Sunday, November 01, 2020

Loss of Engine Power (Partial) : Cessna 310R, N101G; fatal accident occurred October 29, 2020 near Henderson Executive Airport (KHND), Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada

Robert J. Golo
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Tyrone Cabalar, 35 (passenger)
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Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel to the scene of this accident.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Smith, Maja

Additional Participating Entity:
Richard Ramirez; Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Las Vegas, Nevada 

Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:  


Location: Las Vegas, Nevada
Accident Number: WPR21LA030
Date and  Time: October 29, 2020, 09:39 Local
Registration: N101G
Aircraft: Cessna 310 
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Loss of engine power (partial)
Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

Analysis

The pilot departed in the twin-engine airplane for the cross-country flight. About 1 mile south of the airport, at an altitude of 2,800 ft, the pilot requested a destination change from air traffic control to a nearby airport. The pilot further requested a direct heading to the airport and stated he needed to shut down one engine. As the airplane flew toward the new destination airport, a witness observed the airplane fly over powerlines and then pitch down. The airplane maintained its altitude briefly then nosed down again before it rolled sharply to the left. The airplane impacted the ground about 8 nautical miles northwest of the airport and a postcrash fire ensued. The witness stated that the left engine appeared to be inoperable as the propeller was not spinning. Recorded footage from a witness video confirmed the lack of power from the left engine and power being produced on the right engine.

Recorded automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast data indicate the airplane’s airspeed was approximately 86 knots at the time the turn to the new destination airport was initiated. The airspeed briefly increased to 97 knots over the next minute then gradually decreased to a final airspeed of 78 knots when the data was lost. The airplane’s minimum controllable airspeed (VMC) was 80 knots; therefore, as the airspeed decreased below VMC, the pilot was likely unable to maintain control of the airplane while maneuvering with one engine inoperative.

A postaccident examination of the left engine revealed two holes in the crankcase above cylinder Nos. 3 and 4. The No. 2 connecting rod was separated from the crankshaft and no indication of lubrication was noted in the crankcase. The lack of lubrication, combined with signatures of thermal damage on many of the crankshaft journals and bearings, indicated the likelihood of an oil pressure problem, which resulted in a loss of engine power.

About 10 months before the accident, the engine was disassembled and inspected for a low oil pressure problem. During the maintenance, the main bearings and rod bearings were replaced, as well as the alternator, oil cooler, and starter adapter. The airplane flew about 40 hours after the maintenance was completed; an annual inspection was performed about 6 months before the accident. During the inspection, cylinder compression was noted between 61-65 pounds per square inch (psi) on each cylinder. FAA guidance states cylinder compression less than 60 psi requires removal and inspection of the cylinder. While the cylinder compressions were just above the limit requiring removal, their low compression readings should have indicated a problem to maintenance personnel that needed to be addressed.

The low compression readings only 40 hours after engine disassembly and the failure to identify or correct the reason for the low compression indicates inadequate maintenance.

Toxicology testing detected ethanol in the pilot’s liver and muscle tissue but not in his brain tissue. The ethanol concentration in his liver was over ten times higher than the concentration detected in his muscle tissue. Extensive trauma increases the risk of postmortem ethanol production. Given the differing ethanol tissue concentrations and the trauma received by the body from the crash, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from sources other than ingestion. Thus, the identified ethanol did not contribute to the accident.

Additionally, although toxicology testing detected the sedating antihistamine diphenhydramine in the pilot’s urine and liver tissue, the amounts were too low to quantify. Based on the circumstances of this accident, including the pilot’s appropriate decision to land after an engine failure, it is unlikely that effects from the pilot’s use of diphenhydramine contributed to this accident.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot’s failure to maintain the airplane’s minimum controllable airspeed while maneuvering with one engine inoperative. Also causal was the loss of power in the left engine due to oil starvation. Contributing to the accident were inadequate maintenance that failed to correct an ongoing problem with the engine in the months preceding the accident.

Findings

Personnel issues Aircraft control - Pilot
Aircraft Airspeed - Not attained/maintained
Aircraft Oil - Fluid level
Personnel issues Scheduled/routine maintenance - Maintenance personnel

Factual Information

History of Flight

Enroute-climb to cruise Loss of engine power (partial) (Defining event)
Emergency descent Engine shutdown
Uncontrolled descent Collision with terr/obj (non-CFIT)

On October 29, 2020, about 0939 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 310, N101G was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Henderson, Nevada. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B) data indicate that the airplane departed from runway 12 at North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), Las Vegas, Nevada, at 0929 and proceeded to fly on a southeast heading for about 1 minute before turning toward the southwest. The pilot’s intended destination was Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), San Diego/El Cajon, California. At 0930, approximately 1 mile south of VGT at an altitude of 2,800 ft, the pilot contacted Las Vegas Term Terminal Radar Control and requested a change of destination to Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Henderson, Nevada.

At 0935, the pilot requested to proceed direct to HND and stated that he needed to shut down one engine. The controller approved the request and transferred communication to HND tower controllers. No further communication was received from the pilot. ADS-B data indicate that, about the time of the pilot’s request to proceed to HND, the airplane turned to the east then southeast before data was lost at 0938. When the airplane began the turn to the east, the airspeed was approximately 86 knots. The airspeed briefly increased to 97 knots over the next minute, then gradually decreased to a final airspeed of 78 knots when the data was lost.

The final portion of the accident flight was captured by a video taken on a cell phone by a witness and another video from a home security camera. The security camera video showed the airplane rolled to the left before ground impact followed by a postcrash fire. Examination of the cell phone video at the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Vehicle Recorders Laboratory found the left propeller was not turning before ground impact and the right propeller was turning.

Another witness later reported observing the airplane fly south as it crossed a highway. According to the witness, it appeared as if the airplane attempted to gain altitude (while losing airspeed) as it avoided hitting powerlines that ran across the highway. The airplane appeared to nose down after crossing the powerlines then maintained its altitude for approximately 1,000 ft. Shortly after, the airplane nosed down again, rolled “hard left,” and impacted the ground. The witness stated that the left engine appeared to be inoperable as the propeller was not spinning. Additionally, the airplane was flying about 15° to 20° right wing down before it
rolled to the left and impacted the ground.

A postaccident examination of the left engine revealed it separated from the airframe upon impact; visual examination of the engine revealed extensive thermal and impact damage. It also revealed two holes in the crankcase above cylinder Nos. 3 and 4. Both magnetos remained attached to their respective installation points; however, the impulse coupling assembly exhibited extensive thermal and impact damage and could not be tested for sparks. Both magnetos were disassembled, and no anomalies were noted. The spark plugs all remained installed in their respective cylinders and were undamaged. The top spark plugs were removed and visually inspected; their electrodes all appeared to have normal wear. The fuel pump was removed and examined. The fuel drive coupling was intact; however, the fuel pump could not be rotated by hand due to the impact damage. The oil pump remained secured to its respective installation point, and no anomalies were noted with the pump.

All six cylinders remained attached to the engine and sustained damage consistent with the impact and thermal exposure. A borescope inspection performed on each cylinder revealed the intake and exhaust valve heads on each cylinder displayed normal operating and combustion signatures. The top and bottom throughbolts on cylinder No. 5, as well as the top throughbolt on cylinder No. 3, exposed threads between the respective nuts and the corresponding cylinder decks. The No. 2 connecting rod was separated from the crankshaft. All six piston faces displayed normal operating and combustion signatures and all the piston rings were undamaged and free in their respective grooves.

The crankcase was opened, and indications of fretting were present on main bearing Nos. 2 and 3. Additionally, no indication of lubrication was noted. The No. 2 main bearing was laterally displaced, indicating there was some bearing movement. The left engine three-blade propeller separated at the crankshaft propeller flange. Two of the blades remained straight with no bending or twisting deformation. One blade was slightly bent as a result of the impact.

Examination of the right engine revealed signatures of power at the time of the accident.

The following components from the left engine were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination: inserts for main bearing Nos. 1 – 5, inserts for connecting rod bearings Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, and a thrust bearing. The components were manufactured by both Continental Motors and Superior Air Parts. Several of the inserts exhibited features consistent with heat exposure. The number 4 main bearing inserts exhibited heavy rubbing damage and metal had filled in much of the bearing groove, obstructing five of the six oil through-holes. All of the main bearing left inserts exhibited features consistent with melted and resolidified metal near the insert end face.

Examination of maintenance records revealed an entry dated January 29, 2020, stating the left engine was “disassembled and inspected for low oil pressure.” The entry stated: “alternator failure – metal caused oil pressure problem.” According to the entry, the connecting rod nuts and bolts were replaced, and the main bearings and rod bearings were replaced. Additionally, the alternator, oil cooler, and starter adapter were replaced with overhauled units. The engine was reassembled, test run, and reinstalled on the airplane on January 31, 2020, at a Hobbs time of 1,157.1 hours, and 1,002.2 hours since major overhaul.

The most recent annual examination was completed on April 18, 2020, at a Hobbs time of 1,197.2 hours. The entry in the logbook for the examination indicated cylinder compressions were: 1/62, 2/61, 3/64, 4/65, 5/62, and 6/64. The entry also stated the engine magneto to engine timing was checked and adjusted, and the spark plugs were serviced. The last entry in the left engine logbook was dated August 3, 2020, for an oil change. The last Hobbs time recorded at the oil change was 1,250.4 hours.

Examination of the pilot’s logbook revealed he flew the accident airplane 24.6 hours since the oil change.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) No. 43.13-1B, “Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair,” states in part: “If cylinder has less than a 60/80 reading on the differential test gauges on a hot engine, and procedures in paragraphs 8-15b(5)(i) and (j) fail to raise the compression reading, the cylinder must be removed and inspected.” According to the AC, when performing a differential compression test, cylinders should be pressurized to 80 pounds per square inch (psi).

The minimum controllable speed (VMC), as defined by the FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAAH-8083-3B), is the minimum speed at which directional control can be maintained (under a specific set of circumstances), with the critical engine inoperative. The VMC for the Cessna 310 is 80 knots.

A fuel receipt provided by personnel at VGT revealed the pilot purchased 115 gallons of 100LL fuel at 0912 on the morning of the accident.

The Clark County, Nevada Coroner performed an autopsy on the pilot. The autopsy listed the cause of death as “blunt trauma.” Toxicology testing performed by the forensic pathologist detected ethanol in the pilot’s liver tissue at 0.200 grams per hectogram (gm/hg).

Toxicology testing performed at the FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory detected ethanol in the pilot’s muscle tissue at 0.015 gm/hg; ethanol was not detected in his brain tissue. The antihistamine diphenhydramine was detected in the pilot’s urine and liver tissue.

Ethanol is a social drug commonly consumed by drinking beer, wine, or liquor. It acts as a central nervous system depressant; it impairs judgment, psychomotor functioning, and vigilance. Ethanol can also be produced after death by microbial activity. Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine (commonly marketed as Benadryl) and is available over the counter in many products used to treat colds, allergies, and insomnia. Diphenhydramine carries the warning that use of the medication may impair mental and physical ability to perform potentially hazardous tasks, including driving or operating heavy machinery.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Airline transport; Commercial; Flight instructor
Age: 73, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land; Multi-engine land
Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane 
Second Pilot Present:
Instructor Rating(s): Airplane multi-engine; Airplane single-engine; Instrument airplane
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With waivers/limitations 
Last FAA Medical Exam: December 2, 2019
Occupational Pilot: Yes 
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: May 7, 2020
Flight Time: 12233 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 73.2 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 21.7 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft)
Passenger Information
Certificate: Age:
Airplane Rating(s):
Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s): 
Restraint Used:
Instrument Rating(s): Second 
Pilot Present:
Instructor Rating(s): 
Toxicology Performed:
Medical Certification:
Last FAA Medical Exam:
Occupational Pilot: No 
Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time:

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Cessna
Registration: N101G
Model/Series: 310 R
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1975
Amateur Built:
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal 
Serial Number: 310-0017
Landing Gear Type: 
Retractable - Tricycle Seats:
Date/Type of Last Inspection: April 18, 2020 Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.:
Time Since Last Inspection: 
Engines: 2 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 10386.3 Hrs as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Continental
ELT: 
Engine Model/Series: IO-520-M
Registered Owner: 
Rated Power:
Operator: On file
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual (VMC)
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KLAS, 2180 ft msl 
Distance from Accident Site: 3 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 09:56 Local
Direction from Accident Site: 28°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility: 10 miles
Lowest Ceiling: None 
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual:  /
Wind Direction:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual:  /
Altimeter Setting: 30.2 inches Hg 
Temperature/Dew Point: 20°C / -7°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Las Vegas, NV (VGT) 
Type of Flight Plan Filed: VFR
Destination: San Diego, CA (SEE)
Type of Clearance: VFR
Departure Time: 09:29 Local 
Type of Airspace: Class D

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal 
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries:
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 2 Fatal 
Latitude, Longitude: 36.026127,-115.19351


Location: Las Vegas, NV 
Accident Number: WPR21LA030
Date & Time: October 29, 2020, 09:39 Local
Registration: N101G
Aircraft: Cessna 310 
Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under:

On October 29, 2020, about 0939 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 310, N101G was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Henderson, Nevada. The pilot and the passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot departed North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), Las Vegas, Nevada at 0929 en route to Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), San Diego/El Cajon, California. At 0935, the pilot contacted Air Traffic Control (ATC), declared “engine-out” and requested to change the destination to Henderson Executive Airport (HND), Las Vegas, Nevada. About three minutes later, the airplane crashed 4.5 miles northwest of HND Airport.

The airplane was secured for further examination.

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: Cessna
Registration: N101G
Model/Series: 310 R 
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Amateur Built: No
Operator: 
Operating Certificate(s) Held: On-demand air taxi (135)
Operator Designator Code:

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: VMC 
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: KLAS,2180 ft msl
Observation Time: 09:56 Local
Distance from Accident Site: 3 Nautical Miles 
Temperature/Dew Point: 20°C /-7°C
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear 
Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: / ,
Lowest Ceiling: None 
Visibility: 10 miles
Altimeter Setting: 30.2 inches Hg
Type of Flight Plan Filed:
Departure Point: Las Vegas, NV (VGT) 
Destination: San Diego, CA (SEE)

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 1 Fatal 
Aircraft Fire: On-ground
Ground Injuries:
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 2 Fatal 
Latitude, Longitude: 36.026127,-115.19351


 


Clark County officials have identified the passenger of a plane that crashed in the Las Vegas area shortly after takeoff to San Diego.

The county's Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner says 35-year-old Tyrone Cabalar was killed in the crash on October 29th.

Cabalar was one of two people aboard the Cessna 310R when it went down minutes after taking off from North Las Vegas Airport.

The pilot of the plane, which was heading to Gillespie Field in San Diego, has not been identified.

On October 29th the plane crashed at about 9:30 a.m. near Raven Avenue and Hinson Street, several miles southwest of the Las Vegas Strip.

Witnesses told the Clark County Fire Department they saw the plane flying low before hearing the crash and describing an "awful" sound and a giant "fireball."

First responders say the plane struck the wall of a construction site and burst into flames.

The National Transportation Safety Board and Federal Aviation Administration continue to investigate the incident.


LAS VEGAS (FOX5) -- Two people have died after a small plane crash west of I-15 in Las Vegas Thursday morning, according to the Clark County Fire Department.

The aircraft was a 1974 Cessna 310-R, according to CCFD Deputy Chief Warren Whitney.

It departed North Las Vegas airport at 9:29 a.m., Whitney said. No other injuries were reported.

The incident occurred near Raven Avenue and Hinson Street, west of I-15 near Valley View Boulevard.

CCFD said the plane caught fire, which extended to a nearby trailer. Bruce Langson said he was in the trailer at the time of the crash.

"I could hear the propeller turning over and it sounded like a helicopter. Then I heard a thud, crash and a gigantic ball of flames, fuel splashed over my construction trailer," Langson said. "I ran around and saw it was totally engulfed in flames, a giant fireball.

"There was nothing I could do personally to assist anyone there. It was just... it looked like a movie scene from the worst horror movie I've seen," Langson said.

Audio recordings from Flight Aware reveal what the pilot said moments before the crash.

The pilot told the Henderson control tower he had to shut down one of the engines and needed to land at the Henderson Airport.

An air traffic controller asked if he wanted to get emergency crews ready.

The pilot responded, “negative” then went silent.

About 23 seconds later, the air traffic controller asked for other controllers and pilots to stand by because  they, “just had an aircraft incident.”

Las Vegas police assisted on scene. The FAA is conducting an investigation.



LAS VEGAS (KSNV) — Two people were killed when a small plane crashed at a construction site in the south valley Thursday morning, a fire official has confirmed.

A spokesperson for the Federal Aviation Administration said the Cessna 310 crashed into a lot about four miles northwest of Henderson Executive Airport around 9:30 a.m.

Two people were on board at the time, and the plane caught fire after crashing into a wall at the construction site.

Thomas Touchstone with Clark County Fire Department discusses the plane crash in the south Las Vegas valley.

Thomas Touchstone with the Clark County Fire Department said crews responded around 9:40 a.m. and were able to put out the fire by about 10 a.m. Nobody else was injured.

The cause of the crash is under investigation and the identities of the two people on board have not yet been confirmed, Touchstone said, adding that several witnesses reported seeing the plane flying low before it crashed.

The plane took off from North Las Vegas Airport and crashed after about nine minutes in the air, Touchstone said.

Preliminary details indicate it was bound for Gillespie Field Airport in San Diego, according to the FAA.

Both the FAA and National Transportation Safety Board will investigate, with the NTSB taking the lead. The FAA says it will release the tail number of the plane once verified by investigators on the ground.



LAS VEGAS (FOX 5) --  Thursday started as a normal day for many people in a neighborhood that sees planes every 15 to 20 minutes.

"We were just getting ready during our daily routine," said Anthony Mair, who witnessed the accident. 

"We were taking a morning stroll with my sister," said Isreal Tigabu. 

"I was driving up, I think this is Arville street, on my way to physical therapy," said Ron Cook. 

It didn't take long for witnesses to realize something was wrong. 

"I noticed it about 10 to 15 seconds before it crashed because it was flying very low," Cook said.

"We noticed one of the propellers wasn't working," Tigabu said. "We were like 'Oh my God. I hope the pilot knows."

"It didn't look like it was out of control or anything so I thought it was going to make it," Mair said.

Sadly, that wasn't the case.

"I looked and I saw the plane coming from the west and I said 'Where did that take off from? I can't tell where it's going,'" said Kristin who saw the accident. "My husband immediately said, he's not going to make it."

"At the last second, about 50 feet above the ground, it just turned to the right, I believe, and nosedived," Cook said. "Went straight down, flames came straight up. I pulled over and called 911 and just went running to it.

Authorities said the Cessna 310R crashed just nine minutes after it took off. Neighbors said they're just glad the plane didn't hit a home.

"You're grateful for when others don't die also," Cook said. "And I don't know how many people were on board. Just any loss of life is sad of course."

Authorities said two people died in the crash. The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating the cause of the accident.

66 comments:

  1. In the following video, at about 01m05s, it looks like a Vmc rollover.

    title: Friend shares about pilot killed in south Valley plane crash
    by: 8 News NOW Las Vegas
    published: Oct 31, 2020
    source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8g8yBXInqNw

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    Replies
    1. Yes, the left engine is the critical engine in this plane as it doesn't have counter-rotating propellers. I can't tell from any of the videos because of the angle but it seems to me that the left prop wasn't feathered. I could be totally wrong but the investigators should be able to tell what the blade angle was at impact. My condolences to the family and friends of the deceased.

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    2. Strobe effect of video frame rate always makes it difficult to interpret propeller rotation.

      Delete
    3. In the embedded video at the 4 second mark, https://youtu.be/8OPiDaAHbv4?t=4 it appears that the left propeller is stopped in fine pitch, or max RPM, but not feathered. The Cessna 310 and most piston powered twins will not maintain altitude if the dead engine is unfeathered.

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    4. If you stop the amateur video at 6 seconds, the left propeller isn't feathered.

      Something must have prevented it from feathering. Terrible.

      Condolences to the families and friends of the pilot and passenger.

      Delete
  2. Departure (KVGT) @ Thursday 09:29:04 PDT  FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:29:0436.2008-115.1842↘ 130°1041202,100   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:29:2036.1946-115.1784↓ 161°1071232,300563   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:29:3636.1876-115.1796↙ 225°1051212,400375   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:29:5236.1844-115.1886← 252°1091252,500375   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:30:0836.1816-115.1985↙ 239°1151322,600188   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:30:2436.1751-115.2060↙ 217°1201382,600375   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:30:4036.1679-115.2121↙ 211°1181362,800375   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:30:5636.1606-115.2163↓ 199°1211392,800   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:31:1236.1514-115.2190↓ 195°1211392,800188   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:31:2836.1439-115.2234↙ 219°1141312,900261   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:31:5836.1323-115.2372↙ 221°1161333,000130   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:32:1436.1262-115.2449↙ 224°1101273,000   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:32:3036.1202-115.2506↙ 213°1041203,000   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:32:5236.1117-115.2583↙ 217°1041203,000-154   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:33:0936.1048-115.2638↙ 205°1031192,900-171   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:33:2736.0963-115.2661↓ 191°991142,900   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:33:4336.0898-115.2689↓ 196°961102,900   FlightAware ADS-B (KLSV)Thu 12:34:0136.0825-115.2714↙ 203°901042,900   FlightAware ADS-B (KHND)Thu 12:34:1836.0753-115.2751↓ 198°961102,900-176   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:34:3536.0688-115.2781↙ 202°961102,800-167   FlightAware ADS-B (KLSV)Thu 12:34:5436.0606-115.2819↓ 191°911052,800   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:35:1136.0540-115.2818↘ 147°871002,800-171   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:35:2936.0505-115.2750→ 102°901042,700-324   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:35:4836.0494-115.2636→ 90°941082,600-154   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)Thu 12:36:0836.0493-115.2536→ 102°901042,600-167   FlightAware ADS-B (KLSV)Thu 12:36:2436.0473-115.2457↘ 114°921062,500-293   FlightAware ADS-B (KLSV)Thu 12:36:4936.0419-115.2339↘ 120°931072,400-140   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:37:0736.0390-115.2258→ 108°891022,400   FlightAware ADS-B (KLSV)Thu 12:37:2336.0365-115.2185↘ 115°921062,400-188   FlightAware ADS-B (KHND)Thu 12:37:3936.0336-115.2111↘ 116°871002,300-188   FlightAware ADS-B (KHND)Thu 12:37:5536.0299-115.2037↘ 130°901042,300   FlightAware ADS-B (KLAS)Thu 12:38:1136.0268-115.1980→ 106°80922,300   FlightAware ADS-B (KVGT)

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It would be more useful to the readers to post the track log link instead of an unformatted data dump of the log:

      https://flightaware.com/live/flight/N101G/history/20201029/1629Z/KVGT/L%2036.02600%20-115.19409/tracklog

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    2. for readers without access to flightaware or like sites, a complete or partial track log's multi dimensional readout aids in understanding the PIC's actions; as with the last 25 degree heading change resulting in a 10kts loss to Vmc (velocity minimum controllable), the slowest speed at which the airplane will accept full power on one side and still remain controllable with the other engine inoperative.
      On a Cessna 310R, Vmc is 80 knots and stall speed is 79 knots.

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    3. I truly appreciate the "unformatted data dump of the log", it's very helpful. Thanks!

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    4. The greatest rate of climb, from departure is 375FPM. That is roughly the single engine best rate of climb. At initial speeds ROC should have been 1000FPM or better. He never climbed more than about 800 feet above the departure field elevation. IF there was any performance available, I would have been at 3800-3900 asap, if not cleared into Bravo. I feel that the engine issue began almost immediately. As others have said, KLAS for sure, if not staying in the pattern of KVGT. Makes you wonder if he had an alternate aircraft at Henderson, with which to complete the charter.

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  3. Last ADS data point logged him at 92 MPH, which is VMC in a C310R (80 knots).

    He was holding his speed good prior to that (around 105mph avg, which is what the manual lists as recommended single engine speed ~92 knots) but then the speed bled off.

    Found a manual onlin

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thanks for the information.

      Rest in peace, Mr. Golo, and condolences to family and friends.

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    2. Remember that the ADS-B data is showing ground speed. Vmc is related to airspeed.

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  4. Actually it appears he may have hit power lines. Check out the Googlemap street view at the intersection of W. Pebble Rd and South Valley View Blvd looking south towards the empty lot and building they crashed next to. The video from the home security camera shows what appears to be a flash or puff of smoke and then instantly afterword the snap roll.

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    1. Crashed along Raven avenue going east, before reaching those big power lines.

      Pinned map location of impact point:
      http://maps.google.com/maps?t=k&q=loc:36.026179+-115.193579

      Determination of crash location and match to older google map photography uses recognizable cluster of solar equipped shipping containers in this news video (see 6 to 9 second mark):
      https://www.ktnv.com/news/small-plane-crashes-in-southwest-las-vegas

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  5. "As every multi-engine pilot knows, Vmc stands for velocity minimum controllable, the slowest speed at which the airplane will accept full power on one side and still remain controllable with the other engine inoperative.  

    On a Cessna 310R, for example, Vmc is 80 knots and stall speed is 79 knots. If you’ve ever had to demonstrate minimum controlled flight in a 310 with one engine zero-thrusted and the other running at full power, you’ll see this phenomenon at work — and you’ll feel it too.  ositive (even if you’re doing everything right), and the pilot will not be having fun. Perhaps worst of all, you’ll be below the Vyse speed of 106 knots by a wide margin, and that’s never a comfortable feeling.  

    As you slow the airplane, you’ll need progressively more rudder on the power side to hold up the “dead” wing. Eventually, you’ll get to a point where you’re totally out of top (or “power”) rudder and the airplane will want to stall and roll uncontrollably toward the dead engine. " https://cessnaowner.org/beware-the-deadly-vmc-preparing-for-a-single-engine-loss-in-a-twin/

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    1. Got too slow on single engine maybe better to just make the airport and feather cut the good engine glide in?

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    2. Vmc is the speed you see just before the crash. You would be insane to get anywhere down there in a 310. Vmc has killed a lot of airplanes.

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  6. Seems like there was a lot of open space out there. Keep it above blue line and set it down. Sad.

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  7. Looks like he hit power lines then it rolled.

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    1. Did not hit power lines. Came down going East on Raven Avenue, houses on Raven have underground power. Go to street view from mapped crash location and have a look, transformers in front of homes, no poles. Big power pole line is beyond crash site.

      http://maps.google.com/maps?t=k&q=loc:36.026179+-115.193579

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    2. Maybe not, however if you look at the pictures and watch the videos of the accident site, there sure look like a lot of above ground power lines in the area.

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    3. Yes there are power lines East of the crash site, but he came in from the West. Did you look at the map link in the comment you responded to and use street view on Raven? Other streets have poles but not Raven.

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  8. we were at 4205 raven avenue, when he hit a steel fence by the place next to us. he did not hit power lines, as they start more west of where he went down. we ran to try and help but the whole plane was engulfed in flames immediately. it sucked to tell you the truth and is still with me a week later.. would like to know what exactly lead to this.

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  9. He should have declared an emergency the moment he experienced engine problems and landed at McCarren. McCarren was just off his left wing, much closer than Henderson, has a variety of long wide runways to choose from, and is at a 300 ft lower elevation than Henderson. If you listen to the ATC tapes, he initially just said he wanted to amend his destination to Henderson and was later directed to stay clear of the Bravo. Eventually the pilot casually mentions he had to shut down an engine, but declines assistance when the tower offers to roll equipment for him. He may have understandably not wanted to bother ATC (or disrupt McCarren operations) for a situation he felt like he could control, but an engine issue, even on a multi-engine aircraft, should always be treated as an emergency. A very tragic situation. My condolences to his family and friends.

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    1. Agreed - ATC recordings show 4 or 5 minutes of flight between asking to divert and shutting down an engine. Misjudged the engine problem thinking it would stay up to Henderson.

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  10. Considering the stringent requirements for Part 135 maintenance I suspect the operating certificate of the company will be put in question. Someone out there decided to violate willfully and recklessly a rule written in blood and more blood was spilled because of it.
    My condoleances to the Pilot and the innocent victim i.e the passenger.

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    1. please enlighten us with ur part 135 conclusion!

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    2. Very simple... Part 135 regs are stringent as hell regarding maintenance:
      1) Pilot/owner cannot do any sort of maintenance on the plane himself as is permitted for some items under Part 91.
      2) All the maintenance has to be done by a repair shop or certified mechanic which has a drug testing program. If an emergency repair (say a flat) happens and is repaired on the field the operator needs to have the work checked by the above authorized entities.
      3) 100 hr inspections are compulsory as well as the regular annuals. If an engine is at TBO it needs to be overhauled to zero time unlike for part 91 where the TBO is a recommended interval.
      4) All recommended items like safety bulletins become compulsory under part 91. For example the SB for bladder to the fuel tanks for Robinsons was an optional item for part 91 operators but was a 20-40k expenses as compulsory for all part 135 air taxis with Robinson helicopters.

      All of these are, you guessed it, to PROTECT the public from mishaps that can result from poor/shady maintenance for an air taxi. Maintenance expenses are HUGE for any legal air charter operation. because of those stringent maintenance requirements and this is why they have to charge the prices they do (Say a flight from French Valley to Santa Monica i.e 120 miles is 2.5k!!!).
      This multi airplane should have never ever had an engine out... in fact the very fact under a stringent maintenance mandate it would have happened means the FAA/NTSB will investigate the operator and repair shops involved because if everyone followed the stringent rules for maintenance, overhaul and following all the ADs and SBs, this engine would have never had an issue!!!
      So something must give... and I suspect if this was a one man operator there was a lot of corner cutting and a poor not knowledgeable passenger off the street was lead down to slaughter in a poorly maintained aircraft and even more the predictable reaction of a pilot who may have tried to hide the truth and pretend all was alright not declaring an emergency.
      Losing an engine is a small twin is a BIG DEAL. It is a DEADLY situation for which any experienced pilot will do a mayday in a split second and mobilize all the available resources.
      He didn't declare an emergency nor sought to land in the large class B airport within glide distance, of course with quite a few FAA inspectors there as is generally the case of them doing surveillance on part 121 (scheduled flights) operators... go figure.

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    3. "This multi airplane should have never ever had an engine out..."

      Engines fail. Even brand new ones from the factory.

      "Losing an engine is a small twin is a BIG DEAL. It is a DEADLY situation for which any experienced pilot will do a mayday in a split second..."

      No. The first order of business is to secure the failed engine, not get on the radio in a split second. You do a lot of suspecting but don't seem to have experience on your side.

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    4. Have to agree if he had gone to McCarran probalby be alive?

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    5. "He didn't declare an emergency nor sought to land in the large class B airport within glide distance..."

      If you're saying he should have decided to land when the engine failed, KVGT was closer. Why didn't you suggest that? If he was equally close to KLAS and KVGT when the engine failed, what factors into the decision to go to one field over the other?

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    6. KLAS was the best option, no question. Look at the track log. KVGT might have been closer initially, but it was also behind him since it was his departure airport while KLAS was either ahead of him or off his left most of the time. When your engine fails, you want to turn as little as possible. Other factors are runway length. KVGT's runways are 75 feet wide and 4200-5000 feet long. KLAS runways are 150 feet wide and range from 9000-14,000 feet long. Longer wider runways give you a lot more tolerance for misalignment and other errors on your approach when you are battling an engine failure. Finally KLAS has a higher ARFF rating, so you would potentially get faster and better rescue/fire services if you crashed.

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    7. My questions were directed at MarcPilot in an effort to get him to think. I don't disagree with what you wrote, although I think runway length/width is a really a non-issue - this is an engine failure situation, not a control surface/flight control failure emergency.

      Clearly the pilot thought he could make KHND. And a C310R with an engine failure under those weather conditions should have been able to manage 150-200 fpm climb. But this one could only manage a 100-200 fpm descent. Will be interested to see what the investigation says about that. If I knew ahead of time that the best I could do was a 100-200 fpm descent, I would have declared right away. I think (but don't know for certain) that the pilot should have seen he was unable to maintain altitude-it may be that he was distracted by ATC instructing him to stay out of the Class B.

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    8. An owner/pilot can perform maintenance/repairs if he/she is a certificated mechanic.

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    9. @marcpilot: Part 135 aircraft can be maintained just as part 91 and part 61, if you write your 135 operation specs that way, and the FAA approves them. Once you have done that you are required to do 100 hour inspections,(basically an annual). ADs and one Annual a year. You do have to follow recommended time and hours for engine TBO. Your mechanic needs to be on a drug test program, but again if written properly no "145 repair station". This assumes part 23, and CAR 3 piston aircraft. Part 25 airplanes go to the repair station AFIK. You have to comply with mandatory items relating to continuing airworthiness, that are part of the TCDS, but not all service bulletins and service letters.
      This is a tragic accident. RIP

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  11. Anyone find the audio on Live ATC? Too many freqs at KLAS to go through.

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    1. VAS Avation made a video with all of it. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMLCzbqUo9o

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  12. And I suspect this whole part 135 was shady for him deciding not to declare an emergency which would automatically trigger a compulsory investigation and report under the air taxi regs. So I suspect the pilot knew the airplane may have been unworthy or out of something and wanted to keep it quiet, but the end result was death of an innocent passenger that entrusted his life to this enterprise. Expect a lot of interesting things to be revealed by the investigation...

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    1. Agree 100% with the minor caveat that declaring an emergency doesn't normally result in an investigation - even for Part 135 operators - except under the most egregious of circumstances. In fact, many Part 135 operators have an ASAP program wherein they can even self disclose without penalty, so long as they are not self disclosing an intentional violation of the FAR's. But I do agree completely that a "one man" Part 135 operation was probably the main ingredient in a fatal stew of non-compliance and / or poor maintenance and training practices. We'll all find out once the NTSB publishes the report.

      In any case, this is sadly another fatality of an innocent passenger who put his trust in the aviation system and another avoidable black eye for aviation.

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    2. Indeed this is ever more a black eye as we're talking of a part 135 operator here. Part 91 is the "wild west" but it is so hard to get a 135 certificate for the very reason the operator has to prove their level of safety is enough for them to advertise to the general public and compete with the airlines by becoming a mini airline.
      Mishaps for part 135 are very rare too... with the latest big one publicized being the crash of Kobe Bryant earlier this year.

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpGl2_fVr2Y&feature=youtu.be

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    3. "And I suspect this whole part 135 was shady..."

      We call that drawing a conclusion in the absence of fact.

      And then you contradict yourself: "...but it is so hard to get a 135 certificate for the very reason the operator has to prove their level of safety..."

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  13. Air Charter Express provides direct economical passenger Las Vegas
    no mention of 135 certificate
    858 692 1683

    or e-mail: BobGolo@gmail.com

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    1. Here's his 135 listing

      "Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 135 Operators and Aircraft
      UPDATED: 11/3/2020"

      Air Charter Express Inc XIRA 135 WP09 - San Diego (SAN) N101G 310R0017 CE-310-R

      You can find out about 135, and much more at this link. Lots to click on.

      https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/afs/afs200/afs260/

      JW

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    2. Consumers can learn about red flags using the safe charter page:
      https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/safe_charter_operations/

      And no need to hunt for the direct link to the .xls file of operators and their aircraft:

      https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/afs/afs200/afs260/media/135aircraft.xlsx

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  14. Checked the charter company web page after reading unflattering comments about possible one-man shop pitfalls and noticed that a San Diego 2020 Award trophy was showing there. The lower portion of the crystal trophy has a stylized olive branch emblem that says "Presented by San Diego Awards Program".

    Searched for the announcement and origin of the award, expecting it to be aviation industry or San Diego BBB related which would be relevant to the comment discussion. No such "Program" in San Diego gave the charter business that award.

    Turns out that the "Award Program" is a widespread long running vanity award scheme. Found other recipients and articles with images of that award and explanation of how the vanity award scheme operates (see Outline link below).

    Regardless of whether he got duped and paid out for it or just copied the image from the come-on email the schemers sent him, the fake award on the company web page is not a good look for a 135 operation.

    The web page:
    http://aircharterexpress.com/
    The award scheme explained:
    https://outline.com/ykCZC8

    (The scheme is so successful, you can substitute almost any city name in the search string "city Award Program" and find companies and organizations that proudly declare their winning of the award with the same boilerplate "press release" text. Search for "Daytona Beach Award Program" and see what car dealers "won". Warnings in news stories go back to 2013 but the scheme is still going on and very widespread. Check by searching on your city and be amazed at what you find.)

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    1. Just his behavior trying not to declare an emergency and minimizing the issue saying they didn't need any equipment is enough of a red flag.
      TEAM - Transfer, Eliminate, Accept and Mitigate as the chain of decisions needed when dealing with the Perform part of Perceive, Process, Perform i.e the 3 P's... and that means mobilizing all the outside resources possible declaring an emergency to ATC which gives you 100% priority, here diverting to the LARGE Class B airport nearby with massively long runways and within glide distance, and making sure the equipment would be there in case of rough landing to prevent a fire and assist crew and passengers.
      Sure there will be paperwork and questions but if all is legit that is non issue...

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    2. Overflew TWO airports. Not one to armchair sh*t, but an engine out is serious deal and you need to declare and get her down asap. Speaking from experience. MANY high time Twin Cessna pilot's have paid the ultimate price. Learn from the blood of others. God bless the deceased. Read, think, learn, save a life.

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  15. The owner-operator, Bob Golo always had his 3 aircraft professionally maintained by FAA certified mechanics. The only work he ever did to his aircraft was to wash or wax them. He never skimped 1 penny on maintenance or parts. I'm shocked the plane went down the way it did. Bob was an extremely competent pilot. Northwestern grad, worked for Chicago Center in ATC long ago, regularly flew the Cessna 310, Cessna 340, and his Eclipse jet. He & I were best friends & started flying together 50 years ago. We spent hundreds of hours flying together. Lost my best friend in the world. Little hard to tell in the short video clip, but it looked like the right engine was feathered, and the left engine was windmilling...ready to be feathered. Anybody can 2nd guess or play Monday morning quarterback, but Bob was one of the best pilots I ever knew for 5 decades.

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    1. I'm sorry for your loss. It must be difficult and all the questions surrounding the accident are more meaningful to you.

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    2. Human factors dictate no matter the skills, hours or currency any startle reaction will make us regress to the level of a first lesson student pilot gripping the controls in panic unless we condition ourselves to imagine an emergency happening every second.
      The fact his engine went out warrants the FAA will most likely talk to the said certified mechanics in the part D of his 135 Opspecs too. No one is saying he was at fault of course but the fact a duly licensed air taxi has such a problem will raise eyebrows especially of the shops need to be extra cautious for any aircraft used in a part 135 operation...

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    3. "Human factors dictate no matter the skills, hours or currency any startle reaction will make us regress to the level of a first lesson student pilot gripping the controls in panic unless we condition ourselves to imagine an emergency happening every second."

      No. You don't have to imagine an emergency happening every second to be prepared for an emergency.

      "...but the fact a duly licensed air taxi has such a problem will raise eyebrows especially of the shops..."

      Engines fail all the time, including engines in Part 135 service. The mere fact that an engine failed doesn't mean the FAA will interview anyone.


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    4. Sorry for your loss. I'm sure Bob did everything he could have to bring N101G down safely.

      Something must have prevented the propeller from feathering.

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    5. If engines fail all the time in part 135 operations... who the hell will be crazy enough to take an air taxi??? This is a ridiculous statement. Dunning Krueger from someone who has never worked for a Part 135. I did. The respectable part 135 operations that spend the time, energy and comply with a mountain of regulations meant to assure said air taxi operations are safe and the outcome of a flight is never in doubt will disagree!!!

      The mere fact here a SIMPLE engine failure resulted in the DEATH of an innocent passenger who never imagined the day he paid for a flight would be his last is matter of major scrutiny by the FAA.

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    6. Engines fail regularly. That is a fact. Ask someone who is actually a pilot and they'll tell you the same thing.

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    7. The owner-operator, Bob Golo always had his 3 aircraft professionally maintained by FAA certified mechanics.
      Who did you expect to do the maintenance, Rufus under his shade tree ??? Dummy.

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    8. Just noticed your shitty comment. I made that comment because there were a couple people who suggested that maybe he skimped on maintenance, etc., or had done some work himself. That was not the case.

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    9. Greg Seznak: I see that there are numerous lawsuits against your buddy, Bob, by the passengers relatives for $100 million each. How is that even possible?

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  16. I have flown a lot of twin engine airplanes. Frankly, pilots don't regularly, if ever, check the feathering action on their airplanes. It is Not cycling the prop on runup. It is done at altitude. There are some who say it is "hard on the airplane". I have found around half the twins I've tired it on would Not Feather.

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    1. I have maybe 500 hours in twins. I don't remember feather check on the Seminole checklist, but it is on the Grumman Cougar, 1200 RPM not to exceed 500 RPM drop.

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    2. John, I am not talking about a drop, but will the prop actually go all the way to f

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  17. The owner, Bob, endangered himself and others by failing to declare an emergency, assuming PIC authority and bypassing not one but 2 good airports i.e Las Vegas North and McCarran to go to Henderson.
    He furthermore started a descent at 700 ft on a 4 mile final to Henderson airport when altitude = LIFE when you have an engine out in a light twin.
    Lotsa questions why he was so incompetent but what may seem to transpire is he didn't want the FAA to ask questions and was more concerned by that than the life of his passenger...

    This is the video analysis that lay it all out:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upd21upoCk8

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    Replies
    1. So there is one conclusion making flights safer: Don't scare people off the FAA! This actually means there should be no sanctions by the FAA or only in very rare cases.

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    2. While your introspection seems worthy to me too, I do think we cannot convict or condemn Bob Golo at this point, nor will we ever (nor should we), as we should wait for the NTSB final report after all the investigators turn in their findings.

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