Friday, January 10, 2014

Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, Era Alaska, N12373: Accident occurred November 29, 2013 in Saint Marys, Alaska

Docket And Docket Items:  http://dms.ntsb.gov


NTSB Identification: ANC14MA008 
 Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, November 29, 2013 in Saint Marys, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/26/2016
Aircraft: CESSNA 208B, registration: N12373
Injuries: 4 Fatal, 6 Serious.

NTSB investigators traveled in support of this investigation and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The scheduled commuter flight departed 40 minutes late for a two-stop flight. During the first leg of the night visual flight rules (VFR) flight, weather at the first destination airport deteriorated, so the pilot diverted to the second destination airport. The pilot requested and received a special VFR clearance from an air route traffic controller into the diversion airport area. Review of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data transmitted by the airplane showed that, after the clearance was issued, the airplane's track changed and proceeded in a direct line to the diversion airport.

Postaccident examination of the pilot's radio showed that his audio panel was selected to the air route traffic control (ARTCC) frequency rather than the destination airport frequency; therefore, although the pilot attempted to activate the pilot-controlled lighting at the destination airport, as heard on the ARTCC frequency, it did not activate. Further, witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's reported that the airport lighting system was not activated when they saw the accident airplane fly over, and then proceed away from the airport. Witnesses in the area described the weather at the airport as deteriorating with fog and ice. About 1 mile from the runway, the airplane began to descend, followed by a descending right turn and controlled flight into terrain. The pilot appeared to be in control of the airplane up to the point of the right descending turn. Given the lack of runway lighting, the restricted visibility due to fog, and the witness statements, the pilot likely lost situational awareness of the airplane's geographic position, which led to his subsequent controlled flight into terrain.

After the airplane proceeded away from the airport, the witnesses attempted to contact the pilot by radio. When the pilot did not respond, they accessed the company's flight tracking software and noted that the airplane's last reported position was in the area of the airplane's observed flightpath. They proceeded to search the area where they believed the airplane was located and found the airplane about 1 hour later.

Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 3/4 inch of ice was noted on the nonprotected surfaces of the empennage. However, ice formation on the airplane's inflatable leading edge de-ice boots was consistent with normal operation of the de-ice system, and structural icing likely was not a factor in the accident.

According to the company's General Operations Manual (GOM), operational control was held by the flight coordinator for the accident flight, and the flight coordinator and pilot-in-command (PIC) were jointly responsible for preflight planning, flight delay, and release of the flight, which included the risk assessment process. The flight coordinator assigned the flight a risk level of 2 (on a scale of 1 to 4) due to instrument meteorological and night conditions and contaminated runways at both of the destination airports. The first flight coordinator assigned another flight coordinator to create the manifest, which listed eight passengers and a risk assessment level of 2. According to company risk assessment and operational control procedures, a risk level of 2 required a discussion between the PIC and flight coordinator about the risks involved. However, the flight coordinators did not discuss with the pilot the risks and weather conditions associated with the flight. Neither of the flight coordinators working the flight had received company training on the risk assessment program. At the time of the accident, no signoff was required for flight coordinators or pilots on the risk assessment form, and the form was not integrated into the company manuals.

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) surveillance activities revealed that aviation safety inspectors had performed numerous operational control inspections and repeatedly noted deficiencies within the company's training, risk management, and operational control procedures. Enforcement Information System records indicated that FAA inspectors observed multiple incidences of the operator's noncompliance related to flight operations and that they opened investigations; however, the investigations were closed after only administrative action had been taken. Therefore, although FAA inspectors were providing surveillance and noting discrepancies within the company's procedures and processes, the FAA did not hold the operator sufficiently accountable for correcting the types of operational deficiencies evident in this accident, such as the operator's failure to comply with its operations specifications, operations training manual, and GOM and applicable federal regulations.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot's decision to initiate a visual flight rules approach into an area of instrument meteorological conditions at night and the flight coordinators' release of the flight without discussing the risks with the pilot, which resulted in the pilot experiencing a loss of situational awareness and subsequent controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident were the operator's inadequate procedures for operational control and flight release and its inadequate training and oversight of operational control personnel. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to hold the operator accountable for correcting known operational deficiencies and ensuring compliance with its operational control procedures.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 29, 2013, at 1824 Alaska standard time, a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan airplane, N12373, sustained substantial damage after impacting terrain about 1 mile southeast of St. Mary's Airport, St. Mary's, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as flight 1453 by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Era Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska, as a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled commuter flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. Of the 10 people on board, the commercial pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries, and six passengers sustained serious injuries. Night, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at St. Mary's Airport at the time of the accident, and company flight-following procedures were in effect. Flight 1453 departed from Bethel Airport, Bethel, Alaska, at 1741 destined for Mountain Village, Alaska. Before reaching Mountain Village, the flight diverted to St. Mary's due to deteriorating weather conditions.

The pilot's flight and duty records indicated that, on the day of the accident, the pilot arrived at the company office in St. Mary's about 0800. The accident flight was the pilot's fifth flight of the day. Flight 1453 was to depart Bethel Airport with eight adult passengers and one infant passenger (who was not listed on the flight manifest), make a stop in Mountain Village, and then proceed to St. Mary's.

Hageland Aviation Services had recently incorporated a risk assessment program into its operational control procedures, which required each flight be assigned a risk level on a scale of 1 to 4, with the intention of mitigating the hazards for high-risk flights. Although not required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the risk assessment was being used as part of the company's operational control procedures; however, it had not been incorporated into the company General Operations Manual (GOM).

Before departure, the flight coordinator checked the weather and assigned the flight a risk assessment level of 2 due to IMC and night conditions and contaminated runways at both of the destination airports. He assigned another flight coordinator to create the manifest, which listed eight passengers and a risk assessment level of 2.

A risk assessment level 2 required a conversation between the flight coordinator and the pilot about possible hazards associated with the flight. However, the flight coordinators did not discuss with the pilot the risk assessment level assigned to the flight, current weather conditions or hazards, or ways to mitigate the hazards as required by the risk assessment program. Neither of the flight coordinators working the flight had received company training on the risk assessment program.

The flight was scheduled to depart at 1700, but it was late arriving into Bethel and did not depart until 1741. The pilot reported his departure from Bethel Airport to the company flight coordinator via radio at 1741, reporting 10 souls on board and 4 hours of fuel.

According to a passenger, they had been flying for about 30 minutes when the airplane entered thick fog. He reported that the airplane was picking up ice and had accumulated about 1/2 to 3/4 inch of ice on the lift strut.

According to an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) recording, about 18 miles from Mountain Village, the pilot made an announcement to the passengers that, due to deteriorating weather conditions, the flight was diverting to St. Mary's, which is about 13 miles east of Mountain Village.

At 1819:20, the pilot contacted the Anchorage ARTCC and requested a special VFR clearance to St. Mary's Airport.

At 1819:43, an Anchorage ARTCC controller cleared the flight into the St. Mary's surface area, told the pilot to maintain special VFR conditions, and provided the St. Mary's altimeter setting of 30.35 inches of Mercury (inHg). This was the last communication with the airplane.

About 1822, sounds similar to that of a microphone being keyed to activate pilot-controlled approach lighting were heard on the ARTCC frequency. Postaccident examination of the pilot's radio showed that his audio panel was still selected to the ARTCC frequency rather than the destination airport frequency; therefore, the pilot-controlled lighting would not have activated. Witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's reported that the pilot-controlled airport lighting system was not activated when they saw the accident airplane fly over the airport. A passenger reported that no lights were visible but that she saw the ground about 30 ft below the airplane and was able to make out dark patches of trees.

Witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's Airport reported seeing the airplane fly over the airport at a relatively low altitude, about 300 to 400 ft, traveling southeast. They watched the airplane travel away from the airport until its rotating beacon disappeared. One witness stated that he saw the landing lights of the airplane illuminate something white before he lost sight of the beacon, and he assumed that the airplane had entered the clouds. Due to concern about the direction and altitude the airplane was flying, the witnesses attempted to contact the pilot on the radio, but the pilot did not respond. They then heard another pilot report on the radio that there was an emergency locator transmitter broadcasting in the vicinity of St. Mary's. After checking for the airplane's last reported position on the company's flight-following software, a search was initiated.

About 1 hour after the search was initiated, the airplane was located, and rescue personnel confirmed that the pilot and two passengers died at the scene. One passenger died after being transported to the local clinic. The six surviving passengers were evacuated to Anchorage for treatment.

The airplane impacted the top of a ridge about 1 mile southeast of St. Mary's Airport at an elevation of about 425 ft mean seal level (msl) in a nose-high, upright attitude. The airplane came to rest upright about 200 ft from the initial impact point at an elevation of about 530 ft.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 68, held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land, single-engine sea, multiengine land, and instrument ratings. Pilot training records indicated that he had accumulated over 25,000 hours of flight time with over 1,800 hours in Cessna 208 airplanes. His most recent FAA second-class airman medical certificate was issued on August 21, 2013, with the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses for distance and must possess corrective lenses for near vision. The pilot's personal logbooks were not located.

A review of Hageland Aviation Services personnel records indicated that the pilot was hired, completed his initial company training (which included pilot ground and flight training), and was assigned to fly Cessna 207A airplanes on December 18, 2012.

On February 11, 2013, the pilot completed initial Cessna 208B ground training. On June 14, 2013, he completed recurrent ground training. On June 19, 2013, he completed flight training and a check ride and was assigned to fly Cessna 208B airplanes out of the St. Mary's base.

Flight and duty records revealed that, in September 2013, the pilot was on duty for 15 days, flew 60.5 hours, and had 15 days off. In October 2013, the pilot was on duty for 16 days, flew 73.8 hours, and had 15 days off. In November 2013, the pilot was on duty November 1 to 16, flew 63.7 hours, was off duty November 17 to 28, and returned to work on November 29 (the day of the accident).

On the day of the accident, the pilot was on a 14-hour assigned duty day, starting at 0800 and ending at 2200. He flew four trips totaling about 4.4 hours before the accident flight.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The accident airplane was a turboprop Cessna 208B Grand Caravan, registration number N12373, manufactured in 1998. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated 12,653 total flight hours and was maintained under an approved aircraft inspection program. The most recent inspection of the airframe and engine was completed on November 12, 2013.

The airplane was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-114A turbine engine that was rated at 675-shaft horsepower. The engine was overhauled 4,655 hours before the accident.

The airplane was equipped for instrument flight and flight into icing conditions and was certificated for single-pilot operation. The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell KGP-560 Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS), and a Midcontinent Avionics MD41 Terrain Awareness Annunciator Control Unit. The fully integrated control unit provided annunciation and mode selection for both TAWS and the general aviation-enhanced ground proximity warning system (GA-EGPWS).

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

At the time of the accident, an airmen's meteorological information (AIRMET) valid for the accident site forecast mountain obscuration conditions due to clouds and precipitation. Another AIRMET for turbulence was valid for flight level (FL) 270 to FL 370. The area forecast issued at 1806 predicted few clouds at 500 ft above ground level (agl), scattered clouds at 2,000 ft, and a broken ceiling at 4,000 ft with tops to 12,000 ft. The ceiling was forecast to be occasionally at 2,000 ft with isolated light snow showers and visibility below 3 miles. No turbulence or icing conditions were forecast for the accident site at the accident time. The area forecast issued at 1210 predicted similar conditions to the 1806 area forecast; however, the 1210 area forecast predicted isolated moderate icing between 3,000 and 9,000 ft along the coast and inland through 1600.

The nearest official weather reporting station was St. Mary's Airport. About 8 minutes before the accident, at 1816, a meteorological aerodrome report (METAR) was reporting, in part, the following: wind from 230 degrees (true) at 6 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, sky condition overcast at 300 ft agl, temperature 18 degrees F, dew point -32 degrees F, and altimeter setting 30.35 inHg.

The 1836 METAR was reporting, in part, the following: wind from 240 degrees (true) at 5 knots, visibility 2.5 statute miles, sky condition overcast at 300 ft agl, temperature 18 degrees F, dew point -32 degrees F, and altimeter setting 30.35 inHg.

None of the persons interviewed from the Bethel base had any knowledge of the accident pilot reviewing weather information before takeoff. The last known weather information received by the pilot was the weather at the top of the hour before takeoff for his destination (METARs around and before 1700).

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

There were no reported malfunctions or anomalies with aids to navigation at the time of the accident.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

St. Mary's Airport is a public airport in Class E airspace, located 4 miles west of St. Mary's, Alaska, at a surveyed elevation of 312 ft msl. The airport had two open runways (17/35 and 6/24) at the time of the accident. Runway 17/35 was 6,008 ft long and 150 ft wide, and runway 6/24 was 1,520 ft long and 60 ft wide.

Runway 17 was equipped with pilot-controlled high-intensity runway edge lights, a visual approach slope indicator (VASI), and a 1,400-ft medium-intensity approach lighting system with runway alignment indicator lights, but they were not illuminated at the time of the accident. It was serviced by a LOC/DME and an RNAV (GPS) instrument approach. Runway 35 was equipped with high-intensity runway edge lights and a VASI and was serviced by an RNAV (GPS) instrument approach.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The accident airplane was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped with, a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder.

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Tracking and Recording

The airplane was equipped with ADS-B technology. In typical applications, an airplane equipped with ADS-B uses an ordinary GPS receiver to derive its precise position from the Global Navigation Satellite System constellation and then combines that position with any number of aircraft parameters, such as speed, heading, altitude and flight number. This information is then simultaneously broadcast to other aircraft equipped with ADS-B and to ADS-B ground or satellite communications transceivers, which then relay the aircraft's position and additional information to ARTCCs in real time.

A review of the ADS-B data received by the Anchorage ARTCC showed the following:

At 1820:31, the airplane passed 1 nautical mile (nm) west of the ONEPY intersection at 800 ft msl inbound to St. Mary's Airport on a heading of 357 degrees magnetic.

At 1823:01, the airplane started a descent from 900 ft msl (800 ft agl) while about 3/4 nm from the runway 35 threshold and 1/4 nm left of the runway 35 extended centerline.

At 1823:09, the airplane started a right turn that continued until radar contact was lost about 36 seconds later. The average turn rate was 7 degrees per second with an average ground speed in the turn of 119 knots and an average descent rate of 835 ft per minute. During the turn, at 1823:18, the airplane passed through the runway 35 extended centerline, about 1/10 nm from the runway threshold, passing through a heading of about 051 degrees magnetic.

The last radar return occurred at 1823:45, which showed the airplane at 450 ft msl (75 ft agl). The airplane heading showed that the airplane was flying toward rising terrain and that the last radar return was less than 1/10 nm from terrain that was 450 ft msl.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge and an inspector from the FAA Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) traveled to the accident scene but continuous poor weather conditions prevented site access until December 1, 2013.

The wreckage path, which extended about 200 ft along a heading of 122 degrees magnetic, began at an area of broken small trees and disturbed ground. The initial impact site consisted of three separate ground disturbances. The first two disturbed areas were noted to be the contact points of the airplane's main landing gear, followed by a large impact crater where the nose and fuselage of the airplane impacted the up-sloping terrain. The majority of the airplane belly cargo pod and its contents remained in the initial impact crater with fragments of the belly pod structure and belly pod contents scattered forward from the initial impact point and along the wreckage path.

The main wreckage was located in an open area of snow-covered tundra, at an elevation of about 425 ft msl. The top of the ridge where the airplane impacted was at an elevation of about 530 ft msl. The main wreckage consisted of the right and left wings, empennage, main fuselage, cabin, and engine. About 3/4 inch of ice was noted on the nonprotected surfaces of the empennage. Ice formation on the airplane's inflatable leading edge de-ice boots was consistent with normal operation of the de-ice system.

The cockpit survivable space was severely compromised. The pilot's seat was crushed under the center wing structure and inboard of the left wing. The copilot seat was lying on its left side and was mostly buried by snow that entered the cockpit during the impact.

Examination of the airframe revealed extensive component and structural damage to the area of the fuselage near the carry-through structure for the wing spars. Both forward wing spar fittings were separated at the fuselage attachments, and each aft spar attachment showed twist deformation.

Elevator and rudder control cable continuity was established from the flight control surfaces to the cockpit area just before the control yoke. Aileron and flap continuity was not established on-scene due to the disposition of the wreckage.

No preaccident anomalies were noted with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

A postmortem examination of the pilot was conducted under the authority of the Alaska State Medical Examiner, Anchorage, Alaska, on December 2, 2013. The cause of death for the pilot was attributed to multiple blunt force injuries.

The FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute performed toxicological testing for the pilot on December 17, 2013, which was negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol. The toxicological tests revealed 44.8 ug/ml of salicylate in the pilot's urine. Salicylate is an over-the-counter analgesic with an acceptable profile used in the treatment of mild pain.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

After the witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's saw the airplane fly overhead, they attempted to contact the pilot by radio. When the pilot did not respond, they accessed the company's flight tracking software and discovered that the airplane's last reported position was in the area of the airplane's observed flightpath. They proceeded to search the area where they believed the airplane was located and found the airplane after about 1 hour of searching. Additional search and rescue personnel were then directed to the accident site to aid in the rescue operation.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The fuselage sustained extensive impact damage and the forward section of fuselage (forward of the aft wing carry-through spar) was severely fragmented. The forward fuselage section was rotated about 90 degrees on the longitudinal axis and was laying on the right side. The top cabin roof section had separated at the aft wing carry-through spar and shifted forward and down leaving an exposed area of the floor and cabin. The floor of the airframe was buckled upward. The survivable cabin space in the area directly below and forward of the wing was severely compromised. The aft section of the fuselage was more intact. There were multiple areas of tearing of the skin around the window frames. The cargo door frame was buckled forward and torn just above the upper door's attachment bracket. The lower section of doorframe was mostly undamaged, and the door moved freely. The rear of the cargo door frame had another forward buckle near both corners of the aft window. The door was opened, likely by the first responders.

One of the four fatalities was an infant who was being carried as a "lap child" by his mother in a forward-facing backpack carrier.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

On March 18, 2014, the Honeywell Bendix/King KGP-560 GA-EGPWS processor was examined at the Honeywell facility located in Redmond, Washington. The Honeywell GA-EGPWS is a TAWS, which provided terrain alerting and display functions with additional features meeting the requirements of Technical Standard Order C151b Class B TAWS. The GA-EGPWS uses aircraft inputs including geographic position, attitude, altitude, airspeed, and glideslope deviation. These are used with internal terrain, obstacles, and airport runway databases to predict a potential conflict between the aircraft's flightpath and terrain or an obstacle. A terrain or obstacle conflict results in the GA-EGPWS providing a visual and audio caution or warning alert.

The GA-EGPWS "Look-Ahead" alerting and warning and runway field clearance floor (RFCF) functions are gradually "de-sensitized" as an aircraft nears a known runway. Aircraft operating near known runways may experience very short or no advance warnings with respect to terrain or obstacles in this area. The altitude and distance between the accident airplane and the runway at the time of impact would have remained above the floor of protection for the "Look Ahead" and RFCF function, and no alerts would have been triggered.

The KGP 560/860 database is contained in a removable card installed in the top of each unit. It is up to KGP 560/860 customers to determine if a specific database is applicable to their operation. Honeywell estimates that KGP 560/860 customers will update their database about once per year, although there is no regulatory requirement to update the database. The database in the airplane was dated December 2006. Information regarding new releases and the content details of the database may be obtained via the internet at the following websites: www.bendixking.com and www.egpws.com.

GA-EGPWS Inhibit Mode

The KGP 560/860 GA-EGPWS requires the installation of a terrain inhibit switch as part of the system installation. When engaged by the pilot, this switch will inhibit all visual and aural alerts and warnings associated with the GA-EGPWS. Also, an external annunciator lamp is illuminated, and a message will be displayed indicating "Warnings Inhibited." The terrain display, if installed, remains operational. The purpose of the terrain inhibit switch is to allow aircraft to operate without nuisance or unwanted warnings at airports that are not in the KGP 560/860 database. Examples might be private airports or those with runways shorter than 2,000 ft. Additionally, there may be some "VFR only" airports where unique terrain features are near the runway, and the terrain inhibit switch may be used when operating in good VFR conditions. According to the operating manual, the terrain inhibit switch should NOT be engaged for normal operations.

Examination of the airplane's cockpit instruments revealed that the terrain inhibit switch was in the "inhibit" mode at the time of the accident. Data recovered from the GA-EGPWS showed the following operational times:

Total time of operation for GA-EGPWS: 12,206:31 hours.

Total GA-EGPWS flight time: 10,485:11 hours.

Total time GA-EGPWS operated in "inhibit" mode: 9,277:34 hours.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Hageland Aviation Services is a 14 CFR Part 135 air carrier that holds on-demand and commuter operations specifications and is authorized to conduct business exclusively under the business names "Hageland Aviation Services, Inc." or "Era Alaska." The company headquarters are located at the Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska. The president, director of operations, and chief pilot in place at the time of the accident all resided in Anchorage. The director of maintenance resided in Palmer, Alaska.

At the time of the accident, Hageland operated 56 airplanes and employed about 130 pilots. The company had 12 bases located throughout Alaska at Anchorage, Palmer, Aniak, Barrow, Bethel, Deadhorse, Fairbanks, Galena, Kotzebue, Nome, St. Mary's, and Unalakleet.

According to the company's GOM, the flight coordinator had operational control for the accident flight, and the flight coordinator and pilot-in-command (PIC) were jointly responsible for preflight planning, flight delay, and release of the flight, which included the risk assessment process. Authority for operational control is specified in federal regulations, the company's operations specifications, and the procedures outlined in the GOM. In all, about 80 flight coordinators and 96 company pilots were allowed to release flights and exercise operational control on behalf of the company.

A review of the company's FAA-approved operations training manual revealed that flight coordinator training was required for personnel authorized to exercise operational control. Initial flight coordinator training consisted of 8 hours of classroom time, and recurrent training consisted of between 3 and 4 hours, depending on the student's experience. Both of the flight coordinators working at the time of the accident had completed the initial flight coordinator training.

In addition, the company used a basic risk assessment form containing a four-tiered numbered system to determine the level of operational control needed for a specific flight, with 1 being the lowest risk and 4 being the highest risk. A risk level of 1 required no risk mitigation, a level 2 required a discussion between the PIC and flight coordinator about the risks involved, a level 3 required a phone call to management for evaluation and approval, and a level 4 required canceling the flight. At the time of the accident, no signoff was required for flight coordinators or PICs on the risk assessment form, and the form was not integrated into the company manuals. According to the company, the risk assessment was part of its operational control and flight release system and was presented to and accepted by the FAA but was not incorporated into the GOM, training program, or other company manuals.

An FAA principal operations inspector in the Anchorage FSDO was assigned to oversee the company. He had been employed with the FAA for about 7 years at the time of the accident and had been temporarily assigned to the Hageland certificate from October 2012 to April 2013 and permanently assigned to the certificate in September 2013, about 3 months before the accident.

A query of the FAA Program Tracking and Reporting System found that from July 16, 2013, to October 22, 2013, FAA aviation safety inspectors conducted five operational control inspections of Hageland. The inspections noted deficiencies in the company's training, risk management, and operational control procedures.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In the months following the accident, both the FAA and the operator initiated numerous safety improvements, including but not limited to, increased FAA surveillance, changes to company training programs, changes to company management, addition of established routes and increased limits for special VFR operations, and the establishment of a company operations control center to handle release and dispatch of flights.

 


The NTSB is investigating the Era commuter plane that crashed and killed four people and injured six outside St. Mary’s.

The government’s full report is many months away, but in the meantime, Era, now known as Ravn and others are digging into the cause of the crash.

Witnesses at the airport in St. Mary’s saw the Cessna 208 approaching at a dangerously low altitude and then flying past the runway before it crashed into a tundra ridge.  While the cause is still unknown, weather at the time included rain and fog, conditions that make flying challenging.

The NTSB is not saying what role the weather played or if the wings took on ice, but Ravn CEO Bob Hajdukovich believes the plane was flying within its envelop of safe operation.

“I can with a pretty high level of confidence say that icing was present the day of the accident, but certainly didn’t bring the airplane down,” Hajdukovich said. “We’re not treating this as a Cessna 208 tail stall or icing event.”

The 208 forms a big part of Ravn’s fleet, about a quarter of their aircraft. It’s a workhorse that Hajdukovich believes in. But the aircraft has some history with icing. The NTSB in 2006 released recommendations stating the 208 should not be flown in anything beyond light icing. That’s a recommendation, not a rule.

The manufacturer has made some changes. Cessna has swapped the deicing system on new aircraft, from the inflatable boots – that blow up and knock off ice, to an anti icing system, the TKS weeping wing.  This puts out small amounts of anti-ice fluid on the wing’s leading edge. This should prevent ice from ever forming. Hageland has not retrofitted any of its Caravans.

And after the crash, that’s attracted the attention of lawyers, like Ladd Sanger, an attorney with Slack and Davis, a Dallas based firm that works in aviation law. He’s a pilot and has litigated several cases involving the 208.

“The caravan has a very bad track record in ice,” Sanger said. “There was a solution that was possible that would have likely prevented this crash, but unfortunately Cessna and Hageland chose not to employ it on this airplane or other that are operating in areas where icing is not only foreseeable but likely.”

Sanger has been in contact with attorneys working with crash victims.

Hajdukovich says that Cessna’s new anti-ice system is not a silver bullet. Ravn has done research into the TKS system. He says it’s expensive and somewhat problematic here.  He points to causes some corrosion to the wing, plus you have to have the liquid running constantly, which would require refills at small airfields.

“The caravan is very well suited for Bethel and can fly in ice, but you need tight controls in place to make sure you don’t get into heavy ice in the wrong condition with the wrong pilot experience, and you don’t want anything wrong with plane so you don’t want anything deferred,” Hajdukovich said. “There’s a lot of things you can do as a company to help tighten that envelop.”

Going forward, Ravn is sticking with the Caravan. And Hajdukovich says the group is taking a hard look at safety.  He says there are some unrelated safety initiatives in play.  The company is looking at putting additional controls in place to elevate discussion of weather in the decision to fly or not.


“We hurt our friends, we hurt our customers, and we hurt ourselves and we want to gain that public trust back,” Hajdukovich said. “While we’re investigating what went wrong, if we’ll ever find out. it was a very traumatic event and we certainly don’t want to minimize the tragedy itself.”

“In terms of moving forward, we always use accidents like this as opportunities to try to find ways to minimize that risk in the future.”

And six weeks after the accident, Ravn’s 208s are moving people, groceries, and necessary supplies all over the delta.  The caravan flies to nearly 40 communities Ravn serves in the region.

No one knows with certainty what happened on Nov. 29. The NTSB says it could be a year before their final report is ready.

http://www.alaskapublic.org

NTSB Identification: ANC14FA008
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Friday, November 29, 2013 in Saint Marys, AK
Aircraft: CESSNA 208B, registration: N12373
Injuries: 4 Fatal,6 Serious.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On November 29, 2013, at 1824 Alaska standard time, a Cessna 208B Caravan airplane, N12373, sustained substantial damage after impacting terrain about 1 mile southeast of the St. Mary's Airport, St. Mary's, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as flight 1453, by Hageland Aviation Services, Inc., dba Era Alaska, Anchorage, Alaska as a visual flight rules (VFR) scheduled commuter flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Of the 10 people on board, the commercial pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries, and six passengers sustained serious injuries. Night, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed at the St. Mary's airport at the time of the accident and company flight following procedures were in effect. Flight 1453 departed from the Bethel Airport, Bethel, Alaska, at 1741 destined for Mountain Village, Alaska, and continuing to St. Mary's. Prior to reaching Mountain Village, the flight diverted to St. Mary's due to deteriorating weather.

Witnesses on the ground at St. Mary's reported seeing the airplane fly over the airport at low altitude, traveling in a southeasterly direction. They continued to watch the airplane travel away from the airport, until its rotating beacon disappeared. Being concerned about the direction and altitude the airplane was flying, the witnesses attempted to contact the pilot on the radio, with no response. They then heard another aircraft on the radio report that there was an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) going off in the vicinity of St. Mary's. After checking for the airplane's last reported position on the company's flight following software, a search was initiated.

Approximately one hour after the search was initiated, the airplane was located and rescue personnel confirmed that the pilot and two passengers died at the scene. One passenger died after being transported to the local clinic. The six surviving passengers were evacuated to Anchorage for treatment.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), along with an inspector from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) traveled to the accident scene, but continuous poor weather conditions prevented them from reaching the site until December 1.

The main wreckage was in an open area of snow-covered tundra, at an elevation of approximately 425 feet mean sea level (msl). The top of the ridge where the airplane impacted is at an approximate elevation of 530 feet msl. From the initial point of impact, the airplane traveled approximately 200 feet before coming to rest in an upright position. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, empennage, and wings. An on-scene documentation of the wreckage was completed, and a detailed wreckage examination is pending, following recovery of the airplane.

The accident airplane was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped with, a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), or a flight data recorder (FDR).

The nearest official reporting station is the St. Mary's Airport (PASM). About 8 minutes before the accident, at 1816, an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) was reporting: Wind, 230 degrees (True) at 7 knots; visibility, 3 statute miles; sky condition, overcast at 300 feet above ground level (agl); temperature, 18 degrees F; dew point, -32 degrees F; altimeter, 30.01 inches Hg.

At 1836, the METAR was reporting, in part: Wind, 240 degrees (True) at 6 knots; visibility, 2.5 statute miles; sky condition, overcast at 300 feet agl; temperature, 18 degrees F; dew point, -32 degrees F; altimeter, 30.01 inches Hg.

Caribbean Airlines adds more flights for winter season

"Passengers can now choose from four weekly flights between Kingston and New York – JFK. The new schedule includes two non-stop flights – Fridays and Sundays – and two flights stopping in Montego Bay on Mondays and Thursdays," said the airline in a media release today. 

The updated schedule sees the airline offering additional direct flights between Kingston and New York, Fridays and Sundays, with connections from Montego Bay, Mondays and Thursdays.

The flights will depart Kingston's Norman Manley International Airport as early as 7:20 a.m. arriving in New York by 11:05 a.m.

South bound, the flights depart JFK at 12:55 p.m., arriving in Kingston at 4:44 p.m.

For the tourism capital, the regional carrier, will depart Mondays and Thursdays, at 8:20 a.m. from the Sangster International, arriving New York by noon.

On the return leg, the flights depart New York at 1:50 p.m., arriving at 5:35 in the second city, continuing on to Kingston.

“Our new schedule is designed to offer more convenient travel times during what we expect to be a heavy travel season. The Jamaica Tourist Board is optimistic that more people will choose Jamaica, and we want to do everything we can to make it easier for them to do so,” said Clive Forbes, Caribbean Airlines Jamaica, general manager.

Forbes also announced an increase in flights between Kingston and Fort Lauderdale, a response to the Jamaican travel style specific to this route. “We know that the strong business and family connections necessitate day trips between Kingston and Fort Lauderdale. We are now offering the convenience of an early departure from Kingston at 6:45 a.m. with a late return flight at 11:15 p.m.”

For weekend travel, the airline now offers a 7:50 p.m. departure from Kingston to Fort Lauderdale on Fridays and Sundays. 


Source:   http://go-jamaica.com

Dillant-Hopkins (KEEN), Keene, New Hampshire: City committee recommends new airport restaurant

A Keene City Council committee has recommended approving a new restaurant for the city-owned Dillant-Hopkins Airport in North Swanzey.

The council’s finance, organization and personnel committee unanimously recommended moving forward with an Italian restaurant, which would fill the vacancy left by India Pavilion.

Councilor Kris E. Roberts, the committee’s vice chairman who conducted the meeting Thursday night in Chairman Mitchell H. Greenwald’s absence, said Gary Taylor, who is proposing the restaurant, will likely pay $600 a month in rent to the city, while paying property taxes to the town of Swanzey, where the airport is physically located.

Roberts said Taylor and his chef/manager, Antonio Martino, propose a menu with moderately priced items, ranging from $9.95 to $15.95.

Roberts said the duo have big plans for the space.

“They will invest $35,000 to upgrade the facility,” he said. “Part of it’s going to be for modern equipment, bakery items so he can make his own breads on the premises, and to update the décor to meet an Italian restaurant (theme).”

Martino trained in Sorrento, Italy, and his “extensive experience working in various hotels and restaurants in Europe and the U.S.,” according to city documents.

“He wants to make his own sauces, his own bread, open it up for catering, special functions, and basically also wants to be able to conduct cooking classes for people who want to do their own Italian cooking,” Roberts said.

Roberts said the committee also agreed to recommend paying H.G. Johnson Real Estate a 12 percent finder’s fee for bringing the proposal to the city, which would come out to about $900 for the first year only.

“To pay $900 to have someone else do all the work is much better than using city manpower to try to come up with it,” he said.

The full council will vote on the proposal at Thursday’s council meeting.


Source:   http://www.sentinelsource.com

Operator calls criticism “ironic”

After years of struggling to make a go of it with a restaurant at the Santa Fe Municipal Airport, proprietor Lisa Van Allen says she is not pleased that issues have arisen over the lease and other issues with her business.

“It is ironic that I was promised for years that the airport would become the budding enterprise it is today if I just hung in there,” Van Allen wrote in a letter to the city regarding the lease of the Santa Fe Airport Grill. “Now that I may have the opportunity to mitigate some of my substantial losses on that facility … somehow the deal is more beneficial to me than the city.”

Earlier this week, Santa Fe City Councilor Patti Bushee, who is running for mayor in the March 4 election, called for an audit of the situation, which includes a federal lien of $108,078 for the restaurant’s failure to pay withholding taxes.

Under the city audit plan that the council approved in November, the airport and its concessionaires are scheduled to be audited in fiscal year 2015/16. The city underwent an external audit that it felt would cover the issue until then.

Van Allen, in an email to the Journal, said: “I do want to be clear that I have paid the IRS original taxes.” The lien remained in effect as of Thursday, however.

Bushee said it appears the restaurant operators are in violation of their lease because they haven’t kept tax payments up to date; that the restaurant may be paying rent that is below market value; and that the federal tax lien may jeopardize federal funding for the airport.

But city spokeswoman Jodi McGinnis Porter, in an email response to questions from the Journal, said that any concerns about Federal Aviation Administration funding aren’t valid.

“The city is in compliance with the (Federal Aviation Administration),” she wrote.

“The lien is a tax lien on the business and does not attach to real property or any of the premises that they lease, therefore it does not violate the lease with the city,” Porter wrote. “It also does not affect their obligations to (the) city under the lease.”

Last year, airport manager Francey Jesson discovered discrepancies in rental payments that the restaurant was making and that the quarterly payments were habitually late, according to city documents.

In July, as Jesson was going into a meeting with the city manager about the situation, Mayor David Coss told Jesson to “be nice to them,” Jesson wrote in an email.

In one of several aspects that lend a political tinge to the controversy, Coss is friends with Van Allen and local union leader Jon Hendry, listed on corporate records from the 1990s as an organizer of Duke City Gourmet, which operates as the Airport Grill.

Both Van Allen, who also as a contractor serves as the city’s liaison with the film industry, and Hendry have also been political supporters of the mayor. But Hendry said this week that he is no longer connected with the airport restaurant operation, which pays the city a percentage of sales for various kinds of food services.

Coss recently endorsed one of Bushee’s opponents, former state Democratic Party chair Javier Gonzales, for mayor. Hendry was originally chairman of a PAC formed earlier this year to support Gonzales for mayor, but later said he was leaving the PAC and would merely support Gonzales’ campaign.

‘Be nice?’


Coss did not return phone calls about his alleged “be nice to them” remark about the airport diner operators, but Porter provided this comment: “The mayor routinely instructs staff to be courteous in dealing with members of the public, contractors and partners.”

While it is true that Coss is friends with Van Allen and Hendry, the restaurant did not receive special treatment, Porter wrote.

“The airport restaurant, AKA Duke City Gourmet, has a long standing relationship with the city (since 1996) that began years ago when market profitability for a restaurant was meager due to no commercial flights,” she wrote.

“The City of Santa Fe often works with existing tenants according to the terms of their lease and believes it is better to keep an existing business open and maintain continuity of service while working with them to renegotiate terms of the lease to reflect current market conditions,” Porter added.

In an email to the Journal on Thursday, Van Allen said that what appears to be at issue is the contract’s definition of gross receipts and “an issue of non-exclusive dining room space, which also serves as an extension of the airport’s waiting room.”

“I was under the impression up until now that we were amicably negotiating to clean up any language concerning those two issues in a reworded lease agreement,” she wrote.

In her letter to the city, Van Allen noted that she offers discounted prices to airport employees and that, for many years, the facility did not offer enough passenger traffic to be profitable.

“I took a loss on every meal I served for a number of years,” she wrote. “This was with the expectation that eventually there would be more of a balance between full paying and discounted clients. … For many years, my daily gross was $200ish, while my payroll was $300.”

Craft service


To offset her losses, Van Allen has been providing food – in a role called craft service – at film sites.

“I keep my main business in motion picture rentals and craft service (not catering – there’s a big difference) as low key as possible,” Van Allen wrote. “However, I should point out that this facet of my business has subsidized the airport for as many years as I have been there for at least ($20,000) to ($30,000) per year on average.”

Here is how Wikipedia distinguishes craft service from catering in the film business: “Catering handles the regular hot sit down meals that occur every six hours and usually last between thirty minutes and an hour. Catering is brought in from an outside company hired by the production, but craft service is a crew position and craft service people are sometimes represented by the union, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE).”

Hendry is the business agent for Local 480 of IATSE, according to the local’s website.

Porter, on Thursday night, couldn’t address whether city officials see any conflict between Van Allen’s job as the city’s hired film liaison and her craft service work.


Source:   http://www.abqjournal.com

Owensboro-Daviess County Airport (KOWB), Kentucky: Coyote delays lieutenant governor's plane Thursday

Runway coyotes an occasional problem, says airport manager

Lt. Gov. Jerry Abramson was running a few minutes late Thursday for his speech to the Greater Owensboro Chamber of Commerce's Rooster Booster breakfast.

He apologized, saying his plane was delayed by a coyote on the runway at Owensboro-Daviess County Regional Airport.


Source:   http://www.messenger-inquirer.com

Plane makes emergency landing at Indianapolis International Airport (KIND): Reported engine out after takeoff from Evansville

INDIANAPOLIS - An American Eagle flight had to make an emergency stop in Indianapolis Friday after a pose-takeoff engine failure.

American Eagle Flight 2906 departed Evansville Regional Airport at 5:33 p.m. EST originally headed for Chicago O'Hare International Airport.

After takeoff, the passenger jet, an Embraer 145, notified air traffic controllers of an emergency situation after an engine went out midair. The plane redirected to the Indianapolis International Airport for an emergency landing.

Flight 2906 landed safely in Indianapolis at 6:10 p.m. EST with 44 passengers aboard. No injuries were reported.

After repairs, the plane departed from Indianapolis and resumed its course toward Chicago at 6:45 p.m. EST.


Source:   http://www.theindychannel.com



Thursday, January 9, 2014

Ohio man admits scamming New Jersey-based air charter firm

Federal prosecutors in New Jersey say an Ohio man has admitted posing as a high-level executive with a financial firm to improperly obtain charter jet flights and limo rides.

Christopher Henderson pleaded guilty Thursday to a complaint charging him with wire fraud. The 32-year-old Akron resident faces up to 20 years in prison when he's sentenced April 15.

Prosecutors say Henderson and others conspired last year to fraudulently obtain at least three flights between May and June through Jet Aviation, a major business aviation provider based at Teterboro Airport. They paid for the flights by tapping into a sham $350,000 line of credit issued by the company.

The scheme unraveled in June, when a Jet Aviation employee contacted the unnamed company where the conspirators supposedly worked and learned that neither man was employed by the firm. Officials said Jet Aviation was never paid for nearly $176,000 in charter flights and limousine services it provided.

Federal prosecutors said the conspirators also used their fake corporate credentials at a Tiffany store in Florida and at a Miami hotel. They allegedly charged about $20,000 in watches, sunglasses, sterling silver and leather business card holders, and men's cologne from Tiffany, and about $25,500 in overnight hotel stays.


Source:  http://www.the-dispatch.com

Cirrus SR-22, Cirrus Design Corporation, N7YT, accident occurred January 25, 2015 in Hilo, Hawaii • Cirrus SR22, N450TX, accident occurred January 04, 2014 in Buckhannon, West Virginia • Cirrus SR22 GTS G3 Turbo, Nylund Imports Inc., N903SR, accident occurred January 09, 2014 in Pocatello, Idaho

National Transportation Safety Board - Aviation Accident Final Report: http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf 

Docket And Docket Items  -  National Transportation Safety Board: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms


Aviation Accident Data Summary  -  National Transportation Safety Board:   http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf


Aviation Accident Final Report - National Transportation Safety Board: http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

National Transportation Safety Board  -  Docket And Docket Items: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms

Aviation Accident Data Summary -  National Transportation Safety Board: http://app.ntsb.gov/pdf

NTSB Identification: WPR15LA089 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, January 25, 2015 in Maui, HI
Probable Cause Approval Date: 07/13/2015
Aircraft: CIRRUS SR22 - NO SERIES, registration: N7YT
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that, during the transpacific flight, he was unable to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to the main fuel tanks. Despite multiple attempts to troubleshoot the fuel system issue, he was unable to correct the situation. After transferring fuel from the forward auxiliary fuel tank to both main fuel tanks, he estimated that there was only enough fuel in the main tanks to reach within about 200 miles of land, so he decided to divert to a nearby cruise ship. Once the airplane was in the immediate vicinity of the cruise ship, the pilot activated the airplane’s parachute system, the parachute deployed, and the airplane descended under the canopy into the ocean. The pilot immediately exited the airplane and inflated an emergency life raft; he was recovered from the water a short time later. The airplane subsequently became submerged in the water and was not recovered. The reason for the pilot’s inability to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to the main fuel tanks could not be determined. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The pilot’s inability to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to the main fuel tanks for reasons that could not be determined because the airplane was ditched and not recovered.

On January 25, 2015, about 1644 Hawaiian standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, N7YT, ditched into the waters of the Pacific Ocean about 230 miles east of Maui, Hawaii. The airplane was registered to Cirrus Design Corporation, Duluth, Minnesota, and operated by The Flight Academy, Kirkland, Washington, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The commercial pilot, sole occupant of the airplane, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the repositioning flight. The cross-country flight originated from Tracy, California, about 0530, with an intended destination of Maui.

In a written statement to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that the flight was uneventful, and a previous fuel transfer from the front and aft auxiliary fuel tanks was successful as the flight was about 200 miles offshore. However, as the flight passed the BILLO intersection, the pilot opened the valves to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to the right wing fuel tank and did not observe any fuel flow. Upon verifying that the pressure line was open, he closed the valve to the aft tank and opened the valve for the forward auxiliary fuel tank, and observed that fuel immediately began flowing to the right wing fuel tank.

The pilot further stated that as he was well past the half-way point to Hawaii, he performed various maneuvers in an attempt to get fuel to flow from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to either the left or right main wing fuel tanks with no success. The pilot utilized a satellite phone and obtained further troubleshooting assistance from company personnel. After transferring fuel from the forward auxiliary fuel tank to both left and right wing fuel tanks, he estimated that he had about enough fuel onboard to be about 200 miles short of Hawaii.

The pilot stated that numerous attempts to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank to the main fuel tanks were unsuccessful, and siphoning fuel from the aft auxiliary to the forward auxiliary fuel tank was partially successful, however, eventually fuel would not transfer into either wing fuel tank.

While in contact with the United States Coast Guard, the pilot made the decision that he would eventually have to deploy the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The pilot was informed of a cruise ship near his location, and subsequently diverted towards that location. He further reported that once he was in the immediate vicinity of the cruise ship, he activated the CAPS and the parachute deployed. The airplane descended under the canopy into the waters of the Pacific Ocean. The pilot stated that he immediately exited the airplane and inflated an emergency life raft; he was extracted from the water a short time later.

The airplane became submerged within the water shortly thereafter. At the time of this report, there is no intention of recovering the wreckage.

FAA Flight Standards District Office: FAA Honolulu FSDO-13

CIRRUS DESIGN CORP:  http://registry.faa.gov/N7YT

NTSB Identification: WPR15LA089
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, January 25, 2015 in Maui, HI
Aircraft: CIRRUS SR22 - NO SERIES, registration: N7YT
Injuries: 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On January 25, 2015, about 1644 Hawaiian standard time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, N7YT, ditched into the waters of the Pacific Ocean about 230 miles east of Maui, Hawaii. The airplane was registered to Cirrus Design Corporation, Duluth, Minnesota, and operated by The Flight Academy, Kirkland, Washington, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The commercial pilot, sole occupant of the airplane, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the repositioning flight. The cross-country flight originated from Tracy, California, about 0530, with an intended destination of Maui. 

During a telephone interview with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge, the pilot reported that the flight was uneventful and a previous fuel transfer from the front and aft auxiliary fuel tanks was successful. However, as the airplane was about 900 miles from Hawaii, he was unable to transfer fuel from the aft auxiliary fuel tank. The pilot stated that numerous attempts to transfer fuel to the main fuel tanks were unsuccessful, and while in contact with the United States Coast Guard, he made the decision to deploy the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The pilot was informed of a cruise ship near his location and diverted towards their location. He further reported that once he was in the immediate vicinity of the cruise ship, he activated the CAPS and the parachute deployed. The airplane descended under canopy into the waters of the Pacific Ocean. The pilot stated that he immediately exited the airplane and inflated an emergency life raft and was extracted from the water about 30 to 40 minutes later. 

The airplane became submerged within the water shortly after the pilot egress. At this time, there is no intention to recover the aircraft.    

MEDIA RELEASE

HONOLULU – The Coast Guard is responding to a distress call from a single engine aircraft running out of fuel approximately 975 miles north of the Big Island Sunday.

At 12:30 p.m. the pilot contacted the Hawaii National Guard and reported his aircraft had approximately three hours of fuel remaining and he would be ditching 230 miles north east of Maui.

The Coast Guard has launched crews aboard an HC-130 Hercules airplane and an MH-65 Dolphin helicopter from Air Station Barbers Point.

As of 2:35 p.m. the aircraft was 529 miles north east of the Big Island.

The Hercules is expected to rendezvous with the plane around 3:20 p.m.

Pilots explain what happened when planes went down off Maui, Oahu

Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board will be traveling to Hawaii to find out what exactly happened when two planes went down in a span of a few hours Sunday.

Both were reported to have run out of fuel.

The first happened at 4:44 p.m. off Maui. The pilot, who was flying in from Tracy, Calif., ditched the plane and managed to get out on his own. He was picked up by a cruise ship en route to Lahaina.

Then, just after 6 p.m., a distress call was made by the pilot of a Cessna 172 flying from Kauai to Oahu. About 10 minutes later, his plane disappeared from radar and lost communication.

A U.S. Coast Guard helicopter located the plane about 11 miles off Oahu. All four people on board, including a one-year-old girl, were rescued and taken to the hospital in stable condition.

Experts KHON2 spoke with are scratching their heads as to why a plane going from Kauai to Oahu would run out of fuel, but they’re also praising the pilot for getting everybody out of the plane safely.

Hugs of relief were evident from passengers who just survived what must have been a terrifying ordeal. Three adults and a toddler had to be hoisted up to a Coast Guard helicopter after their single-engine Cessna was ditched in the ocean.

The aircraft’s owner, Reggie Perry, runs Barbers Point Flight School. He has nothing but high praise for the pilot.

“The fact that he was able to keep it all together, land the airplane and pull it off, where the plane never came apart and no one got hurt, that in itself was a miracle,” he said.

Perry says the pilot rented the plane and had flown from Kalaeloa to Kauai earlier that day. He says the pilot had learned to fly from his school and had only been doing so for about a year.

Pilot Clyde Kawasaki knows how hard it is to land a plane safely in the rough seas. He had to ditch his plane in the ocean over a year ago because of engine trouble, but he can’t understand why a plane ran out of fuel.

“You always try to make the flight as comfortable as possible for them and one of the ways you do that is you plan ahead and make sure that that issue of fuel does not come up. For me, it’s hard to conceive that you run out of gas,” he said.

Kawasaki says he can understand why the pilot flying from California ran out of fuel, because it was a much longer flight. In that case, Lue Morton deployed a parachute to land safely in the water.

A statement from The Flight Academy says Morton had spent several hours during the flight trying to troubleshoot a fuel system malfunction.

A cruise ship from Holland America coordinated with the Coast Guard to rescue him. Back on land in Maui, Morton was relieved and grateful.

“The coordination with Coast Guard and the coordination with Holland America has been more than impressive, so the entire crew has been great at helping me out in the situation,” Morton said.

When asked he felt, Morton said he was “glad to be with these guys to be out here.”

Story, video and comments:  http://khon2.com


http://registry.faa.gov/N903SR

NTSB Identification: WPR14FA091 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, January 09, 2014 in Pocatello, ID
Probable Cause Approval Date: 06/18/2015
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N903SR
Injuries: 2 Minor.

NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

The pilot reported that, at 17,000 ft mean sea level, the engine suddenly started vibrating severely and partially lost power. He declared an emergency and an air traffic controller provided vectors for an instrument approach into a nearby airport. The pilot stated that the vibrations increased in severity and available engine power was decreasing. The pilot adjusted the mixture and throttle to no effect; he did not cycle the magnetos because he didn’t want to risk losing engine power completely. After descending through the 2,000-ft broken cloud layer on the instrument approach, he determined that the airplane was not going to make it to the runway. At 1,000 ft above ground level, he deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System, which brought the airplane down into an open field. He and his passenger rapidly exited the airplane before it was dragged away by the parachute in a 30-knot wind. Engine data indicated that, 2 hours 56 minutes into the flight, the engine rpm started to fluctuate. Two minutes later, the cylinder head temperature (CHT) of the No. 6 cylinder increased and peaked at 331 degrees F; 7 minutes later, it had decreased to 248 degrees F. At this point, the CHT for the No. 3 cylinder increased to 315 degrees F. About 3 hours 13 minutes into the flight, the engine exhaust gas temperatures (EGT) of cylinder Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6 dropped off while the EGTs for cylinder Nos. 1 and 3 increased. 

Examination of the left and right magnetos revealed that the right magneto distributor drive gear had 10 teeth fractured off in the same gear sector, and the left magneto had 3 teeth broken in the same sector; all of the fracture surfaces on both gears exhibited crack arrest marks and river patterns consistent with progressive fracture. Based on the right magneto distributor gear damage, it is likely that the failure of the distributor drive gear teeth allowed the magneto distributor to stop rotating in proper firing order and allowed unsequenced repeated firing of the No. 6 cylinder and later the No. 3 cylinder, as reflected by the increase in CHT, which resulted in severe engine vibration and a partial loss of power. The unsequenced firing of the Nos. 6 and 3 cylinders also precipitated erratic power pulses through the engine that affected the left magneto distributor drive gear, which in turn initiated the left magneto distributor gear teeth failure. The pilot operating handbook lists the steps the pilot should take in the event of an engine partial power loss. Step seven of the engine partial power loss emergency procedures calls for the pilot to cycle through the left and right magnetos using the ignition switch. It is likely that, if the pilot had selected the left magneto after the initial indications of partial power loss and vibration, power could have been restored by isolating the right magneto and operating the engine entirely on the left magneto.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The distributor gear teeth failure of the right magneto that resulted in severe engine vibration and partial loss of engine power, which progressively led to the failure of the left magneto distributor drive gear teeth. Contributing to the airplane’s continued operation with the partial loss of engine power was the pilot’s failure to execute all steps in the engine partial power loss procedure.

HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

On January 9, 2014, at 1515 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22, N903SR, experienced severe engine vibrations and a partial loss of engine power during cruise flight near Pocatello, Idaho. The pilot executed a forced landing utilizing the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The private pilot and single passenger received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to, and operated by, Nylund Imports Incorporated, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Centennial Airport, Denver, Colorado, at 1153, and was destined for Sun Valley, Idaho.

The pilot reported that while passing Pocatello at 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the engine suddenly started vibrating severely in conjunction with a partial loss of power. He declared an emergency and Salt Lake Center provided vectors to the final approach course for the Pocatello instrument landing system (ILS) RWY 21 approach. The pilot stated that the vibrations increased in severity and available engine power was decreasing. The pilot adjusted the mixture and throttle to no effect. He did not switch between the two magnetos because he didn't want to risk losing engine power completely. After descending through the 2,000-foot broken cloud layer on the ILS approach, engine instruments indicated that only 20% power was being produced, and he determined that the airplane was not going to make it to the runway. At 1,000 feet above ground level (agl) he shut down the engine and deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), which brought the airplane down into an open field. He and his passenger rapidly egressed before the airplane was dragged away by the parachute in a 30-knot wind.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane issued December 28, 2003, and a third-class medical certificate issued January 30, 2012, with the limitation that he must have glasses available for near vision. The pilot reported having 2,159 total flight hours, with 2,046 hours in the accident airplane make and model, and 42 hours with in the previous 90 days.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The four-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane, serial number 2465, was manufactured in 2007. It was powered by a Continental Motors IO-550-N46B, 310-hp engine that had been modified with Tornado Alley turbonormalizing system by Cirrus and equipped with Hartzell model PHC-J3YFIN, 3-bladed composite constant speed propeller. Review of the airplane maintenance records show that an annual inspection was performed on December 13, 2013, at a total airframe and engine time of 850.3 hours. On September 2, 2010, at 496.2 engine hours, both magnetos were overhauled, and reinstalled on the engine.

Engine Failure Procedures

The SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, dictate the following for Engine Partial Power Loss.

"The following procedure provides guidance to isolate and correct some of the conditions contributing to a rough running engine of a partial power loss:

1. Air Conditioner – OFF
2. Fuel Pump – BOOST
Selecting BOOST on may clear the problem if vapor in the injection lines is the problem or if the engine-driven fuel pump has partially failed. The electric fuel pump will not provide sufficient fuel pressure to supply the engine if the engine-driven fuel pump completely fails.
3. Fuel Selector – SWITCH TANKS
Selecting the opposite fuel tank may resolve the problem if fuel starvation or contamination in one tank was the problem.
4. Mixture - CHECK appropriate for flight conditions
5. Power Lever – SWEEP. Sweep the Power Lever through the range as required to obtain smooth operation and required power.
6. Alternate Induction Air – ON
7. Ignition Switch – BOTH, L, then R. Cycling the ignition switch momentarily from BOTH to L and then R may help identify the problem. An obvious power loss in single ignition operation indicates magneto or spark plug trouble. If engine does not smooth out in several minutes, try a richer mixture setting. Return ignition to BOTH positions unless extreme roughness dictates the use of a single magneto.
8. Land as soon as practical."

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Primary Flight Display and Multi-Function Display Data

The Primary Flight Display (PFD) unit includes a solid state Air Data and Attitude Heading Reference System (ADAHRS) and displays aircraft flight data including altitude, airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, and heading. The PFD unit has external pitot-static inputs for altitude, airspeed, and vertical speed information. Each PFD contains two flash memory devices mounted on a riser card. The flash memory stores information the PFD unit uses to generate the various PFD displays. Additionally, the PFD has a data logging function which is used by the manufacturer for maintenance and diagnostics.

The Multi-Function Display (MFD) unit is able to display checklists, terrain/map information, approach chart information, and other aircraft/operational information depending on the specific configuration and options that are installed. One of the options available is a display of comprehensive engine monitoring and performance data.

Based on the data downloaded from the PFD & MFD the following event timeline was established.

Time(approx) Elapsed Time Event
11:44:24 0:00 Engine Start
11:53:06 0:08:42 Take Off
14:38:30 2:54:06 Pressure alt starts to decrease (descent starts)
14:41:18 2:56:54 RPM starts to decrease/fluctuate
14:42:00 2:57:36 Increase fuel flow - pilot manipulates the mixture, then manipulates the throttle indicated by RPM changes
14:42:24 2:58:00 CHT* in No. 6 Cyl starts to trend upward
14:44:12 2:59:42 CHT in No. 6 Cyl Peaks 331° F
14:47:00 3:02:36 CHT No. 6 decreases to ~280°F
14:51:00 3:06:36 CHT No. 6 starts to trend upward ~248°F
14:52:18 3:07:54 CHT No. 3 starts to trend upward ~250°F
14:56:30 3:12:06 CHT No. 3 increases above the average peaking at~315°F
14:58:00 3:13:36 EGT** 2,4,5,6, drop off. EGT 1 & 3 increase.

* CHT- cylinder head temperature
**EGT - exhaust gas temperature

The full data download and NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory report are located in the official docket of this investigation.

Engine Examination

On April 15, 2014, the engine was examined at Continental Motors, Inc, under the supervision of the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) with technical representatives from Continental Motors, Cirrus Aircraft, and Tornado Alley.

The engine was removed from the shipping crate and placed on an engine stand for examination. The turbochargers and associated hardware had been removed and placed in the shipping container for shipping. The engine was visually examined and the crankshaft was rotated to verify engine drive train continuity. During the crankshaft rotation both magneto drives were observed through the pressurization port on the magneto housing. Both distributor gears were not moving in either magneto during the crankshaft rotation. The engine driven magneto metal drive gear interfaces with the light weight nylon composite distributor gear during operation. It was noted that the No. 3 ignition leads were producing a spark after the No. 1 ignition leads, indicating an improper firing order. The magnetos were removed for further examination. Examination of the magneto distributor gears revealed that the nylon composite gear teeth, 10 teeth on the right magneto and 3 teeth on the left magneto, had broken off.

The fractured distributor gear teeth were clocked on an exemplary distributor gear in an exemplary magneto. The magneto drive shaft was rotated in a clockwise direction until the area of the separated teeth aligned with the drive gear. Doing so revealed that the separated gear teeth on the right magneto would have correlated to an area that placed the distributor gear electrode between the #6 and #3 cylinders' distributor block electrodes. Doing so on the left magneto revealed that the separated gear teeth would have correlated to an area that placed the distributor gear electrode between the #1 and #6 cylinders' distributor block electrodes.

New magnetos were placed on the engine and the turbocharger system reinstalled. The engine was then successfully test run to full power in a test cell, and no anomalies were noted.

Magneto Distributor Gear Examination

The left and right nylon magneto distributor drive gears and separated teeth were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further investigation. The magneto distributor had undergone 860.4 hours at the time of the accident. The last magneto inspection was performed at 496.2 hours on September 2, 2009. The required inspection interval is 500 hours.

Three of the teeth on the left gear had fractured off. The fracture surfaces of all three broken gear teeth exhibited crack arrest marks and radial river patterns that were consistent with progressive failure. All three fracture surfaces exhibited features consistent with crack propagation in the same direction.

Examination of the right gear showed 10 of the teeth had fractured. Similar to the left gear, the fracture surfaces of the right gear exhibited features consistent with progressive cracking. The teeth fractures generally progressed circumferentially away from a central point on the gear, as opposed to all in one direction. In addition, there was a 0.5-inch radial crack present on one of the tooth fracture surfaces. Similar to the left gear, all of the fracture surfaces on the right gear exhibited crack arrest marks and river patterns consistent with a progressive fracture. The fracture surfaces of the right gear were sectioned and gold sputter-coated to facilitate examination in a scanning electron microscope (SEM). The initiation region of the fracture was generally flat and smoother than the rest of the fracture surface. There were no material defects noted at the crack initiation site that might have led to premature failure.

The full NTSB Materials Laboratory report is available in the official docket of this investigation.
  
NTSB Identification: WPR14FA091 
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Thursday, January 09, 2014 in Pocatello, ID
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N903SR
Injuries: 2 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On January 9, 2014, at 1512 mountain standard time, a Cirrus SR22, N903SR, experienced severe engine vibrations and a partial loss of engine power during cruise flight near Pocatello, Idaho. The pilot executed a force landing utilizing the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). The private pilot and single passenger received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to, and operated by, Nylund Imports Incorporated, under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Centennial Airport, Denver, Colorado, about 1200, and was destined for Sun Valley, Idaho.

The pilot reported that while passing Pocatello at 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the engine suddenly started vibrating severely in conjunction with a partial loss of power. He declared an emergency and Salt Lake Center provided vectors to the final approach course for the Pocatello instrument landing system (ILS) RWY 21. The pilot stated that the vibrations increased in severity and available engine power was decreasing. After descending through the 2,000-foot broken cloud layer on the ILS, engine instruments indicated that only 20% power was being produced, and he determined that the airplane was not going to make it to the runway. At 1,000 feet above ground level (agl) he deployed the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS), which brought the airplane down into an open field. He and his passenger rapidly egressed before the airplane was dragged away by the parachute in a 30-knot wind.


http://registry.faa.gov/N450TX

NTSB Identification: ERA14LA086
 14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Saturday, January 04, 2014 in Buckhannon, WV
Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22, registration: N450TX
Injuries: 1 Minor.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.

On January 4, 2014 about 1735 eastern standard time, a Cirrus SR22, N450TX, was substantially damaged after the pilot deployed its Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) and impacted a motor vehicle and then terrain in Buckhannon, West Virginia. The private pilot received minor injuries. The flight departed from Donegal Springs Airpark (N71) Marietta, Pennsylvania, about 1405, destined for Upshur County Regional Airport (W22), Buckhannon, West Virginia. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight, conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to the pilot, he departed N71, around 1405. About 10 miles from W22, the pilot called in on the UNICOM frequency, and verified the weather conditions. He was advised that there was no aircraft in the traffic pattern, so he opted for a straight in approach to runway 29.

About 5 miles from touchdown, he was at an approach speed of approximately 100 knots indicated airspeed. He performed his prelanding checklist. Both fuel tanks had approximately 25 gallons of fuel in them and he verified that the fuel selector was on fullest tank. He verified that the fuel boost pump was on, lowered the wing flaps to 50 percent, and set the mixture to about 60 percent. He then made a final approach call around 4 miles from touchdown, and verified the airport conditions on UNICOM once again.

Approximately 3 miles from the threshold of runway 29, at 400 to 500 feet above ground level, he increased throttle to compensate for the normal airspeed loss on final approach. To his surprise, nothing happened. He was expecting to hear a pitch change, feel a subtle change in vibration, and see his airspeed stabilize but, none of those events occurred.

He moved his hand in a manner to manipulate both throttle and mixture at the same time and increased both to maximum. Again, no response in engine noise, vibration, or gain in airspeed occurred.

By now the indicated airspeed had decayed to below 80 knots. Knowing that he was just at, or just below, the published minimums for the CAPS, without hesitation he reached for the red handle with my right hand while maintaining control of the airplane with his left hand as he deployed the CAPS and transmitted a "Mayday" call over the radio. After the CAPS was deployed, all he had time to do was to tighten his restraint prior to impact. After impact he shutdown the airplane's systems, and exited the airplane.

Postaccident examination of the accident site and airplane by a Federal Aviation Administration Inspector revealed that during the impact sequence, the airplane first struck a pickup truck, then terrain, and sustained substantial damage prior to coming to rest. The left main landing gear had penetrated the bottom of the left wing and left main fuel tank, the nose landing gear had separated from the airplane, two of the blades on the four-bladed propeller were bent back, the right wing flap was bent back on the outboard portion, and the fuselage was damaged from the CAPS deployment.

The wreckage was retained by the NTSB for further examination.



 Cirrus SR22, N450TX: Accident occurred January 04, 2014 in Buckhannon, West Virginia


 Cirrus SR22, N450TX: Accident occurred January 04, 2014 in Buckhannon, West Virginia




BUCKHANNON -  Authorities were called to the scene of a small plane crash in Upshur County Saturday night.

It happened just after 5:30 p.m. on Brushy Fork Road outside of Buckhannon.

The Upshur County Sheriff's Department said James Meadows, 30, of Hendersonville, Tennessee was flying a Cirrus SR 22 aircraft to Pennsylvania when he heard a bang and his engine failed.

The plane was equipped with a Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) which Meadows deployed, according to deputies.

The plane came down and struck a truck driven by Billy King, 42,  that was passing by on Brushy Fork Road. The plane ended up on Brushy Fork Road between Jenkins Ford and Buckhannon Toyota.

Meadows and King are both uninjured.

"I must have an angel looking over me somehow," said King of the close call. "I've been everywhere, but never had anything like this happen to me."

King moved from Greenbrier County, and lives in Upshur County. King was on his way to work in Jane Lew when the accident happened.

"I didn't see nothing, all I heard was a boom, and I thought it was one of those poles giving away because of the cold, I looked around and seen this plane and said oh my," King said.

"He called me, and I said oh lord what's going on? A plane had landed on my truck," said Delvia King, Billy's wife. "And I said a plane landed your truck? He said, there's a plane that hit my truck seriously."

The Buckhannon Volunteer Fire Department and West Virginia State Police assisted at the scene.

The plane was following a second plane, a Grumman aircraft, which was preparing to land at the Upshur County Regional Airport to refuel.

Deputies said the Cirrus SR22 will be taken to the Upshur County Regional Airport so the FAA can continue to investigate.



   


 
Two people aboard a single-engine airplane that made an emergency landing southwest of the Fort Hall townsite about 3 p.m. Thursday received minor injuries and were reportedly treated in an ambulance at the scene. They were not transported to a hospital.

The plane did snap off a power pole as it came down in a field near Rio Vista and North Philbin Road within 100 yards of a home. Power was out to residents in the area for a couple of hours before being restored by Idaho Power.

 The plane didn’t actually make a crash landing, it deployed an emergency parachute that allowed it descend into the field.

Emergency personnel from the Fort Hall Police and Bannock County Sheriff’s office closed off the area because the downed aircraft continued to move across the field in the high winds and posed the threat of downing more power lines. A resident of the area said he watched a parachute from the airplane come loose and blow in the wind until it went out of sight.

 Fort Hall authorities said the chute became tangled in power lines for a short period of time.

Bannock County Sheriff Lorin Nielsen said the pilot of the airplane radioed the Pocatello Regional Airport tower about 3 p.m. and said as he was preparing an approach to land because his plane began having engine trouble. The Pocatello Fire Department at the airport scrambled in preparation for an emergency landing, but the plane went down in a field within the boundaries of the Fort Hall Indian Reservation several miles from any runways.


The fuselage of the plane seemed to be broken nearly in half behind the cockpit and passenger seats. The wings were severely damaged.

The scene remained off limits while authorities waited for investigators from the Federal Aviation Administration to arrive and investigate the crash site.


Source:   http://www.idahostatejournal.com



Cirrus SR22 G3,  N903SR,   Nylund Imports Inc: Accident occurred January 09, 2014 in Pocatello, Idaho



Cirrus SR22 G3,  N903SR,   Nylund Imports Inc: Accident occurred January 09, 2014 in Pocatello, Idaho 


Emergency responders are on the scene of a plane crash in Bannock County. 

A Journal reporter at the scene says that the fuselage of the plane is in a field about a mile from the intersection of Philbin and Ballard roads. The tail of the aircraft is broken off and the wings are heavily damaged. Power lines are broken in the area and Idaho Power has been notified.

Earlier reports indicate that there were two people on the plane and that neither are seriously injured.

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes news release:

Emergency landing for aircraft on reservation

 FORT HALL —  At 3:20PM, Department of Public Safety sent notification that Fort Hall EMS is responding to a small aircraft that landed in a field off of Rio Vista road in Fort Hall.

 There are no fatalities to report. It is reported that two individuals are outside of the aircraft and are being taken to the hospital. Condition of the individuals was not available at time of report.

 The aircraft is not secure and high winds are moving the aircraft through the field.  There is concern of potential impact to Idaho Power, power lines.  A power line has already been broken in half.  There also appears to be a parachute entangled in the power lines that is being further investigated.

 According to Tribal Transportation, roads in the intersection areas of Ballard and Hawthorn and Ballard and Philbin and surrounding areas are closed down.  No traffic is being allowed in the area.  They encourage all vehicles to stay out of the area and seek alternate routes until further advised.

 Fort Hall Responders are working with Pocatello resources at this time.

 Further update will be provided as it is received by the Tribes Department of Public Safety.



Source:   http://www.idahostatejournal.com

A small aircraft crashed and broke apart in a field on the Shoshone-Bannock reservation on Thursday January 9, prompting warnings from public safety officials as the plane was buffeted about in high winds.

“The aircraft is not secure and high winds are moving the aircraft through the field,” the tribes’ Department of Public Safety said in a statement. “There is concern of potential impact to Idaho Power, power lines.  A power line has already been broken in half. There also appears to be a parachute entangled in the power lines that is being further investigated.”

No one was killed in the accident but “two individuals are outside of the aircraft and are being taken to the hospital,” the statement said. Their condition was not available.

The pilot reported engine problems before the plane went down, according to KPVI News 6. The plane took out a power line on the way down, the television station said. 

The plane landed at 3:20 p.m. in a field off of Rio Vista road in Fort Hall, the public safety department said, adding that EMS personnel were responding. Roads in the intersection areas of Ballard and Hawthorn and Ballard and Philbin and surrounding areas were closed down, the Tribal Transportation department said in the release.

“No traffic is being allowed in the area,” the statement said. “They encourage all vehicles to stay out of the area and seek alternate routes until further advised.”

The Idaho State Journal reported that the airplane’s tail was snapped off and the wings are “heavily damaged” in the plane, whose fuselage lay in a field about a mile from an intersection. Power lines were broken, and Idaho Power had been notified. The Journal also said that the two people aboard did not appear to be seriously injured.

Fort Hall responders and Pocatello resources were working together, and the Tribes Department of Public Safety promised more updates as events unfold. 

Read more at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com 
 


A pilot and passenger walked away from a plane crash after engine problems caused the aircraft to go down in a field on the Fort Hall Reservation.

Law enforcement officers from Bannock County, Pocatello and Fort Hall along with the Chubbuck Fire Department and paramedics rushed to the scene of the crash around 3:00 p.m., Thursday.

The pilot was communicating with the tower before the plane went down.  He reported engine trouble about five miles out from the Pocatello regional airport.  The plane eventually came down along Philbin Road between Reservation and Ballard Roads.

Two people were on board at the time of the crash.  Both were able to get out of the plane safely after landing.  They were treated for minor injuries at the scene but not admitted to the hospital as previously reported.

Law enforcement has blocked roads in the area over concerns that high winds are pushing the unsecure plane through a field.

The plane also made contact and damaged a power pole at the time it went down.  Law enforcement is waiting for Idaho Power to come out and repair the line.