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| Ron Cote, left, and John Guimond, have developed a device to improve safety at smaller airports by capturing and saving radio communications transmitted by pilots and airport personnel. Less than a year on the market, the device is in use at 13 airports. |
When it comes to flying planes, the rules are pretty cut and dried. They clearly weren't observed when, this summer, a pilot took off from a New Mexico taxiway, the narrow strip of pavement connecting airport runways.
"There are quite a few different no-nos on that," says Robert Uecker, the airport manager for the city of Belén, N.M.
Uecker is one of the first customers of Invisible Intelligence LLC, a Maine company producing a patent-pending computer system for smaller airports that records otherwise fleeting radio transmissions. The company's system uses the recordings to calculate traffic statistics and provide a firsthand account of events for airport managers who are trying to reconstruct them. It's also used to train staff to prevent the relatively rare cases when operations don't go as they should.
It was just a week after getting an Invisible Intelligence trial unit in his office that the New Mexico airport manager put the device to use. He sent captured radio transmissions from two pilots who observed the errant taxiway flier to the Federal Aviation Administration.
"It was useful knowing that I had some evidence right there, instead of [relying on] he-said she-said," says Uecker.
Sophisticated record-keeping is typically beyond the scope and budget of an airport like Belén's, where Uecker is the only employee. There, and at the nearly 5,200 other public general aviation airports in the country, pilots are most often guided not by a fleet of air traffic controllers but by FAA protocol that mandates pilots communicate their intended maneuvers over a common radio frequency. Depending on the hour, those communications may play to an empty room, after airport staff have gone home.
Those smaller airports in the United States and abroad are Invisible Intelligence's primary market, and one with which its founders are familiar.
John Guimond is the airport manager at the municipal Augusta State Airport and Ron Cote is an electrical supervisor for the Maine Department of Transportation, a job in which he has managed runway lighting at municipal airports for more than a decade. (The duo says they have their employers' blessings on their venture, on which they work off hours.)
It's their combined aviation knowledge, buy-in from Maine's DOT and the quick delivery to market of a product that was just a notion a year ago that gives them confidence they'll find ready customers among airport managers like Uecker. After launching the recorder system earlier this year, Maine's DOT announced it is developing a program to cover up to half the cost of the system for any of the 42 public airports in the state. The systems cost from $2,000 to $3,500, depending on the exact setup and platform. So far, 10 Maine airports are using it.
Overall, Cote and Guimond say they expect to generate $35,000 in gross sales this year, a figure that represents about six months of sales from around the country, mostly generated by word-of-mouth and a write-up in an industry email newsletter.
While the duo is still operating the business out of their homes (and Damon's Pizza & Italians in Augusta), their flagship General Audio Recording Device, or G.A.R.D., is recording radio transmissions at 13 airports and a heliport in four states. An installation in New Hampshire, a fifth state, was pending at press time.
Tapping an aviation metaphor, Cote says launching the company was a lot like building a plane in-flight, an approach that has worked so far.
"A lot of people will design something and wait till they perfect it," Cote says. "We did just the opposite and put it out there and asked how to improve it... it's kind of been designed by airport managers."
The next phase of the company's development will be fueled by a $25,000 grant from the Maine Technology Institute that Cote says will allow the company to deploy more advanced voice recognition software into its product and hire two contract employees to take on sales and administrative tasks.
The first unit Guimond and Cote installed began recording audio in February at the Knox County Regional Airport in Owls Head, near Rockland. They intentionally picked that location.
"The idea started after the terrible airplane accident in Rockland last year," Cote says.
Three young men died after their Cessna 172 collided during takeoff with a pickup truck driven by an employee of Penobscot Island Air. A preliminary report from the National Transportation Safety Board stated the driver of the vehicle had announced plans to cross the runway over the radio and heard no response. "We'll never really know [what happened]," Cote says.
Guimond didn't understand why more information couldn't be available, and familiar with Cote's electronics expertise, he asked to meet and made his pitch to develop a recording device that would enhance airport safety.
After about 10 days tinkering and coding at his camp in Eustis, Cote had built and developed a basic prototype that could capture individual radio transmissions — cutting out dead air — and store the digital files with timestamps down to the second. The next step was contracting the Winthrop-based Alternative Manufacturing Inc. to build the small black box that links a unicom radio to a computer.
In a written testimonial about the company's system, Knox County Regional Airport Manager Jeffrey Northgraves says he began researching ways to record radio transmissions after the accident. Most options on the market, Northgraves wrote, have features beyond what his airport needed and are expensive. He expects other airport managers will find the device useful.
According to the latest annual report by the General Aviation Manufacturers Association and FAA statistics, there were 1,422 general aviation accidents in the United States in 2012, 270 of which resulted in the death of one or more passengers. Representatives from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, contacted by Mainebiz, reviewed the company's website but said they could not comment on market demand for such a system.
Since the first deployment of the G.A.R.D. system at the Knox airport, Cote says he's continued to work on new features at the request of customers. That led to the first major upgrade earlier this year, enabling the program to tally airport traffic and maintenance operations.
Federal regulations require pilots to make a number of transmissions as they're taking off or landing, and Cote says his software can single out those events by analyzing characteristics of the unicom radio transmissions. That development represents half of the company's pending patent, which Cote says covers the combined functions of recording radio transmissions and logging a count and timeline of airport operations to enhance the planning abilities for airport managers.
At the Augusta airport, Guimond said the traffic data showed an unexpected lull on the weekends. Airport staff had previously performed only routine maintenance operations on weekends, but knowing that weekends are actually less busy has caused them to change that practice.
Cote and Guimond say that technology will give airport managers a better way to track airport traffic, which is not done uniformly, and to allow after-hours logging of traffic data.
"We've talked to five different [airport] managers and they had five different answers about where they got their numbers," Cote says.
Next steps
Now that it has an MTI seed grant, Cote says the next step for the G.A.R.D. system is to rebuild the software in a new programming language that can more efficiently incorporate voice recognition.
That, the duo hopes, will allow them to extract even more information from radio transmissions, like how frequently a specific runway is used, what types of planes are landing at the airport and other basic information. Cote expects development of that software to take around eight months.
The grant has paid for some patent attorney services and supported two year-long contracts with an administrative assistant and a full-time salesperson whose first task was contacting every state transportation department in the country. The company is also bringing on an intern from the University of Maine at Orono to help develop the software for Google's Android and Apple's iOS platforms.
It's the latest in a pattern of quick development for the young company.
"We went from concept to prototype in 12 days and then to market in less than six months," Cote says.
Invisible Intelligence LLC
Address: 32 Dusty Road, West Gardiner
Owners: Ron Cote and John Guimond
Founded: 2013
Employees: 2
Revenue, 2013: $35,000
Contact: 485-5521
www.invisibleintelligencellc.com
Source: http://www.mainebiz.biz
Cessna 172N Skyhawk, Ang Aero Club Inc., N6142F
NTSB Identification: ERA13FA059
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 16, 2012 in Owls Head, ME
Probable Cause Approval Date: 05/08/2014
Aircraft: CESSNA 172N, registration: N6142F
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
Shortly after the end of civil twilight and during the departure roll with about liftoff speed, the airplane collided with a private ground vehicle that was crossing the runway, which resulted in the separation of the airplane’s right elevator. The vehicle driver reported that he did not see the airplane until after the collision as it was attempting to gain altitude. Witnesses observed the airplane attempting to climb, drifting left of the runway, and then beginning a left turn. Witnesses then observed the airplane in “slow flight” and subsequently spinning until impact.
Examination of the vehicle revealed impact marks on the left front fender consistent in size and shape with the airplane’s right elevator. One light bulb from the vehicle’s headlights was located, and examination of the light bulb revealed that the filament was stretched, which is consistent with the light being on at the time of the collision. The driver stated that he did not, nor was ever required to, have a yellow beacon on his vehicle. After the accident, the airport required airport beacons to be placed on the top most portion of the vehicle and to be operational both day and night while that vehicle operates on the ramp, taxiway, runway, or any other areas that an aircraft may operate.
Examination of the airplane’s wingtip light bulbs revealed that the filaments were stretched, indicating that the lights were on at the time of the accident. Examination of the beacon and navigation light bulbs did not reveal any information about their operational status at the time of the accident.
It could not be determined if the driver or pilot announced their intentions over the airport common traffic advisory frequency. A handheld radio was located on the vehicle’s dashboard; however, it was found in the “off” position. When the radio was placed in the “on” position and the correct frequency was set, the radio transmitted and received with no anomalies noted. Although the airplane was close to or perhaps past liftoff speed, the pilot likely could have stopped the airplane on the remaining 3,600-feet of paved runway following the impact with the vehicle. However, the pilot did not discontinue the takeoff.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The vehicle driver's failure to verify that the runway was not occupied by an airplane before crossing the runway, which resulted in the vehicle being struck by a departing airplane, and the pilot's continued takeoff with flight control damage, which subsequently resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin at low altitude.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 16, 2012, about 1645 eastern standard time, a Cessna 172N, N6142F, was substantially damaged when it impacted a non-airport vehicle and then subsequently impacted terrain during takeoff from Knox County Airport (RKD), Owls Head, Maine. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured and the occupant of the non-airport vehicle was not injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 with the intended destination of Bangor International Airport (BGR), Bangor, Maine.
According to an interview with the driver of the vehicle, he was driving his private vehicle on the taxiway and had followed another aircraft out to taxiway "alpha." The other airplane continued down taxiway "delta" and he proceeded with his vehicle to the hold short line of the runway. He announced his intentions on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), utilizing a radio in his vehicle, heard no response nor saw anything on the runway, and he proceeded to cross runway 31. As his truck entered the runway a blur of an object went by in front of him striking the front of his truck.He continued to cross the runway and then got out to inspect what he saw at which time he observed an airplane attempting to climb. He continued watching the airplane drift to the left of runway 31 and then made a left turn as if attempting to return to the airport. Subsequently, the airplane was then observed in "slow flight" and then it began to spin. He observed the airplane on fire as he was driving to the accident scene. He also noticed while driving that his headlights were not working now.
According to an eyewitness statement, the airplane was observed departing to the west and appeared to be doing a left climbing "chandelle" type maneuver. The airplane also had what appeared to be a high angle of attack. About 200 feet above ground level (agl) the navigation identification lights were observed rotating slowly counter clockwise. The airplane then appeared to pitch down and was observed descending behind trees.
According to a representative from Lockheed-Martin Flight Service Station the accident pilot had called for a weather briefing at 1208 for the flight from BGR to RKD with a proposed departure time of 1500. No return weather briefing or flight plan was requested.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He held a third class medical certificate which was issued on June 30, 2011 and had a restriction "must wear corrective lenses."
According to the pilots most recent Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, dated June 15, 2012, he had 48.5 total flight hours, 17.4 of those hours were logged as solo flight, 3.8 flight hours of night instruction received, and 0.2 hours of night flight as pilot in command. However, an accurate amount of flight time at the time of the accident could not be achieved as no pilot logbook had been located at the time of this writing.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on August 23, 1979, and was registered to the flying club on April 18, 1991. It was equipped with a Lycoming O-320-H2AD, Serial number L1894-76T, 160-hp engine. It was also equipped with a McCauley propeller. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was recorded on December 4, 2011, and at that time a recorded hobbs time was 7601.9 hours. The engines most recent annual inspection was recorded on December 4, 2011, with a recorded tachometer time of 7601.9 hours and an engine total time in service of 1816.9 hours.
The last recorded fueling was accomplished on November 16, 2012 at BGR. The airplane had been fueled with 10.5 gallons of fuel. Fuel samples acquired from the fixed base operator appeared to be blue in color, similar to 100 LL aviation fuel, and free of debris or foreign matter.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 1655 recorded weather observation at RKD, included wind from 340 degrees at 3 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 3 degrees C, dew point minus 3 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.31 inches of mercury.
According to information obtained from the United States Naval Observatory official sunset was 1609 on the day of the accident and end of civil twilight
was 1640.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The airport is a publically owned airport and at the time of the accident did not have an operating control tower. The airport was equipped with two runways designated as runway 13/31 and 03/21. The runways were reported as "in good condition" at the time of the accident. Runway 13/31 was a 5,007 -foot-long by 100-foot-wide runway and runway 03/21 was a 4,000 -foot-long by 100-foot-wide runway. The airport was 55.4 feet above mean sea level.
The airport lights were examined the following evening and operated as required. Photo documentation and video was produced about the time of the accident the following day in similar cloud conditions. From the threshold of runway 31 with the lights of an airport operations vehicle, parked on taxiway "A" could be detected with only the use of the vehicles headlights; however, when the airport runway and taxiway lights were illuminated to the full bright position the vehicle lights were unable to be differentiated from the surrounding lights.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Ground Vehicle
The personal vehicle was a white pickup truck and owned by the driver. The vehicle exhibited damage along the front including the headlights and grill. The vehicle also had an impact mark along the left tire well located approximately 26 inches above the ground and the impact mark was similar in size as the right elevator. A light bulb from one headlamp was located and the filament was stretched similar to being utilized. A hand held two-way capable radio was located on the dash of the truck. The radio was in the "OFF" position, when found. The radio was turned to the "ON" position and the correct CTAF frequency was noted, transmissions and reception were confirmed on the radio over the CTAF frequency. According to the owner of the vehicle, it did not have nor has he ever used a yellow airport flashing light.
Airplane
The airplane impacted the ground in a nose down, approximately 70 degrees, inverted attitude. The left wing came to rest inverted and the right wing and cockpit came to rest right side up. The wreckage was located approximately 2,100 feet from the initial impact with the vehicle.
Nose Section
The engine and cockpit exhibited thermal damage. The engine remained attached to the firewall. The nose wheel remained attached to the engine. The propeller remained attached to the propeller flange and the spinner remained attached; however, exhibited crush damage with deformation towards one direction. One propeller blade exhibited no chordwise or S-bending but was located in the ground about 1 inch. The other blade exhibited bending in the aft direction along the entire span of the blade which continued until the blade tip was perpendicular to the normal position. Engine rotation was unable to be confirmed due to thermal damage; however examination of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact abnormalities or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The taxi light and landing light were destroyed.
Right Wing
The right wing exhibited thermal damage; however, the leading edge exhibited crush damage along the entire leading edge and an impression was made in the surrounding terrain. The flap was in the up or retracted position and the cable continuity was confirmed from the flap actuator to the flap. The aileron remained attached and cable continuity was confirmed from the aileron to cuts in the cable produced by first responders, then from that cut to the yoke. The flap actuator was measured at the jack screw which indicated 0 inches, that correlates to a flap position of 0 degrees or fully retracted. The flap cable exhibited signs of tensile overload at the wing root. The right wingtip navigation light filament was stretched due to impact forces, which is similar in appearance of being in operation at the time of ground impact. No conclusive evidence could be obtained from the strobe lights as to their operation at ground impact. The autopilot servo cables remained intact and secured to the aileron cables; however, operation of the autopilot could not be determined.
Empennage
The empennage exhibited thermal damage up to the bulkhead forward of the vertical stabilizer. Examination of the right side of the rudder revealed and impact mark similar to a mark from the right elevator impacting it at about a 15 degree trailing edge up angle. The right elevator was separated and remained at the initial impact point on the runway. The right elevator exhibited paint transfer marks associated with the vehicle. The right elevator also exhibited a slight bend in the positive direction and then was also impact separated into two large pieces and several smaller pieces. The right side elevator counter weight remained with the elevator. The right horizontal stabilizer leading edge exhibited crush damage in the aft direction approximately 10 inches from the tip. The right horizontal stabilizer exhibited crush damage in the aft direction. The left elevator remained attached and continuity was confirmed from the elevator horn to the yoke. Rudder continuity was confirmed from the rudder horn to the rudder pedals. An elevator trim cable was separated at a turnbuckle; however, the separation exhibited signature of postimpact separation. The beacon and identification light filaments were unremarkable; however, no conclusive evidence could be obtained on their operation at ground impact. The elevator trim tab actuator was extended to 1.5 inches, the trim tab cable was cut; however, continuity was confirmed from the trim actuator chain to the cut and from the cut to the trim wheel chain in the cockpit.
Left Wing
The wing exhibited thermal damage and came to rest next to a tree, inverted. Impact damage was observed 17 inches in diameter beginning 43 inches from the wingtip. The outboard approximate 8 feet of the wing was separated and appeared to be similar as damage associated with the impact with the tree. The aileron remained attached and continuity was confirmed from the aileron to the cable cut at the door post, produced by first responders, then from that cut to the yoke. The aileron crossover cable exhibited tensile overload about the left wing root location. The flaps remained attached to the associated attach points; however, the flap cable exhibited tensile overload. The left navigation light filaments were stretched due to impact forces, which is similar in appearance of being in operation at the time of ground impact. No conclusive evidence could be obtained from the strobe lights as to their operation at ground impact.
Cockpit
The cockpit was consumed by post-impact fire; the directional gyro was the only instrument that was recognizable; however, due to the thermal damage no notable information was obtained. The yokes were consumed by post-impact; however, the yoke chain assembly remained intact and on the sprocket; however, exhibited thermal damage. The rudder pedals remained attached to the rudder bar; however, exhibited thermal damage. Three seatbelt latches were located and buckled; however, due to the thermal damage no seatbelt webbing was located. No shoulder harness were located and no should harness straps were buckled to the lap belt buckle.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot on November 18, 2012, by the Office of Chief Medical Examiner, Augusta, Maine. The autopsy listed the cause of death as "multiple blunt injuries" and the report listed the specific injuries.
The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute performed forensic toxicology on specimens from the pilot. The report stated no carbon monoxide, no cyanide or ethanol was detected in the blood.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Cessna Model 172N "Information Manual"
According to Section 4 "Normal Procedures" for a normal takeoff states
1. Wing Flaps – UP
2. Carburetor Heat – Cold
3. Throttle – FULL OPEN
4. Elevator Control – LIFT NOSE WHEEL (at 55 KIAS)
5. Climb Speed – 70-80 KIAS
According to Section 5 "Performance", the ground roll required should have been 737 feet with a takeoff speed of 52 knots indicated airspeed at 2300 pounds. The manual further shows the distance needed for landing at the maximum weight over a 50 foot obstacle would have been about 1210 feet.
FAA's Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A),
According to Chapter 5 "Takeoffs and Departure Climbs" states in part "Rejected Takeoff/Engine Failure. Emergency or abnormal situations can occur during a takeoff that will require a pilot to reject the takeoff while still on the runway. Circumstances such as a malfunctioning powerplant, inadequate acceleration, runway incursion, or air traffic conflict may be reasons for a rejected takeoff. Prior to takeoff, the pilot should have in mind a point along the runway at which the airplane should be airborne. If that point is reached and the airplane is not airborne, immediate action should be taken to discontinue the takeoff. Properly planned and executed, chances are excellent the airplane can be stopped on the remaining runway without using extraordinary measures…"
According to Chapter 10 "Night Operation" states in part "Takeoff and Climb. Night flying is very different from day flying and demands more attention of the pilot. The most noticeable difference is the limited availability of outside visual references. Therefore, flight instruments should be used to a greater degree in controlling the airplane. This is particularly true on night takeoffs and climbs. The cockpit lights should be adjusted to a minimum brightness that will allow the pilot to read the instruments and switches and yet not hinder the pilot's outside vision. This will also eliminate light reflections on the windshield and windows.
After ensuring that the final approach and runway are clear of other air traffic, or when cleared for takeoff by the tower, the landing lights and taxi lights should be turned ON and the airplane lined up with the centerline of the runway. If the runway does not have centerline lighting, use the painted centerline and the runwayedge lights..."
Knox County Regional Airport Flightline Driving Manual
According to the manual under the section titled "Movement Areas" which states in part "The movement area consists of taxiways and runways. You are required to must [sic] have a need to access the movement area, prior authorization from airport management and you must have (and monitor) an operating two-way radio (set to Unicom Frequency 123.05) at all times before entering/driving on any movement area…"
The section titled "Driving on the Movement Areas" goes on to state:
• Do not enter a movement area unless you have a legitimate need, authorization from airport management and two-way aviation radio communications.
• Monitor your aviation two-way radio at all times, RDK Unicom frequency is 123.05
• After announcing your location and intentions on the radio, proceed only after you have looked in all direction, including up
• Never drive your vehicle on or across runways unless absolutely necessary and limit your time within the runway safety area by driving at an expedited but safe speed.
The manual goes on to state in part "…When driving on an AOA [airport operations area] make sure your vehicle is properly equipped for the area where you operated, i.e. radio, beacon, markings…use extreme caution at night and/or in poor weather conditions…aircraft always have the right of way…"
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, November 16, 2012 in Rockland, ME
Aircraft: CESSNA 172N, registration: N6142F
Injuries: 3 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On November 16, 2012, about 1645 eastern standard time), a Cessna 172N, N6142F, was substantially damaged when it impacted a non-airport vehicle and then subsequently impacted terrain during takeoff from Knox County Airport (RKD), Rockland, Maine. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured and the occupant of the non-airport vehicle was not injured. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 with the intended destination of Bangor International Airport (BGR), Bangor, Maine.
According to an interview with the driver of the vehicle, he was driving his private vehicle on the taxiway and had followed another aircraft out to taxiway "alpha." The other airplane continued down taxiway "delta" and he proceeded with his vehicle to the hold short line of the runway. He announced his intentions on the common traffic advisory frequency using a radio in his vehicle, heard no response nor saw anything on the runway, and he proceeded to cross runway 31. He subsequently saw something grayish in color, continued to cross the runway, and then got out to inspect what he saw at which time he observed an airplane attempting to climb. He continued watching the airplane drift to the left of the runway and make a left turn as if attempting to return to the airport. Subsequently, the airplane was then observed in "slow flight" and then it began to "spin."
According to an eyewitness statement, the airplane was observed departing to the west and appeared to be doing a left climbing "chandelle" type maneuver. The airplane also had what appeared to be a high angle of attack. About 200 feet above ground level the navigation identification lights were observed rotating slowly counter clockwise. The airplane then appeared to pitch down and descended behind trees.
Examination of the airplane revealed that it impacted the ground in a nose down attitude, next to a tree, approximately 2,200 feet from the initial impact location with the vehicle, and subsequently caught fire. The right elevator was in the vicinity of the initial impact location on the runway. The airplane came to rest on a heading of 346 degrees.
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