14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 09, 2015 in Draper, UT
Probable Cause Approval Date: 01/15/2016
Aircraft: AIRBUS AS350, registration: N253HP
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker.
A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade.
The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage.
The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The ground recovery team member's failure to secure a rescue rope during the helicopter loading process in steep terrain, resulting in the rope fouling the helicopter's main rotor system.
The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker.
A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade.
The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage.
The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
The United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service (for the National Search and Rescue Academy) has published a manual, Helicopter Rescue Techniques (2013). This manual describes the various rescue techniques that can be employed with helicopters. This manual states in part;
Helicopters provide an outstanding rescue tool, but they have specific operating limitations. Recognize that the consequences of a poorly managed helicopter rescue can be swift and fatal. Rescuers need to understand these limits and have the professional discipline not to exceed them during an emergency. As accident investigators repeatedly conclude, "self-imposed psychological pressure" causes us to make poor decisions when adrenaline clouds our judgment. Poor decision-making is preventable yet, tragically, it is a factor in the vast majority of helicopter rescue accidents.
The option of delaying the mission in favor of safer operating conditions is repeatedly overlooked and requires considerable discipline on the part of a rescue team. Remarkably, accidents with the same root cause occur over and over. As rescuers, we must learn from these mistakes and break this dangerous pattern of repetition.
The Mountain Rescue Association (MRA) has published a manual, Helicopters in Search and Rescue Intermediate Level (2008). This manual provides intermediate level knowledge with utilizing helicopters for search and rescue operations. This manual states in part;
In certain situation, pilots and rescuers may choose to perform a hovering or one-skid recovery of a rescue victim.
The factors to be taken into account in selecting a site for a hovering recovery are generally the same as those for selecting a helispot. In these conditions, a smaller ground area, rougher terrain and steeper slope are permissible. On the other hand, it is extremely important that there be plenty of room for both the main rotor and the tail rotor boom, since the pilot may have to turn the helicopter in the event changes in wind direction. An experienced hand signaler, one that the pilot knows is competent, should be at the site and all ground personnel should be within the pilot's view, if at all possible. In the case of one-skid recoveries on rock outcrops, this may be impractical.
The MRA has also published another manual, Situational Awareness in Mountain Rescue (2008). This manual describes the three stages of Situational Awareness during mountain rescue operations. This manual states in part;
"Situational Awareness" is "the degree of accuracy by which one's perception of his/her current environment mirrors reality." Situational Awareness can also be looked at as a constantly evolving picture of the state of the environment. It is the perception and comprehension of the relevant elements in an incident within a volume of time and space. In this regard, Situational Awareness is not an event, but rather a process that only ends when the search and rescue incident is concluded.
Situational Awareness requires the human operator to quickly detect, integrate and interpret data gathered from the environment. In the case of search and rescue operations, the "human detector" can be anything from the incident commander to a "field grunt." That is the beauty (and challenge) of Situational Awareness – it requires and demands awareness by all users.
Stage I – Perception of Relevant Information
The first stage of Situational Awareness – perception – is arguably the most important stage. After all, without perception of information, one cannot really comprehend, interpret and draw conclusions.
Many accidents in search and rescue operations result from a series of different things happening. There are often a number of contributing factors that, if occurring individually, might not have resulted in an accident. Break any rescue accident down, and you will often find that there were a number of elements that came together to make that accident possible.
In this important perception stage of Situational Awareness, rescuers need to be very attentive – not only to the occurrence of situations that are beyond their expectations, but to the frequency and number of those situations. This perception stage requires that you OBSERVE! In order to be an effective observer, one must remain attentive. This can be one of the greatest challenges to a search and rescue professional, as periods of inactivity and boredom can hamper one's ability to be an effective observer.
Stage II – Comprehension and Interpretation of the Relevant Information
The second stage of Situational Awareness is the stage wherein one attempts to comprehend and interpret the data collected in the first stage. While the collection of data and the perception of the relevant information are important, the comprehension and interpretation of that data cannot be overlooked.
The key to this stage of Situational Awareness is that it requires one to have and utilize key training and experience.
Stage III – Projection into the Future
The third stage of Situational Awareness – projection into the future – is the stage where one puts it all together. Once the clues are interpreted, the next step is to project how that information will affect the future of the operation.
STATE OF UTAH: http://registry.faa.gov/N253HP
NTSB Identification: GAA15CA258
14 CFR Public Use
Accident occurred Wednesday, September 09, 2015 in Draper, UT
Aircraft: AIRBUS AS350, registration: N253HP
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The pilot reported that he and a tactical flight officer were conducting a high altitude rescue mission in "remote and nearly vertical" terrain with a public use helicopter, by doing a one-skid recovery. The purpose of this mission was to recover a fallen hiker.
A member of the three person ground recovery team had secured himself to a rescue rope that was anchored to the steep terrain above the plane-of-rotation of the main rotor system blades. Once the helicopter's right skid landed on a rock outcrop, the ground recovery team approached the helicopter to begin the loading process. During the approach to the helicopter, the rescue rope came in contact with a main rotor blade.
The pilot reported that the helicopter then, "rotated abruptly to the left and began to shake violently." The helicopter impacted terrain, the pilot regained control, and he then made an emergency landing at a lower altitude. He reported that upon applying power to land, the helicopter "began to shake violently again until touching down and reducing collective pitch." A postflight inspection revealed substantial damage to the main rotor system, the tail boom, and the empennage.
The pilot reported there were no pre-impact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Helicopter Rescue Missions
The United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service (for the National Search and Rescue Academy) has published a manual, Helicopter Rescue Techniques (2013). This manual describes the various rescue techniques that can be employed with helicopters. This manual states in part;
Helicopters provide an outstanding rescue tool, but they have specific operating limitations. Recognize that the consequences of a poorly managed helicopter rescue can be swift and fatal. Rescuers need to understand these limits and have the professional discipline not to exceed them during an emergency. As accident investigators repeatedly conclude, "self-imposed psychological pressure" causes us to make poor decisions when adrenaline clouds our judgment. Poor decision-making is preventable yet, tragically, it is a factor in the vast majority of helicopter rescue accidents.
The option of delaying the mission in favor of safer operating conditions is repeatedly overlooked and requires considerable discipline on the part of a rescue team. Remarkably, accidents with the same root cause occur over and over. As rescuers, we must learn from these mistakes and break this dangerous pattern of repetition.
Hovering and One-Skid Recoveries
The Mountain Rescue Association (MRA) has published a manual, Helicopters in Search and Rescue Intermediate Level (2008). This manual provides intermediate level knowledge with utilizing helicopters for search and rescue operations. This manual states in part;
In certain situation, pilots and rescuers may choose to perform a hovering or one-skid recovery of a rescue victim.
The factors to be taken into account in selecting a site for a hovering recovery are generally the same as those for selecting a helispot. In these conditions, a smaller ground area, rougher terrain and steeper slope are permissible. On the other hand, it is extremely important that there be plenty of room for both the main rotor and the tail rotor boom, since the pilot may have to turn the helicopter in the event changes in wind direction. An experienced hand signaler, one that the pilot knows is competent, should be at the site and all ground personnel should be within the pilot's view, if at all possible. In the case of one-skid recoveries on rock outcrops, this may be impractical.
Situational Awareness
The MRA has also published another manual, Situational Awareness in Mountain Rescue (2008). This manual describes the three stages of Situational Awareness during mountain rescue operations. This manual states in part;
"Situational Awareness" is "the degree of accuracy by which one's perception of his/her current environment mirrors reality." Situational Awareness can also be looked at as a constantly evolving picture of the state of the environment. It is the perception and comprehension of the relevant elements in an incident within a volume of time and space. In this regard, Situational Awareness is not an event, but rather a process that only ends when the search and rescue incident is concluded.
Situational Awareness requires the human operator to quickly detect, integrate and interpret data gathered from the environment. In the case of search and rescue operations, the "human detector" can be anything from the incident commander to a "field grunt." That is the beauty (and challenge) of Situational Awareness – it requires and demands awareness by all users.
Stage I – Perception of Relevant Information
The first stage of Situational Awareness – perception – is arguably the most important stage. After all, without perception of information, one cannot really comprehend, interpret and draw conclusions.
Many accidents in search and rescue operations result from a series of different things happening. There are often a number of contributing factors that, if occurring individually, might not have resulted in an accident. Break any rescue accident down, and you will often find that there were a number of elements that came together to make that accident possible.
In this important perception stage of Situational Awareness, rescuers need to be very attentive – not only to the occurrence of situations that are beyond their expectations, but to the frequency and number of those situations. This perception stage requires that you OBSERVE! In order to be an effective observer, one must remain attentive. This can be one of the greatest challenges to a search and rescue professional, as periods of inactivity and boredom can hamper one's ability to be an effective observer.
Stage II – Comprehension and Interpretation of the Relevant Information
The second stage of Situational Awareness is the stage wherein one attempts to comprehend and interpret the data collected in the first stage. While the collection of data and the perception of the relevant information are important, the comprehension and interpretation of that data cannot be overlooked.
The key to this stage of Situational Awareness is that it requires one to have and utilize key training and experience.
Stage III – Projection into the Future
The third stage of Situational Awareness – projection into the future – is the stage where one puts it all together. Once the clues are interpreted, the next step is to project how that information will affect the future of the operation.
DRAPER — A Utah Department of Public Safety helicopter attempting to retrieve the body of a fallen hiker in Corner Canyon nearly crashed in a terrifying close call on Wednesday, the agency reported.
Luke Bowman, chief pilot for the Utah Highway Patrol's aero bureau, said the pilot, Kent Harrison, and another officer on board were attempting to meet with rescuers on a cliff ledge. The crews were attempting a "skid load," intending to rest one skid on the ledge while essentially keeping the chopper hovering, when a rope became tangled in the craft's main rotor.
"The pilot, at that point, applies some aggressive maneuvers to maneuver the aircraft away from the cliff and the people on the ground," Bowman said.
The chopper's rotor was spinning at full power, sending the craft spinning and sending the helicopter's tail toward the rescuers on the ledge, Bowman said. The tail passed over the heads of the rescuers and hit the cliff wall, and the chopper continued to spin as it headed toward the ground.
Harrison began to prepare for a crash landing, but managed to steady the craft and determined he had enough control to fly down to a park in Highland, Bowman said.
As Harrison applied more power as he prepared to land, however, the chopper began to shake again. Fearing a crash, the pilot called for a medical response before he attempted to put the craft down.
"He was convinced at that point that, when he did go to land, that they were going to roll and they wouldn't be able to control it well enough to land," Bowman said. "They were actually able to land pretty uneventfully. … They were able to land upright on the landing gear in the park."
After the emergency was averted, the crews successfully completed their mission of retrieving the body of 43-year-old Kerry Crowley, a South Jordan woman believed to have died in an accidental fall.
The chopper — which is the department's newest and best helicopter — has been pulled from service since the near-crash and is significantly banged-up, Bowman said. However, the aircraft's engine and other mechanics pose an even greater concern.
In the meantime, the department will rely on some of its older units.
Bowman complimented Harrison's flying, applauding his ability to keep himself and the people around him safe in an emergency.
"I've talked extensively with him and spent the day with him yesterday going over the situation," Bowman said. "He's doing really good, and I think he did an phenomenal job. … He had a situation and he did his job and dealt with it, and now he has kind of moved on. He's not really one to emotionally dwell on things."
The accident will be reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board.
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