Tuesday, October 08, 2019

Landing Area Undershoot: Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress, N93012; fatal accident occurred October 02, 2019 at Bradley International Airport (KBDL), Windsor Locks, Hartford County, Connecticut

New lawsuit filed in Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress plane crash that killed 7 at Bradley International Airport



Another lawsuit has been filed in connection with the October 2019 crash of a vintage World War II military plane at Bradley International Airport in Windsor Locks that killed seven people.

The latest lawsuit was filed June 10 in Hartford Superior Court by the two children of the flight’s volunteer co-pilot, Michael Foster, who died along with the pilot and five passengers.

The flight on Oct. 2, 2019, was part of an annual tour run by the Collings Foundation, which gave paying passengers a chance to take short trips on vintage military planes at airports around the country.

According to a report of the crash, the plane’s pilot radioed an air traffic controller about five minutes into the flight to request permission to land. The controller asked the pilot if he needed assistance and the pilot responded with “negative.”

The plane stopped climbing in altitude, and the pilot instructed the co-pilot to extend the landing gear. The pilot then shut down a malfunctioning engine.

On final approach, the airplane struck the runway approach lights, causing it to land short of the runway and hit vehicles and a deicing fluid tank. The plane then caught fire.

The lawsuit follows the release in April of a final report on the cause of the crash from the National Transportation Safety Board.

Among the probable causes for the accident the board cited was pilot error. The report states that the pilot failed to properly manage the airplane’s configuration and speed after shutting down the malfunctioning engine.

Contributing factors included inadequate maintenance of the airplane, the Collings Foundation’s ineffective safety management system, and inadequate oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration.

In the most recent lawsuit, filed by Erin Foster as the administrator of her father’s estate and Liam Foster, the two cite the findings from the report.

The lawsuit also accuses the foundation and its trustees of not only failing to follow the foundation’s safety rules and performing proper maintenance, but deliberately choosing not to.

“It could have delayed and impacted the flight schedule and precluded a second flight of paying passengers from occurring, a result that would have reduced revenue from the flight,” the lawsuit states.

The lawsuit accuses Robert Collings Jr., director of operations for the foundation, of “placing revenue and reputation before safety.”

Furthermore, the lawsuit accuses the foundation of transferring its assets to an affiliate company, including six aircraft, and 33 acres of real estate in Stow, Massachusetts. The lawsuit states that those transfers were completed because Collings had insufficient insurance to cover its liability from the crash.

There are several other pending lawsuits related to the crash. They have been filed by the family members of Gary Mazzone, 66, of East Windsor; Robert Riddell, 59, of East Granby; Robert Rubner, 64, of Tolland; and David Broderick Jr., 56, of West Springfield.

 



Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities: 
Federal Aviation Administration Accident Investigation and Prevention-100; Washington, DC
The Collins Foundation; Stow, Massachusetts 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:


Location: Windsor Locks, Connecticut 
Accident Number: ERA20MA001
Date & Time: October 2, 2019, 09:53 Local 
Registration: N93012
Aircraft: Boeing B17
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Landing area undershoot 
Injuries: 7 Fatal, 5 Serious, 2 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Other work use

Analysis

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) identified the following safety issues during this accident investigation:

o the need for an appropriate regulatory framework for living flight history experience (LHFE) flights, including maintenance and management policies and procedures;

o the need for increased Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of LHFE operations; and

o the need for FAA oversight of LHFE operators’ safety management systems (SMS).

These safety issues are discussed in the NTSB’s aviation investigation report addressing broader systemic safety issues associated with revenue passenger-carrying operations currently conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, including LHFE flights. That aviation investigation report, titled Enhance Safety of Revenue Passenger-Carrying Operations Conducted Under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 (NTSB/AAR21/03), can be accessed from the Aviation Accident Reports page of the NTSB’s website. This report includes references to safety recommendations from the Part 91 aviation investigation report.

The vintage, former US military bomber airplane was on a tour that allowed members of the public to purchase an excursion aboard the airplane for an LHFE flight. The accident flight was the airplane’s first flight of the day. During the initial climb, one of the pilots retracted the landing gear, and the crew chief/flight engineer (referred to as the loadmaster) left the cockpit to inform the passengers that they could leave their seats and walk around the airplane.

One of the pilots reported to air traffic control that the airplane needed to return to the airport because of a rough magneto. At that time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 600 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller asked the pilot if he needed any assistance, to which the pilot replied, “negative.”

When the loadmaster returned to the cockpit, he realized that the airplane was no longer climbing, and the pilot, realizing the same, instructed the copilot to extend the landing gear, which he did. The loadmaster left the cockpit to instruct the passengers to return to their seats and fasten their seat belts. When the loadmaster returned again to the cockpit, the pilot stated that the No. 4 engine was losing power; the pilot then shut down that engine and feathered the propeller without any further coordination or discussion.

When the airplane was at an altitude of about 400 ft agl, it was on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6. Witness video showed that the landing gear had already been extended by that time, even though the airplane still had about 2.7 nautical miles to fly in the traffic pattern before reaching the runway 6 threshold.

During final approach, the airplane struck the runway 6 approach lights in a right-wing-down attitude about 1,000 ft before the runway and then contacted the ground about 500 ft before the runway. After landing short of the runway, the airplane traveled onto the right edge of the runway threshold and continued to veer to the right. The airplane collided with vehicles and a deicing fluid tank before coming to rest upright about 940 ft to the right of the runway. A postcrash fire ensued.

Postaccident examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Teardown examination of the Nos. 3 and 4 propellers revealed that their blades were in the low-pitch and feathered positions, respectively.

Teardown examination of the No. 4 engine revealed that the left magneto’s P-lead was partially pulled out of the magneto housing and that a single strand of safety wire was around the retaining nut. Although the No. 4 engine’s left magneto produced a strong spark on the ignition leads for all nine cylinders, the grounding tab contacted the housing and caused the magneto to short and not function during a postaccident test. The No. 4 engine’s right magneto produced no spark on one of the nine ignition leads and a weak and intermittent spark on the other eight ignition leads because of wear to the compensator cam. The shorted-out left magneto would have caused rough engine operation and a partial loss of engine power that would have been exacerbated by the weak right magneto, which is likely what prompted the pilot to shut down the No. 4 engine and return to the airport.

With the No. 4 engine shut down, the pilot would have had to use a higher power setting for the No. 3 engine to compensate for the loss of power from the No. 4 engine. Teardown examination of the No. 3 engine revealed evidence of detonation on four of the nine cylinders. In addition, the teardown examination revealed that the spark plugs were worn and had gaps between the electrodes that were beyond the manufacturer’s specifications. The condition of the spark plugs likely resulted in detonation and a partial loss of engine power that further reduced the total thrust available and exacerbated the thrust asymmetry. The pilot likely did not recognize, or recognized too late, the extent of the loss of engine power on the airplane’s right side.

The pilot had performed a preflight run-up check of the magnetos at an engine speed of 1,700 rpm, which was higher than the 1,600-rpm speed in the Collings Foundation’s run-up checklist; after the check, the magnetos appeared to perform normally. However, a B-17 engine ground test checklist included instructions to check the magnetos at an engine speed between 1,900 and 2,000 rpm. If the pilots had been required to perform the magneto check at the higher rpm, they might have detected the detonation on the No. 3 engine and/or the magneto anomalies on the No. 4 engine (if either resulted in an rpm drop that exceeded 100 rpm, which would have been inconsistent with the B-17’s acceptable limits) and taken action before the flight to resolve the issues.

During the return to the airport, the pilot flew the traffic pattern at an airspeed of 100 mph and below, and he allowed the airspeed to decay far below that required to minimize the loss of altitude over a given distance flown (about 120 mph). It is likely that the airplane was unable to maintain altitude at the lower airspeeds because the pilot could apply only a limited amount of power to the left-wing engines while simultaneously trimming the asymmetric thrust with the available rudder authority. Extending the landing gear created additional drag that exacerbated this situation; the landing gear should not have been extended until it became evident that the airplane could reach the runway. If the pilot had lowered the airplane’s nose to maintain the airspeed that was initially achieved during the climb and kept the landing gear retracted until landing on the runway was assured, the NTSB’s airplane performance study showed that the airplane could likely have overflown the approach lights and touched down beyond the runway threshold. Thus, the pilot did not appropriately manage the airplane’s configuration and airspeed after he shut down the No. 4 engine.

The accident pilot was also the Collings Foundation’s director of maintenance and was responsible for performing the airplane’s maintenance while it was on tour. However, the teardown examinations of the Nos. 3 and 4 engines revealed maintenance issues that were not addressed during the airplane’s current tour. For example, the No. 3 engine’s 25-hour inspection occurred less than 1 month before the accident. As part of that inspection, the spark plugs should either have been cleaned, inspected, and tested or replaced with new plugs, and the gap between the electrodes should have been checked. The teardown examination foundworn spark plugs with gaps between the electrodes that were beyond the manufacturer’s specifications, which should have been identified and corrected during the inspection of the No. 3 engine. As previously stated, the worn spark plugs would have contributed to the partial loss of power on the No. 3 engine and the asymmetric thrust.

The 25-hour inspection also includes a check of the point gap for each magneto. The No. 4 engine had its 25-hour inspection 9 days before the accident, but the teardown examination found that the gap between the points on the right magneto was less than the minimum gap that the manufacturer required, indicating that this check was either not performed or was improperly performed. As a result of the point gap, most of the ignition leads produced sparks that were weak or intermittent, adding to the loss of engine power caused by the short in the left magneto. To address the aircraft maintenance deficiencies found in this and other accident investigations discussed in the Part 91 aviation investigation report, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-21-9 in April 2021. This safety recommendation asked the FAA to “develop national safety standards, or equivalent regulations, for revenue passenger-carrying operations that are currently conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, including, butnot limited to…living history flight experience and other vintage aircraft flights.” The recommendation stated that these standards, or equivalent regulations, should include (among other things) operationally specific maintenance requirements.

At the time of the accident, the Collings Foundation was operating with an LHFE exemption that provided the operator with relief from specific FAA regulations. The FAA’s most recent letter granting the Collings Foundation’s exemption stated that the foundation “must maintain and apply on a continuous basis its safety and risk management program that meets or exceeds the criteria specified in the FAA [LHFE] Policy.” The FAA’s policy stated that LHFE operators, including the Collings Foundation, were required to have a plan to mitigate risks that followed safety risk management principles.

The Collings Foundation implemented an SMS about 2 1/2 years before the accident, which could have met the requirements of the FAA’s LHFE policy and the FAA’s letter that granted the foundation’s LHFE exemption. However, the SMS was not an effective safety risk management program. The SMS safety officer, who was responsible for managing the SMS, was a part-time, volunteer pilot and, as such, interacted with the foundation’s management and personnel on a sporadic basis only. Further, the SMS did not detect and appropriately manage the risks associated with safety issues related to the pilot’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane while it was on tour.

The SMS also did not detect that the Collings Foundation’s engine run-up checklist was inconsistent with the B-17 engine ground test checklist or that the pilot and copilot did not wear their shoulder harnesses during flights (as reported by the loadmaster). In addition, the SMS did not detect that the loadmaster’s passenger briefings might have been insufficient (as indicated by statements from multiple surviving passengers that the briefing did not include information about seat belts, exits, or emergency equipment) or that he would stand unrestrained between the pilot and copilot during takeoff and landing, even though the foundation indicated that the seat to the left of the ball turret was available for him. The pilots’ failure to use their shoulder harnesses and the loadmaster’s failure to be restrained during takeoff and landing were inconsistent with federal regulations addressing the use of safety belts and shoulder harnesses.

Even though the Collings Foundation was not specifically required to have an SMS, the FAA’s most recent letter granting the Collings Foundation’s exemption stated that the foundation was required to have an SMS manual (used as a basis for an equivalent level of safety) and provide it to the Orlando, Florida, Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). However, the manual was not a regulatory or an approved document, and the FSDO did not review the manual or the safety reports submitted as part of the SMS to ensure that the SMS met or exceeded the safety risk management criteria in the FAA’s policy for operators with LHFE exemptions. As a result, the FAA’s oversight of the Collings Foundation’s SMS was not effective in identifying and mitigating safety risks. In April 2021, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations A-21-13, which asked the FAA to require SMS for the revenue passenger-carrying operations discussed in the Part 91 aviation investigation report; these operations included LHFE flights. The NTSB also issued Safety Recommendation A-21-14, which asked the FAA to provide ongoing oversight of each operator’s SMS once established.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot’s failure to properly manage the airplane’s configuration and airspeed after he shut down the No. 4 engine following its partial loss of power during the initial climb. Contributing to the accident was the pilot/maintenance director’s inadequate maintenance while the airplane was on tour, which resulted in the partial loss of power to the Nos. 3 and 4 engines; the Collings Foundation’s ineffective safety management system (SMS), which failed to identify and mitigate safety risks; and the Federal Aviation Administration’s inadequate oversight of the Collings Foundation’s SMS.

Findings

Personnel issues Incorrect action selection - Pilot
Personnel issues Incorrect action performance - Pilot
Aircraft (general) - Incorrect use/operation
Aircraft Airspeed - Not attained/maintained
Personnel issues Scheduled/routine maintenance - Maintenance personnel
Organizational issues Adequacy of safety program - Operator
Organizational issues Oversight of operation - FAA/Regulator

Factual Information

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 2, 2019, about 0953 eastern daylight time, a Boeing B-17G, N93012, was destroyed when it impacted terrain short of runway 6 at Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks, Connecticut. The commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, and five passengers were fatally injured; the crew chief/flight engineer and four passengers were seriously injured; and one passenger and one person on the ground sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated by the Collings Foundation as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 local commercial sightseeing flight.

The accident airplane, shown in figure 1, was a vintage, former US military bomber that was on a tour that allowed members of the public to purchase an excursion aboard the airplane for a living history flight experience (LHFE). After the passengers boarded the airplane, they were seated by the crew chief/flight engineer (referred to as the loadmaster). The 20- to 25-minute flight included a planned in-flight walking tour of the airplane.

Source: Ms. Macey Lorden
Figure 1. Accident airplane

On the morning of the accident flight, a lineman at BDL assisted the loadmaster as he added 160 gallons of 100 low-lead aviation fuel to the accident airplane. The loadmaster stated, during a postaccident interview, that the pilot had difficulty starting the Nos. 3 and 4 engines (both of which were on the right wing of the airplane) because of moisture in the magnetos due to rain the day before. (A magneto is an electrical generator that uses a rotating magnet to produce high-voltage electricity that is distributed to the spark plugs). The loadmaster, who held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings, dried the magnetos by blowing compressed nitrogen into them, after which the engines started normally. Before takeoff, the pilot performed a magneto check at an engine speed of 1,700 rpm, and the loadmaster reported that everything seemed normal.

The accident flight was the airplane’s first flight of the day. The flight departed from runway 6 about 0947. During the initial climb, one of the pilots retracted the landing gear, and the loadmaster, who had been standing between the pilot and copilot in the cockpit, moved into the cabin to tell the passengers that they could leave their seats and walk through the airplane.

According to a transcript of radio communications between air traffic controllers and the pilots, at 0949:19, one of the pilots stated, “we would like to return to the field.” Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that, at the time, the airplane was about 600 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller asked the pilot if he required any assistance, to which the pilot replied “negative.” The controller then asked why the airplane would be returning to the airport, and the pilot replied that the airplane had a “rough mag[neto]” on the No. 4 engine.

During a postaccident interview, the loadmaster stated that, when he returned to the cockpit, he realized that the airplane was no longer climbing and that the pilot, realizing the same, instructed the copilot to extend the landing gear, which he did. The loadmaster also stated that he left the cockpit to instruct the passengers to return to their seats and fasten their seat belts.

According to the loadmaster, after returning to the cockpit, the pilot indicated that the No. 4 engine was losing power and that he wanted to shut down that engine. (The loadmaster looked at the rpm gauge and confirmed that the No. 4 engine was losing power.) The pilot then shut down the No. 4 engine without any further coordination or discussion.

At 0949:42, the controller instructed the pilot to fly a right downwind leg for runway 6 and asked whether the airplane needed an immediate landing. One of the pilots responded that he wanted the airplane “to be on the ground as soon as possible.” The controller subsequently canceled another airplane’s approach to the airport and advised the pilot to “proceed however necessary” to runway 6.

At 0950:50, the approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the tower (local) controller, and the pilot acknowledged the instruction. After the pilot established contact, the tower controller reported that the wind was calm and that the airplane was cleared to land on runway 6. According to ADS-B data, starting about 0951:00, the airplane’s airspeed was at or below 100 mph. At 0951:08, the pilot acknowledged the landing clearance; ADS-B data indicated that the airplane was at an altitude of about 400 ft agl on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6 at that time. Witness video confirmed the loadmaster’s report that the airplane’s landing gear had been extended by the time the airplane had entered the downwind leg of the airport traffic pattern (about 2.7 nautical miles in the traffic pattern from the runway 6 threshold). 

At 0951:28, the tower controller asked about the airplane’s progress to the runway; 6 seconds later, one of the pilots replied, “we’ll get there midfield downwind now.” No further communications were received from the airplane.

The airplane was descending through an altitude of 300 ft as it turned onto the base leg of the traffic pattern for runway 6. The airplane then turned onto final approach at an altitude of 150 ft; at that time, the airplane was about 0.4 nautical mile from the runway threshold. Figure 2 depicts the airplane’s ADS-B-derived flightpath overlaid onto aerial imagery of the airport and surrounding area along with relevant voice radio transmissions between air traffic control (ATC) and the airplane.

Figure 2. ADS-B-derived flightpath and select voice radio transmissions

Note: The public docket for this accident contains the full ATC transcript. The crash location is shown in figure 4.

Witness statements and video indicated that the airplane struck the runway 6 approach lights in a right-wing-down attitude about 1,000 ft before the runway. The airplane contacted the ground about 500 ft before reaching runway 6. The engine noise increased, and the airplane accelerated as it veered to the right of the runway. The airplane then collided with vehicles and a deicing fluid tank before coming to rest upright about 940 ft to the right of the runway 6 centerline and oriented to the east. A postcrash fire ensued.

PILOT INFORMATION

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings that included airplane multiengine land as well as a type rating for the Boeing B-17. He also held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. The pilot’s logbook was not recovered. The operator reported that the pilot had 7,300 hours of flight experience in the B-17G and that he completed his annual proficiency check in the airplane on February 26, 2019. The pilot was the director of maintenance for the Collings Foundation, which was a paid position. (The pilot flew the B-17G as a volunteer.)

The copilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings that included airplane multiengine land as well as five type ratings for transport-category airplanes. He did not hold a type rating for the Boeing B-17 and was not required to hold that rating as a copilot. The copilot’s logbook was not recovered. The operator reported that the copilot had 23 hours of flight experience in the B-17G and that he completed his annual proficiency check in the airplane on February 24, 2019.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a limited airworthiness certificate for the airplane in 1994, and most of the passenger seats were installed in 1995. According to operator and maintenance records, the airplane had 15 seats in the following configuration (forward to aft):

o 2 original-equipment seats in the lower nose area, which were not used for passengers;

o 2 original-equipment pilot seats on the flight deck (above the lower nose area);

o 2 aft-facing floor seats mounted to the structure behind the pilot seats;

o 3 seats in the radio room (2 side-facing seats on the floor and 1 swivel-style original-equipment radio operator seat);

o 1 aft-facing seat on the left-side bulkhead panel near the ball turret, which the operator reported was not used for passengers but was available to the loadmaster; and o 5 side-facing seats on the floor in the waist gunner area (3 right-side seats and 2 left-side seats).

The passenger seats that were not original equipment were installed in the airplane according to an engineering document that conformed with the structural requirements of Civil Aviation Regulation 4b. Some of the seats consisted of a 5/8-inch-thick plywood seatback attached to the airframe with aluminum angles and brackets, as shown in figure 3. The other seats were secured directly to the structure on an airplane sidewall or bulkhead. All of the passenger seats included a seatback cushion secured with hook and loop fasteners and a seat bottom cushion secured to a floor panel. The passenger seats were equipped with a two-point military/aerobatic-style lap belt affixed to either the seat or structural areas on or near the floor. 

Source: The Collings Foundation.

Figure 3. Accident airplane interior (forward looking aft)

The pilot and copilot seats were equipped with a four-point restraint—a two-point military/aerobatic-style lap belt and shoulder harnesses—but the loadmaster reported that the pilots did not use the shoulder harnesses. The loadmaster also reported that he did not have a dedicated seat (and thus no available restraint) and that he would “stand in between the copilot and the pilot” during flights.

The airplane was on tour each year for 10 months, and the pilot was responsible for performing the airplane’s maintenance during that time. (As previously stated, the pilot held a mechanic certificate and was the Collings Foundation’s director of maintenance.) The airplane’s continuous airworthiness inspection program included four 25-hour progressive inspections. Each of these inspections included one of the engines and its propeller. The inspected engine items included a check of the spark plugs, during which they were either cleaned, inspected, and tested or replaced with new plugs; a check of the gap between the spark plug electrodes; and a check of the point gap and timing for both engine magnetos.

The airplane’s most recent 25-hour inspection was performed on September 23, 2019, and included an examination of the No. 4 engine and propeller and the landing gear. The most recent 25-hour inspection of the No. 3 engine and propeller was performed on September 7, 2019. The pilot endorsed the work performed during these and other 25-hour inspections.

American Aero Services, a maintenance facility in New Smyrna Beach, Florida, performed annual inspections (which were not required according to the continuous airworthiness inspection program) when the airplane was not on tour. Review of maintenance records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on January 16, 2019. At that time, the airframe had accumulated a total of about 11,121 hours. Between the time of the annual inspection and the most recent 25-hour inspection, the airplane had accumulated about 267 hours.

Each of the airplane’s four nine-cylinder supercharged radial engines was equipped with a three-blade, constant-speed propeller. Engine No. 1 (outboard on the left wing) was installed on February 21, 2019, and, as of September 23, 2019, had accumulated 250 hours since its overhaul on January 8, 2019. Engine No. 2 (inboard on the left wing) was installed on January 16, 2019, and had accumulated about 267 hours since its overhaul on December 10, 2018. Engine No. 3 (inboard on the right wing) was installed on September 15, 2018, and had accumulated about 291 hours since its overhaul on January 15, 2018. Engine No. 4 (outboard on the right wing) was installed on January 15, 2016, and had accumulated about 1,106 hours since its overhaul on May 13, 2015.

Review of the Engine and Accessories Ground Test checklist in the Pilot’s Manual for Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress revealed instructions to test the magnetos at an engine speed between 1,900 and 2,000 rpm and noted that the rpm drop should not exceed 100 rpm when switching from one magneto to the other (for each engine). The Collings Foundation engine run-up and ignition checklist indicated that the magnetos were to be checked at an engine speed of 1,600 rpm. The B-17 Field Service Manual stated that the presence of moisture in the magnetos should be removed with a cloth and solvent. The manual did not contain any checklist or approved procedure for using compressed nitrogen to dry moisture in the magnetos, but, according to the Collings Foundation, that was an accepted practice within the vintage warbird community.

No stall speeds were published in the B-17 pilot’s manual for the accident airplane model. Review of a B-17 performance chart from the Experimental Aircraft Association’s (EAA) flight training manual revealed that, at 45,000 pounds and with the flaps and landing gear up, the stall speed was about 95 mph. (The EAA’s manual did not contain B-17 performance information for the airplane in the flaps-up and landing gear-down accident configuration).

AIRPORT INFORMATION

BDL has three paved runway surfaces designated 6/24 (9,510 ft long), 15/33 (6,847 ft long), and 1/19 (4,269 ft long). At the time of the accident, a notice to airmen indicated that runway 15/33 was closed except for taxi operations. The approach lighting system for runway 6 is 2,400 ft long. The lights are spaced at 100-ft intervals from the runway 6 threshold. 

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Figure 4 is an overhead image that shows the runway 6 approach area, the areas of impact damage to the instrument landing system (ILS) lighting equipment, and the location of witness marks from the airplane’s main landing gear (MLG) and right wing. The figure also shows the airplane’s final resting position about 940 ft to the right of the runway 6 centerline. Most of the cabin, cockpit, and right wing were consumed by a postcrash fire, as shown in figure 5.

Figure 4. Overhead image depicting the airplane’s path to final impact

Figure 5. Airplane wreckage

Measurement of the left- and right-wing flap jackscrews corresponded to the retracted flap setting. The left-wing flap and aileron remained attached to the wing, and a section of the flap was consumed by the postcrash fire. The right-wing flap remained attached to the wing; the aileron was consumed by the postcrash fire. The empennage, elevator, and rudder remained intact.

Control continuity was established for the elevator, rudder, and their trim tabs from each control surface to the respective cockpit controls (except for the area in the cabin that was consumed by the postcrash fire). The elevator trim and rudder trim cables were pulled by impact forces, so their preimpact position on the drum at their respective control surfaces could not be determined. The left-wing aileron trim tab remained intact, and its pushrod was connected but bent. The left aileron bellcrank separated from the wing, but the aileron cables remained attached to the bellcrank and in the cockpit. Examination of the airframe revealed no
evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions.

The Nos. 1 and 2 engines remained partially attached to the left wing, and the propeller blades remained attached to each engine. One of the propeller blades attached to the No. 1 engine exhibited an 8-inch tip separation; the separated section traveled about 700 ft before coming to rest in an airport building. Another propeller blade on the No. 1 engine exhibited chordwise scratching and leading-edge gouging. The other propeller blade on the No. 1 engine was bent aft. All of the propeller blades on the No. 2 engine exhibited leading-edge gouges and chordwise scratches. 

The No. 3 engine had separated from the right wing and was recovered on top of the airport’s deicing fluid tank, which was adjacent to the main wreckage. All of the propeller blades were attached. One of the propeller blades exhibited a 5-inch tip separation, and the separated tip section had fragmented and was recovered from two locations that were 100 and 700 ft from the main wreckage.

Teardown examination of the No. 3 engine revealed that the Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 8 cylinder piston heads exhibited areas of dark gray and white coloration that were consistent with detonation rather than normal combustion, with the No. 4 cylinder exhibiting the most evidence of detonation. (Detonation in a piston engine occurs when the fuel-air mixture in the cylinder detonates or explodes prematurely instead of being ignited by spark plugs and burning evenly and smoothly, as occurs with normal combustion. Detonation can cause rough engine operation and a loss of power and, if unaddressed, can progress to catastrophic engine failure.) Most of the spark plugs on the No. 3 engine were worn with gaps between the electrodes that were beyond the manufacturer’s specifications. Teardown examination of the No. 3 propeller showed that its internal components displayed signatures consistent with it being in the low-pitch position at the time of impact.

A fuel sample recovered from one of the No. 3 engine’s two fuel tanks had a visual appearance and smell consistent with 100 low-lead aviation fuel. The sample showed no evidence of debris or water contamination. Examination of the fuel truck used to service the airplane revealed no equipment or fuel supply anomalies.

The No. 4 engine had separated from the right wing and was recovered partially embedded in an airport building. All of the propeller blades were attached. Teardown examination of the No. 4 propeller showed that its internal components displayed signatures consistent with it being in the feathered position at the time of impact.

Teardown examination of the No. 4 engine revealed no evidence of abnormal combustion or detonation on the cylinders or pistons. The left magneto’s P-lead (the electrical connection between a magneto and the cockpit ignition switches) was partially pulled out of the magneto housing, and the grounding tab was in contact with the housing. Figure 6 shows a generic radial engine ignition system (similar to the one on the accident airplane) and the location of the left and right magnetos (for informational purposes only.) A single strand of safety wire was observed around the retaining nut. A functional test of the magneto showed that the contact between the grounding tab and the housing resulted in the magneto being shorted to ground and unable to function. When a piece of cardboard was placed between the grounding tab and the housing, the ignition leads for all nine cylinders produced a strong spark when the
drive spline was rotated. 

Source: Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook–Powerplant Volume 1 (FAA-H-8083-32A).

Figure 6. Radial engine ignition system.

The right magneto’s P-lead was partially engaged in its fitting, and the grounding tab did not contact the magneto housing. The right magneto’s gap between the points was 0.004 inch, which was less than the minimum gap (0.008 to 0.010 inch) that the manufacturer required. When the magneto was tested, the ignition leads for the No. 8 cylinder did not spark; the ignition leads for the other eight cylinders produced sparks that were weak and intermittent. In addition, the right magneto’s compensator cam and associated cam follower were worn.

Ten personal electronic devices were found in the wreckage and were forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC. No data were recovered from eight of the devices due to extensive heat damage. Video recorded before the accident flight was recovered from the other two devices; no in-flight video was recovered.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the State of Connecticut, Farmington, Connecticut, performed autopsies on the pilot, copilot, and five passengers who died. The cause of death for the pilot was smoke inhalation and thermal injury. The cause of death for the copilot was smoke inhalation, thermal injury, and blunt trauma of the trunk. The cause of death for the five passengers was blunt impact injury and/or thermal injury and smoke inhalation.

Toxicology testing was performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory. The pilot’s testing identified elevated blood carboxyhemoglobin as well as atenolol and amlodipine in his blood and urine specimens. The copilot’s testing identified elevated blood carboxyhemoglobin.

Carboxyhemoglobin is formed when carbon monoxide binds to hemoglobin in blood, impairing the blood’s ability to deliver oxygen to body tissues. Carbon monoxide exposure usually occurs by inhalation of smoke or exhaust fumes. Atenolol and amlodipine are prescription medications commonly used to treat high blood pressure and are generally considered not impairing.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The loadmaster stated that he provided a passenger briefing before every flight, which included information regarding seating locations, seat belt use, emergency exits, and prohibitions about touching flight control cables and distracting the flight crew (including taking photographs with the crew). The loadmaster also stated that he instructed passengers to be seated during taxi, takeoff, and landing and, when it was safe to move about the airplane, to limit the number of people in the nose area to two people at a time. The loadmaster indicated that he did not specifically show the passengers how to fasten their seat belts because that was “selfexplanatory.”

Multiple surviving passengers reported that the loadmaster’s briefing covered tour and logistical topics but did not include information about the seat belts, exits, or emergency equipment. According to one of the passengers, the loadmaster reminded the passengers to buckle their seat belts and indicated that the passengers should not be concerned if the seat belts were loose.

After the accident, a passenger who was seated in the rear of the airplane opened the aft right door and exited the airplane with two other passengers. The loadmaster and the two passengers who sat behind the pilot and copilot seats exited the airplane by climbing out of the upper turret located above and behind the pilot seat.

Eleven of the 13 airplane occupants received serious burn injuries. Two of the passengers who evacuated quickly from the aft right door avoided burn injuries (but received other injuries).

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The NTSB’s aircraft performance study found that the extension of the landing gear at an altitude of about 400 ft agl (before the airplane was on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6) would have steepened the descent angle at a given engine power setting and increased the power required to maintain level flight. The study also found that, during the airplane’s return to the airport from about 0951 to 0953, the airplane’s airspeed was 100 mph or below, which was less than the calculated airspeed necessary to achieve the shallowest descent angle—about 120 mph. (The shallowest descent angle minimizes the altitude lost for a given horizontal distance flown.)

According to the study, if the airplane had been flown at an airspeed that was closer to 120 mph, and with the landing gear retracted until the final approach, the airplane would likely have been at an altitude that would have allowed it to overfly the approach lights and touch down beyond the runway threshold. The study further found that, if the Nos. 1 and 2 engines had been operating at full takeoff power, the airplane should have had enough thrust to maintain level flight and approach the runway along a normal glidepath rather than land short into the approach lights. However, given the available evidence, the study was unable to determine whether the airplane would have had enough rudder authority to counteract the asymmetric thrust resulting from the Nos. 1 and 2 engines operating at full takeoff power, an unknown level of thrust from the No. 3 engine, and no thrust from the No. 4 engine.

In its October 5, 2020, submission to the NTSB as a party to this investigation, the Collings Foundation provided its assessment of the airplane’s performance with one or two inoperative engines. (The Collings Foundation became a party to this investigation on February 26, 2020.) The submission stated that “the general consensus in the B-17 community is that for one outboard engine out, 135 mph is a satisfactory speed for some climb performance, and a speed of 145-155 mph is needed for two failed engines on one wing.” The submission also stated that, during annual ground school training, the Collings Foundation taught its pilots that the B-17 “critical airspeed is 115 - 125 mph. Below this speed the aircraft will not sustain flight - 145 [mph] ideal” and “the airplane will not accelerate on two engines below critical airspeed, regardless of power, it is only possible through lowering the nose.”

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Operator Information

According to its website, the Collings Foundation is a nonprofit, educational foundation that began in 1979 and is headquartered in Stow, Massachusetts. The purpose of the foundation is “to organize and support ‘living history’ events and the presentation of historical artifacts and content that enable Americans to learn more about their heritage through direct participation” (www.collingsfoundation.org/, accessed March 24, 2021). During the mid-1980s, these activities were broadened to include aviation-related events. At the time of the accident, the Collings Foundation operated 10 aircraft, including the B-17G and a Consolidated B-24 (another former US military bomber airplane).

Living History Flight Experience Exemption

An LHFE exemption provides operators with relief from certain FAA regulations, allowing exemption holders to carry passengers for compensation or hire in historically significant aircraft that were formerly operated in US military service. These aircraft have been issued either a limited or an experimental airworthiness certificate. According to the FAA, as of February 25, 2021, 20 operators held LHFE exemptions. These exemption holders operated a fleet of 87 aircraft that ranged from small single-engine aircraft to large four-engine aircraft.

Some exemption holders operated 1 aircraft each, and the exemption holder with the largest fleet operated 23 aircraft.

The Collings Foundation had conducted LHFE flights since 1996 under exemption No. 6540P, which exempted the foundation’s operations from the requirements of the following Federal Aviation Regulations:

o 91.9, which prescribed flight manual, marking, and placard requirements; 

o 91.315, which prohibited carrying persons for compensation or hire in limited-category aircraft;

o 91.319(a), which prohibited carrying persons for compensation or hire in experimental-category aircraft;

o 119.5(g), which prescribed the need for a commercial operator certificate and operating specifications; and

o 119.21(a), which prescribed certification and operations specifications requirements for intrastate common carriage operations.

About every 2 years, the Collings Foundation was required to petition the FAA to extend the foundation’s LHFE exemption. In a September 11, 2017, letter, the Collings Foundation petitioned the FAA to extend the LHFE exemption. The FAA’s March 22, 2018, response letter extended the exemption until March 31, 2020 (unless superseded or rescinded). All of the aircraft in the Collings Foundation’s fleet at that time were covered by the exemption. According to the FAA’s letter, the petition noted that the Collings Foundation met the criteria specified in the FAA’s LHFE policy (80 Federal Register 43012, July 21, 2015). The FAA’s exemption letter also noted that the Collings Foundation was required to maintain and provide the FAA with certain manuals and documents, including at least the following: the company’s general operations manual, pilot qualifications and training manual, general maintenance manual, safety management system (SMS) manual, and approved inspection program.

On August 22, 2019, the Collings Foundation again petitioned the FAA to extend the foundation’s LHFE exemption. (The accident occurred while the FAA was reviewing the exemption extension request.) On March 25, 2020, the FAA issued a “Rescission of Existing Exemptions and Denial of Petition to Extend Exemption.” The rescission letter stated the FAA found that the Collings Foundation was not “operating in compliance with the conditions and limitations of the 6540P exemption” and that the exemption was “rescinded in full, effective immediately.” The rescission letter also stated the following:

A grant of the exemption is not in the public interest because it would adversely affect the safety of Collings Foundation’s US-registered aircraft, the FAA-certificated airmen that would be participating in the operations, the passengers on board the aircraft, and others involved in or affected by the operations.

Safety Management System

The FAA’s March 2018 letter granting the extension of the Collings Foundation’s exemption stated the following as a condition for the exemption:

Collings must maintain and apply on a continuous basis its safety and risk management program that meets or exceeds the criteria specified in the FAA Policy for all operations subject to this exemption. This includes, at a minimum, the Collings SMS Manual, used as a basis for an equivalent level of safety.

The FAA’s policy regarding LHFE exemptions stated that each operator should be guided by criteria including “an understanding and use of Safety Risk Management…principles” and “a plan to mitigate risks as they become known, or to correct an unsafe condition or practice.” The policy further stated that such risks included, but were not limited to, those involving maintenance and operations.

The Collings Foundation implemented an SMS in May 2017 and issued an SMS manual in September 2017. The SMS manual stated, in the “Background” section, “this is not a regulatory or approved document.”

The Collings Foundation’s SMS safety officer was responsible for managing the foundation’s SMS. The SMS safety officer was a part-time, volunteer pilot for the Collings Foundation and, as such, interacted with the foundation’s management and personnel on a sporadic basis. The SMS manual stated, “if a hazard is recognized the observer shall complete a Wings of Freedom Safety report through [the foundation’s] anonymous Online system or directly submit it to the Safety Officer.” (Wings of Freedom was the name of the airplane’s tour.) The Collings Foundation pilots who were interviewed after the accident indicated that, although they discussed safety issues that arose with the chief pilot, they did not submit safety reports about these issues to the safety officer or SMS.

According to the SMS safety officer, between May 2017 and January 29, 2020 (the date of the postaccident interview with the safety officer), 33 safety reports from foundation personnel had been received. The safety officer did not recall any trends and indicated that some of the reports addressed maintenance issues, birdstrikes, and spectators on the ground. The safety officer stated that the reports were reviewed before each year’s ground school training to determine if any changes to the training were warranted. The safety officer further stated that, for the January 2019 ground school training, presentation slides included examples of the safety reporting form, the link to the safety reporting form, and pages from the SMS manual. The ground school training for January 2020 was not developed at the time of the accident but included slides to encourage pilots to submit safety reports.

According to the Collings Foundation party submission for this accident, 2 of the 33 safety reports submitted to the SMS pertained to the B-17G. Those reports addressed passengers moving during taxi operations for a May 2017 flight and a cowling panel that separated from the airplane during a May 2018 flight. The Collings Foundation indicated that these issues, as well as the issues raised in the other 31 reports, were “addressed promptly,” but the specific actions taken in response were not mentioned.

Federal Aviation Administration Oversight

The 6540P exemption letter specified that the FAA’s flight standards district office (FSDO) in Orlando, Florida, was responsible for oversight of the Collings Foundation’s operations involving reciprocating engine-equipped aircraft. An aviation safety inspector was assigned to the operator as a point of contact only. The point of contact was responsible for answering regulatory questions and did not conduct ramp inspections (surveillance of a pilot, an operator, or an aircraft during operations at an airport) or en route surveillance. (The FAA was not required to perform comprehensive oversight of Part 91 operations, including LHFE operations.)

The point of contact died in 2017 and was not replaced by the FSDO. The Collings Foundation then sent regulatory questions via e-mail to another FSDO inspector (who was not assigned as the point of contact); this inspector advised the company to send questions or concerns to the Orlando FSDO’s general e-mail address. According to the Collings Foundation’s chief pilot, after several messages were not answered, foundation staff members stopped sending messages.

According to the Orlando FSDO office manager, after the accident, two people were assigned to be the points of contact for the Collings Foundation certificate, and they were intended to provide oversight for the foundation’s operations as the principal maintenance inspector and the principal operations inspector. The office manager stated that the FSDO had also provided surveillance in various cities after the accident to ensure that the Collings Foundation “was doing static display only with the B-24.”

The FAA issued Notice N 8900.568 with an effective date of November 3, 2020. The purpose of the notice was to provide FSDO inspectors with increased oversight procedures for LHFE operators. The notice indicated that the B-17 accident “revealed the need to bolster surveillance and oversight of LHFE exemption holders.” The notice instructed inspectors to perform an audit of all LHFE operators within their FSDO’s jurisdiction by the end of calendar year 2021 to “ensure compliance with regulations, the C/Ls [conditions and limitations] of the exemptions, and manual systems, utilizing FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 6, Chapter 1, Section 8, Inspect a Living History Flight Experience Exemption Holder.” According to the FAA, the information in this notice will be incorporated into Order 8900.1 before November 3, 2021, the expiration date of the notice, and the inspection will be added to the next revision of FAA Order 1800.56, National Flight Standards Work Program Guidelines, as an annual requirement.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Title 14 CFR 5.5 defines an SMS as “the formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of safety risk.” The regulation defines safety risk management as “a process within the SMS composed of describing the system, identifying the hazards, and analyzing, assessing and controlling risk.” As previously stated, the Collings Foundation was required to have a “safety and risk management program.”

Title 14 CFR 91.107 states that each person aboard a US-registered civil aircraft “must occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about him or her during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing.” As previously stated, during flights aboard the accident airplane, the pilots did not use the shoulder harnesses, and the loadmaster was not restrained in a seat.

History of Flight

Initial climb Loss of engine power (partial)
Landing Landing area undershoot (Defining event)
Landing Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)

Pilot Information

Certificate: Commercial 
Age: 75, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None 
Restraint Used: Lap only
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane 
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With waivers/limitations 
Last FAA Medical Exam: January 9, 2019
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: February 26, 2019
Flight Time: (Estimated) 14500 hours (Total, all aircraft), 7300 hours (Total, this make and model) 

Co-pilot Information

Certificate: Airline transport; Flight engineer; Flight instructor
Age: 71,Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Right
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None 
Restraint Used: Lap only
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane 
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane single-engine; Instrument airplane
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With waivers/limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: January 8, 2019
Occupational Pilot: No 
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: February 24, 2019
Flight Time: (Estimated) 22000 hours (Total, all aircraft), 23 hours (Total, this make and model)

Other flight crew Information

Certificate: Student 
Age: 34,Male
Airplane Rating(s): None
Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): None
Second Pilot Present: Yes
Instructor Rating(s): None 
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 3 Without waivers/limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: August 17, 2010
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 
Flight Time:

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Boeing
Registration: N93012
Model/Series: B17 G 
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1944 
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Limited (Special)
Serial Number: 32264
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tailwheel
Seats: 15
Date/Type of Last Inspection: September 23, 2019 Continuous airworthiness
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 64500 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 4 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 11388 Hrs as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Wright
ELT: Installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: R-1820-97
Registered Owner:
Rated Power: 1200 Horsepower
Operator: 
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Operator Does Business As: Collings Foundation
Operator Designator Code:

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual (VMC)
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: BDL,175 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 09:51 Local
Direction from Accident Site: 50°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Few / 11000 ft AGL
Visibility 10 miles
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 18000 ft AGL
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: / 
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: None / None
Wind Direction: 
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 29.8 inches Hg 
Temperature/Dew Point: 23°C / 19°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Windsor Locks, CT (BDL) 
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Destination: Windsor Locks, CT (BDL)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 09:47 Local 
Type of Airspace: Class C

Airport Information

Airport: Bradley Intl BDL 
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 173 ft msl 
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 06 
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 9510 ft / 200 ft 
VFR Approach/Landing: Precautionary landing; Traffic pattern

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 5 Fatal, 4 Serious, 1 Minor 
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries: 1 Minor
Aircraft Explosion:  None
Total Injuries: 7 Fatal, 5 Serious, 2 Minor
Latitude, Longitude: 41.931667,-72.692222

B-Roll
National Transportation Safety Board


The owner of the World War II B17-G Flying Fortress bomber that crashed at Bradley International Airport Oct. 2, killing seven and injuring five, said Thursday it is evaluating its options after the Federal Aviation Administration revoked its permission to carry passengers for pay aboard its fleet of historic aircraft.

The FAA, according to a decision released Wednesday, found that the Stow, Massachusetts-based Collings Foundation failed to properly maintain two of the four engines on the aircraft that crashed, did not follow the requirements of its permission to operate the aircraft with paying passengers and “lacked a safety culture when operating the B17-G.”

The FAA decision revoked the permission it had previously granted Collings to carry paying passengers and rejected an application to the FAA to renew that permission to carry paying passengers.

FAA says owner of World War II bomber involved in deadly Bradley crash did not take safety seriously and can no longer carry passengers »

The National Transportation Safety Board, which works closely with the FAA, is likely months away from issuing its report on the Oct. 2 crash of the B17-G “Nine O Nine," which developed engine trouble after takeoff and crashed while trying to return to the airport.

Not being able to collect the fees passengers pay to fly aboard the foundation’s World War II bombers, about $450 a ride, could effectively ground the organization’s “Wings of Freedom” tour, which has traveled the nation for about 30 years. The Collings Foundation has brought its aircraft to Connecticut dozens of times during that 30-year period.

“The Collings Foundation currently is reviewing the FAA’s decision and evaluating our options,” Hunter Chaney, a Collings spokesman, said, in a written statement. “As a party to the NTSB investigation into the tragic B-17 accident in Connecticut on October 2 of last year, we are not permitted comment on issues pertaining to the accident investigation or findings to date. We look forward to discussing with the FAA its decision findings that were not addressed with the Foundation before the issuance of the FAA decision.”

NTSB releases preliminary report about crash of B-17 at Bradley International Airport »

Chaney said the Collings Foundation has a solid safety record.

“Through 30 years of passenger carrying operations, and until the October 2, 2019 accident, the Wings of Freedom tour had never had an accident, injury or fatality,” he said. "This record reflects a commitment to safety that has proudly set a standard among the warbird community for generations. The Foundation has always held safety as its top priority."

The Collings Foundation can challenge the FAA decision if it can show that it has a significant additional fact it did not already present to the FAA, that the FAA made an important factual error or that the FAA misinterpreted the law, a regulation or precedent.


https://www.courant.com



PORTLAND (WGME) – The Portland Jetport is helping out an airport in Connecticut, following a deadly plane crash that damaged one of its buildings. 

Last month, seven people died when a World War II-era bomber plane hit the de-icing building and maintenance facility at Bradley Airport in Hartford.

With the de-icing facility out of service, the Portland Jetport is now stepping up.

The Jetport is the only airport in the nation to have a de-icing fluid recycling plant, and has agreed to take Bradley's used fluid.

"So, we will be handling more of their fluid here in Portland while they get that operation back online, which will not likely be until next de-icing season or next winter season, so we're very pleased we can help out," Portland International Jetport Director Paul Bradbury said.

Inland Technologies runs the Portland recycling facility.

The fluid from Bradley is not pre-treated or filtered, Portland will be handling the entire process.

Story and video ➤ https://wgme.com

A week after its B-17 Flying Fortress crashed killing seven in Connecticut, the Collings Foundation sent an impassioned plea to aviation groups to contact the Federal Aviation Administration in support of the exemption that allows the warbirds to fly passengers for a fee.

Aviation websites and FAA documents indicate it wasn’t the first time the foundation has asked supporters to inundate the agency with positive letters about their Wings of Freedom program flying under a Living History Flight Experience exemption.

In 2012, foundation members were blunt about what they wanted supporters to tell the FAA, which had implemented a moratorium the previous year on any new exemptions.

“End the unnecessary moratorium immediately and process the Collings Foundations’ requests as expeditiously as possible,” a letter read sent by the foundation to aviation groups around the country instructing supporters on what to say to the FAA.

In 2009 and 2010, the foundation sought a change to the exemption that would allow the non-profit to also charge passengers to fly in planes conducting aerial maneuvers and allow passengers to “manipulate the controls” of the vintage warbirds. The suggested activities sparked a third FAA review of the program since its inception in 1996 and a four-year moratorium on any new exemptions, according to FAA documents.

“The clear market orientation of these requests undermines arguments of a public-interest goal in preserving unique historical aircraft,” the FAA wrote in a 2012 notice of a public meeting seeking comment on the exemptions as the moratorium continued.

The exemptions are under fire again with U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal calling for an inquiry into the program.

The B-17, one of 10 vintage aircraft approved by the FAA for the foundation to fly passengers for a donation or fee, had just taken off from Bradley Internal Airport the morning of Oct. 2 when pilot Ernest “Mac” McCauley reported that he needed to land as soon as possible due to an engine problem, reports said.

Minutes later, the B-17 crashed about 1,000 yards short of the runway, struck stanchions, which guide airplanes in, and veered off to the right, eventually striking a de-icing building before bursting into flames.

McCauley, 75, was believed by aviation enthusiasts to be the country’s most experienced B-17 pilot with more than 7,000 hours of flight time behind the controls of the vintage warbird. He was killed in the crash along with his co-pilot and five passengers, including a retired Vernon police officer. The plane’s technician, five passengers and an airport employee suffered varying degrees of injuries.

The National Transportation Safety Board is expected to release a preliminary report on the crash in the coming days. As part of the year-long final investigation, the LHFE exemptions will be examined by the NTSB and the FAA, officials said.

The plane was flying as part of Collings’ Wings of Freedom tour, which brings vintage aircraft to about 100 commercial airports nationwide each year. Visitors are allowed to check out the planes and can take a short ride on certain models such as the B-17 for $450.

The Connecticut Airport Authority facilitated “security coordination” for the tour, which was arranged through airport “tenant” TAC Air, a national fuel wholesaler and aviation services provider.

This was the first time the Wings of Freedom tour was at Bradley since 2014. The tours had come to Bradley in 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, according to Alisa Sisic, CAA manager of marketing. There are no future tour dates scheduled, she said.

Aside from the FAA approval, there are no other clearance steps or approval authority to allow the warbirds to fly in and out of Bradley because the event was held on "leased" property, Sisic said.

"Also, we can not discriminate against a particular type of aircraft," she added.

Turbulent relationship

Collings approached the FAA with the idea for the special exemption in 1996 after restoring the B-17 Flying Fortress to match the Nine-0-Nine, which flew 140 combat missions during World War II. Collings was granted the first exemption in the country allowing a foundation or museum to fly passengers for a fee or donation under specific restrictions that don’t require the same regulations as commercial aircraft.

Since then, FAA documents and Collings Foundation letters to supporters show the organization and the agency have tendered a tense but cordial relationship. Foundation Executive Director Rob Collings has questioned the need for certain restrictions and has sought public support when their amendments are stalled or denied.

In 2010, Rob Collings repeatedly sent the agency letters highlighting what he perceived to be misinterpretations of its own exemption policy and said the stipulations never prohibited the activities he was now seeking to include.

“Passengers are prohibited from manipulating the aircraft controls when the aircraft is operated under the LHFE exemption and no aerobatics may be performed in the aircraft while operating under the LHFE exemption,” the FAA told Rob Collings in a July 29, 2011 letter announcing that no further action would be taken on the foundation’s amendment to add the activities until a new agency policy on the program was drafted.

Less than a year later, Rob Collings sent a letter to national aviation groups asking their members to deluge the FAA with letters of support for his amendments and the entire LHFE exemption program.

“We are certain changes in the LHFE program are just another way to limit warbird operation,” Rob Collings wrote in the letter. He also pointed to the moratorium and an attempt to prohibit the transfer of any government aircraft or parts for any purpose other than static display, as “examples of FAA and Department of Defense hostility” toward the program.

Rob Collings did not respond to a request for an interview.

A 2011 DOD study on the feasibility of transferring military aircraft to “non-federal entities” for the purposes of restoring and preserving warbirds questioned the FAA’s ability to monitor the LHFE exemption participants if the exemptions included aerial maneuvers and allowing the public to manipulate the controls. DOD officials also pointed out that once an aircraft has been destroyed in a crash, it has not been “preserved.”

“Some of these petitioners (in the LHFE program) are now creating business models that, if authorized by the FAA, would offer civilians an opportunity to conduct simulated aerial combat flights with hands-on flight experience in these aircraft,” the DOD study said. “They argue that the economics of preserving aircraft for public access and historical purposes require the income such flights would generate. The financial challenges faced by NFEs should not be basis for allowing activities, which are significantly more hazardous to passenger, the public to occur.”

Tax documents show that Rob Collings was compensated $17,000 by the foundation in 2008 for his role as executive director. By 2016, his compensation jumped to more than $333,000.

Within days of the B-17 crash, the Collings Foundation released a message of condolence for those who died and said the tour and all flight activities have been canceled for the rest of 2019. The FAA has received hundreds of positive letters about the foundation and the Wings of Freedom tour since Wednesday when Rob Collings issued a letter to aviation groups seeking support.

Only a few of those who sent letters mentioned the risks and concerns for the passengers and the public on the ground.

“In the coming months, federal agencies will be reviewing the LHFE program for not only our organization, but many other organizations nationwide who continue to fly vintage aircraft as a part of their educational mission,” Rob Collins said in the Wednesday letter to supporters. “As these reviews take place, we feel it is important for the voices of those impacted by the Wings of Freedom Tour over the years to be heard. We need to let federal agencies know that the LHFE program is important to you and other American citizens as an educational tool.”

Original article ➤ https://www.middletownpress.com












National Transportation Safety Board board member Jennifer Homendy briefs the media Thursday on the 10/2/19 crash of a B-17 in Connecticut.
 
Ernest “Mac” McCauley, a veteran pilot who volunteers with the Collings Foundation, works on one of the nine-cylinder radial engines on a B17 Flying Fortress bomber on display July 1st, 2019 at the Spokane International Airport. McCauley was at the controls when the plane crashed Wednesday in Connecticut. He died in the crash. 





Two days after a deadly crash of a World War II-era bomber at Bradley International Airport, the chief of the Connecticut Airport Authority said Friday he had no reason to block the vintage airplane show that would eventually cost seven people their lives.

“In hindsight, would we have done anything different in this event? No, unfortunately,” Kevin Dillon, the authority’s executive director, said, in an interview Friday. “There is no information that I had that the Collings Foundation has done anything wrong, that there was anything wrong with that aircraft.”

“This is a tragic event, an unfortunate event, and that is what the [National Transportation Safety Board] is here for -- to tell us what happened here and put in motion anything they can to prevent it in the future.”

“This is a tragic event, an unfortunate event, and that is what the [National Transportation Safety Board] is here for -- to tell us what happened here and put in motion anything they can to prevent it in the future.”

Collings approached TAC-Air, which leases space at Bradley to park and service private aircraft, in early September. TAC-Air then turned to the authority, which must seek permission from the Transportation Security Administration to allow visitors on airport land that is normally a restricted area.

Dillon said the request from TAC-Air did not raise any red flags, so to block the Collings visit “would have been deemed unreasonable.”

The Federal Aviation Administration certifies the “airworthiness” of aircraft, or the physical requirements for pilots, he said.

The fiery crash took place just before 10 a.m. Wednesday after the B-17G appeared to encounter trouble taking off and had to make an emergency landing. The plane slammed into a de-icing shed.

"These aircraft, up until this accident, have been operating at many, many different locations across the country, and I don’t think there is any airport that I am aware of that would have said, ‘These aircraft can’t come into my airport,' " Dillon said. “There’s no basis for it.”

In the days since the crash, questions have been raised about why the event was sanctioned for a busy airport.

But Dillon said Collings has staged similar events at airports in Boston, Dallas and San Diego, for example, all much larger than Bradley. Dillon also noted that smaller airports are not necessarily a better alternative.

“An airport is an airport,” Dillon said. “What is the difference if it is [an airport] that isn’t anywhere near a busy as Bradley, but the aircraft impacts an office building off that airport, I’m not understanding the distinction there.”

This week, U.S. Sen. Richard Blumenthal took aim at the vintage plane program, noting both the age of the aircraft and a history of 21 crashes since 1982, in which 22 people died. Blumenthal called for a thorough investigation.

“The senator, I think has every right to call for an investigation, but I don’t think the senator is qualified to be making determinations,” Dillon said. “That is what the NTSB is there for, and I’m sure they will accommodate his request.”

Dillon was adamant that Bradley is not responsible, in any way, for the crash. The airport had operated in the best way possible for the show, he said.

“Bradley is certainly not responsible for what occurred, no more than we can be responsible for any other accident from an airline,” Dillon said.

Original article can be found here ➤ https://www.courant.com



Location: Windsor Locks, CT
Accident Number: ERA20MA001
Date & Time: 10/02/2019, 0953 EDT
Registration: N93012 
Aircraft: Boeing B17
Injuries: 7 Fatal, 5 Serious, 2 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Other Work Use - Sightseeing 

On October 2, 2019, at 0953 eastern daylight time, a Boeing B-17G, N93012, owned and operated by the Collings Foundation, was destroyed during a precautionary landing and subsequent runway excursion at Bradley International Airport (BDL), Windsor Locks, Connecticut. The commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, and five passengers were fatally injured. The flight mechanic/loadmaster and four passengers were seriously injured, while one passenger and one person on the ground incurred minor injuries. The local commercial sightseeing flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, in accordance with a Living History Flight Experience exemption granted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area and no flight plan was filed for the flight, which departed BDL at 0947.

On the morning of the accident flight, an airport lineman at BDL assisted the loadmaster as he added 160 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel to the accident airplane. The lineman stated that the accident airplane was the first to be fueled with 100LL fuel that day.

According to preliminary air traffic control (ATC) data provided by the FAA, shortly after takeoff, at 0950, one of the pilots reported to ATC that he wanted to return to the airport. At that time, the airplane was about 500 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller verified the request and asked if the pilot required any assistance, to which he replied no. The controller then asked for the reason for the return to the airport, and the pilot replied that the airplane had a "rough mag" on the No. 4 engine. The controller then instructed the pilot to fly a right downwind leg for runway 6 and confirmed that the flight needed an immediate landing. He subsequently cancelled the approach of another airplane and advised the pilot to proceed however necessary to runway 6. The approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the tower controller, which he did.

The tower controller reported that the wind was calm and cleared the flight to land on runway 6. The pilot acknowledged the landing clearance; at that time, the airplane was about 300 ft agl on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6. The tower controller asked about the airplane's progress to the runway and the pilot replied that they were "getting there" and on the right downwind leg. No further communications were received from the accident airplane. Witness statements and airport surveillance video confirmed that the airplane struck approach lights about 1,000 ft prior to the runway, then contacted the ground about 500 ft prior to the runway before reaching runway 6. It then veered right off the runway before colliding with vehicles and a deicing fluid tank about 1,100 ft right of the center of the runway threshold.

The wreckage came to rest upright and the majority of the cabin, cockpit, and right wing were consumed by postimpact fire. The landing gear was extended and measurement of the left and right wing flap jackscrews corresponded to a flaps retracted setting. The flap remained attached to the right wing and the aileron was consumed by fire. The flap and aileron remained attached to the left wing and a section of flap was consumed by fire. The empennage, elevator, and rudder remained intact. Control continuity was confirmed from the elevator, rudder, elevator trim, and rudder trim from each respective control surface to the area in the cabin consumed by fire, and then forward to the cockpit controls. Elevator trim and rudder trim cables were pulled during impact and their preimpact position on their respective drum at the control surfaces could not be determined. The left wing aileron trim tab remained intact and its pushrod was connected but bent. The left aileron bellcrank separated from the wing, but the aileron cables remained attached to it and the aileron cable remained attached in cockpit.

The Nos. 1 and 2 engines remained partially attached to the left wing and all three propeller blades remained attached to each engine. One propeller blade attached to engine No. 1 exhibited an 8-inch tip separation; the separated section traveled about 700 ft before coming to rest near an airport building. Another propeller blade on the No. 1 engine exhibited chordwise scratching and leading edge gouging. The third propeller blade was bent aft. The No. 2 engine propeller blades exhibited leading edge gouges and chordwise scratches.

The No. 3 engine was recovered from the top of the deicing tank. One blade was impact damaged and near the feather position. The other two blades appeared in a position between low pitch and feather. One propeller blade exhibited a 5-inch tip separation and the separated tip sections were recovered from 100 ft and 700 ft from the main wreckage. The No. 4 engine was recovered from the deice building. All three propeller blades on the No. 4 engine appeared in the feather position.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

A fuel sample was able to be recovered from one of the No 3. engine's two fuel tanks. The recovered sample had a visual appearance and smell consistent with 100LL aviation fuel and was absent of debris or water contamination. Following the accident, the fuel truck used to service the airplane was quarantined and subsequent testing revealed no anomalies of the truck's equipment or fuel supply. Additionally, none of the airplanes serviced with fuel from the truck before or after the accident airplane, including another airplane operated by the Collings Foundation, reported any anomalies.

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, instrument airplane, and held a type rating for the B-17. In addition, he held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 9, 2019. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 14,500 hours.

The co-pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane, with type ratings for B-737, B-757, B-767, DC-10, and LR-Jet. In addition, he held a flight engineer certificate as well as a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on January 8, 2019. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 22,000 hours.

The airplane was manufactured in 1944, issued a limited airworthiness certificate in 1994, and equipped with passenger seats in 1995. It was powered by four Wright R-1820-97, 1,200-horsepower engines, each equipped with a three-blade, constant-speed Hamilton Standard propeller. The airplane was maintained under an airworthiness inspection program, which incorporated an annual inspection, and 25-hour, 50-hour, 75-hour, and 100-hour progressive inspections. Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on January 16, 2019. At that time, the airframe had accumulated about 11,120 total hours of operation. Engine Nos. 1, 2, and 3 had 0 hours since major overhaul at that time. Engine No. 4 had 838.2 hours since major overhaul at that time. The airplane's most recent progressive inspection, which was the 100-hour inspection, was completed on September 23, 2019. At that time, the airplane had been operated about 268 hours since the annual inspection.

The recorded weather at BDL at 0951 included calm wind; 10 statute miles visibility; few clouds at 11,000 ft; few clouds at 14,000 ft; broken clouds at 18,000 ft; temperature 23°C; dew point 19°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.81 inches of mercury.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Boeing
Registration: N93012
Model/Series: B17 G
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No 
Operator: Collings Foundation
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None
Operator Does Business As: Collings Foundation
Operator Designator Code: 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: BDL, 175 ft msl
Observation Time: 0951 EDT
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Temperature/Dew Point: 23°C / 19°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Few / 11000 ft agl
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: Calm / ,
Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 18000 ft agl
Visibility:  10 Miles
Altimeter Setting: 29.81 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed: None
Departure Point: Windsor Locks, CT (BDL)
Destination: Windsor Locks, CT (BDL)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 5 Fatal, 4 Serious, 1 Minor
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries: 1 Minor
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries:7 Fatal, 5 Serious, 2 Minor 
Latitude, Longitude: 41.931667, -72.692222

26 comments:

  1. I'm sad at the loss of life and I'm sad at the loss of another irreplaceable flying piece of history.

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  2. A quote from a post on another forum helps to put things in perspective:


    “Since 1982, the 23 deaths before these 7 is an extraordinarily low level of fatalities. [An average of less than one per year]

    Some Elective Activities Risks:
    41 people are killed on average every year in the USA skiing or snowboarding
    30 people a year die in jet ski accidents (approx)
    800 cyclists die every year (approx)
    30 US climbers die every year on average
    70 US scuba divers die every year
    between 300 and 400 US ATC riders die every year
    In an average year, "fewer than 1000" US people are accidentally shot in hunting, and "only 75" die
    9000 injuries occur each year due to golf cart use
    Every 2-3 years someone is killed by a golf ball
    In 2012, 19 US parachutists died, in 2018, 13 died
    Kite surfing deaths from 2000 to mid 2007 averaged 8.3/year.”


    So before we consider banning flights in historic aircraft, should we also consider banning the above activities?

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    Replies
    1. The significant difference between what you shared above and what happened here is, who is in control of the circumstances?
      In the majority of the above examples the person who passed away was responsible for the equipment they used and assessed the risk to them. They understood the risk, and accepted that risk, and while any accidental death is tragic, they made that choice.
      In the crash of this aircraft, and while they may have signed a waiver of some type, they relied on the reputation of the foundation and experience of the those in charge of the various safety programs to do the right thing. Would you have flown on this aircraft if you knew the required maintenance was not being done appropriately and that very morning one of the engines, I believe the engine that failed, was "difficult" to start?
      Perspective is nice, context is as well.

      Delete
  3. I used to be of the opinion that vintage airplanes should be made flyable and flown as much as practicable; that's why they were created. But the relentless toll year after year of irreplaceable airplanes destroyed has changed my opinion. If one is wealthy enough to afford owning and operating an authentic antique airplane, certainly one would be wealthy enough to build as exact a replica as desired and fly that. No one would encourage flying the original Wright Flyer, the original Spirit of St. Louis, the Spruce Goose - these are icons history whose title belongs to mankind, not the holder of a piece of paper. Before they are lost forever to inevitable destruction by ineptitude or accident, we should put a moratorium on operating the rarest of the antiques and develop a replicas industry.

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  4. As horrible as the loss of life and historic machinery is here, the posts above about about fatalities have merit.
    If we compare how many unnecessary fatalities there are each year from fuel shortages and minor mechanical failures we see on all aircraft these warbirds are no where near any extreme.
    As with many of the other aircraft crashes this one is right in there as to why a precautionary shutdown of an engine due to it cross firing from wet spark plug wires lead into this crash really needs to be understood and will take allot of time and energy for the investigators to come up with an honest answer.
    Personally I feel these Living History Tours are very important to keep our history lessons complete since at these tour events I work at we see a near total lack of teens through the late 20s attending.

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  5. These airplanes are from a different era. The crash-worthiness of a General Aviation aircraft or an airliner or even an experimental (homebuilt) airplane of current design is going to be much better than anything built before 1950. Everyone on that airplane knew and understood the risks. Many more would have jumped at the chance (if $450.00 weren't a lot of money). As the earlier post said, there are lot's of ways of having fun and most of them have risk. There have been several instances in the past year of homeowners being killed when airplanes slam into their homes. Not even staying at home is safe.

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  6. Organizations that are still able to bring a vintage aircraft to a show bear high expenses and are able to do it through dedicated effort by many individuals that keep their aircraft flight-capable. Take a ride if you can or just listen to the loping and rumble of round engines at work before the remaining examples can only be seen in static display at museums.

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  7. As usual a couple of old guys flying a vintage plane. They should get out of the way and let a younger generation fly these aircraft, but of course they think they know best and so people die.

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  8. I have a theory as to the plane veering off to the right into the de-icing tanks. The pilot radioed ATC and said they had a problem with the #4 engine and needed to return to "blow it out". A witness on the ground stated the plane flew over his head at low altitude with the #3 engine trailing smoke and sputtering. I wonder if in the "heat of battle" they accidentally shut down the wrong engine and ended up having both engines on the right side out which would make the plane hard to maintain directional stability. I just toured that plane in Aug. at KBTP and the pilot "Mac" and a younger mechanic with a bushy beard were doing a compression test on the #2 engine after un-sticking an exhaust valve. We watched them run-up the engine with the cowling removed and it sounded good. I can't believe it's gone now, RIP 909 and crew.

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  9. Looking at the B roll one of the props looks feathered or partially feathered ... hard to tell.

    RIP to all lost

    7C

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  10. Above: "As usual a couple of old guys flying a vintage plane. They should get out of the way and let a younger generation fly these aircraft, but of course they think they know best and so people die."

    You obviously have bought into the stupid argument that "old" people are a liability and don't know what they are doing. The NTSB reports are full of accidents of people of all ages.

    You definitely need to grow up. OTOH, with your attitude, you may not live to get old.

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  11. I saw this airplane flying about 6 months ago. Was admiring it as it flew past. Then I read about this accident and looked up the past schedule ... me not know for sure whether this was the same plane without a little research.

    Same plane. It was back in March. Beautiful airplane.

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  12. Yea, after 34 years and 25,000 plus hours of boring holes thru the atmosphere, I'd have to agree. I was 10 times the pilot when I was a kid. Just like the thousands of boys that flew these things in battle 70 years ago, they were more on top of it, less complacent than the old well experienced guy, who was more apt to teaching or instructing if you will. No way this lightly loaded over powered bomber went down with 1 or 2 engines out. Unless the experienced crew let Vmc get a hold of them................May have been fueled with Jet A.............

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  13. The flight engineer survived the crash. He should have a first hand account of what took place in the cockpit. I strongly doubt it was mis-fueled with Jet A, but the engines will show that upon tear-down. They didn't do a VMC roll, they just didn't have directional control. It will be interesting to see what the NTSB will piece together. I suspect they already have a good idea what happened.

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  14. This is the risk you take flying in ANY aircraft. Airlines crash planes look at the 737 max killed over 300 people did the FAA ground all airline planes. DOD complaining about letting people fly these planes like the T6 yet they allow celebrates to fly in fighter jets. They are even letting people fly in the U2 now. Whats next rocket rides up to the space station. Maybe if the DOD properly funded a program for historical aviation we would not have to rely on Collins foundation to generate money so they can restore these with no help from the government. The future of military aviation history is really ending right under our noses with the last flying F-4 sent to be a target. The F-16 and newer aircraft will never be allowed in civilian hands so in 50-100 years we won't ever see a F-16 fly again like the F-14 Tomcat scrapped because of fear of Iran.

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  15. They hassled with #4 on the ground for possible wet mags and when they got airborne they had reduced thrust on the starboard wing so they shut it(#4) down and said they had to go back and blow it out...only...it wasn't #4, it was #3.(witness)

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  16. The initial report says # 4 was fully feathered and # 3 had one blade in full feather and the other two appeared partially feathered. #1 and #2 were producing power. I would think the flight engineer should be able to give a good account of the events but they were definitely having trouble maintaining altitude and were reported to be at only 300 feet on downwind. Flaps were up and gear was down. Winds were calm. Perhaps declaring a emergency and choosing to land in the opposite direction of their takeoff might have given them a better chance. When things start going bad get it on the ground !

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  17. Would like to see these old warbirds flying and sharing the experience with those interested.

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  18. Replying to airportkid,

    The aircraft you mentioned were all one of a kind. Nobody is saying fly all remaining B-17s until none remain in museums. Some should be left as (almost flying condition) hanger queens for as long as possible (museums burn down too), but some should stay flying.

    Replica's aren't necessarily a bad idea. Maybe new technologies (CNC, 3-D printers) will make them possible. And I'd probably ride in one. But I'd ride on the real one first, if I could.

    I've paid for rides in two B-17s - Fuddy Duddy and Aluminum Overcast. If there are funds available when the opportunity arises I'd highly like to ride in a B-29, B-24, B-25, P-51, P-40 and even others, but those first. The B-17 was the first to come along, but I really wanted to have even a fraction of the experience of those brave boys that fought for freedom knowing the odds were strongly against them even completing their 25 flights. Yes, my ride wasn't 8-10 hours long, it wasn't over enemy territory, it wasn't in low O2 or flesh freezing cold, it wasn't being shot at, it wasn't a scary agonizing takeoff with full bomb load, or a long flight back or marginal landing with bomb damage. But it was in the air. It was a chance to hear the 4 thunderous radials at takeoff power. It was a chance to hear their harmonic humming at cruise setting while looking out over those broad thick airfoils (which was a comforting site). It was a chance to walk on the narrow catwalk in the bomb bay, look out the bombardier's nose station at the ground passing by below, and watch the pilots adjusting the motors to keep them in sync while flying down a canyon back to the airport. It was living history, maybe just a tiny fraction of what our fly boys experienced, but it was real, and it touched me more than any book, picture, or movie ever has.

    I am in my 50s and lived (a stint on Guam during Vietnam) when WWII was sort of forgotten but not that long ago. When the last vet dies, it will be ancient history. At that point, I hope a B-17 will still be flying, and that people who care about the individual sacrifices, given in mass, and who care about how close the world came to melting down and the lessons we should remember about that, will take a young person for a ride in it.

    In the meantime, if a WW-II aircraft comes around while I have some extra $, I'll go for a ride, hoping it's safe and uneventful, but realizing the statistics are on my side, the risk is commensurate with reward, and within the range of many other activities people do for fun and pleasure.

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  19. I agree with Jim W 100%. I have been a student of military history since middle school and am thankful for just the brief experience of experiencing flight in these legendary aircraft. I flew in FIFI in the first months that it was flying knowing fully well that B-29s are prone to engine fires and that the flight was perhaps 100 time more risky than driving down the 105 after the show. For me, I would accept almost any risk to fly in a b-17, P-51 or with the Blue Angels or Thunderbirds and would sign any waiver because it is that important and special to me. OTOH, anyone who would take their children or significant other on such a flight without understanding the risks involved are going beyond boundaries.

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  20. Initial inspection of wreckage indicates flaps up. May have made a difference. Applicable airspeeds I could find:

    "LANDING (47,000 lbs.) (Weight on this flight probably under 40,000)
    Gear and flaps down: 150 mph IAS
    Full flaps below 150 mph IAS (will require retrimming)
    Approach speed: 105-110 mph
    Over airfield boundary: 105 mph IAS
    Touchdown at 90-95 mph IAS

    Specifications:
    Top Speed @ SL: 230 mph TAS
    Top Speed @ Alt: 295 mph TAS @ 25,000 feet
    Cruise @ SL: 175 mph TAS @ 30" Hg/2000 rpm
    Cruise @ 25,000 ft: 145 mph IAS/213 mph TAS @ 30" Hg/2000 rpm
    Climb: 41.0 minutes to 25,000 ft @ 150 mph IAS/38" Hg/2300 rpm
    Initial climb: 900 fpm
    1 g stall speed, clean: 102 mph IAS (50,000 pounds)
    1 g stall speed, landing: 90 mph IAS (50,000 pounds)"

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  21. In a recent ruling (Posted March 25, 2020), the Federal Aviation Administration revoked the Collings Foundation’s permission to have passengers aboard its aircraft after a deadly crash last October, citing various safety reasons.

    See "Rescission of Exemption 6540" full document at:
    https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FAA-2001-11089-1673

    See also interesting related info in docket using link on the same page as above.

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    Replies
    1. And news article:

      https://www.ctpost.com/local/article/FAA-says-no-passengers-on-Collings-Foundations-15157635.php

      Delete
  22. I had boarded and toured this aircraft, and the B-24 at Bangor, ME about 12 yrs before. McCauley was flying the aircraft that day and I had a brief conversation with him. He obviously loved the B-17 and his life showing it to Americans all over the country. It is very sad that it was lost, and lives were lost with it.

    All that being said, it is clear that there was no real oversight on safety issues regarding this aircraft. McCauley was the PIC and made the ultimate decision to fly the aircraft. He was also the A&P mechanic who did most of the maintenance on it. In addition he was the Foundation's "safety officer" who signed a report a few weeks before this crash certifying there were NO safety defects on Nine O Nine. All the safety issues, plus the decision to fly with known defects, came down to just one man, McCauley. While it is not a good feeling to speak ill of the deceased, I think any reasonable person would easily conclude that to fly an aircraft, carrying passengers for hire, that had been having magneto problems due to moisture infiltration, for at least several weeks, was a simply appalling decision. The foundation's permit to fly passengers was revoked months ago.

    Passengers, and ground witnesses, had mentioned several incidents of McCauley having to deal with faulty mags on several previous flights at other fields. He routinely, it seems, used compressed air, or CO2 to dry up the faulty mags so the engine would run properly. And on more than one engine according to those witnesses. After the crash the NTSB removed spark plugs from all 4 R-1820 engines. Many should have been replaced some time back, many others were incorrectly gapped. During military use checking those plugs was regular maintenance provided often! The NTSB report regarding their safety program, or lack of, was damning.

    These aircraft flew all over the country in a season, being demonstrated and flown many hundreds of times. One would think, that with these engines, that certainly some spare parts would be with them at all times considering they did tons of maintenance on the road. A spare mag does not cost much, they are readily rebuilt to as good as new specs by companies all over the USA. The crew chief was new at his job and had little knowledge of the aircraft and it's systems. #4 was shut down and feathered clearly. They had the problems with #4 prior to the flight. It is quite possible that they may have shut down the wrong engine, which has happened before more than a few times. We will see in the final report. In any case they had very little time to analyze the problem(s) and deal with it. A few hundred feet agl and a few knots above flying speed don't leave much time to think. Many are amazed that they did a 180 turn without stalling it.

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  23. Final report is out. Gear down too early, detonation power reduction from wide plug gaps on #3 and pilot-limited power on #1 and #2 to control yaw.

    https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/100356/pdf

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  24. The Broadcast (ADS-B) archive data for N93012 on Oct 02, 2019 between 1300 UTC to 1400 UTC.

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