Monday, April 24, 2017

Abnormal Runway Contact: Cirrus SR22, N94LP; fatal accident occurred April 24, 2017 at Meriden Markham Municipal Airport (KMMK), Meriden, New Haven County, Connecticut

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Enfield, Connecticut
Cirrus Aircraft; Duluth, Minnesota
Continental Motors; Mobile, Alabama

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

http://registry.faa.gov/N94LP

Location: Wallingford, CT
Accident Number: ERA17FA167
Date & Time: 04/24/2017, 1825 EDT
Registration: N94LP
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Abnormal runway contact
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Personal 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 24, 2017, about 1825 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, N94LP, impacted terrain in Wallingford, Connecticut, following a loss of control during an aborted landing at Meriden Markham Municipal Airport (MMK), Meriden, Connecticut. The private pilot was fatally injured and the passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. The airplane was privately owned and was being operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local flight.

According to witness statements and security camera video, about 1740, the airplane departed the airport to the east and returned to the airport around 1817. Witnesses described that the airplane was "fast and high" as it approached runway 18. The airplane then flared about 10 ft above the runway before it abruptly descended and touched down about halfway down the runway. The airplane bounced two or three times and became airborne again, then banked about 30° to the left and climbed to airport traffic pattern altitude.

The pilot's second landing approach appeared to be slower, but the airplane was again high. The airplane flared about 10 ft above the runway, abruptly descended, and touched down about halfway down the runway. It bounced two or three times; the pilot then initiated a go-around. One witness described that, during the subsequent climb, the airplane entered a 40° nose-up attitude and it sounded as if the airplane was "hanging on its prop." About 75 ft above the ground, the airplane rolled into a steep left descending turn. It then impacted the ground, cartwheeled, impacted the airport perimeter (security) fence, slid across the ground while continuing to turn to the left, came to rest, and caught fire.

According to the passenger, who was the pilot's son, the accident flight was his father's first flight in the airplane without an instructor and was a proficiency flight in preparation for an upcoming trip to North Carolina. The passenger stated that he did not handle the flight controls during the accident flight and that there were no unusual noises or issues with the airplane. During the pilot's first landing attempt, which was supposed to have been a full-stop landing, the pilot said "oops," commenced a go-around, then said, "let's try it again." During the second landing attempt, the airplane bounced "a couple of times" and the bounces were "pretty high."

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 1, 2017. On that date, he reported about 1,200 total hours of flight experience.

The pilot had flown out of MMK for several years. He previously owned a Piper PA-28-180, which he recently sold, and had purchased the accident airplane about 3 weeks before the accident. After the purchase of the airplane, he had taken transition training from a local flight instructor who also owned an SR22. The pilot received ground instruction from the flight instructor as well as 2 hours of dual instruction in the flight instructor's SR22, and 8.5 hours of dual instruction in the accident airplane. During that time, the pilot performed 12 landings.

The flight instructor stated that he used the Cirrus Transition Training Manual as a guide for the accident pilot's training, instructed him in the use of the airplane's avionics, and had taught him to use more right rudder input during climb. He endorsed the pilot for operation of high-performance airplanes (airplanes equipped with engines producing 200 horsepower or greater) on April 23, 2017, the day before the accident. Review of pilot records revealed that the pilot's most recent flight review occurred on October 30, 2014.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a low-wing, fully cantilevered, single-engine monoplane of composite construction. It was equipped with fixed tricycle configuration landing gear, with a castering nose wheel, and steering was accomplished via differential braking on the main wheels. It was also equipped with a ballistic recovery system known as the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), which could, under certain conditions, lower the entire airplane to the ground in an emergency. It was powered by a fuel-injected, horizontally opposed, air-cooled, 310-horsepower, Continental IO-550-N27B engine, driving a constant-speed, variable pitch Hartzell three-bladed propeller.

According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2005. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on March 13, 2017. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued about 1,229 total hours of operation.

The four-seat cabin included a composite roll cage within the fuselage structure to provide roll protection for the cabin occupants and was accessed through doors on either side of the fuselage. The seats were equipped with 4-point, integrated seat belt and shoulder harness assemblies with inertia reels, and seat bottoms with an integral aluminum honeycomb core designed to crush under impact to absorb downward loads. The Avidyne Entegra integrated aircraft instrumentation system comprised a primary flight display (PFD) and multi-function display (MFD).

The flight controls for ailerons, elevator, and rudder were conventional in design. The control surfaces were pilot-controlled through either of two single-handed side-control yokes mounted beneath the instrument panel. Roll and pitch trim were available through an electric button on the top of each side-control yoke. The yaw trim system employed a ground-adjustable trim tab. Neutral rudder position was held by a ground-adjustable spring cartridge that was bolted to the left rudder pedal torque tube and center console assembly, which provided a centering force regardless of the direction of control surface deflection.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather conditions at MMK at 1833 included wind from 180° at 5 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, few clouds at 300 ft, an overcast ceiling at 12,000 ft, temperature 16°C, dew point 2°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.15 inches of mercury.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

According to FAA Chart Supplements, MMK was owned by the City of Meriden, Connecticut, and was classified by the FAA as a non-towered, public use airport. The airport elevation was 103 ft mean sea level and there was one runway oriented in a 18/36 configuration. Runway 18 was asphalt and was in good condition; it measured 3,100 ft long by 75 ft wide.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Runway Examination

Examination of runway 18 revealed black tire marks in an S-shaped (sinusoidal) pattern co-located with white paint transfer marks on the surface of the runway pavement. The tire marks and paint transfer marks were discovered in two locations about 1,350 ft from the beginning of runway 18. Both the tire marks and paint transfer marks were consistent with nose wheel shimmy and nose wheel pant contact.

Accident Site Examination

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane first made ground contact with the left wingtip. After cartwheeling and subsequently impacting and breaching a 30-ft section of the 8-ft-tall airport security fence, the airplane slid along a public roadway on an approximate 078° magnetic heading. About 115 ft from the initial impact point, the airplane came to rest in the northbound travel lane against an earthen berm. Most of the airplane was then consumed by a postcrash fire.

A 115-ft-long and 62-ft-wide debris path extended from the initial impact point to the main wreckage. It contained the propeller, which was found buried beneath the shoulder of the southbound travel lane about 37 ft from the initial impact point; the engine cowling, which came to rest about 52 ft from the initial impact point; the left wing tip and a portion of the outer left wing panel, which came to rest about 81 ft from the initial impact point; and the top rail of the breached section of airport security fence, which came to rest about 92 ft from the initial impact point. It also contained smaller components of the airplane and portions of the airplane structure.

Airplane Examination

Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the airplane or flight controls.

The fuselage came to rest upright and was mostly consumed by fire. The empennage was separated from the aft fuselage, inverted, and displayed impact and fire damage.

The outboard section of the left wing and the left wing tip separated during the impact sequence. The remaining portion of the left wing remained in its mounting location and exhibited impact and fire damage. The left aileron was almost completely consumed by fire. Pooled aluminum was located on the ground aft of the wing at the mounting location of the left wing flap along with the remains of a flap hinge.

The right wing exhibited impact and fire damage. The inboard third of the right aileron was consumed by fire. Pooled aluminum was located on the ground aft of the wing at the mounting location of the right wing flap along with the remains of a flap hinge.

Aileron control cable continuity was verified from the remains of the cabin to the ailerons. The flap actuator was fully extended, consistent with the wing flaps in the retracted position.

The horizontal stabilizer remained attached to the empennage and exhibited impact and fire damage. The right elevator was mostly consumed by fire, with the outboard portion and elevator tip still present. The left elevator was mostly consumed by fire, with the leading edge and tip still present. Elevator control cable continuity was verified from the remains of the cabin to the elevators.

The vertical stabilizer was impact and fire damaged and remained attached to the empennage. The rudder also exhibited impact and fire damage. Rudder control cable continuity was verified from the remains of the cabin to the rudder. The pitch trim motor position could not be determined due to fire damage.

Propeller Examination

Examination of the three-bladed propeller revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure.

The propeller remained attached to the propeller flange, but separated from the crankshaft, which fractured just aft of the propeller flange. The crankshaft fracture surface displayed 45° shear angles and a cupped appearance with blue-black discoloration in a smeared area. All three blades remained attached to the propeller hub; however, one propeller blade tip separated during the impact sequence and one propeller blade rotated 180° in the propeller hub. All three propeller blades exhibited chordwise scratching and leading-edge gouging; the gouges matched the spacing of the chain links of the airport security fence. The propeller governor remained secured to the front left side of the engine and the propeller control cable remained secured to the propeller control lever.

Engine Examination

Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine.

The engine had remained attached to the firewall via the engine control cables, the main fuel line, and the electrical wires and cables. There were no pre-accident anomalies noted with the induction system. The exhaust system components remained attached to the engine with no signs of pre-accident anomalies noted. The exhaust mufflers and shrouds sustained deformation damage.

The ignition harness remained secured to each magneto and each terminal remained secured to its respective spark plug. During crankshaft rotation, and audible snap and spark was observed from both magnetos. No pre-accident anomalies were noted with either of the magnetos.

The spark plugs had remained secured to their respective cylinders. The top spark plugs were removed and displayed normal wear with lean operation signatures and no signs of carbon or lead fouling. The bottom spark plugs were observed during the borescope inspection with no signs of lead or carbon fouling noted.

The engine-driven fuel pump remained secured to the backside of the engine Manual rotation of the drive coupling resulted in rotation of the drive shaft. No pre-accident anomalies were noted with the internal components.

The fuel lines to and from the throttle body/fuel metering unit remained secured and fuel was observed in the lines between the fuel flow transducer and the fuel metering unit. Manual rotation of the throttle lever resulted in a coinciding rotation of the drive shaft. No pre-accident anomalies were noted with the unit.

The fuel manifold valve remained secured to the engine. All fuel injection lines remained secured to the manifold valve body and the torque putty was intact. Fuel was noted within the manifold valve. The screen was not obstructed. The diaphragm remained intact and pliable and was still attached to the plunger. No pre-accident anomalies were noted with the unit.

The injector lines remained secured to the nozzles. Each nozzle was removed and inspected and no obstructions were noted. Light was visible through each nozzle jet, except for the No. 1 nozzle jet, due to bending damage.

The oil sump sustained impact deformation and puncture damage. Oil was observed leaking from the oil sump and the oil pump remained secured to the backside of the engine. The oil filter sustained thermal damage and was dented, and the internal components were charred. The oil cooler remained secured on the back left side of the engine. There were no signs of lubrication distress on the observed engine components, and no pre-accident anomalies were noted.

All six cylinders remained attached to the engine and borescope examination of the internal components revealed no preaccident anomalies. All six cylinders also produced thumb compression and suction during rotation of the drivetrain, and valve functionality was confirmed.

The crankcase remained intact with no external signs of operational distress. There were no pre-accident anomalies noted with the crankcase.

The crankshaft was fractured aft of the propeller flange. Crankshaft continuity was confirmed to the front and out to each connecting rod during manual rotation from the accessory end. No pre-accident anomalies were noted.

Camshaft continuity was confirmed during manual rotation of the upper right accessory drive gear. The rockers and valve springs functioned during the continuity test and no pre-accident anomalies were noted. The Nos. 5 and 6 pushrods displayed impact-related deformation damage.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL

The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Farmington, Connecticut, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was blunt injuries of head and trunk with fractures and aortic laceration.

The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory conducted toxicological testing on specimens from the pilot. The toxicological testing results for the pilot were negative for carbon monoxide, and ethanol. Acetaminophen, a common over-the-counter analgesic/antipyretic, was detected in urine; it is not impairing.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Cirrus Aircraft Guidance

According to the Cirrus Design SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual (Section 4, Normal Procedures);

Normal landings are made with full flaps with power on or off. Surface winds and air turbulence are usually the primary factors in determining the most comfortable approach speeds. Actual touchdown should be made with power off and on the main wheels first to reduce the landing speed and subsequent need for braking. Gently lower the nose wheel to the runway after airplane speed has diminished. This is especially important for rough or soft field landings.

In a balked landing (go around) climb, disengage autopilot, apply full power, then reduce the flap setting to 50%. If obstacles must be cleared during the go around, climb at 75-80 KIAS with 50% flaps. After clearing any obstacles, retract the flaps and accelerate to the normal flaps up climb speed.

FAA Guidance

According to the Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3B):

A stabilized descent angle is controlled throughout the approach so that the airplane lands in the center of the first third of the runway…The objective of a good, stabilized final approach is to descend at an angle and airspeed that permits the airplane to reach the desired touchdown point at an airspeed that results in minimum floating just before touchdown; in essence, a semi-stalled condition. To accomplish this, it is essential that both the descent angle and the airspeed be accurately controlled.

Regarding bouncing on touchdown, the handbook states:

When a bounce is severe, the safest procedure is to execute a go-around immediately. An attempt should not be made to salvage the landing. Full power should be applied while simultaneously maintaining directional control and lowering the nose to a safe climb attitude.

The handbook also states that, whenever landing conditions are not satisfactory, a go-around is warranted:

The assumption that an aborted landing is invariably the consequence of a poor approach, which in turn is due to insufficient experience or skill, is a fallacy. The go-around is not strictly an emergency procedure. It is a normal maneuver that is also used in an emergency situation….The earlier a condition that warrants a go-around is recognized, the safer the go-round/rejected landing is. The go-around maneuver is not inherently dangerous in itself. It becomes dangerous only when delayed unduly or executed improperly.

Attitude is always critical when close to the ground, and when power is added, a deliberate effort on the part of the pilot is required to keep the nose from pitching up prematurely. The airplane executing a go-around must be maintained in an attitude that permits a buildup of airspeed well beyond the stall point before any effort is made to gain altitude or to execute a turn. Raising the nose too early could result in a stall from which the airplane could not be recovered if the go-around is performed at a low altitude.

A concern for quickly regaining altitude during a go-around produces a natural tendency to pull the nose up. A pilot executing a go-around must accept the fact that an airplane cannot climb until it can fly, and it cannot fly below stall speed. In some circumstances, it is desirable to lower the nose briefly to gain airspeed. As soon as the appropriate climb airspeed and pitch attitude are attained, "rough trim" the airplane to relieve any adverse control pressures. More precise trim adjustments can be made when flight conditions have stabilized. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private
Age: 56, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 3 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 02/01/2017
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 10/30/2014
Flight Time:  (Estimated) 1217.1 hours (Total, all aircraft), 10.2 hours (Total, this make and model), 1139.4 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 10.2 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 8.4 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 1.8 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP
Registration: N94LP
Model/Series: SR22
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture:
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 1484
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 4
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 03/13/2017, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 3400 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 1229 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: CONT MOTOR
ELT: C91A installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: IO-550-N27B
Registered Owner: On file
Rated Power: 310 hp
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: MMK, 103 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1833 EDT
Direction from Accident Site: 283°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Few / 300 ft agl
Visibility:  10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 12000 ft agl
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 5 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: / None
Wind Direction: 180°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 30.15 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 16°C / 2°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Wallingford, CT (MMK)
Type of Flight Plan Filed:None 
Destination: Wallingford, CT (MMK)
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 1740 EDT
Type of Airspace: Class G 

Airport Information

Airport: MERIDEN MARKHAM MUNI (MMK)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 103 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Dry
Runway Used: 18
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 3100 ft / 75 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Go Around; Traffic Pattern

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 1 Serious
Aircraft Fire: On-Ground
Ground Injuries:N/A 
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Latitude, Longitude: 41.508333, -72.827222

NTSB Identification: ERA17FA167
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, April 24, 2017 in Wallingford, CT
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N94LP
Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On April 24, 2017, about 1825 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22, N94LP, impacted terrain in Wallingford, Connecticut during initial climb from Meriden Markham Municipal Airport (MMK), Meriden, Connecticut. The private pilot was fatally injured. The passenger was seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local personal flight conducted in accordance with the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The pilot had been flying out of MMK for several years. He previously owned a Piper PA-28-180, which he had recently sold, and had purchased the accident airplane about 3 weeks prior to the accident. Since that time, he had transition training from a flight instructor.

On the day of the accident, the pilot had decided to increase his proficiency in preparation for a planned trip to North Carolina. According to witness statements and security camera video, about 1740, the airplane departed the airport to the east. Around 1817, the airplane returned to the airport, and witnesses describe that the airplane was "fast and high" as it approached runway 18. The airplane then flared about 10 feet above the runway before it abruptly descended, and then touched down about half way down the runway. The airplane then bounced about three times and then became airborne once again. The airplane banked about 30° to the left, and climbed to an altitude of about 1,100 feet and joined the traffic pattern.

About 6 minutes later, the airplane was once again on final approach to runway 18. This time the approach appeared to be slower, but the airplane was again high. It again appeared to flare 10 feet above the runway, abruptly descend, and then touch down approximately half way down the runway. The airplane bounced about two times, the engine began to accelerate, and the airplane became airborne. During the climb, the airplane appeared to be at a higher angle of attack, and it sounded as if the airplane was "hanging on its prop." The airplane rolled into an approximately 60° left bank and descended while turning to the left. It then impacted the ground, slide across the ground while continuing to turn to the left, came to rest, and caught fire.

Examination of runway 18, revealed scrapes and S-shaped rubber transfer marks, consistent with an airplane touching down nosewheel first, in two locations that corresponded to the last two bounces that were observed by witnesses, and security camera videos.

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane first made ground contact with the left wingtip, and after impacting and breaching a 30-foot section of the 8-foot-tall airport security fence, slid across a public use roadway, on an approximate 078° magnetic heading. About 115 feet later, it came to rest in the north bound travel lane against an earthen berm. Most of the airplane was then consumed by a postcrash fire.

Further examination of the accident site revealed that a 115-foot-long, and 62-foot-wide, debris path existed that began at the initial impact point, and spread out along the ground until reaching the point where the airplane came to rest. It contained the propeller, which was found buried beneath the shoulder of the south bound travel lane about 37 feet from the initial impact point; the engine cowling, which came to rest about 52 feet from the initial impact point; the left wing tip and a portion of the outer left wing panel, which came to rest about 81 feet from the initial impact point; and the top rail of the breached 30 foot section of airport security fence, which came to rest about 92 feet from the initial impact point. It also contained, smaller subcomponents of the airplane and portions of the airplane structure.

Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed no evidence of any inflight structural failure. The wing flaps were up, and control continuity was established from the remains of the cockpit flight controls to the remains of the ailerons, elevator, and rudder.

Examination of the propeller and engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. The three-blade propeller exhibited chord wise scratching, and leading edge gouging, with the gouges matching the spacing of the chain links of the airport security fence. Oil was present in the engine, and drive train and valve train continuity was confirmed. Thumb compression and piston movement was also confirmed on all cylinders. The spark plugs displayed normal wear with lean operations signatures, and there were no signs of carbon or lead fouling. The magnetos and ignition harnesses were intact, and both magnetos generated sparks at all the ignition leads. Fuel was observed in the fuel manifold valve, and the lines between the fuel flow transducer and the fuel metering unit.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Chart Supplements, MMK was publicly-owned, and was classified by the FAA as a non-towered public use airport. The airport elevation was 103 feet msl and there was one runway oriented in a 18/36 configuration. Runway 18 was asphalt, and was in good condition. Its total length was 3,100 feet-long by 75 feet-wide.

According to FAA records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 1, 2017. On that date, he reported that he had accrued about 1,200 total hours of flight experience.

According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2005. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on March 13, 2017. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued approximately 1,229 total hours of operation.

The recorded weather conditions reported at MMK, at 1833, included wind from 180° at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 300 feet, an overcast ceiling at 12,000 feet, temperature 16° C, dew point 2° C, and altimeter setting of 30.15 inches of mercury.  

The wreckage was retained by the NTSB for further examination.



Todd Gunther, an investigator with the NTSB, speaks during a press conference on Hanover Street in Wallingford near Meriden Markham Airport. 

Todd Gunther 
National Transportation Safety Board










































6 comments:

  1. Registration History 03-Apr-2017 TOMANELLI JOSEPH OCEAN ISLE BEACH NC

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  2. ANOTHER CR22 crash ?? I used to really like these planes but incidents or accidents involving this aircraft seem to be very common. Is it just that there are a lot of them ? Maybe the training with this aircraft is inadequate? I've personally never flown one, I'm just a 172/182 pilot so not sure how different this aircraft would be but tired of reading about the accidents.

    Prayers to the family.

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  3. Cirrus aircraft are not forgiving. They market the parachute as a safety feature but in reality, the chute is there for a lack of spin recovery. Not a comforting flight characteristic for any small GA aircraft. The bonanza was the first "unsafe high performance aircraft" but it is now the cirrus. The only difference is that the bonanza is a great and proven airframe. Cirrus aircraft started as a kit airplane and bought them all back when they became a mainstream company. What does that say for their confidence in reliability?

    ReplyDelete
  4. First of all, thoughts and prayers to the family. I'm a Cirrus pilot with a commercial rating. At this time we can only speculate, but I agree with anon in general that Cirrus are not as forgiving. Cirrus and Bonanzas (your example) are high performance aircraft with significantly faster approach speeds than your typical trainer. If I'd have to guess, this particular accident was potentially due to a high approach speed.

    Respectfully, from my limited research, the most compelling argument for high accident rates in bonanzas and Cirrus were due to low time pilots with money moving up to high performance aircraft. In that vein, I wouldn't blame a 747 for being dangerous compared to a trainer even though it's vastly "less forgiving".

    Part of my Cirrus specific training (for insurance) was on the use of the parachute. It wasn't advertised as a 'get out of all situations' device at all. They were very clear on the envelope of when it can be used. The anon commenter is incorrect in saying that it is only there for spin recovery; that's only half of the story. Cirrus parachute (CAPS/BRS) system has saved 373 lives so far, not just getting out of a spin.

    The cirrus website is pretty clear: "THE CHUTE WILL DO ITS JOB, IF YOU DO YOURS.
    CAPS is a truly remarkable safety innovation. But every new and innovative device requires training to master. CAPS is about more than just pulling a handle. It takes training and a safety-first mindset to make CAPS deployment an instinctual act in situations where you have lost control of the airplane. To support our pilot community, we have developed a wide range of reference materials and training resources. That is why we recommend recurrent training that includes CAPS deployment scenarios as an area of focus every twelve months."

    ReplyDelete
  5. Very sad ending to a fellow pilots love affair with his plane. Through the photos provided it appears clear that the father wanted the sons to learn to fly and share his enthusiasm.

    It is difficult to imagine how this accident came about. Airplanes are not difficult to fly but also they are unforgiving in situations where the limits are exceeded. In my view there are way to many accidents that did not have to happen. Yes, some are mechanical failure, but quite rare. Pilot error is most often the contributing factor whether it be an engine out, flying into IMC and lacking the training to recover, or misjudging or underestimating the performance criteria of the aircraft. Better training is needed in preparing for the unexpected. Not all pilots have the same basic abilities, but proper and recurring training can clearly eliminate a lot of these accidents.

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  6. Agreed, training is a big part of improving the safety margin in GA. Scenario based training is about as good as it gets to prepare pilots for real world emergencies. Now more than ever, private pilots are transitioning into high performance turbine aircraft capable of true air speeds greater than 300 kts. Typically but not always, the faster the aircraft the less chances a pilot has to make mistakes. If a pilot does, they will pay for it. The bonanza history stems from many reasons including lack of training. The 36 has a club seating arrangement in the rear of the aircraft which is behind the CG. Burning fuel makes the CG move aft. A unsuspecting pilot that was a little tail heavy in the beginning, will be very tailbheavy during landing. They all have their quirks. People just need to focus on safety and not just passing the ride. This is an unfortunate event that no person wants to read about. Prayers to their families and friends.

    ReplyDelete