Joseph and Anna Trustey, together on the day of her school prom in April 2015, were killed in a plane crash July 29, 2015.
The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident.
Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration / Flight Standards District Office; Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Daher; Pompano Beach, Florida
Pratt & Whitney Canada; Bridgeport, West Virginia
Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf
Trustey Management Corporation: http://registry.faa.gov/N425KJ
Anna Trustey
Joseph Trustey
NTSB Identification: CEN15FA328
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, July 29, 2015 in Milwaukee, WIAircraft: SOCATA TBM 700, registration: N425KJ
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 29, 2015, about 1810 central daylight time, a Socata TBM 700 single-engine turboprop airplane, N425KJ, collided with terrain following a loss of control during a go-around at Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (MWC), Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The airline transport pilot and his passenger were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was registered to Trustey Management Corporation and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight that departed Beverly Municipal Airport (BVY), Beverly, Massachusetts, at 1552 eastern daylight time with a destination of MWC.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control (ATC) data, the flight was cleared for a visual approach to runway 33R at MWC. At 1808:12, while on a 2.5-mile final approach, the pilot asked the tower controller for the current wind conditions. At 1808:18, the tower controller told the pilot that the prevailing wind was from 230° at 10 knots. At 1808:21, the pilot replied, "Three zero one zero, thanks, or two three zero?" At 1808:24, the tower controller responded, "Two three, two thirty."
In a postaccident interview, the tower controller reported that he established visual contact with the airplane when it was on a 3-mile final approach to runway 33R. The tower controller stated that the airplane's landing gear appeared to be extended during final approach and that the airplane landed within the runway's touchdown zone. The tower controller further stated that, although the airplane made a normal landing, he heard a squealing noise that continued longer than what he believed was typical.
According to ATC transmissions, at 1809:56, shortly after the airplane had touched down, the pilot transmitted, "go-around." The tower controller acknowledged the go-around and cleared the pilot to enter a left traffic pattern. The tower controller stated that he heard the engine speed accelerate while the airplane maintained a level attitude over the runway until it passed midfield. He then saw the airplane pitch up and enter a climbing left turn. The tower controller stated that the airplane appeared to "stall" during the turn before it descended into terrain in a left-wing-down attitude.
Another witness reported that he saw the airplane, with its landing gear extended, in a steep left turn before it descended toward the ground. He stated that the airplane maintained the steep left bank throughout the final descent and estimated that the airplane's final descent path was about 45° below a level flight attitude. The witness reported that, shortly after he lost sight of the airplane, he heard it impact terrain and saw a large explosion.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to FAA records, the 53-year-old pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings. The airplane single-engine land rating was limited to commercial privileges. The pilot was type-rated for the Bombardier Challenger 300 and Embraer Phenom 300. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on June 13, 2014, with no restrictions or limitations. On the application for his current medical certificate, the pilot reported having accumulated 1,594 total hours of flight experience, of which 112 hours were flown within the previous 6 months.
The pilot's flight history was established using his logbook. The final logbook entry was dated July 20, 2015, at which time he had accumulated 1,875.1 hours total flight time. The pilot had logged 1,656.5 hours as pilot-in-command, 1,363 hours in single-engine airplanes, and 512.1 hours in multi-engine airplanes. He had flown 268.1 hours during the year before the accident, 152.7 hours during the 6 months before the accident, 64.4 hours during the 90 days before the accident, and 16.2 hours during the month before the accident. Based on available information, the 3.3-hour accident flight was the only flight flown within 24 hours of the accident. The pilot had accumulated 721.1 hours in the accident airplane make/model. His last flight review and instrument proficiency check were completed in the accident airplane on November 16, 2014.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was a 2009 Socata TBM 700, serial number 518. The low-wing airplane was of conventional aluminum construction and was equipped with a retractable tricycle landing gear and a pressurized cabin that was configured to seat six individuals. The airplane was powered by an 850 shaft-horsepower Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-66D turbo-propeller engine, serial number PCE-RV0179, through a 4-blade, constant speed, full-feathering, Hartzell model HC-E4N-3/E9083SK propeller assembly. The airplane was approved for operations in instrument meteorological conditions and in known icing conditions. The airplane had a maximum allowable takeoff weight of 7,394 pounds. On December 2, 2009, the airplane was issued a standard airworthiness certificate and a registration number when it was imported into the United States after manufacture in France. The current airplane owner, Trustey Management Corporation, purchased the airplane on December 16, 2009.
According to maintenance records, the airplane had been maintained under the provisions of an approved manufacturer inspection program. The most recent phase inspection was completed on December 29, 2014, at 656.7 hours total airframe time. The recording hour meter was destroyed during the postimpact fire, which precluded a determination of the airplane's total service time at the time of the accident. A postaccident review of the available maintenance records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues.
The airplane had two fuel tanks, one located in each wing, and a total fuel capacity of 301 gallons (292 gallons usable). According to available fueling information, the fuel tanks were topped-off before the accident flight.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1745, the MWC automated surface observing system reported: wind 270° at 14 knots, a clear sky, 10 miles surface visibility; temperature 29°C; dew point 6°C; and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury.
According to air traffic control communications, at 1808:12, the pilot asked the tower controller for the current wind conditions while on final approach to runway 33R. The tower controller replied that the prevailing wind was from 230° at 10 knots.
COMMUNICATIONS
A review of available air traffic control information indicated that the accident flight received normal services and handling. Transcripts of the voice communications recorded between the accident pilot and the tower controller are included in the docket materials associated with the investigation.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (MWC), a public airport located about 5 miles northwest of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was owned and operated by Milwaukee County. The airport field elevation was 745 ft msl. The airport was served by two asphalt runways, runway 15L/33R (4,103 ft by 75 ft) and runway 4L/22R (3,201 ft by 75 ft). Runway 4L/22R was closed for maintenance at the time of the accident. The airport also had two turf runways, runway 15R/33L (3,231 ft by 270 ft) and runway 4R/22L (2,839 ft by 270 ft). The airport was equipped with an air traffic control tower that was operational at the time of the accident.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
A postaccident examination of runway 33R revealed numerous slash marks consistent with propeller blades striking the asphalt runway surface. The first propeller strike was identified about 1,384 ft from the runway 33R threshold, or about 215 ft past the runway's touchdown zone. There were 22 propeller strike marks identified over a distance of about 25 feet 7 inches. The propeller strike marks were located slightly right of the runway centerline. There were also numerous small asphalt pieces found adjacent to the slash markings.
The main wreckage was in an open field located on the west side of the airport property. The initial impact was identified by a small ground depression that contained pieces of red lens material that were consistent with the left wing navigational light. A large area of burnt ground and vegetation preceded the main wreckage. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a 180° heading and measured about 141 ft. The propeller, nose landing gear, right flap, and left aileron were located along the wreckage debris path.
The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, empennage, both wings, and the engine. The main wreckage was oriented on a north heading. A majority of the fuselage, including the cockpit, cabin, and the left wing were consumed by the postimpact fire. The cockpit Garmin G1000 avionic components, including the nonvolatile memory cards, were destroyed by the postimpact fire. Flight control continuity could not be established due to impact and fire damage; however, all observed separations were consistent with overstress or were consumed during the postimpact fire.
The landing gear selector switch was found in the "DOWN" position. Measurements of the landing gear actuators were consistent with all three landing gear being fully extended at the time of impact. Examination of the nose wheel tire and right main tire did not reveal any flat spots. The right main and nose wheel assemblies rotated freely, and no anomalies were noted with the right brake components. A majority of the left main tire was consumed during the postimpact fire. The fuselage skid plates, installed on the lower wing spar carry-through structure, did not exhibit any evidence of being scraped. The lower VHF antenna had separated from the fuselage and was located along the wreckage debris path. The lower VHF antenna did not exhibit any evidence of being scraped. The trailing edge of the right flap and the corresponding flap track fairings did not exhibit any evidence of being scraped. The left flap was partially consumed during the postimpact fire. Measurements of the flap actuator jack screws established that the flaps were extended to 34°, which was consistent with a normal landing flap configuration.
The propeller assembly and the forward section of the reduction gearbox had separated from the engine and were found along the wreckage debris path. All four propeller blades remained attached to the hub assembly and exhibited S-shaped bends, tip curls, chordwise scratching, and leading edge damage. The fractured propeller shaft exhibited features consistent with torsional overload. The engine exhaust exhibited evidence of torsional bending associated with impact. The downstream face of the compressor turbine disc and blades exhibited rotational scoring from contact with the adjacent static components. The upstream face of the compressor turbine disc and blades were unremarkable. The first-stage power turbine vane and baffle exhibited rub marks on both sides from contact with the power turbine and compressor turbine discs and blades. The first-stage power turbine disc and blades exhibited rotational scoring on the upstream face. Examination of the engine oil filter and magnetic chip detectors did not reveal any significant particulate contamination. The observed damage to the propeller and engine components were consistent with the engine operating at a medium to high power output at the time of final impact.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The Milwaukee County Medical Examiner's Office, located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, performed an autopsy on the pilot. The cause of death was attributed to thermal injuries and the inhalation of combustion products during the postaccident fire. The autopsy report also noted multiple blunt-force injuries. The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens obtained during the autopsy. The test results included 23% carbon monoxide and 1.3 ug/ml cyanide detected in blood. There was no ethanol detected in vitreous. Ibuprofen was detected in urine. Ibuprofen, sold under multiple brand names, is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory analgesic drug.
ADDITIONAL DATA/INFORMATION
According to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Alert No. SA-019, Prevent Aerodynamic Stalls at Low Altitude, many aerodynamic stalls occur in visual meteorological conditions when a pilot becomes momentarily distracted from the primary task of flying, such as while maneuvering in the airport traffic pattern, during an emergency, or when fixating on ground objects. The safety alert further states that reducing angle-of-attack by lowering the airplane's nose at the first indication of a stall is the most important immediate response for stall avoidance and stall recovery.
NTSB Identification: CEN15FA328
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, July 29, 2015 in Milwaukee, WI
Aircraft: SOCATA TBM 700, registration: N425KJ
Injuries: 2 Fatal.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On July 29, 2015, about 1810 central daylight time, a Socata model TBM 700 single-engine turboprop airplane, N425KJ, was destroyed during a postimpact fire after it collided with terrain following a loss of control during an aborted landing at Lawrence J. Timmerman Airport (MWC), Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The airline transport pilot and his passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Trustey Management Corporation and was operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 while on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight that departed Beverly Municipal Airport (BVY), Beverly, Massachusetts, at 1552 eastern daylight time.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control (ATC) data, the flight had been cleared for a visual approach to runway 33R (4,103 feet by 75 feet, asphalt). At 1808:12 (hhmm:ss), while on a 2.5 mile final approach, the pilot asked the tower controller for the current wind conditions. At 1808:18, the tower controller told the pilot that the prevailing wind was from 230 degrees at 10 knots. At 1808:21, the pilot replied "Three zero one zero, thanks, or two three zero?" At 1808:24, the tower controller stated "Two three, two thirty."
In a postaccident interview, the tower controller reported that he established visual contact with the accident airplane when it was on a 3 mile final approach to runway 33R. The tower controller stated that the airplane's landing gear appeared to be extended during final approach and that the airplane landed within the runway's marked touchdown zone. The tower controller stated that the airplane did not appear to bounce upon landing; however, he heard a squealing noise that was longer in duration than typical. Shortly after the landing the pilot transmitted "Go-Around." (According to an ATC audio recording, the pilot transmitted "Go-Around" at 1809:56) The tower controller stated that he acknowledged the aborted landing and cleared the pilot to enter a left traffic pattern. The tower controller stated that he heard the engine speed accelerate and observed the airplane maintain a level attitude over the runway until it passed the taxiway charley intersection. He then observed the airplane pitch-up and enter a climbing left turn. The tower controller stated that the airplane appeared to "stall" during the climbing left turn and subsequently descended into terrain while in a left wing low attitude.
A postaccident examination of the runway revealed numerous slash marks that were consistent with propeller blades striking the asphalt surface. The first propeller strike was identified about 1,384 feet from the runway 33R threshold. There were 22 propeller strike marks identified over a distance of about 25 feet 7 inches. The propeller strike marks were located slightly to the right of the runway centerline. There were numerous small asphalt pieces found adjacent to the slash markings.
The main wreckage was located in an open field located on the west side of the airport property. The initial impact was identified by a small ground depression that contained pieces of red lens material that were consistent with the left wing navigational light. A large area of burnt ground and vegetation preceded the main wreckage. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a 180-degree heading and measured about 141 feet long. The propeller, nose landing gear, right flap, and left aileron were located along the wreckage debris path. The main wreckage consisted of the fuselage, empennage, both wings, and the engine. The main wreckage was oriented on a north heading. A majority of the fuselage, including the cockpit and cabin, and the left wing were consumed by the postimpact fire. The cockpit Garmin G1000 avionic components, including the nonvolatile memory cards, were destroyed by the postimpact fire. Flight control continuity could not be established due to impact and fire damage; however, all observed separations were consistent with overstress or were consumed during the postimpact fire. The landing gear selector switch was found in the GEAR DOWN position. Measurements of the landing gear actuators were consistent with all three landing gear being fully extended at the time of impact. Examination of the nose wheel tire and right main tire did not reveal any flat spots. The right main and nose wheel assemblies rotated freely and no anomalies were noted with the right brake components. A majority of the left main tire had been consumed during the postimpact fire. The four fuselage skid plates, installed on the lower wing spar carry-through structure, did not exhibit any evidence of scraping damage. The lower VHF antenna had separated from the fuselage and was located along the wreckage debris path. The lower VHF antenna did not exhibit any evidence of scraping damage. The trailing edge of the right flap and the corresponding flap track fairings did not exhibit any evidence of scraping damage. The left flap was partially consumed during the postimpact fire. Measurements of the flap actuator jack screws were consistent with the flaps in the landing configuration (34-degrees).
The propeller assembly and the forward section of the reduction gearbox had separated from the engine and were found along the wreckage debris path. All four propeller blades remained attached to the hub assembly and exhibited S-shape bends, tip curls, chordwise scratching, and leading edge damage. The fractured propeller shaft exhibited features consistent with torsional overload. The engine exhaust exhibited evidence of torsional bending associated with impact. The downstream face of the compressor turbine disc and blades exhibited rotational scoring from contact with the adjacent static components. The upstream face of the compressor turbine disc and blades were unremarkable. The first-stage power turbine vane and baffle exhibited rub marks on both sides from contact with the power turbine and compressor turbine discs and blades. The first-stage power turbine disc and blades exhibited rotational scoring on the upstream face. Examination of the engine oil filter and magnetic chip detectors did not reveal any significant particulate contamination. The observed damage to the propeller and engine components were consistent with the engine operating at a medium-to-high power output at the time of impact.
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