Thursday, September 01, 2016

Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, registered to N752RV LLC and operated by Hageland Aviation Services Inc doing business as Ravn Connect, N752RV (and) Piper PA-18-150 Super Cub, registered to DioAir LLC and operated by Renfro's Alaskan Adventures Inc, N82452: Fatal accident occurred August 31, 2016 near Russian Mission Airport (PARS), Alaska

Hageland Aviation pilot Harry Wrase, 48, of Wasilla, Alaska

Hageland passengers Steven Paul Andrew, 32, of Kenai, and Aaron Jay Minock, 21, of Russian Mission, Alaska

Steven Paul Andrew


Aaron Jay Minock

Renfro pilot Zach Justin Babat, 44, of Montana (left side)

 Guide Jeff Thomas Burruss, 40, of Haines, Alaska.


The National Transportation Safety Board traveled to the scene of this accident. 

Additional Participating Entities:
Federal Aviation Administration Denali Certificate Management Office; Anchorage, Alaska 
Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Ravn Connect; Anchorage, Alaska
Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc.; Bethel, Alaska
Textron Aviation, Inc.; Wichita, Kansas 
Piper Aircraft, Inc.; Vero Beach, Florida 
Transportation Safety Board of Canada; Gatineau,  Quebec, Canada

Pratt & Whitney Canada Corporation; Saint-Hubert,  Quebec, Canada

N752RV Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

N752RV Investigation Docket - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

https://registry.faa.gov/N752RV

Location: Russian Mission, AK
Accident Number: ANC16FA061A
Date & Time: 08/31/2016, 1001 AKD
Registration: N752RV
Aircraft: CESSNA 208
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Midair collision
Injuries: 3 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter - Scheduled 

On August 31, 2016, about 1001 Alaska daylight time, a turbine-powered Cessna 208B (Grand Caravan) airplane, N752RV, and a Piper PA-18-150 (Super Cub) airplane, N82452, were destroyed when they collided in midair near Russian Mission, Alaska. The airline transport pilot and the two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper sustained fatal injuries. The Cessna was registered to N752RV, LLC, Fairbanks, Alaska, and operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Ravn Connect, Anchorage, Alaska, flight number 3190, a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled passenger flight, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. Company flight following procedures were in effect for the scheduled passenger flight, which departed Russian Mission Airport (PARS), Russian Mission, Alaska, about 0958 and was destined for Marshall Don Hunter Senior Airport (PADM), Marshall, Alaska. The Piper was registered to DioAir, LLC, Bethel, Alaska, and operated by Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc., Bethel, as a VFR guided hunting operation flight, under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91. Company flight following procedures were in effect for the flight, which departed Bethel Airport (PABE), Bethel, Alaska, about 0907, and was transporting the passenger to a remote hunting camp about 20 miles northwest of Russian Mission. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.

The operator of the Cessna reported that the flight was scheduled to arrive at PADM at 1017. In addition to the pilot, onboard the airplane was a company employee (non-pilot) and a private individual traveling to Marshall. When the airplane did not arrive as scheduled, the company village agent at PADM notified the Ravn Connect operational control center (OCC) in Palmer, Alaska, which initiated overdue airplane procedures. The OCC contacted two company airplanes near Russian Mission and provided the last latitude and longitude coordinates from the Cessna's Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system. The two company airplanes then flew to the area of the last coordinates and located the accident site. The pilots of the two company airplanes reported their findings back to the OCC.

The owner and master guide-outfitter of the hunting/fishing expedition company that operated the Piper reported that the purpose of the flight was to drop off a guide, who was a company employee, along with hunting and field gear at a hunting camp. He reported that he also was flying another company guide to a different hunting camp in another airplane, and that he departed from PABE about 15 minutes after the Piper. The owner reported that he delivered the guide to the hunting camp about 1030, then overflew the Piper's intended destination and saw that the Piper was not present. The owner radioed the company headquarters at PABE for a status update on the Piper and was provided the Piper's last latitude and longitude coordinates from the company's flight following system. The owner then flew to the area of the last coordinates and located the accident site. The owner reported his findings back to the company headquarters.

Flight track information recovered from the ADS-B system on the Cessna and a Garmin GPSMAP 296 GPS device on the Piper indicated that the Cessna departed runway 17 at PARS about 09:58:50. At that time, the Piper was about 5.1 nautical miles (nm) west and 1.3 nm south of the Cessna, flying northbound (about 003°) in level flight between 1,700 and 1,800 ft above mean sea level (msl), at an airspeed about 70 knots (kts).

Shortly after takeoff, the Cessna entered a climbing right turn to the northwest, rolling onto a heading of 300° at 09:59:41, while climbing through 850 ft msl and accelerating through about 120 kts. The Cessna continued climbing and leveled about 1,760 ft msl at 10:01:00, while accelerating through 138 kts. At that time, the airplanes were 1.1 nm apart and converging.

The airplanes continued to converge without further maneuvering until they collided at 10:01:28 at an altitude of 1,760 ft msl. The closure rate at the time of collision was about 145 kts, with the Piper approaching the Cessna from ahead and to the left and the Cessna approaching the Piper from the right.

Both operators reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation for each airplane. 

Pilot Information


Certificate: Airline Transport
Age: 48, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land
Seat Occupied: Left
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 5-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 1 With Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 01/15/2016
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 03/18/2016
Flight Time:  (Estimated) 18810 hours (Total, all aircraft), 12808 hours (Total, this make and model), 18560 hours (Pilot In Command, all aircraft), 147 hours (Last 90 days, all aircraft), 58 hours (Last 30 days, all aircraft), 4 hours (Last 24 hours, all aircraft) 

Cessna

The Cessna pilot, age 48, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent first-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate was issued on January 15, 2016 and contained a limitation that he must wear lenses for distant vision and have glasses for near vision.

According to the operator, the pilot had about 18,810 total hours of flight experience. The operator's pilot training records showed no deficiencies; the accident pilot had completed all required training, including a competency check ride on March 18, 2016.

Piper

The Piper pilot, age 44, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent second-class FAA medical certificate was issued on August 8, 2016, with no limitations.

According to the operator, the pilot had about 5,000 total hours of flight experience. 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: CESSNA
Registration: N752RV
Model/Series: 208 B
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 2014
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 208B5088
Landing Gear Type: Tricycle
Seats: 11
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 07/18/2016, AAIP
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 9062 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Turbo Prop
Airframe Total Time: 811 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Pratt & Whitney Canada
ELT: C126 installed, activated, did not aid in locating accident
Engine Model/Series: PT6A-140
Registered Owner: N752RV, LLC
Rated Power: 867 hp
Operator: Hageland Aviation Services, Inc.
Operating Certificate(s) Held: Commuter Air Carrier (135); On-demand Air Taxi (135)
Operator Does Business As: Ravn Connect
Operator Designator Code: EPUA

Cessna
The fixed-gear, high-wing, single-engine Cessna airplane was manufactured in 2014 and was configured with seating for the pilot, a co-pilot, and 9 passengers; it also had a belly cargo pod. The airplane was powered by a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-140 turbine engine. The airplane's primary base color was white with red and black accent lines, white wings, a black belly cargo pod, a chrome propeller spinner, and a grey Hartzell propeller.

The airplane had 811 hours in service at the time of its most recent approved aircraft inspection program inspection, which was completed on July 18, 2016.

Review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated no mechanical discrepancies with the airframe, engine, or propeller.

Piper

The tailwheel-equipped, high-wing, single-engine Piper airplane was manufactured in 1978 and was configured with tandem seating for the pilot and a passenger; it also had a belly cargo pod. The airplane was powered by a Lycoming O-320 reciprocating engine. The airplane's primary base color was white with blue accent lines, white wings with blue leading edges, a white belly cargo pod, a blue propeller spinner, and a black McCauley propeller.

The airplane had 3,559 hours in service at the time of its most recent annual inspection, which was completed on May 26, 2016.

Review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated no mechanical discrepancies with the airframe, engine, or propeller. 



Harry Wrase

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: PARS, 51 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 5 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1756 UTC
Direction from Accident Site: 105°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility:  10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: Calm /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: None / None
Wind Direction:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 30.09 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 11°C / 8°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Russian Mission, AK (RSH)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: Company VFR
Destination: Marshall, AK (MDM)
Type of Clearance: VFR
Departure Time: 0958 AKD
Type of Airspace: Class G 

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 2 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 3 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude:  61.798056, -161.498889 (est) 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) and two air safety investigators from the NTSB, along with a team of Alaska State Troopers (AST) traveled to the accident site on September 1, 2016. The team members flew in on an AST helicopter and hiked into the locations for both wreckage sites. Two FAA aviation safety inspectors (ASI) conducted aerial surveys of the two wreckage sites via a commercial helicopter.

Both wreckage sites were located in areas of rolling hills with heavy vegetation about 10 ft tall and populated with various alder trees, spruce trees, and birch trees. The main wreckage of the Cessna came to rest about 1/2 mile west of the Piper.

Cessna

The airplane's initial impact point, located at an elevation of about 610 ft msl, exhibited disturbed terrain and vegetation consistent with a nose-down attitude at the time of impact. The engine was buried in dirt at the bottom of the impact crater. Various avionics boxes were scattered throughout the impact crater and in the immediate surrounding area.

The impact crater was located about 144 ft from the main wreckage; the debris field was oriented on an approximate 231° heading. Portions of both wings were located about halfway between the impact crater and the main wreckage. Additionally, the main landing gear separated from the fuselage, along with one propeller blade, and were found near the wing pieces between the impact crater and main wreckage.

The fuselage and the empennage, while separated, were collocated in the main wreckage. The area of the main wreckage was about 15 ft wide by 25 ft long with disturbed terrain and vegetation. The fuselage was inverted and was heavily damaged, with cargo scattered throughout the cabin. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were crushed and torn from impact.

Most of the visible sections of the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage were heavily coated with dirt from the impact crater. Flight control continuity could not be established due to extensive impact damage.

All major structural components were accounted for at the site, with the exception of a portion of the outboard left wing and a portion of the outboard left horizontal stabilizer, which were located about 430 ft southwest.

Piper


The wreckage came to rest in a densely-forested area at an elevation of about 580 ft msl. The nose of the airplane was oriented on a heading of about 340°. The fuselage was located on its right side with the top portion missing. The fuselage was bent and buckled throughout.

The right wing was separated and was located about 50 ft east of the fuselage. The left wing was separated and was located adjacent to the fuselage. The empennage was relatively intact. Except for the missing upper fuselage, the cockpit area appeared intact. Both main landing gear with tundra tires were present as was the tailwheel. The engine and propeller assembly appeared intact on the airframe.

Flight control continuity could not be established due to extensive impact damage. All portions of the airplane were accounted for at the wreckage site, except for the propeller spinner and the left wing leading edge wing root fairing. The spinner was located about 630 ft southwest of the main wreckage and the left wing leading edge wing root fairing was not recovered.

The wreckage of both airplanes was recovered and transported to a secure facility in Wasilla, Alaska, for further examination. The wreckage for both airplanes was examined by the NTSB IIC, an NTSB air safety investigator, and the NTSB Airworthiness Group. An air safety investigator from Pratt & Whitney Canada was present to examine the engine from the Cessna. During the follow-up examinations, no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were noted for either airplane. 

An examination of the Cessna's outboard left wing showed a flat impact impression on the leading edge and upper skin between wing station (WS) 293 and WS 298 with black and white paint transfer. There was a distinct line between the black and white paint transfer areas.

An examination of the Piper's right forward wing strut revealed that black anti-skid paint had been applied to the strut from the lower end up about 88 inches with white paint above. The Piper's right forward wing strut was flattened and deformed in the paint transition area and along most of its length. 

All of the fracture surfaces associated with both airplanes had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overload separation. 

Refer to the Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual report in the public docket for more information.

Communications

Due to the extensive damage sustained to the Cessna's cockpit components, no postaccident operational test of the transceiver was possible.

Postaccident operational testing of the Piper's transceiver revealed a primary active radio frequency of 123.675 MHz, and a non-active secondary frequency of 122.90 MHz.

The common traffic advisory frequency used at both PARS and PADM was 122.90 MHz. Neither airport was tower-controlled. Both airports were within Class G airspace with Class E airspace starting at 700 ft agl. The area between the two airports was classified as Class G airspace. For both Class E airspace and Class G airspace, there is no regulatory requirement for airplanes to be equipped with two-way radio communications. The location of the midair collision was located at a point-in-space in Class G airspace, right outside of the Class E airspace border of PARS.

No FAA radar coverage existed in the accident area. 

Flight Recorders
Neither airplane carried, nor was required to carry, a crashworthy flight data recorder. 

Medical And Pathological Information

Cessna

The Alaska State Medical Examiner, Anchorage, Alaska, conducted an autopsy of the Cessna pilot. The cause of death was attributed to blunt impacts and multiple injuries. Due to the level of trauma, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease.

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens from the pilot. Carbon monoxide and cyanide tests were not performed. Ethanol was detected in muscle at 0.01 mg%, and no drugs were detected in muscle. It could not be determined if some or all of the ethanol was from sources other than ingestion.

Piper


The Alaska State Medical Examiner, Anchorage, Alaska, conducted an autopsy of the Piper pilot. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries.

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens from the pilot that were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Cyanide tests were not performed. Naproxen was detected in urine. It is unknown if the pilot was prescribed naproxen by a medical doctor.

Naproxen is a medication available in two formulations, prescription and over-the-counter (OTC). Prescription naproxen is used to relieve pain, tenderness, swelling, and stiffness caused by osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis and other similar conditions. OTC naproxen is used to reduce fever and to relieve mild pain from headaches, muscle aches, mild arthritis, the common cold, toothaches, and backaches. Naproxen is in a class of medications called non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. 

Tests And Research

Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility Study 


An Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility study was conducted. ADS-B data from the Cessna and onboard GPS data from the Piper were used to calculate the position and orientation of each airplane in the minutes preceding the collision.

The visibility study indicated that the Cessna and the Piper would have initially appeared as relatively small, slow-moving objects in each pilot's windows (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the pilot's potential field of view, which is equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away). About 10 seconds before the collision, the airplanes would have begun to appear to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut.

The ADS-B and GPS data were also used to determine the cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) data that could have been presented to the pilots had both airplanes been equipped to both receive and provide this information. CDTI uses the ADS-B system to drive a traffic situation display in the cockpits of appropriately-equipped aircraft, and optionally to also provide an aural and visual alert of conflicting traffic.

The FAA implemented ADS-B technology in Alaska, and the Cessna was equipped with ADS-B Out, which broadcast the airplane's GPS position and other data to ADS-B ground stations and to other aircraft (to receive this information, other aircraft would have to be equipped with ADS-B In; the Cessna was not so equipped, and so would not have been able to receive ADS-B Out messages broadcast from nearby aircraft). GPS data and avionics provide pilots with situational awareness by displaying the airplane's position over terrain; if their aircraft are also equipped with ADS-B In (and the appropriate displays), ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft can warn pilots of the presence of other ADS-B-equipped aircraft that may be present. For the ADS-B system to be able to provide the traffic information required to drive the CDTI displays and alerts of two aircraft that are in danger of a collision, both aircraft must have ADS-B Out and ADS-B In installed. ADS-B Out data from the Cessna was recorded by the FAA and provided to the NTSB. The Cessna had ADS-B Out, but it did not have ADS-B In or any cockpit display of CDTI data; it was not required to be ADS-B In or CDTI equipped at the time of the accident. The Piper was not ADS-B equipped at the time of the accident, nor was it required to be.

Had the airplanes been equipped to display CDTI data, the system could have aurally alerted the pilots to the presence of the other airplane and presented precise bearing, range, and altitude information about each target up to 39 seconds before the collision. A CDTI display would have presented the relative positions of the two airplanes visually to each pilot as early as when the Cessna became airborne: about 2 minutes 39 seconds before the collision.

For more information, refer to the Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility Study and the ADS-B data in the public docket.

Organizational And Management Information

Cessna


Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., was a Title 14 CFR Part 135 certificated operator, providing both scheduled (commuter) and on-demand flights under the brand Ravn Connect. Company pilots were based at various airports throughout Alaska. All flights were planned and released from the Hageland OCC in Palmer. Hageland is a party to the NTSB investigation.

Piper
Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc., was a Title 14 CFR Part 91 operator, providing both guided and unguided hunting packages, along with fishing packages. The company conducted operations throughout Alaska. All flights were planned and departed from company headquarters at PABE. Renfro's was originally a party to the NTSB investigation, but during the NTSB Party Member review process of the accident report, it was discovered that Renfro's had violated the NTSB Party Member process in accordance with Title 49 CFR Part 831.11 by improperly divulging privileged information it had received by virtue of its party status. Consequently, Renfro's party status was revoked on November 15, 2018. Refer to the Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc. NTSB Party Member Removal Letter in the public docket. 

Additional Information

Right-of-Way Rules
 


Title 14 CFR 91.113 lists the right-of-way rules for aircraft, and states:

(a) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to the operation of an aircraft on water.

(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.

(c) In distress. An aircraft in distress has the right-of-way over all other air traffic.

(d) Converging. When aircraft of the same category are converging at approximately the same altitude (except head-on, or nearly so), the aircraft to the other's right has the right-of-way. If the aircraft are of different categories -

(1) A balloon has the right-of-way over any other category of aircraft;

(2) A glider has the right-of-way over an airship, powered parachute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.

(3) An airship has the right-of-way over a powered parachute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.

However, an aircraft towing or refueling other aircraft has the right-of-way over all other engine-driven aircraft.

(e) Approaching head-on. When aircraft are approaching each other head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each aircraft shall alter course to the right.

(f) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall alter course to the right to pass well clear.

(g) Landing. Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to force an aircraft off the runway surface which has already landed and is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final approach. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake that aircraft.

Vigilant Lookout

FAA Advisory Circular 90-48D, Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance, discusses the importance of maintaining a vigilant lookout and states in part:

Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that most midair collision accidents and reported near midair collision incidents occurred during good VFR weather conditions and during the hours of daylight.

Pilot Profiles 


FAA P-8740-51, How to Avoid a Midair Collision, discusses pilot profiles in midair collisions and states in part:

There is no way to say whether the inexperienced pilot or the older, more experienced pilot is more likely to be involved in an in-flight collision. A beginning pilot has so much to think about he may forget to look around. On the other hand, the older pilot, having sat through many hours of boring flight without spotting any hazardous traffic, may grow complacent and forget to scan. No pilot is invulnerable.

The See-and-Avoid Concept 


In 1991, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau published a research report titled "Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle." The report discusses the role of the see-and-avoid concept in preventing collisions and some of its inherent limitations and states in part:

Cockpit workload and other factors reduce the time that pilots spend in traffic scans. However, even when pilots are looking out, there is no guarantee that other aircraft will be sighted. Most cockpit windscreen configurations severely limit the view available to the pilot. The available view is frequently interrupted by obstructions such as window-posts which totally obscure some parts of the view and make other areas visible to only one eye....Visual scanning involves moving the eyes in order to bring successive areas of the visual field onto the small area of sharp vision in the centre of the eye. The process is frequently unsystematic and may leave large areas of the field of view unsearched….The physical limitations of the human eye are such that even the most careful search does not guarantee that traffic will be sighted….An object which is smaller than the eye's acuity threshold is unlikely to be detected and even less likely to be identified as an approaching aircraft….The human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision course appears as a stationary target in the pilot's visual field. The contrast between an aircraft and its background can be significantly reduced by atmospheric effects, even in conditions of good visibility. An approaching aircraft, in many cases, presents a very small visual angle until a short time before impact. …In addition, complex backgrounds such as ground features or clouds hamper the identification of aircraft via a visual effect known as 'contour interaction'. This occurs when background contours interact with the form of the aircraft, producing a less distinct image. Even when an approaching aircraft has been sighted, there is no guarantee that evasive action will be successful.

Midair Collision Avoidance Technology

The NTSB has published Safety Alert SA-058 Prevent Midair Collisions: Don't Depend on Vision Alone. This document discusses the benefits of utilizing technologies in the cockpit to prevent midair collisions and states in part:

The "see-and-avoid" concept has long been the foundation of midair collision prevention. However, the inherent limitations of this concept, including human limitations, environmental conditions, aircraft blind spots, and operational distractions, leave even the most diligent pilot vulnerable to the threat of a midair collision with an unseen aircraft.

Technologies in the cockpit that display or alert of traffic conflicts, such as traffic advisory systems and automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B), can help pilots become aware of and maintain separation from nearby aircraft. Such systems can augment reality and help compensate for the limitations of visually searching for traffic.

Remote Flying Areas

The Alaskan Aviation Safety Foundation has published Safety Briefing: Avoiding A Midair Collision in Alaska – En Route Traffic Advisory Reminders. This document discusses midair collision avoidance reminders while conducting flight operations in Alaska and advises pilots to treat remote flying areas with the same situation awareness as flying in an area of congested traffic.

NTSB Parties to the Investigation

Title 49 CFR 831.11 explains the participants in NTSB investigations and starts in part:


(a) Participants.

(1) The IIC may designate one or more entities to serve as parties in an investigation. Party status is limited to those persons, Federal, state, or local government agencies and organizations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident and that can provide suitable qualified technical personnel to actively assist in an investigation. To the extent practicable, a representative proposed by party organizations to participate in the investigation may not be a person who had direct involvement in the accident under investigation.

(2) Except for the FAA, no entity has a right to participate in an NTSB investigation as a party.

(3) The participation of the Administrator of the FAA and other Federal entities in aviation accident investigations is addressed in § 831.21 of this part.

(4) Participants in an investigation (e.g., party representatives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) must follow all directions and instructions from NTSB representatives. Party status may be revoked or suspended if a party fails to comply with assigned duties and instructions, withholds information, or otherwise acts in a manner prejudicial or disruptive to an investigation.

(d) Party agreement. Except for representatives of other Federal agencies, all party representatives must sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" (Statement) upon acceptance of party status. Failure to timely sign the statement may result in sanctions, including loss of party status. Representatives of other Federal agencies, while not required to sign the Statement, will be provided notice of and must comply with the responsibilities and limitations set forth in the agreement.


N82452 Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board:  https://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

N82452 Aviation Accident Factual Report - National Transportation Safety Board: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

https://registry.faa.gov/N82452 


Location: Russian Mission, AK
Accident Number: ANC16FA061B
Date & Time: 08/31/2016, 1001 AKD
Registration: N82452
Aircraft: PIPER PA18
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Midair collision
Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General Aviation - Other Work Use 

On August 31, 2016, about 1001 Alaska daylight time, a turbine-powered Cessna 208B (Grand Caravan) airplane, N752RV, and a Piper PA-18-150 (Super Cub) airplane, N82452, were destroyed when they collided in midair near Russian Mission, Alaska. The airline transport pilot and the two passengers onboard the Cessna and the commercial pilot and the passenger onboard the Piper sustained fatal injuries. The Cessna was registered to N752RV, LLC, Fairbanks, Alaska, and operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Ravn Connect, Anchorage, Alaska, flight number 3190, a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled passenger flight, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. Company flight following procedures were in effect for the scheduled passenger flight, which departed Russian Mission Airport (PARS), Russian Mission, Alaska, about 0958 and was destined for Marshall Don Hunter Senior Airport (PADM), Marshall, Alaska. The Piper was registered to DioAir, LLC, Bethel, Alaska, and operated by Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc., Bethel, as a VFR guided hunting operation flight, under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91. Company flight following procedures were in effect for the flight, which departed Bethel Airport (PABE), Bethel, Alaska, about 0907, and was transporting the passenger to a remote hunting camp about 20 miles northwest of Russian Mission. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed in the area at the time of the accident.

The operator of the Cessna reported that the flight was scheduled to arrive at PADM at 1017. In addition to the pilot, onboard the airplane was a company employee (non-pilot) and a private individual traveling to Marshall. When the airplane did not arrive as scheduled, the company village agent at PADM notified the Ravn Connect operational control center (OCC) in Palmer, Alaska, which initiated overdue airplane procedures. The OCC contacted two company airplanes near Russian Mission and provided the last latitude and longitude coordinates from the Cessna's Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system. The two company airplanes then flew to the area of the last coordinates and located the accident site. The pilots of the two company airplanes reported their findings back to the OCC.

The owner and master guide-outfitter of the hunting/fishing expedition company that operated the Piper reported that the purpose of the flight was to drop off a guide, who was a company employee, along with hunting and field gear at a hunting camp. He reported that he also was flying another company guide to a different hunting camp in another airplane, and that he departed from PABE about 15 minutes after the Piper. The owner reported that he delivered the guide to the hunting camp about 1030, then overflew the Piper's intended destination and saw that the Piper was not present. The owner radioed the company headquarters at PABE for a status update on the Piper and was provided the Piper's last latitude and longitude coordinates from the company's flight following system. The owner then flew to the area of the last coordinates and located the accident site. The owner reported his findings back to the company headquarters.

Flight track information recovered from the ADS-B system on the Cessna and a Garmin GPSMAP 296 GPS device on the Piper indicated that the Cessna departed runway 17 at PARS about 09:58:50. At that time, the Piper was about 5.1 nautical miles (nm) west and 1.3 nm south of the Cessna, flying northbound (about 003°) in level flight between 1,700 and 1,800 ft above mean sea level (msl), at an airspeed about 70 knots (kts).

Shortly after takeoff, the Cessna entered a climbing right turn to the northwest, rolling onto a heading of 300° at 09:59:41, while climbing through 850 ft msl and accelerating through about 120 kts. The Cessna continued climbing and leveled about 1,760 ft msl at 10:01:00, while accelerating through 138 kts. At that time, the airplanes were 1.1 nm apart and converging.

The airplanes continued to converge without further maneuvering until they collided at 10:01:28 at an altitude of 1,760 ft msl. The closure rate at the time of collision was about 145 kts, with the Piper approaching the Cessna from ahead and to the left and the Cessna approaching the Piper from the right.

Both operators reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation for each airplane.

Pilot Information

Certificate: Commercial
Age: 44, Male
Airplane Rating(s): Multi-engine Land; Single-engine Land; Single-engine Sea
Seat Occupied: Front
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None
Restraint Used: 4-point
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane
Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None
Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 Without Waivers/Limitations
Last FAA Medical Exam: 08/08/2016
Occupational Pilot: Yes
Last Flight Review or Equivalent: 09/01/2015
Flight Time: (Estimated) 5000 hours (Total, all aircraft)

Cessna

The Cessna pilot, age 48, held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent first-class Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate was issued on January 15, 2016 and contained a limitation that he must wear lenses for distant vision and have glasses for near vision.

According to the operator, the pilot had about 18,810 total hours of flight experience. The operator's pilot training records showed no deficiencies; the accident pilot had completed all required training, including a competency check ride on March 18, 2016.

Piper

The Piper pilot, age 44, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane single-engine sea, airplane multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent second-class FAA medical certificate was issued on August 8, 2016, with no limitations.

According to the operator, the pilot had about 5,000 total hours of flight experience. 

Aircraft and Owner/Operator Information

Aircraft Make: PIPER
Registration: N82452
Model/Series: PA18 150
Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1978
Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal
Serial Number: 18-7809139
Landing Gear Type: Tailwheel
Seats: 2
Date/Type of Last Inspection: 05/26/2016, Annual
Certified Max Gross Wt.: 1750 lbs
Time Since Last Inspection:
Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 3559.2 Hours as of last inspection
Engine Manufacturer: Lycoming
ELT: C91A installed, not activated
Engine Model/Series: O-320-B2B
Registered Owner: DioAir, LLC
Rated Power: 150 hp
Operator: Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc.
Operating Certificate(s) Held: None

Cessna

The fixed-gear, high-wing, single-engine Cessna airplane was manufactured in 2014 and was configured with seating for the pilot, a co-pilot, and 9 passengers; it also had a belly cargo pod. The airplane was powered by a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-140 turbine engine. The airplane's primary base color was white with red and black accent lines, white wings, a black belly cargo pod, a chrome propeller spinner, and a grey Hartzell propeller.

The airplane had 811 hours in service at the time of its most recent approved aircraft inspection program inspection, which was completed on July 18, 2016.

Review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated no mechanical discrepancies with the airframe, engine, or propeller.

Piper

The tailwheel-equipped, high-wing, single-engine Piper airplane was manufactured in 1978 and was configured with tandem seating for the pilot and a passenger; it also had a belly cargo pod. The airplane was powered by a Lycoming O-320 reciprocating engine. The airplane's primary base color was white with blue accent lines, white wings with blue leading edges, a white belly cargo pod, a blue propeller spinner, and a black McCauley propeller.

The airplane had 3,559 hours in service at the time of its most recent annual inspection, which was completed on May 26, 2016.

Review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated no mechanical discrepancies with the airframe, engine, or propeller. 

Meteorological Information and Flight Plan

Conditions at Accident Site: Visual Conditions
Condition of Light: Day
Observation Facility, Elevation: PARS, 51 ft msl
Distance from Accident Site: 5 Nautical Miles
Observation Time: 1756 UTC
Direction from Accident Site: 105°
Lowest Cloud Condition: Clear
Visibility:  10 Miles
Lowest Ceiling: None
Visibility (RVR):
Wind Speed/Gusts: Calm /
Turbulence Type Forecast/Actual: None / None
Wind Direction:
Turbulence Severity Forecast/Actual: N/A / N/A
Altimeter Setting: 30.09 inches Hg
Temperature/Dew Point: 11°C / 8°C
Precipitation and Obscuration: No Obscuration; No Precipitation
Departure Point: Bethel, AK (BET)
Type of Flight Plan Filed: Company VFR
Destination: Marshall, AK
Type of Clearance: None
Departure Time: 0907 AKD
Type of Airspace: Class G

Wreckage and Impact Information

Crew Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Passenger Injuries: 1 Fatal
Aircraft Fire: None
Ground Injuries: N/A
Aircraft Explosion: None
Total Injuries: 2 Fatal
Latitude, Longitude: 61.798056, -161.498889 (est)

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) and two air safety investigators from the NTSB, along with a team of Alaska State Troopers (AST) traveled to the accident site on September 1, 2016. The team members flew in on an AST helicopter and hiked into the locations for both wreckage sites. Two FAA aviation safety inspectors (ASI) conducted aerial surveys of the two wreckage sites via a commercial helicopter.

Both wreckage sites were located in areas of rolling hills with heavy vegetation about 10 ft tall and populated with various alder trees, spruce trees, and birch trees. The main wreckage of the Cessna came to rest about 1/2 mile west of the Piper.

Cessna

The airplane's initial impact point, located at an elevation of about 610 ft msl, exhibited disturbed terrain and vegetation consistent with a nose-down attitude at the time of impact. The engine was buried in dirt at the bottom of the impact crater. Various avionics boxes were scattered throughout the impact crater and in the immediate surrounding area.

The impact crater was located about 144 ft from the main wreckage; the debris field was oriented on an approximate 231° heading. Portions of both wings were located about halfway between the impact crater and the main wreckage. Additionally, the main landing gear separated from the fuselage, along with one propeller blade, and were found near the wing pieces between the impact crater and main wreckage.

The fuselage and the empennage, while separated, were collocated in the main wreckage. The area of the main wreckage was about 15 ft wide by 25 ft long with disturbed terrain and vegetation. The fuselage was inverted and was heavily damaged, with cargo scattered throughout the cabin. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were crushed and torn from impact.

Most of the visible sections of the fuselage, both wings, and the empennage were heavily coated with dirt from the impact crater. Flight control continuity could not be established due to extensive impact damage.

All major structural components were accounted for at the site, with the exception of a portion of the outboard left wing and a portion of the outboard left horizontal stabilizer, which were located about 430 ft southwest.

Piper

The wreckage came to rest in a densely-forested area at an elevation of about 580 ft msl. The nose of the airplane was oriented on a heading of about 340°. The fuselage was located on its right side with the top portion missing. The fuselage was bent and buckled throughout.

The right wing was separated and was located about 50 ft east of the fuselage. The left wing was separated and was located adjacent to the fuselage. The empennage was relatively intact. Except for the missing upper fuselage, the cockpit area appeared intact. Both main landing gear with tundra tires were present as was the tailwheel. The engine and propeller assembly appeared intact on the airframe.

Flight control continuity could not be established due to extensive impact damage. All portions of the airplane were accounted for at the wreckage site, except for the propeller spinner and the left wing leading edge wing root fairing. The spinner was located about 630 ft southwest of the main wreckage and the left wing leading edge wing root fairing was not recovered.

The wreckage of both airplanes was recovered and transported to a secure facility in Wasilla, Alaska, for further examination. The wreckage for both airplanes was examined by the NTSB IIC, an NTSB air safety investigator, and the NTSB Airworthiness Group. An air safety investigator from Pratt & Whitney Canada was present to examine the engine from the Cessna. During the follow-up examinations, no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were noted for either airplane. 

An examination of the Cessna's outboard left wing showed a flat impact impression on the leading edge and upper skin between wing station (WS) 293 and WS 298 with black and white paint transfer. There was a distinct line between the black and white paint transfer areas.

An examination of the Piper's right forward wing strut revealed that black anti-skid paint had been applied to the strut from the lower end up about 88 inches with white paint above. The Piper's right forward wing strut was flattened and deformed in the paint transition area and along most of its length. 

All of the fracture surfaces associated with both airplanes had a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overload separation. 

Refer to the Airworthiness Group Chairman's Factual report in the public docket for more information.

Communications

Due to the extensive damage sustained to the Cessna's cockpit components, no postaccident operational test of the transceiver was possible.

Postaccident operational testing of the Piper's transceiver revealed a primary active radio frequency of 123.675 MHz, and a non-active secondary frequency of 122.90 MHz.

The common traffic advisory frequency used at both PARS and PADM was 122.90 MHz. Neither airport was tower-controlled. Both airports were within Class G airspace with Class E airspace starting at 700 ft agl. The area between the two airports was classified as Class G airspace. For both Class E airspace and Class G airspace, there is no regulatory requirement for airplanes to be equipped with two-way radio communications. The location of the midair collision was located at a point-in-space in Class G airspace, right outside of the Class E airspace border of PARS.

No FAA radar coverage existed in the accident area. 

Flight Recorders

Neither airplane carried, nor was required to carry, a crashworthy flight data recorder.

Medical And Pathological Information

Cessna

The Alaska State Medical Examiner, Anchorage, Alaska, conducted an autopsy of the Cessna pilot. The cause of death was attributed to blunt impacts and multiple injuries. Due to the level of trauma, the autopsy was inconclusive for the presence of natural disease.

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens from the pilot. Carbon monoxide and cyanide tests were not performed. Ethanol was detected in muscle at 0.01 mg%, and no drugs were detected in muscle. It could not be determined if some or all of the ethanol was from sources other than ingestion.

Piper

The Alaska State Medical Examiner, Anchorage, Alaska, conducted an autopsy of the Piper pilot. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries.

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology tests on specimens from the pilot that were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. Cyanide tests were not performed. Naproxen was detected in urine. It is unknown if the pilot was prescribed naproxen by a medical doctor.

Naproxen is a medication available in two formulations, prescription and over-the-counter (OTC). Prescription naproxen is used to relieve pain, tenderness, swelling, and stiffness caused by osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis and other similar conditions. OTC naproxen is used to reduce fever and to relieve mild pain from headaches, muscle aches, mild arthritis, the common cold, toothaches, and backaches. Naproxen is in a class of medications called non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. 

Tests And Research

Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility Study

An Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility study was conducted. ADS-B data from the Cessna and onboard GPS data from the Piper were used to calculate the position and orientation of each airplane in the minutes preceding the collision.

The visibility study indicated that the Cessna and the Piper would have initially appeared as relatively small, slow-moving objects in each pilot's windows (their fuselages spanning less than 0.5° of the pilot's potential field of view, which is equivalent to the diameter of a penny viewed from about 7 ft away). About 10 seconds before the collision, the airplanes would have begun to appear to grow in size suddenly (the "blossom" effect). From about 2 minutes before the collision, neither airplane would have been obscured from the other pilot's (nominal) field of view by cockpit structure, although the Cessna would have appeared close to the bottom of the Piper's right wing and near the forward edge of its forward wing strut.

The ADS-B and GPS data were also used to determine the cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) data that could have been presented to the pilots had both airplanes been equipped to both receive and provide this information. CDTI uses the ADS-B system to drive a traffic situation display in the cockpits of appropriately-equipped aircraft, and optionally to also provide an aural and visual alert of conflicting traffic.

The FAA implemented ADS-B technology in Alaska, and the Cessna was equipped with ADS-B Out, which broadcast the airplane's GPS position and other data to ADS-B ground stations and to other aircraft (to receive this information, other aircraft would have to be equipped with ADS-B In; the Cessna was not so equipped, and so would not have been able to receive ADS-B Out messages broadcast from nearby aircraft). GPS data and avionics provide pilots with situational awareness by displaying the airplane's position over terrain; if their aircraft are also equipped with ADS-B In (and the appropriate displays), ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft can warn pilots of the presence of other ADS-B-equipped aircraft that may be present. For the ADS-B system to be able to provide the traffic information required to drive the CDTI displays and alerts of two aircraft that are in danger of a collision, both aircraft must have ADS-B Out and ADS-B In installed. ADS-B Out data from the Cessna was recorded by the FAA and provided to the NTSB. The Cessna had ADS-B Out, but it did not have ADS-B In or any cockpit display of CDTI data; it was not required to be ADS-B In or CDTI equipped at the time of the accident. The Piper was not ADS-B equipped at the time of the accident, nor was it required to be.

Had the airplanes been equipped to display CDTI data, the system could have aurally alerted the pilots to the presence of the other airplane and presented precise bearing, range, and altitude information about each target up to 39 seconds before the collision. A CDTI display would have presented the relative positions of the two airplanes visually to each pilot as early as when the Cessna became airborne: about 2 minutes 39 seconds before the collision.

For more information, refer to the Aircraft Performance and Cockpit Visibility Study and the ADS-B data in the public docket.

Organizational And Management Information

Cessna

Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., was a Title 14 CFR Part 135 certificated operator, providing both scheduled (commuter) and on-demand flights under the brand Ravn Connect. Company pilots were based at various airports throughout Alaska. All flights were planned and released from the Hageland OCC in Palmer. Hageland is a party to the NTSB investigation.

Piper

Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc., was a Title 14 CFR Part 91 operator, providing both guided and unguided hunting packages, along with fishing packages. The company conducted operations throughout Alaska. All flights were planned and departed from company headquarters at PABE. Renfro's was originally a party to the NTSB investigation, but during the NTSB Party Member review process of the accident report, it was discovered that Renfro's had violated the NTSB Party Member process in accordance with Title 49 CFR Part 831.11 by improperly divulging privileged information it had received by virtue of its party status. Consequently, Renfro's party status was revoked on November 15, 2018. Refer to the Renfro's Alaskan Adventures, Inc. NTSB Party Member Removal Letter in the public docket.

Additional Information

Right-of-Way Rules

Title 14 CFR 91.113 lists the right-of-way rules for aircraft, and states:

(a) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to the operation of an aircraft on water.

(b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.

(c) In distress. An aircraft in distress has the right-of-way over all other air traffic.

(d) Converging. When aircraft of the same category are converging at approximately the same altitude (except head-on, or nearly so), the aircraft to the other's right has the right-of-way. If the aircraft are of different categories -

(1) A balloon has the right-of-way over any other category of aircraft;

(2) A glider has the right-of-way over an airship, powered parachute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.

(3) An airship has the right-of-way over a powered parachute, weight-shift-control aircraft, airplane, or rotorcraft.

However, an aircraft towing or refueling other aircraft has the right-of-way over all other engine-driven aircraft.

(e) Approaching head-on. When aircraft are approaching each other head-on, or nearly so, each pilot of each aircraft shall alter course to the right.

(f) Overtaking. Each aircraft that is being overtaken has the right-of-way and each pilot of an overtaking aircraft shall alter course to the right to pass well clear.

(g) Landing. Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to force an aircraft off the runway surface which has already landed and is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final approach. When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake that aircraft.

Vigilant Lookout

FAA Advisory Circular 90-48D, Pilots' Role in Collision Avoidance, discusses the importance of maintaining a vigilant lookout and states in part:

Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that most midair collision accidents and reported near midair collision incidents occurred during good VFR weather conditions and during the hours of daylight.

Pilot Profiles

FAA P-8740-51, How to Avoid a Midair Collision, discusses pilot profiles in midair collisions and states in part:

There is no way to say whether the inexperienced pilot or the older, more experienced pilot is more likely to be involved in an in-flight collision. A beginning pilot has so much to think about he may forget to look around. On the other hand, the older pilot, having sat through many hours of boring flight without spotting any hazardous traffic, may grow complacent and forget to scan. No pilot is invulnerable.

The See-and-Avoid Concept

In 1991, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau published a research report titled "Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle." The report discusses the role of the see-and-avoid concept in preventing collisions and some of its inherent limitations and states in part:

Cockpit workload and other factors reduce the time that pilots spend in traffic scans. However, even when pilots are looking out, there is no guarantee that other aircraft will be sighted. Most cockpit windscreen configurations severely limit the view available to the pilot. The available view is frequently interrupted by obstructions such as window-posts which totally obscure some parts of the view and make other areas visible to only one eye....Visual scanning involves moving the eyes in order to bring successive areas of the visual field onto the small area of sharp vision in the centre of the eye. The process is frequently unsystematic and may leave large areas of the field of view unsearched….The physical limitations of the human eye are such that even the most careful search does not guarantee that traffic will be sighted….An object which is smaller than the eye's acuity threshold is unlikely to be detected and even less likely to be identified as an approaching aircraft….The human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision course appears as a stationary target in the pilot's visual field. The contrast between an aircraft and its background can be significantly reduced by atmospheric effects, even in conditions of good visibility. An approaching aircraft, in many cases, presents a very small visual angle until a short time before impact. …In addition, complex backgrounds such as ground features or clouds hamper the identification of aircraft via a visual effect known as 'contour interaction'. This occurs when background contours interact with the form of the aircraft, producing a less distinct image. Even when an approaching aircraft has been sighted, there is no guarantee that evasive action will be successful.

Midair Collision Avoidance Technology

The NTSB has published Safety Alert SA-058 Prevent Midair Collisions: Don't Depend on Vision Alone. This document discusses the benefits of utilizing technologies in the cockpit to prevent midair collisions and states in part:

The "see-and-avoid" concept has long been the foundation of midair collision prevention. However, the inherent limitations of this concept, including human limitations, environmental conditions, aircraft blind spots, and operational distractions, leave even the most diligent pilot vulnerable to the threat of a midair collision with an unseen aircraft.

Technologies in the cockpit that display or alert of traffic conflicts, such as traffic advisory systems and automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B), can help pilots become aware of and maintain separation from nearby aircraft. Such systems can augment reality and help compensate for the limitations of visually searching for traffic.

Remote Flying Areas

The Alaskan Aviation Safety Foundation has published Safety Briefing: Avoiding A Midair Collision in Alaska – En Route Traffic Advisory Reminders. This document discusses midair collision avoidance reminders while conducting flight operations in Alaska and advises pilots to treat remote flying areas with the same situation awareness as flying in an area of congested traffic.

NTSB Parties to the Investigation

Title 49 CFR 831.11 explains the participants in NTSB investigations and starts in part:

(a) Participants.

(1) The IIC may designate one or more entities to serve as parties in an investigation. Party status is limited to those persons, Federal, state, or local government agencies and organizations whose employees, functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident and that can provide suitable qualified technical personnel to actively assist in an investigation. To the extent practicable, a representative proposed by party organizations to participate in the investigation may not be a person who had direct involvement in the accident under investigation.

(2) Except for the FAA, no entity has a right to participate in an NTSB investigation as a party.

(3) The participation of the Administrator of the FAA and other Federal entities in aviation accident investigations is addressed in § 831.21 of this part.

(4) Participants in an investigation (e.g., party representatives, party coordinators, and/or the larger party organization) must follow all directions and instructions from NTSB representatives. Party status may be revoked or suspended if a party fails to comply with assigned duties and instructions, withholds information, or otherwise acts in a manner prejudicial or disruptive to an investigation.


(d) Party agreement. Except for representatives of other Federal agencies, all party representatives must sign the "Statement of Party Representatives to NTSB Investigation" (Statement) upon acceptance of party status. Failure to timely sign the statement may result in sanctions, including loss of party status. Representatives of other Federal agencies, while not required to sign the Statement, will be provided notice of and must comply with the responsibilities and limitations set forth in the agreement.


Federal investigators planned Thursday to revisit the site of Wednesday's deadly midair collision near Russian Mission, which claimed the lives of five men and left the wreckage of two small planes in rugged terrain near the Western Alaska village.

A Hageland Aviation Cessna 208 Caravan flying from Russian Mission to Marshall collided with a Piper PA-18 Super Cub operated by Renfro's Alaskan Adventures headed from Bethel, according to the Alaska Air National Guard. The crash, about 6 miles northwest of Russian Mission, occurred shortly before 11 a.m. Wednesday.

Alaska State Troopers identified the victims Wednesday night. The Caravan was flown by Wasilla pilot Harry Wrase, 48, and carried passengers Steven Paul Andrew, 32, of Russian Mission and Aaron Jay Minock, 21, of Russian Mission. The Super Cub was flown by Montana resident Zach Justin Babat, 44, and carried Haines passenger Jeff Thomas Burruss, 40.

Renfro's Manager Nate DeHaan said Burruss worked as a hunting and fishing guide for the company. State records show Burruss currently registered as an assistant guide.

Andrew, one of the passengers aboard the Caravan, worked as a ramp agent at Ravn since 2007, his father Tom Andrew said in a phone interview. His immediate family lives on the Kenai Peninsula, he said.

Tom Andrew worked as a public school teacher when his son was growing up and the family lived in multiple Alaska towns including Pilot Station and Kodiak, where Steven Andrew attended school.

The family is originally from Marshall. Steven was headed to the Yukon-Kuskokwim community to moose hunt. He considered the village home, his father said.

"He was a good, kind and loving person," Tom Andrew said.

Clint Johnson, the National Transportation Safety Board's Alaska chief, said Thursday that three NTSB investigators were working on the crash. Two Federal Aviation Administration investigators were also on-site Wednesday, according to FAA spokesman Allen Kenitzer.

Crews were only able to reach the Cessna's crash site Wednesday evening, Johnson said. Both NTSB investigators and troopers had to wait for weather to clear in Bethel before they successfully reached the scene Thursday afternoon.

"The conditions where this thing is are very challenging — high alders, steep mountainous terrain only accessible by helicopter," Johnson said. "These guys have their work cut out for them."

Troopers spokeswoman Megan Peters said the troopers who responded to Russian Mission Wednesday were involved with the recovery of bodies from the crashed aircraft, a task that was continuing Thursday.

Johnson said the Cessna operated by Hageland was equipped with map displays for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, or ADS-B, which lets pilots see the locations of other nearby aircraft on a screen similar to those used by air traffic controllers. Washington, D.C.-based investigators were working to determine whether the PA-18 operated by Renfro's was also equipped with ADS-B.

ADS-B transmitters will be required for flight in many areas of U.S. airspace by 2020. Johnson said the technology is "widespread" in Alaska, but only displays the location of other ADS-B aircraft.

"Both aircraft has to be ADS-B equipped, so if one has it and the other doesn't, the one that has it won't see the other aircraft," Johnson said.

Hageland Aviation operator Ravn Alaska wasn't immediately able to answer questions Thursday morning. The company said Wednesday that it had established an emergency support number for family and friends of the crash victims at 888-346-7502.

Renfro's released a statement Thursday afternoon about the collision, along with photos of Babat and Burruss, on its Facebook page. The company also offered condolences to the three people killed on board the Hageland aircraft.

"There are no words to express the anguish felt by everyone within the Renfro's Alaskan Adventures family in the wake of this immense loss," Renfro's staff wrote. "Zach and Jeff were amazing men that lived life to the fullest and they will be sorely missed. Our thoughts and prayers go out to their families and friends as well as those of Harry, Steven and Aaron. We greatly appreciate the support of the community during this difficult time."

The NTSB is preparing for an extended investigation of the wreckage, due to the difficult terrain and the two separate crash sites involved.

Realistically, our guys will probably be out there through the weekend," Johnson said.


Source:   http://www.adn.com



The investigation continues into a mid-air plane collision northwest of Russian Mission on Wednesday that left no survivors.

Alaska State Troopers and investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are heading to the crash sites today.

“Our focus is on body recovery efforts,” said Megan Peters, public information officer for the Alaska State Troopers.

“The NTSB is the agency that actually investigates the cause and circumstances of aircraft crashes.”

The recovered bodies will be sent to the State Medical Examiner’s Office in Anchorage. Alaska State Troopers have identified the two aircraft and the five victims.

The Renfro’s Alaskan Adventure Super Cub flying from Bethel to a hunting camp carried pilot Zach Justin Babat of Montana, 44, and passenger Jeff Thomas Burruss of Haines, 40.

The RAVN C208 Caravan flying from Russian Mission to Marshall carried pilot Harry Wrase of Wasilla, 48, and passengers Aaron Jay Minock of Russian Mission, 21, and Steven Paul Andrew of Kenai, 32.

NTSB Alaska Chief Clint Johnson said the planes crashed about a half-mile away from each other across a terrain of rolling hills and thick alders. Two investigators reached the Caravan crash site Wednesday evening just before dark.

“The briefing I was able to get from Mike Hodges, who was on scene briefly last night, indicated that the airplane is badly fragmented. Didn’t go into any other details,” Johnson said Thursday morning.

With the hike through the dense brush and rapid loss of daylight, the investigators were only at the site a short while.

“What they were able to do,” Johnson said, “was get an idea of what equipment is going to be needed to do their job.”

NTSB investigators are reviewing the limited radar data available from the area. At this point, how the planes collided is unknown.

“Keep in mind that where this accident or mid-air collision took place is in what we refer to as uncontrolled air space where they’re not under control of any air traffic control, or ATC, services at the time,” Johnson said. There is what we refer to as ADSB, which is a type of tracking system. But nevertheless, this accident took place in uncontrolled airspace, so it’s incumbent on each one of the pilots, each one of the flight crews to see and avoid the other airplane.”

Kristen DiMartino was one of the last people to see Wrase, the RAVN pilot, and one of his passengers alive Wednesday. She was one of the three people on the RAVN plane as it flew from Bethel to Russian Mission and remembers Wrase and the other passenger admiring the aircraft.

“I feel like I’m still in shock, because I’ll never get that image out of them being so happy.” DiMartino said. “They were so happy. They were just talking about the plane and literally saying how awesome it was, and then I find out they’re gone.”

The plane dropped DiMartino off in Russian Mission and picked up another passenger before flying north to Marshall. The plane never reached its destination.

Source:  http://www.ktoo.org



ANCHORAGE (KTUU) UPDATE: The pilot of one of the two planes involved in a deadly mid-air collision in western Alaska Wednesday has been identified by a family member as Harry Wrase, Jr.

His niece, Hannah Nadesta Brown, tells KTUU that her uncle was the pilot of the Hageland plane that crashed after a collision with another aircraft.

Brown said "My uncle had the biggest heart. He truly loved flying and serving the villages. He is going to be missed by so many".

Brown said Wrase lived in Wasilla but grew up in McGrath and leaves behind two children. "We just want people to know that he was an amazing father and he was a good pilot" Brown said. "He loved chess, he was an avid player and went to Vegas every year to compete in the International chess festival."

The names of the crash victims have not been released by officials, but Brown says members of her family have been notified about his death.

(Original story)

Two investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board are expected to arrive later today at the scene of a midair collision in Western Alaska that claimed the lives of five people. A third investigator from Seattle should land in Russian Mission on Thursday, said Clint Johnson, chief of the NTSB’s regional office in Alaska.

The crash occurred approximately six miles northwest of Russian Mission, a Yup'ik Eskimo village along the Yukon River, 376 miles west of Anchorage.

“Preliminary reports indicate the crash sites are accessible only by helicopter,” Johnson said.

The aircraft involved are a Hageland Aviation Cessna 208 Caravan with three people on board and a Renfro’s Alaska Adventures Piper PA-18 Super Cub with two people on board, said Guard spokeswoman Lt. Col. Candis Olmstead.

Olmstead said rolling hills and heavy vegetation define the terrain.

The weather is good with clear skies and temperatures in the low 60s. A National Guard Black Hawk helicopter is responding to the second crash site at this hour, Olmstead said.

One of the aviation companies contacted the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center at 11 a.m. on Wednesday to say that they had lost radio contact with an aircraft and that it was overdue.

Alaska State Troopers contacted the coordination center at 11:15 a.m. to report that a second aircraft was overdue, according to Olmstead.

A third aircraft flying overhead spotted aircraft wreckage on the ground that indicated a mid-air collision between two planes.

Troopers said there were no survivors. The identities of the pilots and passengers have not yet been released.

Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corp. expressed condolences to the family and friends of those killed in the crash. Emergency clinicians are available for families and loved ones at the corporation's Family Center in Bethel. Behavioral health aides throughout the region's village clinics are also standing by the speak with those affected by the crash. If anyone would like to speak with an emergency clinician, they can call 907-543-6499.

Source:   http://www.ktuu.com

With 5 open National Transportation Safety Board investigations, Ravn Alaska operators under microscope 

April 11, 2014

The fatal crash Tuesday of a Cessna Caravan near Bethel is the latest in a string of accidents by longtime air taxi operator Hageland Aviation Services. Hageland -- which now operates as Ravn Connect and is part of the Ravn Alaska “family of airlines” -- has been involved in 29 accidents resulting in 23 deaths over the past 20 years. The latest accident is one of five ongoing National Transportation Safety Board investigations into commercial flights operated under the Ravn Alaska banner. 

In another recent accident, an aircraft operated by Hageland crashed outside of St. Marys in late November, killing the pilot and three passengers and leaving six other passengers with serious injuries.

The latest crash joins three other accidents and an incident -- the difference between an accident and an incident is determined by NTSB regulations and involves levels of damage and injury as determined by investigators -- involving Ravn Alaska air group members that are under active investigation by the NTSB. When reviewed as a group, they reveal a pattern of mishaps dating back more than 18 months, which have cumulatively resulted in six deaths.


A series of accidents

 
According to a preliminary NTSB report, the first of these mishaps occurred in September 2012 when an Era Aviation de Havilland DHC-8 departing Anchorage International Airport experienced “an uncommanded left roll and uncontrolled descent during climb at about 12,000 feet." The flight crew regained control at about 7,000 feet and returned to land. None of the 12 passengers or three crew members were injured.

Due to the size of the aircraft and the nature of the operation -- Era Aviation operates under the more-stringent Part 121 section of the Federal Aviation Regulations due to the size of its aircraft and passenger loads -- this incident was turned over to Washington, D.C.-based NTSB officials for investigation.

Then, in October 2013, an Era Aviation Beechcraft 1900 suffered a collapse of the nose and main landing gear while landing in Homer. The flight crew and 13 passengers were uninjured but the aircraft received substantial damage.

In discussing the events at Anchorage and Homer in a recent phone conversation, Washington D.C.-based NTSB public affairs officer Eric Weiss explained that the investigations will extend as far as possible to understand not only what happened, but why. This could include moving the investigation beyond the individual events and into the overall management of the air group. "If answering the question of why extends to management and the overall safety culture, we will look at that," said Weiss. "We will go wherever the investigation takes us."

On Nov. 22, another Beechcraft 1900, this one operated by Hageland Aviation, hit the elevated edge of the runway surface while landing at Badami Airport near Deadhorse. According to the preliminary report, the right main landing gear separated and the airplane slid along the runway surface, causing substantial damage. Weather in Badami at the time of the accident included heavy blowing snow and broken clouds at 1,000 feet, with a half-mile of visibility.

Five days later, Era Alaska Flight 1453 -- operated by Hageland Aviation -- departed Bethel and crashed within 40 minutes near St. Marys, resulting in those four fatalities and six injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at St. Marys when the flight was dispatched, with a ceiling of 300 feet and an overcast sky at the time of the crash. Despite conditions requiring instrument navigation, flight 1453 was operating under visual flight rules. The Badami, St. Marys and recent Bethel accident are all under investigation by the Anchorage NTSB office.

According to investigator Clint Johnson, those accidents are all in the fact-gathering stage. Once analysis of those facts has taken place, the NTSB will look at the carrier as a whole to consider, for example, if there are overall concerns with pilot training, maintenance, oversight by the Federal Aviation Administration or other factors.

"At this point we are working on a case-by-case basis," Johnson said.

The FAA has increased surveillance of the Hageland operation in Bethel since the St. Marys accident. While officials could not confirm any possible enforcement action against the company in the wake of the most recent fatal crash, the FAA asserted that its policy is to “explore all options to address our enforcement responsibilities."

Both Hageland Aviation and Era Aviation are cooperating with all the investigations.


Alaska Airlines 'unwinding' from Hageland

Ownership and operational control of the three air carriers under the Ravn Alaska umbrella is complex and deeply rooted in the companies' history. The first combining of resources between two members of the group came in 2008. The owners of Hageland Aviation Services -- Mike Hageland and Jim Tweto -- and the owner of Frontier Flying Service -- John Hajdukovich -- established a parent company named HoTh Inc. This company was formed to create a self-described “airgroup” where, according to the company website, “the parent company could acquire companies that have synergies with each other (to) market the combined services under a common brand.” State records show that presently HoTh Inc. is owned by Tweto (11 percent), Hageland (39 percent) and Robert Hajdukovich (50 percent).

HoTH Inc. owns Frontier Flying Service, Hageland Aviation Services and Era Aviation, the latter of which was purchased in 2009.

Each of the three companies have separate directors of operation and chief pilots, though Frontier and Era share a CEO in Robert Hajdukovich. The CEO of Hageland Aviation is James Dickerson. The FAA has also assigned individual Certificate Management Teams to each company with specific principal operations and maintenance inspectors and separate annual inspections.
 

Alaska Airlines currently partners with Era Alaska in a “code-sharing” relationship. This allows passengers to purchase tickets from a point of departure with Alaska Airlines all the way through to a destination operated by one of the Era Alaska air group members. This will likely change to Ravn Alaska soon as part of the Era Alaska rebranding effort.

  This seamless scheduling and travel is part of the Alaska Airlines/Era Alaska relationship and based upon “consistent passenger service standards and procedures” for the duration of transport. 
 
Hageland, however, will soon be removed from that equation. In an email, Alaska Airlines spokesperson Bobbie Egan wrote:

"Alaska Air Group maintains a comprehensive safety oversight program of all of our alliance partners. This includes operational safety focused assessments, regular monitoring, and meetings with these partner airlines. As part of this program, Alaska Air Group made the policy decision in December 2013 to begin unwinding our business partnership with Hageland Aviation, Inc. ... This business partnership will fully terminate this month."

Egan said that Hageland is the only Ravn Alaska member Alaska Airlines is terminating its relationship with.


Going forward

Hageland Aviation recently opened a new centralized operation center in Palmer that will weigh 25-30 risk factors prior to each flight as part of a new and enhanced risk management approach. Dispatchers at the center are in constant contact with pilots during their flights. This is unusual for a smaller operator -- referred to as Part 135 under Federal Aviation Regulations -- like Hageland. The center mirrors the one utilized by Era Aviation in Anchorage, and similar to those required of all Part 121 airlines.

As the five investigations continue, the operation and training standards of all of Ravn Alaska member airlines will likely receive more scrutiny from FAA and NTSB investigators. With Ravn Alaska's common ownership, common management and common reservation and scheduling systems, it presents a unique and complicated situation for accident investigators and enforcement officials.

Although Hageland Aviation aircraft may present in different livery or colors and the pilots may or may not wear uniforms to match those of Anchorage-based flight crews, the airline itself is owned and operated by the same group of individuals that owns and operates its sister companies. Since the 2008 combination of resources, there have been six Hageland Aviation accidents in addition to two fatality crashes, five of which occurred in the Bethel region. In fact, accidents involving Bethel-based aircraft have long dominated Hageland’s accident history, which includes crashes in such villages as Marshall, Scammon Bay, Kongiganak, Kwigillingok and Bethel itself. As an integral part of the group, that accident history has belonged first to Frontier Alaska and then Era Alaska and now, through the rebranding, Ravn Alaska.

As owners, the open accident and incident investigations are the collective responsibility of the HoTH board of directors. Ultimately, the current fatality crash, and the one in St. Marys, are just as much a part of Ravn Alaska’s future as they are of Hageland Aviation’s.

The probable cause report for the 2012 incident should be released later this year. The reports for 2013 accidents may extend into early 2015. All of the Ravn Alaska flights continue to operate as scheduled and the Hageland Aviation base in Bethel remains open.


Story and comments/reaction:   http://www.alaskadispatch.com

Multiple people are dead after two aircraft collided midair, then crashed about six miles northwest of the village of Russian Mission, 60 miles north of Bethel just before 11 a.m. Wednesday.

Some of the deceased have been identified as 48-year-old pilot Harry Wrase, of Wasilla, and his passengers — 32-year-old Steven Paul Andrew, of Kenai, and 21-year-old Aaron Jay Minock, of Russian Mission, all aboard a C208 Caravan plane operated by Hageland Aviation Services. Others killed in the second plane involved were 44-year-old pilot Zach Justin Babat, of Montana, and his passenger, 40-year-old Jeff Thomas Burruss, of Haines, flying in a Super Cub operated by Renfro’s Alaska Adventure. All of the victims’ next of kin have been notified of their deaths.

More details about the crash were shared by Lt. Col. Candis Olmstead, chief public affairs officer for the Alaska National Guard, on Wednesday afternoon. Olmstead wrote in an email that an aviation company told the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (ARCC) at 11 a.m. Wednesday stating they lost radio contact with an aircraft that was overdue.

Alaska State Troopers contacted ARCC to report another aircraft was overdue as well.

Olmstead wrote that a third aircraft was flying overhead and spotted wreckage “indicative of a mid-air collision between two aircraft.”

Alaska State Troopers confirmed no survivors were found at the site of the wreckage in an online release Wednesday afternoon.

“Terrain in the area consists of rolling hills and heavy vegetation, at an elevation between 600 to 800 feet,” wrote Olmstead. “Weather is good in the region with clear skies and temperature at 63 degrees mid-afternoon.”

Olmstead wrote that a National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from the 207th Aviation Battalion in Bethel, responded to the crash site around noon Wednesday. Two Life Flight medics were on board the helicopter.

She stated Alaska State Troopers also responded.

“When tragedy happens, community members pull through together for support for the families,” said Russian Mission city administrator Agnes Housler.

Hageland is now owned by Ravn Alaska, which issued a statement Wednesday announcing an emergency support line had been set up for families and friends of the deceased, 888-346-7502.

“On behalf of all the employees of the Ravn family we are deeply saddened by this news,” the company wrote. “Our hearts and prayers go out to the family and friends.”

Hageland made “significant changes” to its operations following a report into two previous crashes was released earlier this year by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), including the construction of a new control center in Palmer.

The fatal 2014 crash near Kwethluk occurred when a pilot on a training flight put the plane into a stall, according to the NTSB report. The student pilot and trainer were unable to bring the plane out of the stall, and both died in the crash.

Investigators determined the fatal 2013 crash of a Hageland aircraft near St. Mary’s, in which four people were killed and six were injured, was likely caused by pilot error and the failure of Federal Aviation Administration officials to hold the company accountable for prior errors.

Ravn Alaska’s statement confirmed the company is cooperating with local officials and the NTSB during their investigation.


http://www.ktva.com

BETHEL – None of the five people aboard two planes that collided Wednesday morning in the skies above a Yukon River village survived the crash, Alaska State Troopers said.

The planes collided on a sunny day about 6 miles northwest of Russian Mission and some 60 miles from the Southwest Alaska hub of Bethel.

Troopers identified three victims aboard a Hageland Aviation Cessna 208 Caravan as pilot Harry Wrase, 48, of Wasilla; and passengers Steven Paul Andrew, 32, of Kenai, and Aaron Jay Minock, 21, of Russian Mission.

The other aircraft was a Piper PA-18 Super Cub operated through Renfro's Alaskan Adventures that took off from Bethel flying to a hunting camp with pilot Zach Justin Babat, 44, of Montana, and passenger Jeff Thomas Burruss, 40, of Haines.

Two National Transportation Safety Board investigators flew on a trooper helicopter from Anchorage to the extensive crash site, said Clint Johnson, NTSB lead investigator for Alaska. A third investigator was headed to Bethel from the Lower 48. The Federal Aviation Administration is also investigating, said spokesman Allen Kenitzer.

Midair crashes are usually technical and complex, Johnson said.

"Ultimately what we are trying to do is to see how the airplanes came together," Johnson said. "What we want to do is to see if either one of these airplanes was able to see one another, either electronically or visually."

Hageland now operates under the Ravn Alaska umbrella, the busiest commuter service in Alaska. Hageland came under scrutiny after a string of crashes in 2013 and 2014, including one that killed four passengers and another that killed two pilots on a training flight.

Reports and interviews released by the NTSB last year suggested that Hageland had been operating with loose controls and a bush-pilot culture of tight landings and flights in extreme weather. But improvements were made, including creating a tracking and control system directed from Palmer, according to news reports.

"They did a very good job as far as changing their operations," Johnson said Wednesday. "As far as we are concerned, that's in the past."

The Cessna 208 is "the mainstay of bush carriers," he said. The Piper Super Cub is also a popular aircraft that's been around for years.

At 11 a.m. on Wednesday, an aviation company reported to the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson that it had lost radio contact with a plane that was overdue, Olmstead said.

Fifteen minutes later, troopers alerted the RCC about a different plane, also overdue.

"It didn't take too long for the rescuers to figure out we were dealing with a midair," Johnson said.

A third aircraft spotted wreckage on the ground. Johnson said there are essentially two crash sites.

The Rescue Coordination Center enlisted a Bethel-based Alaska Army National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter carrying medics, which took off at noon, Olmstead said.

Employees at both Ravn Alaska — which operates Hageland — and Renfro's didn't return calls Wednesday morning and afternoon.

Around noon, before rescuers got to the scene, the Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corp., which operates a clinic in the village and hospital in Bethel, was alerted that medical help might be needed. Within 12 minutes, it had activated an emergency operations center in Bethel to make sure medical staff, equipment and transportation were ready to go, said Tiffany Zulkosky, vice president of communications.

Then around 2:15 p.m., troopers announced no one survived. "YKHC has stood down," the health agency said.

YKHC still is offering help; emergency clinicians for families of those in the crash were standing by at YKHC's family center at 837 Chief Eddie Hoffman Highway. Behavioral health aides in village clinics are available too.

The terrain in the area features rolling hills and heavy vegetation, with elevation between 600 to 800 feet. Skies were clear. The temperature was warm for late summer, 63 degrees.

Source:   http://www.adn.com

There were no survivors on either plane, according to rescuers at the crash site, Alaska State Troopers say.

The two planes were carrying a total of five people, according to the Alaska National Guard.

This post will be updated when more information becomes available.

ORIGINAL POST:
Two small planes carrying a total of five people collided mid-air just before 11 a.m. today in southwest Alaska, according to the Alaska National Guard.

The condition of the pilots and passengers is unknown. The crash site is about 6 miles west, northwest of the Yukon River village of Russian Mission, said Clint Johnson, Alaska chief for the National Transportation Safety Board.

The aircraft involved are a Hageland Aviation Cessna 208 Caravan with three people on board and a Renfro’s Alaska Adventures Piper PA-18 Super Cub with two people on board, said Guard spokeswoman Lt. Col. Candis Olmstead.

An Alaska Army National Guard UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter -- carrying medics -- left Bethel for the crash site and was expected to arrive about 1:30 p.m., Olmstead said.

Alaska State Troopers also are responding. Johnson said two NTSB investigators are traveling by helicopter with troopers to Russian Mission today.

One of the aircraft owners, based in Bethel, first alerted officials to the crash, Johnson said.

“Initially we thought it was just involving one airplane," Johnson said. "So we were monitoring that rescue (and) soon after that were informed that there was another airplane that was missing.”  A trooper spokesperson could not immediately be reached.

NTSB Identification: ANC16FA061A
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Wednesday, August 31, 2016 in Russian Mission, AK
Aircraft: CESSNA 208, registration: N752RV
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

NTSB Identification: ANC16FA061B
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, August 31, 2016 in Russian Mission, AK
Aircraft: PIPER PA 18-150, registration: N82452
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.


On August 31, 2016, about 1001 Alaska daylight time (AKD), a turbine-powered Cessna 208B (Caravan) airplane, N752RV, and a Piper PA-18-150 (Super Cub) airplane, N82452, collided midair while both airplanes were en route about 6.5 miles northwest of the Russian Mission Airport, Russian Mission, Alaska. The Cessna 208B was registered to N752RV, LLC, Fairbanks, Alaska, and operated by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Ravn Connect, Flight number 3190, a scheduled commuter flight operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135 and visual flight rules (VFR). The Piper PA-18-150 was registered to DioAir, LLC, Bethel, Alaska, and operated as a guided hunting operation flight under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 91 and VFR. The airline transport pilot and the two passengers on board the Cessna 208B sustained fatal injuries. The commercial pilot and the sole passenger in the Piper PA-18-150 sustained fatal injuries. Both airplanes sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident. The Cessna 208B departed from Russian Mission Airport about 0958, destined for the Marshall Don Hunter Senior Airport, Marshall, Alaska, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The Piper PA-18-150 departed the Bethel Airport, Bethel, about 0907, destined for a remote hunting camp about 20 miles northwest of Russian Mission, with company flight following procedures in effect.


In a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC) on September 7, a representative of the operator of the Cessna reported that the flight was scheduled to arrive in Marshall at 1017. When the airplane did not arrive as scheduled, the Ravn Connect operational control center (OCC) initiated overdue airplane procedures. The Ravn Connect OCC contacted the pilots of two company airplanes flying near Russian Mission and provided the pilots with the last latitude and longitude coordinates supplied from the Cessna's automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) system. The two company pilots then flew their airplanes to the area of the last coordinates and obtained visual confirmation of the Cessna wreckage.


In a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on September 7, the owner of the hunting/fishing expedition company that operated the Piper reported that he was flying a customer to a remote hunting camp and that he departed from Bethel about 15 minutes after the Piper departed. The operator/owner reported that he delivered his customer to his hunting camp about 1030 and then flew by the hunting camp that was the Piper's destination and observed that the Piper and the occupants were not present. The operator/owner radioed the company headquarters for a status update on the Piper and was supplied the last latitude and longitude coordinates from the company's DeLorme flight following system. The owner/operator flew to the area of the last coordinates and obtained visual confirmation of the Piper wreckage.


The NTSB IIC, two NTSB air safety investigators, and a team of Alaska State Troopers traveled to the accident scene. Both wreckage sites, about 0.5 mile apart, were located in an area of rolling hills with heavy vegetation about 10 feet tall populated with various alder trees, spruce trees, and birch trees. The wreckage for both airplanes was recovered and transported to a secure facility for future examination.


The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented national ADS-B technology in Alaska, and the Cessna was equipped with an avionics package as part of that program. Formerly known as Capstone, the joint industry/FAA program (which includes ground-based stations, satellites, and airplane avionics) currently provides pilots with situational awareness by displaying the airplane's position over terrain, and warns pilots of the presence of other ADS-B-equipped aircraft which may be present, while using global positioning system (GPS) technology, coupled with an instrument panel mounted, moving map display. The preliminary examination of the ADS-B equipment installed in the Cessna revealed that it included two Garmin multi-function display units, commercially known as the G1000. According to management personnel with Ravn Connect, at the time of the accident, the ADS-B capability of the Cessna consisted of the transmit function only (ADS-B out). ADS-B track data from the Cessna was requested from the FAA.


A Garmin GPSMap 296 unit was recovered from the Piper and shipped to the NTSB vehicle recorder laboratory in Washington, DC. Radar data for the two airplanes was also requested from the FAA.



The closest official weather observation station is located at the Russian Mission Airport. At 0956, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) reported, in part: wind calm; visibility 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition clear; temperature 52 degrees F; dew point 46 degrees F; altimeter 30.09 inHg.

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