14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 28, 2015 in West Palm Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/28/2016
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28R-200, registration: N54380
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
NTSB Identification: ERA15LA115B
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 28, 2015 in West Palm Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/28/2016
Aircraft: ROBINSON HELICOPTER R22 BETA, registration: N475AT
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The designated pilot examiner (DPE) and the commercial pilot on board the airplane were performing left traffic patterns during a checkride. A helicopter was simultaneously performing right traffic patterns to the same runway. Throughout the flight, the DPE and pilot had observed the accident helicopter and other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel to and to the right side of the runway. The airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the commercial pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing. In light of the previously-observed helicopter operations to the right side of the runway, the DPE advised the pilot that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopters and to continue the approach and landing. The helicopter, however, was established on a shallow, final approach leg of the traffic pattern for a run-on landing. Upon entering the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern for landing, the DPE’s view of the accident helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing. The airplane overtook the helicopter from above, and the aircraft collided. The helicopter entered a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane completed a go-around and subsequently landed safely. Review of recorded radio communications revealed that the pilots in the airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs of the traffic pattern only, but did not announce their intentions to conduct, or the airplane’s entry into, the simulated power-off landing maneuver. The helicopter pilots transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern, but before the accident landing approach, announced only that the helicopter was “turning final.” The helicopter pilots provided no specificity about the shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface. Other helicopters operating in the traffic pattern on the day of the accident had conducted their operations to the grass on the right side of the runway. On the previous approach, the accident helicopter pilots had announced their intention to land the helicopter in the grass abeam the runway. The lack of explicit communication from the helicopter pilots regarding their intentions resulted in the helicopter being in a position that was unexpected to the airplane pilots. In the absence of any information to the contrary, the airplane pilots likely assumed that the accident helicopter would continue to remain clear of the runway and the extended runway centerline, as it and other helicopters had done during previous approaches. This likely lowered the airplane pilots' vigilance in maintaining visual contact with the helicopter throughout the approach for landing.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The failure of the airplane pilots to maintain an adequate visual lookout for known traffic in the traffic pattern, which resulted in a midair collision. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the airplane pilots to announce their intentions before landing, and the helicopter pilots' lack of specificity in their radio communications.
On January 28, 2015, about 1200 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28R-200 airplane, N54380, operated by Palm Beach Flight Training, and a Robinson R22B helicopter, N475AT, operated by Palm Beach Helicopters, collided while maneuvering for landing at Palm Beach County Park Airport (LNA), West Palm Beach, Florida. The helicopter performed a precautionary landing to the runway, while the airplane performed a go-around and subsequently landed uneventfully. The helicopter sustained substantial damage and the airplane sustained minor damage. The flight instructor and private pilot receiving instruction in the helicopter were not injured. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) designated pilot examiner (DPE) and commercial pilot on board the airplane were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for either instructional flight, both of which were conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The pilots in each aircraft provided written statements, and their statements were consistent throughout. The pilot in the airplane was undergoing a flight instructor practical test from the DPE, and the airplane-rated pilot in the helicopter was receiving primary rotary wing instruction.
Radar information from the FAA revealed that both aircraft were operating in the traffic pattern for runway 33 at LNA prior to the accident. The airplane was performing left traffic patterns, while the helicopter was performing right traffic patterns.
The helicopter maneuvered around the right traffic pattern and was established on a shallow final approach for a run-on landing. About the same time, the airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the applicant pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing.
The DPE stated that while the airplane had been conducting left traffic patterns, he and the applicant had observed other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel and to the right side of runway 33. In light of these operations, the DPE advised the applicant that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopter, and to continue the approach and landing. Once the airplane entered the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern, the DPE's view of the helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing.
Witnesses observed the airplane overtake the helicopter from above, heard the contact, and watched the helicopter enter a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane banked sharply, the engine accelerated, and completed a go-around.
A review of the recorded radio communications revealed that the helicopter transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern. The airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs only, and did not announce its intentions or its entry into the simulated power-off landing.
On its previous approach, the helicopter announced its intention to land in the grass abeam the runway, but prior to the accident; the helicopter announced only that it was "turning final." There was no specificity about a shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface.
The airplane pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued September 16, 2014. He reported 677 total hours of flight experience, of which 22 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
The DPE held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple type ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with multiple ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued January 16, 2014. The DPE reported 33,164 total hours of flight experience, of which 234 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
The flight instructor in the helicopter held commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates with ratings for airplane single-engine, multiengine, and rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued June 26, 2014, and he reported 1,498 total hours of flight experience, of which 521 hours were in the accident helicopter make and model.
The helicopter pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land. His most recent FAA first class medical certificate was issued December 22, 2014. He reported 265 total hours of flight experience, of which 12 hours were in the accident helicopter make and model.
LNA was not tower-controlled. Runway 15/33 was 3,421 feet long and 100 feet wide, and was located along the east side of the field. The grass area on the east side of the runway was approximately 200 feet wide.
Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed damage to the cabin step. The helicopter displayed substantial damage to the leading edge and spar of one main rotor blade. The pilots of both the airplane and helicopter reported that there were no mechanical issues that would have precluded normal operation of their aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 91.126 states, in part, "Each pilot of a helicopter or powered parachute must avoid the flow of fixed-wing traffic."
The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Chapter 4, Section 4-1-9, Traffic Advisory Practices at Airports Without Operating Control Towers, states, "There is no substitute for alertness while in the vicinity of an airport. It is essential that pilots be alert and look for traffic and exchange traffic information when approaching or departing an airport without an operating control tower…To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that all radio-equipped aircraft transmit/receive on a common frequency identified for the purpose of airport advisories." The AIM recommends that when operating at an airport without a control tower, pilots self-announce their position on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern.
Docket And Docket Items - National Transportation Safety Board: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms
NTSB Identification: ERA15LA115A
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, January 28, 2015 in West Palm Beach, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 11/28/2016
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28R-200, registration: N54380
Injuries: 4 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
The designated pilot examiner (DPE) and the commercial pilot on board the airplane were performing left traffic patterns during a checkride. A helicopter was simultaneously performing right traffic patterns to the same runway. Throughout the flight, the DPE and pilot had observed the accident helicopter and other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel to and to the right side of the runway. The airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the commercial pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing. In light of the previously-observed helicopter operations to the right side of the runway, the DPE advised the pilot that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopters and to continue the approach and landing. The helicopter, however, was established on a shallow, final approach leg of the traffic pattern for a run-on landing. Upon entering the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern for landing, the DPE’s view of the accident helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing. The airplane overtook the helicopter from above, and the aircraft collided. The helicopter entered a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane completed a go-around and subsequently landed safely. Review of recorded radio communications revealed that the pilots in the airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs of the traffic pattern only, but did not announce their intentions to conduct, or the airplane’s entry into, the simulated power-off landing maneuver. The helicopter pilots transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern, but before the accident landing approach, announced only that the helicopter was “turning final.” The helicopter pilots provided no specificity about the shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface. Other helicopters operating in the traffic pattern on the day of the accident had conducted their operations to the grass on the right side of the runway. On the previous approach, the accident helicopter pilots had announced their intention to land the helicopter in the grass abeam the runway. The lack of explicit communication from the helicopter pilots regarding their intentions resulted in the helicopter being in a position that was unexpected to the airplane pilots. In the absence of any information to the contrary, the airplane pilots likely assumed that the accident helicopter would continue to remain clear of the runway and the extended runway centerline, as it and other helicopters had done during previous approaches. This likely lowered the airplane pilots' vigilance in maintaining visual contact with the helicopter throughout the approach for landing.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The failure of the airplane pilots to maintain an adequate visual lookout for known traffic in the traffic pattern, which resulted in a midair collision. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the airplane pilots to announce their intentions before landing, and the helicopter pilots' lack of specificity in their radio communications.
On January 28, 2015, about 1200 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28R-200 airplane, N54380, operated by Palm Beach Flight Training, and a Robinson R22B helicopter, N475AT, operated by Palm Beach Helicopters, collided while maneuvering for landing at Palm Beach County Park Airport (LNA), West Palm Beach, Florida. The helicopter performed a precautionary landing to the runway, while the airplane performed a go-around and subsequently landed uneventfully. The helicopter sustained substantial damage and the airplane sustained minor damage. The flight instructor and private pilot receiving instruction in the helicopter were not injured. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) designated pilot examiner (DPE) and commercial pilot on board the airplane were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for either instructional flight, both of which were conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The pilots in each aircraft provided written statements, and their statements were consistent throughout. The pilot in the airplane was undergoing a flight instructor practical test from the DPE, and the airplane-rated pilot in the helicopter was receiving primary rotary wing instruction.
Radar information from the FAA revealed that both aircraft were operating in the traffic pattern for runway 33 at LNA prior to the accident. The airplane was performing left traffic patterns, while the helicopter was performing right traffic patterns.
The helicopter maneuvered around the right traffic pattern and was established on a shallow final approach for a run-on landing. About the same time, the airplane was on the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern, with the applicant pilot preparing for a simulated power-off landing.
The DPE stated that while the airplane had been conducting left traffic patterns, he and the applicant had observed other helicopters in the right traffic pattern completing their approaches parallel and to the right side of runway 33. In light of these operations, the DPE advised the applicant that the airplane would remain clear of the helicopter, and to continue the approach and landing. Once the airplane entered the turn from the downwind leg and while on the final approach leg of the traffic pattern, the DPE's view of the helicopter was blocked by the cabin and right wing.
Witnesses observed the airplane overtake the helicopter from above, heard the contact, and watched the helicopter enter a rapid, controlled descent to the runway. The airplane banked sharply, the engine accelerated, and completed a go-around.
A review of the recorded radio communications revealed that the helicopter transmitted position reports on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern. The airplane transmitted position reports for the crosswind and downwind legs only, and did not announce its intentions or its entry into the simulated power-off landing.
On its previous approach, the helicopter announced its intention to land in the grass abeam the runway, but prior to the accident; the helicopter announced only that it was "turning final." There was no specificity about a shallow approach or performing a run-on landing to the runway surface.
The airplane pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued September 16, 2014. He reported 677 total hours of flight experience, of which 22 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
The DPE held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple type ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with multiple ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued January 16, 2014. The DPE reported 33,164 total hours of flight experience, of which 234 hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
The flight instructor in the helicopter held commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates with ratings for airplane single-engine, multiengine, and rotorcraft-helicopter. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued June 26, 2014, and he reported 1,498 total hours of flight experience, of which 521 hours were in the accident helicopter make and model.
The helicopter pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land. His most recent FAA first class medical certificate was issued December 22, 2014. He reported 265 total hours of flight experience, of which 12 hours were in the accident helicopter make and model.
LNA was not tower-controlled. Runway 15/33 was 3,421 feet long and 100 feet wide, and was located along the east side of the field. The grass area on the east side of the runway was approximately 200 feet wide.
Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed damage to the cabin step. The helicopter displayed substantial damage to the leading edge and spar of one main rotor blade. The pilots of both the airplane and helicopter reported that there were no mechanical issues that would have precluded normal operation of their aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 91.126 states, in part, "Each pilot of a helicopter or powered parachute must avoid the flow of fixed-wing traffic."
The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM), Chapter 4, Section 4-1-9, Traffic Advisory Practices at Airports Without Operating Control Towers, states, "There is no substitute for alertness while in the vicinity of an airport. It is essential that pilots be alert and look for traffic and exchange traffic information when approaching or departing an airport without an operating control tower…To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that all radio-equipped aircraft transmit/receive on a common frequency identified for the purpose of airport advisories." The AIM recommends that when operating at an airport without a control tower, pilots self-announce their position on the downwind, base, and final legs of the traffic pattern.
NTSB Identification: ERA15FA299
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 10, 2015 in Marathon, FL
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/08/2016
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28R, registration: N54380
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
According to the airplane owner, the noninstrument-rated pilot had rented the airplane in Palm Beach, Florida, 1 day before the accident and was not scheduled to return the airplane until the day after the accident. The rental agreement prohibited night flight to or from the Florida Keys. However, about 4 hours after sunset on the night of the accident, the pilot departed an airport on the Florida Keys. Airport security video recorded the airplane becoming airborne, climbing, and beginning to turn right. A witness reported seeing the airplane descending into the water with the engines running. The flight was conducted on a dark, moonless night, and in a sparsely populated area of Florida near the water. No visible horizon could be seen on the video. Based on the dark night conditions, the lack of visual reference at the time of the accident, the pilot’s low overall flight time, and the pilot’s lack of an instrument rating, it is likely that he became spatially disoriented, which led to the subsequent descent into water.
Examination of the wreckage revealed a right wing low attitude at the time of the impact, which was consistent with the pilot maintaining the right turn seen in the security video recordings. Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's failure to maintain a positive climb rate after takeoff due to spatial disorientation while turning after takeoff in dark night conditions in a sparsely populated area, which resulted in the airplane’s descent into water. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to depart on a night flight over water.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On August 10, 2015 about 0035 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-200, N54380, was destroyed when it impacted the water after takeoff from the Marathon Airport (MTH), Marathon, Florida. The private pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight had an intended destination of Palm Beach County Park Airport (LNA), West Palm Beach, Florida. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed. The airplane was owned by The Wildwood Helicopter Company, Inc. and operated by Palm Beach Flight Training. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Airport security video recorded the airplane taxing out to the runway and began the takeoff roll, on runway 25, at 0034. A second video captured the airplane after it had already become airborne, a few feet above ground level, at an indicated time of 0034:17. The recording revealed the airplane climbing on the upwind leg of the traffic pattern, and began to turn right for the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern about 0034:59. At 0035:22, the airplane lights were no longer visible. The recording further revealed the absence of any visible horizon to the northwest of the airport. The video was further overlaid by a daytime screen shot, to verify that the view of the airplane was unhindered. The modified video revealed one tree had obstructed the actual impact with the water.
According to a representative of Palm Beach Flight Training, the pilot rented the airplane on August 9, 2015, departed about noon, and was not to return until Tuesday August 11, 2015.
According to an eyewitness, the airplane was observed descending into the water and the engine could be heard operating.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and flight school records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, which was issued December 20, 2012. He held an FAA third-class medical certificate, issued April 15, 2014, and was issued with a limitation of "Must have available glasses for near vision." At the time of the medical examination, the pilot reported 125.5 total hours of flight experience and 5.0 hours of flight experience in the 6 months prior to the medical certificate. Documentation provided by the flight school did not include any flight time, but did indicate that the pilot accomplished an airplane checkout on August 9, 2015. The pilot also received his "PIC [Pilot-in-command] in a complex airplane" endorsement on May 4, 2015 and had accomplished a flight review on December 17, 2014. At the time of this writing the pilot's flight time logbook had not been located, as such, his total and recent night flying experience could not be determined.
The pilot rented the airplane from Palm Beach Flight Training in the afternoon of August 9, 2015. The rental agreement provided by the flight school, dated September 6, 2009, contained the pilot's signature and included several limitations. One of the limitations was "There are not to be any night flights to or from the Bahamas or Florida Keys before sunrise or after sunset."
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According to FAA and aircraft maintenance records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on November 15, 1973 and was originally registered to Wildwood Helicopter Company Inc. on October 25, 2013. It was powered by a Lycoming IO-360-C1C engine. It was also driven by a Hartzell propeller HC-C3YK-1RE/F7282. According to the maintenance records, the most recent annual inspection was conducted on November 14, 2014 with a recorded tachometer of 7,566.53 hours, which correlated to 8,817.07 hours total time in service. According to the operator, the last recorded 100-hour inspection was completed on July 10, 2015, at a recorded tachometer time of 7,561.53 hours. At the time of that entry, the airframe had accumulated 9,012.07 hours total time. The engine had accumulated 791.42 hours since major overhaul and 10,292.91 hours total time in service. The propeller had accumulated 2,382.92 hours total time in service. The tachometer was located within the instrument panel and indicated 7,578.91 hours.
According to fuel records located at MTH, the airplane was fueled with 16.8 gallons of "Avgas." The credit card receipt associated with the refueling had a time stamp of 1430:49, on August 9, 2015. The fuel order also indicated "Top off all tanks."
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 0054 recorded weather observation at MTH, included calm wind, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 29 degrees C, dew point 24 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.95 inches of mercury.
According to the United States Naval Observatory, Sun and Moon Data, official sunset was at 2003 and end of civil twilight was 2027. The moonset occurred at 1703 and 15 percent of the moon disc may have been visible had the moon been above the horizon.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane was found in the Florida Bay, in about 9 feet of water. The main wreckage was located at 24°43.8N and 081°04.6W. The debris path was fairly compact. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a line that ran parallel to the shore. However, due to tide changes it could not be accurately determined the original debris path in relation to the main wreckage, which was located on a 320 degree magnetic heading and about 1.5 miles from the MTH.
Examination revealed that the airplane exhibited impact and crush damage to both wings, cabin, and fuselage. The airplane was segmented into numerous pieces. The right side stabilator was damaged in the aft and positive direction at an approximate 45-degree angle. The right wing main spar exhibited an approximate 50-degree twist. Impact and crush damage was consistent with the airplane impacting the water in a right wing low, nose down attitude. An outboard portion of the left wing, left wing aileron, and main cabin door were unable to be located. Examination of the engine revealed crankshaft and valve train continuity from the propeller flange to the rear accessory pad. Thumb compression was noted on all cylinders. A fluid, similar in smell as 100LL Aviation fuel was present in all fuel lines and in the fuel pump. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the aileron bellcrank, located in each wing and the stabilator. One of the two rudder cables exhibited tensile overload; however, rudder control continuity was confirmed from the pilot's rudder pedals to the rudder.
The airplane's instrument panel was examined and the as found indications were noted. The airspeed indicator was in place and indicated about 100 knots. The attitude indicator was found tumbled; however, the instrument case exhibited minimal damage and the unit was disassembled. Examination of the gyro and gyro case revealed no score marks; however, due to salt water saturation, corrosion was evident throughout the instrument case. The turn and bank indicator indicated a right wing low attitude. The directional gyro indicated about 325 degrees and the heading preselect indicator was found selected to 015 degrees.
The engine remained attached to the airplane with electrical and fuel lines, cables, and was collocated with the main wreckage. The propeller was impact separated at the propeller flange, and was located about 300 feet from the main wreckage. All three propeller blades exhibited cord wise bending. The vacuum pump was removed and rotated by hand. Suction was noted and the vanes were audible noted as having unimpeded movement during hand rotation.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot on August 11, 2015, by the Office of the Medical Examiner, located in Marathon, Florida. The autopsy findings included "Multiple blunt force injuries." The report listed the specific injuries.
Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot, by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated no ethanol nor drugs were detected in urine.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Spatial Disorientation
The FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge contained guidance which stated that "under normal flight conditions, when there is a visual reference to the horizon and ground, the sensory system in the inner ear helps to identify the pitch, roll, and yaw movements of the airplane. When visual contact with the horizon is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable. Without visual references outside the airplane, there are many situations where combinations of normal motions and forces can create convincing illusions that are difficult to overcome."
The Handbook also advised, "unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when the horizon is not visible should be avoided."
The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3) described some hazards associated with flying when visual references, such as the ground or horizon, are obscured. "The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular tends to confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in the attitude of the airplane, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated; leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation."
FAA Publication "Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions" (OK-11-1550) , states in part "false visual reference illusions may cause you to orient your aircraft in relation to a false horizon; these illusions are caused by flying over a banked cloud, night flying over featureless terrain with ground lights that are indistinguishable from a dark sky with stars, or night flying over a featureless terrain with a clearly defined pattern of ground lights and a dark starless sky." The publication further provides guidance on the prevention of spatial disorientation. One of the preventive measures was "When flying at night or in reduced visibility, use and rely on your flight instruments." It further states "if you experience a visual illusion during flight (most pilots do at one time or another), have confidence in your instruments and ignore all conflicting signals your body gives you. Accidents usually happen as a result of a pilot's indecision to rely on the instruments."
Although FAA Advisory Circular AC 60-4A, "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation," was canceled in May 2015, it provided credible information. The tests conducted with qualified instrument pilots indicated that it can take as long as 35 seconds to establish full control by instruments after a loss of visual reference of the earth's surface.
The FAA publication Medical Facts for Pilots (AM-400-03/1), described several vestibular illusions associated with the operation of aircraft in low visibility conditions. Somatogravic illusions, those involving the semicircular canals of the vestibular system, were generally placed into one of four categories, one of which was the "graveyard spiral." According to the text, the graveyard spiral, "…is associated with a return to level flight following an intentional or unintentional prolonged bank turn. For example, a pilot who enters a banking turn to the left will initially have a sensation of a turn in the same direction. If the left turn continues (~20 seconds or more), the pilot will experience the sensation that the airplane is no longer turning to the left. At this point, if the pilot attempts to level the wings this action will produce a sensation that the airplane is turning and banking in the opposite direction (to the right). If the pilot believes the illusion of a right turn (which can be very compelling), he/she will reenter the original left turn in an attempt to counteract the sensation of a right turn. Unfortunately, while this is happening, the airplane is still turning to the left and losing altitude.
Edward "Russ" Elgin Jr.
NTSB Identification: ERA15FA299
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 10, 2015 in Marathon, FL
Aircraft: PIPER PA-28R, registration: N54380
Injuries: 1 Fatal.
NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On August 10, 2015 about 0035 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-200, N54380, was destroyed when it impacted the water after takeoff from the Marathon Airport (MTH), Marathon, Florida. The private pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The flight had an intended destination of Palm Beach County Park Airport (LNA), West Palm Beach, Florida. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed. The airplane was owned by The Wildwood Helicopter Company, Inc. and operated by Palm Beach Flight Training. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
Airport security video recorded the airplane taxing out to the runway and began the takeoff roll, on runway 25, at 0034. A second video captured the airplane after it had already become airborne, a few feet above ground level, at an indicated time of 0034:17. The recording revealed the airplane climbing on the upwind leg of the traffic pattern, and began to turn right for the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern about 0034:59. At 0035:22, the airplane lights were no longer visible. The recording further revealed the absence of any visible horizon to the northwest of the airport. The video was further overlaid by a daytime screen shot, to verify that the view of the airplane was unhindered. The modified video revealed one tree had obstructed the actual impact with the water.
According to a representative of Palm Beach Flight Training, the pilot rented the airplane on August 9, 2015, departed about noon, and was not to return until Tuesday August 11, 2015.
According to an eyewitness, the airplane was observed descending into the water and the engine could be heard operating.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and flight school records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, which was issued December 20, 2012. He held an FAA third-class medical certificate, issued April 15, 2014, and was issued with a limitation of "Must have available glasses for near vision." At the time of the medical examination, the pilot reported 125.5 total hours of flight experience and 5.0 hours of flight experience in the 6 months prior to the medical certificate. Documentation provided by the flight school did not include any flight time, but did indicate that the pilot accomplished an airplane checkout on August 9, 2015. The pilot also received his "PIC [Pilot-in-command] in a complex airplane" endorsement on May 4, 2015 and had accomplished a flight review on December 17, 2014. At the time of this writing the pilot's flight time logbook had not been located, as such, his total and recent night flying experience could not be determined.
The pilot rented the airplane from Palm Beach Flight Training in the afternoon of August 9, 2015. The rental agreement provided by the flight school, dated September 6, 2009, contained the pilot's signature and included several limitations. One of the limitations was "There are not to be any night flights to or from the Bahamas or Florida Keys before sunrise or after sunset."
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According to FAA and aircraft maintenance records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on November 15, 1973 and was originally registered to Wildwood Helicopter Company Inc. on October 25, 2013. It was powered by a Lycoming IO-360-C1C engine. It was also driven by a Hartzell propeller HC-C3YK-1RE/F7282. According to the maintenance records, the most recent annual inspection was conducted on November 14, 2014 with a recorded tachometer of 7,566.53 hours, which correlated to 8,817.07 hours total time in service. According to the operator, the last recorded 100-hour inspection was completed on July 10, 2015, at a recorded tachometer time of 7,561.53 hours. At the time of that entry, the airframe had accumulated 9,012.07 hours total time. The engine had accumulated 791.42 hours since major overhaul and 10,292.91 hours total time in service. The propeller had accumulated 2,382.92 hours total time in service. The tachometer was located within the instrument panel and indicated 7,578.91 hours.
According to fuel records located at MTH, the airplane was fueled with 16.8 gallons of "Avgas." The credit card receipt associated with the refueling had a time stamp of 1430:49, on August 9, 2015. The fuel order also indicated "Top off all tanks."
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 0054 recorded weather observation at MTH, included calm wind, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 29 degrees C, dew point 24 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.95 inches of mercury.
According to the United States Naval Observatory, Sun and Moon Data, official sunset was at 2003 and end of civil twilight was 2027. The moonset occurred at 1703 and 15 percent of the moon disc may have been visible had the moon been above the horizon.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane was found in the Florida Bay, in about 9 feet of water. The main wreckage was located at 24°43.8N and 081°04.6W. The debris path was fairly compact. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a line that ran parallel to the shore. However, due to tide changes it could not be accurately determined the original debris path in relation to the main wreckage, which was located on a 320 degree magnetic heading and about 1.5 miles from the MTH.
Examination revealed that the airplane exhibited impact and crush damage to both wings, cabin, and fuselage. The airplane was segmented into numerous pieces. The right side stabilator was damaged in the aft and positive direction at an approximate 45-degree angle. The right wing main spar exhibited an approximate 50-degree twist. Impact and crush damage was consistent with the airplane impacting the water in a right wing low, nose down attitude. An outboard portion of the left wing, left wing aileron, and main cabin door were unable to be located. Examination of the engine revealed crankshaft and valve train continuity from the propeller flange to the rear accessory pad. Thumb compression was noted on all cylinders. A fluid, similar in smell as 100LL Aviation fuel was present in all fuel lines and in the fuel pump. Flight control continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column to the aileron bellcrank, located in each wing and the stabilator. One of the two rudder cables exhibited tensile overload; however, rudder control continuity was confirmed from the pilot's rudder pedals to the rudder.
The airplane's instrument panel was examined and the as found indications were noted. The airspeed indicator was in place and indicated about 100 knots. The attitude indicator was found tumbled; however, the instrument case exhibited minimal damage and the unit was disassembled. Examination of the gyro and gyro case revealed no score marks; however, due to salt water saturation, corrosion was evident throughout the instrument case. The turn and bank indicator indicated a right wing low attitude. The directional gyro indicated about 325 degrees and the heading preselect indicator was found selected to 015 degrees.
The engine remained attached to the airplane with electrical and fuel lines, cables, and was collocated with the main wreckage. The propeller was impact separated at the propeller flange, and was located about 300 feet from the main wreckage. All three propeller blades exhibited cord wise bending. The vacuum pump was removed and rotated by hand. Suction was noted and the vanes were audible noted as having unimpeded movement during hand rotation.
MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
An autopsy was performed on the pilot on August 11, 2015, by the Office of the Medical Examiner, located in Marathon, Florida. The autopsy findings included "Multiple blunt force injuries." The report listed the specific injuries.
Forensic toxicology was performed on specimens from the pilot, by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The toxicology report stated no ethanol nor drugs were detected in urine.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Spatial Disorientation
The FAA's Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge contained guidance which stated that "under normal flight conditions, when there is a visual reference to the horizon and ground, the sensory system in the inner ear helps to identify the pitch, roll, and yaw movements of the airplane. When visual contact with the horizon is lost, the vestibular system becomes unreliable. Without visual references outside the airplane, there are many situations where combinations of normal motions and forces can create convincing illusions that are difficult to overcome."
The Handbook also advised, "unless a pilot has many hours of training in instrument flight, flight in reduced visibility or at night when the horizon is not visible should be avoided."
The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3) described some hazards associated with flying when visual references, such as the ground or horizon, are obscured. "The vestibular sense (motion sensing by the inner ear) in particular tends to confuse the pilot. Because of inertia, the sensory areas of the inner ear cannot detect slight changes in the attitude of the airplane, nor can they accurately sense attitude changes that occur at a uniform rate over a period of time. On the other hand, false sensations are often generated; leading the pilot to believe the attitude of the airplane has changed when in fact, it has not. These false sensations result in the pilot experiencing spatial disorientation."
FAA Publication "Spatial Disorientation Visual Illusions" (OK-11-1550) , states in part "false visual reference illusions may cause you to orient your aircraft in relation to a false horizon; these illusions are caused by flying over a banked cloud, night flying over featureless terrain with ground lights that are indistinguishable from a dark sky with stars, or night flying over a featureless terrain with a clearly defined pattern of ground lights and a dark starless sky." The publication further provides guidance on the prevention of spatial disorientation. One of the preventive measures was "When flying at night or in reduced visibility, use and rely on your flight instruments." It further states "if you experience a visual illusion during flight (most pilots do at one time or another), have confidence in your instruments and ignore all conflicting signals your body gives you. Accidents usually happen as a result of a pilot's indecision to rely on the instruments."
Although FAA Advisory Circular AC 60-4A, "Pilot's Spatial Disorientation," was canceled in May 2015, it provided credible information. The tests conducted with qualified instrument pilots indicated that it can take as long as 35 seconds to establish full control by instruments after a loss of visual reference of the earth's surface.
The FAA publication Medical Facts for Pilots (AM-400-03/1), described several vestibular illusions associated with the operation of aircraft in low visibility conditions. Somatogravic illusions, those involving the semicircular canals of the vestibular system, were generally placed into one of four categories, one of which was the "graveyard spiral." According to the text, the graveyard spiral, "…is associated with a return to level flight following an intentional or unintentional prolonged bank turn. For example, a pilot who enters a banking turn to the left will initially have a sensation of a turn in the same direction. If the left turn continues (~20 seconds or more), the pilot will experience the sensation that the airplane is no longer turning to the left. At this point, if the pilot attempts to level the wings this action will produce a sensation that the airplane is turning and banking in the opposite direction (to the right). If the pilot believes the illusion of a right turn (which can be very compelling), he/she will reenter the original left turn in an attempt to counteract the sensation of a right turn. Unfortunately, while this is happening, the airplane is still turning to the left and losing altitude.
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