Monday, February 16, 2015

Cessna 421C Golden Eagle, Venezia Marine Inc, N229H: Fatal accident occurred August 27, 2013 in Paris, Illinois

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA509 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, August 27, 2013 in Paris, IL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/01/2015
Aircraft: CESSNA 421C, registration: N229H
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

Company personnel reported that, in the weeks before the accident, the airplane's left engine had been experiencing a problem that prevented it from initially producing 100 percent power. The accident pilot and maintenance personnel attempted to correct the discrepancy; however, the discrepancy was not corrected before the accident flight, and company personnel had previously flown flights in the airplane with the known discrepancy. 

Witnesses reported observing a portion of the takeoff roll, which they described as slower than normal. However, the airplane was subsequently blocked from their view. Examination of the runway environment showed that, during the takeoff roll, the airplane traveled the entire length of the 4,501-ft runway, continued to travel through a 300-ft-long grassy area and a 300-ft-long soybean field, and then impacted the top of 10-ft-tall corn stalks for about 50 ft before it began to climb. About 1/2 mile from the airport, the airplane impacted several trees in a left-wing, nose-low attitude, consistent with the airplane being operated below the minimum controllable airspeed. The main wreckage was consumed by postimpact fire. 

Postaccident examinations revealed no evidence of mechanical anomalies with the airframe, right engine, or propellers that would have precluded normal operation. Given the left engine's preexisting condition, it is likely that its performance was degraded; however, postimpact damage and fire preluded a determination of the cause of the problem. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff during the ground roll after detecting the airplane's degraded performance. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to attempt a flight with a known problem with the left engine and the likely partial loss of left engine power for reasons that could not be determined during the postaccident examination of the engine.

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA509
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, August 27, 2013 in Paris, IL
Aircraft: CESSNA 421C, registration: N229H
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 27, 2013, approximately 1120 central daylight time, a Cessna 421C Riley Turbine Rocket twin-engine airplane, N229H, impacted wooded terrain shortly after takeoff from the Edgar County Airport (PRG), Paris, Illinois. The airline transport pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed and a post-impact fire ensued. The airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., Terre Haute, Indiana, and operated by RSB Aviation, Inc., Paris, Illinois, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was en route to the Terre Haute International Airport - Hulman Field (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana.

According to RSB Aviation company personnel, prior to the flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 178 gallons of fuel, which according to a company pilot, would have topped off the fuel tanks. The pilot intended to depart PRG, pick up an individual at HUF, and then continue to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Witnesses, located inside a building on the airport, observed a portion of the airplane's takeoff roll from runway 9. They stated the airplane seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed with the accident airplane. Due to corn and other obstacles on the airport property blocking their view, and concerned with the slow takeoff roll, the witnesses exited the building and went to the edge of the runway to see if the pilot stopped the airplane or turned around. The witnesses did not observe the airplane; however, shortly thereafter, they noticed a smoke plume about 1 mile east of the airport.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 33, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating, a commercial certificate with airplane single-engine land and airplane single-engine sea ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class medical certificate was dated August 13, 2012, and had no limitations. The pilot's application for his medical certificate indicated no use of any medications and no medical history conditions.

According to an insurance application dated December 4, 2012, the pilot reported he had accumulated at least 8,600 total flight hours, 4,700 total flight hours in multiengine airplanes, and 2,000 total flight hours in Cessna 421C Riley Turbine Rocket powered airplanes. The pilot's logbooks were not located during the investigation.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 by The Cessna Aircraft Company as model 421C, serial number 421C0088, and was a high-performance, twin engine, low wing, piston-powered airplane. The airplane was originally issued a standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category on April 22, 1976, and the airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., on March 5, 2009. At the time of the accident, the airplane was equipped with two 675 shaft horsepower (shp) Lycoming LTP101-600A-1A engines, flat rated to 475 shp, per a supplemental type certificate (STC), and Hartzell Propeller HC-B3TN-3C three-blade, single-acting, constant speed, hydraulically operated propellers with feathering and reversing capability. 

On January 28, 1982, in accordance with Riley Aircraft STC SA4293WE, two Lycoming turboprop engines were installed on the airplane. The airplane was then issued a new standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category on January 29, 1982. 

A review of STC SA4293WE indicated the minimum controllable airspeed is 97 knots with the inoperative engine propeller in the feathered position.

Current airframe, engine, and propeller maintenance logbooks were not located during the investigation. RSB Aviation company personnel stated the maintenance records were in the accident airplane; no evidence of maintenance records were noted within the aircraft wreckage. The airplane's current weight and balance documents were not located.

According to RSB Aviation company maintenance personnel, the airplane underwent its most recent annual inspection in May or June of 2013.

According to RSB Aviation company personnel, during the previous several weeks before the accident, the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up. A company pilot reported the following: "The left engine sometimes would 'hang' at 70 [percent] gas [generator]. Upon moving (cycling) the throttle and or cycling the fuel pump on/off, the power to the left engine would accelerate and be normal. To say another way, it was slow to accelerate on power up to 70 [percent] gas [generator] and would stop at that power setting. Moving the throttle more forward (toward full) would not do anything. This sometimes would go on for minutes before coming up and would operate normal after that." The company pilot stated the delay/lag would not occur at each engine start-up, but at intermittent times. The airplane was flown on several flights by RBS Aviation pilots with the known delay/lag condition. According to maintenance personnel and another company pilot, the known problem with the left engine had not been corrected prior to the accident flight.

During an interview with a Honeywell technical representative, he stated that at an unknown date preceding the accident, the accident pilot contacted him to inquire about troubleshooting the left engine issue. The technical representative offered several suggestions to troubleshoot the problem; however, he had not received a call back whether the issue had been resolved. 

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1155, the PRG automated weather observation system, located approximately 0.5 miles west of the accident site, reported the wind from 260 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 30 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 24 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.07 inches of mercury.

COMMUNICATION AND RADAR INFORMATION

There were no recorded air traffic communications or radar data for the accident flight.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Edgar County Airport, PRG, is a public, non-towered airport located about 5 miles north of Paris, Illinois, at a surveyed elevation of 654 feet. The airport features two asphalt runways, runway 9/27, which is 4,501 feet by 75 feet, and runway 18/36, which is 3,200 feet by 75 feet.

Runway 9 has a 38 foot tree located approximately 1,411 feet from the runway and 104 feet left of runway centerline.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, or cockpit image recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located approximately 1/2 of a mile from the departure end of runway 9. The airplane wreckage was distributed on a heading of 090 degrees for approximately 300 feet. The airplane impacted numerous trees prior to coming to rest at the base of a large tree. A post-impact fire and 2 post-impact explosions ensued. Several separated sections of the left wing, left horizontal stabilizer, and left elevator were located near the initial tree impacts. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, right wing, a portion of the left wing, both engines, and portions of the empennage.

Visual examination and aerial photographs of the departure end of runway 9 and adjacent terrain showed the airplane's main landing gear exit the end of the runway surface, travel approximately 300 feet through grass, continue to travel approximately 300 feet through 3-foot-tall soybeans, and then impact the top of 10-foot-tall corn stalks for approximately 50 feet. Damage to the soybean and corn vegetation was greater on the right path area than on the left path area. Following the damaged corn stalks, there was no evidence of the airplane impacting terrain prior to the tree impacts. 

The fuselage, to include the cockpit and cabin areas, was destroyed by fire and thermal damage. The six seat frames (2 cockpit, 4 cabin) were separated from the fuselage structure. No seat restraint webbing was observed or located. No cockpit instrument readings or navigation/communication radio settings were discernable due to thermal damage. 

The flight control cables and linkage system were examined for continuity. One elevator control cable was continuous from the ball end to a separation in the aft fuselage. The separation was consistent with an overload failure. The other elevator control cable was continuous from a damaged turn barrel near the cockpit to a separation in the aft fuselage. The separation was consistent with an overload failure. The aileron, rudder, and flap control continuity could not be determined due to damage associated with the impact and fire. Landing gear and flap positions could not be determined due to damage associated with the impact and fire.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) completed the on-scene examination/wreckage documentation, and a recovery company removed all remaining airplane wreckage from the accident site. The engines, propellers, and miscellaneous airframe structure were transported to Honeywell, Phoenix, Arizona, for further examination. Details of the engine and propeller examinations are found later in this report.

PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Terre Haute Regional Hospital, Department of Pathology, Terre Haute, Indiana. The autopsy ruled the cause of death as the result of blunt force trauma, and the manner of death as an accident. No unusual findings were discovered during the autopsy.

Biological specimens from the pilot's body were forwarded to the FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute for toxicological testing. These specimens tested negative for ethanol and drugs. The specimens were unsuitable for carbon monoxide testing, and testing for cyanide was not performed.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Engine Examination

The engines were disassembled at Honeywell's facilities in Phoenix, Arizona, under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the engines did not reveal evidence of preimpact malfunctions.

The left engine external surfaces were covered in black soot and displayed deposits of solidified aluminum. The power turbine rotated freely with continuity established to the propeller. The gas producer shaft would not rotate; however, remained connected to the gearbox. The gas producer rotated with resistance after the fuel and oil pumps were removed. The accessory gearbox rotated freely through both high and low speed gear train after the power section was removed from the gearbox housing.

Disassembly of the left engine revealed the cup lock and nut were rotated 45 degrees from the anti-rotation slot to the crimped area of the cup washer. No torque on the nut was noted during the disassembly. Circumferential rubs were noted on the inner diameter of the compressor vane assembly. The axial compressor rotor was covered in black soot and the blade tips displayed rubs and material buildup on the trailing edge. The compressor impeller was covered in black soot and the blades displayed rubs at the inducer, knee, and exducer. The impeller shroud displayed a light rub at the inducer from about the 12 to 3 o'clock position (aft looking forward), rub in the knee area at 3 to 4 o'clock position, and a rub in the exducer area from the 5 to 3 o'clock position. The compressor diffuser assembly showed evidence of metallic deposits on the inlet side of the vanes. The gas producer turbine rotor assembly showed evidence of metal spray on the pressure side of the blades at the trailing edge. The power turbine nozzle assembly displayed a light circumferential rub mark at the trailing edge and evidence of metal spray on the aft side of the vanes. The power turbine rotor assembly was covered in black soot and displayed evidence of blade tip rubs at the trailing edge. The accessory gearbox module components were intact and appeared undamaged. The following items were removed and retained for further examination: fuel pump, fuel control, fuel manifold, overspeed limiter, and propeller governor.

The right engine power section was separated from the accessory gearbox and the engine was covered in white ash. The power turbine was free to rotate. The gas producer would not rotate. The high and low speed spool in the accessory gearbox would not rotate.

Disassembly of the right engine revealed the cup lock and nut were missing. Circumferential rubs were noted on the inner diameter of the compressor vane assembly. The axial compressor rotor blade tips displayed material rolled in the direction opposite of rotation. Several blades were missing material at the forward leading edge, and several blades displayed damage on the leading edge with missing material. The compressor impeller was covered in light soot and the blade tips displayed rubs on the entire length of the blade. Material buildup was noted on both sides of the blades. The impeller shroud displayed a rub with material missing at the inducer from about the 10 to 2 o'clock position (aft looking forward), static blade indications on the shroud in area of a rub in the knee, a rub in the exducer area from the 11 to 1 o'clock position, and a light rub at the exducer area from the 1 to 11 o'clock position. The gas producer turbine rotor assembly showed evidence of metal spray on the aft side of the blades, and a circumferential rub on the outer diameter of the seal plate. The power turbine nozzle assembly displayed a light 360-degree circumferential rub at the aft area of the blade. The power turbine rotor assembly forward end of shaft was fractured approximately 5 ¼ inches from forward end. The forward end of the shaft displayed a blue tint. The assembly displayed evidence of blade tip rubs at the trailing edge. The accessory gearbox module housing had missing areas due to thermal damage which exposed internal gears and bearings. 

Left Engine Fuel Pump

The left engine fuel pump was examined at Triumph Engine Control Systems, West Hartford, Connecticut, under the supervision of the NTSB. Extensive thermal damage was noted on the pump housing which precluded any functional test of the pump. Disassembly and examination of the pump did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction.

Left Engine Fuel Control

The left engine fuel control was examined at Honeywell, South Bend, Indiana, under the supervision of the NTSB. Extensive thermal damage was noted on the control, which precluded any functional test of the control. Disassembly and examination of the control did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction.

Left Engine Fuel Manifold

The left engine fuel manifold was examined at UTC Aerospace Systems Engine Components, Des Moines, Iowa, under the supervision of the FAA. Visual examination of the manifold showed it was covered in carbon and a portion of the hard line was bent. The inlet fitting threads were damaged and a new inlet fitting was installed to perform a flow test per the approved test procedure (ATP). During the flow test, the number 1 and 2 nozzles had streaking to no flow. A pressure test was performed at 650 pounds per square inch (PSI) and several leaks were noted. The nozzles were removed from the manifold to replace the O-rings and Teflon seals. A pressure test at 650 PSI was again performed and no leaks were found. The ATP was repeated and the flow improved, however, the number 1 nozzle was clogged with no flow noted.

The left engine fuel manifold was further examined at Parker Aerospace, Glendale, Arizona, under the supervision of the FAA. The 68600501 ATP was performed on the patternation test fixture, and leakage was observed from the valve expansion plug. The manifold was installed into a spray quality chamber and all nozzles, with the exception of the number 5 nozzle, showed sputtering, backflow, and very little flow. The number 5 nozzle showed nominal flow. The nozzles were removed for further examination. New nozzles were installed on the accident manifold and the new nozzles met the test requirements. The accident nozzles were installed back onto the accident manifold with new O-rings and the flow test was repeated. All pressures were higher which was consistent with reduced flow primary circuit flow.

The left engine fuel manifold was placed on a test engine at Honeywell, Phoenix, Arizona, and an engine test was performed. The engine test revealed no discrepancy in the engine operation.

Propeller Examination

The propellers were disassembled at Honeywell's facilities in Phoenix under the supervision of the NTSB. Disassembly and examination of the propellers did not reveal evidence of a preimpact malfunction. Extensive thermal damage precluded determination of blade angle at the time of the accident; however, evidence revealed that neither propeller was in the feather or reverse position.

Disassembly of the left propeller revealed that the propeller assembly contained extensive thermal damage. All three blades remained partially attached to the hub. All three blades rotated in their respective clamps. Propeller cycling was not possible due to thermal and impact damage. The piston had thermal damage and large portions of the piston were melted. The piston contained deep impression marks consistent with the feather stops, which was indicative of the piston being forced into the feathered position. One blade was bent 90 degrees aft at mid blade, twisted forward at the blade tip, and the tip curled. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip. Several inches of the blade tip were missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage. One blade was 90 percent missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage.

Disassembly of the right propeller revealed that the propeller assembly contained extensive thermal damage. One blade was separated from the hub, and two blades remained partially attached to the hub. Propeller cycling was not possible due to thermal and impact damage. The piston was fragmented and a few fragmented sections remained on the beta rods. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip. One blade was 50 percent missing, and the remaining portion displayed thermal damage. One blade was bent in the forward and aft directions, and twisted forward at the blade tip.

Weight and Balance Information

The airplane's current weight and balance documents were not located. Based on the airplane's flight manual (AFM), gross weight computations were made for the accident takeoff based on the airplane's original empty weight, pilot, and fuel weights. The takeoff condition was calculated for a full fuel tank condition based on company personnel statements which indicated the pilot topped off the tanks with full fuel (total fuel capacity was 290.4 gallons, of which 281 was usable). The occupant weight was obtained from the pilot's most recent airman application, which was 200 pounds. The AFM listed the maximum takeoff weight was 7,579 pounds.

For the takeoff condition, the calculated gross weight was about 7,522 pounds. 

Airplane Performance

According to the AFM and a temperature of approximately 85 F, the twin-engine climb performance at sea level is about 1,900 feet per minute, and the single-engine climb performance at sea level is about 390 feet per minute with the propeller feathered, and the gear and flaps in the up position. The total distance over a 50 foot obstacle with takeoff power on both engines is approximately 2,600 feet.

AFM Checklist Emergency Procedures

Section 3 of the Riley Turbine Rocket Cessna 421C AFM provides information regarding airplane emergencies, the warnings or alerts associated with a particular emergency, and the procedures to follow once the emergency has been identified. Some of those procedures are listed as follows.

Engine Inoperative Procedures:

1. Engine Securing Procedure: Power Lever – FLIGHT IDLE Condition Lever – FEATHER Main Tank Pumps – OFF Generator – OFF Cabin Air Switches – OFF Fuel Selector – OFF Engine Anti-Ice - OFF Air Conditioner – OFF (If Installed) 

10. Engine Failure Before Liftoff – Speed Below 105 KIAS (knots indicated airspeed) Power Levers – GROUND IDLE or REVERSE as required Brakes – AS REQUIRED CAUTION: Use of reverse power with one engine inoperative only to the amount that directional control can be maintained.

13. Engine Failure After Take-Off – Speed Above 105 KIAS 1. POWER LEVERS – 51.3 PSIG Torque (DO NOT EXCEED MGT RED LINE) 2. Landing Gear – UP after positive rate is achieved 3. Establish Bank – 5 degrees TOWARD OPERATIVE ENGINE 4. Climb to Obstacle – 110 KIAS (Best Angle of Climb Speed) 5. Accelerate to Best Single Engine Climb Speed (Vyse) – 117 KIAS 6. Trim Tabs – ADJUST (Adjust to relieve control pressures) 7. Cabin Air Switches – OFF 8. Inoperative Engine – Secure (See Sect 1-A Above) 9. As Soon As Practical – LAND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Family members and friends of the pilot expressed concerns to the NTSB regarding some possible sabotage or criminal activity to the airplane by unknown persons that may have caused the accident. In the year preceding the accident, the pilot and his company felt harassed by local officials and airport personnel. The investigation did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity that precluded the accident.


PARIS — After nearly two years, an investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) “did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity” regarding the fatal RSB Aviation crash at the Edgar County Airport.

The factual report, released May 14, is not the final Probable Cause report and only includes the factual data found during the investigation.

On Aug. 27, 2013, RSB Aviation owner and operator Rusty Bogue, 33, was piloting a Cessna 421 C Riley Turbine Rocket twin-engine airplane from the Edgar County Airport, headed to Terre Haute International Airport — Hulman Field in Terre Haute, where he was planning to pick up a passenger and continue to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Shortly after take-off, however, the airplane struck a wooded terrain approximately one half mile from the departure end of Edgar County Airport Runway 9. Bogue died of injuries sustained from the accident.
According to the factual report, “the airplane was destroyed and a post-impact fire ensued.”

Witnesses inside the airport stated the airplane “seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed.”

RSB Aviation personnel reported to investigators that during the previous several weeks before the accident, “the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up.” The report also noted that Bogue had contacted a Honeywell Aerospace technician “to inquire about troubleshooting the left engine issue.”

An autopsy performed at Terre Haute Regional Hospital ruled the cause of death as blunt force trauma and the manner of death as an accident. “No unusual findings were discovered during the autopsy.”

“Biological specimens from the pilot’s body were forwarded to the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute for toxicological testing. These specimens tested negative for ethanol and drugs,” according to the factual report.
Family members and friends of Bogue interviewed during the investigation “expressed concerns to the NTSB regarding some possible sabotage or criminal activity to the airplane by unknown persons that may have caused the accident. In the year preceding the accident, the pilot and his company felt harassed by local officials and airport personnel. The investigation did not reveal any evidence of sabotage or criminal activity that precluded the accident.”

Bogue’s father, Robert Bogue, has been on a quest to find the truth about the accident since it occurred; however, the factual report released by the NTSB has left him with more questions than answers. To the Bogue patriarch, there is only one explanation.

“My feelings haven’t changed,” he said. “The plane was tampered with. Period.”

http://www.parisbeacon.com

PARIS, IL. (ECWd) – The Edgar County Airport Advisory Board held a meeting on February 9, 2015 at the airport.

During the public comment session, at about the 2:20 mark in the audio, Mr. Rob Bogue talks to the airport advisory board about their response to his FOIA request, and the fact that some people think they are special and do not need to provide a copy of their insurance policy to the airport like the lease demands.

Around the 7:27 mark is where Chris Patrick tries blowing smoke to the board about why he won’t provide a copy of his insurance certificate to the airport. He blamed it on Rob Bogue and flat-out lied when he stated that Rob Bogue called Jerry Newlin’s insurance company and told them not to pay off the insurance claim. That never happened and it appears Chris Patrick can’t quit lying even when he’s not on the board.

Chris then reads from some “Airport Manager’s Handbook” that the County has never adopted even after Chris attempted to present it and approve it all at the same meeting before he resigned as chairman (even though it was fine not to have it for the 20+ years prior when he was the airport board chairman), about exclusive use of the main hangar not being allowed, however, there are exceptions to that rule and he failed to mention them. Additionally, I believe this comment was simply another step in Patrick’s and Heltsley’s attempts at running yet another rent paying leaseholder from the airport simply because they want to.

Interestingly we find that the language in the FAA Airport Compliance manual is quite different than what Patrick would lead people to believe, nor is the language found in the FAA Grant Assurance 23 Document the same as what he read to the board. As if that is not enough, Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5190-6, Exclusive Rights at Federally Obligated Airports is yet another FAA document that is quite different than what Patrick presented.  In an effort to be thorough, we reviewed and linked to all applicable FAA and CFR codes and once again, Patrick is wrong!

FAA Airport Compliance- Since 1938, there has been a statutory prohibition on exclusive rights 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e)  “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended.”

Air Navigation Facility Defined (40102- (4) ‘‘air navigation facility’’ means a facility used, available for use, or designed for use, in aid of air navigation, including— (A) a landing area; (B) a light; (C) Apparatus or equipment for distributing weather information, signaling, radio-directional finding, or radio or other electro-magnetic communication; and (D) another structure or mechanism for guiding or controlling flight in the air or the landing and takeoff of aircraft.  (None of those definitions apply to the hanger lease Patrick wishes to question)

FAA Grant Assurance 23 – Exclusive Rights “It will permit no exclusive right for the use of the airport by any person providing, or intending to provide, aeronautical services to the public”. (there is not Exclusive right for the use of the airport issued to anyone)

49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) No Exclusive Rights at Certain Facilities.  “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended”.  (Once again, there is not exclusive right granted to the hanger lease holder.  The hanger is not an air navigation facility as defined by federal law.)

Advisory Circular 150/5190-6 – “A person does not have an exclusive right to use an air navigation facility on which Government money has been expended.” (An“air navigation facility” includes, among other things, an airport.See “Definitions” at 49 U.S.C. § 40102.) (see definition link above)

Article and audio:   http://edgarcountywatchdogs.com

RUSTY BOGUE sits at the controls of a plane he loved to fly. He was killed August 27, 2013 when the Cessna 421 he was piloting back to Terre Haute, Ind., crashed shortly after taking off from the Edgar County Airport.

NTSB Identification: CEN13FA509
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Tuesday, August 27, 2013 in Paris, IL
Aircraft: CESSNA 421C, registration: N229H
Injuries: 1 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On August 27, 2013, approximately 1120 central daylight time, a Cessna 421C twin-engine airplane, N229H, impacted wooded terrain shortly after takeoff from the Edgar County Airport (PRG), Paris, Illinois. The airline transport pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact and post-impact fire. The airplane was registered to Venezia Marine, Inc., Terre Haute, Indiana, and operated by RSB Aviation, Inc, Paris, Illinois, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and a flight plan was not filed. The flight was originating at the time of the accident and was en route to the Terre Haute International Airport - Hulman Field (HUF), Terre Haute, Indiana.

Prior to the flight, the pilot fueled the airplane with 178 gallons of fuel, which according to a company pilot, would have topped off the fuel tanks. The pilot intended to depart PRG, pick up an individual at HUF, and then continue the flight to Cincinnati, Ohio.

Witnesses observed the airplane during its takeoff roll from runway 09. They stated the airplane seemed to be very slow in comparison to other takeoff rolls they have observed with the accident airplane. Due to corn and other obstacles on airport property, the witnesses did not observe the airplane takeoff; however, shortly thereafter, they noticed a smoke plume about 1 mile east of the airport.

The accident site was located approximately 3/4 of a mile from the departure end of runway 09 (4,502 feet long by 75 feet wide). The airplane wreckage was distributed on a heading of 090 for approximately 300 feet. The airplane impacted numerous trees prior to coming to rest at the base of a large tree. A post-impact fire and 2 post-impact explosions ensued. Several separated sections of the left wing, left horizontal stabilizer, and left elevator were located near the initial tree impacts. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, right wing, a portion of the left wing, both engines, and portions of the empennage. The left engine propeller was found in the feathered position, and right engine propeller was found in an operating range position.

Visual examination and aerial photographs of the departure end of runway 09 and adjacent terrain showed the airplane's main landing gear exit the end of the runway surface, travel approximately 300 feet through grass, continue to travel approximately 300 feet through 3-foot-tall soybeans, and then impact the top of 10-foot-tall corn stalks for approximately 50 feet. Following the damaged corn stalks, there was no evidence of the airplane impacting terrain prior to the initial tree impacts.

The airplane was equipped with two Lycoming LTP 101-600A-1A turboprop engines. The Lycoming engines were originally installed on the airplane per a Supplemental Type Certificate in 1982. According to RSB Aviation company personnel, during the previous several weeks before the accident, the left engine had been experiencing a delay/lag in obtaining 100 percent power after engine start-up. After a period of time, typically about 30 seconds, the left engine would obtain 100 percent power. After the engine obtained 100 percent power, the engine would maintain the power unless the pilot commanded otherwise. The delay/lag would not occur at each engine start-up, but at intermittent times. The airplane was flown by RBS Aviation with the known delay/lag condition. According to maintenance personnel and another company pilot, the known problem with the left engine had not been corrected prior to the accident flight.

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