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Accident occurred Saturday, July 30, 2005 in Key West, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 07/25/2007
Aircraft: Cessna 172S, registration: N65982
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
Adverse weather delayed the instrument rated but not instrument current pilot's departure to her home airport. Additionally, lodging accommodations in Key West could not be obtained. The pilot elected to depart in night visual flight rules (VFR) conditions for a nearby airport at approximately 2118. After takeoff, while flying over water during the dark night, the pilot established two-way radio communications with Navy Key West Approach Control. The radar facility did not receive the assigned discrete transponder code (0210), despite several attempts by the controller to get the pilot to reset the transponder. The pilot did not make any distress calls. The aircraft crashed into the Straits of Florida, and some of the wreckage was located the following day. Several days later the majority of the wreckage was located; the left wing was not recovered. Examination of the recovered wreckage revealed no evidence of pre-impact failure or malfunction of the flight controls, engine, airframe, and attitude gyro. No evidence of fire or sort was noted on any of the recovered components. The transponder was found set to "SBY" or standby position; the transponder does not transmit in that position. No servicing or maintenance was performed to the airplane while at Key West. During the inbound flight into Key West, the flight was radar identified using the transponder. Prior to departure, the pilot talked with a dispatcher from the operator and did not advise that person of any discrepancy related to the airplane.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The failure of the pilot-in-command to maintain directional control of the airplane during the dark, night flight over water, resulting in the uncontrolled descent and in-flight collision with the water. A contributing factor in the accident was the pilot's distraction with the inappropriately set transponder.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 30, 2005, about 2120 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 172S, N65982, registered to MFH Leasing, Inc., operated by Epic Aviation, crashed in the Straits of Florida shortly after takeoff from Key West International Airport, Key West, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR part 91 personal flight from Key West International Airport (KEYW), to The Florida Keys Marathon Airport (KMTH), Marathon, Florida. The airplane was destroyed, and the commercial-rated pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The flight originated about 2118, from Key West International Airport.
According to a transcription of communications with Navy Key West Approach Control, at 2118:45, an occupant of the airplane established contacted with their facility and provided the airplane registration number. The controller replied, "squawk zero two one zero wind one three zero at seven Navy Key West altimeter three zero zero four say type Cessna destination and requested altitude." The next comment was from the controller advising the pilot to say the type of aircraft, the destination, and again advised the transponder code was 0210. At 2119:21, an occupant of the airplane replied, "Squawking zero two one zero. It's a Cessna Skyhawk six five nine eight two. We like southbound to transition your airspace to the south on a cross country to Marathon, yeah." The controller again advised the pilot to "squawk" 0210, to which an occupant replied at 2119:48 "zero two one zero Cessna six five nine eight two." The controller advised the pilot that the "transponder not observed reset and squawk zero two one zero." The pilot did not reply and there were no further recorded transmissions from the occupant of the accident airplane. The controller attempted numerous times to communicate with the pilot; the results were negative. There was no recorded distress call made by the pilot.
According to the "Radar Supervisor/Approach Controller" at Navy Key West Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), after advising the pilot a second time to apply discrete transponder code 0210, he waited a few scans of the radar but he was never able to radar identify the flight. Additionally, he did not see a primary target departing KEYW. He attempted to communicate with the airplane on VHF guard (121.5) and also UHF guard (243.0) frequencies but there was no response. Knowing the KEYW air traffic control tower was closed, he also attempted to establish contact with the pilot on the KEYW Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (118.2 MHz); there was no response.
Review of recorded radar data from Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center revealed there was no radar target associated with the assigned transponder code 0210. Two radar targets with beacon code 0201 were observed. The first radar target occurred at 2116:47, and the second target occurred at 2117:11, both were located over KEYW.
The controller who was talking with the pilot of the accident airplane contacted Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (Miami ARTCC) about 2135, and questioned whether Miami ARTCC had established two-way communications with the accident airplane; the response was they had not. The controller also contacted fire rescue at Key West International Airport about 2145, and asked to have a ramp search performed. The individual reported that he advised the controller that the flight had departed at 2112, but a ramp check would be performed. Additionally, the Miami ARTCC reportedly established contact with personnel from KMTH, and requested a ramp search to be performed. Ramp searches were performed at KEYW and KMTH; the results were negative. On the evening of the accident, the U.S. Coast Guard was advised by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office of a report of a boater seeing a flash and hearing a loud sound. The U.S.C.G. dispatched a boat in the area and the crew of that boat later reported seeing lighting and hearing thunder from a nearby storm, but no wreckage was located. The following morning at approximately 0813, a boater contacted the U.S.C.G. and advised seeing a portion of one of the wings partially submerged. The U.S. Coast Guard contacted Monroe County Sheriff's office on July 31, 2005, at 0930, and requested underwater assistance with the aircraft wreckage. The wing was recovered and a search for the airplane and the occupants was then performed by the U.S. Coast Guard, Monroe County Sheriff's Office, U.S. Navy Police, Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC), and NOAA. The wreckage consisting of the fuselage was located on August 2, 2005.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot was the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with ratings airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane, which was issued last on August 17, 2002. She was the holder of a first-class medical certificate issued on February 7, 2005, with the restriction or limitation "must wear corrective lenses." Her last "Flight Review" conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56, occurred on July 27, 2005. The flight review was given by a flight instructor with Epic Aviation in a Cessna 172S.
The flight review consisted of 1.0 hour ground, and 1.4 hours of flight. According to the flight instructor who performed the flight review, the ground review consisted of airplane performance, systems of the airplane, review of speed, airspace, VFR weather minimums, and emergency engine procedures. The flight instructor stated that the pilot was "...found to be very knowledgeable on covered topics." The flight review was conducted to the commercial practical test standards, and consisted of steep turns, slow flight, power-on departure stall, and several touch-and-go landings.
NTSB review of the pilot's pilot logbook that contained entries from July 24, 1999, to the last entry dated July 27, 2005 (Flight Review), revealed her logged total time was 260.4 hours, of which 144.4 hours were as pilot-in-command. There were only 2 logged flights in Cessna type airplanes. Her total logged night time was listed as 9.4 hours. There were no logged flights between October 14, 2002, and the last logged flight on July 27, 2005. No determination could be made whether the pilot was current to fly at night.
A review of the application for the pilot's last medical certificate dated February 7, 2005, revealed she listed a total flight time of 900 hours.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was manufactured by Cessna aircraft Company in 2004, as a model 172S, and was designated serial number 172S9766. The airplane was certificated in the normal and utility categories, and was equipped with a McCauley fixed pitched propeller, model 1A170E/JHA7660, and a 180-horsepower Lycoming IO-360-L2A engine. The airplane was also equipped with a two-axis autopilot with altitude preselect and two engine-driven vacuum pumps, which provide vacuum necessary to operate the attitude indicator and directional gyro.
A review of the airplane maintenance records revealed the airplane was last inspected in accordance with a "Phase II" inspection, which was signed off as being completed on July 29, 2005. The airplane had accumulated approximately 1.8 hours since the inspection at the time the airplane was rented by the accident pilot. Further review of the maintenance records revealed no entry indicating removal, replacement, or repair of the transponder.
At the time of rental by the accident pilot, the installed hour meter indicated 653.2. At the time of the accident, the hour meter indicated 656.9.
There was no record of fuel servicing or maintenance being performed to the airplane while at KEYW.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
A METAR weather observation taken at 2053, at Key West International Airport, or approximately 26 minutes before the accident, indicates the wind was from 100 degrees at 11 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, clear skies existed, the temperature and dewpoint were 30 and 23 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.03 inHg.
On the day of the accident at 1647, the pilot phoned the Miami Automated International Flight Service Station (Miami AIFSS) and received a preflight weather briefing for a flight from KEYW to New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (KEVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida. At 1952, the pilot again phoned the Miami Automated International Flight Service Station and obtained an abbreviated preflight briefing for a flight from KMTH to KEVB.
On the date, and area of the accident, the sunset was determined to have occurred at 2012, and the end of civil twilight occurred at 2037. The phase of the moon was waning crescent with 25 percent of the Moon's visible disk illuminated.
COMMUNICATIONS
The Key West International Airport (KEYW) air traffic control tower (ATCT) closed at 2100; and was not recording communications at the time the flight departed. A "Watch Log" which documents arriving and departing aircraft indicates that on the date of the accident at 2112, an airport fire department individual noted the flight departed.
According to the individual who prepared the entry in the "Watch Log", the time "2112" was based on a digital watch.
According to personnel from Key West Approach Control, their facility utilizes transponder codes that begin with 02, followed by two digits. On the night and time of the recorded 0201 radar targets, they had not assigned that transponder code to any aircraft. Approximately 2125, or approximately 7 minutes after the accident flight departed, another airplane (N122AW) departed KEYW and the pilot established contact with Key West Approach Control. There were no reported communication difficulties with that facility, and the airplane (N122AW) was radar identified. Additionally, there were no reported discrepancies related to the Key West Approach Control radar.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The Key West International Airport is equipped with a one runway designated 09/27 which is 4,801 feet long and 100 feet wide.
Review of a security tape from KEYW Airport revealed the airplane was captured taxiing for takeoff, and a portion of the takeoff was also captured. The flight was determined to have departed at 2118.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The right wing was the first piece of wreckage found on July 31, 2005, and was located at 24 degrees 33.7 minutes North latitude, and 081 degrees 43,0 minutes West longitude. The fuselage was located on August 2, 2005, at 24 degrees 32.323 minutes North latitude, and 081 degrees 42.719 minutes West longitude, in 27 feet of water. The fuselage was inverted on a heading of 310 degrees, and the empennage was bent approximately 90 degrees to the right. The engine with attached propeller, firewall, and instrument panel were located on August 5, 2005, at 24 degrees 41.012 minutes North latitude, and 081 degrees 41.897 minutes West longitude. All observed/located wreckage was recovered for further examination.
Examination of the wreckage revealed the left wing was separated and not located, and the right wing was separated at the wing root. The airframe structure from the instrument panel forward, and the cabin roof were separated. The cabin floor was displaced up approximately 2 feet between the main gear attach point and the aft cabin bulkhead. The vertical stabilizer remained attached to the airframe, and the rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. Both horizontal stabilizers were structurally attached, and both elevators remained attached to both horizontal stabilizers.
The left elevator was partially separated at midspan; the elevator was bent up nearly 180 degrees. The tip of the right elevator was displaced up. The elevator trim tab actuator measured 1.6 inches extended, which equates to 15 degrees trailing edge tab up. The left horizontal stabilizer was rotated down approximately 90 degrees, and aft crushing was noted. The right horizontal stabilizer tip was rotated down, and the full span of the leading edge was damaged.
The empennage was displaced to the right, and compression wrinkles were noted on the right side of the empennage. Examination of the separated right wing revealed the main spar was still attached to the carry-thru which was fractured mid-span. The rear spar attach point was pulled from the wing. The full span of the flap was installed, and the flap actuator indicated the flaps were retracted. Both flap cables were attached to the flap actuator. A section of aileron remained connected at the inboard and middle hinges; the aileron separated in the area of the bellcrank. Both aileron cables were connected to the right aileron bellcrank near the control surface, but both exhibited evidence of tension overload in the wing root area. Full-span leading edge damage was noted, and the main spar was rotated down approximately 180 degrees beginning about 1/3 span. Both cables for autopilot roll were connected to the roll servo; the capstan was noted to move freely.
The fuel strainer bowl was separated; the screen had white colored debris adhering to it. Both main landing gear wheel assemblies were separated from the axles; the bearings were missing. The nose landing gear strut was separated from the nose landing gear strut housing. Both aileron control cables were connected in the cockpit, but exhibited tension overload in the wing root area. Rudder control cable continuity was confirmed. Elevator control cable continuity was confirmed for one of the cables, but the other cable was fractured near the bellcrank in the cockpit; no evidence of preexisting failure was noted on the fractured cable. No evidence of fire or soot was noted on any recovered component.
Examination of the separated instrument panel revealed the clock was destroyed, and the airspeed indicator was reading off scale low (the needle moved freely). The vertical speed indicator indicated a descent of 2,000 feet-per-minute. The attitude indicator indicated a 30 degree nose low, and approximately 120 degree right bank. The directional gyro was indicating 270 degrees, and the electric turn coordinator was destroyed. The tachometer, fuel gauges, vacuum gauge, CHT gauge, oil temperature gauge, and amp meter were missing and not recovered. The throttle and mixture controls were in the full open, and full rich positions, respectively. The flap selector was at 10 degree extension, while the flap indicator was at 30 degrees. The cabin heat was off, and the cabin air was closed. The hour meter indicated 656.9. The horns of the pilot's control yoke were not fractured, while the right horn on the co-pilot's control yoke was fractured. The autopilot circuit breaker was in an open position. The transponder remained secured to the mounting rack but the mounting rack was separated from the instrument panel. The transponder, directional gyro, and attitude indicator were retained for further examination.
Examination of the engine revealed impact damage to the left and bottom side of the engine, and the No. 2 cylinder exhibited impact damage including separation of the front pushrod. Additionally, the No. 2 cylinder injector nozzle was broken. The propeller remained secured to the engine. Compression was noted in all cylinders during hand rotation of the crankshaft. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity was confirmed with the exception of the missing No. 2 cylinder forward pushrod. The servo fuel injector (fuel servo) and mechanical fuel pump were separated but recovered. Examination of the fuel servo revealed the control connections were broken, and the inlet screen was separated and not located. Partial disassembly of the fuel servo revealed salt water and aviation fuel were present. Examination of the flow divider revealed the spring was not failed, and the valve piston was free to move. There were no obstructions of the flow divider, fuel injector lines, or fuel injector nozzles. The mechanical fuel pump was impact damaged; the top of the unit remained secured to the accessory case, while the lower portion was separated but recovered. Examination of the top of the mechanical fuel pump revealed the internal steel parts and diaphragm were not failed. Examination of the lower portion of the mechanical fuel pump revealed the internal valves and lower diaphragm were not failed. Impact damage and condition precluded testing of the ignition harness and spark plugs. All spark plugs were corroded, but all electrode wear was considered to be moderate. The upper vacuum pump remained attached to the accessory case, while the lower vacuum pump was separated and not located. Examination of the upper vacuum pump revealed the drive coupling, rotor, and rotor vanes were not failed. The oil suction screen and oil filter were clean. Both magnetos were retained for further examination.
Examination of the propeller which remained secured to the engine revealed one blade was bent forward and exhibited torsional twisting, while the other blade was bent aft.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Postmortem examinations of the pilot and three passengers were performed by District 16 Medical Examiner's Office. The cause of death for all occupants was listed as blunt force injury.
Toxicological analysis of specimens of the pilot was performed by FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory (CAMI), located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The submitted specimens tested negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and tested drugs. Various levels of ethanol and N-Propanol were detected in the submitted specimens. A note on the toxicology report indicates, "The ethanol found in this case is from sources other than ingestion."
TESTS AND RESEARCH
According to Epic Aviation's "Overnight/All day Form" with the accident pilot's name and signature, dated July 28, 2005, indicates she was "instrument rated", but was not "instrument current." She indicated on the form that the flight would be flying to Key West, Florida, on July 30, 2005, and would return that same day to New Smyrna Beach Municipal Airport (KEVB), New Smyrna Beach, Florida, with an estimated arrival time of 2100.
The airplane was last fueled on July 30, 2005, at KEVB. The individual who fueled the airplane reported "...I topped it off with fuel. Once I was finished fueling the plane I checked for adequate oil and washed the windshield." While doing so, the accident pilot arrived, and being a friend of the pilot, they started talking. The pilot stated that she was going to key West.
According to a flight progress strip from Key West Approach Control for the flight from KEVB to KEYW, the pilot first established contact with that facility at 1126 (1526 UTC), was assigned transponder code 1142, and the flight was radar identified. The last contact with that facility was at 1144 (1544 UTC), when air traffic control communications were transferred to KEYW Air Traffic Control Tower. There was no reported discrepancy with the transponder related to air traffic control on the flight.
According to dispatcher with Epic Aviation, the pilot contacted the facility by phone sometime between 1400 and 1800 hours, and stated that she had spoken to a weather briefer who advised her about level 5 thunderstorms throughout Florida, and she probably would not be back in time. She (dispatcher) reportedly advised the pilot that the next scheduled flight in the accident airplane was at 0800 the next day, and if she wasn't going to make it by that time, to leave a voice mail message and, "...it wouldn't be a problem. She apologized for any inconveniences and I told her don't be sorry it's not a big deal. She said ok, then I guess I'll stay the night and leave early the next morning." She (dispatcher) relayed the message by leaving a note for the dispatcher to see the following morning. There was no mention by the pilot of any mechanical problem with the airplane.
According to an customer service representative (CSR) at a fixed base operator (FBO) at the Key West International Airport, on July 30th, she spoke with the accident pilot several times throughout the afternoon and early evening. The pilot mentioned to her about wanting to wait until the weather cleared because, "...she was not comfortable flying IFR." The CSR reported that the pilot seemed pretty nervous and frazzled. Another individual with the same FBO reported that he and several other employees attempted to locate overnight accommodations for the pilot and passengers, but were unable. Sometime around 2100, the pilot came down from the pilot's lounge and stated to one of the individuals, "... forget about the hotel, they were going to fly to Marathon Key for the night." A few minutes later at the pilot's requested, he repositioned the accident airplane away from a nearby parked airplane. The same individual reported hearing the pilot have difficulty starting the engine, then after doing so, taxied, then departed. He was advised of the accident about 2220.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records indicate that an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed with the Miami AIFSS on the accident date at 1954 hours. The IFR flight plan was for a flight from KMTH to KEVB, with a proposed departure from KMTH of 2100. The flight plan listed the accident pilot by her first name, but misspelled last name; the flight plan was not activated.
A Sony handheld digital video recorder with installed memory stick and digital video tape, and a memory card from a Canon still digital camera were retained by NTSB for readout at the NTSB Video Recorders Laboratory, located in Washington, D.C. The results of the examination of the tape and memory stick from the video recorder revealed no stored images associated with the accident flight. The result of the examination of the memory card from the digital camera also revealed no stored images of the accident flight.
The retained Honeywell (formerly Bendix/King) KT 76C transponder was examined at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight on February 28, 2006, and again on March 16, 2006. Visual inspection of the unit revealed impact damage and corrosion which precluded bench testing. The power/mode selector shaft with attached knob was bent up and found positioned to the "SBY" or standby position. According to the manufacturer, with the mode selector switch in that position, the unit would not be transmitting. The power/mode selector shaft has 5-positions, which are "OFF", "SBY" (Standby), "TST" (Test), "ON", and "ALT" (Altitude). A ball-type detent is noted when the shaft is rotated to one of the 5 positions, and each of the 5 positions are located approximately 45 degrees apart. Approximately 180 degrees of rotation of the power/mode selector shaft is between the "OFF" and "ALT" positions. Approximately 135 degrees counter-clockwise rotation of the power/mode selector shaft is required to move it from the "ALT" to "SBY" position. An internal component (microcontroller) of the transponder, which retains the selected transponder code when power is lost or removed, was removed and cleaned, then placed in an exemplar transponder. Power was applied to the exemplar transponder and the displayed transponder code was 0210.
The retained Sigma Tek, Inc., attitude indicator was examined at the manufacturer's facility with FAA oversight on February 8, 2006. The unit was not bench tested. Visual inspection revealed the airplane adjust knob was bent up approximately 30 degrees. The airplane silhouette indicated a pitch down of approximately 30 degrees (which agreed with the position as first viewed in the inverted instrument panel). The roll indication during the component examination was determined to be approximately 40 degree left bank (while the roll position when the instrument was first viewed in the inverted instrument panel was greater than 120 degree right bank). The vacuum flag depicting the word "gyro" was in view, or in the "off" position, and the mask and indices ring were cantilevered from the right side of the display and show acceleration deformation to the left side, "...such that the indices ring rests on the right side of the football." None of the gimballing was free to move due to salt water corrosion. Following removal of the bezel, the aft side of it was inspected and the bezel gasket exhibited paint transfer similar in color and shape of the vacuum flag, which, according to the gyro manufacturer, was consistent with the flag being out of view at the time of impact. By design, the flag is out of view when there is a differential of 4.2 inHg. vacuum across the mechanism. The flag reportedly comes into view when there is a vacuum differential of less than 1.0 inHg. The rotor housing did not shear off the pivots, nor did it break apart. Examination of top of the rotor and rotor cap revealed no scoring; the rotor housing was not failed.
Examination of the directional gyro (DG) was performed with NTSB oversight. The examination revealed the heading select shaft was bent, and the aft portion of the case was dented on 1 side. The heading select was found at 175 degrees, and the heading was 270 degrees. Partial disassembly of the DG revealed no scoring of the rotor or rotor housing.
Following initial examination of the magnetos which were submerged in either salt or fresh water for a period of approximately 18 days, they were retained for NTSB examination at an FAA certified repair station. Bench testing of the left magneto revealed the condenser tested unsatisfactory. The points were "dressed", the condenser replaced, and the magneto was placed on the test bench. The unit was noted to operate and produce spark at all ignition towers, but the spark was intermittent. Partial disassembly of the magneto revealed no internal etching or visual carbon tracking of the distributor block. Bench testing of the right magneto revealed the condenser checked good. The points were "dressed" and the unit was placed on a test bench where the unit sparked at all ignition towers. No internal etching or visual carbon tracking of the distributor block was noted.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The airplane minus the retained components was released to Steve Mitchell, claims manager for Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc., on May 23, 2007. All NTSB retained airplane components were also released to Mr. Mitchell on June 22, 2007. The retained Sony digital video recorder and memory card from the Canon digital camera were also released to Steve Mitchell on July 17, 2007.
VOLUSIA COUNTY -- History was made in a Volusia County Courthouse on Wednesday, but it wasn't inside a courtroom. It was actually in the courthouse garage.
The entire wreckage of a plane which crashed in 2005 was brought into the garage, and jurors had a firsthand look at the evidence. The parts were what were left of the Cessna single-engine plane, which crashed in South Florida in 2005.
Now, the parts of the plane are inside the first floor of the Volusia County Courthouse's parking garage.
Three South African skydivers with ties to Skydive DeLand and the pilot with a local charter airline were killed in the crash. Families of the skydivers are suing Cessna and a parts manufacturer, claiming the autopilot was to blame for the crash.
Lawyers for the manufacturer, however, say pilot error is to blame.
Until now, proceedings were being held inside a courtroom, but on Wednesday, jurors, lawyers and the judge got to see the remaining parts of the plane that were recovered from the ocean.
A court spokesperson said bringing these parts to the first floor of the garage took several days.
The wreckage is expected to remain in the parking garage for at least another 24 hours. The trial is expected to last another three weeks.
Jurors, lawyers and the judge went into the Volusia County Courthouse garage on Wednesday, March 26, to see pieces of a Cessna single-engine place that crashed in 2005, killing three skydivers and the pilot. In what might have been a first, pieces of the Cessna 172S, which crashed late on July 30, 2005, near Key West, sat next to a similar airplane, a Cessna SkyHawk, inside the parking garage of the Volusia County Courthouse in DeLand during the initial stages of the trial. The pieces were there to show jurors what the crashed plane looked like. Lawyers also used the SkyHawk to explain to the jurors how the Cessna operated.
Attorney J. Lester Kaney, who was co-counsel for Honeywell International Inc, said the six-member jury took only about 1 1/2 hours to reach its decision on April 10 after the 13-day trial.
“When you get through one of those and the jury validates your position it is very satisfying,” Kaney said.
The pilot, Crystal Koch, who was a student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach, also died in the crash.
The families of the sky divers who died in the crash, roommates from Ponce Inlet, filed suit in 2007 against the plane’s manufacturer, Cessna Aircraft Company, as well as Honeywell International, Inc. The plaintiffs, relatives of Egon Sussmann, Piers Littleford and Bruno Assmann, had asked the court for more than $4 million in damages, attorney fees and other costs.
Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board said pilot error caused the crash, but court documents show that lawyers for the families of the skydivers claimed that the autopilot designed and manufactured by Honeywell was defective, causing the deaths of the three skydivers.
The suit also charged that Honeywell was negligent in its design and manufacture of the autopilot.
The suit further claimed that the Cessna aircraft was defective, causing the skydivers’ deaths.
In earlier reports of the crash, officials said Koch, was flying with the three sky divers, all originally from South Africa, from Key West to New Smyrna Beach. Koch’s logbook showed that she had 260 hours of flight between 1999 and the time of the crash in 2005. Of that, 144hours were as pilot-in-command. She had only two logged flights in Cessna type airplanes, the NTSB report said.
Records show that jurors were asked if Honeywell was negligent and whether the company placed a defective autopilot on the market. Jurors were also asked if Cessna provided a defective aircraft, causing the deaths of the skydivers.
The jurors said “No,” to each question as shown in the verdict form filed with the court.
