn750 remote audio receiver, and it never included cockpit communications.

  32. Quoted from above:
    Last approach calls he mistakingly says “Uh clear one-two right” and in the next call acknowledges “clear ten right.”
    —Thursday, October 24, 2019 at 11:44:00 AM EDT

    I too noticed the pilot's "12R" error and correction.
    I also noticed that the pilot had requested going to the IAF UNSON but then accepted going to the IF PETKE instead. Maybe that rushed him too much?

    Here are excerpts from my transcript of KLAN-Oct-03-2019-1230Z.mp3:
    [08:40:53] N700AQ: Expect a[n] I-L-S, uh, 1-0-Right. And we have information Papa. Is it possible to go to the, uh, Un... UNSON, uh, for our initial approach fix? [Note: UNSON is the charted IAF; PETKE is the IF.]
    [08:42:54] GREAT LAKES APP: And T-B-M-0-Alpha-Quebec, did you want to go, uh, to UNSON, or did you want to go to PETKE?

    [08:43:03] N700AQ: We can do PETKE. [unknown word/phrase]

    [08:43:07] GREAT LAKES APP: [clipped?] Alpha-Quebec, uh, roger, cleared direct PETKE.

    [08:43:10] N700AQ: Direct PETKE. [unclear] Alpha-Quebec.

    [08:52:47] GREAT LAKES APP: T-B-M-0-Alpha-Quebec, you're 5 miles from FAMLI [outer marker], turn right... uh, right heading 0-7-0. Maintain 3-thousand until established on the localizer. Cleared ILS Runway 1-0 Right.

    [08:52:58] N700AQ: 0-7-0, uh, cleared for I-L-S, uh, 10-Right into Lansing.

    [08:54:11] GREAT LAKES APP: T-B-M-0-Alpha-Quebec, contact Lansing Tower, 1-1-9er-point-9er. Good day.

    [08:54:15] N700AQ: 1-19-90. (condensed pronunciation) 0-Alpha-Quebec.

    [08:54:19] N700AQ: [Lansing] Tower, 7-hundred-Alpha-Quebec with you on I-L-S, uh, 1-2-Right. [note: should be "1-0-Right"]

    [08:54:25] KLAN-TWR: T-B-M-7-0-0-Alpha-Quebec, Lansing Tower. The wind's calm. 1-0-Right, cleared to land.

    [08:54:30] N700AQ: Cleared to land, uh, 10-Right. [Unclear phrase.]

    [08:58:00] KLAN-TWR: T-B-M-0-Alpha-Quebec, Lans[-ing] Tower.

    [08:58:13] KLAN-TWR: [after no response from N700AQ] November-7-0-0-Alpha-Quebec, Lansing Tower.

  33. If the 2 rear seat passengers hadn't been aboard the plane would have been about 350 lbs lighter and the cg not past the aft limits. Maybe then they could have salvaged the go-around attempt despite all the other blunders.

    1. You are 100% correct in that the weight and balance would have been better, If the 2 rear passengers were not in that aircraft. If that is true then that is 100% pilot error. The pilot is in charge of weight and balance.

  34. In response to Anonymous and the weight issue. They had 181 gallons of fuel in the plane on the morning of the flight. The report I read said they added 100 gallons before they left. That makes 281 gallons of fuel. The report also said they used 70 gallons to fly to Michigan. With a fuel reserve in mind, why did they have so much fuel onboard? AVGas is 6.01 lbs per gallon. With approx 150-181 gallons of extra fuel, that is 900-1086lbs that they didn't need to carry. Was this a factor as well or do they use fuel to balance the aircraft better?

  35. High vertical-G impact, not good on human bodies. Very little forward energy.

  36. Anonymous bro - you milk your flaps up. If you power up, raise the gear and raise the flaps any at all you will sink, as they did. I agree, take-off flaps is where you'd end up. A good way of getting a low wing airplane onto the runway if you're floating is dump the flaps. You will hit the ground.