Friday, September 03, 2021

Federal Aviation Administration proposes $339,716 civil penalty against Montana company and associates

 Cessna 550 Citation II, N941JM



HELENA, Montana — The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes a $339,716 civil penalty against Slice of the 406 LLC, 82 and Sunny LLC, and other associated parties for allegedly conducting illegal charter flights.

Slice of the 406 LLC is based out of Helena, according to records filed with the Montana Secretary of State.

The FAA alleges that between July 2017 and November 2018 Slice of the 406 LLC, as well as 82 and Sunny LLC, conducted 26 paid passenger flights without having required FAA operating or air carrier certificates and without appropriate operating specifications.

The FAA also claims the flights were conducted with pilots who lacked the required training, testing and competency checks.

The flights reportedly involved a Cessna Citation II C550.

FAA records obtained by MTN show a plane of the same make and model registered to Slice of the 406 crashed on November 30, 2018, while approaching the airport in Fargo, North Dakota. 11 people were on board at the time, only minor injuries were reported.

MTN has also obtained documents relating to another plane crash with an aircraft was owned by Slice of the 406 LLC, although it was outside the time frame of the FAA’s current investigation.

On November 23, 2016, a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 listed to be under the ownership of Slice of the 406 LLC missed an approach at Minnesota’s Moorhead Municipal Airport. Seven people were aboard the aircraft at the time. The pilot and one passenger sustained minor injures, the other five were uninjured. The plane sustained significant damage to the landing gear, engines and tail.


Friday, September 3, 2021

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes a $339,716 civil penalty against Slice of the 406 LLC, 82 and Sunny LLC, and other associated parties for allegedly conducting illegal charter flights.

The FAA alleges that between July 2017 and November 2018, these parties conducted approximately 26 paid passenger-carrying flights in a Cessna Citation II C550. The agency alleges the parties did not have the required FAA operating or air carrier certificate. The parties also conducted flights without appropriate operations specifications, which outline what a company is authorized to do. 

The FAA further alleges the parties conducted operations with unqualified pilots who did not complete FAA-required training, testing, and competency checks. 

The parties have 30 days to respond to the FAA after receiving the letter. 


























Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board 

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Fargo, North Dakota
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:


Location: Fargo, North Dakota 
Accident Number: CEN19LA039
Date & Time: November 30, 2018, 13:53 Local 
Registration: N941JM
Aircraft: Cessna 550 
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Aerodynamic stall/spin 
Injuries: 9 Minor, 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation

Analysis

The commercial pilot was conducting a cross-country, business flight with 10 passengers onboard the 8-passenger airplane. He reported that air traffic control cleared the flight for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to the runway. While descending, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at 3,100 ft mean sea level (msl), and ice started to accumulate on the wing's leading edges, empennage, and windshield. The pilot activated the pneumatic deice boots multiple times during the approach and slowed the airplane to 120 knots. The airplane then exited the clouds about 400 ft above ground level (agl), and the pilot maintained 120 knots as the airplane flew over the airport fence; all indications for landing were normal. About 100 ft agl, the airplane started to pull right. He applied left correction inputs, but the airplane continued to pull right. He applied engine power to conduct a goaround, but the airplane landed in grass right of the runway, sustaining damage to the wings and landing gear. Witnesses and passengers reported that the airplane stalled.

During examination of the airplane immediately after the accident, about 1/2 to 1 inch of mixed ice was found on the right wing's leading edge, the vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and the angle of attack probe. Ice was also observed on the windshield. The flaps were found in the "up" position. Flight control continuity was established.

Although the airplane was originally certificated for two-pilot operation, the pilot was flying the airplane under a single-pilot exemption. The pilot received a logbook endorsement indicating that he had received single-pilot training and was properly qualified under the single-pilot exemption. However, he had not met the turbine flight time qualifications (1,000 hours) to be properly authorized to conduct the flight under the single-pilot exemption because he only had 500 hours.

A review of cockpit voice recorder information indicated that, although the pilot verbalized that the landing gear was "all green," followed by stating "check, check, check," he did not verbalize all the approach or landing checklist items nor did he make any audible comments about activating the pneumatic deice boots or windshield anti-ice.

A review of radar data for the flight indicated that, during the last 2 minutes of flight, while the airplane was on final approach to the runway, the indicated airspeed got as low as 99 knots. The last recorded radar return indicated that the airplane had an airspeed of 104 knots at 900 ft msl. The pilot's lack of minimum flight experience required to fly the airplane without a copilot likely led to task saturation as he flew the airplane entered IMC and icing conditions while on an ILS approach. He subsequently failed to lower the flaps during the approach, which resulted in a no-flap approach instead of a full-flap landing. The ice on the leading edges of the wings, the no-flap approach, and the low airspeed likely led to the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to lower the flaps during the approach and maintain sufficient airspeed while flying in instrument meteorological and icing conditions and the accumulation of ice on the wings' leading edges, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack and subsequent aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of proper qualification to operate the airplane under a single-pilot exemption due to his lack of total turbine time, which led to task saturation and his failure to properly configure the flaps for landing.

Findings

Aircraft Configuration - Incorrect use/operation
Aircraft Airspeed - Not attained/maintained
Aircraft Angle of attack - Capability exceeded
Personnel issues Use of equip/system - Pilot
Environmental issues Conducive to structural icing - Effect on operation
Personnel issues Qualification/certification - Pilot
Personnel issues Task overload - Pilot

Factual Information

History of Flight

On November 30, 2018, about 1353 central standard time, a Cessna 550, N941JM, departed controlled flight and impacted terrain while on approach at the Hector International Airport (FAR), Fargo, North Dakota. The pilot and one of the passengers were not injured, and 9 passengers received minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to Slice of the 406 LLC and operated by the pilot under the provisions of the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and the flight was operating on an instrument flight plan. The flight departed from the Sloulin Field International Airport (ISN), Williston, North Dakota, about 1250 with FAR as the destination.

The pilot reported that after departure, the flight was cleared direct as filed on the instrument flight plan. He obtained the destination weather when the flight was 100 nautical miles (nm) and 30 nm from FAR. Air traffic control (ATC) provided radar vectors to the inbound course for the FAR ILS RWY 18 approach and subsequently cleared the flight for the approach. He stated that he completed the approach checklist, activated the deicing equipment, and started a descent to 2,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane was about 10 nm from FAR when it entered a layer of clouds, which were at 3,100 ft msl, at an airspeed of 160 kts. He stated that ice started to accumulate on the wings, so he activated the de-ice boots. While inbound to FAR from the final approach fix, he switched the radio to the tower frequency, maintained 140 kts airspeed, completed the landing checklist, and was cleared to land. He reported that he activated the de-ice boots several times on the approach and slowed the airplane to 120 kts airspeed for the final approach. The airplane exited the clouds at 400 ft above ground level (agl), and it was right of centerline with the airport and runway in sight. He reported that he turned the autopilot and yaw damper off, corrected to the left to line up with the centerline, and maintained 120 kts airspeed over the airport fence. He stated that all indications were normal for landing. He stated that at approximately 100 ft agl, the airplane started to pull to the right. He applied left corrective control inputs, but the airplane continued to pull to the right. He applied engine power to perform a go-around, but the airplane landed in the grass just right of runway 18. He shut the engines down, turned the battery off, and conducted an emergency evacuation through the main cabin door.

A witness, who observed the accident from his office window which faced the approach threshold for runway 18, reported that he "watched the airplane fall out of the sky." He explained that he saw the wings slowly "fluttering" back and forth and recognized that the airplane was about to stall from an altitude of 130 to 140 ft agl. He said the airplane's nose pitched up and then the right wing went down. He could see the belly of the airplane and he estimated that the angle of bank was possibly 80°.

Another witness said that he saw the airplane as it was on final approach over the runway threshold. He said the airplane looked "odd." The airplane was over the runway, but it was 30 – 50 ft high. He said it was way too high for the flare. The nose was high and then it leveled off. Then the nose rose up and the wings started "waffling" and was about to stall. The right wing dropped and hit the ground about 2 seconds later. He estimated that the angle of bank was about 40°.

The passenger, who was sitting in the right seat of the cockpit, reported that the airplane started to take on ice on the windshield and the deicing boot on the right wing while they were on the approach in the clouds. He reported that the approach was normal until they neared the ground when the tail started "fishtailing." He saw the pilot push the throttles forward; however, the left wing climbed and the airplane "pulled hard to the right." The airplane impacted the ground on its right wing and then impacted back on its belly.

The passenger who was sitting on the couch directly behind the copilot's seat reported that the airplane was in the clouds for about 15 minutes and she saw ice forming on the windshield. When they were about to land, she said the pilot had the control wheel all the way toward him. She did not see any lights or hear any "bells," but she did see the pilot holding the control yoke as hard as he could and as close to his chest as he could. She said his arms were shaking because he was pulling back so hard. She said the pilot said an expletive, and then the airplane crashed seconds later.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The 41-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single-engine land, multi-engine land, and airplane instrument ratings. He held a second-class airman medical certificate that was issued on July 12, 2018 with no limitations. The pilot reported that he had a total of 1,513 flight hours with 263 hours in a Cessna 550, and a total turbine time of 432.9 hours

The pilot's flight logbook indicted that he passed his commercial, multi-engine check ride on July 31, 2016, when he had a total of 479.1 flight hours. On May 11, 2017, he passed a check ride in a Cessna 550 when he had a total of 1,071.8 flight hours with 69.6 hours of turbojet time and 85.1 hours of turboprop time. On June 28, 2018, he passed the Pilot Proficiency Check 14 CFR 61.58 check ride for single-pilot operation in a Cessna 550 when he had a total of 1,420.5 flight hours with 257.5 hours of turbojet time and 85.1 hours of turboprop time.

Single-pilot Exemption

The logbook entry for single-pilot exemption #9917 stated that the pilot, "… has met all requirements for FAA exemption No. 9917 published at docket No. FAA-2009-0373, received training and review of the Practical Test Standards listed in FAA-S-8081-5F, and has completed the FAA Approved Training Course by 'VUE, Inc.'"

The pilot received single-pilot exemption training through VUE, Inc., the company which held the Exemption No. 9917. The exemption was from FAR 91.9 (a), and 91.531 (a) (1) and (2) of Title 14, CFR to the extent possible to allow VUE to train and check pilots of certain Cessna Citation airplanes covered by the CE-500 type rating to operate those airplanes with a single pilot, rather than with two as required by their type certificate sheets, subject to certain conditions and limitations.

One of the pilot requirements was that the pilot must have logged at least 1,000 hours of total pilot flight time, including at least 50 hours of night flight time; 75 hours of instrument flight time; 40 hours of which are in actual instrument meteorological conditions; and 500 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC), second-in-command (SIC), or both, in turbine-powered airplanes.

A review of the pilot's flight logbook indicated that he had less than 500 hours as PIC or SIC in turbine-powered aircraft which was required to exercise the single-pilot exemption.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Cessna 550 is a low-wing airplane powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada JT-15B-4 turbofan engines which produced 2,500 lbs of thrust each. It is equipped with straight wings with integral wet-wing fuel tanks, a conventional tail, and retractable tricycle landing gear. The accident airplane was manufactured in 1980 and had a seating capacity of seven passengers and two pilots and had a maximum gross weight was 13,500 lbs.

According to the Cessna Citation Model 500 Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), the airplane was originally certificated under 14 CFR Part 25, which requires that a two-pilot crew operate the airplane. However, the FAA subsequently allowed for certain exemptions, including the VUE, Inc. No.9917 exemption, which allowed for single-pilot operation of the CE-500 and other specific airplanes.

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reported that according to the airplane's maintenance records, in 1986, two of the regular forward-facing passenger seats were removed from the cabin and replaced with a 3-person couch. The installation of the couch was installed without approved data for the accident airplane. During the accident, the cable for the seat belt attachment for the mid and aft passenger failed during ground impact.

The FAA inspector also reported that the factory installed toilet seat (and bench that covered the toilet seat) was a non-belted seat. It was not designed to be used as a passenger seat during takeoffs and landings. The seat belt installation for the toilet seat on the accident airplane was not approved and did not meet FAR Part 25 requirements.

During the accident flight, one of the passengers was sitting in the copilot's seat, 5 passengers were sitting in the originally installed cabin passenger seats, 3 passengers were sitting on the side facing couch located on the right, front side of the cabin, and 1 passenger was sitting on the bench which was over the toilet seat located in the rear of the cabin. All the passengers were wearing the seatbelts that were provided with the seats.

The Cessna 550 AFM had the following description of the airplane's stall warning system:

"Stall warning is achieved aerodynamically, aided by stall strips on the inboard section of each wing. The strips disrupt airflow over the wing, causing that area to stall first accentuating prestall buffet. The pilot is alerted to impending stall by aerodynamic buffeting which occurs at approximately VS1 + 10 in the clean configuration and VS0 + 5 in the landing configuration."

The airplane was also equipped with an optional Teledyne Angle-of-Attack System. The Supplement to the AFM stated that "the angle-of-attack system can be used as a reference for approach speed (1.3 VS1) at all airplane weights and center-of-gravity locations at zero, takeoff/approach, and landing flap positions.

Flaps

The airplane had three flaps settings: Flaps UP, Takeoff and Approach (T.O. & APPR), and LAND. The Before Landing checklist found in the Cessna Citation II Operating Manual Performance Section states that the flaps should be extended to the T.O. & APPR below 202 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and to verify the flap indicator position during the approach. Prior to landing, the manual states that the flaps LAND should be selected. The manual states:

"Flaps may be extended to T.O. & APPR below 202 KIAS and LAND below 176 KIAS. Should be in LAND position for all normal landings. Check indicator to verify position. Handle must be pushed in to clear T.O. & APPR detent when LAND flaps are desired."

The manual further states:

"After passing the instrument approach fix outbound or nearing the airport traffic area, airspeed should be reduced below 202 KIAS and the flaps extended to the APPR (15°) position. Approaching the final instrument fix inbound (one dot from glideslope intercept, on an ILS), or a downwind abeam position, extend the landing gear below 176 KIAS. At the point where final descent to landing is begun, extend FULL flaps, establish the desired vertical rate, and adjust power to maintain VREF to VREF + 10 KIAS indicated airspeed."

The Cessna AFM Performance section indicated that at a gross weight of 12,100 lbs, the VREF speed was about 106 KIAS. The landing performance charts are predicated on full flaps (LAND).

Ice Protection

The Cessna 550 Citation II was equipped with an anti-ice system to prevent ice on the windshield and a separate de-ice system that provided for removal of ice on the leading edge of the wing and tail by pneumatically expanding boots.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At 1353, FAR reported a wind at from 200° at 10 knots, visibility of 5 statute miles, mist, ceiling overcast at 400 feet above ground level, temperature of -1° Celsius (C) and a dew point temperature of -1°C, altimeter setting of 29.91 inches of mercury; remarks: station with a precipitation discriminator, sea level pressure of 1014.2 hectopascals (hPa), temperature of -1.1°C and a dew point temperature of -1.1°C.

The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) issued at 1133 CST for FAR forecasted for the accident time: a variable wind at 6 knots, visibility of 5 statute miles, mist, ceiling overcast at 300 feet agl.

At 0845 CST, an AIRMET ZULU was issued for moderate icing below 10,000 feet.

Images provided by the National Center for Atmospheric Research included the Current Icing Potential (CIP) and the Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) valid between 1300 and 1400 CST. Both the CIP and FIP indicated a 60% to 70% chance of light icing below 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) in the vicinity of the accident. In addition, about 30 minutes after the accident, the pilot of a Citation Excel at 3,000 ft and close to FAR reported overcast skies and moderate rime ice with a temperature of -2°C. See the NTSB Meteorology Weather Study for more details about the accident weather conditions.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

Multiple Electronic Devices Examination

The National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Vehicle Recorders Division examined the following electronic devices: 1) Sandel ST3400 Terrain Awareness Warning System, 2) Honeywell KLM 900, 3) Garmin AT MX20 Chart View. The data downloaded from the devices did not have pertinent data concerning the accident airplane while it was flying the ILS RWY 18 approach to FAR.

Cockpit Voice Recorder

The airplane was equipped with a Fairchild GA-100 cockpit voice recorder (CVR) designed to record 30 minutes of analog audio, including channels for each flight crewmember and the cockpit area microphone, on a continuous loop tape. The magnetic tape was retrieved from the crash-protected case and was successfully read out. A CVR group was not convened, and a summary of the recording was made and is included with the docket material associated with this investigation.

The summary CVR report indicated that the pilot did not verbalize out loud the approach and landing checklist responses. Approximately 45 seconds after ATC instructed the pilot to switch to the tower frequency and subsequently cleared to land on runway 18, the CVR recorded a sound consistent with landing gear extension and a voice stating, "all green." The pilot responded, "check, check, check," followed by the "outer marker, four miles." There was no other indication on the CVR that the pilot verbalized any checklist items, nor did the pilot make any audible comments about activating the pneumatic de-ice boots or windshield anti-ice.

Flight Data Recorder

The airplane was not equipped, and was not required to be equipped, with a flight data recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane's right wingtip impacted the right edge of runway 18. After the initial impact, the airplane bounced and skidded on the grass infield for about 635 ft before coming to a stop resting on its belly. There was no ground fire. Immediately after the accident, about ½ - 1 inch of mixed ice was found on the leading edge of the right wing, vertical stabilizer, horizontal stabilizer, and the angle of attack (AOA) probe. Ice was also observed on the windshield. The ice accretion found on the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer was the same size and shape on the de-icing boots as that of the ice on the unprotected surfaces.

The initial examination of the airplane revealed that the right wing's outboard section was pushed up and aft. The nose wheel landing gear assembly was bent to the right, and the nose wheel trunnion assembly was broken in two pieces. The nose wheel assembly was separated from the fuselage with part of the trunnion attached to the wheel assembly. The left main landing gear was found folded into the gear wheel well, and the landing gear components were pushed upwards through the upper wing surface above the gear well. The left and right pitot tubes located on the left and right side of the nose of the airplane were broken. The AOA probe on the right side of the fuselage was intact; however, the operation of the AOA's heat element could not be verified when tested. The wing flaps were found in the up (0.0 degrees) position. The limited damage to the bottom surface or trailing edge of the flaps was consistent with the flaps being in the UP position. The examination of the cockpit revealed that the flap handle was found in the LAND (down) position, but the flap indicator was found in the UP position.

FAA inspectors examined the wreckage to verify the flap position based on the cable and drive chain position. The number of chain links visible confirmed that the flaps were in the full up position at the time of the accident. Both primary and secondary cables for the left and right flaps were both in the same position and the cables and surrounding structure did not show signs of damage. The continuity of the flap indicator cable was confirmed.

TESTS AND RESEARCH INFORMATION

NTSB Radar Performance Study

The NTSB Vehicle Performance Division conducted a radar performance study of the accident flight. Radar track data indicated that the airplane approached FAR from the west and was receiving vectors from air traffic control to capture the instrument landing system (ILS) signal for runway 18. The airplane encountered icing conditions for about 9 - 10 minutes while it was flying the ILS approach. The radar data indicated that during the last 2 minutes while the airplane was on final approach to the runway, the indicated airspeed was as low as 99 kts. The last radar return recorded indicated 104 kts airspeed and was at an altitude of 900 ft msl, the same as the touchdown zone elevation for runway 18.

The radar study included a simulation using models that were used to match altitude and position data from radar. The simulation indicated that during the last 2 minutes of flight, the angle-of-attack (AOA) approached angles very close to the stall AOA, and the AOA momentarily exceeded the linear portion of the Cessna 550 "no-ice" lift curve with flaps in the retracted position. When the lift coefficient was reduced by 5% to model the effect of ice accretions on the airplane's wings in the simulation, the AOA with the lift reduction was consistently into the non-linear portion of the no-ice lift curve for the last 30 seconds of flight.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Operational Control of the Flight

FAA inspectors interviewed the passengers of the accident flight to determine who had operational control of the airplane. The passenger who made the flight arrangements reported that he contacted the pilot via text message and made all the arrangements for the flight with the pilot. He stated that the pilot was responsible for operation of the flight, to include fuel, maintenance, pilot qualifications and weather. He stated that the pilot was the single source provider for the flight. He was not informed that it was a charter flight, or that there was a separate lease for the airplane and for the pilot services. The passenger stated that he would be billed for the flight, and then he would sub-bill the cost of the flight to the other parties (passengers).

Pilot Information

Certificate: Commercial
Age: 41, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 2 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 07/12/2018
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 09/02/2018
Flight Time:  1513 hours (Total, all aircraft), 263 hours (Total, this make and model), 649 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 57 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 10 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft) 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Cessna
Registration: N941JM
Model/Series: 550 No Series
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1980
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 550-0146
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle
Seats: 11
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 03/23/2017, Continuous Airworthiness
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 13500 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 2 Turbo Jet
Airframe Total Time: 7180 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney
ELT: Installed
Engine Model/Series: JT 15B-4
Registered Owner: Slice Of The 406 Llc
Rated Power: 2500 lbs
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: FAR, 901 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 0 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1353 CST
Direction from Accident Site: 0°
Lowest Cloud Condition:
Visibility:  5 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 400 ft agl
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 10 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:
Wind Direction: 200°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:
Altimeter Setting: 29.91 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: -1°C / -1°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: Mist
Departure Point: Williston, ND (ISN)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Fargo, ND (FAR)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 1250 CST
Type of Airspace:

Airport Information

Airport: Hector International (FAR)
Runway Surface Type: Concrete
Airport Elevation: 901 ft
Runway Surface Condition: Wet
Runway Used: 18
IFR Approach: ILS
Runway Length/Width: 9001 ft / 150 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: Full Stop

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 None
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 9 Minor, 1 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 9 Minor, 2 None
Latitude, Longitude: 46.920556, -96.815833 (est)

Beech 200 Super King Air, N80RT


Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board 

Additional Participating Entity:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Fargo, North Dakota
Textron Aviation; Wichita, Kansas 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:

Location: Moorhead, MN
Accident Number: CEN17LA043
Date & Time: 11/23/2016, 1759 CST
Registration: N80RT
Aircraft: BEECH 200
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT)
Injuries: 3 Minor, 4 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter - Non-scheduled

Analysis

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand passenger flight at night in instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near straight-in approach minimums for the runway. The pilot flew the approach as a nonprecision LNAV approach, and he reported that the approach was stabilized and that he did not notice anything unusual. A few seconds after leveling the airplane at the missed approach altitude, he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He then disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights. However, before he could turn on the landing lights, the runway became obscured by clouds. The pilot immediately decided to conduct a missed approach and applied engine power, but the airplane subsequently impacted terrain short of the runway in a nose-up level attitude. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. It is likely the pilot lost sight of the runway due to the visibility being at/near the straight-in approach minimums and that the airplane got too low for a missed approach, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

A passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing available shoulder harnesses. The passenger said that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses or told how to adjust the seats. The pilot sustained injuries to his face in the accident.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to attain a positive climb rate during an attempted missed approach in night instrument meteorological conditions that were at/near approach minimums, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

Findings

Aircraft
Climb rate - Not attained/maintained (Cause)
Emergency equipment - Not used/operated

Personnel issues
Aircraft control - Pilot (Cause)
Issuing instructions - Pilot

Environmental issues
Ceiling/visibility/precip - Effect on operation (Cause)



Factual Information

On November 23, 2016, at 1759 central standard time, a Beech 200, N80RT, impacted terrain during a missed approach from runway 30 at Moorhead Municipal Airport (JKJ), Moorhead, Minnesota. The pilot initiated a missed approach after losing visual reference of the runway environment during the final segment of a GPS instrument approach. The pilot and two passengers sustained minor injuries and four passengers were uninjured. The airplane received substantial damage. The airplane was operated by Flight Development, LLC under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a single-pilot on-demand passenger flight. The flight was operating on an instrument rules flight plan. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight departed from Baudette International Airport (BDE), Baudette, Minnesota, at 1714 and was destined to JKJ.

A passenger stated that he and his work crew had been flying between Baudette and Moorhead on a weekly basis for the past 5-6 weeks to build agricultural storage facilities. The passenger stated that the pilot had flown the work crew on one of the previous flights, and the remainder of the flights were flown by the company chief pilot and the company director of operations.

The passenger stated that the accident flight was the first flight in which he was seated in the copilot seat. The passenger stated that he and the pilot were not wearing a shoulder harness. The passenger stated that he was not informed that the airplane was equipped with shoulder harnesses, how to use them, and how to adjust the seats. The passenger stated that he would have adjusted the seat if he would have known that was an option and used his shoulder harness, as he is a safety conscious person.

The pilot stated that before he was handed off from Minneapolis Center to Fargo Approach, he listened to the automated weather observing system (AWOS) at JKJ, which reported that light north winds, a ceiling of 300 feet above ground level, and 1.25 statute mile visibility. He checked in with Fargo Approach and informed them that he had the weather at JKJ and requested the area navigation (RNAV) approach to runway 30 starting at IVEJE, the initial approach fix (IAF). N80RT was not equipped with a wide area augmentation system (WAAS) GPS so he flew the approach as a non-precision lateral navigation (LNAV) approach (straight-in approach minima were: 300 feet above ground level and 1 statute mile visibility). He told Fargo Approach that he realized the weather was deteriorating and would make one attempt at JKJ and then divert to Hector International Airport (FAR), Fargo, North Dakota. Fargo Approach issued a clearance to the IAF, and initial approach altitude, and provided missed approach instructions. The pilot stated that he had flown this approach numerous times and briefed the approach. He stated that the approach was stabilized with the appropriate altitudes and airspeeds throughout and did not notice anything unusual. Upon leveling off at the missed approach altitude of 1,300 feet mean sea level, he looked for the runway. After what seemed like just a few seconds he saw the runway end lights, the strobe lights, and the precision approach path indicator. He disconnected the autopilot and took his hand off the throttles to turn on the landing lights for landing. Before he could even turn on the landing lights, the runway disappeared from sight due to the clouds. He immediately decided to perform a missed approach and applied engine power. He said that he referenced the flight director, but did not recall what it was indicating. He did not feel any sinking feeling indicating that he was losing altitude. He said that It seemed like just a few seconds before the airplane impacted the ground. The airplane struck the ground in somewhat of a nose-up, level bank attitude. The airplane slid along the ground and turned slightly to the right before coming to rest.

The passenger stated that prior to departure, the pilot said they needed to get going because the weather was getting bad in Fargo. While en route, the passenger heard Fargo Air Traffic Control Tower advise weather was not good, and the pilot stated he would try to fly to JKJ first and then fly to FAR, if that did not work. The passenger said the pilot asked him to be on the lookout for the runway and about 3,600 feet the airplane banked to line up for the approach. The passenger said he heard an audible "too low" warning three times, saw some runway lights at eye level, and then the airplane impacted the ground. The passenger said he did not think the pilot initiated a go-around, and he did not see him adjust engine power settings or move the control yoke. The passenger stated that he received facial injuries that required stitches.

The pilot reported that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane.

The pilot's safety recommendation on how the accident could have been prevented was:

"Stick to my normal personal weather minimums and not attempt a non-precision approach to minimums. It would of been so easy to go to Fargo and do the ILS. I have always lectured to my students on the advantage of having two pilots when things are challenging. This is a prime example of such [an accident]. Over confidence is always something that we have to try to keep in check."

A review of the pilot's training records showed that the pilot completed the company's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved ground and flight training program, dated August 17, 2016. The ground training was conducted by the company director of operations and the company chief pilot. The pilot's flight training, which was 10.8 hours in duration, was conducted by the company chief pilot. The pilot received and passed his most recent Part 135.293 Airman Proficiency Check, dated August 18, 2016, which was conducted by an FAA inspector from the Fargo Flight Standards District Office. The check was performed using a Beech 200 and was 1.7 hours in flight duration. The pilot received a grade of satisfactory for all of the check's maneuvers/procedures.

FAA Advisory Circular 91-65, Use of Shoulder Harnesses in Passenger Seats, states in part:

On December 17, 1985, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety recommendation A-85-124, recommending issuance of advisory circular to provide information on crash survivability aspects of small aircraft. The recommendation was the result of an NTSB general aviation airplane crashworthiness project. In the project, the safety board examined 500 relatively severe general aviation airplane accident, to determine what proportion of the occupants would have benefited from the use of shoulder harnesses and energy-absorbing seats. The safety board found that 20 percent of the fatally-injured occupants in these accidents could have survived with shoulder harnesses (assuming the seat belt was fastened) and 88 percent of the seriously injured could have had significantly less severe injuries with the use of shoulder harnesses. Energy-absorbing seats could have benefited 34 percent

of the seriously injured. The safety board concluded that shoulder harness use is the most effective way of reducing fatalities and serious injuries in general aviation accidents.

Part 135.117, Briefing of Passengers Before Flight, states that before each takeoff each pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers shall ensure that all passengers have been orally briefed on: the use of seat belts, the placement of seat backs in an upright position before takeoff and landing, location and means for opening the passenger entry door and emergency exits, location of survival equipment, if the flight involves extended overwater operation, ditching procedures and the use of required flotation equipment, if the flight involves operations above 12,000 feet MSL, the normal and emergency use of oxygen, and location and operation of fire extinguishers. 

History of Flight

Approach-IFR final approach
Loss of visual reference

Approach-IFR missed approach
Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT) (Defining event)
Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT) 

Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline Transport; Flight Instructor; Commercial
Age: 59, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land; Single-engine Sea
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 3-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s):  Airplane Multi-engine; Airplane Single-engine; Instrument Airplane
Toxicology Performed: No
Medical Certification: Class 1 None
Last FAA Medical Exam: 09/20/2016
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 08/18/2016
Flight Time:  5630 hours (Total, all aircraft), 89 hours (Total, this make and model), 5345 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 149 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 46 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 0 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft)



Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: BEECH
Registration: N80RT
Model/Series: 200
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1978
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: BB-370
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 11
Date/Type of Last Inspection:  100 Hour
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 12500 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 2 Turbo Prop
Airframe Total Time:
Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney
ELT: Installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: PT6A-41
Registered Owner: SLICE OF THE 406 LLC
Rated Power: 1050 hp
Operator: Flight Development, LLC
Operating Certificate(s) Held: On-demand Air Taxi (135)
Operator Does Business As:
Operator Designator Code: VOXA

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Instrument Conditions
Condition of Light: Night
Observation Facility, Elevation: JKJ, 918 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 1 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1754 CST
Direction from Accident Site: 120°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility:  0.5 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 300 ft agl
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: 7 knots /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: / None
Wind Direction: 350°
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 30.1 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 1°C / 1°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: Moderate - Fog; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Baudette, MN (BDE)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR
Destination: Moorhead, MN (JKJ)
Type of Clearance: IFR
Departure Time: 1714 CDT
Type of Airspace:

Airport Information

Airport: Moorhead Municipal Airport (JKJ)
Runway Surface Type: Asphalt
Airport Elevation: 918 ft
Runway Surface Condition:
Runway Used: 30
IFR Approach: Global Positioning System
Runway Length/Width: 4300 ft / 75 ft
VFR Approach/Landing: 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Minor
Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Passenger Injuries: 2 Minor, 4 None
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 3 Minor, 4 None
Latitude, Longitude: 46.839167, -96.664167 (est)

16 comments:

  1. to make a legal point and cause real $$$ fortitures, the feds should propose a $339,716 civil penalty against specific NAMED officers and pilots of Slice of the 406 LLC, 82 and Sunny LLC, and other associated parties for allegedly and KNOWINGLY conducting illegal charter flights.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Obviously, you are NOT an attorney.

      Delete
    2. No, he’s an Atrolly, mean troll of unlimited wisdom and knowledge. Superior being mike also work.

      Delete
  2. And pax assume that a fancy shirt with four stripes indicates competency.........

    ReplyDelete
  3. Wow... just wow. Where to begin? The fact 10 people were in an 8 person plane? Or the fact regs are for a reason and if they seem stupid or overreaching it generally means someone did something far more stupider? Like here I guess...
    Maybe if getting a 135 is too complicated and seems impossible... then it maybe means you're not qualified for one. Just suck it up and do something else.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Sometimes it all distills down to one singular motivation, greed. At the expense of lives, properties and or health. No fine or prison term seems to deter the motivation, it just sharpens the blade of those who embrace the violations. Throw in some low ethic high priced attorneys, .. you get the picture.
      From aviation to food services, it’s everywhere.

      Delete
  4. This happens all the time in aviation. You have to dig deeper and not fall for the fluff in aviation. Sadly, the FAA only does something once there is an accident or incident. I have seen them do nothing even after multiple people are deceased. The agency is understaffed and they pick and choose their battles. Not surprised by this accident.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Everything in your commentary is FALSE! Stop the lies!

      Delete
  5. “This happens all the time in aviation” .. to comment that this statement is false could be debated, over and over. I’ve heard several horror stories over the decades of plausible details concerning gross violations reported to the FAA, with no follow up. Lots of frustration. I’ve never personally complained so I speak from what I’ve heard from other pilots.
    With regards to cramming 10 pax into this jet is insane, from two perspectives. Really now, would you sit on the crapper with no restraint. At least that one Pax should be given 90v shock treatments.. Then there is the pilot, cramming ten in, departing into demanding IFR with icing? A pax in the right seat under these conditions? God Christ. what a cluster f#$k.
    Who listens to me? Maybe I missed the boat flying Lear36s. Copious power out those twin TFE731-2-2B’s, hell .. we could have crammed 15 in. Kick the Co pilot out and make even more.

    ReplyDelete
  6. For all its flaws the FAA does a good job enforcing the CFRs. I doubt any other country has a better system.
    That aside I can easily see this is a legit Part 135 operator that got greedy/sloppy and had a mishap in 2016... then got its certificate revoked, then switched to loophole seeking mode and did a typical dry lease arrangement to go around the regs.
    A commercial pilot can legally fly for a company owning a plane. The loophole here is create one entity owning a plane then supposedly advertise pilot positions to fly a private plane but always get them from another entity as if from a free market but really always the same, and related to the one owning the plane.
    End result is lack of the stringent constraints for safety of a real 135 operator with the predictable result here.

    ReplyDelete
  7. I wonder if they gave you a discount or at least a drink voucher for having to sit on the toilet with no restraints. Maybe they got more leg room.

    ReplyDelete
  8. This does go on all the time in our aviation community much to our dismay. I personally have been in and around the Part 135 world for over 45+ years. I have had been hired and fired from flying jobs because I wouldn’t play the games that aircraft management/operators want pilots to play. I have reported several Part 135 operators to the FAA. At least I can sleep at night. Here’s the bottom line….aircraft management companies and some Part 135 operators are the “pimps” and the pilots are the “whores”

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You address a simple logical fact here: The ones having the $$$ to start part 135 operations, by definition, would have obtained those funds through psychopathic behavior. It proven most wealthy people are psychopatic and sociopathic for a large majority as are CEOs etc... basically those in position of power as they were able to out-predator other intra species predators.
      Which brings me to the fact they will bring this mentality to operating an air carrier... which doesn't bode well with not respecting the rules.
      The hazardous attitudes still apply wether pilot or company owner... and anti-authority is especially dangerous.

      Delete
    2. 45 years in 135? Wow. What kind of shady stuff have you seen? What kind of things had the operator done to warrant turning them in?

      Delete
  9. very long list "faa part 135 operators list" @ https://www.faa.gov › afs › afs200 › afs260 › media
    XLS
    1, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 135 Operators and Aircraft UPDATED: 9/1/2021. 2, Part 135 Certificate Holder Name ...

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. More useless comments from the two trolls who post more than any other commenters. Obviously feeling inadequate and need to criticize to feel better.

      Delete