Sunday, October 02, 2022

Cessna 172S Skyhawk SP, N262TA: Fatal accident occurred October 01, 2022 in Hermantown, Saint Louis County, Minnesota

Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Minneapolis, Minnesota 

Aircraft crashed under unknown circumstances into a home.


Date: 02-OCT-22
Time: 01:28:00Z
Regis#: N262TA
Aircraft Make: CESSNA
Aircraft Model: 172
Event Type: ACCIDENT
Highest Injury: FATAL
Total Fatal: 3
Flight Crew: 1 Fatal 
Pax: 2 Fatal
Aircraft Missing: No
Damage: UNKNOWN
Activity: PERSONAL
Flight Phase: INITIAL CLIMB (ICL)
Operation: 91
City: HERMANTOWN
State: MINNESOTA

Those who may have information that might be relevant to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation may contact them by email witness@ntsb.gov, and any friends and family who want to contact investigators about the accident should email assistance@ntsb.gov. You can also call the NTSB Response Operations Center at 844-373-9922 or 202-314-6290. 


The Schmidt family released the following statement on the crash:

“We are heartbroken by the untimely and devastating loss of three beautiful souls, Alyssa, Matt and Tyler. Deeply devoted family members, Alyss and Matt had infectious spirits and were wholly selfless in their approach to lie. Most importantly, they were best friends who enjoyed each other’s company while taking many adventures together. Alyssa spent considerable time teaching the future generation with an uncanny ability to connect with all on an individual level. She consistently lit up a room and always made sure everyone was having a good time. Matt viewed life from a glass half full perspective and made sure to take full advantage of every opportunity. He frequently lent a helping hand to those most in need. Both have made an indelible impression on the world and will live forever in our hearts and memories. We are so grateful for the outpouring of love and support from family, friends and our community. We kindly ask that everyone respect our privacy during this extremely difficult time.”

Schmidt Family

From left, Alyssa Schmidt and her brother Matthew Schmidt.




The wreckage of a plane that crashed minutes after taking off from the Duluth International Airport on Saturday, killing the pilot and two passengers, is on its way to the Twin Cities for a partial reconstruction and examination by aviation experts. 

Aaron McCarter, an investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board, told MPR News that the remnants of the plane were hauled away Monday afternoon as part of the effort to determine the cause of the crash. The wreckage will be examined in south Minneapolis starting Tuesday morning. 

The Cessna 172 went down and hit a home in Hermantown, about two miles southwest of the airport, late Saturday night. The pilot, Tyler Fretland, 32, of Burnsville, and two passengers, siblings Alyssa Schmidt, 32, of St. Paul and Matthew Schmidt, 31, of Burnsville, died in the crash.

The plane struck the roof of a home and broke apart in the yard. No one on the ground, including two people who were inside the home, was physically injured.

The NTSB’s McCarter said representatives of the aircraft manufacturer and its engine maker and other officials will join his probe into the crash, although he said there was no immediate indication of a mechanical problem before the crash.  

McCarter said the plane took off in Duluth at about 11:10 p.m. on Saturday and crashed about 7 minutes later, apparently during the plane’s initial climb. “It was a very short flight,” he said. “They never got established on their route to down South St. Paul.” 

McCarter did say that the weather was less than ideal at the time of the crash, including a low cloud ceiling and precipitation.

“I wouldn't say it was hazardous weather. I would say it was low visibility and in mist, and it was a very dark night,” he said.

He said the control tower at the Duluth airport was staffed at the time. 

McCarter said the initial indication was that the weather may have imposed instrument flight rules, rather than the less-complicated visual flight rules. He said Fretland, the pilot, had a commercial pilot’s license and was instrument rated for flying aircraft. Fretland also filed a flight plan, indicating his destination in the Twin Cities. 

McCarter said investigators will be looking at many factors — about the plane, the pilot and the weather conditions — as they try to determine what caused the plane to crash.

The Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan school district said Monday that Alyssa Schmidt, one of the passengers who died, had been teaching second grade at Echo Park Elementary School of Leadership, Engineering and Technology in Burnsville. She had been with the district since 2014, and previously taught kindergarten and third grade.

“We are deeply saddened over the tragic loss of three lives, including an incredibly talented young teacher who positively impacted students every day,” the district said in a statement. “District 196 and the Echo Park school community are focused on supporting staff, students and families through this sudden and difficult loss.”

The NTSB typically issues a preliminary report about 10 days after the start of an investigation, which may offer more details. It’s issued after a full examination of the wreckage, a complete analysis of the weather, and interviews with any air traffic control personnel or witnesses who may have details on the incident, as well as other relevant information. 

A full report on the crash is likely to be finished in about a year. 


Tyler Fretland














HERMANTOWN — Three Twin Cities area residents were killed late Saturday night when the small airplane they were flying in crashed into a home and yard just south of Duluth International Airport.

Hermantown officials said Sunday afternoon that Alyssa Schmidt, 32, of St. Paul, and her brother, Matthew Schmidt, 31, of Burnsville, Minnesota, were passengers in the plane, while Tyler Fretland, 32, of Burnsville, was the pilot. All three died in the crash.

Two occupants in the house, Jason and Crystal Hoffman, were not injured in the crash that happened Saturday just minutes before midnight.

"I’m still not sure what to think. It doesn’t seem real, at all. We’re just lucky. The loss of life is heartbreaking. At the same time we’re grateful for making it through this," Jason Hoffman said, recalling the crash on Sunday morning.

According to Hermantown Communications Director Joe Wicklund, the Hermantown Police Department was notified by the airport's control tower that a small airplane had left radar and was believed to have crashed. The control tower advised the last location on radar was 1 to 1.5 miles south of the airport.

Police and fire departments from surrounding agencies responded to the area and located the wreckage of a Cessna 172S Skyhawk SP plane in the 5100 block of Arrowhead Road. The airplane hit the second floor before coming to rest in the backyard of the property.

The plane took out much of the second floor of the home at 5154 Arrowhead Road. Pieces of the plane, and damaged vehicles that were parked in the yard, were strewn across the backyard. The largest intact piece of the Cessna appeared to be the tail section. Wicklund said the occupants of the small brick house were upstairs when the crash occurred and were unscathed.

"I remember waking up to a very loud explosion and my wife screaming," Hoffman said. "The first thing I thought was that the furnace exploded."
  
It wasn't until he fumbled through the darkness and dust to get a flashlight that Hoffman noticed an airplane wheel next to his bed and realized it was a crash.

Neighbors quickly responded to the scene and warned the Hoffmans not to move yet as there were live power lines around the home. The couple found their cat unharmed in the basement and eventually left the home when the dust and rubble became overpowering.

The crash apparently caused extensive power outages in the area but Minnesota Power reported no customers without power at 8 a.m. Sunday.

Hoffman believes the house may be a total loss. He and his wife have lived there for seven years since moving from Worthington, Minnesota.

"This was actually the first house we saw when we came into town. My wife and I said to each other, we need to live there, and ended up buying it, amazingly," Hoffman said. "It was kind of like a storybook tale that we found it and fell in love with it so quickly."

The Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board are performing an investigation, authorities said. 
  
Additional information will be released in concert with the NTSB.
  

124 comments:

  1. note: The registered owner, Svetfur Aviation LLC of South Carolina, may not be current due to new owner registration backlog at the FAA Records Branch. All the recent ADSB tracks are located in Minnesota and Illinois and appear based out of South St Paul (KSGS).

    KDLH weather at the time of the incident, ~11:15 PM CDT was 200' overcast ceiling, fog/mist, so IFR. Surface Winds out of the east around 10-12 mph. The plane was on a flight from KDLH to KSGS (South St Paul - Richard E. Fleming Field), for what supposed to be a ~1+10 flight of about 143 miles. So night IMC conditions. The airplane was only in the air about 3 minutes or so. Got to 2,100 MSL (GPS), then initiated about 270º left turn turn that accelerated rapidly heading SW into the ground about 2 miles south of approach-end of rwy 09 at KDLH.
    ATC audio recordings will reveal whether the pilot was trying to return to the field with engine problems and/or spatial disorientation. The plane (and likely same pilot) had flown into DLH about 12 hours earlier on flight at 4,700' MSL that took him through a line of light rain showers, landing on visual approach to KDLH rwy 09.

    With the rapidly increasing ground speed prior to impact, regardless of the reason for the 270º descending turn, it looks like spatial Disorientation. The tower/ATC was obviously communicating with the pilot because they knew immediately the aircraft crashed and alerted off airport emergency first responders.

    Note: there is a Caution in the Airport Chart Suppl of bird hazard 1 Sep through 31 Oct. Just noting that. I would be surprised if birds at late night.

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    1. Tower didn’t alert the off-airfield first responders, semi-other way around, tower called 911 but not after several minutes. If you listen to liveatc.net archives you can hear the convo b/w CFR and tower

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  2. From the LiveATC archive, not sure what to make of it. https://archive.liveatc.net/kdlh/KDLH1-Oct-02-2022-0400Z.mp3

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    1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_mRPb1AqdI

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  3. - 262TA comms with tower pretty normal-routine through T/O. (0412:00)
    - After T/O, the pilot immediately acknowledges tower instruction to contact departure. (0413:28 UTC)
    - 1minute 9 seconds goes by: nothing heard
    - Departure calls 262TA: "Cessna 262TA, departure here" (0414:37 UTC)
    - 11 seconds later, Departure makes 2nd attempt: "Cessna 2TA, contact departure"
    (0414:49 UTC)

    - At 0414:49, ADSB data shows alt as 2,300' MSL, but a previous ~+ 500'/min to +700'/min climb is now turning to roughly a -300'/min descent.

    - 262TA acknowledges Departure immediately,(speaking fast): "262TA, Hold on 1 second." (0414:52 UTC)
    - (20 seconds later) Departure: "Cessna 262TA, I'm showing you,you descending out of 19-hundred. Verify you're climbing." (0415:12 UTC)

    - A clear, distinct ATC voice: "For 2TA, Duluth" (0415:50 UTC)
    - ATC: "2TA, Duluth" (0415:55 UTC)
    - ATC: "2TA, Duluth Approach, How do you hear?" (0416:00)
    //No further air-to-air comms//

    Aircraft hit 2nd floor of house at 5154 W Arrowhead Rd, Hermantown, MN, with mangled wreckage seen in photo above in front of detached garage, here:

    https://www.google.com/maps/@46.8220901,-92.2230116,3a,75y,175.21h,94.6t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1snrLYjodDeg-61ChTp11mDA!2e0!7i16384!8i8192?hl=en&authuser=0

    So nothing from pilot to ATC about trouble or an emergency. Spatial Disorientation maybe flight into IMC is likely here. The JFK, Jr. scenario redux.


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    1. Na to ur "The JFK, Jr. scenario redux," ... not even close.

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    2. Agree. Pilot here was a CFI with recent instrument training and proficiency, even if relatively new. His plane was almost certainly IFR capable too, to be willing to depart into a 200foot ceiling.
      something else here maybe: equipment or instrument failure? the cockpit install will be relevant to the investigation. A 2002 Skyhawk with original 6 pack layout (vacuum pump driven)?, or new digital AHRS, SynVis, WAAS GPS navigator and HSI?
      Something failed here.
      Fatigue could also be a factor with the flight into DLH 12 hours earlier.

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    3. The transcript posted here glosses over several elements in the part labeled “normal-routine:”

      2TA was filed and cleared direct SGS at 6000.

      The tower was reporting 1/2 mile visibility, but the runway 9 RVR was 6000’ (both far less than the 4SM reported by the METAR for that timeframe).

      The tower set the lighting intensity on step 4 (of 5). Runway 9 has a full compliment of touchdown zone (TDZ) and Centerline (CL) lights in addition to the high-intensity runway lights (HIRL).

      A King Air that had previously departed reported based as 250’ AGL, tops unknown (during climb at 12,000’). This was relayed to 2TA by the tower with an advisory that they’d likely be in IMC for a while.

      Tower cleared them for takeoff with a right turn direct on course. Generally, in the absence of any other departure procedure or ATC instruction, you start turns no less than 400’ above the airport elevation following an IFR takeoff.

      The spiraling flight path almost certainly indicates spatial disorientation. We won’t know the “why” for a long time - it could be proficiency/competency, instrument failure, or other dealing with something else in the cockpit (for example, a dropped pen, bad trim settings, a spurious annunciation) that resulted in disorientation. The “hold on” communication from 2TA that happened late, without any specifics, suggests that it wasn’t major mechanical (no urgency or detail), just a pilot way behind the plane, trying to unscrew the situation.

      But one thing that strikes me, and the reason I bring up the glossed-over part of the transcript, is that they went from an environment with fairly bright lights into a very low overcast with a right turn on-course, nominally within a few seconds after entering said low overcast. Make no mistake: the transition from the visual environment to instruments is one of the most challenging aspects of IFR flying, even during the day, even for an instrument-rated pilot (see Kobe). Doing so at night - going from a bright visual immediately into dark IMC and an almost-immediate climbing turn is a heck of a setup for somatogravic and somatogyric illusions. I’m not saying these were definitely contributing factors, and the investigation may bear more detail, but it can be a cautionary lesson now for anyone trying to go up in similar conditions.

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    4. Lighting and lighting changes in night LIFR and even night VFR/severe clear is something to be very aware of. I was a freight rat back in the last century flying at night into Allentown with about a 800 ft ceiling and clear beneath. Tower had the lights full up. When I broke out the dazzle was so bad, I had to track the glide slope to DH. I asked the tower to dim the lights which helped but it takes time for eyes to accommodate. Departure for the deadhead was similar. Tower lit up the ground to max. Going from brilliant lights into the soup at 500 AGL on a moonless night took a lot of concentration. Second was a trip from Boston to Nantucket, another moonless night, this time clear and unrestricted. It was pretty much IFR with no horizon all the way to the approach. It's easy to see how this could be trouble to anyone, even high timers.

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  4. I'm going to go with a vacuum pump failure/vertigo. As always, aviation is terribly unforgiving to poor decision making. With a 200 foot ceiling and at night, what options have you got if something goes bad? RIP. Condolences to the families involved.

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  5. Pilot: Tyler Fretland, 32
    Pax1: Alyssa Schmidt, 32
    Pax2: Matthew Schmidt, 31

    (Matthew is Alyssa's brother)

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    1. Dang such a shame, they didn’t know what they didn’t know. I’ve flown professionally for my entire life, currently in a PC12, and I wouldn’t have attempted that. Life’s too short and jobs are too easy to find.

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    2. Personal Minimums are very important! Night Flight, into IMC, with 2 Passengers; where do you draw the line?

      Pilot has only been flying commercially for just over a year and was also a newly minted CFI; issued on 03/17/2022.

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  6. A day trip originating from Twin Cities area where they all lived, expecting to return that evening. Home drome KSGS wasn't IMC when they set forth from Duluth, so with no concern for performing the end of the outing's landing, didn't opt to wait until morning. Duluth conditions didn't change suddenly, meaning it was a deliberated decision to launch, not an unanticipated WX encounter. Classic schedule pressure induced pilot acceptance of unfavorable conditions.

    KDLH 020455Z 08012KT 4SM BR OVC002 09/08 A3038
    KDLH 020355Z 08010G19KT 5SM BR OVC002 09/08 A3038
    KDLH 020255Z 09015G24KT 10SM OVC003 09/08 A3037
    KDLH 020214Z 08015G22KT 10SM OVC004 09/08 A3037
    KDLH 020155Z 09012G22KT 10SM OVC005 09/08 A3037
    KDLH 020127Z 09013G24KT 10SM OVC004 09/08 A3036
    KDLH 020055Z 09013KT 10SM OVC005 09/08 A3036
    KDLH 012355Z 08011G20KT 10SM BKN007 BKN023 10/08 A3036

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    1. And the five minute reports for the departure:
      KDLH 020400Z AUTO 09011KT 4SM BR OVC002 09/08 A3038
      KDLH 020405Z AUTO 09011G19KT 3SM BR OVC002 09/08
      KDLH 020410Z AUTO 09013KT 3SM BR OVC002 09/08 A3037
      KDLH 020415Z AUTO 09011KT 3SM BR OVC002 09/08 A3038

      From:
      https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/download.phtml?network=MN_ASOS

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  7. the 200 foot overcast put KDLH 09 GPS instrument approach, if immediate return needed, right at LPV mins of 200- 1/2. and outside of LNAV mins at 500 - 1.

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    1. Runway 9 also has a good ol’ ILS with a 200’ DH and 1800 RVR mins.

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  8. I am familiar with a 1998 172R and a 2002 T182T. During those years both were made with dual vacuum pumps with an automatic isolation check valve if either vacuum pump fails as well as an annunciator for which pump failed (or both, but these are driven on separate accessory shafts). SP? not sure.

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    1. 172SP has two engine-driven vacuum pumps, two pressure switches for measuring vacuum available through each pump (indicated as VAC R and VAC L warnings on the annunciator), and a vacuum gauge for total vacuum system pressure, and a manifold with check valves to allow for normal vacuum system operation if one of the vacuum pumps should fail. The vacuum system drives both the attitude indicator and heading indicator. If the vacuum system completely failed, there would be both a VAC R and VAC L annunciation on the warning panel, as well as a low indication on the vacuum gage and flags displayed on all the vacuum instruments.

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  9. I was a CFII at age 28. Felt bulletproof. Did trips like that. Insane. I was lucky to have survived that type of flying. Your passengers trust you. Do them a favor and book hotel rooms. In Duluth that are cheap. Depart in daylight and under better conditions. 500/2 would be a better departure minimum so you can fly a slam dunk approach back to the airport and make it in. RIP.

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    1. Heck, sleep in the car, sleep in the plane, sleep in the fricking dirt under the plane - the sun's gonna be up in a few hours. Killed himself and his pax trying to save a few bucks....
      Crazy thing about all these jokers is that in spite of having read plenty of accident reports describing just this scenario they do the same thing. Mind boggling.

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    2. >Crazy thing about all these jokers is that in spite of having read plenty of accident reports describing just this scenario they do the same thing.

      Like 333, I did ALL SORTS of flights in minimal viz conditions mostly when young, but that's the thing, "success is a lousy teacher." I wouldn't pick on the guy that had an instrument failure more than the 1000 times he did similar with no bad outcome.

      I'm trying to say, don't call them "jokers" and feel superior. Especially in this case, seems to me more likely than not an instrument or other failure.

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  10. N262TA's Panel photo linked below, from undated advert for lease "2002 CESSNA 172S SKYHAWK SP For Lease in Camden, South Carolina":

    https://media.sandhills.com/img.axd?id=7047337733&wid=6262287965&rwl=False&p=&ext=&w=0&h=0&t=&lp=&c=True&wt=False&sz=Max&rt=0&checksum=nbuoZC6RvuQ%2fKrn9JniFEJKkkHEPHPIwL41mu%2bK32sY%3d

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    1. panel in front can't compensate sole pilot spatial disorientation.

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  11. 2TA is listed among KSGS-available rental aircraft on the current rate page and archived rate pages of a local flight school.

    https://web.archive.org/web/20210725014311/https://www.airtreknorth.com/rates.html

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    1. I looked at the picture of the panel. Looks like it had an Auto Pilot. Another scenario where they might be alive if they would have just turned the Auto Pilot on. So sad....

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    2. ur "just turned the Auto Pilot" ... min engagement was likely above 800 ft. AGL.

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    3. Also, I see only one vacuum pump gauge. There was mention above that 2TA may have had two (L/R) vacuum pumps. Regardless, I find it interesting how often a vacuum pump failure is almost always one of the first explanation offered for this type of accident - departure into IMC at night with low visibility - when pilot spatial disorientation (aka pilot error including decision to fly) is the more likely reason. Anecdotally relatively small percentage of these type of accidents have been subsequently linked to a vacuum pump failure. I think all IR pilots know that a vacuum pump failure in IMC at night is a very bad place to be regardless of experience but unfortunately we continue to read about these accidents. It's even more upsetting when family members suffer the consequences.

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  12. Was there a compelling reason they had to conduct this flight late at night in these weather conditions in a very basic single? I asked this rhetorical question for another fatal crash in a single at night in questionable weather conditions and got some superman comments, obviously from people, possibly pilots, who think that they are immortal. I rest my case after 2 fatal accidents/ 4 fatalities within 2 months. Advice: get a sky blue business card, hold it up to the sky. If the colors don't match, go to a hotel, enjoy a beer, remember bottle/throttle rule, perform the test until the colors match.

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    1. The tragedy of it is awful. This case could have very well been prevented, however, you’re presenting biased anecdotes as data regarding the bigger picture. Is the overall trend up per flight hour/mile (or whatever denominator you choose)? We’d all love to see zero defects, but more empirical evidence is needed as to whether it’s trending worse.

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    2. Sad, sad, sad….Didn’t need to happen almost certainly spatial disorientation. No equipment failure here to look at. What in the world was he doing departing in those kind of conditions at night? Duluth is on Lake Superior and fog and low visibility happens, but you can always wait it out. Feel very sorry for the passengers who had no idea how much risk the pilot was biting off. To top it off he was a CFI and should have known better. May they all Rest In Peace.

      Thank goodness he didn’t kill the 2 people in the house.

      Looks like this plane belonged to Air Trek North at KSGS. Sign on their office door says “Closed through October 8th” No planes in fleet flying as of today.

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    3. How can you say "Didn’t need to happen almost certainly spatial disorientation". Are you an expert ?

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    4. Yes-as a IFR pilot who has experienced spatial disorientation I would say i know what it's like. Flying in this crap is real stuff. No where in a small plane you need or have to be. The weather won and the pilot lost. Sad....

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  13. This accident needs to be investigated before any conclusions are drawn, but cautions about fatigue and possible spatial disorientation are worth noting for safety purposes. Someone’s comment about possible visual hazards happening when transitioning from bright lights in runway environment to pitch black are worth a pilot thinking carefully about and being prepared for. There could have been an unexpected mechanical emergency. The investigation should discover that if it occurred. Friends or acquaintances familiar with the victims and reasons for the flight will probably shed some light on what/why.

    However, if a pilot is instrument rated flying an airworthy and appropriately equipped airplane, what would make it unsafe to fly at midnight? If properly rested and in safe meteorological conditions (no ice/convective weather, adequate destination/alternate WX reports), I would think such a flight is possible and I disagree with a blanket statement that it was unsafe from the get go. The best approach involves careful planning and a risk assessment. Instrument flights happen at all hours and most are completed safely.

    Also thankful that the occupants of the home were spared. Let’s be reminded of safety practices but be patient for learning causes. Meanwhile, RIP to a fellow CFI and his passengers.

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    1. I would encourage you (assuming you haven't done so already) to check out the N2104J accident. He lost an engine and could not see the roads and fields available that could have saved his life. Having an instrument rating would have been useless in such a situation.



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    2. The two pilots of the 2019 Cline helicopter crash were both instrument rated and experienced. In the air only a minute, they went from blazing lights on the helipad to no visual references as they flew above the water on a completely dark night. Despite "warning terrain" messages multiple times, they crashed. How?

      http://www.kathrynsreport.com/search?q=cline

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    3. ADM-Areonautcal Decision Making. On just the issue of Fatigue alone, nobody brings their A game after midnight. Low Visibility, Low Ceilings, Night they all add to the risk profile. As a well seasoned IFR pilot myself, there is no place I ever need be. Weather dictates my schedule on Go or No Go.

      9.5 out of 10 General Aviation IFR pilots would likely agree with me.

      Respect the weather conditions always. Even if equipment is found to be the cause (it won’t) he could have never found his way back to the airport for an emergency landing. The weather was that bad.

      Bad ADM.

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    4. I’m instrument-rated and current. Could I perform such a flight safely? Sure. Would I have tried? Not in a million blessed years.

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    5. Nope! Definitely nope SE. I'm in that 9.5.

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  14. Here's my assessment based upon the radio communication: normal conversation until instructed to contact departure control during the climb out. Right-handed pilot in the left seat leans forward to change the frequency on the radio. This causes his left hand down (which is still on the yoke) causing the aircraft to begin a slight turn to the left. Pilot leans back and suffers spatial disorientation. This starts a chain of events that ultimately leads to the crash. It's possible he stalled and the plane broke left and he never recovered. If you look at the ADS-B data his speed and course at that time were all over the place (at one point just 56kts). For the next minute or two he is turning left, accelerating but gaining and losing altitude. Thirty seconds later his speed is 136kts and for the next minute he accelerates to 144 but only loses 125ft. It looks like he might have ultimately gained control but ran out of altitude. Being IFR rated means you are qualified to fly in IMC conditions. It doesn't make you immune to the physiological effects. Not to mention the pressure of knowing you have two other souls on board.

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    1. https://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/spatiald.pdf
      FAA: "Spatial Orientation. Defines our natural ability to maintain our body orientation and/or pos-ture in relation to the surrounding environment (physical space) at rest and during motion. Genetically speaking, humans are designed to maintain spa-tial orientation on the ground. The three-dimensional environment of flight is unfamiliar to the human body, creating sensory conflicts and illusions that make spatial orientation difficult, and sometimes impossible to achieve. Statistics show that between 5 to 10% of all general aviation accidents can be attributed to spatial disorientation, 90% of which are fatal.
      Spatial Orientation in Flight: Spatial orientation in flight is difficult to achieve because numerous sensory stimuli (visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive) vary in magnitude, direction, and frequency. Any differences or discrepancies between visual, vestibular, and proprioceptive sensory inputs result in a sensory mismatch that can produce illusions and lead to spatial disorientation. Good spatial orientation relies on the effective perception, integration and interpretation of visual, vestibular (organs of equilibrium located in the inner ear) and proprioceptive (receptors located in the skin, muscles, tendons, and joints) sensory information."

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  15. Some knowns to consider:
    1. Rented aircraft; Delayed return impacts next day's bookings. Fee+.
    2. A post on pilot's instagram 143 weeks ago, wearing foggles.
    3. LinkdIn shows airline ramp worker, but no occupational piloting.
    Some possible factors to consider:
    A. Takeoff may have already delayed hours waiting out the 20+ gusts.
    B. Good conditions at destination airfield biases decision toward "go".
    C. Low stress foggle training no match for bright-->dark, gusty w/pax.
    D. Autopilot-dependent pilots crash in IMC when not engaged asap.
    E. "Invincibility" as described upthread by FAP333 impacts ADM.
    F. Ramp co-workers at his job may wuss-razz a stand-down decision.

    Sad to say, but #1 and letter F can have a much greater influence on ADM for this set of day trip return accident cheese layers than they should. In addition, a pilot who isn't renting is likely to go to the hotel much earlier instead of letting letter A lengthen the flight day.

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    1. an earlier "Got to 2,100 MSL (GPS)." KDLH elev 1400ft, thus PIC below auto-pilot engagement AGL altitude of at least 800ft AGL.

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    2. The incident 172 was listed on aircraft.com in the past and the listing shows no autopilot, so it's unlikely it had one unless they retrofitted it. https://www.aircraft.com/aircraft/1188837/n262ta-2002-cessna-172s-skyhawk-sp

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    3. Go back and look at the five amp circuit breaker labeled "autopilot" and installed equipment of the "for lease" panel photo. The panel photo in the aircraft.com listing is from a time before that upgrade.

      N262TA's Panel photo linked below, from undated advert for lease "2002 CESSNA 172S SKYHAWK SP For Lease in Camden, South Carolina":

      https://media.sandhills.com/img.axd?id=7047337733&wid=6262287965&rwl=False&p=&ext=&w=0&h=0&t=&lp=&c=True&wt=False&sz=Max&rt=0&checksum=nbuoZC6RvuQ%2fKrn9JniFEJKkkHEPHPIwL41mu%2bK32sY%3d

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    4. "KAP 140 Autopilot" in the aircraft.com list avionics listing text!

      Delete
    5. A couple things I can clear up anonymously:
      1. The plane was rented, but booked until 11am the next day. Waiting and coming back in the morning would not have incurred additional fees.
      2. The pilot was an active flight instructor. Perhaps also a ramp worker, but definitely actively teaching.

      Delete
    6. A booking thru the next morning and being involved in giving instruction makes it all the more puzzling to risk pax safety (specifically, the undesirably poor conditions for making an immediate return to DLH).

      Delete
  16. one more telling reason the PIC was unaware of his spatial disorientation, no final "oh ...." or !!!!!!

    ReplyDelete
  17. Night cargo pilots take off in 200 feet ceiling and one mile vis. many times a month. But.. They are dam good pilots that dont get confused even in turbulence. Or fight it well. Yes even on twins and single pilot. I did them in the 1970s. Crazy but true. Not smart but i wanted the multi time as a young CPL.
    Been in good strong physical shape (due the cargo hauling @day) helps a lot to combat body wrong signals.. I dont think that CFI was in strong shape to overcome Spatial Disorientation. If you work out hard, you get used to control your body or mind needs and Spatial confusion that will LOC you.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I had no idea gym bros had invaded aviation. Being out of shape is a risk for spatial disorientation since when?

      Delete
    2. Peter L. Strick, PhD, Scientific Director, University of Pittsburgh Brain Institute might agree that physical conditioning especially in the core muscle group may favorably alter the higher cortical as well as the adrenal glands' response to stress. I was skeptical myself but after I read about it it made sense.

      Delete
    3. I disagree with the original comment about the pilot's physical shape.
      There is NO way to tell that from a single photo. However, I do agree that being out of shape increases your aviation risk as a pilot. If you have poor cardiovascular fitness your body is less effective at oxygen intake which increases your chances of being hypoxic. If you are overweight, it increases the likelyhood of all-cause sudden mortality including heart attack and stroke. Out of shape individuals do not deal with physical and mental stress as well, which can result in poor outcomes when facing an emergency.

      Delete
    4. Had 727 class in college and there was a woman acting as the PF in the right seat during the rotations. After doing a V1 cut on #2 and climbing out lost #2. Flying only on #1 in manual reversion. She was 4'9" 90 lbs. Sim instructor abruptly shut the sim off and excused her. The yoke literally turned her all the way left and could not get full deflection on the rudders let alone trying to reach them. He said and I will never forget this, you need to go to the corec and get strong before coming back. She never returned and her slot was filled by the next session. The 727 in manual reversion is no walk in the park.

      Delete
    5. typing too fast, V1 cut on #3

      Delete
    6. OMG I used to fly night cargo in 402Cs and damn I was GOOD! Hand flying to 1800 RVR night after freakin night, departures into the same goop, but I did it NIGHT AFTER FREAKIN NIGHT and practice really does matter here. Now I fly a PC12 professionally maybe 200 hours per year, my personal takeoff minimums are basically VFR, and if my employer doesn’t like it I’ll find another job in 5 minutes. But I’m lucky, they are OK with my personal minimums. Taking off into low viz at night takes every bit of training and ability that you possess and if you aren’t doing it every night then you aren’t good enough. Just my 2 cents.

      Delete
  18. I own a very similar 172. These newer 172’s (R&S models) are equipped with dual vacuum pumps with a single vacuum gauge, along with a vacuum fail annunciator light. Although vacuum failures do happen, in the two years I’ve owned my 172 I’ve had two Attitude Indicator failures. These can be way worse than a vacuum failure because there is no warning flag indicating something is wrong. The Attitude Indicator has a red vacuum failure flag, but vacuum wasn’t the issue. The gyro just goes bad and slowly shows a turn when straight and level. Both times this has happened to me in day VFR conditions so it wasn’t an issue. But you can see where an instrument failure like this could be a major threat and very disorienting in a night low IFR departure such as this. Spatial Disorientation seems to be a logical conclusion at this stage despite the Pilots and Planes capabilities. And, a vacuum failure isn’t the only way to get spatial d.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Very true. An Attitude Indicator is most likely to fail at during takeoff rotation, primarily because that is the first time it is being exposed to a force in the pitch/roll axis since it was started (taxi is primarily yaw force which has a negligible effect on an AI). During takeoff on a steam gauge aircraft in IMC, you MUST continuously cross check the attitude indicator against the turn coordinator primarily, as well as the other instruments you are taught to crosscheck during IFR training. If you fixate on the attitude indicator and fail to check the other instruments, an AI failure will quickly kill you in IMC.

      Delete
  19. This is a G1000 equipped 172. And that also includes an autopilot. A head scratcher considering the tech onboard which is pretty much the same as a brand new Cirrus.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. They would have taxied past the Cirrus factory with its brand new G6s a stone throw away.

      Delete
    2. False, this is not a G1000 equipped 172, unless someone did an extremely expensive upgrade after it was listed on aircraft.com: https://www.aircraft.com/aircraft/1188837/n262ta-2002-cessna-172s-skyhawk-sp

      I doubt anyone would go through the expense of retrofitting a G1000 into a steam gauge 172 when there are many comparable third party glass panel upgrades available these days for much less money.

      Delete
    3. The aircraft.com listing panel photo is older than the for lease photo, which shows different installed equipment and a marked 5 amp "autopilot" circuit breaker.

      N262TA's Panel photo linked below, from undated advert for lease "2002 CESSNA 172S SKYHAWK SP For Lease in Camden, South Carolina":

      https://media.sandhills.com/img.axd?id=7047337733&wid=6262287965&rwl=False&p=&ext=&w=0&h=0&t=&lp=&c=True&wt=False&sz=Max&rt=0&checksum=nbuoZC6RvuQ%2fKrn9JniFEJKkkHEPHPIwL41mu%2bK32sY%3d

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    4. The breaker marked autopilot is somewhat misleading.

      The panel got a GTN 750 Navigator and a GTX 345/335 series ADS-B Transponder in the upgrade that had been installed at the time the currently registered owner posted the "for lease" panel photo.

      The 750 Navigator needs a GFC 500 or 600 Autopilot control head and servos to perform autopilot controlled flight. No 500/600 control head is visible.

      No autopilot capability existed in the accident aircraft unless further upgrading has been done since the "for lease" photo was posted by the current registered owner.

      Delete
    5. A Bendix/King Autopilot is visible at the bottom of the center stack in both the Aircraft.com and the later "for lease" panel photo.

      KAP 140 Autopilot manual w/description & photos:
      https://www.bendixking.com/content/dam/bendixking/en/documents/document-lists/downloads-and-manuals/006-18034-0000-KAP-140-Pilots-Guide.pdf

      Delete
    6. Visual appearance (buttons present/omitted) allow easy determination of which KAP 140 version is installed from photos in the manual.

      Panel photos show a KAP 140 Two Axis/Altitude Preselect system.

      Delete
    7. N262TA did indeed have a Garmin 750 with a KAP 140 autopilot that coupled with the GPS, including for approaches. And as other have said, it was not G1000. I can say with certainty, the picture of the panel linked above is exactly as the panel was on the day of the accident. All equipment was functioning, nothing marked INOP as of 9/24/2022.

      Delete
  20. Very good! Non-emotional and analytical!

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  21. Article linked below talks about the KAP 140 Autopilot that is visible at the bottom of the center stack in the accident aircraft's panel photos. Reportedly, Cessna began using the KAP 140 autopilot in their 172 Skyhawks in 1996 with the introduction of the R model. Interesting information on capabilities and shortcomings:

    https://www.flyhpa.com/2011/10/an-overview-of-the-kap-140-autopilot-part-i/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Here is part 2 of the article:
      https://www.flyhpa.com/2011/10/uses-of-the-kap-140-autopilot-part-ii/

      Delete
  22. I rented this plane a couple times it had the Garmin 750 and KAP140 autopilot. Very well maintained, clean, nice to fly. Frequency switching on the 750 was not intuitive as you have to use the touch screen, rather that a tactile flip flop switch on a Garmin 430 which I find easier to change frequencies while in IMC.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. So possible task saturating when contacting departure leading to spatial disorientation?

      Delete
    2. If the ADS-B track is accurate, the right turn began almost immediately after takeoff (well below 400’ AGL) and included some descents, almost to the ground on the airport property. The contact departure instruction wasn’t given until he was southbound and finally climbing (before the ill-fated left spiral began).

      Delete
    3. Fly your plane is always #1 priority, no ifs ands or buts about it in IMC. As its understood, the PIC had filed his IFR flight plan, then departure (radar) control would been waiting for him and likely seen him, already with a flight strip printed out, thus my take contacting departure could've waited until PIC established his controlled planned departure.

      Delete
    4. I'm not seeing those descents over airport property on the the FlightRadar24 playback. What track data shows the descents that the 3:22 PM post describes? Flightaware and Adsbexchange didn't capture the early portion. Here is the FlightRadar24 link:
      https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/n262ta#2daf3024

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    5. The FR24 playback shows altitude starting from 1,100 MSL. During the turn away from the runway the 1,475 report is followed by a drop back to 1,425 which makes for roughly 325' AGL in the dip when compared to the 1,100' coming alive number at the start. Not exactly "almost to the surface", but a dip, nonetheless.

      Delete
    6. The FR24 playback shows altitude starting from zero. It catches up as he takes off. KDLH elevation is 1428. However, I’m not sure what to believe as far as the altitudes given there. What becomes right? Is it pressure altitude? If so, then add 500’ to all altitudes to derive MSL altitude. However, the point is the descent.

      The 10-second descent, reaching almost 400 fpm, quickly became a 1600+ fpm climb as he traded airspeed (102kts GS) for altitude. 102 (in a direct crosswind at that point, so we assume indicated is very close to that) is well above Vx or Vy in a 172 and indicative of level flight or a descent so quickly after takeoff.

      With three souls and a density altitude of ~600’, a 1600+ fpm climb in a 172 is only really achievable with said excess airspeed from level or descending flight as a zoom climb, not a continuous climb upon takeoff. The data as to the energy state all foot, except the actual altitude is still somewhat nebulous.

      Then there’s a second descent several seconds later with another commensurate increase in groundspeed. Truth is, if the ADS-B data are accurate, he was all over the place. We still don’t know what initiated it, but he was disoriented and not flying well.

      Delete
    7. Someone's faulty interpretation of the 1425' data point produced the erroneous "almost to the ground on the airport property" remark from comparison to airfield elevation.

      Exact correlation of the uncorrected 29.92 referenced ADS-B reports isn't necessary. Looking at the difference from the first reported altitude as FR24's data presentation came out of their zero representation (the aircraft did not transmit zero in ADS-B), the 1475 to 1425 change is fifty feet lost from being at least 375 feet AGL. Reduced lift due to getting turned to crosswind instead of headwind is the cause, but the pilot didn't let the sink continue and he didn't overshoot the necessary correction.

      Unlike typical "chase the response" altitude tracks of the most atrociously incompetent IMC pilot takeoffs, the altitude reported as he turned from the runway and headed off the airfield property does not continuously rise and fall as an increasingly divergent magnitude sine wave, which would be the "all over the place" circumstance.

      The flight ended badly, but the misrepresentation of "almost to the ground on the airport property" was just another misinterpretation of ADS-B data, a regular occurrence in comments.

      Delete
    8. Lol, okay, totally normal to lose altitude, pick up airspeed, then turn it into a high rate of climb, twice, during an IMC climbout. The crosswind had nothing to do with it.

      Delete
    9. “Reduced lift due to getting turned to crosswind instead of headwind…” Tell me you don’t know how indicated airspeed works without telling me you don’t know how indicated airspeed works. If you’d mentioned gust factor, you might have made a point.

      However, as it was, the initial level-off happened prior to the turn. What are you trying to assert? That his flying wasn’t all over the place? I can see four instances, including the terminal, spiraling dive, that say otherwise.

      Delete
    10. Replies not responsive to the almost hit the ground inside the fence point by people who think ADS-B ground speed is airspeed. So far off the post being replied to that even the stated crosswind effect on lift is ignored. More proof that misinterpretation of ADS-B data is a regular occurrence in comments.

      Delete
    11. Turning crosswind (or downwind) will affect climb gradient, not rate (which is what FR24 displays, and can also be derived from the data hits). *Any* turn will affect climb rate somewhat as the vertical component of lift is lost, but shouldn’t result in a level-off or descent unless you’re operating near service ceiling.

      Delete
    12. The “almost hit the ground” was a misinterpretation of ADS-B altitude as it pertains to AGL vs calibrated. The fact that it was still a descent and the fact that it has nothing to do with being in a crosswind (you climb out at a specific indicated speed, to which a crosswind has no effect), is the relevant point.

      Delete
    13. A 40-knot groundspeed difference from departure leg to crosswind, with a commensurate level-off and shallow descent correlates the issue-at-hand. The surface winds were close to 20 knots, almost right down the runway. A crosswind turn should have shown a slight decrease in rate of climb (maybe 100, 150 fpm less than initial, due to loss of vertical component of lift) and a gain of 20, maybe 25 knots of groundspeed if we’re being really generous with the low-level winds aloft. It should not result in a level-off or descent, and it should not incur a 40-knot change in groundspeed. Turning fully to downwind would do that, but that was not the case.

      But the point regarding loss of lift due to a crosswind is utter nonsense. You don’t lose lift due to crosswind, tailwind, etc unless it’s an instantaneous change, like windshear. The only thing those affect is your groundspeed (as I mention here), and resultant climb *gradient* (feet/nm). Climbs indicated in FR24, and the entirety of this conversation are *rate* in FPM, which are only affected by aircraft energy state, not wind.

      Delete
    14. To the 7:28 poster: Plug in the climb rate, graph it, and your non-sinusoidal argument falls apart. The fluctuations in rate of climb were indicative of lack of control. Climb rate should be fairly constant, about 600-700 feet per minute in a Cessna 172 with three people onboard, decreasing later as altitude increases and the pilot shifts to a cruise climb airspeed. You may also lose 1-200 feet per minute during a turn (nothing to do with crosswind). The feet per minute in this accident flight vary wildly from an initial of +700, up to +1000 (likely as he entered the overcast), then down to -400, up to +1600, down to -600, up to +1400, down to +300, up to +1000, down to 0, up to +2000, down to -4500.

      I just watched a playback of a recent IFR (light single-engine) flight of mine, to see if FR is producing noisy data, and my climb rate was constant, within +-100 feet per minute from takeoff all the way up to cruise (no autopilot), including turns.

      Sorry, this flight was out of control. It was never stable. There could still be many reasons that caused that, but those are facts.

      Delete
    15. Someone sees 1425' in ADS-B, checks field elevation and excitedly posts "almost hits the ground inside the fence". Somebody else points out the error. Armchair debate abandons the almost hit the ground inside the fence claim and erupts into elaborate extrapolations from ADS-B data rivaling Reddit or YT postings, a regular occurrence seen in comments for every day that ends in y.

      Delete
    16. Correct, that’s how it works. Abandon the bad notion of the “inside the fence” as that is corrected by updated knowledge that ADS-B is displaying pressure altitude. Still doesn’t account for the bad flying, which is the point, is it not?

      Delete
    17. The point of the response to the 5 October 3:22 posting was to address the incorrect assertion of almost hitting the ground inside the fence. Replies that change or expand beyond the point being discussed are par for the course.

      Delete
    18. Haha, you’re missing the forest for the trees. The point of this whole thing is literally to surmise what happened based on the limited resources available. The initial assertion of “almost near the ground” was one faulty point that was dismissed a long time ago, let it go, man. But it’s part of a larger discussion which was refuted by nonsense like explaining descents as part of loss of lift in a crosswind.

      It sounds like someone is trying to cover their tracks by being pedantic about one point that was corrected, while dismissing the rest of the evidence that things were not stable, and even asserting the contrary.

      Delete
    19. Redditors joined the chat!

      Delete
  23. An IFR rating and currency mean nothing in reality. This is going to flush out as lack of actual IMC experience/spatial disorientation. Period. Tons of people get IFR ratings with zero IMC time, and there's a big difference between driving driving under the hood in the daytime with an instructor next to you and the real thing.

    That's an unbelievable climbing left turn in IMC...followed up by a classic spiral. Given all of the circumstances, vacuum failure is the last thing to suspect.

    200ft ceiling and half a mile vis? While I did not know the pilot and have not seen his logbook, the spectacularly poor ADM only supports the notion he didn't understand what he was getting himself and his passengers into.

    IFR-rated, commercial, CFI, CFII, currency... Whatever. There is no substitute for ACTUAL IMC time/proficiency.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. agree, and one better is a instructional flight into IMC with a CFI during PPL instructions. Been there and then that with caution ever since.

      Delete
    2. The vacuum system had one redundant pump and a reservoir system that used manifold vacuum. I always find it interesting when people tend to point the blame onto equipment failure whenever someone has a mishap in IMC.

      Delete
    3. Everyone knows about IMC-induced spatial D, but I think it's good to talk about equipment failures because often once a pilot gets their instrument rating, they stop practicing and forget about how to detect instrument failures and fly partial panel. Many pilots fly assuming their instruments will operate flawless always and will never let them down, and there are accidents where even highly trained pilots let failed instrumentation cause their death, most famously Air France 447.

      Delete
  24. I am not a pilot so who am I to judge. But I do follow a well respect pilot who is also a Triple 7 pilot who flies for a major US Carrier who is a First Officer. He has over 20 years experience as a part 121 pilot. He also flew military airplanes including the C-130. His name is Juan Browne and his youtube channel is blancolirio. He is also a general aviation pilot and currently owns three planes a Mighty Luscombe 8 (1946) a Aviat Husky A-1 and a 1959 Cessna 310C. With all his training and proficiencies has stated several times as he also discusses airplane crashes. He has a credit card in his wallet and he will use it. He at 60 says he is not going to push it at night and in low visibility conditions. He will use that credit card to rent a room or rooms at night for his safety and the safety of his family. He has the ratings but he has decided that flying at night is just not worth it.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Now, that's an example to follow!

      Delete
  25. I've done all my instrument training in 2TA and used it for cross countries on the regular. Very beautiful, comfortable and modern airplane. I was working on CSEL with the PIC, Tyler, and haven't seen any issues with him as a CFI. What puzzles me is the fact that he had the airplane reserved until 11:00AM the day of the accident but chose to depart at midnight with those low ceilings.

    For those speculating, I've snapped photos of the panel from previous flights. The properly lit one was taken about 1 year ago. The dark one was taken less than a month ago. ( I've had to use my flashlight). Note how the turn coordinator and CDIs are dark so they may have contributed to his disorientation.

    https://postimg.cc/gallery/srQcqBK

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thanks for posting - I think some had assumed it was a G1000 setup. I'll admit that my own personal IFR minimums are equipment dependent. Glass panel and reliable two-axis AP are required for me to fly in the soup without an instructor. Could I manage without it? Sure. But I do this as a hobby, and consequently: 1) My risks tolerances are lower than those doing this for a living (or towards a living), and; 2) I don't fly frequently enough in the soup to maintain confidence on par with the 135 check haulers.

      Delete
  26. This incident baffles me. As mentioned, perhaps wait for better wx unless you are absolutely confident in your IMC flying capabilities. Good point made about transitioning from bright rwy lights to darkness. I just don't get not having the AP set up for initial directions....set heading bug to 180 (right turn) and altitude preselect to 060. Even if you aren't above 800 AGL but at least above 500 and you are becoming disoriented then engage the AP or at least the flight level button. You would think a CFI would be able to handle this situation.

    Reminds me of an older incident in which I knew one of the passengers. Almost same situation: https://www.planecrashmap.com/plane/ga/N4105W/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Autopilot may have been engaged before turning away from the runway heading, flown following the bug, then auto disengagement or disorientation made him decide to disengage, unable to believe in the indications vs. perception.

      Delete
    2. No autopilot on this plane per listing on controller.com

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    3. The KAP 140 autopilot shows up in every panel photo at the bottom of the center stack and in the text listing of the 2010 aircraft,com listing. Browsing comments can catch you up.

      Delete
    4. "Absolutely Confident"...I suspect that he way. Please, put aside such a notion when entering the cockpit. Some fear is your friend!

      Delete
  27. On day of the flight up to Duluth, the plane took off from KSGS, went around the pattern and landed. About 12 minutes later it took off again and continued to Duluth. Does anyone have any audio that would explain why?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Maybe that once around the pattern was a post maintenance verification by the accident pilot before inviting his passengers to join him and commit to making the Duluth trip.

      The most recent previous operation of the accident aircraft before the Saturday flight to Duluth appears to be the return to SGS at 9:38 PM on Tuesday (02:38 Z, UTC day 28). No operation on Wed, Thu, Fri. The aircraft's usage history in ADS-B suggests that a three day period of inactivity is not the norm.

      Delete
    2. The aircraft was undergoing 100Hr maintenance Wed/Thurs/Fri. Thus, no activity.

      Delete
    3. Could also be for recency to carry passengers, though if he was an active CFI, I’d imagine he’d had 3 landings in the preceding 90 days.

      Delete
  28. Wonder if pilot CFI drank any alcohol at wedding he attended . Long day flying to wedding then returning at midnight . Fatigue, alcohol, not flying straight out to at least 1000 ft before switching radio frequency or making turn could be contributing factors . Takeoff immediately into low IFR transitioning from light to dark conditions could be same cause as Chris Cline’s 2 helicopter pilots who crashed in Bahamas . CFI probably needed wanted night IFR experience especially with cost of plane shared by his friends . Friends had no clue as to danger . Pilot will probably be sued by family of his passenger friends

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Where was it confirmed that the pilot and crew were at a wedding? Had not heard or read that.....it does beg the question what were they doing in Duluth and why were they flying home so late at night?

      Delete
    2. "The trio had flown to Duluth for the day for a wedding; Fretland and Matthew Schmidt were roommates, according to social media posts."

      From:
      https://www.duluthnewstribune.com/news/minnesota/pilot-in-hermantown-plane-crash-worked-for-south-st-paul-flight-school-involved-in-cottage-grove-crash

      Delete
    3. Did not see that. Thanks for sharing. The accident chain is starting to make more sense....

      Delete
  29. Young people tend to think that they can do anything. While this might be almost true physically, there is much to be learned from experience, which they do not yet have enough of (there is never enough...). I can see how solo night IFR flying is needed, but particularly when a newbie, surely not with anybody else on board, only under optimal weather conditions, and NOT a completely black night!

    ReplyDelete
  30. Sounds like flight in night IMC by an instrument rated pilot with marginal instrument experience that culminated in a loss of spacial orientation and loss of aircraft control. Sad and avoidable tragedy.

    ReplyDelete
  31. With most pilots using iPads with software that provides Synthetic Vision and AHRS as backup and/or glass cockpits, seems like there would be less spatial disorientation but seems like just as many as using old steam gauges . I had electrical failure in 172 but had an iPad as backup so flight was continued safely .

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hopefully you landed as soon as practicable. The iPad can be a great backup, but it's also not certified so you should get it on the ground as soon as you can safely and with no undue risk.

      Delete
  32. Surely a head scratcher: A 172SP has excellent avionics and an autopilot and proper IFR training would make one setup everything on the ground for a quick AP activation. And a checklist if properly used would make damn sure that AP would be working too.
    Looks to me like once again someone skipped items and went in way over their head with minimal knowledge of a TAA airplane and paid the ultimate price for it.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This 172SP is not a TAA. It had a 6 pack. It would have to be a Cessna Nav III w/G1000 to qualify as a TAA.

      Delete
  33. I have experienced the loss of a child, but I can't image the grief of losing 2 on the same day. My heart goes out to the parents of these young adults.

    ReplyDelete
  34. Look here for a possible issue:
    COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105
    CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
    SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
    Cessna 170, 172, F172, FR172 and 175 Series Aeroplanes
    AD/CESSNA 170/74 (continued)
    Page 2 of 2
    However, when issuing AD 2003-24-13 the FAA inadvertently omitted four part
    numbers from the applicability that was reflected in AD/CESSNA 170/73. This
    Directive, whilst not superseding AD/CESSNA 170/73, complements that Directive by listing the omitted KAP 140 autopilot computer system part numbers.
    This Directive requires the installation of an update to the operating software of the
    KAP 140 autopilot computer system. This action is intended to prevent unintentional
    engagement of the KAP 140 autopilot computer system, which could cause the pilot
    to take inappropriate actions.

    ReplyDelete
  35. Reading all of these responses reminds me that after having a catastrophic engine failure last April, I told myself I would never ask, "What was that pilot thinking" after an incident. With me, a total focus on executing (and not decision making) saved my life. Thank goodness for all the CFI's that put good knowledge into my brain and made me practice it. My point here is that while I am a pilot and am prone to put the puzzle together and follow with what I would've done differently, none of us can absolutely know what the pilot was presented with and to know what were the complete set of facts for each decision and action he took. We all mourn the passing of three human beings and hope we can learn from whatever brought about this tragic ending. I just know it's much easier to say what we would've done while behind a keyboard, rather than from behind the controls.

    ReplyDelete
  36. 12 hours post wedding and wedding party? Into severe IMC? Sounds like fatigue plus possible "get home itis" as contributing factors. If it were me, I'd have stayed the night and flown home in the morning.

    ReplyDelete