A lawsuit says negligence led to an engine problem, which led to the pilot's death and the destruction of a house.
PORTLAND – The children of a highly decorated, retired Air Force pilot who died when his civilian plane crashed in Biddeford two years ago, and the couple whose home was destroyed by the crash, are jointly suing the companies that maintained and inspected the plane.
Edward L'Hommedieu, 71, of North Yarmouth was flying alone in the twin-engine Cessna 402B on April 10, 2011, as he approached Biddeford Municipal Airport at an altitude of about 500 feet when the plane lost partial or total power in its right engine.
The plane rapidly lost altitude and was going too slowly to stay aloft, says the lawsuit filed April 9 in Cumberland County Superior Court.
"L'Hommedieu, as an experienced pilot, would have understood that the aircraft was going to crash and that he was almost certain to die in such a crash," says the lawsuit.
The plane crashed into the home of Stephen and Kim Myers at 235 Granite St., near the Biddeford Municipal Airport, then "caught fire and became engulfed completely in flames," the lawsuit says.
"L'Hommedieu was alive and conscious subsequent to the crash" and "suffered severe and excruciating pain and discomfort prior to his death" as the plane and the house burned, the 13-page lawsuit says.
Lance Walker of the Portland law firm Norman, Hanson and DeTroy sued on behalf of L'Hommedieu's children, E. Chris L'Hommedieu and Heather Perreault, as representatives of his estate, and on behalf of the Myerses, seeking damages in a five-count complaint.
The lawsuit names as defendants nine companies that manufactured parts or maintained or inspected L'Hommedieu's plane.
"These are all companies that each did engine overhauls or they did what is called annuals, which are inspections for airworthiness," Walker said Tuesday. "When they certified it, they are certifying that it is airworthy. It's a heavy burden."
The companies are Ram Aircraft L.P. of Texas, McCauley Propeller Systems of Georgia, Maine Aviation Sales Inc. of Portland, Aircraft Maintenance of Maine Inc. of Portland, Yankee Aviation Services Inc. of Massachusetts, New England Propeller Service Inc. of Connecticut, Engine Component International Inc. of Texas, Champion Aerospace LLC of Delaware and Tom's Aircraft Maintenance Inc. of California.
Ron Caruso, president of Aircraft Maintenance of Maine, said his company did maintenance on the plane but did not work on the engine. He said his other company named in the lawsuit, Maine Aviation Sales, had no connection to the plane.
"We didn't do anything wrong," Caruso said. "We never inspected the part in question."
Caruso said he isn't surprised that his companies are named as defendants, because it is standard procedure in such lawsuits to name all of the companies that worked on a plane.
Representatives of Yankee Aviation, New England Propeller Service, Engine Components International and Tom's Aircraft said they had not been served with the lawsuit and declined comment. Phone messages left with Ram Aircraft and McCauley Propeller were not returned. No one answered the phone in several calls to Champion Aerospace.
Walker said the Myerses' home was insured and their insurance carrier is seeking to recoup its losses of as much as $500,000, claiming negligence.
L'Hommedieu's children are seeking an amount of money to be determined by a jury, claiming that their father's death was wrongful, that it was caused by negligence and that he suffered as a result.
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the crash and determined in May 2012 that a combination of engine trouble and pilot error caused the crash.
L'Hommedieu's plane, built in 1977, lost power on a return trip from White Plains, N.Y., because O-rings in the engine throttle and control assembly were not properly installed, the NTSB found. The report is not admissible evidence in the lawsuit.
Walker said L'Hommedieu's children and the Myerses sued together because they agreed that pilot error was not an issue and that negligence in maintaining and inspecting the plane was the cause of the crash.
"The NTSB reports fairly frequently attribute at least partial responsibility to the pilot," Walker said. "In this case, we don't believe that was true. His airspeed and altitude were too low. He didn't have time to react."
On the day of the crash, L'Hommedieu flew from the Portland International Jetport to pick up a passenger on the island of Nantucket in Massachusetts, flew the passenger to Westchester County Airport in New York and then flew back to Biddeford, where he hoped to have dinner with a friend who lived nearby, according to the lawsuit.
L'Hommedieu began flying as a teenager, and joined the Air Force in 1964, flying B-52s and, later, FB-111s. During his 20-year Air Force career, he earned two Distinguished Flying Crosses, 12 Air Medals, the Cross of Gallantry and the Meritorious Service Medal.
He was a master navigator, a flight instructor and chief of operations and maintenance, according to the lawsuit.
Source: http://www.pressherald.com
NTSB Identification: ERA11FA233
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, April 10, 2011 in Biddeford, ME
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/14/2012
Aircraft: CESSNA 402B, registration: N402RC
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The multi-engine airplane was being repositioned to its base airport, and the pilot had requested to change the destination, but gave no reason for the destination change. Radar data indicated that the airplane entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, flew at pattern attitude, and then performed a right approximate 250-degree turn to enter the final leg of the approach. During the final leg of the approach, the airplane crashed short of the runway into a house located in a residential neighborhood near the airport. According to the airplane's pilot operating handbook, the minimum multi-engine approach speed was 95 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and the minimum controllable airspeed was 82 KIAS. According to radar data, the airplane's groundspeed was about 69 knots with the probability of a direct crosswind.
Postaccident examination of the propellers indicated that both propellers were turning at a low power setting at impact. During a controlled test run of the right engine, a partial power loss was noted. After examination of the throttle and control assembly, two o-rings within the assembly were found to be damaged. The o-rings were replaced with comparable o-rings and the assembly was reinstalled. During the subsequent test run, the engine operated smoothly with no noted anomalies. Examination of the o-rings revealed that the damage was consistent with the o-rings being pinched between the corner of the top o-ring groove and the fuel inlet surface during installation. It is probable that the right engine had a partial loss of engine power while on final approach to the runway due to the damaged o-ring and that the pilot retarded the engine power to prevent the airplane from rolling to the right. The investigation found no mechanical malfunction of the left engine that would have prevented the airplane from maintaining the published airspeed.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot did not maintain minimum controllable airspeed while on final approach with a partial loss of power in the right engine, which resulted in a loss of control. Contributing to the accident was the partial loss of engine power in the right engine due to the improperly installed o-rings in the engine’s throttle and control assembly.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On April 10, 2011, about
1815 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 402B, N402RC, was substantially
damaged when it impacted a house near Biddeford, Maine. The airline
transport certificated pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was
registered to My Plane, LLC, and operated under the provisions of 14
Code of Federal Regulation 91 as a positioning flight. Visual
meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed.
The airplane had departed from West Chester County Airport (HPN), White
Plains, New York, about 1630.
The flight originated at Portland
International Airport (PWM), Portland, Maine earlier in the day, flew to
Nantucket Memorial Airport (ACK), Nantucket, Massachusetts, and
acquired 115.6 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel. Then picked up a
passenger, flew to HPN, where the passenger disembarked, departed and
the pilot was planning to land in PWM. According to Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control transcripts, the pilot
requested to change his destination to Biddeford Municipal Airport
(B19), Biddeford, Maine. Radar data provided by the FAA Portland Air
Traffic Control facility, revealed that the airplane overflew the south
end of B19 at approximately 1,000 feet above mean sea level (msl),
turned left, as if entering the left downwind leg of the airport traffic
pattern. Then, approximately 2 miles from the approach end of runway
24, the airplane was observed, on radar, turning right about 250
degrees, and then a slight left turn in the direction of B19. The last
radar data was recorded for the accident flight at 1804:29 and was in
the vicinity of the accident location. The data indicated an altitude of
400 feet msl and a ground speed of 69 knots.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According
to FAA records, the pilot, age 71, held an Airline Transport pilot
certificate with a rating for airplane multiengine land, commercial
pilot privilege for airplane single-engine land, and a certificated
flight instructor with ratings for airplane single-engine land,
multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA
second-class medical certificate was issued February 4, 2011, and at the
time of the examination the pilot reported 5,010 total hours of flight
experience. According to a resume provided to the pilot's employer in
August 2010, the pilot reported 4,735 total hours of civilian flight
time as well as military navigator flight time. The resume also
indicated 120 flight hours in the accident aircraft make and model. At
the time of this writing no pilot logbooks had been located.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According
to FAA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1977 and registered to
the owner on October 18, 2000. It was equipped with two Continental
Motors TSIO-520 series engines. The airplane's most recent annual
inspection was dated on August 21, 2010. At the time of the inspection
the reported aircraft total time was 6,624.5 time in service and a Hobbs
time of 4,554.1 hours. At the time of the inspection the engines had
359.0 hours since overhaul. The most recent maintenance logbook entry
was March 21, 2011, and indicated a Hobbs time of 4,567.2 hours. The
Hobbs meter was not located in the wreckage.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The
1815 recorded weather observation at Sanford Regional Airport (SFM),
Sanford, Maine, located approximately 16 miles to the southwest of the
accident location, included wind from 150 degrees at 8 knots with gusts
of 15 knots, the wind direction was variable from 100 degrees to 160
degrees, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 14 degrees C, dew
point minus 2 degrees C; barometric altimeter 30.03 inches of mercury.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The
airport was equipped with a single runway oriented northeast to
southwest and designated as 06/24. The runway was 3000-feet-long and
75-feet-wide, constructed of asphalt, was equipped with a 4-box visual
approach slope indicator (VASI) on the left side of runway 6; however,
no visual slope indicators were available to runway 24. The airport did
not have an air traffic control tower. Communication was accomplished
utilizing a common traffic advisory frequency; however, it was not
recorded. The airport was served by two approaches to runway 6; however,
runway 24 was the preferred calm wind runway.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The
airplane impacted four trees varying in diameter from 3.2 inches to
8.75 inches and at a height of approximately 25 feet. The airplane came
to rest on the roof of a single story residence that was located
approximately 1,491 feet to the northeast of the runway 24 threshold. A
post crash fire ensued engulfing the airplane. The left wing was
thermally damaged and the outboard section of the wing was located on
top of the roof. The left engine was located inside the residence. The
right wing and engine were visible above the roof line. The airplane
nose section, cabin, and empennage sections were thermally damaged.
Portions of all flight controls were located at the accident location.
Examination
of the wreckage indicated that the right main landing gear remained
attached to the right wing attach point, and was in the down and locked
position. The left main and nose gear were separated from the airframe
and located within the residence.
The left wing's leading edge
exhibited impact damage and the diameter of the damage was similar in
dimensions to the diameter of the trees that were initially impacted.
The left aileron was consumed by post impact fire. The fuel caps were
secured and in place. The fuel tank selector handle located in the
cockpit was found in the auxiliary tank position and the fuel valve
located in the wing was found between the main and auxiliary tank
position. The fuel strainer and filter were thermally damaged and had an
area of corrosion in the bottom of the strainer approximately 30
degrees of coverage.
The right wing's aileron was separated and
in the vicinity of the right wing. The right wing's outboard section
approximately 2 feet inside the main fuel tank, located at the wingtip,
was fractured but remained attached to the wing structure. The right
main fuel tank was impact damaged near the leading edge of the tank. The
right fuel tank selector handle, which was located in the cockpit and
the fuel valve located in the wing, were in the main fuel tank position.
The fuel strainer was removed from the wing and contained aviation
gasoline, the filter was free of debris. The fuel strainer was noted as
having an area of corrosion located in the bottom of the strainer and
was approximately 30 degrees of coverage and was similar in appearance
as the left fuel strainer.
The wing flaps were found in the
extended position and were verified by the flap motor chain position
located under the cabin floor. Continuity was confirmed from the flap
motor to the flap actuator. The right wing flap remained attached to the
wing, the left wing flap mechanism remained attached; however, the flap
skin was consumed by post impact fire.
The cockpit seats were
separated and thermally damaged. Four of the five cabin seat frames
remained attached to the cabin floor except for the most aft cabin seat
which was located with portions of the flooring still attached to the
seat feet.
Rudder continuity was confirmed from the rudder
pedals to the rudder horn. The rudder counter weight was located in the
wreckage in the vicinity of the empennage. Aileron continuity was
confirmed from the cabin chain on the control columns to the aileron
sector and then from the aileron sector to both ailerons bell cranks.
The aileron sector was impact damaged in the positive direction. The
aileron counter weights were located in the vicinity of the associated
wing or attached to the wing. Elevator continuity was confirmed from the
elevator horn to the swaged end of the cable. The right elevator
counter weight remained attached; however, due to thermal damage the
left counter weight could not be located.
The stall switch,
located in the left wing, was removed and inspected; however, the
internal mechanism was damaged and was found in the closed circuit
position.
Left Engine
The engine and propeller assembly
exhibited impact and thermal damage. The exhaust assembly including the
turbocharger, controller, and wastegate assembly were separated from the
engine and were located with the main wreckage. The wastegate actuator
housing had extensive thermal damage and only the internal components
were visible. The cylinders were thermal and impact damaged. The fuel
system including the fuel manifold valve, fuel control, and lines had
extensive thermal damage. The magnetos and ignition leads had thermal
damage. The induction assembly had thermal damage. The induction elbows
and air throttle assembly were not found during the inspection. The
upper spark plugs were removed and had light gray to dark deposits. The
cylinders were boroscoped and the combustion chambers were undamaged.
The valves heads were undamaged and had normal thermal discoloration.
The oil filler cap had thermal discoloration and damage. No oil was
indicated on the engine oil dipstick.
Right Engine
The
right engine remained partially attached with impact damage to the left
aft mount leg. The engine was removed and the exhaust had impact damage.
The exhaust wye-duct was torn and the left section remained attached to
the impact damaged wing section. The propeller assembly had impact
damage and was removed from the engine. The oil and fuel lines remained
attached. The induction assembly was crushed and the No. 6 cylinder
riser separated near the cylinder attachment. The fuel manifold valve
was undamaged and disassembled. The diaphragm and retaining nut were
undamaged and secure. The manifold valve cavity had fuel present and the
screen was free of debris. The fuel control was undamaged and the
linkages moved freely by hand. The fuel control inlet screen was removed
and was free of debris. Approximately 2 ounces of fuel dripped from the
fuel control inlet screen port. The upper spark plugs were removed and
had light gray deposits. The cylinders were boroscoped and the
combustion chambers were undamaged. The valve heads were undamaged and
had normal thermal discoloration. The crankshaft was rotated by hand
through the upper right accessory mount drive. Gear continuity was
obtained to the crankshaft propeller flange and magneto drives.
Compression was obtained from each cylinder. The ignition leads were
undamaged and spark was obtained from the spark plug connections. The
oil filler cap was undamaged and no oil was indicated on the engine oil
dipstick.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy
was performed on the pilot on April 11, 2011, by the Office of Chief
Medical Examiner, Augusta, Maine. The autopsy listed the cause of death
as "smoke inhalation and thermal burns."
The FAA's Civil
Aerospace Medical Institute performed forensic toxicology on specimens
from the pilot. The report stated 12 percent carbon monoxide, no cyanide
or ethanol was detected in the blood, and Quinine was detected in the
blood.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Engine Examination
The
engines were sent to the Continental Motors facility in Mobile, Alabama
manufacturers facility for examination. It was determined that the left
engine exhibited thermal damage and was unable to be placed on a test
stand and ran. The left engine was disassembled and no preaccident
mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded
normal operation.
The right engine was examined and mounted on
an engine test stand, and a test club propeller was installed.
Approximately 20 minutes into the test the engine sustained a partial
loss of power. Utilization of the manual primer restored engine power;
however, when the primer was not used the engine would incur a partial
power loss. No leaks were noted and the engine was shut down. The engine
driven fuel pump was removed and placed on a test bench; the test
results indicated that when compared to normal tolerance allowed by a
new pump the accident airplane's pump would produce adequate to high
pressure. The accident pump was reinstalled. The engine was restarted
and subsequently backfired and sustained a partial loss of power. The
engine was shut down and fuel was utilized from a temporary fuel tank;
however, during operation the engine continued to sustain a partial
power loss. The fuel screen was examined and free of contaminants. The
throttle body assembly was removed and a replacement assembly was
attached. The engine was started and operated smoothly at various power
settings and was subjected to several rapid accelerations and
decelerations. The engine responded to the power changes smoothly and
without any noticeable delay.
Right Engine Throttle and Control Assembly
The
Throttle and Control Assembly was examined and no noticeable
malfunctions were noted. The unit was placed on a test stand, tested,
and was classified as a "failed test." The unit was disassembled
revealing the four o-rings on the cam, inside the unit. The cam was
determined to be a -11 and according to manufacturers guidance should
have been a -8 unit. The o-rings were examined and two of the o-rings
had noticeable "flat spots" around the outer circumference. The o-rings
were retained and sent to the NTSB's Materials Laboratory. Four new
o-rings were installed; the unit was reassembled, and reattached to the
accident engine for another test run. The engine started and idled
smoothly with no noticeable malfunctions, accelerated to numerous power
settings, including full power, with no noticeable indication of power
loss. The engine was further subjected to several decelerations and
accelerations and performed smoothly without hesitations.
Propellers
The
propellers were removed from the engine and shipped to McCauley
Propeller Systems the manufacturers facility for examination. The
examination took place on July 12, 2011 at the propeller manufacturers
facility in Wichita, Kansas and Federal oversight was provided by an
inspector with the FAA. The examination revealed that propeller damage
was consistent with impact damage and no evidence was noted of any
indications of propeller failure prior to impact. Both propellers had
evidence of rotation at the time of impact and were being operated under
conditions of low power. Impact signature markings indicated that both
propellers were operating at or near the low pitch position at the time
of impact, and the feather stop mechanisms were undamaged. Blade
bending, twisting, and damage on both propellers were consistent with
low power at impact.
O-Rings
The two o-rings from the
right engine throttle and control assembly were sent to the NTSB's
Materials Laboratory in Washington, D.C. for further examination. Both
o-rings were examined utilizing a stereomicroscope. One o-ring had two
semi-circular cuts; however, no material was missing from the damaged
area and no mechanism was identified that could have caused the damage.
The other o-ring was damaged in two areas of the outer diameter,
material was missing from the damaged areas and the damage was
consistent with the o-ring being pinched between the corner of the top
o-ring groove and the fuel inlet surface during installation. For more
information, the Materials Laboratory Report is located in the docket
for this accident.
According to a right engine log book entry
dated 02/16/04, several engine accessories were exchanged for
remanufactured units; however, no reference to the Throttle and Control
Assembly being changed was found in the logbook. According to the
Authorized Certificate Release form the throttle controller unit was
overhauled on 02/04/04. Based on the information from the last airframe
logbook entry, the right engine Throttle and Control Assembly had
accumulated more than 372.1 flight hours.
Pilot's Operating Handbook
According
to Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) and FAA Approved Airplane Flight
Manual (AFM), Section 4, Normal Procedures "Before Landing" checklist
for the accident airplane model states in part "…Wing Flaps – Down 45°
below 140 KIAS [knots indicated airspeed]… Minimum Multi-Engine Approach
Speed – 95 KIAS at 6200 pounds … Air Minimum Control Speed – 82 KIAS."
According
to the POH/AFM, Section 5 "Performance" the lowest aircraft weight
provided by the "Normal Landing Distance" chart was 4300 pounds and a
"Speed at 50-Foot Obstacle" was 79 KIAS.
Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25)
According
to the Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25),
minimum control speed (Vmc) is defined as "the minimum flight speed at
which a light, twin-engine airplane can be satisfactorily controlled
when an engine suddenly becomes inoperative and the remaining engine is
at takeoff power."
Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A)
The
Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3A), Chapter 12 "Transition to
Multiengine Airplanes", states in part "If an engine fails below Vmc
while airborne, directional control is not possible with the remaining
engine producing takeoff power…the final approach should be made with
power and at a speed recommended by the manufacturer…but in no case less
than critical engine-out minimum control speed (Vmc)…"
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