Saturday, May 07, 2022

Loss of Control in Flight: Pilatus PC-12/47E, N56KJ; fatal accident occurred November 30, 2019 near Chamberlain Municipal Airport (9V9), Brule County, South Dakota

Houston James Hansen
January 24, 2014 ~ November 30, 2019 (age 5)

Logan LaGrande Hansen 
June 18th, 2007 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 12)

Stockton Kirkland Hansen
October 14th, 1997 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 22)

Tyson Barry Dennert
October 2nd, 1993 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 26)

M. Kyle Naylor
December 27th, 1990 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 28)

Jake Hansen
October 26, 1989 ~ November 30, 2019 (age 30)

Kirkland "Kirk" Rigby Hansen
April 13th, 1971 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 48)

Jim Hansen Jr.
June 27, 1965 ~ November 30, 2019 (age 54)

James "Jim" D. Hansen Sr.
July 15th, 1938 ~ November 30th, 2019 (age 81)

Initial taxi on ramp

Taxi from ramp area

Accident takeoff

Kirk Hansen and Pilatus PC-12/47E N56KJ

Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board 

The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration; Accident Investigation; Washington, District of Columbia
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Rapid City, South Dakota
Swiss Transportation Safety Board; Payerne, Switzerland
Pilatus Aircraft Ltd; Stans, Switzerland
Pilatus Aircraft (USA); Broomfield, Colorado

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:

Location: Chamberlain, South Dakota
Accident Number: CEN20FA022
Date and Time: November 30, 2019, 12:33 Local
Registration: N56KJ
Aircraft: Pilatus PC12
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
Injuries: 9 Fatal, 3 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On November 30, 2019, at 1233 central standard time, a Pilatus PC-12/47E airplane, N56KJ, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Chamberlain, South Dakota. The pilot and 8 passengers were fatally injured, and three passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot and passengers flew to Chamberlain Municipal Airport (9V9) the day before the accident, arriving about 0927. The airplane then remained parked outside on the ramp.

A representative of a local lodge reported that the pilot and passengers stayed overnight. The morning of the accident, the pilot and one passenger stayed back while everyone else went hunting. The representative took the pilot and passenger to the airport to check on the airplane. The pilot thought there would be favorable weather between 1130 and 1430. They took a ladder from the lodge and stopped at a local hardware store to buy isopropyl alcohol. The pilot and passenger worked for about 3 hours to remove the snow and ice that had accumulated on the airplane overnight. The representative noted that the ladder they brought from the lodge was approximately 7 feet tall and did not reach to the top of the tail on the airplane. The pilot stated that they needed to get home, that the airplane was 98% good, and the remaining ice would come off during takeoff. The lodge representative recalled that it was snowing hard at the time the pilot took off.

At 1224, the pilot contacted Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance from 9V9 to Idaho Falls Regional Airport (IDA). The pilot advised he planned to depart from runway 31 and would be ready in 5 minutes. At 1227, Minneapolis ARTCC issued an IFR clearance to the pilot with a void time of 1235. No radio communications were received from the pilot, and radar contact was never established.

Data recovered from the Lightweight Data Recorder (LDR) installed on the airplane revealed that the accident takeoff began from runway 31 at 1231:58. The airplane lifted off 30 seconds later and immediately entered a left turn. Initial airplane bank angles varied from 10°left wing down to 5° right wing down. Ultimately, the airplane reached a bank angle of 64° left wing down at the airplane’s peak altitude of approximately 380 ft agl. The airplane then entered a descent that continued until impact. The airspeed varied between 89 and 97 kts during the initial climb; however, it decayed to about 80 kts as the airplane altitude and bank angle peaked. The stall warning and stick shaker became active approximately 1 second after liftoff. The stick pusher became active about 15 seconds after liftoff. All three continued intermittently for the duration of the flight.

A witness located about ½ mile northwest of the airport reported hearing the airplane takeoff. It was cloudy and snowing at the time. He was not able to see the airplane but noted that it entered a left turn based on the sound. He heard the airplane for about 4 or 5 seconds and the engine seemed to be “running good” until the sound stopped.

The property owner discovered the accident site about 1357. 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Private 
Age: 48, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None 
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane 
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None 
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 3 Without waivers/limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: January 17, 2019
Occupational Pilot: No
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: November 29, 2018
Flight Time: 2314 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1274 hours (Total, this make and model), 10 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 2 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Pilatus 
Registration: N56KJ
Model/Series: PC12 47E 
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2013 
Amateur Built:
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 1431
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle 
Seats: 10
Date/Type of Last Inspection: November 14, 2019 Annual 
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 10450 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection: 17.4 Hrs
Engines: 1 Turbo prop
Airframe Total Time: 1725 Hrs as of last inspection 
Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney Canada
ELT: C126 installed, activated 
Engine Model/Series: PT6A-67P
Registered Owner: 
Rated Power: 1200 Horsepower
Operator: On file 
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

The airplane was approved for day/night operations under visual and instrument flight rules, including flight into known icing conditions. The accident airplane was configured with two flight crew seats and eight passenger seats (a total of ten seats). However, twelve individuals were on board during the accident flight and none of them qualified as lap children (less than 2 years of age) under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations.

An estimated weight & balance calculation for the accident flight indicated that the airplane was about 107 lbs. over the approved maximum gross weight. Center of gravity (CG) calculations indicated that the airplane was loaded 3.99 inches to 5.49 inches beyond the aft CG limit. The CG range was estimated assuming the unseated occupants and baggage were either all in the forward cabin (most forward CG) or the aft cabin (most aft CG). In any case, the actual CG was located within 12.76 inches of the aft CG limit due to the location of the main landing gear and because the airplane was stable on the ramp. If the actual CG was located aft of the main landing gear pivot point, the airplane would have tended to tip back on its tail.

An image study of photos and video footage revealed accumulated precipitation, presumably snow, on the upper surface of the horizontal stabilizer and on the vertical stabilizer with icicles present on the horizontal stabilizer bullet fairing with the airplane parked on the airport ramp and as it began to taxi before the accident takeoff.

According to the airplane flight manual, the specified takeoff rotation speed at maximum gross weight in icing conditions was 92 kts.

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument (IMC)
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: 9V9,1696 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 12:35 Local 
Direction from Accident Site: 90°
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Visibility: 0.5 miles
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 500 ft AGL
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 6 knots / 0 knots 
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: Terrain-Induced / Terrain-Induced
Wind Direction: 20° 
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: Moderate / Unknown
Altimeter Setting: 29.3 inches Hg 
Temperature/Dew Point: 1°C / 1°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: Moderate - None - Snow
Departure Point: Chamberlain, SD (9V9)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Idaho Falls, ID (IDA)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 12:32 Local 
Type of Airspace: Class G

Observations indicated that winter weather had persisted for 12 to 24 hours in the vicinity of the accident site. Light to moderate snow, freezing drizzle, and mist occurred throughout the night and morning with 2.1 inches of accumulated snow from 0730 the day before the accident until 0730 on the morning of the accident. Surface observations indicated low instrument flight rules (LIFR) conditions existed about the time of the accident. The observation taken at 1215 noted light snow; however, moderate snow was observed at 1235. Atmospheric sounding data indicated that moderate or greater airframe icing conditions were likely from the surface to 11,500 ft mean sea level.

Airman Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisories for moderate turbulence, moderate icing conditions, and instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions due to precipitation, mist, fog, and blowing snow were in effect at the time of the accident.

The pilot’s most recent preflight weather briefing was obtained at 1204. It included current surface observations (METARs), pilot reports (PIREPs), and terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAF). The pilot did not request the current AIRMET information as part of the briefing.

The airport manager reported that he was plowing snow at the airport beginning about 0830 and estimated that up to 2 inches had fallen over the past 24 to 36 hours. In his opinion, the weather seemed to be deteriorating at the time of the accident.

Airport Information

Airport: Chamberlain Muni 9V9
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 1696 ft msl
Runway Surface Condition: Snow
Runway Used: 31 
IFR Approach: None
Runway Length/Width: 4299 ft / 75 ft 
VFR Approach/Landing: None

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal 
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 8 Fatal, 3 Serious
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A 
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 9 Fatal, 3 Serious 
Latitude, Longitude: 43.765556,-99.337219

The accident site was located approximately 3/4 mile west of the airport in a dormant corn field. The debris path was approximately 85 ft long and oriented on a 179° heading. The engine was separated from the firewall. The left wing was separated from the fuselage at the root. The engine and left wing were both located in the debris path. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, right wing, and empennage.

A postaccident airframe examination did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. The examination revealed the wing flaps were set at 15° and the landing gear was retracted at the time of impact. The trim system – aileron, elevator, rudder – was set within the specified takeoff range. Data recovered from the LDR revealed the recorded engine parameters were consistent with the engine producing rated takeoff power. No indications of an engine anomaly were observed in the data.

Medical and Pathological Information

Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory found no drugs of abuse.

Tests and Research

An airplane performance study which utilized both computer-driven (“desktop”) simulations and piloted simulations in an FAA-approved PC-12 Level D full flight simulator (FFS) was completed by the NTSB. The simulations indicated that the flight control authority available to the pilot was sufficient to maintain control until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 22 seconds after lifting off. The maximum bank angle of about 64° occurred after the critical angle-of-attack was exceeded. Furthermore, the simulations did not reveal any significant airplane performance degradation resulting from the residual snow and ice on the empennage. Although, the effects of these accumulations on the airplane CG and airflow over the horizontal stabilizer (which could have affected the elevator hinge moments and column forces) are unknown.

Airplane loading on the previous day’s flight from IDA to 9V9 was likely similar to the accident flight (heavy weight and extreme aft CG). LDR data revealed the takeoff from IDA involved a rotation pitch rate of approximately 4.3°/sec, a pitch angle above the 9° flight director target, and pitch oscillations that may have been due to decreased stability and light column forces. A review of previous takeoffs known to have been flown by the accident pilot revealed similar rotation pitch rates and pitch angles beyond 9°. The accident takeoff pitch angle was initially 11.8°, where it paused for less than 1 second before continuing to 15.8°. Rotation was initiated about 88 kts, which was about 4 kts slower than that specified for takeoff at maximum gross weight in icing conditions.

A comparison of LDR data revealed differences in the takeoff rotation technique between the accident pilot and another pilot that flew the airplane. Takeoffs performed by the second pilot employed takeoff rotation pitch rates of 3°/sec and a lower initial pitch angle of 5° before gradually increasing to 9°.

The piloted simulations conducted in the Level D FFS suggested that the accident pilot’s rotation technique, which involved a relatively abrupt and heavy pull on the column, when combined with the extreme aft CG, heavy weight, and early rotation on the accident takeoff, contributed to the airplane’s high angle-of-attack immediately after rotation, the triggering of the stick shaker and stick pusher, and the pilot’s pitch control difficulties. The resulting pitch oscillations eventually resulted in a deep penetration into the stall region and subsequent loss of control. The FFS participants found the takeoff much easier to control using a rotation technique that involved lower pitch rates and angles than the technique used by the accident pilot.


  1. Replies
    1. Negligent homicide - this man killed most of his large family and a couple of others with his arrogant negligence. Taking off under these conditions is outrageous. I imagine there were a lot of nice compliments at the funeral but the fact is he was a really lousy careless pilot and the family would have been been better off with the Three Stooges flying them. I have known many bad pilots but none this bad.

    2. You are so damn right! Hard to believe.

  2. NTSB docket has a lot of data. Many opportunities to prevent this crash, with the over-arching theme of "get-there-itis".

  3. So many bad decisions here.
    * A plane so overloaded, two passengers had to illegally sit unsecured in the aisles.
    * A CG so far aft, you can see it from how the plane sits on the video.
    * Clearing snow and ice in the middle of a snow storm and neglecting to clear the snow and ice from the t-tail.
    But one of the most telling lines of the CVR:

    Pilot:"I was gonna go down and backtaxi three one is that uh work good - work for you?"
    Airport:"it don't look good to me I don't know what you guys are thinkin'."
    P: "uh is the runway in good condition?"
    A:"I would say I can't hardly keep up."
    P: "aright I'll be okay...five six kilo juliet."
    A:"what's that?"
    P:"uh we're gonna be just fine...uh I'll go uh backtaxi three one and we'll uh take off outta here...six kilo juliet."
    A:"kay * the runway is not clear."
    P:"oh I thought you had the-oh-uh let me-let me back taxi down and look at it then I'll be back."
    A:"(why) you guys are crazy...I got berms on this thing - I gotta get the snow outta here"
    A:"that don't look good to me."

    When the airport manager calls you crazy and says he doesn't know what you are thinking, you should probably listen to him. Reciting a Latter Day Saint prayer before takeoff isn't enough to keep you safe, you also need ADM.

    1. Exactly - worst case of poor ADM I've ever heard of.

  4. Horribly sad and completely preventable.

    From another forum:
    This conversation between the airport manager to the pilot caught on the CVR clears up any doubt as to the cause:

    APT it don't look good to me I don't know what you guys are thinkin'.

    RDO-1 uh is the runway in good condition?

    APT I would say I can't hardly keep up.

    RDO-1 aright I'll be okay...five six kilo juliet.

    APT what's that?

    RDO-1 uh we're gonna be just fine...uh I'll go uh backtaxi three one
    and we'll uh take off outta here...six kilo juliet.

    APT 'kay * the runway is not clear.

    RDO-1 oh I thought you had the - oh - uh let me - let me backtaxi down
    and look at it then I'll be back.

    APT (why) you guys are crazy...I got berms on this thing

    RDO-1 I think we're gonna be just fine right down this uh one track
    you've made six kilo juliet.

    APT [If you] guys don't mind (problems with/plowin' through) some drifts.

  5. And as always prayer doesn't do anything in the face if Nature and the Laws of Physics. Atheist here.

    1. Agreed, it sometimes doesn't. But where it may matter is after your body has transitioned to a corpse, and one of two spiritual realms await. I may be wrong, but I certainly am not willing to find out the hard way.

  6. The boss must have been PIC

  7. We pilots are responsible for the lives of our passengers and people on the ground. This crash is just an insult to the entire aviation community.

  8. Apparently the PIC also had a poor technique of yanking the yoke backwards and going into a 11+ degrees nose up attitude... I guess his skills were lacking both in airmanship and risk assessment. Was he part of the FAA wings program? I don't think so...
    The effect of the PIC's murderous incompetence will reverberate for decades to come in that family.

    1. Yes I read that too. His a g takeoff gressive takeoff technique (as recorded in the days recorder on non eventful flights previously) put the plane in an immediate stall in this case. Crazy to think a more gentle takeoff rotation might have advertising worked despite all the other bad decisions that day

    2. As a passenger, I never would have gotten on that plane. The videos of the plane taxiing with snow and ice on the tail and the near zero visibility are just shocking

  9. I think some pilots become almost delusional fan boys of their aircraft. I bet the pic had heard so many praises of the capability of the pilatus and he simply didn't comprehend that he would be attempting to operate his Pilatus outside the safety or physically possible envelope.

    I was speaking with a a Cirrus SR22 owner the other day who bragged he routinely flies a couple hundred pounds over gross because "these planes are amazing and can easily do it".

    1. The delusional fan boy remark prompted a closer look at the pilot's flight time and available company-owned aircraft he had ridden in or piloted.

      The pilot's experience is listed as: Flight Time: 2314 hours (Total, all aircraft), 1274 hours (Total, this make and model). His PPL certificate's most recent update issue date is 2008.

      Not intending to defend the pilot's skill shortcomings or decision making on the accident day, but the 2008 existence date of the pilot's multi-engine and instrument ratings lines up with when the company was migrating from a twin Cessna 414A to their first Pilatus PC-12, registered January 2007.

      With 12 years of PC-12 Idaho home-based operational familiarity, whatever the pilot believed about the aircraft's capabilities on the accident day was not reliant on what he had heard about it.

      His 2017 and 2018 training (noted in the "Record of Flight Experience" document in the docket) should have detected and corrected the yoke-yanking takeoff technique. The fact that the training failed to do so may be an indication that rumors of training center deference to well-heeled owner-pilots are true.

      For reference:
      In 2014, company-registered N56KJ, a 2013 PC-12/47E s/n 1431 replaced the 1997 PC-12/45 s/n 201 (currently N456V) that the company first registered in January 2007, which replaced the Cessna 414A s/n 414A0279 N414CB the company first registered November 2000.

  10. It's likely that the qualities of the pilot's personality which led him to be a very successful businessman also led him to be an unsafe pilot. The corporate world rewards the hard charging aggressive types who take risks, break rules, don't take no for an answer, think outside the box and find a way to make a plan work no matter the obstacles. Those same qualities that are great in business are often fatal in aviation and frequently lead to these type of accidents. Anyone wanting to be a pilot who has those qualities should get significant cognitive training in how to turn off, counteract, and set aside those traits every time they take on the PIC role. You basically have to become a completely different person and not everyone is able to manage that.

    1. Risk taking often includes normalization of deviance (Reference: Space Shuttle booster o-rings and ET foam). That Idaho business owned and flew two PC-12's for more than 12 years, across 12 winter snow seasons.

      The attitude toward the unresolved T-tail contamination of "it will blow off" may have come from the accident pilot having boldly done a few takeoffs in the past without removing snow accumulation from the 14 foot high tail at similar lesser-equipped airfields and getting away with it.

      Although no factory test pilot would want to have to verify by flight test, it is notable that Page 24 Conclusions (pdf sheet 26) of the Aircraft Performance and Simulation Study in the docket included the following:

      "The simulation of the accident takeoff did not reveal any obvious performance degradation resulting from the residual snow and ice on the airframe depicted in Figures 2 and 3, though the effects of these accumulations on the airplane CG and airflow over the horizontal stabilizer (which could affect the elevator hinge moments and column forces) are unknown."

      If you did a thorough read of the performance study, you saw that in spite of loaded weight, aft CG, poor decision making and errors in airmanship, a pilot of normal PC-12 experience and ability who rotated at the proper airspeed specified in the POH and exercised proper pitch management on a straightaway departure would have succeeded.

      The above was not offered to excuse the pilot's decisions and shortcomings, but it is important to recognize the robust performance margin of the PC-12 made apparent by the analysis for the as-attempted circumstances.

      Aircraft Performance and Simulation Study:

    2. Anti-Authority, Impulsivity, Invulnerability, Macho and resignation are the attitudes that kill. Any businessman serious in learning to fly would also focus on those and switch off any tendencies they would have in the corporate world for something compatible with flying and respecting the rules of physics. So this dude was no successful businessman. Whatever made him $$$ to buy this expensive machine may have been luck and he murdered his passengers by reckless and careless operation. Violation of 91.13 it is.

    3. Nail hit right on the head here. Too often the people with deep enough pockets to afford the aircraft are exactly the wrong people to be piloting (or even calling the shots over a hired pilot). I once overheard a confident, successful young surgeon contemplating a flight school and the purchase of a personal aircraft so he could 'travel the 200 miles between hospitals much quicker'. I shuddered, and politely asked him to reconsider. He bought a Tesla instead, thank God.

  11. Replies
    1. CORRECT.....KNOWING you can't get away with this

    2. No. Murder requires much more than negligence: it requires a specific intent to kill, nd in the case of 1st degree, premeditated.

  12. I hope the PIC’s god is a just one and has sentenced him to an eternity of torment for his commitment of mass murder.

  13. Kids, too. Sitting in aisle. I bet they thought the whole experience was "fun".

    This crash highlights why Part 91 carries higher risk: lack of operational oversight and normalized deviance from SOPs.

    When an airport plow driver says "you're crazy"...

  14. Such a sad story to read. Based on weights/seating locations it appears that the two children were completely unrestrained and basically had no chance in surviving this crash (can't really call it an accident with this much negligence). Multiple parties tried to talk these folks out of flying out of 9V9 on that date, yet due to their stubborn arrogance they never even paused to contemplate a change in plans.

    When the airport manager questioned their sanity for even attempting a takeoff in these conditions, the voices in the cockpit recording ridiculed him for his inefficient snowplowing -- "he's been out here for two my pickup I coulda had it done in like thirty minutes". I think this statement speaks volumes to the level of arrogance here and it is further echoed by this statement "oh that's a nice track right there we're fine...this thing
    will take off so fast"

    Even an

  15. I have been flying in and out of 9V9 for pheasant hunts in C421 and BE36 most of the past 40 years. This arrogant pilot really upsets me. His elite budget convinced him he was invincible and was clearly way beyond his skill set. So sad that his innocent family members paid the intimate price. Read the CVR. Read the history of over rotating and pulling too soon. But most of all, read the aft CG! I am angry that idiots like this hurt our industry and our insurance rates!

  16. had to know of the expected weather, thus a family destroyed for the want of a short morning duck hunt!

    1. "12:18:18.4 HOT-2 yeah we got a lot of pheasants in only an hour"

    2. PICs immediate ill-fated left bank on liftoff apparent in the "VIDEO OF ACCIDENT TAKEOFF."
      In conclusion, after committing multiple prep errors and breaking every departure piloting rule, the instrument-rated pilot’s apparent loss of situational awareness resulted in an in-flight collision with the terrain.

  17. Of all the accidents I've read, studied and digested, this one makes me the most angry. My comments could probably get me banned from KR.

    1. Families of those lost in (checks notes) Germanwings flight 9525's crash might ask you if the intentional aiming of an airliner at a mountain was one that you studied.

  18. God only knows what the pilot was thinking about when he decided fly that day.
    The best piece of life-saving equipment that we pilots should carry is our credit card.
    What compelled him to leave, instead of overnighting , we'll never know.

    1. I was living in SD at the time of this accident. It was a miserable weather day with blizzard winds. It is also the dumbest pilot decision I can remember. These people's business was worth millions. Chamberlain is not far from Mitchell or even Sioux Falls where, for a hundred bucks a night they could have kept their plane in a heated hangar, rented a van and driven back and forth to Chamberlain.

      Money can't buy brains.

    2. Returning home on Saturday to be back with the spouses for home town Sunday worship services on Thanksgiving weekend would seem to be the original plan and motivation behind trying to de-ice and go.

      The safest choice was eliminated as the family expanded. Adding son-in-laws and youngsters to the annual trip eventually got to a head count and loaded weight where asking the C&B corporate pilot to come along and drop the family group off at 9V9 was no longer an option.

    3. in the afterlife, saints believe in the continued identity and existence of all living things after the death of the mortal body. Death does not signify the ending of the eternal soul, but is simply the transition from one form of existence to another and they'll all meet up again.

    4. Yeah right, let me complete that statement for you:
      in the foreside some believe in the continued laminar flow and existence of all lifting forces after the death of the critical angle of attack. Stall does not signify the ending of the lift, but is simply the transition from one form of flow to another and they'll all meet down again. In a vortex - of tangled parts on the ground.

    5. Folks on different forums keep insisting attending services on Sunday was the reason for the push. A read of a few of the obits reveal that:

      * There were numerous folks on this trip that, while originally from Idaho, lived out of state. They likely had travel plans on Sunday.
      * These same folks travelled with their spouses and children, increasing the number of people that have a stake in the timeliness of this flight.
      * There were 4 (or more) executives across 3 companies on this flight that likely also had pending commitments.
      * Many probably had plans on Saturday, which could have increased the pressure in the mind of the PIC to complete the flight.

      I’m most certainly not excusing the accident pilot’s egregious errors, just offering a more plausible explanation as to how Get-there-itis struck, again.

    6. Good input that some might have had commercial flights set or trips by road planned for later on Saturday. Winds the GTI spring tighter.

  19. apparently this pilot had complete faith in his planes anti ice capability and very little actual knowledge about icing and aerodynamics. very sad. if an airplane cant handle the situation the pilot cant either.

    1. Ironically, the NTSB simulation analysis found that the aircraft probably could have taken off without crashing if the pilot used the correct technique. At the end of the day, despite all the other mistakes made, regulations broken, and red flags ignored, it was the pilot's bad take off technique by yanking the plane into the air before it reached the proper rotation speed and fighting the stick pusher that sealed their fate.

    2. A disturbing take away from that thorough and surprising NTSB performance analysis is that the training the 1000+ hours in type pilot was given during 2017 and 2018 didn't notice and remedy his errant yoke-yanking takeoff technique.

      It's possible that the pilot used proper technique while trainers were observing and hid an intentional Maverick the fighter pilot alternate takeoff style from them. It is also possible that he did training session takeoffs similarly to the accident flight but the trainers didn't want to risk the customer moving on to another outfit for recurrent training if they pressed the issue.

    3. "Simulation" is wonderful, not real life, especially with a CG 5 inches aft of the limit.

    4. @Doc - If you had read and understood what the Aircraft Performance and Simulation Study presented, you would know that as the title describes, the conclusions were not based only on simulation, but includes analysis of recorded flight data in the aft CG condition, including the IDA to 9V9 flight.

      Aircraft Performance and Simulation Study:

  20. I am speechless! If I saw that weather outside and heard THAT prayer, I would have said let me off!! Unbelievable!

  21. The problem with CEO types like this pilot, is that they believe that normal rules or laws do not apply to them - be they FAA Regulations, the laws of physics etc. These accidents happen very regularly and they are almost always the result of supreme arrogance, narcissism or both.

  22. There is no explanation for this ....This Pilot killed a bunch of innocent people that is excuses period none of them hold any water..just sad that no other adult spoke up or said no ...poor kids never had a chance...Do not make excuses for this man

  23. I believe I'd have stayed in the motel an extra day...or two...or however long it took for better flying conditions. Really poor ADM by the pilot.

  24. Wow, Two Pc12 s full of you men and boys in as many months.
    Both returning from hunting trips.
    Terrible price to pay for all. These PICs are to blame.