Tuesday, January 03, 2023

Embraer EMB-505 Phenom 300, N555NR: Fatal accident occurred January 02, 2023 at Provo Municipal Airport (KPVU), Utah County, Utah

Those who may have information that might be relevant to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation may contact them by email witness@ntsb.gov, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email assistance@ntsb.gov. You can also call the NTSB Response Operations Center at 844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Salt Lake City, Utah 

Aircraft crashed under unknown circumstances. 

Eagle Jet 300 LLC


Date: 02-JAN-23
Time: 18:45:00Z
Regis#: N555NR
Aircraft Make: EMBRAER
Aircraft Model: EMB505
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: FATAL
Total Fatal: 1
Flight Crew: 1 Fatal
Pax: 1 Serious Injuries; 2 Minor Injuries 
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: DESTROYED
Activity: PERSONAL
Flight Phase: TAKEOFF (TOF)
Operation: 91
City: PROVO
State: UTAH

Nathan Ricks
April 30, 1960 - January 2, 2023
~

Nathan Ricks' Testimony
January 1, 2023
~


Nathan Webster Ricks was born on April 30, 1960, in Salt Lake City, Utah, to Clayne Ricks and Connie Corbett. After 62 years of a life lived to its fullest, he passed away in an aircraft accident at the Provo Airport on January 2, 2023.

He is survived by his wife, Joyce Tillotson Ricks and four daughters; Jessica (Andrew) Bybee, Jennifer (Landon) Smith, Rebecca (Trevor) Evans, and Elizabeth (Ryan) Reeves. Nathan also leaves behind 15 beautiful grandchildren, with one on the way.

Nathan grew up in Salt Lake City, Utah and attended Olympus High School where he discovered a passion for football. Nathan was determined to be the best player he could be at the only position available - Center. Despite his naturally lean frame, his drive and commitment to excel led Nathan to gain 100 lbs and become the starting Center. More important than any football accolades, Nathan found his lifelong sweetheart, Joyce Tillotson. He and Joyce started dating during their junior year of high school and both graduated in 1978.

After high school, Nathan walked on to the BYU football team and later earned a scholarship where he played Center on the offensive line.

He later served a mission for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in New York City, New York. His missionary service set the foundation for his life. He shared his testimony across the world in every possible setting, touching countless lives with the light and hope of the Gospel.

After his mission, Nathan came home and married his high school sweetheart, Joyce Tillotson, on April 12, 1983 in the Salt Lake City Temple.

Nathan was a prolific businessman with an unmatched work ethic and determination that was quickly rewarded with success. He was known for “making it happen” and encouraging others that they could do the same. A business partner attributed this Thomas Marsh quote to Nathan’s character: “Some men do not really live for honors or for pay; their happiness is not in the taking and holding, but in the doing, the striving, the building, the serving.” He strove to always conduct his professional life in a way that aligned with his abiding faith. His business endeavors included direct sales (Nu Skin), commercial real estate (STACK Real Estate), and other entrepreneurial activities.

More important than any of his professional pursuits, Nathan prioritized family. He was a devoted husband and father of four daughters, and gave his family every opportunity this life could afford. Nathan and Joyce emphasized the importance of embracing other cultures while developing lasting relationships with people from all over the world. It was important to Nathan and Joyce that their girls always recognize how blessed they were and be willing to help others from all walks of life.

Nathan loved spending time with his family outdoors. He loved riding horses, mountain biking, and snowmobiling at their family ranch and cultivated this love in his children and grandchildren. It was a special place for their family that they loved sharing with others.

He accomplished his lifelong goal of becoming a Pilot in Command and was meticulous in that endeavor. He absolutely loved to fly and had a special spring in his step any morning that was a “Fly Day.” Nathan used his piloting and private plane to bless everyone around him, taking many to treatments and funerals, among other things.

Nathan was a remarkable man who excelled at anything he set his mind to and poured his heart into relationships of all kinds. He loved Joyce with all his heart and praised the ground she walked on and the service she rendered to so many. He was the very best husband, father, grandfather, and friend; he cherished those roles above any other titles the world gave him. His impact on the community, his family, and throughout his career has been profound. The legacy of faith he has left for each of us, and his belief in our potential will continue to be a guiding star for the rest of our lives.

His love for our Savior Jesus Christ will be a constant light and support to us during this difficult time.

To our tender husband, father, brother, grandfather, uncle, and dear friend: We love you and will rejoice when we can be together again.

Funeral Services - Monday, January 9, 2023 at 11:00 AM
Alpine North Stake Center
1125 North Alpine Blvd
Alpine, Utah

Visitation - Sunday, January 8 from 6:30 to 8:00 PM (Open House setting. Encouraged to attend Sunday Evening)
Visitation - Monday, January 9 from 9:00 to 10:30 AM
Alpine North Stake Center
1125 North Alpine Blvd
Alpine, Utah

An overflow location for the funeral broadcast will held at the Fort Canyon Ward meeting house:
890 North Heritage Hills Drive
Alpine, Utah

Interment will take place in the Alpine City Cemetery.
To view the services via livestream, please click on the following link: https://youtube.com/@FortCreekWard

In lieu of flowers, our family would appreciate donations to the following charity: https://www.agnusdeifoundationutah.org/donate.html



134 comments:

  1. More then likely departed with snow on his wings, wallet is thicker then his log book

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You have to ponder how snow country people regard contaminated aircraft surfaces. Do some residents normalize a belief that accumulated snow will "blow off" a hard to reach T-tail?

      Would be a sad repeat mistake if snow had accumulated up on the high T-tail from not being hangared but didn't get de-iced. This represents a second Utah-based T-tail aircraft with crew including an organization's pilot-certified head guy that crashed after lifting off, reminiscent of the Chamberlain crash.

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    2. The pilot had an ATP rating which requires a minimum of 1500 total time, so I'm sure his logbook was plenty thick.

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    3. That is a problem I wish to have

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    4. The thick log book is only good for getting a job. Thick or thin logbook you can be equally dead if you do something stupid on your next flight.

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    5. "The thick log book is only good for getting a job. Thick or thin logbook you can be equally dead if you do something stupid on your next flight."

      Bravo sir, basic truth.

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    6. ATP is not a rating, it's a certificate grade under which ratings may be issued.

      Delete
    7. 1,500 hrs ain’ nuthin’…

      …that’s just enough hours to be dangerous.

      It’s true: Low time pilots are cautious, high time pilots are wise. It’s the mid-timers whose confidence exceeds their experience.

      Delete
  2. The picture (referenced above) is amazing. Everything ripped off the fuselage; wing, engines, gear, horizontal stab and yet the fuselage remained intact. Is that a composite fuselage or metal?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Metal. Notice also by comparing to the factory build photo below that the fuselage retained structural integrity of the forward door opening. The area of green zinc visible in the accident photo can be identified in the factory build photo for orientation. Strong design.
      https://www.ainonline.com/sites/ainonline.com/files/styles/ain30_fullwidth_large/public/uploads/2013/06/embraer.jpg

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  3. Rumor is got about 10' up and rolled inverted. Hopefully not another case of a wealthy Utah pilot deicing with prayer instead of actual deicing fluid.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. His Jet was always hangered. Snow or ice should not have been a factor. It had to be a failure of control or perhaps they left a gust lock pin in and forgot to take it out. Only 10 ft off the runway and rolled suddenly. Not Snow or Ice.

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    2. That all you got, whiner?

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    3. Why would you have gust locks on in the hangar

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  4. Stop sniping! Or Kathryn’s Report might be gone forever. We are adults, not adolescents. Let’s act it.

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  5. any relevancy to momentary 'track' directional change to 90 degrees.
    Departure rwy 13: 8,603 ft × 150 ft (2,622 m × 46 m) asphalt.
    ADS-B. @ Time: 18:35:49 Z. SPATIAL, Groundspeed: 99 kt, Track: 90.0°, Pos.: 40.226°, -111.729°

    ReplyDelete
  6. Mr. Ricks was obviously an accomplished pilot. It's a tragic situation. Reserve judgement until the NTSB investigates. Thoughts and prayers to the families.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I knew Nathan and he was an accomplished pilot. I have flown with him before he got his jet.

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  7. If the contaminated wing rumor is true, surely by looking at that picture the airport is well equipped with de and anti ice services??

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. imagined 55NR was in a hangar near till departure.

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    2. What's your guess as to cause?

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    3. During takeoff, aircraft fly at a low-speed, high thrust regime, a combination that results in the least amount of flight control effectiveness. Thus a single engine failure on tail mounted twin jets during the departure roll results in immediate yaw and roll toward the failed engine. taken from https://simpleflying.com/engine-failure-pilot-perspective/

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    4. He has a very nice hangar in Provo, so I doubt snow/ice contamination had a role in the accident.

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    5. To Anonymous 12:40:00 ... if no one should guess or pontificate and just wait for the facts, what's the point of putting the story online and providing a comments area? And why do you think it's a poorly written article that was written by someone would wouldn't know a Bonanza from a Boeing? Are you just guessing?

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    6. "imagined 55NR was in a hangar near till departure."

      Possible it was on the ramp loading too long, and it iced?

      Is the deice station right before taking the active for departure?

      Delete
    7. Great question Moodyriver. There are plenty of facts out there surrounding this accident. Weather, PIREPS, RWY condition, pilot qualification's/experience. Additionally it doesn't take a journalistic genius to read an aviation article and clearly see the writer ascertained their info via a couple of internet clicks instead of say interviewing a subject matter expert.

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    8. As BlancoLirio pointed out, it’s possible that one engine was providing more thrust than the other which precipitated an asymmetrical thrust event and caused the aircraft to depart the runway center line and crash before getting airborne.

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  8. VMCA is 97kts…ADSB…99kts at rotation

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  9. All things equal 99 knots minor snow addition to the wings due to the time exposed what was the wind at that point and what's the direction of break with accelerated stall, even with no engine out a heavy-handed rotation / stall would result in that roll with substantial forward trajectory with full take off power resulting in the substantial demolition of the airframe?

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  10. KPVU 021844Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC008 M01/M01 A2979 RMK AO2 UPB03E11SNE03B11 CIG 007V012 P0000 $

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  11. Book numbers go out the window if you are flying a snow cone. An early rotation or one with a contaminated airfoil might cause a wing to drop its tip into the runway, which is one of the few ways (without hitting another aircraft) to sustain that much damage at an intersecting taxiway on a takeoff roll. Also, wasn't the runway just freshly plowed right before his takeoff? The EMB-505 QRH shows about 4,558' of uncontaminated runway required at MGTOW. The crash photo shows the airplane resting near the intersection with Rwy 18/36, which is a little more than half of the 8,000' departure runway, so it looks like there was normal acceleration given the elevation, temperature, and contamination.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Crash occurred near taxiway A3. They departed Rwy 13. A3 still NOTAM’ed closed.

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  12. The aircraft must be de-iced even after coming out of a warm hangar, the melted snow now water will immediately freeze when the wind blows over the wing, there is no substitute for deicing, this was his only choice, salt city airport airplanes reported a several hour delay for deicing , roll the dice and take your chance, not a good bet in an airplane, this will be pilot error

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I would even say "the aircraft must be de-iced ESPECIALLY after coming out of a warm hangar" -- contamination is worse when precip melts and then re-freezes.

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    2. No, aircraft does not deice after warm hangar, warm hangar is actually preferred method of prepping an aircraft for operation. I've been managing aircraft operations for 17 years and never deiced an aircraft after pulling out of warm hangar unless it's been outside more than 45 minutes. Wait until NTSB does it's report and feel for the Ricks family. (Nathan and I were freshmen together at BYU).

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    3. PLEASE watch what you write: comments like this can get people killed. A warm hangar does not preclude the need for deice / anti-ice. Active precip with sub freezing temperatures requires a pre takeoff contamination check; this is necessary regardless of whether the plane was in hanger, heated or otherwise.

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    4. Please avoid the “I know more than you” matches. No situation is ever alike and we weren’t there so we are blindly speculating.

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  13. CAROL search reveals that a hung up rudder gust lock caused uncommanded severe yaw to the right immediately after a 2014 EMB-505 takeoff at Palm Springs, Ca.

    Notable in the gust lock design is the arrangement of the working point at the bellcrank such that the engagement dog drops into a notch outside of the center of travel.

    Changes were made to an actuator to resolve the root cause but the working point arrangement is of interest for this Provo accident. An aileron lock event with dog engagement away from center of travel would force a continuous roll.

    Design detail (focused on rudder lock), here:
    https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40446017&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Systems%20Group%20Chairman%27s%20Factual%20Report-Master.PDF

    Final Report:
    https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/90419/pdf

    Docket:
    https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=90419

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The pin at the yoke locks elevator and ailerons in a direct mechanical manner, making the rudder lock the only portion with the actuated bell crank system. (See pin insertion, figure 4 on sheet 10 linked below).

      If N555NR's pilot experienced an uncommanded rudder lock event in either direction's off center position, yaw correction using aileron after realizing the rudder had become dog locked may be one possible explanation of the observed outcome.

      The intact tailcone will make it easy for investigators to evaluate the as found state of the rudder gust lock mechanism.

      Link, Figure 4 Sheet 10:
      https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40446023&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Embraer%20Submission-Master.PDF

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    2. I believe you are right on with the the airplane's gust lock actuator
      had failed in the locked position. I would bet money on that. The exact thing happen in Palm Springs, CA on the same model EMB-505.

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  14. My read, 55NR ADS-B Out signal activated in front of a GA hangar @ 18:21Z, acft held till 18:31Z, proceeded directly to Rwy 13 via Twys C, B, A, then without delay started rolling at 18:35:11Z.

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  15. 01/02 local Provo Municipal Airport surface conditions at 10:56 AM were 30 °F, 29 °F dew pt, 96 % hum. Overnight temps ranged in the 30-31 F range.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Light snow and mist, also.
      Provo Time zone is UTC -7
      ADS-B recorded accident takeoff time = 18:35 Z
      Local Time of accident = 11:35 MST
      KPVU 021756Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC010 M01/M02 A2979
      KPVU 021817Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC008 M01/M01 A2979
      KPVU 021844Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC008 M01/M01 A2979
      KPVU 021856Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC010 M01/M01 A2978
      Light snow = -SN, Mist = BR, M01/M01 = -1C/-1C = 30.2F/30.2F

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  16. I have no idea about stall caristics of rocket ships. How fast and hard do they break?
    And from a king Air that I followed
    http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2019/07/beechcraft-b300-king-air-350i-fatal.html?m=1

    Age: 71, Male

    It is likely that the pilot applied left rudder, the opposite input needed to maintain lateral control, before applying right rudder seconds later.

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  17. Per the bio of the pilot, it doesn't appear he ever flew for the airlines or as a professional pilot, so he had no need to get the ATP rating. The fact that he did anyway speaks volumes of his apparent desire to be a safer and more proficient pilot.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. True. Maybe. There are always a few out there looking to massage the ego … not that there is necessarily anything wrong with that. Obtaining a private, commercial, ATP, or any other ticket only indicates that you were proficient enough to meet the FAA minimum standards on THAT DAY. What matters is ‘are you proficient today?’.

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    2. He didn't just recently move up to jets. Easy enough to see by looking back through aircraft registered to his aviation LLCs over the years if you work from most recent to oldest records in Aviationdb.net:

      Aircraft prior to N555NR's registration April 2021:

      - N144AL s/n 525B0044 CESSNA 525B
      October 2012 thru August 2021

      - N2648X s/n 501-0105 CESSNA 501
      June 2006 thru July 2011

      Other aircraft registered to his LLC's (these were new, first owner):
      - N74WY Aviat A-1C-180 Oct 2014 to June 2020
      - N49PX SR22 December 2009 t0 April 2011
      - N69PX SR22 July 2008 to Nov 2009
      - N742SR SR22 Feb 2007 to July 2007
      - N59PX SR22 Aug 2004 to Dec 2008
      - N388CD SR22 July 2004 to Jan 2007

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    3. The Aviat was not his, belongs to a Montana LLC of same name.

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    4. ATP and type rating check ride are about the same so why not? He was a local so I don't think snow or ice got him.

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  18. https://deseret.brightspotcdn.com/dims4/default/9a4e226/2147483647/strip/true/crop/2873x1914+127+0/resize/1300x866!/format/webp/quality/90/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcdn.vox-cdn.com%2Fthumbor%2FMX3syVGSMqF3MGrX01wQ4aU9-Ac%3D%2F0x0%3A3000x1914%2F3000x1914%2Ffilters%3Afocal%281623x1167%3A1624x1168%29%2Fcdn.vox-cdn.com%2Fuploads%2Fchorus_asset%2Ffile%2F24334270%2Fmerlin_2956292.jpg

    ReplyDelete
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    1. In addition to that fuselage view, a side view of it upright on the recovery trailer is shown at the 23 to 31 second point in this KSL-TV5 video:
      https://content.jwplatform.com/previews/zEEMGNNR

      Provo Airport Manager Brian Torgersen is quoted as saying that based on witness accounts and runway markings, the twin-engine jet appears to have “banked hard left” shortly after takeoff and its “left wingtip drug on the runway,” after which the “nose hit the ground … just off the runway,” He said that you can see where the nose of the plane hit the dirt and left a pretty good-sized crater.

      Source:
      https://www.seattletimes.com/business/seattle-bank-ceo-survives-after-private-jet-crashes-on-way-to-rose-bowl/

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  19. Tragic accident. Nathan was a good friend. We learned to fly together. I have flown his prior Citation. I flew his first Cirrus before that. I don’t know what caused this accident but he was a very detail minded, meticulous person and pilot. That’s why he was so incredibly successful in business. I don’t know any pilot more dedicated to exactness. Yet here we are. Regardless of why or how it happened, it can happen to any of us and often happens to the best of us.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. We all make mistakes and I am saddened to see that your friend died from one.

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    2. Very true in aviation. Some accidents leave more questions than answers. I have personal knowledge of 2 accidents that the NTSB got wrong by blaming the pilot. They were not interested in what I said. I'm an ATP with type ratings and a A&P with IA, 40 years experience. Good luck and condolences.

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  20. "King Air(accident) that I followed" from earlier post. I knew the copilot in that accident. He had been single pilot qualified in the King Air 90 Part 135, single pilot. In the 300 crash he was relegated to landing gear operator. The Captain did not use checklists and was known for aggressive rotations. NTSB listed power lever friction controls not properly adjusted as a possible cause. Capt. used wrong rudder. NTSB stated four other King Air Accidents involving improperly set friction locks.
    Issues that will be examined in the Provo accident- aggressive rotation/over rotation, icing: failure to use engine anti ice, possible water ingestion into engines in freezing temperatures.
    With plenty of runway and performance a pilots "best friend" under those conditions is a slower than normal rotation and some extra speed.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The last sentence is very true, always flew by that rule...

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  21. Until the investigation reveals if and when de-icing was performed at his "very nice hangar" prior to ADS-B Out turned on, we can only speculate on a contaminated wing.
    as noted above, 55NR ADS-B Out signal activated in front of a GA hangar @ 18:21Z, acft held there till 18:31Z, and proceeded directly to 13 for departure....
    as to " the de-icing process, which involves spraying propylene glycol on the plane to remove snow, slush or ice, can take 10 minutes if there’s just a frost. If snow is falling on the aircraft, it may take 20 to 40 minutes to apply the de-icing solution." according to Randy Hubbell, general manager of Integrated Deicing Services at Salt Lake Intl.

    ReplyDelete
  22. For people suggesting ice contamination on the top of the T-tail causing the accident, the tail plane stalls in the nose down direction with extreme force needed to overcome it. You may probably wouldn't be able to pitch up during rotation speed.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ifKduc1hE8

    https://aircrafticing.grc.nasa.gov/1_3_2_3.html#:~:text=Ice%20accretion%20will%20cause%20the,lower%20surface%20and%20grow%20aft.


    ReplyDelete
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    1. Unfortunately aviation was a very thin slice of his life, as he is very accomplished in other areas. As true professionals who do hundreds of hours a year and devote their life to aviation he could not possibly have the true required experience to operate a jet, sure you buy it and fly it but these situations take a true professional. No doubt he was a good pilot, but didn’t have the total picture, this could be other then a contaminated wing, not likely from what we see so far. The only option was a full device with type 1 and type 4 fluid, it is expensive and can be time consuming, I would guess he figured on a warm hangar and beat it to the runway, if he did that then experience if your going to really risk it would be to let her roll 20knots past liftoff speed and climb flat. That is no guarantee however by any means, water droplets will freeze on the roll and slide to rear of wing, sadly people should avoid these conditions unless your really up to speed.

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    2. Puzzling to read an assertion that he could not possibly have the true required experience to operate a jet. His got first jet in 2006.

      - N144AL s/n 525B0044 CESSNA 525B
      October 2012 thru August 2021

      - N2648X s/n 501-0105 CESSNA 501
      June 2006 thru July 2011

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    3. Gives him very little experience, and those are very docile aircraft, straight wing, experience is 500hrs a year for years, can’t fly that much when your career is doing what he was, no he was not up to this, you can’t be as consumed as he was in his business world and have time to fly that kind of equipment competently, not in these wx conditions

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    4. Remarkable that someone who has zero information on a pilot's logbook time in type, evaluations from trainers or knowledge of how the check ride for the 505 rating went presumes incompetence. Maybe its just parroting something put into your mind from watching youtube videos.

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    5. According to flight aware N555NR had 24 hours in the prior 90 days.

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    6. Accident was on takeoff. In the 90 days of N555NR's takeoffs that show up on Adsbexchange from October 08, 2022 through the accident day:
      8(Oct)+6(Nov)+10(Dec) = 24 takeoffs.

      Delete
  23. If you dont de-ice under these conditions you wings will not produce the same lift on both sides and you roll inverted at take off.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. To prevent roll when one wing produces more lift than the other they invented ailerons. I suspect he knew how to use them.

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  24. Back on Nov. 28, 2004 Challenger 601 N873G had visible light snow, turning slushy on the upper surface of the wing and fuselage (noted by survivor) on taxi out, Captain did not think he needed de-icing fluid…perhaps feeling the very light slush would whisk off during the 130kt TO roll….it didn’t. It froze, in the wind, adhered and immediately after rotation, 10 feet in the air, the left wing dragged along 3k’ of remaining runway before gouging in the grass as the nose vaulted into
    the ground on the right side of the runway instantly killing the Captain, flight attendant and and young male passenger. Two very similar tragedies, both with highly accomplished and properly rated “stick and rudder” Captains. Wx is key.
    An old 1971 article written by Dave Anderton for the Cessna Citation news letter,
    was titled: “Icing is Not Enticing” . Lest we, who know and care, all pray for the survivors and families who’s lives have been forever changed by this tragedy.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. In that 2004 accident, the aircraft's time of exposure on the ramp to the light snow and mist was 50 minutes. Will be interesting to learn how long N555NR sat on the ramp after it was pulled out of the hangar.

      Comparing weather reports:
      2004 N873G: KMTJ 281653Z 00000KT 1 1/4SM -SN BR FEW005 OVC009 M01/M02 A2967
      2023 N555NR: KPVU 021844Z VRB06KT 3SM -SN BR OVC008 M01/M01 A2979

      NTSB N873G report:
      https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DEN05MA029.aspx
      Docket for N873G:
      https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=60616

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    2. Spot on Wx comparison…the time sequence could have been 50 minutes too !…hangar pull out, tow position to terminal, walk around, tactile wing inspection, boarding, Meticulous check list, P/U clearance, two engine starts, taxi, hold for one arrival on approach, take off clearance, T.O. Briefing, final control check throttle-up, brake release and Vr. The Captain was reported as very professional and meticulous in conducting his checks. This take time and the entire sequence could have been close to 45-50 minutes
      precip and temp exposure.

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  25. in 2020, Duncan Aviation full-service FBO at Provo (PVU) announced de-icing services for Part 91 and 135 aircraft operators.

    “Our de-ice truck has a 45-foot boom that gives us the ability to de-ice large-cabin aircraft. It has Type I and Type IV fluid, as well as a pressurized air system that can blow off soft snow.”
    “We apply the de-icing fluid to aircraft just prior to takeoff, and it blasts the ice and snow right off. You can see the steam rising from the plane in the frigid air.”

    The Type IV de-icing fluid can be applied after Type I, and it prevents ice from forming. All four of Duncan Aviation’s full-service FBOs have de-ice trucks, and they all use the same two types of de-icing chemicals.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. An example de-ice video:
      https://youtu.be/WLC79FwwACY?t=174

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  26. The Rose Bowl exceeded the power of the word NO. Weather is unforgiving at times and the gotta go, is a deadly combo. Mechanical or environmental failure at this point, are probably the two main elements in this accident. The skill level required to manage the jet at a critical moment is enormous and good decision making on the ground or in the air is essential.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This comment is spot-on. Based on the available info — and assuming this was a contaminated airfoil event — the failure was not one of technical skill and expertise, but rather a non-technical failure (ie: behavioral; adherence to procedures; discipline; professionalism) of the pilot to resist the urgency of the Rose Bowl and take the time to apply type 4 anti-ice.

      The airlines went through this years ago when they allowed pilots way too much discretion in deciding whether to deice. USAir 405, Air Florida 90, Continental 1713 are just a few examples. They learned their lesson, and now it seems airplanes deice when it seems unnecessary.

      Flying 100 hours a year does not allow for the development and maintenance of proficiency in dealing with these infrequent situations. As an 800-hour-a-year airline pilot, i’m still looking up procedures in manuals to ensure I adhere to all the requirements under ground icing conditions.

      Delete
  27. Something I learned. I had a Hawker jet in a warm hangar in Colorado years ago. I had it pulled out, while it was snowing, BUT, I did not wait to allow the aircraft to cool down in the cold air, while in the hangar, BEFORE having it pulled out…..

    The snow immediately froze on all the warm metal surfaces; so we had to get de-iced.

    A kind man, based locally, mentioned the “Open the hangar doors early” trick to me.

    The following time, I did what he suggested. After waiting about a half hour, with the hangar doors open, I had the aircraft pulled out. This time, the snow was like feather down, sliding off of the wings in the light wind. Pretty cool.😎

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  28. Monday 01/02, last PVU departure prior to the accident was a PC12 @10:59 MST. Two previous prior. The last arrival was @ 11:18 MST.

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  29. Regarding the injured passenger, a spokesperson noted, “The surgeons at the hospital said they have never seen anybody with that level of damage survive”.
    Damn...

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    1. LOTS of energy to dissipate when a flying jet comes crashing down. Survival is a miracle.

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  30. Is there any record of the 300 being de-iced on this or previous flights ? If the pilot never flew in conditions that required de-icing, he may have thought snow would blow off plane as mentioned by previous comment . I had ice form on wings after landing with cold plane sitting in warmer rain while we were eating lunch in terminal . When we returned to plane, the wings looked Ike they were covered in bubble wrap where rain drops froze . Another time while we were eating after landing , upon returning to plane the wings were covered with snow. When we attempted to brush snow off wings with our warm hands, the snow melted and stuck to wings so we quit brushing snow off . We taxied to runway and planned to accelerate and see if snow would nlow off before takeoff speed . Snow blew off so we took off but if snow had not blown off before takeoff speed we planned to abort .

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    1. Good question. No de-ice needed if no snowfall or mist was hitting the plane after it came out of the hangar, so pulled up archive wx reports for N555NR's KPVU takeoffs that show up on Adsbexchange from October 08, 2022 through the accident day. Those takeoff dates were:
      10/08,09,26 11/04,18,23 12/02,05,06,23,24.
      Didn't find any days other than the accident day where the aircraft was exposed to snow fall before takeoff.

      Also checked takeoffs from December 30, 2021 through March 28, 2022 when N555NR was operating out of a KSPK hangar before it moved to the Provo hangar on 8/06/2022. No snow in any of the reports at those eleven KSPK takeoff dates & times either.

      Archive weather source:
      https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/download.phtml?network=UT_ASOS

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  31. Old saying about ice on planes is there is “some and none and some is too much “

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  32. Reminds me of that Phenom 100 owned by a wealthy and successful biotech owner who crashed in 2014 into a house killing him, 2 others onboard and a woman and 2 kids on the ground. All due to rushing and not accounting for icing conditions. Might be the same here…

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  33. An interview with the survivors will be key to the investigation.

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  34. So many "Arm Chair" Accident Investigators on this thread. Myself, 1977 Graduate of USAF Accident Investigation and Safety School. USAF Safety Officer 1977-2000. Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) Safety, 1979-2004. Major Airline Safety Co-Chairman, Pacific Operations, 1988-1995. Full Member International Safety and Accident Investigators. Finally, I know the NTSB Lead Investigator on this accident....so if any of you have definitive proof of what occurred, I will personally put you in contact with him! Please await the NTSB findings,

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    1. Biggest lesson of the last two years: Experts aren't.

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    2. People trained in the 1970's are not equipped to understand the replay tools now available for crowdsourcing review. Turn loose the everyman, each according to their interest to pull up, sort and comment.

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    3. concerning 'Myself' asking this discussion to "have definitive proof of what occurred." Accident Reports are one of the main products of an NTSB investigation, yet definitive proof of what occurred is not one of their findings. "Reports provide details about the accident, analysis of the factual data, conclusions and the probable cause of the accident, and the related safety recommendations. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/Reports.aspx
      Also Federal Courts ruled NTSB investigations are not subject to judicial review giving victims no recourse if they believe the investigation was wrong or improperly influenced.
      further insights https://www.cshlaw.com/resources/what-information-from-an-ntsb-report-is-admissible-evidence-in-court/

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    4. That phrase "if any of you have definitive proof of what occurred, I'm going to insist that you personally take it to Mr. Big" is a management tactic frequently used to squash people's input before it embarrasses an organization by exposing discrepancies. Saw it happen myself in over three decades of working in Defense Industry positions.

      No Management Safety Executive can find work in a large organization if they are (ahem...) "overly sensitive" of issues raised, and neither can the original person who first brings up the discrepancy if they are determined to see it get resolved.

      And so it was also when the top "Safety Professionals" overrode Morton Thiokol's Allan Mcdonald. Just wild, WILD, to see the original 8:11:00 PM poster above trot out the threat, reflexively, one more time. Takes me back to 1986, standing atop complex 36's blockhouse and watching those seven astronauts lose their lives with my own eyes after Mr. Mcdonald was overruled and a gaggle of "Safety Professionals" went along.

      Wise up to the "you shouldn't look" people. They are often frauds.

      https://www.wliw.org/radio/news/remembering-allan-mcdonald-he-refused-to-approve-challenger-launch-exposed-cover-up/

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    5. Condolences on losing your friend. I recognize the post. I know it is second nature to speculate (which is 100% different than being a Richard Cranium), but just wanted to say sorry.

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    6. “Please await the NTSB findings” for what???

      Are you trying to ruin Kathryn‘s Report?

      If the only acceptable comments are “Nathan was an accomplished pilot with a nice hangar”, this website will quickly have no visitors.

      Tell me, Mr. Accomplished Investigator, why an accident report, say, for a single engine plane crash, reads “fuel was present in the carburetor, valve train continuity was demonstrated, thumb compression existed on all cylinders, there was chordwise scratching and S-bending of the propeller” ???

      Because engine failure is at the top of the list of potential causes, so it’s something they (ie: your buddies) rule out.

      What’s the top of the list of potential causes for this accident? Here’s a hint: ground icing conditions existed at the time of the accident.

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    7. You're honestly/truly suggesting everyone wait until NTSB publishes a of-little-use 'probable' cause 2-3 years from now? This accident & accident 'probables' that pat-on-their-own-back NTSB officials publish, are of lil use to the flying public today. NTSB is so full of it's own decades/stale rhetoric that it lost its valuableness years ago with the advent present-day crowdshare tech. KR serves a real, valuable, function in the meantime. Even if half the commentary is off-the-wall (from non-pilots) the other half often serves as good reminders to the rest of us pilots of what-to-stay-alert for, continually, even if it's not 'probable' for this particular accident. The "fail-to-the-lock position" of the gust lock that posters list above sure got my attention. Too many "gust lock" accidents out there (from GIVs on down the line to small biz jets). Comments like above on the gust locks absoultely serves as an reminder to not only follow man. published (obligated) checklist, but to add double/triple checks of some items therein (why? cause there's too many gust lock accidents for my liking or tastes). Period. Was it a factor here? Who knows but I like seeing the comment brought up here in KR (and in other KR reports). Icing? Personally I doubt it played a role (perhaps, sure). But as a single-pilot cert jet driver I will say we single-pilot jet ops are much more sensitive to icing situations than all these "professionals" that keep posting (and saying otherwise). I think those "professionals" are bigger culprits actually. As "entrepreneurs", as everyone likes to use the term deragatorily, we don't have to keep 121 schedule times. We don't have flight-ops to which we have answer if we opt to scrub a morning flight and take a later launch, or afternoon after a accomodating lunch, or even next day. Most "single pilot jet drivers" I know (yes the "entrepreneurial" types) enjoy flying and never/ever do it if they're "not" going to enjoy it thorougly!, 100%!, with all check-boxes checked, and knowing we have nothing to worry about. If I have to sit and look at a wing questioning "geez did that snow start freezing on the wing?" or "is it going to blow off" or "should I have taxiied over to the de-ice fluid boom and wait my turn". You commenters kidding? The entrepreneur types are just as strong headed to say "no" as they are to say "yes". Meaning if I have to look in the back to wife, family and friends and say, "Guys. We're scrubbing this morning. Sorry. We're going to get lunch at some go-to five star place and hit the slopes another time and leave in the morning when it's gonna be cerulean blue." And usually I'm greeted by "cheers". And if a teenager says "Oh I was going to see my boyfriend tonight" I tell her I'll make it up to her and everyone is happy, and I'm relaxed and the next day's flight is wonderful. I don't know any "entrepreneur" types (that you all have colored with black cowboy hats and six shooters) that want to be advancing the throttles with their sphincter all bundled-tight-pushing-out-diamonds-from-lead. Sure there was the guy in the Phenom in Gaithersburg, MD a few years back. But then I'll point to all you "professional's" who do the same knuckle-headed things (Air Florida captain, SW pilot/crew flying with their clothes off, Germanwings PIC pushing the stick forward into a mountain cause he felt like it or was off his meds (other pilots like him out there - make no mistake about it). There are countless, countless knuckle-headed things the professionals do and I'll lobby they do them more frequently than the biz-jet certified entrepreneur who is re-certifying each year. But as to "waiting for NTSB" to publish its results, hopefully in this decade. Sure you go ahead and wait. I'll listen to the comments here in the meantime and take heed to some that make sense and toss the ones that don't. Simple as that. Thanks KR for making this available and as you probably already realize, it's becoming more and more popular and a source of reviews for pilots and non-pilots alike.

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  35. In January 2014, the Chinese government announced that it was investigating Nu Skin following a People's Daily newspaper report calling it a "suspected illegal pyramid scheme." In 2016, Nu Skin agreed to pay a $47 million settlement for operating a pyramid scheme after being sued by China in a Utah federal court. Mr. Hicks was apparently the highest earning distributor in the history of the company. Sad. Condolences to family, friends, and loved ones.

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    1. Sad to see this. I'm not surprised, however.

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  36. Many pilots and most of the public make the mistake of believing that ice on the wings is the greatest icing danger. It is in fact ice on the tail that creates the greatest hazard and few are willing to take the time or effort to climb a ladder or a lift to visually check the icing condition of the horizontal stabilizer on the tail. For some reason, the message is not getting through, and is even less likely to get through to a pilot whose primary business is other than aviation.

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    1. People haven't gained a working understanding that the tail's elevator is installed as an upside down airfoil.

      Top side snow accumulation diminishes the airfoil's lift capability. The lift direction is downward by design. The accumulated snow's change in downward lift means that your takeoff trim setting normally used to position the tail airfoil angle isn't gong to be correct.

      The movable surface at the back edge of the airfoil will still stick up into the air stream and create down force while the yoke is pulled back, but the normally trimmed position of the airfoil it is hinged from doesn't contribute the intended down force expected at the takeoff trim setting.

      On takeoff, back pressure on the yoke can still get the nose to come off, but when the pilot eases off some of what he notices was higher than normally required control input, nose drops unexpectedly, as if trim is set wrong. (It is!)

      While this is going on, wing contamination is getting the roll component going. Not much time available to figure out what's happening.

      https://www.aviationsafetymagazine.com/features/aircraft-tailplane-stalls/

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    2. Thank you — EXCELLENT explanation.

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    3. I second that - great explanation and concise!

      Even worse may be contamination (freezing rain or thawing and refreezing snow when moving) on the down/more cambered side of the stabilator, as the negative pressure on that side of the airfoil contributes more to the total (here downward) lift, just as it does on the upper/more cambered side of the wings (for most airfoils) and the effects of AoA on center of lift and flow separation may there be more pronounced than on the positive pressure side.

      Add to that (suddenly and not present during preflight checks) restricted movement of the elevator from snow/ice/re-frozen run-off and it may be much worse than at first thought.

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  37. Read these KathynsReport threads regularly, comment rarely. Just a few thoughts/comments:
    - We all know that we are "armchairing" it in these comments; no reason to repeat every time that we are speculating, thinking -- AND IF YOU ARE A PILOT, you should always think about what could have gone wrong, because it could go wrong for you!
    - Re experience, ATP, owner (business-owner) flown jets: I thought (not certain) that some owners I have known get the rating for insurance reasons (much cheaper)
    - I also agree that if you are a successful/"important" business person, you simply don't have time to devote regular time daily or even weekly to flying. In particular after a few years of uneventful long-distance flights in your jet mostly in good weather, it seems normal, simple, and frankly accumulating jet time is pretty easy in good weather flying cross country (MUCH easier than slugging it out in a Cessna 172). So my guess is: There is less competence and care here than what a professional pilot normally will achieve.
    - Having said all that, and after reading many of these types of threads around jet-crashes: Statistically speaking, it is VERY rare that modern/relatively-new certified business jets fall out of the sky because of catastrophic failures...

    Finally, and for everyone and family personally affected by this tragedy: My sincerest condolences, and I hope you can find a way to move on. The reason we are (I am!) reading and posting at this site is simply to learn, understand what can go wrong, so as to avoid tragedies like this.

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  38. A wise instructor told me many many years ago that an amateur practices until he gets it right and a professional practices until he never gets it wrong. 48 years in the business have taught me that standards and procedures are the heart and soul of a professional operation, it doesn’t matter what type of airplane or how many hours in the pilot’s logbook. Mr Snodgrass died when he neglected his professional duty, there isn’t any way to really know whether Mr Ricks even had an understanding of what is required of a professional level operation. They both had nice hangars though! I know several pilots and mechanics locally that work for the flight department of a MAJOR nationwide retail tire company, it is an absolutely world class flight department which owns multiple examples of the latest and greatest G planes. But you never hear of them. Why? Because PROFESSIONALISM is at the very heart of what they do. They follow their company standards and procedures each and every time without exception. They train relentlessly. They aren’t in the news because they never get it wrong. I wish that I was good enough to work for those guys but I do buy my tires from them!

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  39. To add to my comments above, in my experience entrepreneurs make weak pilots when they apply their entrepreneurial skills to a flight operation. “Winging it” works well in a fluid and ever changing business environment where failure is normal and accepted as part of the education and feedback process but it is EXACTLY the wrong mindset to bring to an aircraft operation. We typically get one failure before we kill ourselves and other innocent people. Standards and procedures don’t guarantee success but they maximize the odds of a successful operation.

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  40. Well said about professionalism and entrepreneurs.

    Entrepreneurs IMPROVE thru failure; the most successful entrepreneurs are experts at failing.

    But in aviation? The CONSEQUENCES of failure are catastrophic. We don't experiment, wing it, or try something "just this once"; we adhere to standards because they have been developed to provide flight operations with the lowest reasonable risk.

    And then there's this:

    The PIC / VIP Conflict. A CEO or other high-functioning individual has a dual role when they fly: they are simultaneously the PIC (solely responsible for the safety of flight) and VIP passenger (they must get to "the game" or to "the meeting"). This conflict of interest from business or social pressures can be insurmountable. They didn't become CEO by missing meetings or disappointing their friends, customers, and colleagues.

    A professional pilot within a professional flight department is as safe as it gets: standards and culture support the correct decisions. The PIC is insulated from the adverse effects of delays and cancellations. Contrast this with the Aspen Gulfstream crash where the lead charter customer was sitting on the jumpseat.

    It can be said that a PIC / VIP pilot always has a customer on the jumpseat !

    The safest amateur pilots recognize this and apply countermeasures. Leave the day before? Have a contingency plan? Have objective standards such as an "ops manual"? Have a mentor? Good aeronautical decision-making requires both clear standards as well as tolerable consequences from delays or cancellations.

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    1. Keep kidding yourself. You've turned it backwards (cause you're obviously not a PIC/VIP yourself.) "A CEO or other high-functioning individual", as you put it, particularly one in their 60's, doesn't "have" to be anywhere at any time (if they choose not to), PARTICULARLY in this age of 'remote' meetings. Are you off you rocker? There is nothing the underlings like hearing more from the cockpit than "Hey guys we're scrubbing this flight for the day. Let's head back, re-book some rooms, get on a Teams meeting, or Skype or whatever the client has, and tell them we're pushing the meeting till tomorrow or have it on Webex today. Their choice." Whether they're at home airport (and everyone heads back to their homes with families for the day/night) or whether they all head back to re-book a hotel in a nice city with a good steakhouse, either way the "CEO high functioning" decision-maker, as you put it, is a hero! In all their eyes (including his own). No "CEO high functioning" type likes taking off with sweaty palms, wondering if he/she should've deiced etc. A simple call to tower or ground and saying "We're taxing back to the FBO" is simple, basic, easy phrase they learned long, long time ago and they're exceedingly comfortable with. Yes there are exceptions (Phenom and KGAI). But generally they didn't get to where they're at by making a big decision (like advancing the throttles forward and looking at the wings saying "I hope it blows off" or "hope it didn't stick" or "maybe I should've deiced."). Go ahead and believe you're own psychosemantic theories of PIC/VIP Conflict. You've obviously not research-studied enough CEO types out there. I'm betting 99.995% will disagree with how you believe their thought processes work.

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    2. Your points are rational and well taken. Of course a CEO of this pilot's experience and stature does not have to be anywhere at a particular time to conduct business successfully. People and their staff can easily conduct business in a cozy hotel room or meeting room until weather conditions improve. The "elephant in the room" here is the fact that they were en-route to the Rose Bowl which is much more enticing than a boring business meeting that could easily be conducted on Zoom. Watching the Rose Bowl on TV cannot possibly be as exciting as flying your own jet plane with guests and colleagues aboard into SoCal to see the game in person. What boggles my mind is that these execs spend astronomical amounts on the purchase or leases of these complex aircraft along with hundreds of thousands on upkeep etc. yet do not spend money for safety pilots even on an occasional basis. This accident reminds me of the Citation crash into Lake Erie that occurred several years ago.

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    3. OK - first I'll concede I didn't realize they were off to the Rose Bowl. I'm still not completely convinced though that matters (but I'll concede it may have influenced some decision-making; but I'll also assert it no more influences the decision-making than if he'd had a so-called professional SIC along and the SIC wanted to get to the Rose Bowl just as bad (not to mention if they were all aboard a Part 135 Charter and the owner decided to sit in back and the 135 PIC/SIC wanted to get to the Rose Bowl just as bad). Again, when 135 PIC/SIC's are anxious to be somewhere (note: Lear 31A Teterboro couple/few years ago) are just as prone to making mistakes -- not that we even know a mistake was made herein the Phenom 300, cause we won't until NTSB is done. Mechanical failure is still on the table. But it sort of reminds me of the Crimson Tide scene where Capt Ramsey says to Denzel Washington (his XO) "We can play these games all night Mr Hunter, but uh, I don't have the luxury of your presumptions. [and we're] not open to interpretation, personal intuition, gut feelings, hairs on the back of your neck, little devils or angels sitting on your shoulder." All we know is that Mr. Hicks was a well trained certified, single-pilot (Phenom) driver and presumably (hopefully) followed all the rules of the road, so to speak. I personally doubt wing-icing came into play here (but hopefully NTSB will have better insight). Someone wrote below of potential runway icing conditions and a witness seeing the plane start to slide sideways (and, potentially, the pilot in a split second decided to gun it and rotating early?). That seems more plausible to me than anything (and I don't like to admit that. But I can see it plausibly perhaps). But again I'll lobby that a 135 PIC/SIC crew might be just as susceptible to the same quick split-second decision (that would be made, let's face it, by the PIC that an SIC couldn't) -- no different than the decision of the Air Florida #90 PIC to continue with a take-off roll when something was clearly amiss. And lastly, I do indeed agree 200% with your comment that "boggles you mind" that these execs don't spend money for safety pilots on occasional basis (as you put it). My single-pilot jet isn't half as valuable as a Phenom 300 and indeed I have a portfolio of contract SIC's I can pull from, even with just a day's notice (and I do). And many other single-pilot jet drivers I know do the same. I fly mostly single-pilot when it's just me. When I have family/friends aboard I like to have a back-up SIC, unless I have a family member that's pretty close having the experience in handling the plane or giving me assistance throughout the flight (but even then I generally won't be flying routes with them that require full approaches -- usually visual approaches only) and I've been flying nearly 40 years (so I'm starting to give myself away here).

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  41. Like a lot of aviation accidents, weather plays a vital part of the contributing factor in an event. Here’s what we do know: 3 miles vis, light snow, mist, temp -1C, and dewpoint -1C. Not good conditions for flying an airplane. There has been some question about whether or not de-icing/anti-icing was accomplished. Being on the commercial side of the operation (think airlines), I can tell you that de-icing/anti-icing an airplane is no longer a personal decision as the pilot in command. It’s a decision that’s based on observing the current airport conditions from a report like ATIS. These conditions would require a commercial airline operator to de-ice/anti-ice the airplane whether or not you feel it is necessary. Sure, the airplane is out in the elements anyway, not protected in a hanger, but the decision to de-ice/anti-ice or not to de-ice/anti-ice is being made solely based on the reported conditions. If it is felt that weather from a report such as ATIS is not accurate, a request can be made by a pilot to update the weather report to reflect current or more accurate conditions.

    This now leads to the discussion of a private operator under the given weather conditions. I don’t believe that a private operator has to abide by a legal set of standards in de-icing/anti-ice an aircraft. It is most likely a judgement call. I can tell from observing many corporate operations that most airplanes are extremely well cared for, almost like prized possessions, and are very clean and spotless in their appearance. I wonder sometimes if the thought to fly or not to fly is based on how contaminated the airplane may become, and hence the decision the apply fluid to the aircraft. Ethylene Glycol (basically radiator fluid) is a nasty toxic product. Yes, a very effective product for airplanes but also a messy and sticky fluid that is tough to clean up after. I only hope that if the procedure was required it was not passed up because of its negative attributes.

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    1. Unbelievable how folks are commenting on how a jet pilot/owner "thinks". And how much 100-percent they're all wrong. I'll concede that yes we keep them spotless and are our prized possessions in a way. But the thought of deice fluid dripping all over our waxed irmon is not so much on our minds as the thought of "If I have to go through the trouble of deice, do I even feel like flying at all?" I got out to Atlantic at Aspen a couple of years ago and saw the line of biz jets down at the de-ice pad to the south near the departure end of runway and thought "If I have to take all this time and expense to de-ice, is it even worth it? and make my departure slot, when we all can head back to the St. Regis, and have our meetings there on Webex and get a good meal for the night." Most of the storm lines blow through within half-a-day to a day and there's a lull between them that you don't have to worry about de-icing just to taxi out to the runway. So heading back to hotel, or waiting few hours while they pull it in the hangar (they're usually pretty flexible in working with you on that - - they have ways of shuffling stuff around for half a day, or even a night). I don't know of any CEO type (as some refer to them here) that felt their meeting was so valuable that they couldn't do it by Webex in this day-and-age (Brian Moynihan inclusive). I think de-icing is more of an irratation of time/expense that most of us plane operators would rather be in the hotel hanging out and doing meetings there than feeling like we have to get to aiport, wait in line for de-ice, make our departure slot, etc. etc. If you're in your 60's, like Mr. Hicks was, then they've reached that period and worth where they don't necessarily have to do anything, for anyone, at any specific time regardless. Just my two cents.

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  42. I agree with most comments above. Cemeteries are filled with successful and rich businessmen (mostly alpha male types) and their victims who had huge pocketbooks and got themselves nice expensive flying machinery, especially the jet kind. A (relatively new) Phenom 100 flew into a house in 2014 in Maryland and killed a woman and her 2 kids and all 3 onboard because a successful executive rushed through the checklists to save time, never accounted for icing, and ironically came in too slow on landing after going through icing conditions.
    There is part 91 "cowboy" private aviation... but I believe it is highly incompatible with very advanced and very complex aircrafts that are normally in the hands of professional and occupational pilots and used for money making A to B charter or scheduled transportation. It is appropriate for small GA propeller planes with a few souls onboard.
    Those expensive jets are not flashy toys like supercars but extremely capable and beautiful machines that will KILL YOU any chance they get. This is how I viewed motorcycles and survived 200K riding them. CFI/MEL/A&P and Part 135 single pilot operation applicant with a lowly 4 seater propeller plane here.

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    1. You’re whacked pal. Many many more pilot and pax souls in cemeteries from so-called professional pilots that ignore checklists, alpha male PICs (over-ruling smart SICs), PIC’s skipping their anti-depressant meds (or hiding them) and then intentionally killing their crews and pax’s, and just good-ole making stupid mistakes, than the number of souls each year from biz jet accidents. Just count up the one versus the other in a 10 year slot. Your “professional and occupstional” pilots have killed scores more (infants, kids, mothers and fathers) with their “flashy” epaulettes they’re so proud and polish each night.. It’s just a fact. It’s the whole reason CRM was even invented (cause of these scores of “professionals” doing dangerous things.) And even with CRM it hasn’t stopped them from severely dangerous actionsi—since just in the several years we’ve had to institute protocols/procedures that now even regulate how a PIC/SIC gets up and goes to bathroom and an attendant comes into the cockpit environment to take his place. You think we’d ever have to do that in an owner-operated biz jet?

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  43. I'm not speculating on the cause, the previously mentioned rudder lock system or ice both sound like trouble.
    Regarding the rudder lock malfunction- is full or almost full rudder deflection needed for the lock to engage? Full deflection isn't likely to be used, especially near the end of the takeoff roll, when speed is high. Full deflection and subsequent lock happening at low speed would probably result in a rejected takeoff, or a "runway excursion". Or so it seems.
    Something I haven't seen mentioned yet is the cost of deicing. I flew for a medium sized charter outfit. They did not outright discourage deicing, but did want an explanation from the captain. As an SIC, I once requested deicing in Toronto, then see the young, slightly arrogant captain approaching with a push broom. We disagreed, my concern being the t-tail on the Lear 55(although the "broom" method would have been inadequate for the wings also, under the conditions). It went far enough that I needed to say "not with me in it, have fun!" Me being a necessary crew member, that resulted in deicing. He was clearly pissed, and made up a story about no hangar being available, a warm hangar being cheaper than deicing. I am glad it went that way..precip was heavy, the wait was long, and, as mentioned by others here, a hangar-heated aircraft is not at all immune to icing. It may have lessened my stubbornness with the situation, though. Many further disagreements on operations and maintenance followed at that company. Good riddance!
    I don't know what the result of that icy takeoff would have been..some people at that company seemed to think the Lear was a hotrod that could deal with such things, which is an idiotic idea easily perpetuated when most of your pilots were previously 172 flying instructors.
    So, the fact that the airport had deicing available doesn't mean much. It costs time and money, along with the small but real risk of some careless deicer blasting the pitot or static port and damaging instrumentation.

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  44. Same guy again..I see that today is the 41st anniversary of the air florida 737 crash that killed 70 something people, due to ice. And erroneous EPR indications, which was also due to ice. A possible contributing factor was their intentional hanging out behind a DC-9 ahead of them, thinking that the warm exhaust would help them. Same idea as those who think a warm hangar negates the need for deicing. It didn't work. Don't do that!

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    1. “Forward, forward, FORWARD!… We only want five hundred…

      FORWARD!… Just barely climb…”

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  45. Reportedly the cost to de-ice a Phenom 300 is $4,500.

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  46. Can we rule out a medical event with the PIC?

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    1. No, but the chances of it are incredibly, incredibly low. This is brought forth in a lot of armchair investigation and rarely ever ends up being the case. So, while you can’t rule it out, it’s extremely unlikely.

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  47. Love reading all these comments written by all these doer-thee-well never make mistake “professionals” who do this day-in-day-out and never make a stupid mistake like forgo de-icing. The reality? Look in the mirror! Your mistakes are just as bad and often more deadly, much more deadly, like the Florida Air 90 forgoing deice o takeoff and killing nearly 100 people ( not just one and pax like these biz jets). And countless others like them. Or even the “professionals” that just plain decide “professionally” to force the stick over, while locking a crew member out of the cockpit, so they can take everyone down. You “professionals” are just as bad as the rest of us - if not worse. Can’t remember the last time I read of a biz jet captain just “nosing it over” to take dozens or more in. But we’re now reading about them regularly and all the other foolish things these “professionals” do (weren’t there two Southwest pilots flying naked up in the cockpit? And arrest on landing? How many have now been convicted of being drunk while flying? Oh that’s “professional” alright. And yes how many “professionals” failing to activate anti-ice or perform deice? Too many to count, long after the Air Florida accident t taught us all. Not to mention the complete and utter failure of captain and crews to keep safety and control amidst their out-of-control pax cabin chaoses. There are risks at everything in aviation. Me? I’ll take my chances/risks with our biz jet and annual recurrent training and re-training rather than take the risks with you “professionals”, at least those of you that keep your clothes on in the cabin, or don’t stop taking your meds and just plain nose it over, thank you very much

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    1. KR is a place to share thoughts about aviation experiences and learn from some of those who contribute. The one inescapable fact in this business is that we are always learning until we stop flying. Every minute, every hour, every day there is something new to absorb. This entire thread is devoted to an accident that had a horrible result. Hopefully, someone will lock onto a shred of information bantered about here, that will resurface in some positive decision making down the road. The NTSB report will eventually reveal a most likely cause but....never reveal the inner workings of ones thoughts or motivations in a precise method. For those who invest a 100% in that report, you need to study in detail, the Rand audit of the NTSB and understand that there are competing interests in those reports. So, until this report comes to fruition, mud slinging will never be helpful or educational. Personally, I spent more then 4 decades as a professional in parts 91,135 and 121. Training is always a key factor in a successful outcome in aviation but....not the only factor. Your examples of 121 deficiencies are not to ignored for they are learning experiences with a very high price. The training that developed from those moments as well as others will continue to be essential moving forward. This is a very dynamic industry and we are all moving parts of that industry. Criticism can be positive and should be incorporated in anyones personal development and hopefully, make us all better at the demanding tasks of aviation. I have never flown a PERFECT leg or....have been a witness to a perfect leg flown. There was always something I could improve.
      That was part of my of my brief before moving metal. Perhaps you to will indeed learn something here or, one day we will be commenting about you as well.

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  48. Whatever anecdotal evidence one comes up with (plenty available), 121 airlines have a safety record much better than 135 charter operations, and both of those are better than 91 type operations. I haven't looked at data lately, but did think that the 135 flying I did compared to airlines roughly like motorcycles (street) compared to driving a car. That the safety record of motorcycles is worse is not debatable.
    Yet, like airlines, cars kill more people. There are just more people by far transported by airlines or cars, than 135 charter or motorcycles. The logic shown in the comment above could lead one to think that commuting by unicycle on interstates is very safe..I've never even heard of an injury from that!
    A business jet crash just doesn't make headlines like airlines do.
    I never went through 121 airline type training, but did think there were shortcomings in my 135 initial and recurrent training. It was "ok", did the job, but that's all. I'm still here, a couple coworkers are not after their crash, after which I did notice the lack of media coverage. Just wasn't enough dead people to raise that much interest. Training/CRM was the primary problem in their case.

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    1. Thanks for the comments about comparisons within the industry. I personally have been involved in Parts 91,135 and 121. Four decades of training and I can personally vouch for the rigors of 121 operation. The angry troll above uses old stories that did have consequences that mattered. Those situations as well as many more have been explored in detail in training. Aviation is a very dynamic profession. Lots of folks work or play in the industry. I have never flown a perfect leg or seen a perfect leg flown. We ALL make mistakes in our daily approach to Flying. Training is one key factor..but...not the only one. Some folks get and some folks don't.

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  49. A fraction of a second - the thought to power out of a squirrelly situation of poor grip at high speed and ….OH SHIT !!! (All those wholes in the cheese align)

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  50. A witness reportedly said runway was slushy with jet sliding toward left side of runway so pilot rotated sooner than normal to avoid running off runway . Closing throttles getting stuck in soft ground or knocking out gear would have been better choice but split second decision to rotate may have seemed like better choice at the time .

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  51. Eyewitness describes crash in detail as he watched the crash occur in comments below the video at link below .

    https://youtu.be/bVUs3Ffi4E4

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    1. Rwy 13, rolling @ 13kt, Time: 18:35:34 Z, Pos.: 40.230°, -111.732°.
      Time: 18:35:47 Z, Groundspeed: 99 kt, Baro. Altitude: on ground, WGS84 altitude: n/a, Vert. Rate: 0 ft/min, Track: n/a, Pos.:40.227°, -111.729°.
      ground track deviation @ Time: 18:35:49 Z, Groundspeed: 99 kt, Baro. Altitude: 4625 ft, WGS84 altitude: n/a, Vert. Rate: 0 ft/min, Track: 90.0°, Pos.: 40.226°, -111.729°.
      Time: 18:35:49 Z, Groundspeed: 107 kt, Baro. Altitude: 4625 ft, WGS84 altitude: 4450 ft, Vert. Rate: -64 ft/min, Track: 146.0°, Pos.: 40.226°, -111.729°.
      Time: 18:35:49 Z, Groundspeed: 113 kt, Baro. Altitude: 4625 ft, WGS84 altitude: 4450 ft, Vert. Rate: -64 ft/min, Track: 146.2°, Pos.: 40.226°, -111.728°.
      last return
      Time: 18:35:54 Z, Groundspeed: 131 kt, Baro. Altitude: ▲ 4625 ft, WGS84 altitude: 4450 ft, Vert. Rate: 256 ft/min, Track: 135.3°, Pos.: 40.223°, -111.726°.
      @globe.adsbexchange

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    2. Thanks for posting the YouTube video and mentioning the witness. Here's his full accounting as published on the video on YouTube: "This accident happened right in front of me. I happened to be pulling out from my hangar just as he rotated. The runway runs just about perpendicular to the hangar alleys, so the aircraft passed about 100 yards or so in front of me, about 15-20 feet off the ground. It was clearly stalled, and was wallowing at a high angle of attack, eventually rolling about 90 degrees to its left, dug the left wing into the ground and cartwheeled down the runway, breaking up in the process. I can’t speak to what happened on his initial roll, because it was hidden from view behind the ILS and glideslope equipment on the field. I can tell you that it was snowing pretty good, and the snow was accumulating fast. By the time emergency vehicles got to the plane, there was about 1-2 inches of heavy wet snow on the aprons. The plows were working the taxiways at the time and were the first vehicles on the scene. What struck me as odd in the moment was how early he was in the air. The airplane rotated, flew for a few seconds, and crashed-all in about 1500 feet of runway. If what you mentioned about the pilot trying to fly his way out of a loss of directional control on the ground is true, it would make sense as to how and why he became airborne so early. It was a very surreal experience, and one that I just can’t unsee."

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  52. Replies
    1. Initial scrape marks were close to and parallel to the runway centerline, making early rotation due to loss of directional control appear less likely.

      The first scrape mark was about 2,600 ft down the runway, meaning the plane was airborne even sooner than that. Is that an expected takeoff roll distance for this plane at this weight? Published takeoff distance is 3,138 ft (MTOW, SL, ISA).

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    2. https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-006.pdf

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    3. https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-006.pdf

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  53. NTSB preliminary reportedly states, "remained hangared until 10:55 .... then fueled."
    ADS-B returns reflect held at hangar till 11:31MST, proceeded direct to Rwy 13 and rolling @ 11:35MST.

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  54. The runway had black ice. He had reported it to the tower when he landed.

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  55. Who reported Black Ice. Tail Number please

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    1. reported on another site that N22LP reported runway condition approx 55 min prior to the accident

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  56. Good question. There is no record of 5NR flying after 12/23. When would he have landed?

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