NTSB Identification: NYC08FA184
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, May 17, 2008 in West Creek, NJ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 04/22/2010
Aircraft: CESSNA 337A, registration: N5382S
Injuries: 2 Fatal,2 Serious.
NTSB investigators either traveled in
support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of
investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from
various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The multi-engine airplane was one of
several owned and operated by the pilot, who flew many of the missions,
and conducted most of the maintenance. The three passengers were
employees of an environmental services company that was contracted to
conduct aerial surveys of marine mammals. Each month, the pilot
re-positioned the airplane from his base in Massachusetts to New Jersey
to conduct the survey flights. The previous month, the survey personnel
documented concerns with the pilot's performance, and the condition of
the airplane. For the accident flight series, the pilot arrived 1 1/2
days late, and one surveyor documented the passengers' concerns about
the pilot's performance and fatigue. About 90 minutes into the accident
flight, the pilot informed the passengers that he "was having some fuel
problems," terminated the survey, and diverted for a precautionary
landing. One passenger saw the front propeller stop and begin rotation
more than once. The airplane impacted trees and terrain approximately
400 feet to the side of the runway threshold. Several witnesses saw the
airplane descend, heard it crash, and notified authorities, but the
unsuccessful search efforts were terminated about 2 hours after the
accident. A surviving passenger used his mobile phone to call for
assistance, and the wreckage was located about 2 hours after that, which
was about 4 hours after the accident. The pilot and a passenger were
killed, and two passengers survived. Autopsy results indicated that the
pilot incurred a transected aorta, which is a non-survivable injury. The
fatally-injured passenger incurred a cervical fracture and a transverse
basilar skull fracture. Though such injuries are commonly fatal, it is
possible that appropriate and more immediate medical treatment would
have increased the chances of the passenger’s survival. Post accident
examination. Post accident examination revealed that the battery for the
emergency locator transmitter bore a "replace by" date that was four
years prior to the accident. Neither propeller exhibited evidence of
rotation during impact. While all fuel tanks were intact, the main tanks
were empty, one auxiliary tank contained 11 gallons, and the other one
contained 2 gallons. Records indicated that the airplane was not
refueled between the previous flight and the accident flight. The
manufacturer's Owner's Manual indicated that the engines can only be
primed from the main tanks, and the "Engine-Out During Flight" checklist
specified that the fuel selector valve should be set to the main tank
for an engine restart attempt. Both engines were successfully test-run
after the accident.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The
pilot's departure with insufficient fuel for the planned flight, and
his improper in-flight fuel management, which resulted in a total loss
of power in both engines due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the
accident was the pilot's fatigue, which was precipitated by his work
activities during the days just prior to the accident flight.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On
May 17, 2008, about 1245 eastern daylight time (EDT), a Cessna 337A,
N5382S, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and terrain
while attempting to divert to Eagles Nest Airport (31E), West Creek, New
Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot and one passenger were
fatally injured, and the other two passengers were seriously injured.
The pilot was the owner of Ambroult Aviation, which operated the marine
mammal survey flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the
flight, and no flight plan was filed.
A Texas-based environmental
services company was contracted to provide marine mammal survey
information for a study by the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, and the environmental services company contracted with the
operator to conduct the survey flights. The three passengers were
employees of the environmental services company. The pilot and airplane
were based at Chatham Municipal Airport (CQX), Chatham, Massachusetts,
but temporarily relocated to Millville Airport (MIV), Millville, New
Jersey each month for the survey flights. According to an environmental
services company representative, the survey flights with the accident
pilot and airplane began in January 2008, were conducted on a monthly
basis, and were scheduled for completion by July, 2008.
According
to the environmental services company documentation, the survey area
extended approximately 80 miles north-south along the New Jersey
shoreline, and extended approximately 20 miles east over the Atlantic
Ocean. Each monthly survey consisted of flying 30 numbered course lines,
called transects, to cover the entire survey area. Each transect was to
be flown at 750 feet above mean sea level (MSL).
According to
the environmental services company personnel, the pilot and airplane
were scheduled to arrive at MIV on May 14, in order to begin the survey
at 0700 on May 15. At some point on May 14, the pilot advised the
company that he would not arrive at MIV until May 15.
According
to personnel and records from the Millville Jet Center at MIV, the
airplane arrived about noon on May 15, and the pilot requested that the
"mains be topped off." The airplane was serviced with 55 gallons of
100LL avgas about 1210. No records of any subsequent fuel servicing
could be located.
The passengers had planned to complete the full
survey grid on May 15, but the pilot arrived too late to accommodate
their plan. The pilot provided different explanations for his delay to
the passengers and to a mechanic at CQX. According to information
obtained from passenger interviews, passenger survey notes, and a
handheld global positioning system (GPS) unit recovered from the
wreckage, the May 15 survey flight began when it departed from MIV at
1244. Due to the lateness of the day and the passengers’ concern about
the pilot being tired, only half the survey grid was completed. The
airplane returned to MIV, and the engines were shut down at 1721.
The
surveyors intended to complete the grid the next day, May 16, but the
weather conditions were unacceptable for the survey, and the flight was
rescheduled for Saturday, May 17. The weather conditions on May 17 were
improved, but the passengers were concerned about the wind, since wind
affected their ability to conduct the survey. After some delay, they
decided to try, and the airplane departed on the accident flight from
MIV about 1104. The day's survey began with transect 14, which was
approximately 60 miles from MIV. Transect 14 was started at 1147, and
was finished at 1159. Transect 15 was started at 1201, and was finished
at 1226. Transect 16 was started at 1228.
All four individuals on
board could hear and talk to one another, and the passengers could hear
all the pilot’s radio calls. According to the passenger in the right
rear seat, at some point "after finishing the third survey line," the
pilot remarked that he would have to "break off" the survey because the
airplane "was having some fuel problems," and that he needed to "go
back." The passenger also saw the pilot repeatedly manipulating the fuel
selector valve handles. The passenger stated that he observed the front
propeller cease and resume rotation several times. The passenger stated
that according to the pilot, they would divert for landing to the
"closest airstrip." One passenger asked how far it was to the nearest
airstrip, and the front seat passenger replied "about 10 minutes."
No-one specifically mentioned any particular airport.
During the
diversion, the right rear passenger did not hear the pilot communicate
with anyone on the radio about the problem or his intentions. The
passenger had the impression that the airplane was in a continuous
descent, and stated that the engines continued to make unusual noises,
as if they were running roughly. At some point, the pilot mentioned to
the passengers that there was "another [airport] close," and he
requested their assistance in visually locating the airport. Shortly
thereafter the left rear passenger visually located 31E, and he informed
the pilot that it was off to the left at their "nine-o’clock position."
The right rear passenger then visually located the airport, but the
airplane "started falling," and impacted trees. The right rear passenger
stated that the landing gear remained extended for the duration of the
flight on May 15, and also on the accident flight.
The
GPS-derived flight path showed that at 1239, the end of transect 16, the
airplane turned south along the shoreline and then climbed to a GPS
altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. The airplane continued a climb,
and about 1241, turned inland and to the north. About 1244, at a GPS
altitude of approximately 1,200 feet, the airplane began tracking over
New Jersey State Route 72. One minute later, the airplane turned to the
southwest, towards 31E, and about 1247 it crossed over the runway at a
GPS altitude of approximately 250 feet.
Three witnesses, who
lived in two separate houses approximately 1/2 mile east of the approach
end of 31E runway 32, heard and saw the accident airplane heading for
the airport. All three witnesses stated that they were familiar with the
sounds and traffic patterns of airplanes using the airport, and that
their attention was drawn to the airplane because of its low altitude
and unusual sounds. All three stated that the airplane was descending,
and that the engine(s) stopped and restarted at least two times. All
three heard the sounds of impact. One of the witnesses searched the
airport herself for about 10 minutes, but then called 911 about 1302.
Personnel from the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) responded, and
initiated a search of the local area. According to NJSP records and
statements, they did not locate the airplane, and there were no other
reports of a missing aircraft, so they abandoned their search about two
hours after the initial notification.
According to the
Texas-based project manager of the Marine Sciences division of the
environmental services company, he received a telephone call from the
right rear passenger informing him that the airplane had crashed. The
passenger told the project manager that he was still in the airplane and
that he was injured. The passenger did not know where the accident site
was, but he thought that they had just completed transect "12 or 13."
Telephone records indicated that this call was made at 1401 central
daylight time, which was 1501 EDT, or approximately 2 hours after the
accident. The call lasted 4 minutes. The project manager then began
attempting to notify various emergency services to inform them of the
approximate location of the wreckage, based on the survey transect
coordinates. At 1517, the passenger called the project manager again,
and the call lasted 2 minutes. Between 1529 and 1616, the project
manager attempted to call the passenger seven times, and the passenger
attempted to call the project manager once, but no calls were answered.
United
States Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) records indicated
that they were first notified of the accident at 1542, via a series of
telephone calls that were initiated by the environmental services
company project manager. The RCC telephoned the passenger, and
instructed him to call 911. At 1546 the RCC contacted telephone service
providers and requested a trace on the passenger's call, in order to
determine which cell phone tower(s) were being used for the call, and
thereby obtain a geographic fix on the accident location.
According
to NJSP dispatch records, the passenger was connected to the NJSP by
telephone at 1604. At 1615, a telephone company provided the geographic
coordinates of the cell phone tower closest to the accident location,
and that, plus correlation of siren and helicopter sounds heard by the
passenger with known NJSP activities, enabled the NJSP to narrow the
search area. At 1656, a helicopter located the wreckage. The two
survivors, both of whom were seated on the right side of the airplane,
were extricated and airlifted separately to Atlantic City for medical
treatment.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a private
pilot certificate with airplane single engine land rating, a commercial
pilot certificate with an instrument airplane rating and a rating for
airplane multiengine land that was limited to aircraft with centerline
thrust. He also held a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant
ratings, and an inspection authorization (IA). The pilot's logbooks
were not located. According to documentation that the pilot provided to
his insurance company in November 2007, he reported 3,775 total hours of
flight experience, 2,810 hours of multiengine flight experience, and
285 hours in the accident airplane make and model. FAA records indicated
that the pilot’s most recent second-class medical certificate was
issued in December 2007. According to documentation provided by a
certificated flight instructor, the pilot's most recent flight review
was successfully conducted on February 24, 2008.
None of the three passengers held any pilot certificates.
AIRPLANE INFORMATION
The
accident airplane was manufactured in 1966, and was first registered to
the pilot in March 1998. It was a six place, high wing airplane of all
metal construction, with retractable, tricycle configuration landing
gear. It was equipped with two Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-360
piston engines, one each at the front and rear of the fuselage. Each
engine was equipped with a full-feathering, two-bladed McCauley
propeller.
The fuel system consisted of three metal tanks in each
wing. Two interconnected tanks in the outboard section of each wing
comprised each main tank. Each main tank had a total capacity of 46.5
gallons, of which 46 were usable. One auxiliary tank was located in the
inboard section of each wing, each with a total capacity of 19 gallons,
18 usable. Total airplane fuel capacity was 131 gallons, of which 128
were usable. Either main tank could provide fuel to either engine, but
the left auxiliary tank could only provide fuel to the front engine, and
the right auxiliary tank could only provide fuel to the rear engine.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The
1254 weather observation at an airport located approximately 20 miles
south of the accident airport, reported winds from 250 degrees at 11
knots with gusts to 16 knots, clear skies, 10 miles visibility,
temperature 21 degrees C, dew point 7 degrees C, and an altimeter
setting of 29.61 inches of mercury.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The
majority of the wreckage was tightly contained in a wooded area
approximately 400 feet south of the approach end of runway 32. The main
wreckage consisted of the entire airplane, with the exception of the
outboard third of the left wing. The fuselage was lying on its left
side, and oriented on a magnetic heading of approximately 140 degrees.
The right wing was standing on its leading edge, and partially attached
to the fuselage. The inboard two-thirds of the left wing was right side
up, and partially attached to the fuselage. The outboard third of the
left wing was located approximately 120 feet north of the main wreckage.
The
front engine was completely separated from the airplane, and was right
side up. The front engine exhibited significant impact damage on its
lower side. The propeller remained fully attached to the hub, and the
hub was fully attached to the engine. One propeller blade was straight,
and the other blade exhibited significant bending. Neither of the blades
displayed any chordwise scratching. The forward spinner had a 6 inch by
10 inch dent, and this dent contained linear material transfer marks
which were oriented parallel to the longitudinal axis of the engine. The
engine was able to be hand-rotated through approximately 270 degrees.
There was fuel in the fuel pump, the fuel pump drive was intact, and the
pump rotated freely. The fuel strainer was full of fuel. The upper
spark plugs exhibited normal wear characteristics and coloration.
The
rear engine was inverted, displaced forward and to the left of its
design location, but partially attached to the fuselage. The propeller
remained fully attached to the hub, and the hub was fully attached to
the engine. One propeller blade was straight, and the other blade
exhibited significant bending. Neither of the blades displayed any
chordwise scratching. The aft spinner was undamaged. The engine
hand-rotated freely, and valve train continuity and thumb compressions
on all cylinders were confirmed. Functionality and continuity of the
ignition system for the upper spark plugs was confirmed. There was a
trace amount of fuel in the fuel pump, the fuel pump drive was intact,
and the pump rotated freely. The fuel strainer was devoid of fuel, and
there were no contaminants in the strainer. The upper spark plugs
exhibited normal wear characteristics and coloration.
All six
fuel tanks were found intact and unbreached, with their caps properly
installed. A total of approximately 13 gallons of fuel were recovered
from the tanks. The main tanks contained either trace amounts, or were
completely devoid, of fuel. The right auxiliary tank contained
approximately 11 gallons, and the left auxiliary tank contained
approximately 2 gallons. The recovered fuel was clear and bright, with
no visible contaminants. Tests with water-detection paste were negative,
which indicated that no water was present in the fuel.
The two
fuel selector valve handles, one for each engine, were located in the
cockpit ceiling along the airplane centerline. Each valve handle was
connected by a push-pull cable to a fuel valve in one of the wing roots.
The fuel selector valve handle for the front engine was found in the
"Left Aux" position, and the corresponding fuel selector valve was found
set to the port from the left auxiliary tank. The fuel selector valve
handle for the rear engine was found in the "Right Main" position, and
the corresponding fuel selector valve was found set to an unused port,
which was the "off" position. The fuel gauges on the instrument panel
were found with the following approximate indications: Left Main, off
scale low; Left Aux, 0 gallons; Right Aux, 0 gallons; Right Main, 20
gallons. All master, generator, and fuel pump switches were found in the
OFF position.
The landing gear handle and the landing gear were
found in their respective "gear extended" positions. The flap handle was
at the flaps one-third extended position, and flap actuator extension
was measured to be 1.8 inches, which corresponded to flaps one-third
extended. The elevator trim tab actuator extension was measured as 2.2
inches, which equated to a deflection greater than the 15 degree
trailing edge down tab travel limit.
The airspeed indicator
indicated approximately 85 miles per hour, and the Kollsman window in
the altimeter was set to 29.66 inches of mercury. The vertical speed
indicator indicated a descent of 825 feet per minute. The artificial
horizon indicated approximately level pitch and roll attitudes, and the
directional gyro registered approximately 085 degrees. The first two
digits on the transponder were missing, and the last two were "70."
The
emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was a Larago Electronic
Manufacturing Inc model LELT-1005-BF. The ELT and its attached battery
pack were intact. The ELT switch was found in the "ON" position. The 9
volt battery pack carried a "replace by" date of May 2004. The residual
battery voltage was measured to be 0.4 volts. A field test of the ELT
with a new 9 volt battery did not produce a detectable signal, but the
reason for this was not determined.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The
pilot occupied the front left seat for the flight and the accident.
After the accident, the seat was found in the airplane cabin, and the
pilot was found in his seat. Toxicological test results on the pilot by
the FAA Civil Aero Medical Institute were negative, and the autopsy
report from the Ocean County, New Jersey medical examiner listed the
cause of death as "multiple traumatic injuries." Under “Pathologic
Findings,” the autopsy report on the pilot noted:
1. MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC INJURIES -
A. EXTRENSIVE RIB CAGE FRACTURES with LACERATIONS OF INTERCOSTAL MUSCLES.
B. DISPLACED FRACTURE OF THORACIC VETERBRAL COLUMN WITH SPINAL CORD INJURY.
C. TRANSECTION OF THORACIC AORTA with BILATERAL HEMOTHORACES.
D. CONTUSIONS and LACERATIONS OF LUNGS.
E. MULTIPLE EXTERNAL CONTUSIONS, ABRASIONS, and LACERATIONS
The
fatally-injured passenger occupied the rear left seat for the flight
and accident sequence. After the accident, the seat was found in the
airplane cabin, and the passenger was found in his seat. The Ocean
County, New Jersey medical examiner autopsy report listed the cause of
death as "multiple traumatic injuries." Under “Pathologic Findings,” the
autopsy report on the passenger noted:
1. MULTIPLE TRAUMATIC INJURIES -
A. HEAD INJURY WITH BASILAR SKULL FRACTURE.
B. CERVICAL FRACTURE.
C. FRACTURE OF STERNUM.
D. RIB FRACTURES.
E. DISPLACED FRACTURES OF LEFT FEMUR AND RIGHT TIBIA.
F. MULTIPLE EXTERNAL ABRASIONS/CONTUSIOSN/LACERATIONS.
Under
“Neck” is noted, in part, “Examination of the cervical vertebrae
exhibits bony crepitus indicative of cervical fracture at the level of
C4-C5.”
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The Operator
Ambroult
Aviation was based at CQX, and was wholly owned by the accident pilot.
According to a pilot/employee who flew for the operator since 2005,
Ambroult Aviation was a "one man operation." As of the date of the
accident, the operator had a total of six airplanes, including the
accident airplane. These included three Cessna 337s, one Cessna 336, and
one Cessna 152 at CQX, and one Cessna 337 in Carlsbad, California.
Another Cessna 337 was also at CQX, but was in non-flying status. In
addition to running the business, the accident pilot conducted most of
the maintenance, and flew many missions as well. Most missions were
various types of survey flights. The operator did not formally advertise
its services; instead, customers were typically made aware of the
services by word-of-mouth from other customers. An executive of the
environmental services company stated that that was how his company
originally was made aware of the operator. According to local media
reports, the operator's "frequent customers included scientists from
private organizations...as well as state and federal agencies," and this
was substantiated in the contract between the environmental services
company and the State of New Jersey.
FAA Findings Regarding the Operator
The
contract between the environmental services company and the State of
New Jersey required that the FAA be contacted "to determine flight
restrictions in the area" of the survey, and that the survey flights
were to be conducted at an altitude of 500 feet. While 14 CFR Part
91.119 permitted operation at altitudes less than 500 feet over open
water, a waiver was required for the operator to fly less than 500 feet
from any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure. No records of the
operator contacting the FAA for flight restrictions were located, and
the operator did not contact the FAA for any waivers. Consequently, this
reduced the likelihood that the operator's aircraft, records or
personal qualifications would be inspected or reviewed by the FAA.
There
were no surveillance records regarding the operator in the FAA Program
Tracking and Reporting Subsystem database. Searches of other FAA
databases did not reveal any records associated with the operator; the
only records that were found were in the name of the owner/pilot, and
consisted of four IA renewal records, and one pilot certificate
practical test. The FAA inspector also conducted a weight and balance
calculation for the most recent survey flights, and concluded that "the
pilot likely operated the aircraft [at weights] higher than [the]
published limits." FAA inspectors also examined several other of the
operator's airplanes and "found them to be in various states of
disrepair, and not airworthy." The inspectors also reviewed the
maintenance records for those airplanes, and "found similar issues" to
deficiencies observed with the maintenance records from the accident
airplane.
Accident Pilot's Schedule and Activities
Attempts
to reconstruct the pilot's schedule and activities in the days prior to
the accident were only partly successful. According to a mechanic who
assisted him, on either Monday or Tuesday, May 12 or May 13
respectively, the pilot replaced the alternator on the front engine of
the accident airplane, and the replacement precipitated additional
maintenance activity due to interference problems with a fuel line.
After the maintenance was completed, the airplane experienced electrical
and intercom problems. It was not determined whether the pilot either
attempted or succeeded in rectifying these two issues, but he did not
fly the airplane to MIV on May 14 as he was scheduled to do.
On
May 15, the pilot departed CQX in the airplane at about 0700, but
returned for a problem he variously described as either mechanical or a
bird strike. He was again observed to depart CQX in the same airplane
about 0900, and arrived at MIV about 1200. The first survey flight began
about 45 minutes later, and lasted about 5 hours. The pilot did not fly
on May 16, but he spoke several times by telephone that evening to a
pilot/employee about the airplane problem the preceding day. On Saturday
May 17, after a weather-related delay, about 1104 the pilot and
passengers departed from MIV on the accident flight.
Pilot/Operator Commitments
The
investigation did not reveal what other flight or maintenance
commitments the pilot/operator had immediately before and after the May
2008 survey at MIV, so no determination of schedule-induced pressures on
the pilot/operator could be made. Examination of the operator's
contract with the environmental services company revealed that each
survey was expected to require 5 flight hours of transit time to
re-position the airplane, and 8 hours of survey flight time per month.
The contract also contained provisions for compensating the operator for
weather delays, and other occasions where the airplane was
re-positioned, but was not being utilized.
Pilot Fatigue
A
pilot safety brochure produced by the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical
Institute entitled "Fatigue in Aviation, Medical Facts for Pilots
(OK-07-193)" stated that "Fatigue leads to a decrease in your ability to
carry out tasks…significant impairment in a person's ability to carry
out tasks that require manual dexterity, concentration, and higher-order
intellectual processing. Fatigue may happen…in a relatively short time
(hours) after some significant physical or mental activity…" The
brochure also provided recommendations on how pilots could combat
fatigue.
FAA Advisory Circular 60-22
Portions of FAA
Advisory Circular (AC) 60-22, entitled "Aeronautical Decision Making,"
provided pilots with information about stress, and to a lesser extent,
fatigue. The AC defined stress as the body’s nonspecific response to
demands placed on it, and notes that numerous physical and physiological
conditions in a pilot’s personal and professional, life, as well as the
nature of flight itself, can hamper a pilot's ability perform at
his/her optimum level, and make decisions to the best of his/her
ability. It also states that "performance of a task will peak and then
begin to degrade rapidly as stress levels exceed a pilot’s adaptive
abilities to handle the situation."
The AC noted that stress is
insidious, and can be well established before becoming apparent; a pilot
may think that he is handling everything quite well, when in fact the
pilot is beyond his/her ability to respond appropriately. Stress is also
cumulative, and if the stress becomes too great, the pilot’s
performance begins to decline, and judgment deteriorates. The indicators
of excessive stress often show as three types of symptoms; emotional,
physical and behavioral. The AC suggested that the pilot should
preflight himself as well as the aircraft, and that he should ask
multiple questions about his fitness for flight, including "Am I tired?
Did I get a good night’s sleep last night? and Am I under undue stress?"
The
AC presented a "personal checklist of basic principles that cannot be
compromised" by any pilot. In part, the checklist stated that that
"Flight with less than the required minimum fuel is never reasonable"
and that "Casual neglect of any applicable checklist is never
justified." Finally, the AC presented an "I'M SAFE" checklist which
included questions that the pilot should ask himself, including "Am I
under psychological pressure from the job?" and "Am I tired and not
adequately rested?"
Flight Plans and Other Precautionary Measures
According
to a pilot/employee of the operator, the accident pilot/operator did
not have any formalized procedures regarding survey flights, and the
survey flights were typically conducted with the VFR code of 1200 set on
the transponder. He also stated that both he and the accident pilot
typically filed flight plans for their survey flights. The
pilot/employee noted that some customers regularly, and of their own
volition, notified the Coast Guard about their departure, routing, and
return intentions. He stated that some passengers also arranged for
regular (e.g. every 30 minutes) radio "check-ins" with the Coast Guard,
in order to provide them with some measure of security in case a problem
arose with the airplane, particularly if a ditching was required. No
such arrangements for the accident flight were discovered.
Examination
of the wreckage revealed that the airplane was equipped with two
aircraft communications transceivers, as well as a Uniden MC1020 "VHF
Marine Radio." This radio was required by the environmental services
company contract with the operator. According to Uniden information, the
radio operated in the frequency range of 156 to 163 megahertz, had the
capability to transmit on 54 discrete channels, and to receive 77 marine
channels, and 10 weather channels. No distress communications were
transmitted by, or received from, the accident airplane.
Environmental Services Company Pre-Accident Observations and Communications
On
April 18, 2008, personnel from the environmental services company
documented their concerns about a just-completed survey flight with the
accident airplane and pilot. The documentation stated that "radio
communications are not acceptable...and there was electronic smoke in
the aircraft today. Also the pilot was not on his best game with regards
to flying." The personnel were told by the pilot that "the smoke was
not an issue and it only affects the fuel gauges."
On May 16,
after the first May survey flight and which was the day prior to the
accident flight, the lead surveyor reported to her company that the
"aerial survey crew had serious concerns about [the pilot's] behavior
while up in the air. It seemed as though he was incredibly overtired, to
the point that [she] passed a note back to the other two observers
questioning if [they] should continue" the flight.
Accident Airplane Maintenance Records
Searches
of the operator's facility at CQX, and also other locations, produced
an incomplete set of maintenance records for the accident airplane. On
two separate occasions, FAA inspectors examined two different sets of
maintenance records for the accident airplane. In both cases, the
inspectors determined that the records were incomplete and exhibited
multiple deficiencies. Virtually all the entries in the maintenance
records from 1998 forward bore the signature and certificate number of
the accident pilot.
The oldest airframe records were from August
1966, and the most recent were from March 2003. The most recent annual
inspection entry was dated June 25, 2002, and the records indicated an
aircraft total time (TT) in service of 4,745.5 hours. According to the
records, the front engine was installed on the airplane in March 1988,
and the rear engine was installed in February 1998. The records
indicated that each engine had a time of "0.0" hours since major
overhaul at the time of its respective installation. Since front engine
lacked a data plate, its serial number was established by researching
TCM records for the specific crankshaft and crankcase halves; the
resulting engine serial number matched the number in the maintenance
records. The most recent airframe and engine maintenance entries were
dated March 11, 2003, and indicated a TT of 4,763.1 hours. Examination
of the Airworthiness Directive (AD) compliance records revealed that
numerous records were missing for the airplane, engines and accessories.
C-337 Fuel Management
According
to the Cessna 337 Owner's Manual (OM), for airplanes equipped with
auxiliary fuel tanks, the electric pumps are not plumbed to the
auxiliary fuel tanks, and therefore the engines can only be primed from
the main tanks. This necessitates that the fuel selector valves be set
to the main tanks for engine start and takeoff. For the same reason, the
"Engine-Out During Flight" checklist in the OM specified that the fuel
selector valve should be set to the main tank for an engine restart
attempt. Finally, the OM specified that the main tanks should be used
for 60 minutes prior to switching to the auxiliary tanks, and this
information also appeared as a placard on the fuel selector panel.
Accident Airplane Fuel Quantity Gauges
The
airplane's four fuel quantity gauges were examined. All showed signs of
burning and overheating on their coils. Overhaul guidance documentation
specified that the electrical resistance "across the disconnected stud
terminals" on each fuel gauge was to be between 200 and 250 ohms.
Resistance measurements yielded a value of 0 ohms for each gauge,
denoting that the coils were shorted, and therefore would not function
properly. The pre-accident condition of the gauges could not be
positively determined.
Accident Airplane Fuel Quantity Sending Units
The
airplane was equipped with a total of six float-type fuel quantity
sending units, one in each tank. Maintenance records indicated that
three (right main outboard, right main inboard, and one auxiliary)
sending units were overhauled and returned to service between May 1998
and May 1999. No records were located for the other three units. Post
accident examination of the units revealed that five of the six had
fractured resistor coils, and three of the six had burned resistor
coils. Only one unit (right auxiliary tank) had an intact and unburned
resistor coil. According to a technician at the facility that overhauled
these units, a burned resistor coil is a common failure signature on
the sending units installed on the accident airplane model, and could
occur pre- or post-accident. Electrical resistance testing of the
sending unit coils revealed that none of the coils were in compliance
with the design values, but the pre-accident condition of the coils
could not be determined.
Accident Airplane Electric Fuel Pumps
The
airplane was equipped with two identical-model electric fuel pumps. The
pump mounted in the right wing was plumbed to provide fuel from the
right main tank to either engine, and the pump mounted in the left wing
was plumbed to provide fuel from the left main tank to either engine.
When provided with an external power supply of 28 volts, no input head,
and no output resistance, the right wing pump provided a flow of
approximately 69 gallons per hour (gph), and the left wing pump provided
a flow of approximately 62 gph. Each pump bore a placard that stated
"35 GPH at 24 PSI Duty - Continuous."
Accident Airplane Engine Test Runs
On
July 22 and 23, 2008, the engines were examined, impact-damaged
components were replaced as necessary, and the engines were then test
run at the TCM facility under FAA supervision. According to the TCM test
reports, which are contained in the NTSB docket, the front engine
"accelerated normally without any hesitation, stumbling or interruption
in power and demonstrated the ability to produce rated horsepower," and
the rear engine "accelerated normally without any hesitation, stumbling
or interruption in power and demonstrated the ability to produce rated
horsepower" throughout all test phases.
TRENTON — The state has agreed to pay $125,000 to a survivor of a 2008 plane crash in Ocean County who claimed the State Police failed to initiate a search-and-rescue mission immediately, forcing her to wait several hours for medical care
Two people died in the crash, including Stephen Claussen, 41, of Seattle, who had trained Keiko the killer whale, the star of the movie "Free Willy."
The survivor, Jacalyn Toth Brown, 33, of Galloway Township, said in a lawsuit filed in 2010 in state Superior Court in Ocean County that troopers at the Tuckerton barracks refused to search for the plane after witnesses reported the crash in Eagleswood Township.
The incident occurred at about 12:45 p.m. but the wreckage was not located by a State Police helicopter until 4:56 p.m., according to federal investigators. Brown, who was severely injured and unconscious, said the delay worsened her injuries, which were extensive.
Leland Moore, a spokesman for the state Attorney General’s Office, said the case was settled last month, but that the State Police admitted no liability. An attorney for Brown, Richard Ansell, declined to comment at the request of his client.
At about noon on May 17, 2008, Brown, Claussen and one other employee of Geo Marine, Inc. took off from the Millville airport to collect data on birds and marine mammals off the New Jersey coast for the state Department of Environmental Protection.
Federal investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates aviation accidents, said in a report issued in 2010 that the pilot and owner of the plane, John Ambroult, 60, of Eastham, Mass., reported having fuel problems shortly after takeoff, and that passengers saw the front propellers stop and restart several times.
Ambroult tried to divert to Eagle’s Nest Airport, just north of Little Egg Harbor, but crashed in a wooded area about a mile away. Claussen and Ambroult were killed in the crash. Toth and Juan Carlos Salinas, then 43, of Mexico City, survived.
Federal investigators said Ambroult, who was tired from working earlier in the day, took off without enough fuel and improperly operated the plane, causing engine failure.
A witness reported the crash to State Police about 15 minutes after the plane went down, according to Brown’s lawsuit. At about 2:30 p.m., the lawsuit said, witnesses showed up at the Tuckerton barracks and asked why a search had not been launched.
According to court documents, the witnesses were told the State Police would not begin a search until they received a formal report of a missing aircraft from an airport, and that one witness was threatened with arrest after protesting the decision.
The federal transportation board’s report said the State Police did undertake a search-and-rescue mission after the initial witness report, but called it off two hours later when they could not locate a plane, which was in a wooded area.
At about 3 p.m., Salinas called a colleague at Geo Marine and reported he was injured and needed to be rescued, the report said. Salinas was put in touch with State Police at 4 p.m. and, after about 45 minutes, led a helicopter to the wreckage site, the report said.
Toth and Salinas were airlifted to Atlantic City for medical treatment.
The transportation board said after the crash the Federal Aviation Administration did not receive an emergency locator transmitter signal that usually goes off automatically when a small plane crashes, making it hard to find the wreckage.
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